# SSR 77-22c: SSR 77-22c: SECTION 202(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)) -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- INELIGIBILITY OF DIVORCED WIFE UNDER AGE 62 WITH CHILD IN HER CARE -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_77_22c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 77-22c
- **Heading:** SSR 77-22c: SECTION 202(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)) -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- INELIGIBILITY OF DIVORCED WIFE UNDER AGE 62 WITH CHILD IN HER CARE -- CONSTITUTIONALITY
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Wife's Insurance Benefits / SSR 77-22c

## Text

20 CFR 404.313(a)(2)

SSR 77-22c

Mathews v. de Castro, 97 S.Ct. 431 (1976)

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., concurred in the judgment.

Under the Social Security Act a married woman whose husband retires or
becomes disabled is granted benefits if she has a minor or dependent child
in her care. A divorced woman whose former husband retires or becomes
disabled does not receive such benefits. The issue in the present case is
whether this difference in the statutory treatment of married and divorced
women is permissible under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. [1]

I

Section 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1970
ed. and Supp. V), provides for the payment of "wife's insurance
benefits." [2] To qualify under
this section a woman must be the wife or "divorced
wife" [3] of an individual
entitled to old-age or disability benefits. Then, assuming that she meets
the other statutory requirements, the woman is eligible to receive a
monthly payment if she "has attained age 62 or (in the case of a
wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with [her husband]) a
child entitled to a child's insurance benefit. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §
402(b)(1)(B). As the italicized phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has
in her care an entitled child [4] must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to
receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is
aged 62 or over and her exhusband retires or becomes disabled, but if she
is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled
child in her care. [5]
phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has
in her care an entitled child [4] must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to
receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is
aged 62 or over and her exhusband retires or becomes disabled, but if she
is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled
child in her care. [5]

The appellee, Helen de Castro, was divorced from her husband in 1968,
after more than 20 years of marriage. She cares for a disabled child who
is eligible for and receives child's insurance benefits under the Act. In
May of 1971 her former husband applied for and later was granted old-age
insurance benefits. Mrs. de Castro applied for wife's insurance benefits
shortly thereafter. At the time of her application she was 56 years old.
Her application was denied by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare because no wife's benefits are payable to a divorced wife under 62
years of age.

Mrs. de Castro then filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, seeking judicial review of the
Secretary's decision. Her complaint alleged that § 202(b)(1)(B) of the
Social Security Act "operates to arbitrarily discriminate against divorced
wives," and prayed for an order directing the Secretary to pay benefits to
her, a declaration that § 202(b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional, and an
injunction against the section's application.
ern District of Illinois, seeking judicial review of the
Secretary's decision. Her complaint alleged that § 202(b)(1)(B) of the
Social Security Act "operates to arbitrarily discriminate against divorced
wives," and prayed for an order directing the Secretary to pay benefits to
her, a declaration that § 202(b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional, and an
injunction against the section's application.

A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282. The
court considered the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and
granted the relief prayed for in the complaint, holding that the wife's
benefits provision "invidiously discriminates against divorced wives . . .
in violation of the Fifth Amendment." 403 F. Supp. 23, 30. Central to the
court's ruling was its determination that "there is no rational basis for
concluding that a married wife having a dependent child in her care has a
greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for such a child." 403
F. Supp., at 28. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, _____ U.S. _____.

II

The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional
challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary
benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to
improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are "not
confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment." Helvering v. Davis , 301 U.S. 619, 640. In enacting
legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection
"merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.'" Dandridge v
S. 619, 640. In enacting
legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection
"merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams , 397 U.S. 471, 485.

To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged
"is not a toothless one," Mathews v. Lucas , _____ U.S. _____,
_____. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutionality. "So long as its judgments are rational, and not
invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor
and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket." Jefferson v. Hackney , 406 U.S. 535, 546-547. It is with this
principle in mind that we consider the specific constitutional issue
presented by this litigation.

The old-age and disability insurance aspects of the Social Security
system do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay
money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of
these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended.
Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and their families
with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings
due to illness or old age. [6]
do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay
money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of
these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended.
Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and their families
with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings
due to illness or old age. [6]

The wife's insurance benefit at issue here is consistent with this
overriding legislative aim: It enables a married woman already burdened
with dependent children to meet the additional need created
when her husband reaches old-age or becomes disabled. Accordingly, the
District Court's observation that many divorced women receive inadequate
child support payments, while undoubtedly true, is hardly in point. The
same can be said of the District Court's statement that "there is no
rational basis for concluding that a married wife having a dependent child
in her care has a greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for
such a child." For whatever relevance these observations might have in a
case involving a constitutional attack on a statute that gave monetary
benefits to women based on their general overall need, that is not this
case.

Section 202(b)(1)(B) of the Act addresses the particular consequences for
his family of a wage earner's old age or disability. Congress could
rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the
extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the consequent
disruption in the family's economic well being that may occur when the
husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with
her husband must still care for a dependent child.
age earner's old age or disability. Congress could
rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the
extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the consequent
disruption in the family's economic well being that may occur when the
husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with
her husband must still care for a dependent child.

Indeed, Congress took note of exactly these kinds of factors when it
amended the Social Security Act in 1958. Between 1950 and 1958 wives under
retirement age with dependent children received benefits only when their
husbands became entitled to old-age insurance payments. Social Security
Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. Congress then amended the Act
to provide the same benefits when the wage earner becomes
disabled. [7] Social Security
Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. Both
the House and Senate committee reports accompanying the proposed
legislation explained that the purpose of the monthly payments was to give
"recognition to the problems confronting families whose bread-winners"
stop work. The focus was specifically on "adequate protection for [the
husband's] family," and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses
often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might
have to forego work in order to care for her disabled husband. H. R. Rep.
No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).
stop work. The focus was specifically on "adequate protection for [the
husband's] family," and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses
often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might
have to forego work in order to care for her disabled husband. H. R. Rep.
No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).

In view of the legislative purpose, it is hardly surprising that the
congressional judgment evidently was a different one with respect to
divorced women. Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the
economic and personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily
it means that they will go their separate ways. Congress could have
rationally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each
other for financial and other support than do couples who stay married.
The problems that a divorced wife may encounter when her former husband
becomes old or disabled may well differ in kind and degree from those that
a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must face. For instance,
a divorced wife need not forego work in order to stay at home to care for
her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses
accompanying her former husband's old age or disability. In short,
divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for
Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly
payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they
reach the age of 62.
me to care for
her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses
accompanying her former husband's old age or disability. In short,
divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for
Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly
payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they
reach the age of 62.

This is not to say that a husband's old age or disability may never
affect his divorced wife. Many women receive alimony or child-support
after divorce that their former husbands might not be able to pay when
they stop work. But even for this group -- which does not include the
appellee in the present case -- Congress was not constitutionally
obligated to use the Social Security Act to subsidize support payments. It
could rationally decide that the problems created for divorced women
remained less pressing than those faced by women who continue to live with
their husbands.

In any event, the constitutional question "is not whether a statutory
provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the
factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in
the statute." Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749, 777. We conclude,
accordingly, that the statutory classifications involved in this case are
not of such an order as to infringe upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

[1] It is well settled that the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection
principles. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749,
768-770.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. §402(b)(1)
(1970 ed. and Supp. V) provides in full: "(b) Wife's insurance
benefits.

"(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every
divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an
individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such
wife or such divorced wife --
Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749,
768-770.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. §402(b)(1)
(1970 ed. and Supp. V) provides in full: "(b) Wife's insurance
benefits.

"(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every
divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an
individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such
wife or such divorced wife --

"(A) has filed application for wife's insurance benefits,

"(B) has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care
(individually or jointly with such individual) at the time of filing such
application a child entitled to a child's insurance benefit on the basis
of the wages and self-employment income of such individual,

"(C) in the case of a divorced wife, is not married,

"(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is
entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits based on a primary
insurance amount which is less than one-half of the primary insurance
amount of such individual, "shall (subject to subsection(s) of this
section) be entitled to a wife's insurance benefit for each month,
beginning with the first month in which she becomes so entitled to such
insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding the first month in
which any of the following occurs --

"(E) she dies,

"(F) such individual dies,

"(G) in the case of a wife, they are divorced and either (i) she has not
attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 62 but has not been married
to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date
the divorce became effective,

"(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such
individual,

"(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such
individual is entitled to a child's insurance benefit,
attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 62 but has not been married
to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date
the divorce became effective,

"(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such
individual,

"(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such
individual is entitled to a child's insurance benefit,

"(J) she becomes entitled to an old-age or disability insurance benefit
based on a primary insurance amount which is equal to or exceeds one-half
of the primary insurance amount of such individual, or

"(K) such individual is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and
is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits."

[3] The Act defines "divorced
wife" as "a woman divorced from an individual, but only if she had been
married so such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the
date the divorce became effective." 42 U.S.C. §416(d)(1). The term
"divorce" refers to a divorce "a vinculo matrimonii." 42 U.S.C.
§416(d)(4).

[4] The conditions upon which a
child is entitled to receive "child's insurance benefits" are set out in
§202(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §402(d) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Generally,
the child must be dependent on the wage earner and either under 18 years
old (or a full-time student under 22 years old) or under a disability.

[5] The Act also provides for
the payment of "widow's insurance benefits" and "mother's insurance
benefits." 42 U.S.C. §§402(e), (g) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Divorced and
married women, with or without dependent children, are eligible to receive
monthly payments under the sections in certain circumstances not pertinent
here.
a full-time student under 22 years old) or under a disability.

[5] The Act also provides for
the payment of "widow's insurance benefits" and "mother's insurance
benefits." 42 U.S.C. §§402(e), (g) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Divorced and
married women, with or without dependent children, are eligible to receive
monthly payments under the sections in certain circumstances not pertinent
here.

[6] The old-age and disability
insurance programs are distinct from the provisions for public assistance
to the aged and disabled also contained in the Social Security Act. 42
U.S.C. §§ 301-306, 1351-1355, partially repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-603, §
303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1970 ed.,
Supp. V). The insurance programs are contributory in nature and are
designed to prevent public dependency by protecting workers and their
families against common economic hazards. Congress in 1935 contemplated
that the old-age insurance benefits would be "payable wholly regardless of
the need of the recipient." H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1935). The public assistance for the aged program, on the other hand, was
designed "to provide for old people who are dependent upon the public for
support . . .," id ., at 4, and the statute specifically referred to
"aged needy individuals." Social Security Act of 1935, § 1, 49 Stat. 620.
See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra , at 3-6, S. Rep. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 4-7 (1935); Message of the President Recommending
Legislation on Economic Security, H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., 20-28 (1935).
upon the public for
support . . .," id ., at 4, and the statute specifically referred to
"aged needy individuals." Social Security Act of 1935, § 1, 49 Stat. 620.
See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra , at 3-6, S. Rep. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 4-7 (1935); Message of the President Recommending
Legislation on Economic Security, H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., 20-28 (1935).

In 1950 the Act was amended to provide for grants-in-aid to the States so
that assistance could be furnished "to needy individuals eighteen years of
age or older who are permanently and totally disabled." Social Security
Amendments of 1950, § 351, 64 Stat. 555. In 1956 Congress created a
program for disability insurance benefits. Social Security Amendments of
1956, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815. Again, the insurance program, unlike the
public assistance provisions, was not need based and instead was designed
to protect against the specific economic hardships created by involuntary,
premature retirement. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
27-28, 53-54 (1949); Recommendations for Social Security Legislation.
Reports of the Advisory Council on Social Security, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., 69-70, 95-97 (1949); S. Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 3-4 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-6
(1955).

[7] "Wife's insurance benefits"
first became part of the Social Security Act in 1939. Amendments enacted
that year provided for monthly payments to wives 65 years or older whose
husbands were entitled to old-age benefits. Social Security Amendments of
1939, § 201, 53 Stat. 1362. In 1950 Congress dropped the age requirement
for women with retired husbands and entitled children in their care.
Social Security Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. In 1958
Congress extended similar benefits to wives of any age who had entitled
children and disabled husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021
§ 201, 53 Stat. 1362. In 1950 Congress dropped the age requirement
for women with retired husbands and entitled children in their care.
Social Security Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. In 1958
Congress extended similar benefits to wives of any age who had entitled
children and disabled husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. While the legislative history
of the 1950 amendments is sparse, the congressional purpose presumably was
to recognize a family need created when the husband reaches old age and
stops working. Certainly the sole purpose could not have been to allow the
wife to remain at home to take care of the child, as the appellee
suggests, because the presence of the retired husband at home ordinarily
would ensure parental supervision. Similarly, when Congress provided
benefits in 1958 to wives with disabled husbands, it had purposes beyond
the mere encouragement of the wife to stay home and take care of the
children. See H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S.
Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).

## Nearby sections

- [SSR 62-21 SSR 62-21. WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFIT -- BENEFIT AMOUNT WHERE HUSBAND'S OLD-AGE INSURANCE BENEFIT IS REDUCED](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_62_21.md)
- [SSR 62-57 SSR 62-57. RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_62_57.md)
- [SSR 63-1 SSR 63-1: SECTION 202(b). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- IN HER CARE -- CHILD OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_63_1.md)
- [SSR 64-16 SSR 64-16: SECTION 202(b). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- BENEFIT AMOUNT WHERE WIFE UNDER 65 IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_64_16.md)
- [SSR 66-1 SSR 66-1: SECTION 202(b). -- TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE -- PURPORTED FOREIGN DIVORCE -- DOMICILE](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_66_1.md)
- [SSR 67-10c SSR 67-10c: SECTIONS 202(b) and 216(h)(1)(A). -- RELATIONSHIP -- VALIDITY OF DIVORCE -- DOMICILE OF THE WORKER](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_67_10c.md)
- [SSR 67-58 SSR 67-58: SECTIONS 202(b)(1), 216(b)(2), and 216(h)(1)(B). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ENTITLEMENT OF DEEMED SPOUSE UPON DIVORCE OF LEGAL SPOUSE -- ONE-YEAR DURATION-OF-MARRIAGE REQUIREMENT](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_67_58.md)
- [SSR 68-1 SSR 68-1: SECTIONS 202(b)(1) 202(q). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- REENTITLEMENT OF DIVORCED WIFE -- AMOUNT OF BENEFIT REDUCTION BEFORE AND AFTER AGE 65](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_68_1.md)
- [SSR 68-2 SSR 68-2: SECTION 202(b)(1)(H). -- RELATIONSHIP -- VALIDITY OF DIVORCE -- MISNOMER OF PARTIES](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_68_2.md)
- [SSR 68-28 SSR 68-28: Rescinded 1978](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_68_28.md)
- [SSR 68-41 SSR 68-41: Rescinded 1978](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_68_41.md)
- [SSR 69-1 SSR 69-1: SECTIONS 202(b)(1), 216(d)(1), and 216(d)(4). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- DIVORCED WIFE -- "DIVORCE A VINCULO MATRIMONII"](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_69_1.md)
- [SSR 69-2 SSR 69-2: Rescinded 1978](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_69_2.md)
- [SSR 69-13 SSR 69-13: SECTIONS 202(a), 202(b), 202(k), and 202(q). -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFIT -- SIMULTANEOUS ENTITLEMENT OF WIFE TO OLD-AGE INSURANCE BENEFITS -- BENEFIT AMOUNT](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_69_13.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_77_22c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.