Opinion

Fritts v. Payne

Court
District Court, E.D. Arkansas
Filed
Sep 4, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.0%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

BRANDON FRITTS PLAINTIFF

#1084818

No: 5:16-cv-141-DPM

DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Division

of Correction;* DALE REED, Deputy Director,

ADC; RANDY WATSON, Warden, Varner/

SuperMax; FLORIA WASHINGTON,

Classification Officer, Varner SuperMax;

CURTIS MEINZER, Deputy Warden, Varner

SuperMax; MOSES JACKSON, Deputy Warden,

Varner SuperMax; JEREMY ANDREWS, Deputy

Warden, Varner SuperMax; BILLY INMAN,

Deputy Warden, Varner SuperMax; and CHRIS

BUDNIK, Deputy Warden, Varner SuperMax DEFENDANTS

ORDER

On de novo review, the Court partly adopts and partly declines the

Magistrate Judge’s careful and thorough recommendation, Doc. 141,

and overrules Fritts’s objections, Doc. 144. FED. R. CIv. P. 72(b)(3).

The Court disagrees on a key point. Fritts was in administrative

segregation for four years and four months—some of that time for

punitive purposes, but most of it not. A stay of that length may well

* Dexter Payne has replaced Wendy Kelly as the Director of what is

now known as the Arkansas Division of Correction. The Court directs

the Clerk to amend the docket. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

amount to an atypical and significant hardship requiring due process

protections. The Court therefore declines the slice of the

recommendation concluding otherwise. Doc. 141 at 54. The Court

agrees with the Magistrate Judge, though, that the Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity because the law on that point is not

clearly established and was not at the time of the alleged violation.

A clearly established right “must be settled law, which means it is

dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of

persuasive authority[.]” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,

589-90 (2018) (quotations omitted). The law must be “particularized

to the facts of the case,” and “existing precedent must have placed the

. . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Morgan v. Robinson,

920 F.3d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted).

There is no controlling authority or robust consensus that four

years in administrative segregation implicates due process. For

example, Eighth Circuit cases are at poles: The Court of Appeals has

found no liberty interest implicated by being in administrative

segregation for relatively short periods of two years or so. Rahman X

v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2002). At the other end, the Court of

Appeals has held that more than a decade in administrative segregation

does trigger due process protections. E.g., Williams v. Norris, 277 F.

App’x 647, 648 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam). But there’s a

«Fa

gray area between the twenty-six months in Rahman X and the twelve

years in Williams. Without any guidance in that middle, the contours

of the due process right were too uncertain to give officials fair warning

here that their conduct might be unconstitutional. Sok Kong Trustee for

Map Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 992 (8th Cir. 2020). The

Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Fritts’s due

process claim.

Fritts argues hard that Chestang v. Varner Super Max clearly

established that a four-year stint in administrative segregation

implicates a liberty interest. 496 F. App’x 684 (8th Cir. 2013)

(unpublished per curiam). As the Magistrate Judge noted, though, the

difference in procedural posture matters: it’s easier to plead an

atypical and significant hardship than it is to prove one. Fritts’s case

is beyond the pleadings. Further, like Williams, Chestang is an

unpublished per curiam decision. Itisnot precedent. EIGHTH CIRCUIT

LOCAL RULE 32.1A. That decision therefore “provides little, if any,

support for imposing liability based on clearly established law[.]”

Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 925 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014).

Fritts also objects to the Court considering qualified immunity at

all. The Defendants pleaded qualified immunity and invoked it in

passing in their motion for summary judgment. Doc. 110at1. They

did not flesh it out in their brief. Rather than arguing that the law

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wasn’ t clearly established, they focused their brief on arguing that there

was no liberty interest and that Fritts received the process he was due.

Doc. 109 at 5-36. The Magistrate Judge addressed qualified immunity,

however, and this Court therefore gave both sides an opportunity to be

heard on whether the right at issue was clearly established. The Court

is aware of no authority —and Fritts cites none—holding that a Court

abuses its discretion in considering an argument in_ these

circumstances. Fritts’s objection is therefore overruled.

The Court adopts the remainder of the recommendation. The

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Fritts’s due process

claim; and Fritts’s Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment claims

fail on the merits. The motion for summary judgment, Doc. 107, 110

& 114, is therefore granted. Fritts’s remaining claims will be

dismissed with prejudice.

So Ordered.

ATrnrartek

D.P. Marshall Jr.

United States District Judge

a Stuhr _2020

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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