# SSR 80-5c: SSR 80-5c: SECTION 1614(a)(3) (42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)) SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME -- DISABILITY -- ALCOHOLISM

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_SSI_SSR_80_5c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 80-5c
- **Heading:** SSR 80-5c: SECTION 1614(a)(3) (42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)) SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME -- DISABILITY -- ALCOHOLISM
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / SSI / Disability / SSR 80-5c

## Text

20 CFR 416.901(b), 416.917(e), and 416.981

SSR 80-5c

DUVALL V. MATHEWS, USDC, D. Maryland, Civ. No. Y 76-157 (1/6/77)
( Aff'd. per curiam USCA, Fourth Circuit, 2/11/78)

YOUNG, District Judge:

Plaintiff, George Duvall, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 29, 1976 to obtain judicial
review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare which denied plaintiff's claim for continuation of disability
benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.

This case is before the Court on cross-motions by plaintiff and defendant
for Summary Judgment based upon the administrative record. Plaintiff moves
this court to either reverse the decision of the Secretary and allow
plaintiff benefits or, in the alternative, remand to the Secretary for a
"fuller and fairer hearing".

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff, George Webster Duvall, was born on February 14, 1928. He
completed ten grades of school. He spent three years on active duty and
four years of reserve duty in the Army beginning in 1951 where he claims
to have been given no specialized training. His significant work
experience consisted of a two year period of work at Sinai Hospital in
different capacities including dishwasher, general porter, salad man, and
shipping clerk; working at the Hecht Company for one Christmas; for
Montgomery Ward; for American Drydocks in their paint department; making
glycerine to go into soap at the Lever Brothers Soap Factory on Holabird
Avenue; and general labor jobs procured at the Howard Street Manpower
Corporation which included a job as a forklift operator in a warehouse.
Plaintiff lives alone in a rented room on 912 East Preston Street. On
occasion, he also stayed in The Chapel which is a mission on Baltimore
Street.
paint department; making
glycerine to go into soap at the Lever Brothers Soap Factory on Holabird
Avenue; and general labor jobs procured at the Howard Street Manpower
Corporation which included a job as a forklift operator in a warehouse.
Plaintiff lives alone in a rented room on 912 East Preston Street. On
occasion, he also stayed in The Chapel which is a mission on Baltimore
Street.

Plaintiff alleges continuous inability to work since immediately prior to
December, 1973 when he began receiving aid under the Maryland State
program of aid to the disabled which was automatically converted to
Supplemental Security Income benefits in January 1974. The alleged reasons
for this disability include chronic alcoholism, arteriosclerosis, and
anxiety neurosis.

Plaintiff complained of difficulty walking around or moving when "his
heart thing" gave him trouble. He feels that his heart beats very weakly
and that sometime it almost stops. He also noted occasional pain around
the heart. Plaintiff stated that he sleeps well unless the temperature
bothers him. He also states that occasionally he does not eat well but
that he does have dietary pills to correct that situation. Plaintiff
acknowledges his present state of alcoholism but claims that as the result
of doctor's orders he has cut down considerably on his drinking. Plaintiff
was last hospitalized at Johns Hopkins where he underwent tests for
possible rectal cancer. He left the hospital claiming the tests were to
painful but stated that he would return later. At one time he entered
Providence Hospital for convalescence for what he described as fatigue. He
had also been admitted to University Hospital because of his alcoholism;
he stated that he was sent to the alcoholic rehabilitation center known as
Turk Home. Plaintiff admits to having spent three days in Crownsville
Hospital. When asked to recall the names of the physicians that treated
him, plaintiff could only recall Dr
Hospital for convalescence for what he described as fatigue. He
had also been admitted to University Hospital because of his alcoholism;
he stated that he was sent to the alcoholic rehabilitation center known as
Turk Home. Plaintiff admits to having spent three days in Crownsville
Hospital. When asked to recall the names of the physicians that treated
him, plaintiff could only recall Dr. Nakazowa (spelled in the transcript
as Nokensowa). Plaintiff was advised that medical records from both Dr.
Nakazowa and from Dr. Gonzalez regarding plaintiff's condition were in
defendant's possession as part of the court record. When questioned as to
what medications he was then taking, he replied that he was taking Valium,
5 mg. for his nervous condition, the food supplement, Miodake, and
introstat which he said that he was "not supposed to touch" unless he was
having one of his "heart flutters". Plaintiff was asked about an alleged
medical discharge from the Army which was a "368 discharge". Plaintiff
himself explained the nature of the discharge by stating that it was
really an undesirable discharge rather than medical, and that it was
received as a result of plaintiff's relationship with a girl while in the
service, which resulted in the birth of a child, presumably illegitimate.
When questioned as to whether he ever got depressed, plaintiff responded,
"Yes, I get depressed, just like everybody else", and that he got upset
"whenever something upsets [him]" without being more specific.
her than medical, and that it was
received as a result of plaintiff's relationship with a girl while in the
service, which resulted in the birth of a child, presumably illegitimate.
When questioned as to whether he ever got depressed, plaintiff responded,
"Yes, I get depressed, just like everybody else", and that he got upset
"whenever something upsets [him]" without being more specific.

The evidence shows that plaintiff was discharged from Turk Home (A.R.U.
University Hospital) on March 17, 1972. He was given his first examination
by Hiroshi Nakazowa, M.D., on March 22, 1972, which revealed that
plaintiff had mild chest pains, gas in the epigastrium, and anxiety
neuroses; however, the absence of heart arrythmia or murmur was noted.
Plaintiff was given nitroglycerin and Volisin. During the period December
22, 1972 to December 27, 1972 plaintiff was examined by A. Fernandez,
M.D., after plaintiff had been voluntarily admitted to Crownsville State
Hospital as the result of over-ingestion of alcohol. Physical examination
noted no gross pathology. The diagnosis was alcohol addiction and the
disposition consisted of recommended Alcoholics Anonymous meeting and
vocational rehabilitation.

Luis Felipe Gonzalez, M.D., a specialist in both cardiovascular diseases
and psychiatry, examined plaintiff on July 15, 1974. He found no clinical
evidence of damage associated with chronic alcoholism, that there was no
EKG evidence of rhythm disturbance while at rest, myocardial infarction,
or myocardial ischemia. He noted that the historical data was presented to
him in a clear cut manner which did not suggest the impairment of
effective intelligence. He further stated that the affective status
appeared within normal limits, and that there was noting to suggest undue
anxiety, tension, depression or swing in mood, reality contact was within
normal limits, and that there was no delusion, hallucination, confusion,
paranoid tendency or bizarreness.
him in a clear cut manner which did not suggest the impairment of
effective intelligence. He further stated that the affective status
appeared within normal limits, and that there was noting to suggest undue
anxiety, tension, depression or swing in mood, reality contact was within
normal limits, and that there was no delusion, hallucination, confusion,
paranoid tendency or bizarreness.

Dr. Gonzalez did make the statement that, "in view of the fact that this
man has not worked since 1969 it is doubtful that he will return to active
work activities currently", but there was no statement made by the doctor
that plaintiff could not or should not work. When asked if the doctors
ever told him that he could not work, plaintiff responded that they never
told him that. He stated that the question never came up but that he was
supposed to return to Johns Hopkins for further examination with respect
to the finding of rectal polyps and the possibility of cancer. There is no
evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiff has cancer of the
rectum.

The testimony of the Director of the Vocational Rehabilitation Program at
Springfield Hospital Center in Sykesville, Maryland, who was retained by
the Social Security Administration as a Vocational Expert, was introduced
into evidence.

The vocational expert, Billy R. Montgomery, testified that by virtue of
plaintiff's age, education, past training and experience, and based upon
alternative assumptions of fact supported by the evidence, an individual
such as the plaintiff could work as a dispatcher or scheduler of work. He
could be a dispatcher of vehicles in a car rental pool or a dispatcher of
vehicles in a truck transfer operation which are sedentary types of jobs
and are available in the national economy.
ucation, past training and experience, and based upon
alternative assumptions of fact supported by the evidence, an individual
such as the plaintiff could work as a dispatcher or scheduler of work. He
could be a dispatcher of vehicles in a car rental pool or a dispatcher of
vehicles in a truck transfer operation which are sedentary types of jobs
and are available in the national economy.

It must finally be noted that during the hearing, plaintiff's attorney,
Mr. Rourke, renewed his request that there be a psychological or
psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Duvall, based upon the findings of Dr.
Nakazowa, the opinion of Dr. Gonzalez and the testimony of record, before
the final decision was made. The Hearing Examiner replied that he would
take the request under consideration but the record indicates that he
neither granted nor explicitly denied the request.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The question before this court is whether or not there is substantial
evidence to support the Secretary's denial of benefits after October 31,
1975. If there is such substantial evidence, then the Court must affirm
the Secretary's finding. The fact that the record as a whole might support
an inconsistent conclusion is immaterial. The court must uphold the
Secretary's decision if supported by substantial evidence, even though the
court may disagree with that decision. Blalock v. Richardson , 483
F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). Substantial evidence has been defined by
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as follows:

Laws v. Celebrezze , 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (emphasis
added).
usion is immaterial. The court must uphold the
Secretary's decision if supported by substantial evidence, even though the
court may disagree with that decision. Blalock v. Richardson , 483
F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). Substantial evidence has been defined by
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as follows:

Laws v. Celebrezze , 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (emphasis
added).

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the final
decision of the Secretary in Social Security disability benefits cases,
four interrelated types of proof are to be considered: (1) objective
medical facts, (2) expert medical opinions, (3) subjective evidence of
pain and disability, and (4) claimant's present age, educational
background and work history. Arrington v. Celebrezze , 252 F.Supp.
65 (M.D. N.C. 1965).

The term "disability" as it applies here is defined in Section 223(d)(1)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Section 423(d)) to mean:

Section 223(d)(3) of the Act (42 U.S.C. Section 423(d)(3) provides:

Section 223(d)(5) of the Act (42 U.S.C. Section 423(d)(5) provides:

In the instant case, examinations by Luis Felipe Gonzalez, M.D.
specialist in cardiovascular diseases and psychiatry, on July 15, 1974,
and by Hiroshi Nakazowa, M.D., on March 22, 1972, reveal that there is an
absence of detectable heart disturbance in plaintiff. Dr. Gonzalez finds
no clinical evidence of damage associated with chronic alcoholism. The
anxiety neurosis found by Dr. Nakazowa which appears to be associated with
plaintiff's alcoholic state was not found by Dr. Gonzalez to be so extreme
as to unduly affect plaintiff's moods or ability to think.

There is no indication by any of the examining doctors that plaintiff
could not or should not work. There is only an observation by Dr. Gonzalez
that because of the nature of plaintiff's recent period of unemployment,
he will not likely seek to return to active work.
s alcoholic state was not found by Dr. Gonzalez to be so extreme
as to unduly affect plaintiff's moods or ability to think.

There is no indication by any of the examining doctors that plaintiff
could not or should not work. There is only an observation by Dr. Gonzalez
that because of the nature of plaintiff's recent period of unemployment,
he will not likely seek to return to active work.

There is no question that plaintiff is a chronic alcoholic, that he
experiences pain to some degree and anxiety, most recently associated with
tests to determine whether or not he has rectal cancer. The Administrative
Law Judge found that plaintiff's alcoholism alone is not sufficient to
prevent him from carrying on substantial gainful activity; his doctors and
the vocational expert do not indicate otherwise. It was held in Roberts
v. Gardner , 396 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1968), that the claim that a Social
Security claimant was a chronic alcoholic did not warrant overturning
trial court's finding that plaintiff was able to work in the relevant
period. In this case, the vocational expert, Billy R. Montgomery,
considering the plaintiff's age, his educational background, past
experience, and his physical ailments, testified that the plaintiff could
engage in such sedentary employment as dispatcher or work scheduler, jobs
which were available in the national economy.

From the foregoing, it is clear to this court that the medical reports
and vocational expert testimony constitute substantial evidence for the
Secretary's conclusion that the plaintiff can engage in substantial
gainful work which exists in substantial numbers in the national
economy.

[ The court also considered, and rejected, the plaintiff's contention
that there was "good cause" to remand the case for further hearing and the
inclusion of additional evidence. Since this issue is irrelevent to the
principle issues of the case, discussion has been omitted. -- ED.]
ntiff can engage in substantial
gainful work which exists in substantial numbers in the national
economy.

[ The court also considered, and rejected, the plaintiff's contention
that there was "good cause" to remand the case for further hearing and the
inclusion of additional evidence. Since this issue is irrelevent to the
principle issues of the case, discussion has been omitted. -- ED.]

Plaintiff finally contends that the Administrative Law Judge and the
Appeals Council, whose decision became the final decision of the
Secretary, applied incorrect standards of law to the case by requiring
that "end organ" damage be shown before an alcoholic will be granted
disability benefits. Plaintiff relies upon Lewis v. Weinberger , 402
F.Supp. 632 (D. Md. 1975) to support this contention. That case involved
the denial of benefits to an alcoholic claimant, who had already been
adjudged to be incapable of substantial gainful employment on the
basis that no end organ damage related to his alcoholism was shown. This
case is readily distinguishable from Lewis in that from all of the
medical records presently available, and the evaluation of a vocational
expert, it has been determined that plaintiff's alcoholism does not
prevent him from carrying on substantial gainful employment. Absence of
end organ damage is merely one part of the medical record but it clearly
was not the sole test relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge.

Accordingly, it is this 6th day of January, 1977, by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED:

PER CURIAM:

George Duvall appeals from an order of the district court sustaining the
Secretary's determination that Duvall was not entitled to continuing
disability payments under the Supplemental Security Income Program, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., because he was not disabled as a result of
chronic alcoholism. We affirm.
ited States
District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED:

PER CURIAM:

George Duvall appeals from an order of the district court sustaining the
Secretary's determination that Duvall was not entitled to continuing
disability payments under the Supplemental Security Income Program, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., because he was not disabled as a result of
chronic alcoholism. We affirm.

As we read the opinion of the administrative law judge, which became the
decision of the Secretary, Duvall was held not to be disabled on the
alternative grounds that (a) under the regulations there was no evidence
that Duvall had suffered end- organ damage as a result of alcoholism, and
(b) there was no evidence to support the finding that Duvall was not
capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity as a result of his
alcoholism irrespective of the lack of evidence of end-organ damage. The
administrative law judge was in error in assigning the first reason for
discontinuing disability benefits, because prior to his decision the
regulations had been amended to eliminate the need for a showing of
end-organ damage as a condition for establishing disability by reason of
alcoholism. See 40 Fed. Reg. pp. 30262, et seq. (July 18,
1975); Martin v. Secretary of HEW , 492 F.2d 905 (4 Cir. 1974). We
agree, however, that there was substantial evidence to support the finding
that Duvall had failed to show that he was incapable of engaging in
substantial gainful activity because of alcoholism, irrespective of the
lack of evidence of end-organ damage. It follows that the judgment of the
district court affirming the Secretary's decision must be sustained.

AFFIRMED.

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