“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
How later courts described this case
- “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
PAMELA POWELL PLAINTIFF
V. 4:20CV00452 JM
WEHCO VIDEO INC., et al DEFENDANTS
ORDER
On April 24, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this case against Defendants alleging
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA). She also
alleged that Defendants committed violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). Along with the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP).
There is a two-step process to proceed IFP. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857
(8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). First, there is a determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies by
economic status under 27 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If she does, the complaint is permitted to be filed. Id.
Second, assuming the allegation of poverty is true, a determination is made under §
1915(e)(2)(B) of whether the cause of action stated in the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. If so, the complaint is to be dismissed. Because it
appears that plaintiff’s economic situation qualifies her for IFP status, the Court hereby
GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP application. (Doc. No. 1).
The Court now turns to the determination of whether, under §1915(e)(2)(B), this action
should be dismissed because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A
claim is frivolous if it “describ[es] fantastic or delusional scenarios,” the factual contentions are
“clearly baseless,” or there is no rational basis in the law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-
28 (1989). A court may dismiss such a complaint before service of process without leave to
amend. Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1023 (1998);
see also Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Early v.
Harmon, 535 U.S. 1040 (2002).
In this case, Ms. Powell asserts that she was discriminated against because of her “race
(White), religion (Christian), and national origin (American).” (Doc. No. 2 at 18) She also
suggests that she was discriminated against because of her age and disability. (Id.) Ms. Powell
has presented no facts supporting these claims.
Ms. Powell maintains that she first sought a call center position from Defendant on
October 28, 2019 and left her employment on January 14, 2020. (Doc. No. 2 at 6 & 16). In her
complaint and attached EEOC charging document, she maintains that she was retaliated against
for complaining about “business-inappropriate music” during training. (Id. at 16) Ms. Powell
further suggests that the trainer, who she remembers mentioning having a biology degree, must
have learned of her daughter’s race (part Hispanic) from her deceased brother’s obituary and
used that information as well has her brother’s and Hilary Clinton’s birthdate to harass her
during training – something she described as a “German Nazi tactic.” (Id. at 8, 16-19). It
appears she made this conclusion after the trainer use a photo of Hitler as the example of a
difficult caller for new services. (Id. at 8).
Further, Ms. Powell recalls “the VP” stating to “the General manager” that “a lot of trees
had been cut down,” and she believes this was “a reference to Jewish males depicting themselves
as ‘trees.’” (Id. at 18). Ms. Powell also concludes that she was able to readily determine which
employees were “Nazi” “key-players” by their last names, which were secret code – “Haight
(pronounced ‘Hate’), Seick (pronounced ‘Syke,’ meaning to discredit and erase prior activities
that had actually occurred, such as alleging German wars never occurred causing millions of
people were never killed through hate crimes stemming from bigots), [and] Joiner (an auditor
who scores subjective performance to determine who is a ‘joiner’ and whose employment will be
terminated with fraudulent low scorings.” (Id. at 8).
Ms. Powell has not identified the race, religion, national origin, age, or gender of any
person she worked with or identified how others similarly situated were treated differently. See
Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere &Co., 49 F.3d 1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1995) (Title VII); Spencer v. Stuart
Hall Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 1998) (ADEA). She has not stated a claim under
RICO. See Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 957 (1993) (discharged employee has no standing under RICO). Instead, she opines,
without any substantiation, that her coworkers were involved with a “subversive movement
aligned with Hitler’s ideologies and goals which are Ashkenazi Jewish aka German Nazism
within the workplace.” (Doc. No. 2 at 10) Further, Ms. Powell has not identified what, if any,
disability she may have or how she was harmed as a result. See Fenny v. Dakota, Minnesota &
Easter R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (ADA elements). At best, she asserts that she
was asked to turn lights off during a training session, which aggravated her knees and arm. (Doc.
No. 2 at 9).
No actions ascribed to any Defendant indicated that Ms. Powell’s race, gender, color,
religion, national origin, or alleged disability had anything to do with her termination. Further,
Ms. Powell’s allegations that Defendants business practices were actually part of a “subversive
agenda” to “destroy earning ability” and to “hinder [traditionally Christian] family bonds” are
frivolous.
“A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to ‘nudge [] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,’ or “their complaint must be dismissed’ for failing
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
569-70 (2007); see also Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a
plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff's complaint must allege specific facts
sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) After
reviewing Ms. Powell’s pro se complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be, and
hereby is dismissed sua sponte.
As stated, the Court grants Ms. Powell’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 1). The Court
further finds that Ms. Powell’s complaint is both frivolous and fails to state a claim for relief and,
therefore, the complaint (Doc. No. 2) is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to
close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13" day of May, 2020.
ants on JUDGE