# SSR 73-7c: SSR 73-7c: SECTION 223(d) -- (42 U.S.C. 443(d)). -- DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- DURATION OF INABILITY TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIAL GAINFUL ACTIVITY

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_73_7c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 73-7c
- **Heading:** SSR 73-7c: SECTION 223(d) -- (42 U.S.C. 443(d)). -- DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- DURATION OF INABILITY TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIAL GAINFUL ACTIVITY
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / DI / Substantial Gainful Activity / SSR 73-7c

## Text

20 CFR 404.1501 and 404.1532

SSR 73-7c

Alexander v. Richardson , 451 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir., 1971). CERT.
DEN. 407 U.S. 911 (6/12/72)

PICKETT, Circuit Judge: The question presented by this appeal is whether
under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) an applicant, to be entitled to
disability benefits under the Social Security Act, is required to
establish that he was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity
for a period of twelve months in cases where there was some physical or
mental impairment for a period of more than one year. After appellant
Alexander's application for disability insurance under the Act had been
denied administratively because of the determination that the alleged
disability did not last for a continuous period of one year, he brought
this action in the United States District Court of Colorado, as authorized
by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the decision of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. The trial court affirmed the Secretary's
decision.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d), for the purposes of the Social Security Act, defines
disability as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ."

The facts are not in dispute. Alexander was unable to engage in a
substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the statute because of
a physical impairment, but this disability extended for a period of less
than twelve months, although there was an impairment which lasted for more
than one year
d or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ."

The facts are not in dispute. Alexander was unable to engage in a
substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the statute because of
a physical impairment, but this disability extended for a period of less
than twelve months, although there was an impairment which lasted for more
than one year. The argument is that a grammatical construction of the
one-sentence statute defining disability leads to the conclusion that only
the impairment is required to extend over the one-year period, and that
this requirement does not apply to the term, "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity." Stated differently, Alexander's analysis of
the statute is that if his impairment extended for a period of one year or
more, he was entitled to benefits if for a lesser period he could not
engage in a substantial gainful activity. Alexander's argument arises from
the position of the word "which" immediately following the phrase, "any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment." He contends that
applying applicable grammatical rules, the word "which" has reference only
to "impairment" and does not modify the disability provisions. Citing White v. Finch , 311 F.Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1970). The purpose of the
statute and its legislative history disclose the fallacy of this
argument.

To recover disability benefits under the Act an applicant must be unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Disability is established
by showing a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which
prevents engaging in any gainful activity and the impairment which causes
it cannot be separated. The two components of disability must exist at the
same time
argument.

To recover disability benefits under the Act an applicant must be unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Disability is established
by showing a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which
prevents engaging in any gainful activity and the impairment which causes
it cannot be separated. The two components of disability must exist at the
same time. The statute, which defines disability, not impairment, speaks
only of an impairment which can be expected to result in death or to last
for a continuous period of at least twelve months and one which will
disable a person seeking disability benefits for a like period. For
example, an applicant may have an injury from which he has lost one of his
hands. The result is a physical impairment for the remainder of his life,
but if he is able to engage in any gainful activities within a year from
his injury he is not entitled to benefits. We think the legislative
history of this statute supports this interpretation.

Prior to the 1965 amendment, the statutory definition of disability
provided that disability benefits were payable only in cases where the
disability was expected to result in death or would be of a long continued
and indefinite duration. In seeking to eliminate this indefinite
provision, the 1965 amendment proposed by the House of Representatives
provided that such benefits would be payable to a claimant who had been
totally disabled for at least six months, even though it was expected that
he would recover in the foreseeable future. Report of the Ways and Means
Comm., H. Rept. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 88. The Senate
substituted a twelve-month duration requirement for the six-month
requirement suggested by the House. In its report on the bill, the Senate
Finance Committee stated:

* * * * * *

The Senate version became law.
months, even though it was expected that
he would recover in the foreseeable future. Report of the Ways and Means
Comm., H. Rept. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 88. The Senate
substituted a twelve-month duration requirement for the six-month
requirement suggested by the House. In its report on the bill, the Senate
Finance Committee stated:

* * * * * *

The Senate version became law.

Although White v. Finch, supra , and Condon v. Finch , 305
F.Supp. 63 (D. N.H. 1969), are the only court decisions cited which have
considered this exact question, other cases have indicated or assumed that
the Act was designed to allow benefits only in cases where the insured's
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity extends for the
minimum twelve-month period. Hayes v. Gardner , 376 F.2d 517 (4th
Cir. 1970); Dvorak v. Celebrezze , 345 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1965); Haverly v. Cohen , 310 F.Supp. 388 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Santagate v.
Gardner , 293 F.Supp. 1284 (D. Mass 1968). Cf. Johnson v. Finch ,
437 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, the Secretary's
interpretation of the statutory definition of disability, if reasonable,
must be given effect. Udall v. Tallman , 380 U.S. 1 (1964), U.S.
v. Amer. Trucking Ass'ns ., 310 U.S. 534 (1940); Norwegian Nitrogen
Co. v. U.S. , 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah &
Ouray Reservation v. Probst , 428 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v.
American Farm Lines , 415 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1969); Garvey v.
Freeman , 397 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1968).

AFFIRMED .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_73_7c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.
