# SSR 75-24c: SSR 75-24c: SECTIONS 205(g) and (h), 216(c)(5) and (e)(2) (42 U.S.C. 405(g) and (h), 416(c)(5) and (e)(2)) -- MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- RELATIONSHIP -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NINE-MONTH DURATION OF MARRIAGE REQUIREMENT -- FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_75_24c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 75-24c
- **Heading:** SSR 75-24c: SECTIONS 205(g) and (h), 216(c)(5) and (e)(2) (42 U.S.C. 405(g) and (h), 416(c)(5) and (e)(2)) -- MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- RELATIONSHIP -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NINE-MONTH DURATION OF MARRIAGE REQUIREMENT -- FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Evidence, Procedure, and Certification for Payment / SSR 75-24c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1104(e) and 404.1109(b)

SSR 75-24c

Weinberger v. Salfi, et al , _____ U.S. _____, 95 S.Ct. 2457
(1975)

Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, its
Secretary, the Social Security Administration and various of its
officials, appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California invalidating duration-of-relationship
Social Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and
stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 373 F.Supp. 961 (1974).

That court concluded that it had jurisdiction of the action by virtue of
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and eventually certified the case as a class action. On
the merits, it concluded that the nine-months requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§
416(c)(5) and (e)(2) constituted "irrebutable presumptions" which were
constitutionally invalid under the authority of Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur , 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Vlandis v. Kline ,
412 U.S. 441 (1973), and Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
We hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction of this action
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that while it had jurisdiction of the claims of the
named appellees under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it had no
jurisdiction over the claims asserted on behalf of unnamed class members.
We further decide that the District Court was wrong on the merits of the
constitutional question tendered by the named appellees.

I
id not have jurisdiction of this action
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that while it had jurisdiction of the claims of the
named appellees under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it had no
jurisdiction over the claims asserted on behalf of unnamed class members.
We further decide that the District Court was wrong on the merits of the
constitutional question tendered by the named appellees.

I

Appellee Salfi married the deceased wage earner, Londo L. Salfi, on May
27, 1972. Despite his alleged apparent good health at the time of the
marriage, he suffered a heart attack less than a month later, and died on
November 21, 1972, less than six months after the marriage. Appellee filed
applications for mother's insurance benefits for herself and child's
insurance benefits for her daughter by a previous marriage, Doreen
Kalnins. [1] These applications
were denied by the Social Security Administration, both initially and on
reconsideration at the regional level, solely on the basis of the
duration-of-relationship requirements of §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2), which
define "widow" and "child." The definitions exclude surviving wives and
stepchildren who had their respective relationships to a deceased wage
earner for less than nine months prior to his
death. [2]

The named appellees then filed this action, principally relying on 28
U.S.C. § 1331 for jurisdiction. They sought to represent the class of "all
widows and stepchildren of deceased wage earners who are denied widow's
[ sic ] and children's insurance benefits because the wage earner
died within nine months of his marriage to the applicant or (in case of a
stepchild) the applicant's mother." App., at 8. They alleged at least
partial exhaustion of remedies with regard to their personal claims, but
made no similar allegations with regard to other class members
deceased wage earners who are denied widow's
[ sic ] and children's insurance benefits because the wage earner
died within nine months of his marriage to the applicant or (in case of a
stepchild) the applicant's mother." App., at 8. They alleged at least
partial exhaustion of remedies with regard to their personal claims, but
made no similar allegations with regard to other class members. They
sought declaratory relief against the challenged statute, and injunctive
relief restraining appellants from denying mother's and child's benefits
on the basis of the statute. In addition to attorney's fees and costs,
they also sought "damages or sums due and owing equivalent to the amount
of benefits to which plaintiffs became entitled as of the date of said
entitlement." Id ., at 13.

A three-judge District Court heard the case on cross-motions for summary
judgment, and granted substantially all of the relief prayed for by
appellees. The District Court rendered a declaratory judgment holding the
challenged statute to be unconstitutional, certified a class consisting of
"all otherwise eligible surviving spouses and stepchildren . . .
heretofore disqualified from receipt of . . . benefits by operation" of
the duration-of-relationship requirements, enjoined appellants from
denying benefits on the basis of those requirements, and ordered them to
provide such benefits "from the time of original entitlement." 373
F.Supp., at 966. We noted probable jurisdiction of the Secretary's appeal
from that judgment. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).
tofore disqualified from receipt of . . . benefits by operation" of
the duration-of-relationship requirements, enjoined appellants from
denying benefits on the basis of those requirements, and ordered them to
provide such benefits "from the time of original entitlement." 373
F.Supp., at 966. We noted probable jurisdiction of the Secretary's appeal
from that judgment. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).

In addition to their basic contention that the duration-of-relationship
requirements meet constitutional muster, appellants present several
contentions bearing on the scope of the monetary relief awarded by the
District Court. They contend that the award if barred by sovereign
immunity insofar as it consists of retroactive benefits, that regardless
of sovereign immunity invalidation of the duration-of-relationship
requirements should be given prospective effect only, and that the
District Court did not properly handle certain class action issues.
Because we conclude that the duration-of-relationship requirements are
constitutional, we have no occasion to reach the retroactivity and class
action issues. We are confronted, however, by a serious question as to
whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this suit.

II

The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides:

On its face, this provision bars district court federal question
jurisdiction over suits, such as this one, which seek to recover Social
Security benefits. Yet it was § 1331 jurisdiction which appellees
successfully invoked in the District Court. That court considered this
provision, but concluded that it was inapplicable because it amounted to
no more than a codification of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The District Court's reading of § 405(h) was, we
think, entirely too narrow.
recover Social
Security benefits. Yet it was § 1331 jurisdiction which appellees
successfully invoked in the District Court. That court considered this
provision, but concluded that it was inapplicable because it amounted to
no more than a codification of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The District Court's reading of § 405(h) was, we
think, entirely too narrow.

That the third sentence of § 405(h) is more than a codified requirement
of administrative exhaustion is plain from its own language, which is
sweeping and direct and which states that no action shall be
brought under § 1331, not merely that only those actions shall be brought
in which administrative remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, if the
third sentence is construed to be nothing more than a requirement of
administrative exhaustion, it would be superfluous. This is because the
firs tow sentences of § 405(h), which appear in the
margin, [4] assure that
administrative exhausting will be required. Specifically, they prevent
review of decisions of the Secretary save as provided in the Act, which
provision is made in §
405(g). [5] The latter section
prescribes typical requirements for review of matters before an
administrative agency, including administrative
exhaustion. [6] Thus the District
Court's treatment of the third sentence of § 405(h) ignored not only that
sentence's plain language, but also relegated it to a function which is
already performed by other statutory provisions.
n is made in §
405(g). [5] The latter section
prescribes typical requirements for review of matters before an
administrative agency, including administrative
exhaustion. [6] Thus the District
Court's treatment of the third sentence of § 405(h) ignored not only that
sentence's plain language, but also relegated it to a function which is
already performed by other statutory provisions.

A somewhat more substantial argument that the third sentence of § 405(h)
does not deprive the District Court of federal question jurisdiction
relies on the fact that it only affects actions to recover on "any claim
arising under [Title II]" of the Social Security
Act. [7] The argument is that the
present action arises under the Constitution and not under Title II. It
would of course be fruitless to contend that appellees' claim is one which
does not arise under the Constitution, since their constitutional
arguments are critical to their complaint. But it is just as fruitless to
argue that this action does not also arise under the Social Security Act.
For not only is it Social Security benefits which appellees seek to
recover, but it is the Social Security Act which provides both the
standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of their
constitutional contentions. Appellees sought, and the District Court
granted, a judgment directing the Secretary to pay Social Security
benefits. To contend that such an action does not arise under the act
whose benefits are sought is to ignore both the language and the substance
of the complaint and judgment. This being so, the third sentence of §
405(h) precludes resort to federal question jurisdiction for the
adjudication of appellees' constitutional contentions.

It has also been argued that Johnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361
. To contend that such an action does not arise under the act
whose benefits are sought is to ignore both the language and the substance
of the complaint and judgment. This being so, the third sentence of §
405(h) precludes resort to federal question jurisdiction for the
adjudication of appellees' constitutional contentions.

It has also been argued that Johnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361
(1974), supports the proposition that appellees are not seeking to recover
on a claim arising under Title II. In that case we considered 38 U.S.C. §
221(a), which provides:

We were required to resolve whether this language precluded an attack on
the constitutionality of a statutory limitation. We concluded that it did
not, basically because such a limitation was not a "decision" of the
Administrator "on any question of law or fact"; indeed, the "decision" had
been made by Congress, not the Administrator, and the issue was one which
the Administrator considered to be beyond his jurisdiction. 415 U.S., at
367-368. Thus the question sought to be litigated was simply not within §
211(a)'s express language, and there was accordingly no basis for
concluding that congress sought to preclude review of the
constitutionality of veterans' legislation.

The language of § 405(h) is quite different. Its reach is not limited to
decisions of the Secretary on issues of law or fact. Rather, it extends to
any "action" seeking "to recover on any [Social Security] claim" --
irrespective of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated by
discretionary decisions of the Secretary or by his nondiscretionary
application of allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions.
te different. Its reach is not limited to
decisions of the Secretary on issues of law or fact. Rather, it extends to
any "action" seeking "to recover on any [Social Security] claim" --
irrespective of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated by
discretionary decisions of the Secretary or by his nondiscretionary
application of allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions.

There is another reason why Johnson v. Robison is inapposite. It
was expressly based at least in part on the fact that if § 221(a) reached
constitutional challenges to statutory limitations, then absolutely no
judicial consideration of the issue would be available. Not only would
such a restriction have been extraordinary, such that "clear and
convincing evidence" would be required before we would ascribe such intent
to Congress, id ., at 373, but it would have raised a serious
constitutional question of the validity of the statute as so construed. Id ., at 366-367. In the present case, as will be discussed below,
the Social Security Act itself provides jurisdiction for constitutional
challenges to its provisions. Thus the plain words of the third sentence
of § 405(h) do not preclude constitutional challenges. They simply require
that they be brought under jurisdictional grants contained in the Act, and
thus in conformity with the same standards which are applicable to
nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act. The result is not only of
unquestionable constitutionality, but it is also manifestly reasonable,
since it assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to constitutional
litigation to ascertain, for example, that the particular claims involved
are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under other provisions
of the Social Security Act.
constitutional claims arising under the Act. The result is not only of
unquestionable constitutionality, but it is also manifestly reasonable,
since it assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to constitutional
litigation to ascertain, for example, that the particular claims involved
are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under other provisions
of the Social Security Act.

As has been stated, the Social Security Act itself provides for district
court review of the Secretary's determinations. Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
provides that [a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action
commenced within 60 days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision. . . ." See n.5, supra . The question with which we must
now deal is whether this provision could serve as a jurisdictional basis
for the District Court's consideration of the present case. We conclude
that it provided jurisdiction only as to the named appellees and not as to
the unnamed members of the
class. [8]

Section 405(g) specifies the following requirements for judicial review:
(1) a final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing; (2)
commencement of a civil action within 60 days after the mailing of the
notice of such decision (or within such further time as the Secretary may
allow); and (3) filing of the action in an appropriate district court, in
general that of the plaintiff's residence or principal place of business.
The second and third of these requirements specify, respectively, a
statute of limitations and appropriate venue. As such, they are waivable
by the parties, and not having been timely raised below, see Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 8(c), 12(h)(1), need not be considered here
the action in an appropriate district court, in
general that of the plaintiff's residence or principal place of business.
The second and third of these requirements specify, respectively, a
statute of limitations and appropriate venue. As such, they are waivable
by the parties, and not having been timely raised below, see Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 8(c), 12(h)(1), need not be considered here. We interpret the
first requirement, however, to be central to the requisite grant of
subject matter jurisdiction the statute empowers district courts to review
a particular type of decision by the Secretary, that type being those
which are "final" and "made after a hearing."

In the present case, the complaint seeks review of the denial of benefits
based on the plain wording of a statute which is alleged to be
unconstitutional. That a denial on such grounds which are beyond the power
of the Secretary to affect, is nonetheless a decision of the Secretary for
these purposes has been heretofore established. Flemming v. Nestor ,
363 U.S. 603 (1960). As to class members, however, the complaint is
deficient in that it contains no allegations that they have even filed an
application with the Secretary, much less that he has rendered any
decision, final or otherwise, review of which is sought. The class thus
cannot satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Other sources of jurisdiction being foreclosed by § 405(h), the District
Court was without jurisdiction over so much of the complaint as concerns
the class, and it should have entered an appropriate order of
dismissal.
at he has rendered any
decision, final or otherwise, review of which is sought. The class thus
cannot satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Other sources of jurisdiction being foreclosed by § 405(h), the District
Court was without jurisdiction over so much of the complaint as concerns
the class, and it should have entered an appropriate order of
dismissal.

The jurisdictional issue with respect to the named appellees is somewhat
more difficult. In a paragraph entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies," the
complaint alleges that they fully presented their claims for benefits "to
their district Social Security Office and, upon denial, to the Regional
Office for reconsideration." It further alleges that they have no dispute
with the Regional Office's findings of fact or applications of statutory
law, and that the only issue is a matter of constitutional law which is
beyond the Secretary's competence. On their face these allegations with
regard to exhaustion fall short of meeting the literal requirement of §
405(g) that there have been a "final decision of the Secretary made after
a hearing." They also fall short of satisfying the Secretary's
regulations, which specify that the finality required for judicial review
is achieved only after the further steps of a hearing before an
administrative law judge and, possibly, consideration by the Appeals
Council. See 20 CFR §§ 404.916, 404.940, 404.951 (1974).

We have previously recognized that the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular
administrative scheme at issue. Parisi v. Davidson , 405 U.S. 34
view
is achieved only after the further steps of a hearing before an
administrative law judge and, possibly, consideration by the Appeals
Council. See 20 CFR §§ 404.916, 404.940, 404.951 (1974).

We have previously recognized that the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular
administrative scheme at issue. Parisi v. Davidson , 405 U.S. 34
(1972); McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185 (1969). Exhaustion is
generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with
agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that
it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the
parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to
compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. See e.g.,
McKart v. United states, id ., at 193-194. Plainly these purposes have
been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue
is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is
beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither
otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act.
Once a benefit applicant has presented his or her claim as sufficiently
high a level of review to satisfy the Secretary's administrative needs,
further exhaustion would not merely be futile for the applicant, but would
also be a commitment of administrative resources unsupported by any
administrative or judicial interest.
rwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act.
Once a benefit applicant has presented his or her claim as sufficiently
high a level of review to satisfy the Secretary's administrative needs,
further exhaustion would not merely be futile for the applicant, but would
also be a commitment of administrative resources unsupported by any
administrative or judicial interest.

The present case, of course, is significantly different from McKart in that a "final decision" is a statutorily specified
jurisdictional prerequisite. The requirement is, therefore, as we have
previously noted, something more than simply a codification of the
judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion, and may not be dispensed with
merely by a judicial conclusion of futility such as that made by the
District Court here. But it is equally true that the requirement of a
"final decision" contained in § 405(g) is not precisely analogous to the
more classical jurisdictional requirements contained in such sections of
Title 28 as 1331 and 1332. The term "final decision" is not only left
undefined by the Act, but its meaning is left to the Secretary to flesh
out by regulation. [9] Section
405( l ) of the Act accords the Secretary complete authority to
delegate his statutory duties to officers and employees of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. The statutory scheme is thus one in
which the Secretary may specify such requirements for exhaustion as he
deems serve his own interests in effective and efficient administration.
While a court may not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the
contrary conclusion of the Secretary, we believe it would be inconsistent
with the congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from determining in
particular cases that full exhaustion of internal review procedures is not
necessary for a decision to be "final" within the language of § 405(g).
d efficient administration.
While a court may not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the
contrary conclusion of the Secretary, we believe it would be inconsistent
with the congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from determining in
particular cases that full exhaustion of internal review procedures is not
necessary for a decision to be "final" within the language of § 405(g).

Much the same may be said about the statutory requirement that the
Secretary's decision be made "after a hearing." Not only would a hearing
be futile and wasteful, once the Secretary has determined that the only
issue to be resolved is a matter of constitutional law concededly beyond
his competence to decide, but the Secretary may, of course, award benefits
without requiring a hearing. We do not understand the statute to prevent
him from similarly determining in favor of the applicant, without a
hearing, all issues with regard to eligibility save for one as to which he
considers a hearing to be useless.

In the present case the Secretary does not raise any challenge to the
sufficiency of the allegations of exhaustion in appellees' complaint. We
interpret this to be a determination by him that for the purposes of his
litigation the reconsideration determination is "final." The named
appellees thus satisfy the requirements for § 405(g) judicial review, and
we proceed to the merits of their
claim. [10]

III
the Secretary does not raise any challenge to the
sufficiency of the allegations of exhaustion in appellees' complaint. We
interpret this to be a determination by him that for the purposes of his
litigation the reconsideration determination is "final." The named
appellees thus satisfy the requirements for § 405(g) judicial review, and
we proceed to the merits of their
claim. [10]

III

The District Court relied on congressional history for the proposition
that the duration-of-relationship requirement was intended to prevent the
use of sham marriages to secure Social Security payments. As such,
concluded the court, "the requirement constitutes a presumption that
marriages like Mrs. Salfi's which did not precede the wage earner's death
by at least nine months, were entered into for the purpose of securing
Social Security benefits." 373 F.Supp., at 965. The presumption was
moreover, conclusive, because applicants were not afforded an opportunity
to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The court held that under
our decisions in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur , 414 U.S.
632 (1974), Vlandis v. Kline , 412 U.S. 441 (1973), and Stanley
v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the requirement was
unconstitutional, because it presumed a fact which was not necessarily or
universally true.

Our ultimate conclusion is that the District Court was wrong in holding
the duration-of-relationship requirement unconstitutional. Because we are
aware that our various holdings in related cases do not all sound
precisely the same note, we will explain ourselves at some length.

The standard for testing the validity of Congress' Social Security
classification was clearly stated in Flemming v. Nestor , 363 U.S.
603, 611 (1960):
rict Court was wrong in holding
the duration-of-relationship requirement unconstitutional. Because we are
aware that our various holdings in related cases do not all sound
precisely the same note, we will explain ourselves at some length.

The standard for testing the validity of Congress' Social Security
classification was clearly stated in Flemming v. Nestor , 363 U.S.
603, 611 (1960):

In Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. 78 (1971), a portion of the
Social Security Act which required an otherwise entitled disability
claimant to be subjected to an "offset" by reason of his simultaneous
receipt of state workmen's compensation benefits was attacked as being
violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The claimant
in that case asserted that the provision was arbitrary in that it required
offsetting of a state workmen's compensation payment, but not of a similar
payment made by a private disability insurer. The Court said:

Two Terms earlier the Court had decided the case of Dandridge v.
Williams , 397 U.S. 471 (1970), in which it rejected a claim that
Maryland welfare legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had said:

The relation between the equal protection analysis of Dandridge and the Fifth Amendment due process analysis of Flemming v. Nestor and Richardson v. Belcher was described in the latter case in this
language:

These cases quite plainly lay down the government principle for disposing
of constitutional challenges to classifications in this type of social
welfare legislation. The District Court, however, chose to rely on Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, supra; Vlandis v. Kline,
supra , and Stanley v. Illinois, supra . It characterized this
recent group of cases as dealing with "the appropriateness of conclusive
evidentiary presumptions." 373 F.Supp., at 965.
ng
of constitutional challenges to classifications in this type of social
welfare legislation. The District Court, however, chose to rely on Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, supra; Vlandis v. Kline,
supra , and Stanley v. Illinois, supra . It characterized this
recent group of cases as dealing with "the appropriateness of conclusive
evidentiary presumptions." 373 F.Supp., at 965.

Stanley v. Illinois held that it was a denial of the equal
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for a State to deny a
hearing on parental fitness to an unwed father when such a hearing was
granted to all other parents whose custody of their children was
challenged. This Court referred to the fact that the "rights to conceive
and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' Mayer v.
Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), 'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma , 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and 'rights far more
precious . . . than property rights.' May v. Anderson , 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953)." 405 U.S., at 651.

In Vlandis v. Kline , a statutory definition of "residents" for
purposes of fixing tuition to be paid by students in a state university
system was held invalid. The Court held that where Connecticut purported
to be concerned with residency, it might not at the same time deny to one
seeking to meet its test of residency the opportunity to show factors
clearly bearing on that issue. 412 U.S., at 452.
v. Kline , a statutory definition of "residents" for
purposes of fixing tuition to be paid by students in a state university
system was held invalid. The Court held that where Connecticut purported
to be concerned with residency, it might not at the same time deny to one
seeking to meet its test of residency the opportunity to show factors
clearly bearing on that issue. 412 U.S., at 452.

In LaFleur the Court held invalid, on the authority of Stanley and Vlandis , school board regulations requiring
pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave commencing five
months before the expected birth. The Court stated its long-standing
recognition "that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment," 414 U.S., at 639-640, and that "overly
restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on
the exercise of these protected freedoms." Id ., at 640.

We hold that these cases are not controlling on the issue before us now.
Unlike the claims involved in Stanley and LaFleur , a
noncontractural claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no
constitutionally protected status, Dandridge v. Williams, supra ,
though of course Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such
claimants on the basis of a "bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group," U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno ,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), or on the basis of criteria which bear no
rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal. Jimenez v.
Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry , 413 U.S. 508, 513-514 (1973). Unlike the statutory scheme in Vlandis , 412 U.S., at 449, the Social Security Act does not purport
to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then
make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible. As in Starns v. Malkerson , 326 F.Supp. 234 (Minn
Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry , 413 U.S. 508, 513-514 (1973). Unlike the statutory scheme in Vlandis , 412 U.S., at 449, the Social Security Act does not purport
to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then
make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible. As in Starns v. Malkerson , 326 F.Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S.
985 (1971), the benefits here are available upon compliance with an
objective criterion, one which the legislature considered to bear a
sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used as
the test for eligibility. Like the plaintiffs in Starns , appellants
are completely free to present evidence that they meet the specified
requirements; failing in this effort, their only constitutional claim is
that the test they cannot meet is not so rationally related to a
legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to deprive them of
benefits available to those who do satisfy that test.

We think that the District Court's extension of the holdings of Stanley, Vlandis and LaFleur to the eligibility requirement
in issue here would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine
of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore
been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. For example, the very Section of Title 42 which
authorizes an action such as this, § 405(g), requires that a claim be
filed within 60 days after administrative remedies are exhausted. It is
indisputable that this requirement places people who file heir claims more
than 60 days after exhaustion in a different "class" than people who file
their claims within the time limit. If we were to follow the District
Court's analysis, we would first try to ascertain the congressional
"purpose" behind the provision, and probably would conclude that it was to
prevent stale claims from being asserted in court
s requirement places people who file heir claims more
than 60 days after exhaustion in a different "class" than people who file
their claims within the time limit. If we were to follow the District
Court's analysis, we would first try to ascertain the congressional
"purpose" behind the provision, and probably would conclude that it was to
prevent stale claims from being asserted in court. We would then turn to
the question of whether such a flat cutoff provision was necessary to
protect the Secretary from stale claims, whether it would be possible to
make individualized determinations as to any prejudice suffered by the
Secretary as the result of an untimely filing, and whether or not an
individualized hearing on that issue should be required in each case. This
would represent a degree of judicial involvement in the legislative
function which we have eschewed except in the most unusual circumstances,
and which is quite unlike the judicial role mandated by Dandridge,
Belcher and Flemming v. Nestor , as well as by a host of cases
arising from legislative efforts to regulate private business
enterprises.

In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co ., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court
dealt with a claim that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated by an Oklahoma statute which subjected opticians to
a system of detailed regulation, but which exempted sellers of
ready-to-wear glasses. In sustaining the Statute the Court said:
efforts to regulate private business
enterprises.

In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co ., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court
dealt with a claim that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated by an Oklahoma statute which subjected opticians to
a system of detailed regulation, but which exempted sellers of
ready-to-wear glasses. In sustaining the Statute the Court said:

More recently, in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411
U.S. 356 (1973), the Court sustained the constitutionality of a regulation
promulgated under the Truth in Lending Act which made the Act's disclosure
provisions applicable whenever credit is offered to a consumer "for which
either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an
agreement, is or may be payable in more than four installments." Id.,
at 362. The regulation was challenged because it was said to conclusively
presume that payments made under an agreement providing for more than four
installments necessarily included a finance charge, when in fact that
might not be the case. The Court rejected the constitutional challenge in
this language:

If the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments permit this latitude to
legislative decisions regulating the private sector of the economy, they
surely allow no less latitude in prescribing the conditions upon which
funds shall be dispensed from the public treasure. Dandridge v.
Williams, supra . With these principles in mind, we turn to consider
the statutory provisions which the District Court held invalid.
and Fourteenth Amendments permit this latitude to
legislative decisions regulating the private sector of the economy, they
surely allow no less latitude in prescribing the conditions upon which
funds shall be dispensed from the public treasure. Dandridge v.
Williams, supra . With these principles in mind, we turn to consider
the statutory provisions which the District Court held invalid.

Title 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 402 is the basic congressional enactment
defining eligibility for old age survivors' insurance benefit payments,
and is divided into 23 lettered subsections. Subsection 402(g) is entitled
"Mother's insurance benefits," and primarily governs the claim of appellee
Salfi. Subsection 402(d) governs eligibility for child's insurance
benefits, and is the provision under which appellee Kalnins makes her
claim. These subsections, along with others in § 402, specify the types of
social risks for which protection is provided by what is basically a
statutory insurance policy.

A different insurance system, but similarly defined by statute and
operated by a governmental entity, was the subject of our consideration in Geduldig v. Aiello , 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and our disposition of
that case is instructive. We reversed the judgment of a district court
which had held that a California state disability insurance program was
invalid insofar as it failed to provide benefits for disabilities
associated with normal pregnancy. In our opinion we said:
governmental entity, was the subject of our consideration in Geduldig v. Aiello , 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and our disposition of
that case is instructive. We reversed the judgment of a district court
which had held that a California state disability insurance program was
invalid insofar as it failed to provide benefits for disabilities
associated with normal pregnancy. In our opinion we said:

The present case is somewhat different, since the Secretary principally
defends the duration-of-relationship requirement not as a reasonable
legislative decision to exclude a particular type of risk from coverage,
but instead as a method of assuring that payments are only made upon the
occurrence of events the risk of which is covered by the insurance
program. [11] Commercial
insurance policies have traditionally relied upon fixed, prophylactic
rules to protect against abuses which could expand liability beyond the
risks which are within the general concept of its coverage. For example,
life insurance policies often cover deaths by suicide, but not those
suicides which were contemplated when the policy was purchased. Frequently
the method chosen to contain liability within these conceptual bounds is a
strict rule that deaths by suicide are covered if, and only if, they occur
some fixed period of time after the policy is issued. See, e.g., 9
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 40.50 (2d Ed. 1962). While such a
limitation doubtless proves in particular cases to be "under-inclusive" or
"over-inclusive," in light of its presumed purpose, it is nonetheless a
widely accepted response to legitimate interests in administrative economy
and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms. When the
Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social insurance
programs, it does not come up against a constitutional stone wall. Rather,
it may rely on such rules so long as they comport with the standards of
legislative reasonableness enunciated in cases like Dandridge v
timate interests in administrative economy
and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms. When the
Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social insurance
programs, it does not come up against a constitutional stone wall. Rather,
it may rely on such rules so long as they comport with the standards of
legislative reasonableness enunciated in cases like Dandridge v.
Williams and Richardson v. Belcher .

Under those standards, the question raised is not whether a statutory
provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the
factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in
the statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions, and would
be directly contrary to our holding in Mourning , supra. Nor is the
question whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class
which caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members
of the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its
concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse
which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded
both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against
its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual
determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.
We conclude that the duration-of-relationship test meets this
constitutional standard.
an abuse
which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded
both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against
its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual
determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.
We conclude that the duration-of-relationship test meets this
constitutional standard.

The danger of persons entering a marriage relationship not to enjoy its
traditional benefits, but instead to enable one spouse to claim benefits
upon the anticipated early death of the wage earner, has been recognized
from the very beginning of the Social Security program. While no early
legislative history addresses itself specifically to the
duration-of-relationship requirement for mother's and child's benefits,
there were discussions of the analogous requirement for receipt of wife's
benefits under § 402(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 416(b), defining "wife." Dr. A.J.
Altmeyer, Chairman of the Social Security Board, noted that a five-year
requirement "should be strict enough to prevent marriage in anticipation
of larger benefit payments." Hearings on Social Security before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Con., 1st Sess., 2297. Similarly, the
Advisory Council on Social Security stated:

The Advisory Council also stated, with regard to § 402(e) widow's
benefits which, like mother's benefits, depend on the § 416(c) definition
of "widow":

Similar concerns were reflected; in the House and Senate Reports on the
1946 amendment which reduced to three years the required duration of a
marriage for the purposes of an eligible "wife." It was stated:
ncil on Social Security stated:

The Advisory Council also stated, with regard to § 402(e) widow's
benefits which, like mother's benefits, depend on the § 416(c) definition
of "widow":

Similar concerns were reflected; in the House and Senate Reports on the
1946 amendment which reduced to three years the required duration of a
marriage for the purposes of an eligible "wife." It was stated:

Later amendments to the Act have been accompanied by discussions of the
duration-of-relationship requirements contained in the definitions of
"widow" and "child." Like the early history of analogous requirements,
they reflect congressional concern with the possibility of relationships
entered for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In 1967, when the
durational period was reduced from one year to nine months, the House
report stated:

When in 1971 Congress added the provisions of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) §
416(k)(2) (eliminating the nine-months requirement with respect to
remarriages of persons who had previously been married for more than nine
months), the House report observed that, "This duration-of-relationship
requirement is included in the law as a general precaution against the
payment of benefits where the marriage was undertaken to secure benefit
rights." H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 55.

Undoubtedly the concerns reflected in this congressional material are
legitimate, involving as they do the integrity of both the Social Security
Trust Fund and the marriage relationship. It is also undoubtedly true that
the duration-of-relationship requirement operates to lessen the likelihood
of abuse through sham relationships entered in contemplation of imminent
death. We also think that Congress could rationally have concluded that
any imprecision from which it might suffer was justified by its ease and
certainty of operation.
rust Fund and the marriage relationship. It is also undoubtedly true that
the duration-of-relationship requirement operates to lessen the likelihood
of abuse through sham relationships entered in contemplation of imminent
death. We also think that Congress could rationally have concluded that
any imprecision from which it might suffer was justified by its ease and
certainty of operation.

We note initially that the requirement is effective only within a
somewhat narrow range of situations lacking certain characteristics which
might reasonably be thought to establish the genuineness of a marital
relationship which involves children (and thus the potential for mother's
and child's benefits). Even though a surviving wife has not been married
for a period of nine months immediately prior to her husband's death, she
is nonetheless within the definition of "widow" if she meets one of the
other disjunctive requirements of § 416(c). If she is the mother of her
late husband's son or daughter; if she legally adopted his son or daughter
while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was under the
age of 18; if he legally adopted her son or daughter under the same
circumstances; or if during their marriage, however short, they legally
adopted a child under the age of 18 -- in any of these circumstances the
surviving wife may claim widow's or mother's benefits even though she has
not been married to her husband for a full nine
months. [12] The common
denominator of these disjunctive requirements appears to us to be the
assumption of responsibilities normally associated with marriage, and we
think that Congress has treated them as alternative indicia of the
fact that the marriage was entered into for a reason other than the desire
to shortly acquire benefits
s
not been married to her husband for a full nine
months. [12] The common
denominator of these disjunctive requirements appears to us to be the
assumption of responsibilities normally associated with marriage, and we
think that Congress has treated them as alternative indicia of the
fact that the marriage was entered into for a reason other than the desire
to shortly acquire benefits. The marriages in which the widow must depend
on qualifying under the nine-months requirement are those in which none of
these other objective evidences of the assumption of marital
responsibilities are present.

Even so, § 416(c)(5) undoubtedly excludes some surviving wives who
married with no anticipation of shortly becoming widows, and it may be
that appellee Salfi is among them. It likewise may be true that the
requirement does not filter out every such claimant, if a wage earner
lingers longer than anticipated, or in the case of illnesses which can be
recognized as terminal more than nine months prior to death. But neither
of these facts necessarily renders the statutory scheme
unconstitutional.

While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding legitimate
claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, and of relying on a
rule which may not exclude some obviously sham arrangements, we think it
clear that Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a course. Large
numbers of people are eligible for these programs and are potentially
subject to inquiry as to the validity of their relationships to wage
earners. These people include not only the classes which appellees
represent, [13] but also
claimants in other programs for which the Social Security Act imposes
duration-of-relationship
requirements
rationally choose to adopt such a course. Large
numbers of people are eligible for these programs and are potentially
subject to inquiry as to the validity of their relationships to wage
earners. These people include not only the classes which appellees
represent, [13] but also
claimants in other programs for which the Social Security Act imposes
duration-of-relationship
requirements. [14] Not only
does the prophylactic approach thus obviate the necessity for large
numbers of individualized determinations, but it also protects large
numbers of claimants who satisfy the rule from the uncertainties and
delays of administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their
marriages. Nor is it all clear that individual determinations could
effectively filter out sham arrangements, since neither marital intent,
life expectancy nor knowledge of terminal illness has been shown by
appellees to be reliably
determinable. [15] Finally, the
very possibility of prevailing at a hearing could reasonably be expected
to encourage sham relationships.

The administrative difficulties of individual eligibility determinations
are without doubt matters which congress may consider when determining
whether to rely on rules which sweep more broadly than the evils with
which they seek to deal. In this sense, the duration-of-relationship
requirement represents nor merely a substantive policy determination that
benefits should be awarded only on the basis of genuine marital
relationships, but also a substantive policy determination that limited
resources would not be well spent in making individual determinations. It
is an expression of Congress' policy choice that the Social Security
system, and its millions of beneficiaries, would be best served by a
prophylactic rule which bars claims arising from the bulk of sham
marriages which are actually entered, which discourages such marriages
from ever taking place, and which is also objective and easily
administered.
making individual determinations. It
is an expression of Congress' policy choice that the Social Security
system, and its millions of beneficiaries, would be best served by a
prophylactic rule which bars claims arising from the bulk of sham
marriages which are actually entered, which discourages such marriages
from ever taking place, and which is also objective and easily
administered.

The Constitution does not preclude such policy choices as a price for
conducting programs for the distribution of social insurance benefits. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, supra , at 496. Unlike Criminal prosecutions, or
the custody proceedings at issue in Stanley v. Illinois , such
programs do not involve affirmative government action which seriously
curtails important liberties cognizable under the Constitution. There is
thus no basis for our requiring individualized determinations when
Congress can rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are
appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties
of individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the
precise effectuation of congressional concern which they might be expected
to produce.

The judgment of the District Court is Reversed .

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

[1] Title 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1)
provides for benefits for the "widow" of an insured wage earner,
regardless of her age, if she had in her care a "child" of such wage
earner who is entitled to child's insurance benefits. Title 42 U.S.C. §
402(d) provides for benefits for the "child" of a deceased insured wage
earner who was dependent upon him at his death.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)
provides in full:
C. § 402(g)(1)
provides for benefits for the "widow" of an insured wage earner,
regardless of her age, if she had in her care a "child" of such wage
earner who is entitled to child's insurance benefits. Title 42 U.S.C. §
402(d) provides for benefits for the "child" of a deceased insured wage
earner who was dependent upon him at his death.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)
provides in full:

"(c) The term 'widow' (except when used in section 402(i) of this title)
means the surviving wife of an individual, but only if (1) she is the
mother of his son or daughter, (2) she legally adopted his son or
daughter, while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was
under the age of eighteen, (3) he legally adopted her son or daughter
while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was under the
age of eighteen, (4) she was married to him at the time both of them
legally adopted a child under the age of eighteen, (5) she was married to
him for a period of not less than nine months immediately prior to the day
on which he died, or (6) in the month prior to the month of her marriage
to him (A) she was entitled to, or on application therefor and attainment
of age 62 in such prior month would have been entitled to, benefits under
subsection (b), (e), or (h) of section 402 of this title, (B) she had
attained age eighteen and was entitled to, or on application therefor
would have been entitled to, benefits under subsection (d) of such section
(subject, however, to section 402(s) of this title), or (C) she was
entitled to, or upon application therefor and attainment of the required
age (if any) would have been entitled to, a widow's, child's (after
attainment of age 18), or parent's insurance annuity under section 228e of
Title 45."

It is undisputed that appellee Salfi cannot qualify as a "widow" by
satisfying conditions (1), (2), (3), (4), or (6).

Title 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) § 416(e) provides in part:
to, or upon application therefor and attainment of the required
age (if any) would have been entitled to, a widow's, child's (after
attainment of age 18), or parent's insurance annuity under section 228e of
Title 45."

It is undisputed that appellee Salfi cannot qualify as a "widow" by
satisfying conditions (1), (2), (3), (4), or (6).

Title 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) § 416(e) provides in part:

"(e) The term "child" means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an
individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not less than
one year immediately preceding the day on which application for child's
insurance benefits is filed or (if the insured individual is deceased) not
less than nine months immediately preceding the day on which such
individual died. . . ."

Prior to 1967, the required duration of relationship was a full year. The
reduction to nine months was accomplished in Pub. L. 90-248, §§ 156(a) and
(b), 81 Stat. 832, 866.

[3] The literal wording of this
section bars actions under § 41 of Title 28. At the time § 405(h) was
enacted, and prior to the 1948 recodification of Title 28, § 41 contained
all of that title's grants of jurisdiction to the United States district
courts, save for several special-purpose jurisdictional grants of no
relevance to the constitutionality of Social Security statutes.

[4] "Title 42 U.s.C. 405(h)
provides in full:

"Finality of Secretary's decision .

"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be
binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings
of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person,
tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action
against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee
thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any
claim arising under this subchapter."

[5] "Title 42 U.S.C. 405(g)
provides:

"Judicial review.
No findings
of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person,
tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action
against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee
thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any
claim arising under this subchapter."

[5] "Title 42 U.S.C. 405(g)
provides:

"Judicial review.

"Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in
controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action
commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allows. Such
action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the
judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal
place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place
of business within any such judicial district, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. As part of his answer the
Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decisions complained of
are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing
the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing
of his answer the
Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decisions complained of
are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing
the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been
denied by the Secretary or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of
this section which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the
hearing before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or such
individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed
under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the
question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such
regulations. The court shall, on motion of the Secretary made before he
files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by
the Secretary, and may, at any time, on good cause shown, order additional
evidence to be taken before the Secretary, and the Secretary shall, after
the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so
ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or its decision, or both,
and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of
fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony
upon which is action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional
or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the
extent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision.
The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject
to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions
ditional record and testimony
upon which is action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional
or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the
extent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision.
The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject
to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions. Any
action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Secretary
or any vacancy in such office."

[6] Nor can it be argued that
the third sentence of § 405(h) simply serves to prevent a by-pass of the §
405(g) requirements by filing a district court complaint alleging
entitlement prior to applying for benefits through administrative
channels. The entitlement sections of the Act specify the filing of an
application as a prerequisite to entitlement, so a court could not in any
event award benefits absent an application. See §§ 402(a) h. See also §
402(h))1). Once the application is filed, it is either approved, in which
event any suit for benefits should be mooted, or it is denied. Even if the
denial is nonfinal, it is fill a "decision of the Secretary" which, by
virtue of the second sentence of § 405(h), may not be reviewed save
pursuant to § 405(g).

Our Brother BRENNAN relies heavily, post, at 5-7, on a passage from a
Senate document entitled "Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure." Sen. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1941).
The basic monograph itself is described as "embodying the results of the
investigation made by the staff of said Committee relative to the
administrative practices and procedures of several agencies of the
government
, on a passage from a
Senate document entitled "Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure." Sen. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1941).
The basic monograph itself is described as "embodying the results of the
investigation made by the staff of said Committee relative to the
administrative practices and procedures of several agencies of the
government. "Following the text of the monograph is the "Appendix," which
in turn is described in a "foreword" as follows: "This statement,
developed from a report by the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
making certain recommendations for the Board's consideration, describes
the essential features of a hearing and review system which has been
authorized by the Board and which is designed to meet both the statutory
requirements and the social purposes of the old-age and survivors
insurance program. It has been developed during several months under the
leadership of Ralph F. Fuchs, professor of law, Washington University, St.
Louis, Mo., a consultant of this Bureau, by whom the Bureau's report, in
the main, was written." Id ., at 34. After the "Foreward" follows a
three-part report in somewhat smaller type, the second of which parts is
entitled "Considerations Affecting the Hearing and Review System." Within
this second part, appears the language which the dissenters characterize
as "the reading which the Social Security Board itself gave to the
provision soon after it went into effect." Post , at 5.
n." Id ., at 34. After the "Foreward" follows a
three-part report in somewhat smaller type, the second of which parts is
entitled "Considerations Affecting the Hearing and Review System." Within
this second part, appears the language which the dissenters characterize
as "the reading which the Social Security Board itself gave to the
provision soon after it went into effect." Post , at 5.

We have some doubts that the report of a consultant can be properly
characterized as incorporating the "reading which the Social Security
Board itself gave" to this provision. Even if the report as a whole is
stated to have been "approved" by the Board, there is no indication that
such approval extends beyond the report's broad-brush conceptualization of
"the essential features of a hearing and review system." In any event, we
do not agree that an administrative agency's general discussion of a
statute, occurring after its passage, and in a context which does not
require it to focus closely on the operative impact of a particular
provision, is either an important indicator of congressional intent, as
the dissent suggests, post , at 7, or an authoritative source for
the proposition that a provision serves a particular function. Finally,
even if the report is an accurate reading of the Act, its significance
goes only to whether the third sentence of § 405(h) serves a function in addition to that which we believe it serves; the possibility that
the District Court's interpretation renders the third sentence only
largely superfluous rather than totally so is not sufficient to disturb
our analysis of the role of that sentence in this case.

[7] Title II contains the
old-age, survivors and disability insurance programs codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq.
function in addition to that which we believe it serves; the possibility that
the District Court's interpretation renders the third sentence only
largely superfluous rather than totally so is not sufficient to disturb
our analysis of the role of that sentence in this case.

[7] Title II contains the
old-age, survivors and disability insurance programs codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq.

[8] Since § 405(h) is the basis
for district court jurisdiction, there is some question as to whether it
had authority to enjoin the operation of the duration-of-relationship
requirements. Section 405(h) accords authority to affirm, modify or
reverse a decision of the Secretary. It contains no suggestion that a
reviewing court is empowered to enter an injunctive decree whose operation
reaches beyond the particular applicants before the court. In view of our
dispositions of the class action and constitutional issues in this case,
the only significance of this problem goes to our own jurisdiction. If a §
405(g) court is not empowered to enjoin the operation of a federal
statute, then a three-judge District Court was not required to hear this
case, 28 U.S.C. § 2252, and we are without jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
1253. However, whether or not the three-judge court was properly convened,
that court did hold a federal statute unconstitutional in a civil action
to which a federal agency and officers are parties. We thus have direct
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1232. McLucas v.
DeChamplain , slip op., at 8-9 (No. 73-1346, Apr. 15, 1975).

[9] Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(a):
on under 18 U.S.C. §
1253. However, whether or not the three-judge court was properly convened,
that court did hold a federal statute unconstitutional in a civil action
to which a federal agency and officers are parties. We thus have direct
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1232. McLucas v.
DeChamplain , slip op., at 8-9 (No. 73-1346, Apr. 15, 1975).

[9] Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(a):

"(a) The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and
regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the
provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry
out such provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and
regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the
proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in
order to establish the right to benefits hereunder."

[10] Section 405(g)
jurisdiction in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , 420 U.S. 00 (1975), was
similarly present. In that case the Secretary stipulated that exhaustion
would have been futile, and he did not make any contentions that
Wiesenfeld had not complied with the requirements of § 405(g), Id .,
at n.8.

[11] The Secretary also
briefly argues that the duration-of-relationship requirement rationally
serves the interest in providing benefits only for persons who are likely
to have become dependent upon the wage earner. Brief for Appellants 11-12.
In view of our conclusion with regard to his principal argument, we need
not consider this justification.

[12] Similarly, the natural or
adopted child of a deceased wage earner need not meet the nine-months
requirement. Sec 42 U.S.C. (Supp II) § 416(e)(1).
est in providing benefits only for persons who are likely
to have become dependent upon the wage earner. Brief for Appellants 11-12.
In view of our conclusion with regard to his principal argument, we need
not consider this justification.

[12] Similarly, the natural or
adopted child of a deceased wage earner need not meet the nine-months
requirement. Sec 42 U.S.C. (Supp II) § 416(e)(1).

[13] According to the Social
Security Administration, in calendar 1973 there were 125,000 applicants
for mother's benefits, 1,313,000 for child's benefits, and 403,000 for
widow's/widower's benefits. While these figures include large numbers of
persons who qualify on bases other than the duration of their relationship
with a wage earner, they also doubtlessly exclude persons who did not even
apply because of the durational restriction, or who were thereby dissuaded
from entering the relationship. A feel for the magnitude of the potential
for case-by-case determinations can also be developed by reference to the
Social Security Administration's estimate that judgment for the class
which the named appellants sought to represent would involve payments of
$30 million, assuming retroactivity to 1967. This figure does not reflect
payments in behalf of persons who met the objective nine-months
requirement, or who could not meet it and therefore either never applied
or never entered the relationship.
Social Security Administration's estimate that judgment for the class
which the named appellants sought to represent would involve payments of
$30 million, assuming retroactivity to 1967. This figure does not reflect
payments in behalf of persons who met the objective nine-months
requirement, or who could not meet it and therefore either never applied
or never entered the relationship.

[14] See U.S.C. §§ 416(b), (f)
and (g), defining "wife," "husband" and "widower." These various
definitions impose duration-of-relationship requirements with regard to
wife's benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), "husband's" benefits, 42 U.S.C. §
402(c), and "widower's" benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(f). In addition,
"widow's" benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), are available only to those women
who satisfy §416(c)'s definition of "widow." "Parent's" benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 402(h), are also subject to an objective eligibility requirement
which is similar to a duration-of-relationship requirement. Under 42
U.S.C. § 402(b)(3), stepparents and adopting parents may receive benefits
with respect to a deceased child who was providing at least half of their
support, but only if the marriage or adoption creating their relationship
occurred prior to the child's 16th birthday.

[15] Appellees do not contend
that marital intent or life expectancy can be entered in contemplation of
imminent death unless the wage earner's "terminal illness" was known, the
inquiry need go to farther than the issue of whether the parties to the
marriage knew of such an illness. They claim that applicants could
demonstrate the state of their knowledge by physicians' affidavits or
documentary medical evidence. These contentions are not, however,
supported by any factual rebuttals of the variety of difficulties which
Congress was entitled to expect to be encountered. See McGowan v.
Maryland , 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
ies to the
marriage knew of such an illness. They claim that applicants could
demonstrate the state of their knowledge by physicians' affidavits or
documentary medical evidence. These contentions are not, however,
supported by any factual rebuttals of the variety of difficulties which
Congress was entitled to expect to be encountered. See McGowan v.
Maryland , 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).

For example, all evidence of "knowledge of terminal illness" would
ordinarily be under the control of applicants, which suggests that they
should bear the burden of proof. But this burden could be convincingly
carried only with respect to wage earners who happened to have had
physical examinations shortly before their weddings; on the other hand,
awarding benefits where the wage earner had not had an examination, and no
medical evidence was available, would encourage participants in sham
arrangements to conceal their own adverse medical evidence. Even when
adequate medical evidence was available there could easily be difficulties
in determining whether a wage earner's physical condition amounted to a
"terminal illness"; if that concept was restricted to conditions which
were virtually certain to result in an early death, benefits would
probably be too broadly available, since certainty of imminent death
rather than a mere high probability of it is not a prerequisite to a sham
relationship; yet inquiries into the degree of likelihood of death could
become very complex indeed.
d to a
"terminal illness"; if that concept was restricted to conditions which
were virtually certain to result in an early death, benefits would
probably be too broadly available, since certainty of imminent death
rather than a mere high probability of it is not a prerequisite to a sham
relationship; yet inquiries into the degree of likelihood of death could
become very complex indeed.

Additional problems with appellees' proposed test arise because it, like
the duration-of-relationship requirement, is not precisely related to the
objective of denying benefits which are sought on the basis of sham
relationships. In the first place, it presumably would be necessary to
limit the requirement of terminal illness inquiries to instances in which
death occurred within a specified period after marriage. It would also
appear to be necessary to set an outside limit on the length of the period
within which death was expected that would disqualify applicants (after
all, and paraphrasing Lord Keynes, in the long run we are all expected to
die). Yet there will always be persons on one side of such lines who are
seriously disadvantaged vis-á-vis persons on the other side. More
basically, appellees' test would clearly exclude persons who knew of a
wage earner's imminent death, but who entered their marriages for reasons
entirely unrelated to Social Security benefits, such as to fulfill the
promises of a long-standing engagement. Thus Appellees' proposed test
would be subject to exactly the same constitutional attacks which they
direct towards the test on which Congress chose to rely.
est would clearly exclude persons who knew of a
wage earner's imminent death, but who entered their marriages for reasons
entirely unrelated to Social Security benefits, such as to fulfill the
promises of a long-standing engagement. Thus Appellees' proposed test
would be subject to exactly the same constitutional attacks which they
direct towards the test on which Congress chose to rely.

Appellees point out that 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) § 416(k) provides for
limited exceptions to the duration-of-relationship requirement, unless the
Secretary determines that at the time of the marriage the wage earner
"could not have reasonably been expected to live for nine months." They
argue that this represents Congress' recognition that case-by-case
consideration would not impose an inordinate administrative burden. The
argument is without merit. Section 416(k) expresses Congress' willingness
to accept case-by-case inquiries with regard to limited classes which bear
particular indices of genuineness (the section is available in cases of
accidental death, death in the line of military duty, and remarriages of
persons previously married for more than nine months). This says nothing
about the feasibility of making such inquiries in other circumstances,
much less the rationality of choosing not to do so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_75_24c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.