# SSR 85-26c: SSR 85-26c: SECTION 210(a)(3)(A) (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(3)(A)) EMPLOYMENT -- EXCLUSION OF SERVICE IN EMPLOY OF PARENT -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUSION

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_85_26c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 85-26c
- **Heading:** SSR 85-26c: SECTION 210(a)(3)(A) (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(3)(A)) EMPLOYMENT -- EXCLUSION OF SERVICE IN EMPLOY OF PARENT -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUSION
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Definition of Employment/Employee / SSR 85-26c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1015(a)(2)

SSR 85-26c

Tyson v. Heckler , 727 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, _____ U.S. _____ (1984)

GODBOLD, Chief Judge:

This appeal, in a social security case, raises the constitutionality of
42 U.S.C. 410(a)(3)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which provides in
pertinent part:

The district court found that the statute had a rational basis, was not
constitutionally overinclusive, and therefore was constitutional. We
affirm.

Plaintiff's son, Timothy, was employed by his father, who owned a sole
proprietorship. Timothy was married, self-supporting, and lived away from
home. Timothy and his father had reported his wages, and the proper Social
Security tax had been paid as provided by FICA. During the month in which
Timothy turned 21 he was involved in a car accident and became totally
disabled.

Timothy's mother filed an application for Social Security dissability
insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration. The agency
denied benefits on the ground that Timothy did not meet the insured status
requirements because the wages he earned from his father's business were
excluded from coverage under Sec. 410(a)(3)(A). On reconsideration the
agency affirmed the denial of benefits because of the statute's exclusion.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the plaintiff then executed
an expedited appeals agreement under which further administrative
proceedings were waived and Timothy's entitlement to benefits was
established except for the exclusion mandated by Sec. 410(a)(3)(A). This
agreement constituted the final decision of the Secretary.

Plaintiff brought this action in district court seeking a finding that
Sec. 410(a)(3)(A) is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and
irrational, lacks a legitimate government goal, is not related to a
legitimate government goal, and is overinclusive. The district court
rejected these arguments and found the statute constitutional.
ement constituted the final decision of the Secretary.

Plaintiff brought this action in district court seeking a finding that
Sec. 410(a)(3)(A) is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and
irrational, lacks a legitimate government goal, is not related to a
legitimate government goal, and is overinclusive. The district court
rejected these arguments and found the statute constitutional.

[1] Social security legislation is tested under a rational basis
standard. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70, 95 S.Ct.
2457, 2468-69, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). As the Salfi court
explained:

Id. at 768, 95 S.Ct. at 2468 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). The Court
has pointed out, however, that the rational basis standard is "not a
toothless one." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 96 S.Ct. 2755,
2764, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976).

[2] Legislative history indicates that prevention of collusion was the
intent of Congress when it adopted this provision in 1939. H.R.Rep. No.
728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1939). Prevention of fraud on the Social
Security System is a legitimate government goal. See Salfi, 422
U.S. at 777-84, 95 S.Ct. at 2472-76. The statute furthers this legitimate
government goal by excluding a class of people whose situation suggests a
high potential for collusion. See Id. at 780, 95 S.Ct. at 2474.
Furthermore, "Congress could rationally have concluded that any
imprecision from which it [the state] might suffer was justified by its
ease and certainty of operation." Id.
22
U.S. at 777-84, 95 S.Ct. at 2472-76. The statute furthers this legitimate
government goal by excluding a class of people whose situation suggests a
high potential for collusion. See Id. at 780, 95 S.Ct. at 2474.
Furthermore, "Congress could rationally have concluded that any
imprecision from which it [the state] might suffer was justified by its
ease and certainty of operation." Id.

That the age of majority in many states is now 18 rather than 21 does not
affect the constitutionality of the statute. The age of majority and the
age limitation for exclusion of employment by parents from Social Security
coverage implicate different concerns. When Congress enacted Sec.
410(a)(3)(A), it sought to prevent fraud on the Social Security
Administration by parents who employ their children. Reduction in the age
of majority does not necessarily reduce or even affect the likelihood of
fraud between parents and children when children seek employment.
Furthermore, reduction of the age limitation is a choice for Congress, and
as long as Congress's original purpose of preventing fraud on the Social
Security system by parental employment of children under 21 is not
presently arbitrary and irrational, change in the age of majority in
states does not change our analysis of the statute.

The "irrebutable presumption" cases of Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974), Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551
presently arbitrary and irrational, change in the age of majority in
states does not change our analysis of the statute.

The "irrebutable presumption" cases of Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974), Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551
(1972) do not require the government to make an individualized
determination of collusion. The Salfi court answered this argument
when it stated that "these [irrebutable presumption] cases are not
controlling on the issue before us now." Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771, 95
S.Cr. at 2470. The Court distinguished Stanley and LaFleur on the ground that the interests in those cases, unlike a noncontractual
claim to government funds, enjoyed "constitutionally protected status." Id. at 771-72, 95 S.Ct. at 2470. The Salfi court further
explained that Vlandis was distinguishable because it involved a
different issue, making "plainly relevant evidence . . . inadmissable." Id. The irrebutable presumption cases do not control this case.

In 1960 Congress repealed another provision of the section at issue that
had excluded from coverage employment of a parent by a child. This action
does not make the remaining provision arbitrary. Congress could have
rationally concluded that there likely would be less occasion for fraud
when children employed their parents because such a situation would occur
less often. Furthermore,

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461,
465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) (citations omitted). Congress's repeal of the
provision excluding coverage of employment of a parent by a child does not
render the statute unconstitutional.
ere likely would be less occasion for fraud
when children employed their parents because such a situation would occur
less often. Furthermore,

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461,
465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) (citations omitted). Congress's repeal of the
provision excluding coverage of employment of a parent by a child does not
render the statute unconstitutional.

[3] The statute is not unconstitutionally overinclusive. Congress is not
required to draw lines with great precision when it enacts social welfare
legislation. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct.
1153, 1161-62, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). As the Salfi court noted, the
question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out
those, and only those, who are in the factual position which generated the
congressional concern reflected in the statute . . . Nor is the question
whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which
caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members of
the class than non-members. The question is whether Congress, its concern
having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it
legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a
particular limitation or qualification would protect against its
occurence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individualized
determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylatic
rule.

Salfi, 422 U.S. at 777, 95 S.Cr. at 2472-73. Under this standard,
the statute is constitutional. Exclusion of children under 21 employed by
their parents protects against the occurrence of fraud. Making
individualized determinations of collusion would not only be expensive but
could also be difficult, as it may be possible to structure a situation so
that no collusion appears although fraud actually exists. Consequently,
potential overinclusiveness does not make the statute unconstitutional.
of children under 21 employed by
their parents protects against the occurrence of fraud. Making
individualized determinations of collusion would not only be expensive but
could also be difficult, as it may be possible to structure a situation so
that no collusion appears although fraud actually exists. Consequently,
potential overinclusiveness does not make the statute unconstitutional.

That the statute does not exclude from coverage children employed by
their parents' wholly-owned corporation or partnership does not render the
statute unconstitutional. Congress reasonably could have concluded that
less likelihood of collusion exists with employment by partnerships and
corporations, as many such organizations are not wholly-owned, and
consequently people other than a child's parents play a role in hiring the
child. Such a difference in treatment is not arbitrary and does not render
the statute unconstitutional.

AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_85_26c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.