# SSR 82-47c: SSR 82-47c: SECTIONS 216(i) and 223(d) (42 U.S.C. 416(i) and 423(d)) DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ABILITY TO PERFORM SEDENTARY WORK -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_82_47c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 82-47c
- **Heading:** SSR 82-47c: SECTIONS 216(i) and 223(d) (42 U.S.C. 416(i) and 423(d)) DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ABILITY TO PERFORM SEDENTARY WORK -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / DI / Vocational / SSR 82-47c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1501-404.1598

SSR 82-47c

Taylor v. Schweiker , USDC, Middle District, N.C., Greensboro
Division, Civ. No. C-80-705-G (9/24/81)

GORDON, District Judge:

The plaintiff seeks judicial review, pursuant to §205(g) of the Social
Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g), of the final decision of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, denying him the establishment of a
period of disability and for disability insurance benefits.

The plaintiff first field his application on December 5, 1979, alleging
that he became unable to work at 27 years of age because of joints leg,
back and side pain and swelling. The application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration. Plaintiff thereafter requested a hearing. The
requested hearing was held on June 25, 1980 before Administrative Law
Judge Rufus K. Hayworth. On July 18, 1980, the Administrative Law Judge
rendered his decision, find that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of
disability or to disability insurance benefits. The Appeals Council
thereafter denied plaintiff's request for review. This action was timely
instituted on December 31, 1980.

The entire administrative record has now been certified to the Court, and
the parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. These motions will be
deemed to have been made pursuant to Rule 7(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking a judgment of the Court affirming or reversing the
decision of the Secretary. (See Torphy v. Weinberger, 384 F. Supp.
1117, 1119 (E.D. Wis. 1974.)

The Administrative Law Judge found that plaintiff was unable to perform
his past relevant work and yet retained the residual functional capacity
for sedentary work. He also found that plaintiff was twenty-eight years
old at the time of the hearing, that he had limited education and
unskilled work experience. (Record, p. 19.) Plaintiff does not dispute any
of these findings of fact.
74.)

The Administrative Law Judge found that plaintiff was unable to perform
his past relevant work and yet retained the residual functional capacity
for sedentary work. He also found that plaintiff was twenty-eight years
old at the time of the hearing, that he had limited education and
unskilled work experience. (Record, p. 19.) Plaintiff does not dispute any
of these findings of fact.

After making his findings of fact, the Administrative Law Judge applied
the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" found in 20 C.F.R., Subpart A, App. 2.
Given the set of facts he had found about plaintiff, the Administrative
Law Judge found that "Rule 201.18 of Table No. 1. Appendix 2, Subpart P,
of Regulations No. 4 and . . . No. 16, direct a finding of not
disabled." [1] (Record, p. 19.)
Because the regulations take administrative notice of the existence of
jobs in the national economy for persons with plaintiff's age, education,
work experience and residual capacity, the Administrative Law Judge found
that they showed plaintiff's continuing ability to engage in gainful work. See Stallings v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 956, 959 (W.D.Tenn. 1980); Boyce v. Harris, 492 F.Supp. 751, 752 (D.S.C. 1980).

Plaintiff's single objection to the ruling of the Secretary is the use of
the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" to dictate a finding of not disabled
in his case. He argues that: "I. A vocational expert is required in all
but exceptional cases." and "II. The grid regulations deny claimant's due
process rights by imposing an irrebuttable presumption."
rris, 492 F.Supp. 751, 752 (D.S.C. 1980).

Plaintiff's single objection to the ruling of the Secretary is the use of
the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" to dictate a finding of not disabled
in his case. He argues that: "I. A vocational expert is required in all
but exceptional cases." and "II. The grid regulations deny claimant's due
process rights by imposing an irrebuttable presumption."

In its first argument, plaintiff's well-written brief relies in large
part on case law within and without this circuit which antedates Frady
v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals' most
recent decision in this area. Thus, with all due respect to Judge
McMillan's decision in Williams v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 214
(W.D.N.C. 1980) and to the reasoning in cases outside this circuit, such
as Santise v. Harris, 501 F.Supp. 274 (D.N.J. 1980), the court is
required to follow the apparent holding of Frady v. Harris, supra, insofar as it controls this case. In that case, the Court of Appeals
specifically affirmed a decision holding Frady ineligible for benefits,
based on his ability to perform sedentary work and the application of the
regulatory grid to his situation. The Court held that the Secretary could
properly apply "broadly based regulatory 'medical vocational guidelines'
dealing with what constitutes capacity to perform and with the
availability of particular types of employment." Id. at 145.

* * * * *
ing Frady ineligible for benefits,
based on his ability to perform sedentary work and the application of the
regulatory grid to his situation. The Court held that the Secretary could
properly apply "broadly based regulatory 'medical vocational guidelines'
dealing with what constitutes capacity to perform and with the
availability of particular types of employment." Id. at 145.

* * * * *

Plaintiff's second contention, that use of the regulations is an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law, was
not addressed by the Court of Appeals in Frady v. Harris; therefore, it will require this Court's special attention. Plaintiff's
main claim of unconstitutionality rests on the "irrebuttable presumption"
line of Supreme Court cases which begins (or so it is thought) with Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). The first case to use the
terminology of "irrebuttable presumption" was Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973). In striking down a Connecticut rule which declared all
university students nonresidents of the state whose addresses at
enrollment were outside Connecticut, the Court said:

Id. at 452.

* * * * *

In more recent years, the opponents of the "irrebuttable presumption"
doctrine seem to have the upper hand. A hard blow fell in Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). There the Court upheld a social security
regulation which defined "widow" and "child" so as to exclude persons who
held the described relationships to a deceased wage earner for less than
nine months. Although a three-judge district court has struck down the
definition as an "irrebuttable presumption," the Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, held that the definition simply states a requirement for the
receipt of benefits: widows and stepchildren must have been related to the
deceased wage earner for more than nine months in order to qualify for
benefits as his survivors. Id at 772
e months. Although a three-judge district court has struck down the
definition as an "irrebuttable presumption," the Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, held that the definition simply states a requirement for the
receipt of benefits: widows and stepchildren must have been related to the
deceased wage earner for more than nine months in order to qualify for
benefits as his survivors. Id at 772. Therefore, the Court held,
the standard which the classification must pass is that of rationality.

* * * * *

Justice Rehnquist distinguished two predecessor irrebuttable presumption
cases, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Cleveland
Board of Education v. LeFleur, supra, as concerned with specially
protected individual freedoms. He did not discuss Bell v. Burson,
supra, or United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
supra. The former dealt with a Georgia provision which automatically
suspended the drivers' license of an uninsured driver involved in an
accident, regardless of fault. The latter dealt with a food stamp
regulation barring from participation any member of a family 18 years old
or older who was simultaneously claimed as a dependent by a non-eligible
taxpayer. Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Vlandis v. Kline,
supra, but few commentators have regarded that effort as
successful:

Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting
Fundamental and Not-so-fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" through a
Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977 Duke L.J. 143, 158.
neously claimed as a dependent by a non-eligible
taxpayer. Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Vlandis v. Kline,
supra, but few commentators have regarded that effort as
successful:

Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting
Fundamental and Not-so-fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" through a
Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977 Duke L.J. 143, 158.

The strong language of Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, the weakness of
Justice Rehnquist's effort to distinguish and preserve Vlandis v.
Kline, supra, and the speculations of commentators like Professor
Yarbrough cause courts to wonder whether the "irrebuttable presumption"
doctrine has any vitality at all in current constitutional jurisprudence.
The Second Circuit held that after the former Weinberger v. Salfi, the "irrebuttable presumption" rule has merged into a simple rule of
rationality which, under the Equal Protection Clause, governs all
legislative classifications. Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866,
869 (2nd Cir. 1977); Clayborne v. Califano, 603 F.2d 372, 380 (2nd
Cir. 1979) ("Whatever viability the above-mentioned cases retain in their
respective contexts, the Supreme Court has all but ruled them inapplicable
to social welfare legislation.") The Seventh Circuit has ruled that after Weinberger v. Salfi, the Supreme Court has tacitly abandoned the
doctrine altogether. See Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 629-30
(7th Cir.), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 906 (1979). Therefore,
plaintiff's argument confronts an initial difficulty in asserting the
validity of the "irrebuttable presumptions" doctrine, especially in the
light of recent cases which seem to discount that doctrine. See, e.g.,
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 429 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976).
ltogether. See Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 629-30
(7th Cir.), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 906 (1979). Therefore,
plaintiff's argument confronts an initial difficulty in asserting the
validity of the "irrebuttable presumptions" doctrine, especially in the
light of recent cases which seem to discount that doctrine. See, e.g.,
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 429 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976).

Nonetheless, if this Court assumes, as it will, that the "irrebuttable
presumptions" doctrine is yet potent, the question remains: What standard
of review does this strand of Due Process employ? The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has analyzed the irrebuttable presumptions cases in two
classes, and that analysis seems applicable here. In Malmed v.
Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir. 1980), the Court reasoned that
cases like Stanley v. Illinois, supra, applied an exacting standard
of review to presumptions which impinged on specially protected rights. Id. at 575. Those cases have no bearing here, where plaintiff is
not claiming any infringement on his constitutional liberties. But the
other category of cases, typified by Vlandis v. Kline, supra, are
cases which "invalidated a classification adopted as an administrative
device to serve as evidence of another classification." Id. at 574.
Those cases, the Court said:

Id. at 575. Therefore, the proper question for this Court as drawn
from a somewhat cloudy set of Supreme Court cases, is whether the
"Medical-Vocational Guidelines" employed by the Secretary offer a
reasonable proxy for the testimony of a vocational expert.

As noted above, the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" are intended to serve
as administrative notice of the availability of jobs within the national
economy for persons of certain age, education, work experience, and
residual work capacity. The introduction to the guidelines explains how
the tables are derived:
e Secretary offer a
reasonable proxy for the testimony of a vocational expert.

As noted above, the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" are intended to serve
as administrative notice of the availability of jobs within the national
economy for persons of certain age, education, work experience, and
residual work capacity. The introduction to the guidelines explains how
the tables are derived:

20 C.F.R., Subpart P, App. 2, § 200.00(b). In other words, the grid,
using the same kind of information which is available to a vocational
expert, yields a uniform set of the same findings as would such an expert,
although in a tabular form. This scheme plainly appears to be a reasonable
proxy for the expense and inconsistency associated with live testimony
from such an expert in each hearing.

But plaintiff does not contest the manner in which the grid was designed
or even its accuracy in reporting the availability of jobs for certain
classes of people. He does argue that it is unreasonable to presume that a
claimant is not disabled "without considering the claimant's individual
characteristics." He poses the apparently hypothetical possibility of a
claimant who is physically able to do sedentary work, but whose emotional
or other non-exertional problems render him unemployable. The problem with
this argument is that the regulations attached to the grid specifically
provide that no individual with non-exertional impairments shall be
presumed not disabled on the basis of the grid, but that that person's
individual situation must be weighed -- most usually through the aid of
vocational testimony. See Id., § 200.00(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513; Phillips v. Harris, 488 F.Supp. 1161, 1166 (W.D.Va. 1980).
Therefore, this argument on plaintiff's behalf cannot stand.
ide that no individual with non-exertional impairments shall be
presumed not disabled on the basis of the grid, but that that person's
individual situation must be weighed -- most usually through the aid of
vocational testimony. See Id., § 200.00(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513; Phillips v. Harris, 488 F.Supp. 1161, 1166 (W.D.Va. 1980).
Therefore, this argument on plaintiff's behalf cannot stand.

Plaintiff also argues that the regulations are unreasonable because in
one case "a single year's age difference may mean the difference between
the claimant being 'disabled' or 'not disabled.'" He urges the Court to
note the difference in result between Rules 201.17 and 201.23 of 20
C.F.R., Subpart P, App. 2. The former rule requires that a 45-year-old
person who is illiterate with unskilled work experience and able to do
sedentary work be found disabled. Under the latter rule, the same
individual, at age 44, must be found not disabled. This difference in
result, plaintiff asserts, is"arbitrary."

Two problems doom plaintiff's argument. First, this particular plaintiff
has no standing to challenge this particular asserted irrationality. To
have standing to challenge a regulation such as this, a plaintiff must
allege that the specific irrational rule has actually injured him " and
that he personal would benefit in a tangible way from the court's
intervention" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). Since
plaintiff is not a 44-year-old man who is presumed not disabled by the
allegedly irrational rule, he cannot raise that particular irregularity as
a claim in his suit.
is, a plaintiff must
allege that the specific irrational rule has actually injured him " and
that he personal would benefit in a tangible way from the court's
intervention" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). Since
plaintiff is not a 44-year-old man who is presumed not disabled by the
allegedly irrational rule, he cannot raise that particular irregularity as
a claim in his suit.

But more directly responsive to plaintiff's argument is the reality that
whether a line is drawn in the mind of a vocational expert or through the
regulatory grid, lines must be drawn to separate eligible claimants from
the ineligible. The fact that plaintiff's hypothetical illiterate,
inexperienced middle-aged sedentary work crosses the line with his 45th
birthday is no more irrational than the fact that a child of 17 years and
11 months may not vote in a national election. If the lines which are
drawn to define eligibility are reasonable, then the hypothetical" closet
possible case" avails naught in an attempt to declare the rules
unreasonable. To put it another way, "almost" only courts in horseshoes,
not in constitutional jurisprudence. See Weinberger v. Salfi, supra at 772-777; Malmed v. Thornburg, supra at 577, n.18, 578 (upholding
mandatory retirement for state judges at age 70). The rationale behind
this regulation is clear: younger people are more hirable than older
people; therefore, based on the sources noted in § 200.00(b) of 20 C.F.R.,
Subpart P, App.2, the regulations draw an eligibility line at age 45 for
the described individual. That is reasonable.
Malmed v. Thornburg, supra at 577, n.18, 578 (upholding
mandatory retirement for state judges at age 70). The rationale behind
this regulation is clear: younger people are more hirable than older
people; therefore, based on the sources noted in § 200.00(b) of 20 C.F.R.,
Subpart P, App.2, the regulations draw an eligibility line at age 45 for
the described individual. That is reasonable.

Plaintiff's final attack on the regulations is the claim that the grid is
not rationally related to achievement of legitimate governmental goals.
The government has two obvious goals in use of the grid: economy and
consistency. The two goals are undeniably legitimate governmental
objectives. The best argument that plaintiff can muster against them is
that the use of this grid does not achieve the same degree of economy
achieved by the regulation upheld in Weinberger v Salfi, supra, and
that consistency might be equal if the use of the grid were restricted to
non-hearing determinations. Neither argument denies that use of the grid
promotes these legitimate objectives; therefore, this last argument
against the regulations must also fall.

Stallings v. Harris, supra at 961.

The factual conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge leading to the
application of the administrative standards are not contested, and the use
of the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" was legally sound.

* * * * *

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the decision of the Secretary
be and is hereby affirmed and the action dismissed with costs addressed to
the plaintiff.
supra at 961.

The factual conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge leading to the
application of the administrative standards are not contested, and the use
of the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" was legally sound.

* * * * *

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the decision of the Secretary
be and is hereby affirmed and the action dismissed with costs addressed to
the plaintiff.

[1] The regulation cited by the
Administrative Law Judge does not fit plaintiff's case. It requires a
finding of not disabled for individuals otherwise like plaintiff, but aged
45-49. The regulation properly applied to plaintiff is Rule 201.24, which
also requires a finding of not disabled. Since the Court believes this
mistake to be a clerical error on the part of the Administrative Law
Judge, and since correction of the error does not change the issues of
this case, plaintiff will be deem to have been disqualified by Rule
201.24. See Eaton v. Capps, 348 F. Supp. 237, 240 (M.D.Ala.
1972).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_82_47c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.