# SSR 77-2c: SSR 77-2c: SECTION 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)) -- CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ELIGIBILITY OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD -- LIVING WITH OR CONTRIBUTING SUPPORT

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_77_2c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 77-2c
- **Heading:** SSR 77-2c: SECTION 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)) -- CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ELIGIBILITY OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD -- LIVING WITH OR CONTRIBUTING SUPPORT
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Family Relationships / SSR 77-2c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1101 and 404.1109

SSR 77-2c

MATHEWS v. LUCAS , 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976)

NORTON v. MATHEWS , 96 S. Ct. 2771 (1976)

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of the Social
Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegitimate
children for a surviving child's insurance benefits upon a showing that
the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's parent and, at the time
of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his
support.

I

Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the years
1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children were born to
them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and Darin E. Lucas, in
1960. In 1966 Cuffee and Lucas separated. Cuffee died in Providence, Rhode
Island, his home, in 1968. He died without ever having acknowledged in
writing his paternity of either Ruby or Darin, and it was never determined
in any judicial proceeding during his lifetime that he was the father of
either child. After Cuffee's death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on
behalf of Ruby and Darin for surviving children's benefits under §
202(d)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), based upon
Cuffee's earnings record.

II

In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or daughter of
an individual, who died fully or currently insured under the Act, may
apply for and be entitled to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is
under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time
student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning
of the statute, at the time of the parents,
death. [1] A child is considered
dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or
contributing to the child's support at the time of death
to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is
under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time
student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning
of the statute, at the time of the parents,
death. [1] A child is considered
dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or
contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain
children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized proof
of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual,
a child who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit
personal property from the insured parent's estate under the applicable
state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of
the parent's death. [2] Even
lacking this relationship under state law, a child, unless adopted by some
other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the
decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the
other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but
for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing
had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court
to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support
the child because the child was
his. [3]

An Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings,
determined that while Cuffee's paternity was established, the children had
failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that Cuffee either lived
with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death,
or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they
were not entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals
council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and
they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare
ee either lived
with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death,
or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they
were not entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals
council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and
they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. Lucas then timely filed this action, pursuant to § 205(g) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter called
the appellees) for review of the Secretary's decision.

The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual findings of
the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the children's father;
that he never acknowledged his paternity in writing; that his paternity or
support obligations had not been the subject of a judicial proceeding
during his lifetime; that no common law marriage had ever been contracted
between Cuffee and Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee's
personal property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at
the time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor
contributing to their support. 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-1314 (1975). None
of these factual matters is at issue
here. [4]

A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appellees, relied on Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628 (1974). It was urged
that denial of Amendment's Due Process Clause, as that provision
comprehends the principle of equal protection of the
laws, [5] because other children,
including all legitimate children are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas
children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual
dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the
statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. [6] 390 F. Supp., at 1314-321
on
comprehends the principle of equal protection of the
laws, [5] because other children,
including all legitimate children are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas
children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual
dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the
statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. [6] 390 F. Supp., at 1314-321.
Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive
dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some children, who were
not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits under the Act -- although
not underinclusive, since no otherwise eligible child who could establish
actual dependency at the time of death was denied such benefits -- the
court concluded that the Act was not intended merely to replace
actual support that a child lost through the death of the insured parent. Id. , at 1319-1320. Rather, the court characterized the statute as
one designed to replace obligations of support or potential support lost
through death, where the obligation was perceived by Congress, on the
basis of the responsibility of the relation between the child's parents,
to be a valid one. Thus, the Court concluded, the Act

With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative
decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both. Juris.
Statement 28a.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted
probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. [2499-11'. 423 U.S. 819 (1975).
e a valid one. Thus, the Court concluded, the Act

With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative
decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both. Juris.
Statement 28a.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted
probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. [2499-11'. 423 U.S. 819 (1975).

The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and others
similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class, from those
children -- legitimate and illegitimate -- who are relieved by statutory
presumption of any requirement of proving actual dependency at the time of
death through cohabitation or contribution for children in the advantaged
classes may be statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never
been dependent upon the father through whom they
claim. [7] Statutory
classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the
matter depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation
to legitimate legislative aims. "The essential inquiry . . . is . . .
inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the
classification endanger?" Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).

Although the District Court concluded that close judicial scrutiny of the
statute's classifications was not necessary to its conclusion invalidating
those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating
legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally
suspect, [8] 390 F. Supp.,
1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted in
cases involving discrimination along the lines of
race [9] or national
origin. [10] Appellees echo
this approach. We
disagree. [11]
on invalidating
those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating
legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally
suspect, [8] 390 F. Supp.,
1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted in
cases involving discrimination along the lines of
race [9] or national
origin. [10] Appellees echo
this approach. We
disagree. [11]

It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however
defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by
causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears
no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute
to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting
condemnation upon the child in order to express society's disapproval of
the parents' liaisons

But where the law is arbitrary in such a way, we have had no difficult in
finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than
those advocated here. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Richardson v, Davis, 409
U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972); Weber, supra; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
And such irrationality in some classifications does not in itself
demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on
the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable. Moreover, while the law
has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to
the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to
obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e.g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-42 (1971);
Gray & Rudovsky. The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. P. L. Rev
in an inferior position relative to
the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to
obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e.g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-42 (1971);
Gray & Rudovsky. The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. P. L. Rev. 1, 19-38 (1969), perhaps in
part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the
parents rather than the
child, [12] and perhaps in part
because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do,
this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the
severity of pervasiveness of the historic legal and political
discrimination against women and Negroes. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-686 (1973) (plurality opinion).

We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971), that the Act's discrimination between individuals on
the basis of their legitimacy does not "command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process," San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), which out most
exacting scrutiny would
entail. [13] See Jimenez, 417 U.S., at 631-634, 636; Weber, 406 U.S., at 173,
175-176.

IV

Relying on Weber, the Court, in Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 538 (1973), held that "once a State posits a judicially
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their
natural fathers there is o constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its mother." The same principle, which we adhere to
now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies
against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, supra.
there is o constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its mother." The same principle, which we adhere to
now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies
against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, supra.

Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design of the
statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for all children of
deceased insureds who can demonstrate their "need" in terms of dependency
at the times of the insureds' deaths. Cf. Jimenez, 417 U.S., at
634. He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit
language of the Act specifying that the applicant child's classification
as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately relevant only to the
determination of dependency, and by reference to legislative history
indicating that the statute was not a general welfare provision for
legitimate or otherwise "approved" children of deceased insureds, but was
intended just "to replace the support lost by a child when his father . .
. dies . . .." S. Rep. N. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1965).

Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that
conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not
impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom
the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, supra, 406
U.S., at 174-175.
that
conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not
impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom
the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, supra, 406
U.S., at 174-175.

But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute belies the
Secretary's description, and that the statute was intended to provide
support for insured decedents' children generally, if they had a
"legitimate" claim to support, without regard to actual dependency at
death; in any case, they assert, the statute's matrix of classifications
bears no adequate relationship to actual dependency at death. Since such
dependency does not justify the statute's discriminations, appellees
argue, those classifications must fall under Gomez v. Perez,
supra. These assertions are in effect one and the
same. [14] The basis for
appellees' argument is the obvious fact that each of the presumptions of
dependency renders the class of benefit-recipients incrementally
overinclusive, in the sense that some children within each class of
presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the
statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence
upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the
statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are
reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.

A
ense that some children within each class of
presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the
statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence
upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the
statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are
reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.

A

Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency
was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was
unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent
at the time of death, by presuming dependency on the basis of relatively
readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence of a
support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate
the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid
the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large
number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such
presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case
adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so
long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at
772. [15]
presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case
adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so
long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at
772. [15]

In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at
least by a showing that the Government's dollar "lost" to overincluded
benefit recipients is returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative
expense avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 689
(plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here,
however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory
classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect
need not be "scientifically substantiated. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States , 354
U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor, in any case,
do we believe that congress is required in this realm of less than
strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely
in terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts
devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi 422 U.S., at 784 Finally, while the scrutiny by which
their showing is to be judged is not a toothless one, e.g., Jimenez,
supra; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 691 (concurring
opinions of MR JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE POWELL); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to
demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).

B
less one, e.g., Jimenez,
supra; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 691 (concurring
opinions of MR JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE POWELL); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to
demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).

B

Applying these principles, we think that the statutory classifications
challenged here are justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are
consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's
dependency at the time of the parent's death. To begin with, we note that
the statutory scheme is significantly different from the provisions
confronted in cases in which the Court has invalidated legislative
discriminations among children on the basis of legitimacy. See Gomez v. Perez, supra; New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill, supra; Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., supra; Levy v. Louisiana, supra . These differences
render those cases of little assistance to appellees. It could not have
been fairly argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in
those cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an
indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of qualification.
Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the legitimate child
automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied
benefits solely and finally on he basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of
any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff'd. 409
U.S., 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588
(Conn.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v
ate child
automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied
benefits solely and finally on he basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of
any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff'd. 409
U.S., 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588
(Conn.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., supra, the sole partial exception, the statutory
scheme provided for a child's equal recovery under a workmen's
compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only if the
child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child was legitimate.
406 U.S., at 173-174 and n. 12. Jimenez v. Weinberger,
supra, invalidating discrimination among afterborn illegitimate
children as to entitlement to a child's disability benefits under the
Social Security Act, is similarly distinguishable. Under the somewhat
related statutory matrix considered there, legitimate children and those
capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and
those illegitimate solely on account of nonobvious defect in their
parents' marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were born
after the onset of the father's disability. Other (illegitimate) afterborn
children were conclusively denied any benefits, regardless of any showing
of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate
afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the
classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof
of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion that

Hence, it was held that

See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645
nefits, regardless of any showing
of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate
afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the
classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof
of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion that

Hence, it was held that

See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645
(1975); cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S., at 539. But this
conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn
illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on
dependency in Jimenez , is absent here, for, as we have noted, any
otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing
contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline , 412 U.S. 441, 452-453 n.9 (1973),
distinguishing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn.
1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).

It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased insured
is eligible for benefits upon some showing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, we found it impermissible to
qualify the entitlement to dependent's benefits of a married woman in the
uniformed services upon an individualized showing of her husband's actual
dependence upon her for more than half his income, when no such showing of
actual dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services
to obtain dependent's benefits on account of his wife. The invalidity of
that gender-based discrimination rested upon the "overboard" assumption. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying
the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vital to the support
of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not
significantly contribute to their families' support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero , 411 U.S., at
689, n. 23
scrimination rested upon the "overboard" assumption. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying
the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vital to the support
of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not
significantly contribute to their families' support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero , 411 U.S., at
689, n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate
between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned
to alternative considerations. The presumption of dependency is withheld
only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of
actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot say that the factors that give rise
to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to the
likelihood of actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of
the three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (Md.
1973): [16]

"[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of
legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support.
Likewise . . . the children of an invalid marriage . . . would typically
live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him. . . . When an order
of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume compliance
occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support,
would almost as strongly suggest support was ultimately obtained.
Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial
proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men
do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an
illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has
acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who
does not."
port was ultimately obtained.
Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial
proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men
do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an
illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has
acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who
does not."

Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a child may
take personal property from a father's estate, it may reasonably be
thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent's
life and at his death. [17] For
in its embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a
parent would have his property devolve among his children in the event of
death, without specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some
degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental
obligation to such an "illegitimate" child in other circumstances, and
thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as
well as after, life. [18] Accord, Watts v. Veneman, 155 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 88, 476
F.2d 529, 533 (1973).

To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the extension of a
presumption of dependency. But the constitutional question is not whether
such a presumption is required, but whether it is permitted. Nor, in
ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to hypothesize
independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible
alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and
empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical
experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with
its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow
set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators
irability or feasibility of any possible
alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and
empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical
experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with
its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow
set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our role is simply
to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so inconsistent or
insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that
individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child
in a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In
the end, the precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of
specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their
detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality. Cf. United
States, v. Gainey, 380 U.S., at 67. We cannot say that these
expectations are unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the
statute's classifications baseless. We conclude, in short, that, in
failing to extend any presumption of dependency to appellees and others
like them, the Act does not impermissibly discriminate against them as
compared with legitimate children or those illegitimate children who are
statutorily deemed dependent.

Reversed.

It is so ordered.

[1] Section 202(d)(1) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970 and Supp. IV, 1974), provides in
pertinent part:

"Every child (as defined in section 216(e) of this title). . . of an
individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child
--

"(A) has filed an application for child's insurance benefits,

"(B) at the time of such application was filed was unmarried and (1)
either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had
not attained the age of 22 . . . and

"(C) was dependent upon such individual --

"(II) if such individual has died, at the time of such death.
rrently insured individual, if such child
--

"(A) has filed an application for child's insurance benefits,

"(B) at the time of such application was filed was unmarried and (1)
either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had
not attained the age of 22 . . . and

"(C) was dependent upon such individual --

"(II) if such individual has died, at the time of such death.

"shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month,
beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child
becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits . . ..

Section 216(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. IV, 1947), includes, under the
definition of child, inter alia, "the child . . . of an
individual," certain legally adopted children, certain stepchildren, and
certain grandchildren and stepgrandchildren. Additionally, § 216(h)(2)(A)
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), provides:

"In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or
currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the
devolution of intestate personal property . . . by the courts of the State
in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death.
. . . Applicants who according to such law would have the same status
relative to taking intestate personal property as a child . . . shall be
deemed such."

[2] Section 202(d)(3) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3), provides in pertinent part:

"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or
his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of
this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with
or contributing to the support of such child and --

"(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such
individual, or
)(3), provides in pertinent part:

"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or
his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of
this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with
or contributing to the support of such child and --

"(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such
individual, or

"(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual." Additionally,
any child who qualifies under § 216(h)(2)(A), see n. 1, supra, is
considered legitimate for § 202(d)(3) purposes, and thus dependent.

[3] Section 202(d)(3) provides
in pertinent part that "a child deemed to be a child of a fully or
currently insured individual pursuant to section 216(h)(2)(B) or section
216(h)(3) . . . shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such
individual," and therefore presumptively dependent. Section 216(h)(2)(B)
provides:

"If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured
individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured
individual under § 216(h)(2)(A), such applicant shall nevertheless be
deemed to be the child of such insured individual if such insured
individual and the mother and father, as the case may be, of such
applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported
marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the
last sentence of paragraph (1)(B), would have been a valid marriage." The
specified last sentence of § 216(h)(1)(B), in turn, refers only to

"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous
marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its
dissolution, or (ii) resulting in a defect in the procedure followed in
connection with such purported marriage."

Section 216(h)(3) provides:
B), would have been a valid marriage." The
specified last sentence of § 216(h)(1)(B), in turn, refers only to

"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous
marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its
dissolution, or (ii) resulting in a defect in the procedure followed in
connection with such purported marriage."

Section 216(h)(3) provides:

"An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured
individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such
insured individual under § 216(h)(2) shall nevertheless be deemed to be
the child of such insured individual if:

"(C) in the case of a deceased individual --

"(i) such insured individual --

"(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or
daughter,

"(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant,
or

"(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the
applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter,

"and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made before
the death of such individual, or

"(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the
Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured
individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant
at the time such insured individual died."

[4] Upon the original petition
for review under § 205(g), the District Court affirmed the administrative
findings that had then been made, but remanded the case to the Secretary
for him to determine the common-law status of the relationship between the
children's parents, a question left unconsidered in the first
administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point
and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the
children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the
common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to
the Act
of the relationship between the
children's parents, a question left unconsidered in the first
administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point
and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the
children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the
common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to
the Act. The District Court affirmed the administrative conclusion of no
common-law marriage, and then turned to the constitutional questions that
are the subject of this appeal.

[5] See, c.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); United States Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 533 n. 5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973).

[6] The District Court affirmed
the Secretary's factual findings in a "Memorandum and Order" entered
August 30, 1974. Viewing the constitutional claim as one requiring the
convention of a three-judge District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and
2284, the single district judge did not reach that issue. A three-judge
District Court was convened, but disbanded when appellees' renewed motion
for summary judgment omitted their earlier request for injunctive relief.
The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single
district judge.

[7] It adds nothing to say that
the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of
proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not
prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove
the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests.
ief.
The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single
district judge.

[7] It adds nothing to say that
the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of
proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not
prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove
the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests.

[8] Appellees do not suggest,
nor could they successfully, that strict judicial scrutiny of the
statutory classifications is required here because, in regulating
entitlement to survivorship benefits, the statute discriminatorily
interferes with interests of constitutional fundamentality. Weinberger v. Salfi, 442 U.S. 749, 768-770 (1975), Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

The Court, of course, has found the privacy of familial relationships to
be entitled to procedural due process protections from disruption by the
State, whether or not those relationships were legitimized by marriage
under state law. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
But the concerns relevant to that context are only tangential to the
analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way
with familial relations.

[9] See Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[10] See Oyama v. California , 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States , 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1913).
context are only tangential to the
analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way
with familial relations.

[9] See Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[10] See Oyama v. California , 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States , 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1913).

[11] That the statutory
classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children
does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as
discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; cf. Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S., at 169, 172. In view of our
conclusion regarding the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny, we need
not consider how the classes of legitimate and illegitimate children would
be constitutionally defined under appellees' approach.

[12] The significance of this
consideration would seem to be suggested by provisions enabling the
parents to legitimate children born illegitimate. Compare Weber, 406 U.S., at 170-171, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,
539 (1971). Of course, the status of "dependency" as recognized by the
statute here is wholly within the control of the parent.

[13] In Rodriguez the
Court identified a "suspect class" entitled to the protections of strict
judicial scrutiny as one

"saddled with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." 411 U.S., at 28.

[14] We are not bound to agree
with the Secretary's description of the legislative design if the
legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves belie
it. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16
tment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." 411 U.S., at 28.

[14] We are not bound to agree
with the Secretary's description of the legislative design if the
legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves belie
it. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16
(1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S., at 634. Appellees
are unable, however, to summon any meaningful legislative history to
support their position regarding the congressional design. They rely
largely upon a section of the House-Senate Conference Committee Report on
the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act, reproduced at 111 Cong.
Rec. 18383, 18387 (1965), partially explaining the addition of §
216(h)(3), set forth in n. 3, supra , to the Act:

"A child would be paid benefits based on his father's earnings without
regard to whether he has the status of a child under State inheritance
laws if the father was supporting the child or had a legal obligation to
do so."

But the clause's reference to legal obligations to support hardly
establishes that the statute was designed to replace any potential source
of lifetime support; in our view the passage appears only to be a partial
description of the actual effect of §§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II) and (III), set
forth in n. 3, supra, not an enunciation of the general purpose of
the Act.

Thus, appellees, in order to make their case, must ultimately rely upon
the asserted failure of the legislative product adequately to fit the
purported legitimate aim.

[15] That these provisions may
thus reflect a "secondary" purpose of Congress is, of course, of no
moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 274-277 1973).

[16] Vacated and remanded for
further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U.S. 902 (1974):
reaffirmed, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (Md. 1975); jurisdiction postponed to the
legislative product adequately to fit the
purported legitimate aim.

[15] That these provisions may
thus reflect a "secondary" purpose of Congress is, of course, of no
moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 274-277 1973).

[16] Vacated and remanded for
further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U.S. 902 (1974):
reaffirmed, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (Md. 1975); jurisdiction postponed to the

[17] The Secretary, pointing
out that § 202(d)(3) in specific terms provides only that "a child deemed
to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to
section 216(h)(2)(B) or section 216(h)(3) . . . shall be deemed to be the
legitimate child of such individual," urges that we misconstrued the
statute in Jimenez, 417 U.S., at 631, n.2, in concluding that an
applicant qualifying as a child under § 216(h)(2)(A) is to considered as a legitimate child and therefore dependent under § 202(d)(3). We have
no question, however, as to the correctness of that conclusion. First, it
is only through operation of § 216(h)(2)(A) that the recognition of
"legitimacy" by state law under § 202(d)(3)A) as giving rise to a
presumption of dependency takes on a consistent operational meaning
Second, §§ 216(h)(2)(B) and (3) specifically exclude any child qualified
under § 216(h)(2)(A); if a § 216(h)(2)(A) child were not considered
legitimate under § 202(d)(3), this would have the anomalous effect that an
illegitimate child who had been acknowledged in a written statement by the
insured father, for example, would be deprived of otherwise established
eligibility for benefits, see § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), if under applicable
state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an intestate
heir. Moreover the legislative history is clear that the Social Security
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat
ld who had been acknowledged in a written statement by the
insured father, for example, would be deprived of otherwise established
eligibility for benefits, see § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), if under applicable
state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an intestate
heir. Moreover the legislative history is clear that the Social Security
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, §§ 208(b) and (d),
adding § 216(h)(2)(B) to the Act and inserting the provision in §
202(d)(3) specifying that a § 216(h)(2)(B) child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate, and therefore dependent, child for death benefit purposes,
were intended to have the effect of deeming any § 216(h)(2) child
"legitimate" and thus "dependent." See. S. Rep. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., 78-79, 133 (discussing §§207(b) and (d)) (1960); H. R. Rep. No.
1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 91-92, 152 (1960).

[18] Appellees do not suggest,
and we are unwilling to assume, that discriminations against children in
appellees' class in state intestacy laws is constitutionally prohibited,
see Labine v. Vincent, supra, in which case appellees would
be made eligible for benefits under § 216(h)(2)(A).

## Nearby sections

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_77_2c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.