# AR 06-1(2): AR 06-1(2): Fowlkes v. Adamec , 432 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005): Determining Whether an Individual is a Fugitive Felon Under the Social Security Act (Act) — Titles II and XVI of the Act. [1]

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_06_1_2

## Section

- **Citation:** AR 06-1(2)
- **Heading:** AR 06-1(2): Fowlkes v. Adamec , 432 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005): Determining Whether an Individual is a Fugitive Felon Under the Social Security Act (Act) — Titles II and XVI of the Act. [1]
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Social Security Rulings / AR / Second Circuit Court / AR 06-1(2)

## Text

EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: April 6, 2006 71 FR 17551

Acquiescence Ruling 06-1(2)

Issue:

Whether an outstanding warrant or similar order for the arrest
of an individual on a felony charge is, on its own, sufficient evidence
for the Agency to determine that an individual is a fugitive felon under
the Act and, therefore, not entitled to receive title II benefits or
ineligible to receive title XVI payments.

Statute/Regulation/Ruling Citation:

Sections 202(x)(1)(A) and 1611(e)(4) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 402(x)(1)(A) and 1382(e)(4)); 20 CFR 416.202(f) and 416.1339 .

Circuit:

Second (Connecticut, New York, Vermont).

Fowlkes v. Adamec , 432 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 2005).

Applicability of Ruling:

This ruling applies to all determinations or
decisions at all levels of the administrative review process that an
individual is a fugitive felon within the meaning of sections 202(x)(1)(A) and 1611(e)(4) of the Act.
This ruling applies to all title II and title XVI applicants, title II
beneficiaries, and title XVI recipients who live in Connecticut,
New York, or Vermont.

Description of Case:

In 1997, Felipe Fowlkes applied for and was found eligible to receive
supplemental security income (SSI) disability payments under title XVI
of the Act. In September 1999, he was indicted in Virginia on two
felony charges. On March 16, 2000, the Agency notified Mr. Fowlkes,
who at that time resided in New York, that his eligibility for SSI
payments would be suspended retroactively to September 1999 because of
two outstanding felony warrants from Virginia. Mr. Fowlkes requested
administrative review and, after a hearing, an ALJ issued a decision
finding that because he had not satisfied the outstanding felony arrest
warrants, Mr. Fowlkes was fleeing to avoid prosecution as described in
section 1611(e)(4) of the Act, 42 USC 1382(e)(4). Accordingly, the ALJ found that
suspension of Mr. Fowlkes' SSI payments was proper because he was a
fugitive felon under the Act.
ed
administrative review and, after a hearing, an ALJ issued a decision
finding that because he had not satisfied the outstanding felony arrest
warrants, Mr. Fowlkes was fleeing to avoid prosecution as described in
section 1611(e)(4) of the Act, 42 USC 1382(e)(4). Accordingly, the ALJ found that
suspension of Mr. Fowlkes' SSI payments was proper because he was a
fugitive felon under the Act.

Mr. Fowlkes sought judicial review, not under the Act, but based on a
claim that the Agency violated his civil rights. The district court
dismissed Mr. Fowlkes' civil rights claim, without reaching the issue
of whether or not Mr. Fowlkes was a fugitive felon under the Act. On
appeal, the Second Circuit converted the action into one seeking review,
under section 1631(c)(3) of the Act, of the Agency's fleeing felon
determination and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Holding:

The Second Circuit held that the Agency could not conclude that an
individual is fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement from
the mere fact that an outstanding felony arrest warrant or similar order
exists. Specifically, the court stated that “fleeing” is
understood to mean the conscious evasion of arrest or prosecution. The
court determined that for “flight” to result in a suspension
of benefits, it must be undertaken with the specific intent to avoid
prosecution. Accordingly, the court concluded that for the Agency to
suspend benefits on the basis that an individual was
“fleeing,” the Agency must have some evidence that the
individual knows that his apprehension is sought. The court found the
implementing regulation consistent with this construction of the Act.
In addition, the court interpreted the implementing regulation to permit
the Agency to suspend benefits only as of the date of a warrant or order
issued by a court or other appropriate tribunal on the basis of a
finding that an individual has fled or was fleeing from justice.
his apprehension is sought. The court found the
implementing regulation consistent with this construction of the Act.
In addition, the court interpreted the implementing regulation to permit
the Agency to suspend benefits only as of the date of a warrant or order
issued by a court or other appropriate tribunal on the basis of a
finding that an individual has fled or was fleeing from justice.

Statement as to How Fowlkes Differs from the Agency's
Policy:

We interpret section 1611(e)(4) of the Act to mean that a person is
“fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement” when
a person has an outstanding warrant for his or her arrest, even if that
person is unaware of that warrant.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation. The
Second Circuit held the term “fleeing” to mean “the
conscious evasion of arrest or prosecution.” The court determined
that for “flight” to result in a suspension of benefits, it
must be undertaken with the specific intent to avoid prosecution. Thus,
for the Agency to take adverse action against an individual described in
the Act as “fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or
confinement,” the Agency must have some evidence that the
individual knew his apprehension was sought.

Explanation of How SSA Will Apply the Fowlkes Decision
Within the Circuit:

This ruling applies to all determinations or decisions at all
levels of the administrative review process that an individual is a
fugitive felon within the meaning of sections 202(x)(1)(A) and 1611(e)(4) of the Act.
This ruling applies to all title II and title XVI applicants, title II
beneficiaries and title XVI recipients who live in Connecticut, New
York, or Vermont.
Within the Circuit:

This ruling applies to all determinations or decisions at all
levels of the administrative review process that an individual is a
fugitive felon within the meaning of sections 202(x)(1)(A) and 1611(e)(4) of the Act.
This ruling applies to all title II and title XVI applicants, title II
beneficiaries and title XVI recipients who live in Connecticut, New
York, or Vermont.

We will not use the existence of an outstanding felony arrest warrant or
similar order as the sole basis for finding that an individual is
fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement and is, therefore,
a fugitive felon subject to withholding of title II benefits or
ineligibility to receive title XVI payments. Before we determine that a
title II or title XVI applicant, title II beneficiary, or title XVI
recipient is a fugitive felon, we must have evidence that the individual
knows that there is an outstanding felony arrest warrant, and the
outstanding arrest warrant must have been issued on the basis that the
individual has fled or is fleeing from justice.

Cross References:

Program Operations Manual System, sections SI 00530.010 and GN 02613.010.

[1] Although Fowlkes was a title XVI case, the Act provides the same
standard under title II for determining whether an individual is a
fugitive felon.

## Nearby sections

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SSA_SSR_AR_AR_06_1_2. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.
