# SSR 86-14c: SSR 86-14c: SECTION 216(h)(2)(A) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A)) RELATIONSHIP -- CHILD BORN OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE -- INHERITANCE FROM FATHER -- ILLINOIS

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_86_14c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 86-14c
- **Heading:** SSR 86-14c: SECTION 216(h)(2)(A) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A)) RELATIONSHIP -- CHILD BORN OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE -- INHERITANCE FROM FATHER -- ILLINOIS
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Family Relationships / SSR 86-14c

## Text

20 CFR 404.354(b) and 404.355(a)

SSR 86-14c

Davis v. Heckler, 1A Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 16,146 (U.S.D.C. N.D., ILL.
1985)

NORGLE, District Judge:

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's, Lula B. Davis, motion and
Defendant's, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
("Secretary"), cross motion for summary judgment. Ms. Davis seeks judicial
review of a final administrative decision of the Secretary's denial of her
application for children's insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act ("Act"), 42 U. S .C. §§ 402(d), 416(h). Because the Administrative Law
Judge's ("ALJ") decision under section 416(h) and Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch.
110-½ § 2-2 is not supported by substantial evidence, that decision is
reversed. The Secretary is ordered to pay the benefits to which the Davis
children are entitled.

The facts in this case are adequately set out in the ALJ's decision. Tr.
18-21. Therefore, only the facts required by this decision will be
discussed. Section 402(d) of the Act provides that an unmarried child of a
person who dies fully or currently insured may be entitled to a surviving
child's benefit if that child is under the age of 18 and was dependent at
the time of the parent's death. Mathews v. Luca, 427 U.S.
495 (1976). To determine if an applicant is the child of a deceased
insured the Secretary initially looks to the state law of intestate
succession. Section 416(h)(2)(A) provides:

42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). There is no dispute that Mr. Smith was domiciled
in Illinois at the time of his death. The applicable provision of the
Illinois Probate Act, therefore, is Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 110-½ § 2-2. that
section provides that an illegitimate child may inherit from his natural
father if "the decedent acknowledged paternity, and the acknowledgement is
proved by clear and convincing evidence." Under § 202, the term
"acknowledgment" must be applied in its non-technical sense. Mezel v. Mobley, 21 Ill. 2d 20, 22, 170 N.E. 2d 595 (1960).
e Act, therefore, is Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 110-½ § 2-2. that
section provides that an illegitimate child may inherit from his natural
father if "the decedent acknowledged paternity, and the acknowledgement is
proved by clear and convincing evidence." Under § 202, the term
"acknowledgment" must be applied in its non-technical sense. Mezel v. Mobley, 21 Ill. 2d 20, 22, 170 N.E. 2d 595 (1960).

Prior to a discussion of the ALJ's decision in this matter we note that
the Secretary's decision must be supported by substantial evidence. The
Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "relevant evidence
[that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 399, 401
(1971). However, in arriving at a decision the ALJ is to consider all
competent and probative evidence; he should not merely pick and choose
from the evidence in order to support a particular conclusion. Whitney v. Schweicker, 695 F.2d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 1982).

[Uncontradicted Testimony]

In this case, the ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Davis that Mr. Smith was
the father of the three children. Moreover, she testified that Mr. Smith
acknowledged his relationship to the children on numerous occasions to
family and friends. The record contains statements from several of these
persons (most notably Mr. Smith's brothers) corroborating Ms. Davis'
testimony. Additionally, the ALJ herd the testimony of one Willie
Thompson, a neighbor and frequent visitor to the home of Ms. Davis, Mr.
Smith and the children. Mr. Thompson testified that Mr. Smith acknowledged
his relationship to the children "at least a half a dozen times" over the
years of their friendship. Tr. at 52. There is no indication in the
administrative record to contradict the above mentioned evidence. Instead,
the ALJ's decision rests primarily on the absence of corroborating
documentary evidence and various indications that Mr. Smith did not live
with Ms. Davis and the children
his relationship to the children "at least a half a dozen times" over the
years of their friendship. Tr. at 52. There is no indication in the
administrative record to contradict the above mentioned evidence. Instead,
the ALJ's decision rests primarily on the absence of corroborating
documentary evidence and various indications that Mr. Smith did not live
with Ms. Davis and the children. Neither of these considerations is
conclusive in a determination made under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110-½ § 2-2.
See Cooper v. Harris, 499 F.Supp. 266, 268 (N.D. Ill.
1980).

The Secretary contends the Illinois appellate court's decision in Morelli v. Battelli, 68 Ill. App. 3d 410, 386 N.E.2d 328
(1st Dist. 1979), controls this case. In Morelli, the plaintiff
alleged he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of a decedent. He
produced testimonial evidence to support his allegations. The decedent's
estate, however, offered testimonial evidence which contradicted the
plaintiff's witness. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's
resolution of the conflict in favor of the decedent's estate. The present
case does not involve conflicting testimony. In fact, the only testimony in this case favors Ms. Davis. The facts in Cooper v. Harris, supra , are closer to those in the present case.

In Cooper , a child was denied benefits under the Act because the
ALJ declined to give weight to oral testimony of the decedent's
acknowledgment of paternity in the absence of the "appropriate document." Id. at 268. The "appropriate document" consisted of a statement
signed by the decedent and later destroyed by fire in a government office.
In the place of any documentary evidence the plaintiff offered her own
testimony and that of relatives regarding the decedent's acknowledgment of
paternity. After noting that proof of paternity under § 2-2 is not limited
to written evidence, the court found the testimonial evidence overwhelming
in establishing the decedent's paternity. Id
d later destroyed by fire in a government office.
In the place of any documentary evidence the plaintiff offered her own
testimony and that of relatives regarding the decedent's acknowledgment of
paternity. After noting that proof of paternity under § 2-2 is not limited
to written evidence, the court found the testimonial evidence overwhelming
in establishing the decedent's paternity. Id. The Cooper court reached its decision under § 2-2 notwithstanding the absence of
any written acknowledgment of paternity. Id. ("The secondary evidence
[plaintiff] introduced more than satisfied the rule.")

Additionally, , in Larimore v. Chatterton, 64 Ill. App. 3d
470, 381 N.E.2d 76 (3d Dist. 1978), the appellate court held a decedent's
paternity was established by clear and convincing evidence despite the
fact that almost all of the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff was
testimonial in nature. Id. at 142-43. There the Defendant did not
offer conflicting testimonial evidence, but instead relied on the
Plaintiff's failure to produce a formal birth certificate. In using the
mother's testimony to support its holding, the court noted that she was in
the best position to know the facts regarding her child's paternity. Id. at 141. Thus, in the present case, Ms. Davis' testimony was not
subject to less weight merely because she failed to produce a formal birth
certificate or similar documentary evidence.

Based on the foregoing analysis it was erroneous for the ALJ to find that
Ms. Davis did not meet her burden under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110-½ § 2-2.
Therefore, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Secretary is ordered to pay the
benefits to which Doris, Lean and Jerome Davis are entitled. Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment is granted and Defendant's cross motion for
summary judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_86_14c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.