The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
DEURSLA LASHAY BARRON PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 3:20-cv-00188 JM
CURTIS TATE DEFENDANT
ORDER
Plaintiff Deursla Lashay Barron, in custody at the Craighead County Detention
Center, filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 2). She also
filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 1). Because Barron
makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915, her motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED. Her Complaint, however, will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
I. In Forma Pauperis Application
Because Barron has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), her request to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 1) is granted. The
Court assesses an initial partial filing fee of $1.03. If Barron’s account does not contain
the full amount assessed as an initial partial filing fee, Barron’s custodian shall withdraw
from the account any portion of the initial filing fee available, even if the account balance
is under $10.00. After the initial partial filing fee has been collected, Barron’s custodian
shall collect the remainder of the filing fee in monthly payments equal to 20% of the
preceding month’s income in Barron’s institutional account each time the amount in that
account is greater than $10. Barron’s custodian must send these payments to the Clerk
until a total of $350 has been paid. These payments should be clearly identified by the
name and number assigned to this action.
II. Screening
Federal law requires courts to screen in forma pauperis complaints, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e), and prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or
employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to
state a claim for relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying
damages should be dismissed before the defendants are served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Bell
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), the Court stated, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
. . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”
citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236
(3d ed. 2004). A complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face, not merely conceivable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, a pro
se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corr.
& Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-1044 (8th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion
Barron is currently incarcerated in the Craighead County Detention Center and is
awaiting trial on pending criminal charges. (Doc. No. 2 at 3). Barron’s claims in this case
arise out of her experiences with the public defenders appointed to represent her in
Craighead County, Arkansas. (Id. at 4-5). Rather than suing any public defender, Barron
named Curtis Tate as a Defendant; she identifies Tate as the person who assigns public
defenders to their clients. (Id. at 1). According to Barron, she has “had problems even
trying to learn, ask questions of even being told where to file a grievance when [she]
need[s] to complain about the public defenders . . . in Jonesboro . . . .” (Id. at 4). She
alleges she was passed from one public defender to the next, and none of the defenders
knew the details of her case. (Id. at 4-5).
Barron maintains she “was tricked into signing a plea deal January 2nd 2020.” (Doc.
Id. at 4). As she explained it, the public defender told her she would be sentenced only to
time served, “but the paper work said 5 years of probation.” (Doc. No. 2 at 5). Barron said
she tried calling and writing the public defender, but to no avail. (Id. at 5). She believes
that “[i]nmates at [the] Craighead County Detention Center have been put through double
jeopardy, abuse, conned, manipulated, tricked and scandaled, and flat out lied to for
decades.” (Id.). Barron does not seek damages, but asks for a complete overhaul of the
public defender’s office—from filing clerks to secretaries to counsel—and requests the jail
be shut down. (Id. at 6).
A. Habeas Corpus
While 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights statute, and the federal habeas corpus statutes
each provide relief from the violation of constitutional rights by a state official, the type of
relief offered by each differs. If a prisoner is seeking money damages or an injunction (i.e.
looking for relief other than release from confinement), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause
of action against a state official who allegedly violated the prisoner’s federally-protected
rights. But “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or speedier release from imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court
has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus
(or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their
confinement – either directly through an injunction compelling speedier
release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies
the unlawfulness of the State’s custody. Thus, Preiser found an implied
exception to § 1983’s coverage where the claim seeks . . . “core” habeas
corpus relief, i.e., where a state prisoner requests present or future release.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1245 (2005).
Here, Barron asks that the jail be shut down—in effect, she is asking for her
immediate release. If Barron wishes to challenge her confinement, she must do so through
a habeas corpus petition. Wilson v. Lockhart, 949 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1991). She cannot
obtain release through this § 1983 action.
The Court notes that while Barron says she is currently in custody pending trial, she also
challenges her January 2, 2020 conviction by alleging she was tricked into pleading guilty. To the
extent Barron seeks to invalidate her conviction, her claims are barred by the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
B. Official Capacity Claims
Barron sued Tate in his personal and official capacities. “A suit against a
government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the
employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257
(8th Cir. 2010). Public defender’s office personnel are considered employees of the County
in which they serve. See, for example, Ware v. Nebraska, Buffalo County, case no. 8:18-
cv-143, 2018 WL 5299713, *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 2018). To establish municipal liability,
a plaintiff must prove that a policy, practice, or custom attributable to the municipality
caused the constitutional injury. See Veatch, 627 F.3d at 1257. Barron maintains that
Craighead County receives a certain amount of money to transport and house inmates.
(Doc. No. 2 at 5.) But she does not say how this violated her rights or harmed her, and the
Court sees no relation between this allegation and the purported shortcomings of the public
defenders appointed to her. Barron sued Tate, who purportedly assigns defenders to
clients. Barron did not, however, challenge anything about the process of appointing a
defender. Accordingly, the Court does not interpret Barron’s Complaint as making policy,
practice, or custom claim in connection with how public defenders are assigned to their
clients.
C. Personal Capacity Claims: No Allegations of Individual Action
Barron brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under
§ 1983, the complaint must allege that a person acting under the color of state law deprived
the plaintiff of a constitutional or federally-protected statutory right. American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). “Liability under § 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights.” Madewell v.
Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable
to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Parrish v. Ball, 594
F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). Factual
allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Barron’s factual allegations are insufficient to make out a claim against Tate.
Barron complains about the public defenders assigned to her case. (Doc. No. 2 at 4-5).
Barron named Tate as a Defendant and identified him as the “person in charge of assigning
inmates to a public defender.” (Id. at 1.) While Barron named Tate as a party, she did not
make any specific factual allegations against him. Liberally construing Barron’s
Complaint, the Court is unable to glean how Tate caused any alleged violation to Barron’s
federally protected rights. And to the extent Barron seeks to hold Tate responsible under
the theory of respondeat superior, vicarious liability is not available under § 1983. See
Parrish, 594 F.3d at 1001. Further, as a member of the public defender’s office, it appears
generally that Tate would not be a state actor for § 1983 purposes. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Chambers v. Kaplan, 648 F.2d 1193, 1194 (8th Cir. 1981).
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Barron’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 1) is
GRANTED.
2. Barron’s custodian, the Administrator of the Craighead County Detention
Center, is directed to collect an initial partial filing fee in the amount of $1.03, and
thereafter to collect the remainder of filing fee in monthly payments equal to 20% of the
preceding month’s income in Barron’s institutional account each time the amount in
Barron’s account is greater than $10. Barron’s custodian must send those payments to the
Clerk until a total of $350 has been paid. All payments made on Barron’s behalf must be
identified by the name and number assigned to this action.
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the
Administrator of the Craighead County Detention Center, 901 Willett Road, Jonesboro,
Arkansas 72401.
4. Barron’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5. Barron’s Complaint (Doc. No. 2) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
6. This dismissal counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
7. This Court certifies that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an in forma
pauperis appeal taken from this Order and accompanying Judgment is considered frivolous
and not in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20" day of July, 2020.
UNITED + ATES ct TRICT JUDGE