# SSR 74-20c: SSR 74-20c: Rescinded 1984

> Federal · Rulings · Rescinded

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_74_20c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 74-20c
- **Heading:** SSR 74-20c: Rescinded 1984
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** Rescinded
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / DI / Disability, Period of Disability / SSR 74-20c

## Text

20 CFR 404.320(a)(4)(iii), 404.1501(a), 404.923, and 404.934

SSR 74-20c

Santos Reyes v. Secretary , USCA, D.C., No. 71-1895 (2/23/73) (CCH,
U.I.R. Fed. Para. 17,064)

Where, to establish disability which began before he was age 18 [1] (in 1940), claimant in 1968
in applying for child's benefits based on disability, submitted doctor's
reports showing he was treated for pulmonary tuberculosis 35 years earlier
(in 1933, when he was 11 or 12), that he had been treated with
anti-tuberculosis drugs since 1964, and that he "makes no assertion that
he received any kind of treatment during the 26 years between 1938 [(when
he was 16)] and 1964," held , evidence (consisting of doctor's
recollection rather than objective clinical, diagnostic evidence) does not
establish that condition of claimant prior to his becoming age 18 was then
and has been at all times since disabling to such degree as to prevent his
engaging in any substantial gainful work. Further held , Secretary's
Regulations No. 4, §404.923, requiring hearings to be conducted only
within the United States, is clearly reasonable and not a denial of due
process of law.

MACKINNON, Circuit Judge : This action was instituted by
claimant-appellee Reyes in the District Court pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §405(g)) for review of the final
decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying him
certain Social Security benefits. The District Court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and thereby reversed that administrative
determination. [2] This appeal
by the Secretary followed.
the District Court pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §405(g)) for review of the final
decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying him
certain Social Security benefits. The District Court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and thereby reversed that administrative
determination. [2] This appeal
by the Secretary followed.

In 1968, claimant applied for child's disability insurance benefits under
section 20(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§402(d)(1)(B)(ii)) [3] which
provides for an award of benefits to an individual who is the son of and
dependent upon an old-age beneficiary, if such individual is under a
disability which began before he attained the age of eighteen. Claimant's
application was denied by the Social Security Administration initially on
April 14, 1969 and again on reconsideration on July 25, 1969. Claimant
then requested review by a Hearing Examiner. [4] The Hearing Examiner found
that the medical evidence indicated, without clinical findings, that
claimant had received some treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis in 1933 or
1934 (when he was 11 or 12), but that the disease apparently had been
inactive or nonexistent thereafter until 1964 when it was detected and
treated. Accordingly, the Hearing Examiner found that claimant's
impairment was not of such severity before age 18 as to prevent him from
engaging in substantial gainful work and denied his application. Claimant
then sought review of the Hearing Examiner's decision by the Appeals
Council and, upon reconsideration of the entire record, the Appeals
Council affirmed the Hearing Examiner's decision and this became the final
decision of the Secretary on December 30, 1969. This action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ensued and resulted in
a reversal of this administrative decision from which the Secretary now
appeals.
n by the Appeals
Council and, upon reconsideration of the entire record, the Appeals
Council affirmed the Hearing Examiner's decision and this became the final
decision of the Secretary on December 30, 1969. This action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ensued and resulted in
a reversal of this administrative decision from which the Secretary now
appeals.

Claimant, a resident of the Philippines, was born October 25, 1922 and is
the unmarried son of a Social Security old-age beneficiary. As such he is
eligible for the benefits in question if he "is under a disability (as
defined in section [42 U.S.C. 423(d)]) which began before he attained the
age of 18." In support of his application, claimant stated that as a child
he tired easily, was confined mostly to bed and had to force himself to go
out and play with other children. He also related that he was compelled to
quit school after the fourth grade because of his ailment and that he has
never worked except to perform a few simple farm chores. The medical
evidence submitted by claimant consists of the reports of two physicians
and a radiologist. One physician's two-sentence report made in 1968 noted
that claimant presently complained of certain tubercular symptoms and that
he remembered treating him for pulmonary tuberculosis in 1933. Another
doctor reported in 1968 that he had treated claimant with
anti-tuberculosis drugs since about 1964. Also, a radiologist interpreted
a 1968 chest x-ray as "minimal" tuberculosis (Koch's pulmonary) and a
physician's review of that x-ray resulted in the conclusion that it showed
"minimal to moderate fibronodular tuberculosis". This physician also
supplied a supplementary report indicating that the claimant had not been
hospitalized under his care and the claimant himself makes no assertion
that he received any kind of treatment during the twenty-six years between
1938 and 1964.
y) and a
physician's review of that x-ray resulted in the conclusion that it showed
"minimal to moderate fibronodular tuberculosis". This physician also
supplied a supplementary report indicating that the claimant had not been
hospitalized under his care and the claimant himself makes no assertion
that he received any kind of treatment during the twenty-six years between
1938 and 1964.

For purposes of section 202(d), under which appellee asserts his claims,
the term "disability" is exhaustively defined in section 223(d) of the
Act:

(d)Same; disability.

(1) The term "disability" means—

(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; * * *

(2)For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)—

(A)an individual . . . shall be determined to be under a disability only
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national economy"
means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where
such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

* * * * * * *

(3)For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is
an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

* * * * * * *
gnificant numbers either in the region where
such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

* * * * * * *

(3)For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is
an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

* * * * * * *

(5) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless
he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as
the Secretary may require.

42 U.S.C. §423(d). Further standards to aid in determining "disability"
are provided by Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1501, et.
seq . (Subpart P).

The Hearing Examiner's determination that appellee had failed to
demonstrate the existence of a disability within the meaning of §223(d)
prior to age 18, was certainly supported by substantial evidence and
should have been sustained. In these matters deference is to be afforded
the administrative decision and it is not for the trial court to review de
novo the Secretary's final decisions as to findings of fact and the
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. [5]

Here there is no clinical, diagnostic evidence as to the claimant's
disease prior to age 18, but only the recollection, 35 years removed, of
his current doctor. There is absolutely no objective evidence of
claimant's disability in the thirty years between 1934 and 1964. The only
clinical, diagnostic medical evidence we have shows a minimal to moderate
tuberculosis existing about 1964. Even at this time claimant was not
hospitalized and his response to drug therapy was recorded as "quite
favorable". Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the
Secretary's denial of benefits due to a failure of appellee to bear his
evidentiary burden was arbitrary or capricious
cal, diagnostic medical evidence we have shows a minimal to moderate
tuberculosis existing about 1964. Even at this time claimant was not
hospitalized and his response to drug therapy was recorded as "quite
favorable". Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the
Secretary's denial of benefits due to a failure of appellee to bear his
evidentiary burden was arbitrary or capricious. Even assuming, arguendo that appellee can be said to be presently totally disabled
within the meaning of §223(d), there is no showing that this is the same
condition that began in 1933 and which at that time and at all times
subsequent thereto was equally disabling to such a degree that appellee
was prevented from engaging in substantial gainful work. [6] The Hearing Examiner clearly
had substantial evidence in the record before him upon which he could
conclude that the condition either did not exist or was wholly inactive [7] until 1964.

Claimant also contends that he was denied due process of law in that he
was not afforded a hearing in the Philippines. [8] We find this argument
without merit. Even if a nonresident alien were entitled to the
protections of the due process clause in a case like this, [9] it is exceedingly clear that
the Secretary's regulation requiring that all proceedings in the
administration of the Act which cannot be conducted by mail, including
hearings, must be conducted only with the boundaries of the United States, [10] is clearly reasonable. [11] It is neither an
arbitrary requirement or is it unduly discriminatory.

We therefore find the Secretary's final decision to have been correct and
supported by substantial evidence and accordingly the District Court erred
in setting it aside.

[1] Under the 1972 Amendments to
the Social Security Act (P.L. 92-603), childhood disability benefits are
payable if the child's disability began before age 22, rather than before
age 18 as under prior law.
riminatory.

We therefore find the Secretary's final decision to have been correct and
supported by substantial evidence and accordingly the District Court erred
in setting it aside.

[1] Under the 1972 Amendments to
the Social Security Act (P.L. 92-603), childhood disability benefits are
payable if the child's disability began before age 22, rather than before
age 18 as under prior law.

[2] The District Court made no
findings of fact and conclusions of law, reversing the Secretary in a
brief order. While this is legally sound under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, since
it was issued pursuant to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, it
renders review particularly difficult in cases like this. We have remarked
that where the trial court reverses an agency decision, apparently relying
"on a lack of substantial evidence, it should at least state which
findings are unsupported." Einbinder v. Novinger, Inc., 115 U.S. App. D.C.
395 at n. 3, 320 F.2d 714 at n. 3 (1963). See also , Gardner v.
Bishop, 362 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1966); Banks v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 801
(6th Cir. 1965). In Celebrezze v. Zimmerman, 339 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964),
involving an appeal under the Social Security Act in which the District
Court similarly reversed the Secretary of H.E.W. on a summary judgment
motion, the court stated:

[I]n the rare case in which it is appropriate for the trial court to
reverse the Secretary's findings because there is no substantial evidence
to support them it would make it much easier for this Court, on appeal, to
have the benefit of the trial court's analysis of the evidence, and the
reasoning by which it arrives at its determination that it is unable to
find support in the record for the Secretary's findings.

339 F.2d at 498. However, since we are as fully capable as the trial court
to review the record at hand, there is no need for a remand for this
purpose.

[3] Section 202(d) provides:
l, to
have the benefit of the trial court's analysis of the evidence, and the
reasoning by which it arrives at its determination that it is unable to
find support in the record for the Secretary's findings.

339 F.2d at 498. However, since we are as fully capable as the trial court
to review the record at hand, there is no need for a remand for this
purpose.

[3] Section 202(d) provides:

(d)(1) Every child . . . of an individual entitled to old-age . . .
insurance benefits . . . if such child—

(A)has filed application for child's insurance benefits,

(B)at the time such application was filed was unmarried and . . . (ii) is
under a disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which
began before he attained the age of 18, and

(C)was dependent upon such individual—

(i)if such individual is living, at the time such application was
filed,

* * * * * * *

shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month, beginning
with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so
entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding .
. .

(G)if such child was under a disability (as so defined) at the time he
attained the age of 18, the third month following the month in which he
ceases to be under such disability. . . .

42 U.S.C. §402(d)(1)(B)(ii).

[4] In the reconsideration
determination, claimant was informed that in lieu of a hearing, to which
he was entitled only if he came to the United States at his own expense,
he could request review of his claim by a Hearing Examiner and was advised
to submit any additional evidence he might have with this request. See
note 7, infra .
r such disability. . . .

42 U.S.C. §402(d)(1)(B)(ii).

[4] In the reconsideration
determination, claimant was informed that in lieu of a hearing, to which
he was entitled only if he came to the United States at his own expense,
he could request review of his claim by a Hearing Examiner and was advised
to submit any additional evidence he might have with this request. See
note 7, infra .

[5] Mitchell v. Gardner, 123
U.S.App.D.C. 195, 358 F.2d 826 (1966); Lessin v. Celebrezze, 114
U.S.App.D.C. 278, 314 F.2d 283 (1963). See also , Beane v.
Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972); Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278
(4th Cir. 1969); Easttam v. Secretary of HEW, 364 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.
1966); Maloney v. Celebrezze, 337 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1964); Adams v.
Flemming, 276 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1960).

[6] Appellee has argued that
section 202(d)(1)(B)(ii) does not require that a claimant for child's
benefits be disabled before he attains age 18, but requires only that a
claimant's present disability as defined in §223(d) be the result of an
impairment that began before he reached age 18. However, the legislative
history of that section clearly precludes such an approach, indicating
explicitly that the intent of Congress was to provide benefits for
children who were permanently disabled prior to age 18 and have remained
so continuously to the present time. The Senate Finance Committee Report
stated:
(d) be the result of an
impairment that began before he reached age 18. However, the legislative
history of that section clearly precludes such an approach, indicating
explicitly that the intent of Congress was to provide benefits for
children who were permanently disabled prior to age 18 and have remained
so continuously to the present time. The Senate Finance Committee Report
stated:

The bill includes provision for payment of disabled child's benefits to
the dependent disabled child of a deceased or retired insured worker if
the child is permanently and totally disabled and has been so disabled
since before he reached age 18. * * * Your committee's bill would provide
benefits for a child who has been totally and permanently disabled before
attaining age 18, if the child is totally and permanently disabled and dependent upon the parent at the time the parent dies or becomes
entitled to retirement benefits . To be considered disabled the child
would have to be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a severe mental or physical impairment that is expected to
continue indefinitely.

S.REP. NO. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5-6 (1956) (emphasis added). The
House Report states that the bill provides for "continuation of monthly
benefits to children who become totally and permanently disabled before
age 18 ." H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1955) (emphasis
added). See also. id . at 8, 24-25.

[7] The Hearing Examiner was
entitled to rely on the Social Security regulations in this regard. For
purposes of §202(d) child's disability insurance, 20 C.F.R. §404.1506
adopts a list of impairments (Subpart P, App.) as an appendix in order to
aid in reaching a determination of "disability" vel non. See 20
C.F.R. 404.1501. These regulations provide:
added). See also. id . at 8, 24-25.

[7] The Hearing Examiner was
entitled to rely on the Social Security regulations in this regard. For
purposes of §202(d) child's disability insurance, 20 C.F.R. §404.1506
adopts a list of impairments (Subpart P, App.) as an appendix in order to
aid in reaching a determination of "disability" vel non. See 20
C.F.R. 404.1501. These regulations provide:

B. Pulmonary tuberculosis is a communicable disease and disability is
determined primarily on the basis of activity of the disease. Individuals
with "inactive" or "quiescent" disease are not considered to be under a
disability on the basis of tuberculosis, whereas individuals with "active"
tuberculosis are considered to be under a disability.

20 C.F.R. Subpart P, App. 3.00 (B). From the long period in which there
was no medical record of treatment or hospitalization, the Hearing
Examiner could correctly conclude that the claimant's condition had
entered an inactive or quiescent stage and as such he was not under a
permanent disability sufficient to preclude him from engaging in
substantial gainful work.

[8] Traditionally the courts
have held that the United States Constitution only operates within our
territorial boundaries. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.SD. 763 (1950); Ross
v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). The equal protection clause, for
example, has been held explicitly to apply only to aliens within the
jurisdiction of the United States. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 .S. 228
(186); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

[9] Traditionally the courts
have held that the United States Constitution only operates within our
territorial boundaries. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ross
v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
ly to aliens within the
jurisdiction of the United States. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 .S. 228
(186); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

[9] Traditionally the courts
have held that the United States Constitution only operates within our
territorial boundaries. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ross
v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).

[10] 20 C.F.R. §§404.923,
404.934 (1971).

[11] There appears to be no
legislative intent to the effect that the Social Security Act was to be
administered outside the United States, and absent such a showing, it is
familiar law that "the legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the
boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent
appears." Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_74_20c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.