# AR 24-1(6): AR 24-1(6): Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018) (Interpreting Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security , 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997)): Effect of Prior Disability Findings on Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim—Titles II and XVI of the Act

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_24_1_6

## Section

- **Citation:** AR 24-1(6)
- **Heading:** AR 24-1(6): Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018) (Interpreting Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security , 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997)): Effect of Prior Disability Findings on Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim—Titles II and XVI of the Act
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / AR / Sixth Circuit Court / AR 24-1(6)

## Text

Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6) Effective Date: December 2, 2024 Federal Register,
Vol. 89, No. 227, page 92995

Issue

Whether, in making a disability determination or decision
on a subsequent disability claim with respect to an
unadjudicated period, the Social Security Administration
(SSA) must consider a finding of a claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) or other finding required under
the applicable sequential evaluation process for
determining disability, made in a final decision by an
administrative law judge (ALJ) or the Appeals Council (AC)
on a prior disability claim.

Statute/Regulation/Ruling Citation

Sections 205(a) and (h) and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a) and (h) and 902(a)(5)), 20 CFR 404.900(a) , 404.957(c)(1) , 416.1400(a) , 416.1457(c)(1) , AR 98-3(6) (rescinded), AR 98-4(6) (rescinded).

Circuit

Sixth (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee) Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d
929 (6th Cir. 2018) (Interpreting Drummond v.
Commissioner of Social Security , 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997))

Applicability of Ruling

This ruling applies to determinations and decisions at all
administrative levels (i.e., the initial, reconsideration,
ALJ hearing, and AC levels).

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Earley was
based, in part, on the panel's interpretation of the Sixth
Circuit's prior decision in Drummond . Drummond , in turn, relied in part on the Sixth
Circuit's earlier decision in Dennard . The following
summaries of the two earlier cases are provided as
background material.

Dennard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 907
F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990)
n of the Sixth Circuit in Earley was
based, in part, on the panel's interpretation of the Sixth
Circuit's prior decision in Drummond . Drummond , in turn, relied in part on the Sixth
Circuit's earlier decision in Dennard . The following
summaries of the two earlier cases are provided as
background material.

Dennard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 907
F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990)

Mr. Dennard argued that because SSA found him unable to do
his past relevant work on his first application for
benefits, SSA was precluded from reconsidering this issue
and finding in a subsequent decision, involving an
unadjudicated period, that Mr. Dennard could perform the
same past relevant work. The Sixth Circuit observed that it
seemed clear that SSA had reconsidered the nature and
extent of Mr. Dennard's exertional level in his former job.
The court stated: “We are persuaded that under the
circumstances, we must remand this case to [SSA] . . . to
determine whether [Mr.] Dennard is disabled in light of the
prior determination that he could not return to his
previous employment.”

Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security , 126
F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997)

Ms. Drummond argued that, absent evidence of improvement in
her condition, the ALJ's finding in a prior claim that she
was limited to sedentary work precluded SSA from finding in
a subsequent claim that she could perform medium work. The
Sixth Circuit stated that, “[a]bsent evidence of an
improvement in a claimant's condition, a subsequent ALJ is
bound by the findings of a previous ALJ.” The court
held that SSA could not reexamine issues previously
decided, in the absence of new and additional evidence or
changed circumstances. The court further stated that,
“[j]ust as a Social Security claimant is barred from
relitigating an issue that has been previously determined,
so is the Commissioner.” After finding that there was
not substantial evidence that Ms
revious ALJ.” The court
held that SSA could not reexamine issues previously
decided, in the absence of new and additional evidence or
changed circumstances. The court further stated that,
“[j]ust as a Social Security claimant is barred from
relitigating an issue that has been previously determined,
so is the Commissioner.” After finding that there was
not substantial evidence that Ms. Drummond's condition had
improved significantly in the time between the two ALJ
decisions, the court concluded that SSA was bound by its
previous finding that Ms. Drummond was limited to sedentary work.

Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d
929 (6th Cir. 2018)

Description of Case

In 2010, Ms. Earley applied for disability benefits,
claiming that she was disabled starting on June 25, 2010.
In 2012, an ALJ found that she remained capable of light
physical exertion and that she was not disabled for the
period from June 25, 2010, through May 15, 2012. Ms. Earley
applied again in July 2012, arguing that she became
disabled after the decision on her last claim. The same
ALJ, invoking Drummond and AR 98-4(6) , stated that
he was bound by his earlier findings, unless Ms. Earley
offered new and material evidence of a changed condition.
Because the ALJ found that Ms. Earley had failed to do
that, the ALJ again found her not disabled and denied her claim.

On review, the district court reversed. The district court
construed Drummond to apply only if it would lead to
a favorable outcome for the claimant. Since any preclusive
effect of the ALJ's prior findings would make it more
difficult for Ms. Earley to be found disabled, the court
found that Drummond did not apply.
to do
that, the ALJ again found her not disabled and denied her claim.

On review, the district court reversed. The district court
construed Drummond to apply only if it would lead to
a favorable outcome for the claimant. Since any preclusive
effect of the ALJ's prior findings would make it more
difficult for Ms. Earley to be found disabled, the court
found that Drummond did not apply.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined and clarified Drummond . The court found that the key principles
protected by Drummond , consistency between
proceedings and finality with respect to prior adjudicated
claims, apply to both individuals and the government. At
the same time, these principles do not prevent the agency
from giving a fresh look to a new claim containing new
evidence or satisfying a new regulatory threshold that
covers a new period of alleged disability while being
mindful of past rulings and the record in prior proceedings.

The court rejected the argument that, “[i]n reviewing
a second application by the same individual . . . the
administrative law judge should completely ignore earlier
findings and applications.” The court explained that
“[f]resh review is not blind review” and that
“a later administrative law judge may consider what
an earlier judge did if for no other reason than to strive
for consistent decision making.” Further, the court
explained that “it is fair for an administrative law
judge to take the view that, absent new and additional
evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are
a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in
reviewing a second application” and, at the same
time, that “an applicant remains free to bring a
second application that introduces no new evidence or very
little new evidence after a failed application.” The
court cautioned, however, that a claimant “should not
have high expectations about success if the second filing
mimics the first one and the individual has not reached any
new age (or othe
second application” and, at the same
time, that “an applicant remains free to bring a
second application that introduces no new evidence or very
little new evidence after a failed application.” The
court cautioned, however, that a claimant “should not
have high expectations about success if the second filing
mimics the first one and the individual has not reached any
new age (or other) threshold to obtain benefits.”

Holding

The Sixth Circuit stated that, “[w]hen an individual
seeks disability benefits for a distinct period of time,
each application is entitled to review.” The court
explained that if an individual files a subsequent
application for the same period and “offers no
cognizable explanation for revisiting the first decision,
res judicata would bar the second application.” The
court further explained that an ALJ honors res judicata
“principles by considering what an earlier judge
found with respect to a later application and by
considering the earlier record” and that,
accordingly, “it is fair for an administrative law
judge to take the view that, absent new and additional
evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are
a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in
reviewing a second application.” Ms. Earley's new
claim involved a new period; therefore, the court held that
res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, the court remanded
the case for the ALJ to reconsider Ms. Earley's claim for
benefits under the correct standard.

Statement as to How Earley Differs From the Agency's
Policy
dings are
a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in
reviewing a second application.” Ms. Earley's new
claim involved a new period; therefore, the court held that
res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, the court remanded
the case for the ALJ to reconsider Ms. Earley's claim for
benefits under the correct standard.

Statement as to How Earley Differs From the Agency's
Policy

In a subsequent disability claim, SSA considers the
issue of disability with respect to a period that was not
adjudicated to be a new issue that requires an independent
evaluation. Thus, when adjudicating a subsequent disability
claim involving an unadjudicated period, SSA considers the
facts and issues de novo in determining or deciding
disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. SSA
does not consider prior findings made in the final
determination or decision on the prior claim as evidence in
adjudicating disability with respect to the unadjudicated
period in the subsequent claim.

In Earley , the Sixth Circuit agreed with SSA's
policy that res judicata does not apply with respect to an
unadjudicated period. Yet, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with
SSA's policy that prior disability findings are not to be
considered in the adjudication of disability for a
previously unadjudicated period in a subsequent claim.
Rather, Earley indicates that such prior findings
made at the ALJ hearing or AC level should be considered in
the adjudication of disability for an unadjudicated period
in a subsequent claim, stating that “it is fair for
an administrative law judge to take the view that, absent
new and additional evidence, the first administrative law
judge's findings are a legitimate, albeit not binding,
consideration in reviewing a second application.” Earley indicates that an adjudicator honors the
principles of res judicata “by considering what an
earlier judge found with respect to a later application and
by considering that earlier record.”
to take the view that, absent
new and additional evidence, the first administrative law
judge's findings are a legitimate, albeit not binding,
consideration in reviewing a second application.” Earley indicates that an adjudicator honors the
principles of res judicata “by considering what an
earlier judge found with respect to a later application and
by considering that earlier record.”

SSA interprets Earley to require that, where a final
decision after a hearing on a prior disability claim
contains a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding
required under the applicable sequential evaluation process
for determining disability, SSA must consider such
finding(s) as evidence when adjudicating a subsequent
disability claim, arising under the same or a different
title of the Act, involving an unadjudicated period.

Explanation of How We Will Apply the Earley Decision
Within the Circuit

This Ruling applies only to disability findings in cases
involving claimants who reside in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
or Tennessee at the time of the determination or decision
on the subsequent claim at the initial, reconsideration,
ALJ hearing, or AC level. Additionally, it applies only to
a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is
required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
adjudicating disability (provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 ,
as appropriate), made in a final
decision (favorable or unfavorable) by an ALJ or the AC on
a prior disability claim. [1]
deration,
ALJ hearing, or AC level. Additionally, it applies only to
a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is
required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
adjudicating disability (provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 ,
as appropriate), made in a final
decision (favorable or unfavorable) by an ALJ or the AC on
a prior disability claim. [1]

When a claimant seeks disability benefits for a new period
in a subsequent claim, that subsequent claim is entitled to
review following the applicable sequential evaluation
process. However, such review does not exist in a vacuum.
When adjudicating a subsequent claim (arising under the
same or a different title of the Act as the prior claim),
an adjudicator deciding whether a claimant is disabled
during a previously unadjudicated period must consider
findings from the decision on the prior claim. As the Court
recognized in Earley , things change with the passage
of time, such as age and physical condition. As a result,
each claim covering a different period should be reviewed
as a new claim. However, when a finding of a claimant's RFC
or other finding required under the sequential evaluation
process for determining disability differs from that in the
prior decision, the adjudicator must make clear that they
considered the prior finding as evidence in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances. [2]
each claim covering a different period should be reviewed
as a new claim. However, when a finding of a claimant's RFC
or other finding required under the sequential evaluation
process for determining disability differs from that in the
prior decision, the adjudicator must make clear that they
considered the prior finding as evidence in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances. [2]

Where the prior finding was about a fact that is subject to
change with the passage of time, such as a claimant's RFC
or the severity of an impairment(s), the likelihood that
the fact has changed generally increases as the time
between the previously adjudicated period and the
subsequent period increases. An adjudicator generally
should pay particular attention to the lapse of time
between the earlier claim and the later claim and the
impact of the passage of time on the claim. In situations
where minimal time has passed, and no or very little new
evidence has been introduced, it is more likely that the
prior finding will remain the same. But the adjudicator
must consider all relevant facts and circumstances on a
case-by-case basis. Additionally, a change in the law,
regulations, or rulings affecting a relevant finding or the
method for arriving at the finding may be a reason why the
prior finding, considered as evidence, is properly departed
from in the current determination or decision.

[1] In making a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is
required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for adjudicating
disability, an ALJ or the AC may have made certain subsidiary findings,
such as an assessment of the claimant's symptoms. A subsidiary finding
does not constitute a finding that is required at a step in the sequential
evaluation process for adjudicating disability, as provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 .
equired at a step in the sequential evaluation process for adjudicating
disability, an ALJ or the AC may have made certain subsidiary findings,
such as an assessment of the claimant's symptoms. A subsidiary finding
does not constitute a finding that is required at a step in the sequential
evaluation process for adjudicating disability, as provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 .

[2] For example, an adjudicator might consider such factors as: (1)
whether the fact on which the prior finding was based is subject to change
with the passage of time, such as a fact relating to the severity of
the claimant's medical condition; (2) the likelihood of such a change,
considering the amount of time between the period adjudicated in the
prior claim and the unadjudicated period in the subsequent claim; and
(3) the extent to which evidence that was not considered in the final
decision on the prior claim provides a basis for making a different
finding for the unadjudicated period in the subsequent claim. These are
only examples and not intended to create specific requirements as part
of the sequential evaluation.

## Nearby sections

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- [AR 93-3(6) AR 93-3(6): Akers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 966 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1992)--Attorney's Fees Based in Part on Continued Benefits Paid to Social Security Claimants--Title II of the Social Security Act](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_93_3_6.md)
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_24_1_6. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.