# SSR 00-1c: SSR 00-1c: Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1)) Disability Insurance Benefits—Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_00_1c

## Section

- **Citation:** SSR 00-1c
- **Heading:** SSR 00-1c: Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1)) Disability Insurance Benefits—Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / DI / Disability Insurance — Medical / SSR 00-1c

## Text

SSR 00-1c

EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: 01/07/2000

20 CFR 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560(c), 404.1592, and
404.1592a

CAROLYN C. CLEVELAND v. POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION ET AL.,
____ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999)

This Ruling concerns whether an individual's claim for, or receipt of,
disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act (the
SSAct) would preclude the individual from pursuing relief under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The SSAct and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities but in
different ways. The SSAct provides monetary benefits to insured
individuals who are under a disability, as defined in the SSAct. The ADA
seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against any individual who
is considered a "qualified individual with a disability" as defined in the
ADA.

In January 1994, the claimant filed for Social Security disability
insurance benefits. By April 1994, her condition improved and she returned
to work. She reported this to the Social Security Administration (SSA)
which denied her claim. Her employer subsequently terminated her. She then
asked SSA to reconsider its denial of her claim. SSA again denied her
claim, but following a hearing, she was awarded benefits. However, before
her Social Security award, the claimant brought an ADA lawsuit contending
that her employer terminated her employment without reasonably
accommodating her disability.

The District Court did not evaluate her "reasonable accommodation" claim
on the merits, but granted summary judgment to the defendant because, in
the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying for and receiving Social
Security disability insurance benefits, had conceded that she was totally
disabled. This fact, the court concluded, estopped the plaintiff from
proving an essential element of her ADA claim, i.e., that she could
"perform the essential functions" of her job with "reasonable
accommodation."
to the defendant because, in
the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying for and receiving Social
Security disability insurance benefits, had conceded that she was totally
disabled. This fact, the court concluded, estopped the plaintiff from
proving an essential element of her ADA claim, i.e., that she could
"perform the essential functions" of her job with "reasonable
accommodation."

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's statement on her
Social Security application that she was totally disabled and unable to
work was sufficient evidence to judically estop her later ADA claim. In
her ADA claim, the plaintiff contended that, for the time in question,
with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions
of her job. The Court of Appeals thought that her claims under both Acts
would incorporate two directly conflicting propositions; namely, "I am too
disabled to work" and "I am not too disabled to work." That court, in an
effort to prevent two conflicting claims under both Acts, used a special
judicial presumption that it believed would prevent the plaintiff from
successfully pursuing her ADA claim.

The Supreme Court (the Court) granted certiorari in light of the
disagreement among the circuits concerning the legal effect upon an ADA
claim of the application for, or receipt of, Social Security disability
insurance benefits. The Court held that, despite the appearance of
conflict between the two statutes, the two claims do not conflict to the
point where courts should apply a special negative presumption as in the
Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that there are
too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an ADA claim can
comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's opinion.
ourts should apply a special negative presumption as in the
Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that there are
too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an ADA claim can
comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's opinion.

BREYER, Supreme Court Justice:

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides benefits
to a person with a disability so severe that she is "unable to do [her]
previous work" and "cannot ... engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy." § 223(a) of the Social
Security Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). This case asks
whether the law erects a special presumption that would significantly
inhibit an SSDI recipient from simultaneously pursuing an action for
disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), claiming that "with ... reasonable accommodation" she could
"perform the essential functions" of her job. § 101, 104 Stat. 331, 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8).

We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent statutory
contentions are often consistent, each with the other. Thus pursuit, and
receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from
pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong presumption against
the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff
cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to
work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, she must
explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she
could "perform the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with
"reasonable accommodation."

I
the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff
cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to
work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, she must
explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she
could "perform the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with
"reasonable accommodation."

I

After suffering a disabling stroke and losing her job, Carolyn Cleveland
sought and obtained SSDI benefits from the Social Security Administration
(SSA). She has also brought this ADA suit in which she claims that her
former employer, Policy Management Systems Corporation, discriminated
against her on account of her disability. The two claims developed in the
following way:

August 1993 : Cleveland began work at Policy Management Systems. Her
job required her to perform background checks on prospective employees of
Policy Management System's clients.

January 7, 1994 : Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her
concentration, memory, and language skills.

January 28, 1994 : Cleveland filed an SSDI application in which she
stated that she was "disabled" and "unable to work." App. 21.

April 11, 1994 : Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned
to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the SSA
two weeks later.

July 11, 1994 : Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA
denied her SSDI application.

July 15, 1994 : Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.
n which she
stated that she was "disabled" and "unable to work." App. 21.

April 11, 1994 : Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned
to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the SSA
two weeks later.

July 11, 1994 : Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA
denied her SSDI application.

July 15, 1994 : Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.

September 14, 1994 : Cleveland asked the SSA to reconsider its July
11th SSDI denial. In doing so, she said, "I was terminated [by Policy
Management Systems] due to my condition and I have not been able to work
since. I continue to be disabled." Id. , at 46. She later added that
she had "attempted to return to work in mid April," that she had "worked
for three months," and that Policy Management Systems terminated her
because she "could no longer do the job" in light of her "condition." Id. , at 47.

November 1994 : The SSA denied Cleveland's request for
reconsideration. Cleveland sought an SSA hearing, reiterating that "I am
unable to work due to my disability," and presenting new evidence about
the extent of her injuries. Id. , at 79.

September 29, 1995 : The SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits
retroactive to the day of her stroke, January 7, 1994.

On September 22, 1995 , the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland
brought this ADA lawsuit. She contended that Policy Management Systems had
"terminat[ed]" her employment without reasonably "accommodat[ing] her
disability." Id. , at 7. She alleged that she requested, but was
denied, accommodations such as training and additional time to complete
her work. Id. , at 96. And she submitted a supporting affidavit from
her treating physician. Id. , at 101. The District Court did not
evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on the merits, but granted
summary judgment to the defendant because, in that court's view,
Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI benefits, had conceded that
she was totally disabled
al time to complete
her work. Id. , at 96. And she submitted a supporting affidavit from
her treating physician. Id. , at 101. The District Court did not
evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on the merits, but granted
summary judgment to the defendant because, in that court's view,
Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI benefits, had conceded that
she was totally disabled. And that fact, the court concluded, now estopped
Cleveland from proving an essential element of her ADA claim, namely that
she could "perform the essential functions" of her job, at least with
"reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment.
120 F.3d 513 (1997). The court wrote:

"[T]he application for or the receipt of social security disability
benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant or recipient
of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting that he is a
'qualified individual with a disability.'" Id. , at 518.

The Circuit Court noted that it was "at least theoretically conceivable
that under some limited and highly unusual set of circumstances the two
claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive." Id. , at 517.
But it concluded that, because

"Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was totally
disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now
asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a 'qualified
individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA claim." Id. ,
at 518-519.
But it concluded that, because

"Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was totally
disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now
asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a 'qualified
individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA claim." Id. ,
at 518-519.

We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits about
the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or receipt of,
disability benefits. Compare, e.g., Rascon v. U S West
Communications, Inc. , 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998)
(application for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does
not estop plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 135 F.3d 376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert.
pending, No. 97-1991; Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority , 116 F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C.1997) (same), with McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc. , 91 F.3d 610, 618-620 (C.A.3
1996) (applying judicial estoppel to bar plaintiff who applied for
disability benefits from bringing suit under the ADA), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 958, 136 L.Ed.2d 845 (1997), and Kennedy v.
Applause, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482 (C.A.9 1996) (declining to
apply judicial estoppel but holding that claimant who declared total
disability in a benefits application failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a
disability).

II

The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with
disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides
monetary benefits to every insured individual who "is under a disability."
42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act defines "disability" as an
ation failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a
disability).

II

The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with
disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides
monetary benefits to every insured individual who "is under a disability."
42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act defines "disability" as an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
... physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months." § 423(d)(1)(A).

The individual's impairment, as we have said, supra, at 1599, must be

"of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work
but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy ...." § 423(d)(2)(A).

The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against disabled
individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal opportunity
and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their consequently increased
productivity. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(8),(9). The Act
prohibits covered employers from discriminating "against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual." § 12112(a). The Act defines a "qualified individual with a
disability" as a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential
functions" of her job, including those who can do so only "with ...
reasonable accommodation." § 12111(8).
. The Act
prohibits covered employers from discriminating "against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual." § 12112(a). The Act defines a "qualified individual with a
disability" as a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential
functions" of her job, including those who can do so only "with ...
reasonable accommodation." § 12111(8).

We here consider but one of the many ways in which these two statutes
might interact. This case does not involve, for example, the
interaction of either of the statutes before us with other statutes, such
as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et
seq. Nor does it involve directly conflicting statements about
purely factual matters, such as "The light was red/green," or "I
can/cannot raise my arm above my head." An SSA representation of total
disability differs from a purely factual statement in that it often
implies a context-related legal conclusion, namely "I am disabled for
purposes of the Social Security Act." And our consideration of this latter
kind of statement consequently leaves the law related to the former,
purely factual, kind of conflict where we found it.

The case before us concerns an ADA plaintiff who both applied for, and
received, SSDI benefits. It requires us to review a Court of Appeals
decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground that an ADA
plaintiff's "represent[ation] to the SSA that she was totally disabled"
created a "rebuttable presumption" sufficient to "judicially esto[p]" her
later representation that, "for the time in question," with reasonable
accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of her job. 120
F.3d, at 518-519
ppeals
decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground that an ADA
plaintiff's "represent[ation] to the SSA that she was totally disabled"
created a "rebuttable presumption" sufficient to "judicially esto[p]" her
later representation that, "for the time in question," with reasonable
accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of her job. 120
F.3d, at 518-519. The Court of Appeals thought, in essence, that claims
under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting propositions,
namely "I am too disabled to work" and "I am not too disabled to work."
And in an effort to prevent two claims that would embody that kind of
factual conflict, the court used a special judicial presumption, which it
believed would ordinarily prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from
successfully asserting an ADA claim.

In our view, however, despite the appearance of conflict that arises from
the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not inherently
conflict to the point where courts should apply a special negative
presumption like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here. That is
because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA
claim can comfortably exist side by side.

For one thing, as we have noted, the ADA defines a "qualified individual"
to include a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential functions"
of her job " with reasonable accommodation ." Reasonable
accommodations may include:

"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
." Reasonable
accommodations may include:

"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

By way of contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual is
disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of
"reasonable accommodation" into account, nor need an applicant refer to
the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for SSDI. See
Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Comm'r for Hearings and
Appeals, SSA, to Administrative Appeals Judges, reprinted in 2 Social
Security Practice Guide, App. § 15C[9], pp. 15-401 to 15-402 (1998). The
omission reflects the facts that the SSA receives more than 2.5 million
claims for disability benefits each year; its administrative resources are
limited; the matter of "reasonable accommodation" may turn on highly
disputed workplace-specific matters; and an SSA misjudgment about that
detailed, and often fact-specific matter would deprive a seriously
disabled person of the critical financial support the statute seeks to
provide. See Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11,
and n. 2, 13. The result is that an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff
can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove
consistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own
job (or other jobs) without it.

For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI claims,
the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure that
embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job availability, and
their interrelation. The SSA asks:

Step One : Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)
See 20 CFR § 404.1520(b) (1998).
her own
job (or other jobs) without it.

For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI claims,
the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure that
embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job availability, and
their interrelation. The SSA asks:

Step One : Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)
See 20 CFR § 404.1520(b) (1998).

Step Two : Do you have a "severe impairment," i.e., one that
"significantly limits" your ability to do basic work activities? (If not,
you are ineligible.) See § 404.1520(c).

Step Three : Does your impairment "mee[t] or equa[l]" an impairment
on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are eligible without more. ) See §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

Step Four : If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, can you perform your "past relevant work?" (If so, you are
ineligible.) See § 404.1520(e).

Step Five : If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment and you cannot perform your "past relevant work," then can you
perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy? (If not, you are eligible.) See §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c).

The presumptions embodied in these questions—particularly those
necessary to produce Step Three's list, which, the Government tells us,
accounts for approximately 60 percent of all awards, see Tr. of Oral Arg.
20—grow out of the need to administer a large benefits system
efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of
many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to
perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI
under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual
circumstances, remain capable of "perform[ing] the essential functions" of
her job.
large benefits system
efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of
many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to
perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI
under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual
circumstances, remain capable of "perform[ing] the essential functions" of
her job.

Further, the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who not
only can work, but are working. For example, to facilitate a disabled
person's reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-month
trial-work period during which SSDI recipients may receive full benefits.
See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 CFR § 404.1592 (1998). See also §
404.1592a (benefits available for an additional
15-month [1] period depending
upon earnings). Improvement in a totally disabled person's physical
condition, while permitting that person to work, will not necessarily or
immediately lead the SSA to terminate SSDI benefits. And the nature of an
individual's disability may change over time, so that a statement about
that disability at the time of an individual's application for SSDI
benefits may not reflect an individual's capacities at the time of the
relevant employment decision.

Finally, if an individual has merely applied for, but has not been
awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims is
of the sort normally tolerated by our legal system. Our ordinary rules
recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which legal theory
she will succeed, and so permit parties to "set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically," and to
"state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of
consistency." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in
respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims should differ
e sure in advance upon which legal theory
she will succeed, and so permit parties to "set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically," and to
"state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of
consistency." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in
respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims should differ. (And, as we
said, we leave the law in respect to purely factual contradictions where
we found it.)

In light of these examples, we would not apply a special legal presumption
permitting someone who has applied for, or received, SSDI benefits to
bring an ADA suit only in "some limited and highly unusual set of
circumstances." 120 F.3d, at 517.

Nonetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may turn out genuinely to
conflict with an ADA claim. Summary judgment for a defendant is
appropriate when the plaintiff "fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on
which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a
"qualified individual with a disability"—that is, a person "who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions" of her job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn
assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for
example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an essential element of
her ADA case—at least if she does not offer a sufficient
explanation. For that reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply
ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI
total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient
explanation.
for disability benefits that she is, for
example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an essential element of
her ADA case—at least if she does not offer a sufficient
explanation. For that reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply
ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI
total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient
explanation.

The lower courts, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found a
similar need for explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity that a
party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary
judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement
(by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's
earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or
attempting to resolve the disparity. See, e.g. , Colantuoni v.
Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc. , 44 F.3d 1, 5 (C.A.1 1994); Rule
v. Brine, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (C.A.2 1996); Hackman v.
Valley Fair , 932 F.2d 239, 241 (C.A.3 1991); Barwick v.
Celotex Corp. , 736 F.2d 946, 960 (C.A.4 1984); Albertson v.
T.J. Stevenson & Co. , 749 F.2d 223, 228 (C.A.5 1984); Davidson & Jones Development Co. v. Elmore Development Co. ,
921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (C.A.6 1991); Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes,
Inc. , 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (C.A.7 1993); Camfield Tires, Inc.
v. Michelin Tire Corp. , 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (C.A.8 1983); Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. , 952 F.2d 262, 266 (C.A.9
1991); Franks v. Nimmo , 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11
1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc. , 924
F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116
L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc. ,
982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct.
2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993)
, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11
1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc. , 924
F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116
L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc. ,
982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct.
2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993). Although these cases for the most part
involve purely factual contradictions (as to which we do not necessarily
endorse these cases, but leave the law as we found it), we believe that a
similar insistence upon explanation is warranted here, where the conflict
involves a legal conclusion. When faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn
statement asserting "total disability" or the like, the court should
require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary
elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment, that explanation
must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the
earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential
functions" of her job, with or without "reasonable accommodation."

III

In her brief in this Court, Cleveland explains the discrepancy between her
SSDI statements that she was "totally disabled" and her ADA claim that she
could "perform the essential functions" of her job. The first statements,
she says, "were made in a forum which does not consider the effect that
reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the ability to work."
Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she claims the SSDI statements were
"accurate statements" if examined "in the time period in which they were
made." Ibid. The parties should have the opportunity in the trial
court to present, or to contest, these explanations, in sworn form where
appropriate
sider the effect that
reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the ability to work."
Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she claims the SSDI statements were
"accurate statements" if examined "in the time period in which they were
made." Ibid. The parties should have the opportunity in the trial
court to present, or to contest, these explanations, in sworn form where
appropriate. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

## Nearby sections

- [SSR 00-1c SSR 00-1c: Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1)) Disability Insurance Benefits—Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_00_1c.md)
- [SSR 00-3p SSR 00-3p: Superseded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_00_3p.md)
- [SSR 02-1p SSR 02-1p: Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_02_1p.md)
- [SSR 02-2p SSR 02-2p: Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_02_2p.md)
- [SSR 03-01p SSR 03-01p: SSR 03-1p: Titles II and XVI: Development and Evaluation of Disability Claims Involving Postpolio Sequelae](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_03_01p.md)
- [SSR 03-02p SSR 03-02p: SSR 03-2p: Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy Syndrome/Complex Regional Pain Syndrome](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_03_02p.md)
- [SSR 03-03p SSR 03-03p: SSR 03-3p: Policy Interpretation Ruling - Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Disability and Blindness in Initial Claims for Individuals Aged 65 or Older](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_03_03p.md)
- [SSR 06-01p SSR 06-01p: Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Tremolite Asbestos-Related Impairments](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_06_01p.md)
- [SSR 06-03p SSR 06-03p: Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_06_03p.md)
- [SSR 07-01p SSR 07-01p: Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Visual Field Loss Using Automated Static Threshold Perimetry](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_07_01p.md)
- [SSR 11-1p SSR 11-1p: Titles II and XVI: Procedures for Handling Requests to File Subsequent Applications for Disability Benefits](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_11_1p.md)
- [SSR 11-2p SSR 11-2p: Titles II and XVI: Documenting and Evaluating Disability in Young Adults](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_11_2p.md)
- [SSR 12-2p SSR 12-2p: Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Fibromyalgia](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_12_2p.md)
- [SSR 13-2p SSR 13-2p: TITLES II AND XVI: EVALUATING CASES INVOLVING DRUG ADDICTION AND ALCOHOLISM (DAA)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_13_2p.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_DI_SSR_00_1c. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.