# SSR 73-17c: SSR 73-17c: SECTION 218(t) (42 U.S. 418(t)). -- STATE AND LOCAL COVERAGE -- STATUS OF JAIL COOKS OF ALLEN AND VIGO COUNTIES -- INDIANA

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_73_17c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 73-17c
- **Heading:** SSR 73-17c: SECTION 218(t) (42 U.S. 418(t)). -- STATE AND LOCAL COVERAGE -- STATUS OF JAIL COOKS OF ALLEN AND VIGO COUNTIES -- INDIANA
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / OASI / Voluntary Agreements for Coverage of State and Local Employees / SSR 73-17c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1275

SSR 73-17c

State of Indiana v. Finch , U.S.D.C., S.D. Ind., No. IP
67-C-57 (6/2/72)

STECKLER, District Judge :

This action was instituted by the State of Indiana against the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare for a re-determination, pursuant to
Section 218(t) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418(t), of the
correctness of an assessment made by the Secretary against the State of
Indiana. The assessment was based upon a finding by the Secretary that
four cooks working in the jails of Allen and Vigo Counties, Indiana, were
employees of the counties and covered for Social Security purposes by an
agreement, pursuant to Section 218 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418, between
the State and the Secretary.

The State took the position that the cooks were employees of the county
sheriffs in their personal capacity and not employees of the counties.

The questions presented were, whether as a matter of law the State had
the right to go behind the Secretary's determination, and if so, whether
in determining the employment relationship between the cooks and the
counties, or the cooks and the county sheriffs, the State would have the
right to have a trial by jury in resolving the issues of fact.

The Court concluded that the State was entitled to a judicial review of
the Secretary's determination of whether the cooks were employees of the
counties, and further, that it was entitled to a jury trial for resolution
of the factual issues, or that if the Court elected, it could have the
benefit of an advisory jury verdict.

The case was assigned for jury trial and tried to completion.

The facts as brought out by the evidence were substantially
undisputed.

The services of the cooks involved were engaged by the county sheriffs of
Allen and Vigo Counties to prepare meals for the prisoners in their
charge.
the factual issues, or that if the Court elected, it could have the
benefit of an advisory jury verdict.

The case was assigned for jury trial and tried to completion.

The facts as brought out by the evidence were substantially
undisputed.

The services of the cooks involved were engaged by the county sheriffs of
Allen and Vigo Counties to prepare meals for the prisoners in their
charge.

Two of the cooks worked full-time and were paid regular salaries, and two
of them worked as substitutes and were paid salaries. In each instance the
food was prepared in the county jail with the use of cooking utensils and
other equipment furnished by the county. Each of the cooks were supervised
in the performance of her work by the sheriff or his wife. The food
prepared was either supplied or paid for by the sheriff. Both the cooks'
salaries and the cost of the food were paid out of funds provided by the
county to the sheriff for the feeding of prisoners. The funds were kept in
a bank account in the sheriff's name as sheriff. These funds were referred
to as "meal money," and were computed on the basis of a fixed amount per
meal per prisoner, determined by the State Auditor pursuant to IC 1971,
17-3-12-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 49-1323 (Burns Repl. 1964). The cooks were
not listed on any county pay roll, although each jail was regularly
examined and inspected by county and state officials.

It was undisputed that the cooks were employees and not independent
contractors.
omputed on the basis of a fixed amount per
meal per prisoner, determined by the State Auditor pursuant to IC 1971,
17-3-12-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 49-1323 (Burns Repl. 1964). The cooks were
not listed on any county pay roll, although each jail was regularly
examined and inspected by county and state officials.

It was undisputed that the cooks were employees and not independent
contractors.

At the close of the State's evidence, and again at the close of all the
evidence, the Secretary moved for a directed verdict. Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(b), the Court reversed ruling on the legal questions raised by
the motion and submitted the case to the jury on special interrogatories
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 49. At the same time that Court announced that
the issues of fact would be submitted to the jury, the Court granted
counsel for the defendant thirty (30) days from the return of a verdict
within which to submit a brief on the questions of law raised by the
motion if the jury should find for the State and against the position
taken by the Secretary.

Four interrogatories were submitted to the jury for answer, and their
special verdict, in substance, was that the cooks were employees of the
respective sheriffs in their personal capacities as individuals and not in
their official capacity as county sheriffs.

The case is now before the Court for the determination of the legal
questions raised by the defendant's motion for directed verdict presented
at the close of all the evidence.
for answer, and their
special verdict, in substance, was that the cooks were employees of the
respective sheriffs in their personal capacities as individuals and not in
their official capacity as county sheriffs.

The case is now before the Court for the determination of the legal
questions raised by the defendant's motion for directed verdict presented
at the close of all the evidence.

Notwithstanding the special verdict of the jury, the issues now before
the Court are whether the cooks, as a matter of fact, and in law, were
employees of the county, or whether they were employees of the respective
sheriffs in their personal capacity; and further, whether the Secretary's
determination that the cooks were employees of the county, and thus
covered for Social Security purposes by the agreement between the State
and the Secretary, is subject to re-determination by judicial review.

The review of administrative agency decisions is limited in scope by
certain settled principles of administrative law, and generally the
judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis
for the conclusions approved by the administrative body. See Moog
Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C. , 355 U.S. 411 (1957); Swift and Co. v.
United States , 316 U.S. 216 (1941); Rochester Telephone Corp. v.
United States , 307 U.S. 125 (1939).

Plaintiff asserts that this case is not one of normal judicial review of
an agency decision where the Court's inquiry is limited to determining
whether there was a "rational basis" for the agency decision. Plaintiff
urges that it is entitled to a trial de novo and therefore the
Court should give no special weight to the Secretary's decision on the
facts.
ed States , 307 U.S. 125 (1939).

Plaintiff asserts that this case is not one of normal judicial review of
an agency decision where the Court's inquiry is limited to determining
whether there was a "rational basis" for the agency decision. Plaintiff
urges that it is entitled to a trial de novo and therefore the
Court should give no special weight to the Secretary's decision on the
facts.

Plaintiff bases its argument exclusively on the language of Sections
418(t) and 405(g) of Title 42. The former provides for "redetermination"
of an assessment made by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare at
the insistence of a state. The latter provides for "review" of a decision
of the Secretary in the case of an individual claimant, and states that
"the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." Plaintiff concludes that the
failure of Section 418(t) to make any mention of giving special weight to
the Secretary's findings indicates that it was the intent of Congress that
where the agency deals with an individual, its decision on the facts is to
receive conclusive weight; however, where the agency deals with one of the
states, its decision on the facts receives no greater weight than that of
the state.

Notwithstanding plaintiff's contentions, nowhere in Section 418(t) are
the words "trial de novo " used. The text of Section 418(s)
provides, in its pertinent part:

A trial de novo would make the review by the Secretary superfluous
and would require this Court to duplicate the function of the
administrative agency. To grant such a trial would also ignore the mandate
of Section 218(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418(i), which provides:

Furthermore, a de novo trial would impair the uniform nationwide
application of the Social Security Act by promoting potentially different
results as to each of the fifty states under Section 218 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 418.
ate the function of the
administrative agency. To grant such a trial would also ignore the mandate
of Section 218(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418(i), which provides:

Furthermore, a de novo trial would impair the uniform nationwide
application of the Social Security Act by promoting potentially different
results as to each of the fifty states under Section 218 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 418.

When faced with problems of statutory construction, the courts generally
show great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the agency
charged with its administration and require that the agency decision be
sustained if reasonable. See Udall v. Tallman , 380 U.S. 1 (1964); F.H.A. v. The Darlington, Inc. , 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Universal
Battery Company v. United States , 281 U.S. 580 (1929); Commonwealth
of Kentucky, etc. v. Hobby, et al. , 209 F.2d 300 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

There appears to be no authority as to whether the above rule would be
applicable to agency interpretation of Section 218(t) of the Social
Security Act. However, in the absence of any statutory language
specifically providing for trial de novo , the Court will apply the
general rule to Section 218(t). Therefore, the judicial function of this
Court will be limited to determining whether the Secretary's finding that
the cooks were employees of the county was reasonable, and if so, the
motion for directed verdict must be sustained. In reaching this decision
it will be necessary to make a statutory analysis both of the pertinent
sections of the Social Security Act and of the Indiana statutes pertaining
to the sheriff's office and the keeping of the prisoners in his
custody.

Plaintiff contends that the sheriff is not an agent of the county for the
purpose of feeding prisoners; that he is both conservator of the peace and
keeper of the jail, but in discharging his duty of feeding prisoners as
keeper of the jail, he acts as an independent contractor and not as an
employee of the county.
to the sheriff's office and the keeping of the prisoners in his
custody.

Plaintiff contends that the sheriff is not an agent of the county for the
purpose of feeding prisoners; that he is both conservator of the peace and
keeper of the jail, but in discharging his duty of feeding prisoners as
keeper of the jail, he acts as an independent contractor and not as an
employee of the county.

The plaintiff bases this theory on "common law indicia." However, this
case does not turn on common law indicia. The issue here is whether under
the Social Security Act, a federal statute, the sheriff is an employee of
the county. Section 218(b)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418(b)(3) reads:

"The term 'employee' includes an officer of a State or political
subdivision." Further, Paragraph (a)(2) of Section 218 of the contract
between the State of Indiana and the Federal Security Administrator, which
is the basic document for Social Security coverage of Indiana state and
municipal employees, contains this same definition. In Indiana the sheriff
is an officer of the county in which he is elected. See Ind. Const. Art.
VI § 2, 11. Although the "common law indicia" may indicate otherwise, for
the purposes of this case, the sheriff himself is an employee of the
county.

County jails in Indiana are required by State law to be established by
the county commissioners, at the expense of the county. IC 1971, 11-5-1-1,
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1001 (Burns Repl. 1956) provides:

Indiana sheriffs are required by law to keep the jail and the prisoners
therein, and to provide proper food and fuel for the prisoners. IC 1971,
11-5-1-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1004 (Burns Repl. 1956) provides:
iana are required by State law to be established by
the county commissioners, at the expense of the county. IC 1971, 11-5-1-1,
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1001 (Burns Repl. 1956) provides:

Indiana sheriffs are required by law to keep the jail and the prisoners
therein, and to provide proper food and fuel for the prisoners. IC 1971,
11-5-1-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1004 (Burns Repl. 1956) provides:

The sheriff is expressly authorized by Indiana law to appoint such
assistants as may be necessary for the discharge of the duties imposed by
statute upon him. Therefore the sheriffs herein had the right to employ
cooks for the jails over which they were the statutory jailors. In this
regard IC 1971 13-3-71-2, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 49-1002 (Burns Repl. 1964),
provides:

The money to pay the cooks herein was expressly included in the money
which Vigo and Allen Counties provided as required by Indiana law to pay
for prisoners' meals. IC 1971, 17-3-12-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 49-1323 (Burns
Repl. 1964), states:

Applying the pertinent provisions of Federal and State law to the instant
case, the Court concludes that the Secretary's decision was correct. The
cooks were employed by the sheriffs of Allen and Vigo Counties in the
course of performance of their duties as keepers of the county jails. The
sheriffs were employees of the county pursuant to Section 218 of the
agreement between the State of Indiana and the Secretary. It follows that
the cooks were themselves the employees of the respective counties for the
purposes of Section 218 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 418, and the agreement
between the State and the Secretary.

In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the motion for
directed verdict should be, and it is, hereby granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_OASI_SSR_73_17c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.