# AR 90-3(3): AR 90-3(3): Rescinded

> Federal · Rulings · Rescinded

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_90_3_3

## Section

- **Citation:** AR 90-3(3)
- **Heading:** AR 90-3(3): Rescinded
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** Rescinded
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / AR / Fourth Circuit Court / AR 90-3(3)

## Text

AR 90-3(4): Rescinded 9/25/2003 by 68 FR 51317

EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: 07/16/90

ISSUE:

Whether the Secretary may use a vocational expert or other vocational
specialist in determining at step four of the sequential evaluation
process whether a claimant can perform past relevant work.

STATUTE/REGULATION/RULING CITATION:

Sections 223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B)); 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e) and
416.966(e); SSR 82-61 .

CIRCUIT:

Fourth (Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West
Virginia)

Smith v. Bowen , 837 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1987)

APPLICABILITY OF RULING:

This Ruling applies to determinations or decisions at all administrative
levels (i.e., initial, reconsideration, Administrative Law Judge hearing
and Appeals Council).

To the extent inconsistent therewith, this Ruling supersedes Social
Security Ruling 82-61 for cases arising in the Fourth Circuit only.

DESCRIPTION OF CASE:

In January 1983, the plaintiff, Rachel T. Smith, filed an application for
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act).
Following denials of her application initially and on reconsideration, the
plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ). At the administrative hearing, the ALJ found that the
plaintiff was suffering from a severe heart impairment. He concluded that
this impairment, combined with several others, limited Smith's residual
functional capacity to work at the light exertional level. After
considering a vocational expert's testimony that if Smith could perform
light work, she could perform her past job as an assembler/packager, the
ALJ found that the plaintiff was not disabled.
ff was suffering from a severe heart impairment. He concluded that
this impairment, combined with several others, limited Smith's residual
functional capacity to work at the light exertional level. After
considering a vocational expert's testimony that if Smith could perform
light work, she could perform her past job as an assembler/packager, the
ALJ found that the plaintiff was not disabled.

The plaintiff sought judicial review of the Secretary's decision. The
district court remanded the case with instructions for the Secretary
either to explain how he considered plaintiff's testimony that her past
job was beyond her exertional ability, or to find Smith unable to perform
her past relevant work and to continue the sequential analysis to
determine her eligibility for disability benefits.

On remand, the ALJ adhered to his earlier conclusion that Smith could
return to her past relevant work. The district court, hearing the case for
the second time, found that the actions of the Secretary on remand were in
"substantial compliance" with its remand instructions and affirmed the
denial of benefits. Smith appealed the decision of the district court to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

HOLDING:

The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case to the Secretary for further proceedings. Relying on 20
C.F.R. 404.1566(e), the court of appeals concluded, among other things,
that it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the vocational expert's
testimony in determining that Smith could return to her past job.
According to the court of appeals, "A vocational expert enters the
sequential analysis for determining disability after a claimant is
found unable to do her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e).
(Emphasis added)."

STATEMENT AS TO HOW SMITH DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY:
or the ALJ to rely on the vocational expert's
testimony in determining that Smith could return to her past job.
According to the court of appeals, "A vocational expert enters the
sequential analysis for determining disability after a claimant is
found unable to do her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e).
(Emphasis added)."

STATEMENT AS TO HOW SMITH DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY:

Social Security regulations provide a sequential evaluation process for
making determinations regarding disability. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520,
404.1594, 416.920, 416.994 and SSR 86-8 . At step four of
the process (step seven in Continuing Disability Review cases) we consider
the individual's capacity to perform past relevant work. See also SSRs 82-61 and 82-62 .

20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e) and 416.966(e) provide that when evaluating
vocational issues, adjudicators may use the services of a vocational
expert or other vocational specialist to assist in determining the
transferability of work skills and the specific jobs in which an
individual's work skills can be used, or when a "similarly complex issue"
arises. Although vocational expert testimony is principally used at step
five of the process (i.e., to determine whether a claimant who is found
unable to perform past relevant work can perform other work), the Social
Security Administration believes that its regulations and policies do not
prohibit adjudicators from using vocational expert testimony at step four. SSR 82-61 provides, for
example, "For those instances where available documentation and vocational
resource material are not sufficient to determine how a particular job is
usually performed, it may be necessary to utilize the services of a
vocational specialist or vocational expert."
ts regulations and policies do not
prohibit adjudicators from using vocational expert testimony at step four. SSR 82-61 provides, for
example, "For those instances where available documentation and vocational
resource material are not sufficient to determine how a particular job is
usually performed, it may be necessary to utilize the services of a
vocational specialist or vocational expert."

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Smith holds that 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e) authorizes use of a
vocational expert or other vocational specialist only at step five of the
sequential evaluation process, and therefore, that reliance on a
vocational expert or other vocational specialist is improper in
determining whether a claimant can return to past relevant work.

EXPLANATION OF HOW SSA WILL APPLY THIS DECISION WITHIN THE
CIRCUIT:

This Ruling applies only to cases involving an applicant for disability
insurance benefits and/or Supplemental Security Income benefits based on
disability who resides in Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, or West Virginia. In such cases, in making a decision or
determination at step four of the sequential evaluation process (step
seven in Continuing Disability Review cases) about whether an individual
can perform past relevant work, adjudicators may not use a vocational
expert or other vocational specialist.

## Nearby sections

- [AR 00-1(4) AR 00-1(4): Albright v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration , 174 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999) (Interpreting Lively v. Secretary of Health and Human Services )—Effect of Prior Disability Findings on Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim—Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_00_1_4.md)
- [AR 15-1(4) AR 15-1(4): Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_15_1_4.md)
- [AR 86-14 AR 86-14(4): Jones v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare , 629 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1980) -- Child's Benefits -- Contributions for Support -- Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_14.md)
- [AR 86-22 AR 86-22(4): Parsons v. Health and Human Services , 762 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1985) -- Contributions to Support re: Posthumous Illegitimate Child -- Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_86_22.md)
- [AR 90-3(3) AR 90-3(3): Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_90_3_3.md)
- [AR 90-4(4) AR 90-4(4): Culbertson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 859 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1988); Young v. Bowen , 858 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1988) -- Waiver of Administrative Finality in Proceedings Involving Unrepresented Claimants Who Lack the Mental Competence to Request Administrative Review -- Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_90_4_4.md)
- [AR 93-1(4) AR 93-1(4): Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_93_1_4.md)
- [AR 94-2(4) AR 94-2(4): Rescinded](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_94_2_4.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_90_3_3. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.
