# AR 97-4(9): AR 97-4(9): Chavez v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) -- Effect of a Prior Final Decision That a Claimant is Not Disabled, And of Findings Contained Therein, On Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim Arising Under the Same Title of the Social Security Act -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act > Federal · Rulings · In force URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_97_4_9 ## Section - **Citation:** AR 97-4(9) - **Heading:** AR 97-4(9): Chavez v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) -- Effect of a Prior Final Decision That a Claimant is Not Disabled, And of Findings Contained Therein, On Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim Arising Under the Same Title of the Social Security Act -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act - **Jurisdiction:** Federal - **Kind:** Rulings - **Status:** In force - **Text as of:** August 14, 2026 - **Source:** Compiled text - **Location:** Social Security Rulings / AR / Ninth Circuit Court / AR 97-4(9) ## Text AR 97-4(9) EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: 12/3/97 Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9) Issue: Whether, in making a disability determination or decision on a subsequent disability claim with respect to an unadjudicated period, where the claim arises under the same title of the Social Security Act (the Act) as a prior claim on which there has been a final decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or the Appeals Council that the claimant is not disabled, the Social Security Administration (SSA) [1] must: (1) apply a presumption of continuing nondisability and, if the presumption is not rebutted by the claimant, determine that the claimant is not disabled; and (2) if the presumption is rebutted, adopt certain findings required under the applicable sequential evaluation process for determining disability, made in the final decision by the ALJ or the Appeals Council on the prior disability claim. [2] Statute/Regulation/Ruling Citation: Sections 205(a) and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a) and 902(a)(5)), 20 CFR 404.900, 404.957(c)(1), 416.1400, 416.1457(c)(1). Circuit: Ninth (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Washington) Chavez v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) Applicability of Ruling: This Ruling applies to determinations or decisions at all administrative levels (i.e., initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing and Appeals Council). Description of Case: Mr. Chavez first applied for disability insurance benefits on June 1, 1982. On March 30, 1983, an ALJ awarded Mr. Chavez a closed period of disability from March 3, 1981, through May 1982. In determining that disability had ended, the ALJ found that, although Mr. Chavez could not perform his past relevant work, he was able to engage in a wide range of at least light substantial gainful activity. Mr. Chavez did not appeal this decision. Therefore, it became final and binding. 1983, an ALJ awarded Mr. Chavez a closed period of disability from March 3, 1981, through May 1982. In determining that disability had ended, the ALJ found that, although Mr. Chavez could not perform his past relevant work, he was able to engage in a wide range of at least light substantial gainful activity. Mr. Chavez did not appeal this decision. Therefore, it became final and binding. On July 18, 1983, Mr. Chavez filed another application for disability insurance benefits. In a decision dated May 10, 1984, an ALJ found that Mr. Chavez could perform work-related activities except for work involving constant standing, walking, and lifting, and carrying more than 20 pounds. The ALJ then found that Mr. Chavez's past work as a backhoe operator did not require excessive standing and lifting and that his impairments therefore did not prevent him from resuming his past work. The decision made no reference to the findings of the first ALJ. This decision became the final decision of the Secretary. Upon appeal, the district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the claimant could perform light work and, therefore, was not disabled. Mr. Chavez appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Holding: The court then found that Mr. Chavez's "attainment of 'advanced age' constitutes a changed circumstance precluding the application of res judicata to the first administrative law judge's ultimate finding against disability." In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he first administrative law judge's findings concerning the claimant's residual functional capacity, education, and work experience are entitled to some res judicata consideration in subsequent proceedings." Statement As To How Chavez Differs From Social Security Policy o the first administrative law judge's ultimate finding against disability." In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he first administrative law judge's findings concerning the claimant's residual functional capacity, education, and work experience are entitled to some res judicata consideration in subsequent proceedings." Statement As To How Chavez Differs From Social Security Policy Under SSA policy, if a determination or decision on a disability claim has become final, the Agency may apply administrative res judicata with respect to a subsequent disability claim under the same title of the Act if the same parties, facts and issues are involved in both the prior and subsequent claims. However, if the subsequent claim involves deciding whether the claimant is disabled during a period that was not adjudicated in the final determination or decision on the prior claim, SSA considers the issue of disability with respect to the unadjudicated period to be a new issue that prevents the application of administrative res judicata. Thus, when adjudicating a subsequent disability claim involving an unadjudicated period, SSA considers the facts and issues de novo in determining disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. SSA does not adopt findings from the final determination or decision on the prior disability claim in determining whether the claimant is disabled with respect to the unadjudicated period. Further, under SSA policy, a prior final determination or decision that a claimant is not disabled does not give rise to any presumption of a continuing condition of nondisability. When a subsequent claim involves an unadjudicated period, the determination or decision as to whether a claimant is disabled with respect to that period is made on a neutral basis, without any inference or presumption that a claimant remains "not disabled." nation or decision that a claimant is not disabled does not give rise to any presumption of a continuing condition of nondisability. When a subsequent claim involves an unadjudicated period, the determination or decision as to whether a claimant is disabled with respect to that period is made on a neutral basis, without any inference or presumption that a claimant remains "not disabled." The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a final decision by an ALJ that a claimant is not disabled gives rise to a presumption that the claimant continues to be not disabled after the period adjudicated, and that this presumption of continuing nondisability applies when adjudicating a subsequent disability claim with an unadjudicated period arising under the same title of the Act as the prior claim. In order to rebut the presumption of continuing nondisability, a claimant must prove "'changed circumstances' indicating a greater disability." In addition, the court indicated that where the claimant rebuts the presumption by proving a "changed circumstance," principles of res judicata require that certain findings contained in the final decision by the ALJ on the prior claim be given some res judicata consideration in determining whether the claimant is disabled with respect to the unadjudicated period involved in the subsequent claim. The court concluded that where the final decision by the ALJ on the prior claim, which found the claimant not disabled, contained findings of the claimant's residual functional capacity, education, and work experience, SSA may not make different findings in adjudicating the subsequent disability claim unless there is new and material evidence relating to the claimant's residual functional capacity, education or work experience. Explanation of How SSA Will Apply The Chavez Decision Within The Circuit led, contained findings of the claimant's residual functional capacity, education, and work experience, SSA may not make different findings in adjudicating the subsequent disability claim unless there is new and material evidence relating to the claimant's residual functional capacity, education or work experience. Explanation of How SSA Will Apply The Chavez Decision Within The Circuit This Ruling applies only to disability cases involving claimants who reside in Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon or Washington at the time of the determination or decision on the subsequent claim at the initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing or Appeals Council level. It applies only to cases involving a subsequent disability claim with an unadjudicated period arising under the same title of the Act as a prior claim on which there has been a final decision by an ALJ or the Appeals Council that the claimant is not disabled. When adjudicating the subsequent claim involving an unadjudicated period, adjudicators will apply a presumption of continuing nondisability and determine that the claimant is not disabled with respect to that period, unless the claimant rebuts the presumption. A claimant may rebut the presumption by showing a "changed circumstance" affecting the issue of disability with respect to the unadjudicated period, e.g., a change in the claimant's age category under 20 CFR 404.1563 or 416.963, an increase in the severity of the claimant's impairment(s), the alleged existence of an impairment(s) not previously considered, or a change in the criteria for determining disability. presumption by showing a "changed circumstance" affecting the issue of disability with respect to the unadjudicated period, e.g., a change in the claimant's age category under 20 CFR 404.1563 or 416.963, an increase in the severity of the claimant's impairment(s), the alleged existence of an impairment(s) not previously considered, or a change in the criteria for determining disability. If the claimant rebuts the presumption, adjudicators then must give effect to certain findings, as explained below, contained in the final decision by an ALJ or the Appeals Council on the prior claim, when adjudicating the subsequent claim. For this purpose, this Ruling applies only to a finding of a claimant's residual functional capacity, education, or work experience, or other finding required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for determining disability provided under 20 CFR 404.1520, 416.920 or 416.924, or a finding required under the evaluation process for determining disability provided under 20 CFR 404.1578, as appropriate, which was made in the final decision on the prior disability claim. Adjudicators must adopt such a finding from the final decision on the prior claim in determining whether the claimant is disabled with respect to the unadjudicated period unless there is new and material evidence relating to such a finding or there has been a change in the law, regulations or rulings affecting the finding or the method for arriving at the finding. [1] Under the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, effective March 31, 1995, SSA became an independent Agency in the Executive Branch of the United States Government and was provided ultimate responsibility for administering the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income programs under titles II and XVI of the Act. Prior to March 31, 1995, the Secretary of Health and Human Services had such responsibility. 4, Pub. L. No. 103-296, effective March 31, 1995, SSA became an independent Agency in the Executive Branch of the United States Government and was provided ultimate responsibility for administering the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income programs under titles II and XVI of the Act. Prior to March 31, 1995, the Secretary of Health and Human Services had such responsibility. [2] Although Chavez was a title II case, similar principles also apply to title XVI. Therefore, this Ruling extends to both title II and title XVI disability claims. ## Nearby sections - [AR 04-1(9) AR 04-1(9): Howard on behalf of Wolff v. Barnhart , 341 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) — Applicability of the Statutory Requirement for Pediatrician Review in Childhood Disability Cases to the Hearings and Appeals Levels of the Administrative Review Process — Title XVI of the Social Security Act.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_04_1_9.md) - [AR 05-1(9) AR 05-1(9): Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_05_1_9.md) - [AR 86-1(9) AR 86-1(9): Summy v. Schweiker , 688 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1982) Third party payments for medical care or services -- Title XVI of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_1_9.md) - [AR 86-5 AR 86-5(9): Leschniok v. Heckler , 713 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1983) Necessity of a Determination under Sections 225(b) and/or 1631(a)(6) of the Social Security Act for a Disability Benefits Recipient Engaged in an Approved Vocational Rehabilitation Program Prior to Cessation of His/Her Benefits Based on Medical Recovery -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_5.md) - [AR 86-9(9) AR 86-9(9): Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare v. Meza , 368 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1966); Gardner v. Wilcox , 370 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1966) -- Interpretation of the Secretary's Regulation Regarding Presumption of Death -- Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_9_9.md) - [AR 86-12(9) AR 86-12(9): Hutcheson v. Califano , 638 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981) -- Determination of Stepchild and Resulting Entitlement to Auxiliary Benefits -- Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_12_9.md) - [AR 86-17(9) AR 86-17(9): Owens v. Schweiker , 692 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1982) Child's Benefits -- Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_17_9.md) - [AR 86-23(9) AR 86-23(9): Doran v. Schweiker , 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982) Contributions to Support re: Posthumous Illegitimate Child Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_23_9.md) - [AR 86-25(9) AR 86-25(9): Fagner v. Heckler , 779 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985) -- Applicability of Section 1127 of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_25_9.md) - [AR 87-3(9) AR 87-3(9): Hart v. Bowen , 799 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1986) Current Market Value of an Installment Sales Contract as an Excess Resource](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_87_3_9.md) - [AR 90-1(9) AR 90-1(9): Paxton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 856 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1988) -- Treatment Of A Dependent's Portion Of An Augmented Veterans Benefit Paid Directly To A Veteran -- Title XVI of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_90_1_9.md) - [AR 92-5(9) AR 92-5(9): Quinlivan v. Sullivan , 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990) -- Meaning of the Term "Against Equity and Good Conscience" in the Rules for Waiver of Recovery of an Overpayment -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act; Title IV of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. [1]](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_92_5_9.md) - [AR 92-7(9) AR 92-7(9): Gonzalez v. Sullivan , 914 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990) -- Effect of Initial Determination Notice Language on the Application of Administrative Finality -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_92_7_9.md) - [AR 95-2(9) AR 95-2(9): AR 95-2 (9): Hodge v. Shalala , 27 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994) -- Workers' Compensation -- Proration of a Lump-Sum Award for Permanent Disability Over the Remainder of an Individual's Working Life Under Oregon Workers' Compensation Law -- Title II of the Social Security Act.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_95_2_9.md) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_97_4_9. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.