The opinion
cAsTRaNUigthior ARKANSAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT —NOV' 2.8202
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 7a /DDWNS, CLERK
DELTA DIVISION By: DEP CLERK
MATTHEW L. STASZAK PETITIONER
Reg. #24227-171
V. No. 2:21-cv-00047-JTR
JOHN P. YATES, Warden
FCI-Low, Forrest City, Arkansas RESPONDENT
ORDER OF DISMISSAL!
Pending before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed by Petitioner, Matthew L. Staszak (“Staszak”), who was incarcerated
at the Forrest City, Arkansas, Federal Correctional Institution when he filed his
Petition. Doc. 1. In the Petition, Staszak challenges his federal conviction, pursuant
to a guilty plea, to Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, two counts of Travel with Intent
to engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, and Failure to Appear.” United States v. Staszak,
4:12-CR-40064-JPG (S.D.Ill., judgment entered Feb. 5, 2014)(“Staszak I’).
| The parties consented in writing to allow a United States Magistrate Judge to exercise
jurisdiction over this case and conduct all proceedings, including the entry of a final judgment.
Doe. 25.
2 On or about October 4, 2012, Staszak cut his electronic monitor and absconded while on
pretrial release, leading to the Failure to Appear conviction. Staszak, 4:12-CR-40064-JPG, Docs.
39, 40, 41, & 69. Staszak claimed he was going to turn himself in, but instead was caught in a bar
on June 2, 2013. Doc. 1, pp. 209-210. While “Staszak does not challenge” his conviction for
Failure to Appear, he still requests this Court to vacate his conviction. Doc. J, p. 2.
I. Introduction
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand the relevant facts giving
rise to Staszak’s collateral attack on his federal conviction.
On August 5, 2013, Staszak pled guilty to Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, two
counts of Travel with Intent to engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, and Failure to
Appear. Staszak I, Docs. 68, 69, & 70. On February 7, 2014, Staszak was sentenced
to imprisonment for 240 months. Staszak I, Docs. 82 & 85.° He did not file a direct
appeal challenging either his conviction or sentence. By accepting the plea
agreement, Staszak understood that he was waving any appeal or collateral attack
rights. Staszak I, Doc. 97, p. 12.
On January 8, 2015, Staszak filed a § 2255 Motion to Vacate his Sentence.
Staszak v. United States, 3:15-CV-00020-JPG (S.D.Ill., dismissed Feb. 21, 2020)
(“Staszak IT’). He raised fourteen grounds for relief and requested an evidentiary
hearing. Staszak IT, Docs. 1, 6, & 31. After multiple evidentiary hearings (Staszak II,
Docs. 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 97, 99, 100, 101), and consideration of the voluminous
record and filings, the sentencing court dismissed Staszak’s § 2255 motion (Staszak
IT, Doc. 134), and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Id. at p. 37.
3 Prior to imposition of sentence, Staszak and his attorney agreed that 300 months’
imprisonment (five years more than he actually received) was an appropriate sentence. Staszak I,
Docs. 70, 97, & 98.
Staszak appealed the denial of § 2255 relief to the Seventh Circuit. On
December 3, 2020, the Court affirmed the denial of Staszak’s § 2255 Motion and
found that Staszak had failed to make a substantial showing that any of his
constitutional rights were violated. Staszak II, Doc. 144. Thereafter, Staszak did not
request permission from the Seventh Circuit to file a Second or Successive § 2255
Motion.
Instead, on May 7, 2021, Staszak initiated this § 2241 habeas action and
sought to use this proceeding to relitigate the same claims that he unsuccessfully
raised in the § 2255 proceeding. Doc. J. Staszak significantly delayed the resolution
of his habeas claims by burdening the Court with hundreds of pages of irrelevant
“evidence”, much of which was devoted to disparaging the Victim and her mother.*
In addition to his 233-page Petition (Doc. 1), Staszak filed an Affidavit Exhibit B
(Doc. 2), a Notice (Doc. 3), “Additional Newly Discovered Evidence” (Verizon
Wireless bill) (Doc. 4), Affidavit Exhibits O and P (Doc. 6), Affidavits of Danny
* Staszak seeks to blame the then-minor Victim for all of his legal problems based on her
alleged sexual promiscuity. His submissions to the Court leave no doubt about his clear animus
toward the Victim and her mother. Despite the sentencing Court in Staszak II noting “it would be
virtually impossible to get evidence of [the Victim’s] prior sexual conduct admitted,” Staszak still
devoted a significant portion of his numerous filings in this proceeding to disparaging the minor
Victim.
The allegedly “newly discovered evidence” of the Victim’s supposed sexual promiscuity
is wholly irrelevant. It does not matter how many other people the minor Victim allegedly had sex
with, or how horrible her mother allegedly is. It simply does not provide a defense for Staszak,
who admitted under oath, during his guilty plea colloquy, that he: filmed himself having
intercourse with the Victim, someone he knew was a minor; repeatedly traveled interstate to have
additional sexual encounters with the minor Victim; and later absconded as a fugitive from justice.
Baxter and Joseph Devlin (Doc. 7), a Petition for Injunction (Doc. 15), another
“Additional Newly Discovered Evidence” (USAA credit card statement) (Doc. 17),
Affidavit Exhibit Q (Docs. 18), Affidavit Exhibit S (Doc. 19), Affidavit Exhibit N
(Doc. 21), multiple additional Affidavits (Docs. 22 & 23), a 262-page response to
the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26), Supplements to his Response (Docs. 27 & 28), a
Notice regarding prison visitation (Doc. 29), a Motion for Expedited Ruling (Doc.
30), Notices regarding prison recreational activities and visitation (Docs. 31, 32, &
33), an Addendum and Complaint against the sentencing judge (Doc. 34), and
extensive correspondence (Jn Re Correspondence, 2:21-cv-00047-JTR).
In his § 2241 habeas Petition, Staszak essentially raises the same issues that
were rejected by the sentencing court and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in his §
2255 proceeding. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Staszak’s § 2241 Petition. Doc.
24. Staszak has filed a Response opposing Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Docs.
26, 27, & 28.
For the reasons explained below, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Staszak’s § 2241 habeas Petition. Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
II. Discussion
Jurisdiction over a federal prisoner’s collateral attack on his conviction or
sentence is governed by the well-recognized distinction between claims that attack
the validity of a federal conviction or sentence, and claims that challenge the
execution of a federal sentence. In his § 2241 habeas Petition, Staszak clearly is
challenging the validity of his federal conviction and sentence, not the execution of
his federal sentence.° Doc. 1.
As a general rule, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction and
sentence must be raised in a motion to vacate filed in the sentencing court under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, rather than by a habeas petition filed in the court of incarceration
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Lopez-Lopez v. Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010);
Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004). Because a § 2255 motion
attacks the validity of the conviction or sentence, it is “a further step in the movant’s
criminal case,” and subject matter jurisdiction lies with the court which convicted
> Staszak strenuously but erroneously argues that he “is NOT challenging the ‘VALIDITY’
of his sentence” but instead only the execution of his sentence. Doc. 26, p. 3. Under Staszak’s
tortured logic, he is asking this Court only to strike the Second Superseding Indictment (something
that inherently would also invalidate his conviction and sentence) because it was the basis for the
“execution” of his sentence. Jd. Obviously, any challenge by a prisoner to the validity of the
charging Indictment or Superseding Indictment is also a direct challenge to the validity of his
underlying conviction and sentence. In contrast, a challenge to the execution of a sentence relates
to much different and far narrower matters limited to such things as calculation errors in the length
of a sentence, loss of good time credits, or the terms of a prison restitution plan. Matheny v.
Morrison, 307 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002).
and sentenced the federal prisoner. DeSimone v. Lacy, 805 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir.
1986); Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1983).
A limited exception to this rule is found in the “savings clause” of § 2255(e),
which permits a federal court in the district of incarceration to entertain a § 2241
habeas petition challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence, but only if the
remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003). Stated differently,
the court of incarceration has subject matter jurisdiction over a collateral attack on a
conviction or sentence rendered by another district court only if the remedies in the
sentencing district are inadequate or ineffective. A petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Lopez-Lopez, 590
F.3d at 907; Hill, 349 F.3d at 1091.
Staszak contends that this Court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
his § 2241 habeas Petition because he “exhausted all other remedies pertaining to
his previous 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 Motion.” Doc. 1, p. 3. This contention in no
way entitles Staszak to the benefit of the “savings clause” in § 2255(e). For Staszak
to pursue a collateral attack on his federal conviction under § 2241, “more is required
than demonstrating that there is a procedural barrier to bringing a § 2255 motion.”
United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). A § 2255 motion is not
“inadequate or ineffective” because: (1) “§ 2255 relief has already been denied;” (2)
the “petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or successive § 2255
motion;” (3) “a second or successive § 2255 motion has been dismissed”; or (4) the
“petitioner has allowed the one year statute of limitations and/or grace period to
expire.” Id.
Staszak argues he received “a ‘limited’ evidentiary hearing” on his previous
§ 2255 Motion. Doc. 1, p. 3. This is true only in the sense that the hearings were
properly “limited” to relevant issues. Over a period of five years, the sentencing
court held multiple evidentiary hearings to allow Staszak to present evidence in
support of his § 2255 Motion. Staszak II, Docs. 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 97, 99, 100,
101. Staszak presented, and the sentencing court considered, thousands of pages of
evidence.
After thoroughly considering the evidence, the sentencing court found that
Staszak’s sworn statements during his plea colloquy, his waiver of his right to file a
§ 2255 motion, and his voluntary guilty plea all combined to completely foreclose §
2255 relief. Staszak II, Doc. 134, pp. 18-20. Finally, the sentencing court also
concluded that Staszak’s claims failed on the merits.
The sentencing court also addressed and rejected each of Staszak’s claims.
For example, the court found a good faith investigation by federal law enforcement
revealed “evidence suggesting [Staszak’s] parents aided him in becoming and/or
remaining a fugitive from justice.” Accordingly, the court rejected Staszak’s claim
that he was induced to plead guilty based on threats that, if he did not, his family
would be prosecuted for aiding and abetting. Staszak II, Doc. 134, pp. 25-26. The
sentencing court also found that Staszak’s statements admitting that he created and
subsequently destroyed a sexually explicit video on his cell phone, of the minor
Victim, along with his sworn admission of that conduct, were sufficient evidence to
support his plea to the charge of Sexual Exploitation of a Minor. Staszak II, Doc.
134, pp. 26-29. Finally, even if Staszak was correct that he did not commit a federal
crime because he had sex with the victim when she was 16 years old (instead of 15
years old), the evidence showed that Staszak had begun the relevant criminal act,
interstate travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct, while the victim was 15 years
old. Staszak IT, Doc. 134, p. 29.
The fact that Staszak may have had “other reasons” for interstate travel,
besides engaging in sexual conduct with the minor Victim, is wholly irrelevant. All
that was required, as a matter of law, to prove Staszak’s guilt was evidence that “a
dominant purpose, not necessarily the dominant or primary purpose” for his
interstate travel “was to have illicit sexual conduct with a minor.” Staszak II, Doc.
134, p. 34.
The court also pointed out that many of Staszak’s allegations of misconduct
by his attorney never happened. Staszak I, Doc. 134, p. 31. Staszak failed to provide
any support for claims of exculpatory evidence, that his attorney failed to introduce
or use. Staszak IT, Doc. 134, p. 32. Further, the court found the “credible evidence”
showed Staszak’s attorney “did everything competent counsel would do.” Staszak
IT, Doc. 134, pp. 34-36. Finally, the court found that in light of the “strong evidence
against Staszak that exposed him to 100 years in prison,”® Staszak’s attorney
produced “an outstanding result that well exceeded mere competent representation.”
Staszak II, Doc. 134, p. 36.
In his § 2241 habeas Petition, Staszak requests this Court to reverse the
thorough, well-reasoned findings of the sentencing court, and also disregard the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ finding of “no substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” Staszak II, Doc. 144-1. Nothing in § 2255’s “savings
clause” authorizes this Court to exercise such far ranging subject matter jurisdiction
under § 2241.
Finally, Staszak argues this Court may address any claims of actual innocence
that he failed to present in his § 2255 Motion. Doc. J, p. 3. The basis for all of his
actual innocence claims were, for the most part, included in his previous proceedings
and rejected in Staszak IT. Staszak had many opportunities to supplement his § 2255
Motion with additional claims and evidence between the original filing of his § 2255
Motion in 2015, and the sentencing Court’s dismissal of that Motion on February
6 This evidence included overhears of Staszak’s own conversations with the minor Victim;
transcripts of sexually graphic Facebook chats with the minor Victim; and statements he made to
law enforcement before his arrest.
21, 2020. The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the “savings clause” may not
be used to raise an issue under § 2241 which could have been, or actually was, raised
in a § 2255 motion in the sentencing district. Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907; Hill,
349 F.3d at 1092; Nichols v. Symmes, 553 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 2009). Staszak has
not shown that any of his claims of actual innocence raised in his § 2241 Petition
arose after the conclusion of his § 2255 proceeding in February 2020.
Staszak also argues he has “newly discovered evidence” showing his actual
innocence. However, all Staszak relies on to support this claim are his own
conclusory assertions, along with irrelevant evidence related to arguments the
sentencing court rejected because they had no bearing on his actual innocence or the
outcome of his case.
The actual innocence exception requires a habeas petitioner to come forward
with “new reliable evidence” which was “not available at trial through the exercise
of due diligence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). To
qualify as “newly discovered evidence,” it must be “material” and sufficiently
probative to likely produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted. English v. United
States, 998 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1993). In this case, Staszak admitted under oath
that he had a sexual relationship with the minor Victim. He also stipulated that he
produced an illicit video of him having sex with the minor Victim. Staszak I, Doc.
69. Staszak testified he met the minor Victim’s mother first, then mailed the minor
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Victim a cellular phone. Doc. 1, p. 211. He knew the Victim was underage, but
continued to have sexual contact with her. Doc. 1, pp. 212-213. He now, almost a
decade later, claims receipts for his cell phone purchase are sufficient to prove that
he did not do any of the things he admitted doing, multiple times, under penalty of
perjury. The “receipts” in the record are not “new evidence,” and come nowhere
close to establishing that Staszak is actually innocent.
Finally, Staszak’s obvious lack of diligence in locating the receipts forecloses
habeas relief. According to Staszak, the receipts for his cell phone were located in
“sealed boxes” in his father’s possession and they were “unavailable” to him before
he filed this habeas action. Doc. 26, 27, & 28. However, Staszak goes on to make it
clear that what made those documents “unavailable” to him was the fact he “did not
recall or remember those receipts” until after he filed this habeas action. Doc. 26, p.
4. A habeas petitioner’s failure to remember the existence of documents that he only
later recalls does not make those document “unavailable” or cause them to qualify
as “new evidence.”
At the time Staszak entered his guilty plea, he potentially faced 100 years in
prison. With so much at stake, even a miniscule amount of diligence would have
motivated a reasonable person to look in boxes of personal possessions from the
relevant time period for potential evidence, even if those receipts were in boxes that
were located at the home of a parent. Staszak clearly could have accessed the
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property himself while on pretrial release or in the months he was a fugitive from
justice. He could have asked his father to access the property in 2012 (the year of his
arrest), 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020. The fact that Staszak is
only now presenting this so-called “new evidence” strongly suggests just how little
evidentiary value it has. Further, if Staszak had read the sentencing court’s orders in
his § 2255 proceeding, he would know this “evidence” has already been determined
to be irrelevant.
Finally, assuming arguendo that Staszak could identify some support for his
actual innocence claim, he fails to explain why he lacked the opportunity to present
that claim to the court in which he was convicted and sentenced. See Abdullah v.
Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2004) (even if a petitioner with a viable claim
of actual innocence seeks to prove § 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective” to test the
legality of his conviction, he cannot use § 2241 to present his claims unless “the
petitioner had not had an earlier procedural opportunity to raise the claim.”). All of
Staszak’s challenges to his conviction, including the current claims of actual
innocence, could have been raised in Staszak’s lengthy § 2255 proceeding that
remained open from 2015 to 2020.
Staszak has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that his § 2255 remedy,
which he unsuccessfully pursued in Staszak II, was “inadequate or ineffective.”
Because this gateway requirement has not been satisfied, this Court cannot exercise
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subject matter jurisdiction over Staszak’s § 2241 challenge to the validity of his
conviction and sentence.
III. Conclusion
The evidence Staszak attempts to rely on falls far short of making even a
colorable showing that he is actually innocent. He also has not come close to meeting
the exception in the “savings clause” found in § 2255(e). Further, even if Staszak
had presented meritorious claims, with some evidentiary support, this Court would
still lack subject matter jurisdiction to provide the relief requested. Finally, for
Staszak to properly proceed with any of these claims he must first receive
authorization from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Only then can a
district court consider the claims in his § 2241 habeas Petition. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(h) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2244).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 24) be GRANTED. Petitioner Matthew L. Staszak’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, is DISMISSED, without prejudice. All pending motions are
DENIED as moot.
Dated this 23ttiay of November, 2021.
—raras a esac Sear
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