# Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 8.4: Rule 8.4. Misconduct

> Delaware · Court rules · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R8_4

## Section

- **Citation:** Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 8.4
- **Heading:** Rule 8.4. Misconduct
- **Jurisdiction:** Delaware
- **Kind:** Court rules
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Delaware Court Rules / Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct / Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct with comments / Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 8.4

## Text

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
« Rule 8.4. »
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of
another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; or
(f) ) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is
a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

COMMENT

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request
or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf. Paragraph (a), however,
does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the
client is legally entitled to take.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice
law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to
file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such
implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses
involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include
offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery
and comparable offenses, which have no specific connection to fitness for
offense of willful failure to
file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such
implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses
involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include
offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery
and comparable offenses, which have no specific connection to fitness for

the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the
entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for
offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.
Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious
interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A
pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when
considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly
manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion,
national
origin,
disability,
age,
sexual
orientation
or
socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy
respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a
discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law
upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of
Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation
of the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going
beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can
suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers
ts. The provisions of
Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation
of the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going
beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can
suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is
true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor,
administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a
corporation or other organization.
INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINE.
Lawyer’s income taxes.
The following statements of principles are promulgated as Interpretive
Guidelines in the application of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct:
Criminal acts that reflect adversely on a lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, as construed under
these Rules, shall be deemed to include, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Willful failure to make and file federal, state, or city income tax
returns or estimated income tax returns, or to pay such estimated tax or
taxes, or to supply information in connection therewith at the time or
times required by law or regulation;
(2) Willful attempt in any manner to evade any federal, state, or city
income tax.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ fees.
— Fee splitting.
Client relations.
— Client funds.
— — Accounting.
— — Misappropriation.
— — Safeguarding.
— Diligence.
— Sexual.
Analysis
Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.
— Defense to misconduct.
— Reinstatement.
Law firms.
— Bookkeeping.
— Managing co-counsel.
— Managing partner.
— Office.
— Taxes.
Professional conduct.
come tax.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ fees.
— Fee splitting.
Client relations.
— Client funds.
— — Accounting.
— — Misappropriation.
— — Safeguarding.
— Diligence.
— Sexual.
Analysis
Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.
— Defense to misconduct.
— Reinstatement.
Law firms.
— Bookkeeping.
— Managing co-counsel.
— Managing partner.
— Office.
— Taxes.
Professional conduct.

— Candor toward the tribunal.
— Decorum of the tribunal.
— Illegal conduct.
— Obligations toward the tribunal.
Sanctions.
— Disbarment.
— Disciplinary proceedings.
— Dismissal of claim.
— Reprimand.
— Suspension.
Attorneys’ fees.
— Fee splitting.
Attorney violated subsection (a) by attempting to divide a prospective
fee in violation of Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(e). In re Maguire, 725 A.2d 417 (Del.
1999).
Client relations.
— Client funds.
— — Accounting.
Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.15A, 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(b),
8.4(d) were violated when for several years the attorney mishandled and
improperly accounted for the attorney’s client’s funds and the attorney’s
escrow account and inaccurately completed certificates of compliance; the
attorney was suspended for 3 years, could apply for reinstatement after 2
years if the attorney fulfilled conditions, and could not return to solo
practice. In re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2005).
— — Misappropriation.
Attorney violated subsection (c) through his misappropriation of client’s
funds, failure to pay off a judgment, and signing client’s name to a check
tes of compliance; the
attorney was suspended for 3 years, could apply for reinstatement after 2
years if the attorney fulfilled conditions, and could not return to solo
practice. In re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2005).
— — Misappropriation.
Attorney violated subsection (c) through his misappropriation of client’s
funds, failure to pay off a judgment, and signing client’s name to a check

without indicating he was signing for her. In re Maguire, 725 A.2d 417
(Del. 1999).
There was substantial evidence to support the factual findings and
conclusions of law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding
an attorney’s violations of Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (b),
and 8.4(c), based on the attorney’s misappropriation of clients’ fees on
various occasions, and the attorney’s failure to include the typical refund
provision regarding unearned fees in the retainer agreements for other
clients; a 1-year suspension was warranted. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322
(Del. 2012).
There was substantial evidence to support the factual findings and
conclusions of law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding
an attorney’s violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), based on the
attorney’s theft by misappropriating firm funds; such conduct reflected
adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).
Based on a report by the Board on Professional Responsibility, there was
clear and convincing evidence that an attorney engaged in criminal
conduct worthy of suspnsion by: (1) misappropriating funds from the
attorney’s employer over a 5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest
conduct by lying to the attorney’s mortgage company; and (3) forging the
employer’s signature. In re Lankenau, 138 A.3d 1151 (Del. 2016).
— — Safeguarding.
When an attorney falsely represented that he had designated an estate
account as an attorney trust or escrow account under Law. R. Prof. Conduct
1.15A, the attorney violated Law
y’s employer over a 5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest
conduct by lying to the attorney’s mortgage company; and (3) forging the
employer’s signature. In re Lankenau, 138 A.3d 1151 (Del. 2016).
— — Safeguarding.
When an attorney falsely represented that he had designated an estate
account as an attorney trust or escrow account under Law. R. Prof. Conduct
1.15A, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) and (d). In re
Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
Attorney was disbarred after having been found to have violated Law. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.15 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 by misappropriating
clients funds and failing to identify a bank account as a law practice
account; the attorney’s conduct was found to have been intentional and no
mitigating factors were present where it was shown that the attorney took
a long time to provide a client with refinancing proceeds and, when the
attorney did, the check was returned for insufficient funds, and the

attorney used a septic system escrow deposit to cover another check that
the attorney had written. In re Garrett, 909 A.2d 103 (Del. 2006).
Attorney whose child stole funds from the attorney’s escrow account
was publicly reprimanded for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and
(d) by filing an annual registration statement that inaccurately reported
that the attorney had a precertification review. In re Otlowski, 976 A.2d
172 (Del. 2009).
Board on Professional Responsibility correctly assigned a 6-month
suspension with conditions for violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R
attorney’s escrow account
was publicly reprimanded for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and
(d) by filing an annual registration statement that inaccurately reported
that the attorney had a precertification review. In re Otlowski, 976 A.2d
172 (Del. 2009).
Board on Professional Responsibility correctly assigned a 6-month
suspension with conditions for violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15, 5.3
and 8.4 because: (1) the Board considered the attorney’s state of mind and
concluded the attorney, as managing partner, was at least negligent in
overseeing 2 non-attorneys to ensure the books and records were
maintained in compliance with the rules; (2) the attorney knew of rule
violations due to the negative balances in the account; (3) the attorney
filed an inaccurate 2015 Certificate of Compliance with the Delaware
Supreme Court that misrepresented the law firm’s compliance with the
rule on safekeeping property; (4) the covering funds relied on by the Board
on Professional Responsibility should not have been considered a
substitute for negative balances in the client subsidiary ledger; (5) the law
firm had a duty to safeguard the clients’ property but failed to do so; and
(6) as a managing partner who failed to supervise non-attorney employees,
the attorney was responsible for those deficiencies. In re Beauregard, 189
A.3d 1236 (Del. 2018).
— Diligence.
When an attorney handling 2 estates, inter alia, failed to probate the
estates in a timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(d). In re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
Lawyer violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) because the lawyer falsely
told a client: (1) a complaint was filed; (2) there was a tolling agreement;
and (3) negotiations were ongoing. In re Wilks, 99 A.3d 228 (Del. 2014).
— Sexual
estates, inter alia, failed to probate the
estates in a timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(d). In re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
Lawyer violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) because the lawyer falsely
told a client: (1) a complaint was filed; (2) there was a tolling agreement;
and (3) negotiations were ongoing. In re Wilks, 99 A.3d 228 (Del. 2014).
— Sexual.
Three-year suspension, along with other conditions, was the appropriate
sanction for an attorney who admitted having had a sexual relationship
with a client (who claimed to have felt pressured into it) that had not pre-

existed representation of the client, and where the attorney was also shown
by clear and convincing evidence to have engaged in conduct with clients
and employees of the firm that amounted to the Delaware misdemeanors
of sexual harassment and offensive touching. In re Tenenbaum, 880 A.2d
1025 (Del. 2005).
In a professional disciplinary proceeding, an attorney was disbarred as a
result of engaging in a pattern of sexual misconduct with clients for more
than 2 decades. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).
Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.
— Defense to misconduct.
A pattern of taking mortgage payoff funds is strong evidence of
deliberate wrongdoing during an extended period of time, and was grounds
for finding a violation of this section notwithstanding the attorney’s mental
illness. In re Dorsey, 683 A.2d 1046 (Del. 1996).
— Reinstatement.
State Supreme Court approved the Professional Responsibility Board’s
report and recommended sanction as the attorney admitted violations of
Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and the 18-month suspension was properly
made retroactive to the date that the State Supreme Court entered its order
that the disciplinary proceedings be held in abeyance because the attorney
had been transferred to disability inactive status and was later granted
transfer to active status after rehabilitation. In re Amalfitano, 931 A.2d
1006 (Del. 2007)
tions of
Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and the 18-month suspension was properly
made retroactive to the date that the State Supreme Court entered its order
that the disciplinary proceedings be held in abeyance because the attorney
had been transferred to disability inactive status and was later granted
transfer to active status after rehabilitation. In re Amalfitano, 931 A.2d
1006 (Del. 2007).
Law firms.
— Bookkeeping.
Attorney was publicly reprimanded and subject to a public two-year
period of probation for her violations of Rule 1.15(b) and (d), former
Interpretive Guideline No. 2, and subsection (d) of this Rule, for failing to
pay various federal and state employee and employer payroll taxes in a
timely manner, for failing to maintain her law practice books and records,
by failing to file her 1998 and 1999 federal unemployment tax returns
until October 2000, and by making consistently delinquent filings and
payment in connection with other law practice payroll tax obligations, and

for certifying to the court that her law practice books and records were in
compliance with the requirements of Rule 1.15 and that her tax obligations
were paid in a timely manner. In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258 (Del. 2001).
Attorney was publicly reprimanded and was ordered to serve a public 2-
year probation period for violating Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing
certificates of compliance containing inaccurate representations as to
compliance with Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 with reference to the
attorney’s law practice bank accounts; the attorney’s substantial
experience, multiple offenses and attitude toward the offenses offset the
attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensive remedial efforts,
full cooperation and lack of injury to a client. In re Member of the Bar of
the Supreme Court, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009)
iance with Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 with reference to the
attorney’s law practice bank accounts; the attorney’s substantial
experience, multiple offenses and attitude toward the offenses offset the
attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensive remedial efforts,
full cooperation and lack of injury to a client. In re Member of the Bar of
the Supreme Court, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009).
Attorney’s failure to maintain law office books and records, filing
certificates of compliance with annual registration statements that
indicated maintenance of such documentation, and failure to file and pay
taxes violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d) and Law. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(c), (d); a public reprimand was imposed. In re Witherell, 998 A.2d 852
(Del. 2010).
Attorney was suspended for 1 year, with the suspension to run
retroactively to the date the attorney was transferred to disability inactive
status, for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), by filing
certificates of compliance that contained misrepresentations relating to
attorney’s maintenance of the law practice’s books and records. In re
Nowak, 5 A.3d 631 (Del. 2010).
Following a self-reported embezzlement by a member of the attorney’s
staff, the attorney failed to obtain court-ordered precertification by a
licensed certified public accountant for 2 years of certificates of
compliance, reporting the status of recordkeeping with regard to
requirements of Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.15 and Law Prof. Conduct R.
1.15A; because the absence of any injury to clients did not excuse the
misconduct, the attorney’s repeated violations of Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and
Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) supported an imposition of a public
reprimand with conditions. In re Holfeld, 74 A.3d 605 (Del. 2013).
Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney
violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d), resulting in 2 years’
any injury to clients did not excuse the
misconduct, the attorney’s repeated violations of Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and
Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) supported an imposition of a public
reprimand with conditions. In re Holfeld, 74 A.3d 605 (Del. 2013).
Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney
violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d), resulting in 2 years’

probation, by: (1) misrepresenting to the court the attorney’s maintenance
of records; and (2) failing to properly maintain them, to safeguard client
funds, to provide for reasonable safeguards to assure accurate accounting,
to supervise nonlawyer staff, and to timely file and pay taxes. In re Gray,
152 A.3d 581 (Del. 2016).
— Managing co-counsel.
Lawyer engaged in knowing misconduct, for which suspension was the
appropriate discipline, by: (1) assisting a suspended lawyer in the
unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer engaged the suspended
lawyer to work on cases without determining the applicable restrictions;
(2) failing to supervise the suspended lawyer adequately; and (3) giving
the suspended lawyer a percentage of a contingency fee that included work
performed both before and after the suspension. In re Martin, 105 A.3d
967 (Del. 2014).
— Managing partner.
Where an attorney, the managing partner of a firm, admitted to violating
Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) by keeping more than $1700 of the
firm’s funds in the client escrow account for almost a year, admitted to
violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d), by failing, for almost a year,
to maintain the firm’s books and records in compliance with the rule’s
requirements, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof
e managing partner of a firm, admitted to violating
Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) by keeping more than $1700 of the
firm’s funds in the client escrow account for almost a year, admitted to
violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d), by failing, for almost a year,
to maintain the firm’s books and records in compliance with the rule’s
requirements, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3 by
failing to have reasonable safeguards in place to ensure an accurate
accounting of the firm’s financial books and records in compliance with
the Rules, by failing to supervise employees’ conduct in reconciling books
and records and filing and paying payroll taxes, and by knowing that
payroll, gross receipts, and corporate taxes were not being timely filed and
paid, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing a
Certificate of Compliance for the year 2000, which falsely stated that the
law practice’s books and records were maintained in compliance with Del.
Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 and by falsely stating on the Certificates of
Compliance for 1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax
filing and payment obligations, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof.
Conduct 8.4(d) by failing to file and pay various taxes and by filing false
Certificates of Compliance for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and
2001, and where a witness testified unequivocally that the attorney
falsely stating on the Certificates of
Compliance for 1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax
filing and payment obligations, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof.
Conduct 8.4(d) by failing to file and pay various taxes and by filing false
Certificates of Compliance for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and
2001, and where a witness testified unequivocally that the attorney

instructed the witness to transfer escrow funds to the firm’s operating
account, and client trust funds had to be, and were, invaded, the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel’s recommended public reprimand was rejected, and
the attorney was suspended from the practice of law for six months and
one day; a managing partner of a law firm had enhanced duties to ensure
that the law firm complied with its recordkeeping and tax obligations, and
the managing partner had to discharge those responsibilities faithfully and
with the utmost diligence. In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003).
— Office.
Attorney who failed to maintain a bona fide office for the practice of
law in Delaware violated various disciplinary rules because the attorney’s
assurance to disciplinary counsel that the bona fide office requirement was
satisfied was knowingly false and dishonest; merely being reachable by
phone was not sufficient. In re A Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
of Delaware: Fred Bar, 99 A.3d 639 (Del. 2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S.
916, 134 S. Ct. 2822, 189 L. Ed. 2d 785 (U.S. 2014).
— Taxes.
When an attorney failed to pay payroll taxes for five years and personal
income taxes for six years, the attorney was suspended from the practice
of law for 3 years for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
subject to the right to seek reinstatement after 6 months. In re Landis, 850
A.2d 291 (Del. 2004).
Attorney who was delinquent in the payment of the attorney’s law
practice’s federal, state, and local payroll tax obligations violated Law. R.
Prof
come taxes for six years, the attorney was suspended from the practice
of law for 3 years for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
subject to the right to seek reinstatement after 6 months. In re Landis, 850
A.2d 291 (Del. 2004).
Attorney who was delinquent in the payment of the attorney’s law
practice’s federal, state, and local payroll tax obligations violated Law. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.15(b), 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d); due to the attorney’s prior
disciplinary history with delinquent taxes, a public reprimand, 18-month
probation and implementation of internal accounting controls were
warranted. In re Finestrauss, 32 A.3d 978 (Del. 2011).
Evidence supported the determination of an attorney’s misconduct by
the Board on Professional Responsibility because the attorney failed to file
taxes in a timely manner for a period of years; the attorney also responded
untruthfully that the taxes had in fact been filed on the annual attorney
registration statement. In re Bria, 86 A.3d 1118 (Del. 2014).

Attorney’s failure to file taxes in a timely manner for a period of years,
and the attorney’s false response on that issue on the annual attorney
registration statement, warranted a suspension of 6 months and 1 day in
order to avoid the automatic reinstatement of a lesser suspension period.
In re Bria, 86 A.3d 1118 (Del. 2014).
Professional conduct.
— Candor toward the tribunal.
“Negligent misrepresentation” may form the basis for a charge of
misconduct under the literal terms of Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). In re
Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
Attorney’s misrepresentation to a Family Court that a client was not in
arrears with regard to alimony and had paid the debt in full was
determined to have been an act of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), a
failure to provide competent representation to the client, in violation of
Law. Prof. Conduct R
A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
Attorney’s misrepresentation to a Family Court that a client was not in
arrears with regard to alimony and had paid the debt in full was
determined to have been an act of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), a
failure to provide competent representation to the client, in violation of
Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, and a failure to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions, in
violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.4(b); the misrepresentation was found
to have been knowingly made, but the recommended suspension of 2 years
was reduced to 6 months, because mitigating circumstances were found in
the
nature
of the
attorney
providing
the
Family
Court with
correspondence, which would have permitted the Family Court and the
adverse party an opportunity to verify the debt. In re Chasanov, 869 A.2d
327 (Del. 2005).
Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing with a Family
Court a petitioner’s answer to a respondent’s counterclaim, on which the
attorney had signed the client’s name and had falsely notarized the
signature. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).
Based on an attorney’s false statements to a Virginia court regarding
delivery of legal documents to a party-opponent, and misleading statements
in a Virginia disciplinary proceeding constituting violations of Law. Prof.
Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, and 8.4(c), a 30-day suspension was imposed;
rather than imposing an “admonishment with terms,” as Virginia
Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).
Based on an attorney’s false statements to a Virginia court regarding
delivery of legal documents to a party-opponent, and misleading statements
in a Virginia disciplinary proceeding constituting violations of Law. Prof.
Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, and 8.4(c), a 30-day suspension was imposed;
rather than imposing an “admonishment with terms,” as Virginia

did, a “substantially different discipline” was warranted pursuant to Bd.
Prof. Resp. 18(4). In re Amberly, 996 A.2d 793 (Del. 2010).
Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by failing to
comply with continuing legal education (CLE) requirements, and by
failing to respond to communications with the CLE Commission about
that deficiency. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d 960 (Del. 2013).
Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by falsely
certifying in the annual registration that there were no disciplinary charges
pending because the attorney knew of a continuing legal education
deficiency issue and the investigation thereof. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d
960 (Del. 2013).
Deputy attorney general was suspended from the practice of law for 6
months and 1 day for 7 ethical violations because the attorney initially
falsely denied making statements (corroborated by a prothonotory also
present) threatening a criminal defendant by implying that the State would
brand that defendant an informant; the attorney admitted only part of the
substance, falsely accusing the defendant of eavesdropping, although later
admitting that the attorney intended for the defendant to hear the
intimidating statements about possible prison reprisals. In re Favata, 119
A.3d 1283 (Del. 2015)
y also
present) threatening a criminal defendant by implying that the State would
brand that defendant an informant; the attorney admitted only part of the
substance, falsely accusing the defendant of eavesdropping, although later
admitting that the attorney intended for the defendant to hear the
intimidating statements about possible prison reprisals. In re Favata, 119
A.3d 1283 (Del. 2015).
Disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s intentional
misconduct in a medical negligence case, which included failing to
disclose altered medical records, failing to supplement discovery responses
and failing to correct a client’s false testimony (despite multiple
opportunities for corrective action); although the attorney had no prior
disciplinary record and presented evidence of good character and
reputation, dishonesty and other aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors. In re McCarthy, 173 A.3d 536 (Del. 2017).
— Decorum of the tribunal.
Revocation of an attorney’s admission pro hac vice was authorized for
his failure to control his client’s behavior during a deposition. State v.
Mumford, 731 A.2d 831 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999).
In an appeal taken to the trial court from a licensing board, attorney’s
written arguments suggesting that the trial court would not rule on the

merits, an unfounded accusation, violated Law R. Prof. Conduct 3.5(d),
conduct degrading to a tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice; the trial court had to waste
judicial resources striking the offending arguments sua sponte and writing
an opinion explaining its actions, and warranted a public reprimand of the
attorney. In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482 (Del.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128
S. Ct. 381, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (U.S. 2007)
tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice; the trial court had to waste
judicial resources striking the offending arguments sua sponte and writing
an opinion explaining its actions, and warranted a public reprimand of the
attorney. In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482 (Del.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128
S. Ct. 381, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (U.S. 2007).
Attorney’s communications sent to 4 different Deputy Attorneys
Generals did not violate this rule because the evidence did not clearly
show that the letters, as offensive and inappropriate as they were, had an
actual impact on the administration of justice; the emails, which included
crude and sexualized comments, were private and did not directly burden
the trial court or affect the outcome of pending litigation. In re Memebr of
the Bar of the Supreme Court: Hurley, 183 A.3d 703 (Del. 2018).
— Illegal conduct.
Attorney’s conviction for felony possession of a firearm was conclusive
of a violation of subsection (b). In re Funk, 742 A.2d 851 (Del. 1999).
Where an attorney was convicted of possession of child pornography
and unlawful dealing in material depicting a child engaging in a prohibited
sexual act, the serious crimes reflected on the attorney’s fitness as a lawyer
in violation of Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and attorney’s
misconduct warranted disbarment without further proceedings. In re Fink,
825 A.2d 238 (Del. 2003).
State Supreme Court approved the state Professional Responsibility
Board’s report and found that the attorney’s conduct in getting together
with a friend, selling paintings to each other, making claims against a
corporation that accepted payments for transactions, and then pursuing a
legal action to recover not only a money back guarantee, but also treble
damages and attorney fees, violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), 8.4(c),
and 8.4(d), and warranted a public reprimand (especially in light of the
attorney’s lack of prior discipline and remorse)
lling paintings to each other, making claims against a
corporation that accepted payments for transactions, and then pursuing a
legal action to recover not only a money back guarantee, but also treble
damages and attorney fees, violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), 8.4(c),
and 8.4(d), and warranted a public reprimand (especially in light of the
attorney’s lack of prior discipline and remorse). In re Gielata, 933 A.2d
1249 (Del. 2007).
In an attorney disciplinary matter, an attorney was disbarred as a result
of committing various felonies (violently physically attacking that

attorney’s spouse in front of their children, destruction of evidence and
continual violation of a protective order) in the State of Maine which
violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(a) and (c) and 8.4(b), (c), and (d); the
Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the attorney’s defense that the
conduct was the result of 2 brain injuries, as the medical evidence did not
address mental state at the time of the crimes and there was nothing in the
record to suggest that the attorney raised any defense to those crimes
based on the claimed infirmity. In re Enna, 971 A.2d 110 (Del. 2009).
Attorney’s conduct in connection with a motor vehicle accident was a
violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4, where the attorney: (1) reported
false information (i.e. that the attorney did not drink prior to the accident)
to a law-enforcement officer relating to an actual offense or incident in
violation of 11 Del C. § 1245; and (2) ingested alcohol after the incident
with the intent to circumvent the police investigation. In re Davis, 43 A.3d
856 (Del. 2012).
Sanction of a public reprimand of attorney was the appropriate where
the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), (c) and (d); the attorney
had made a false report to the police in a 9-1-1 call that a hostage situation
was taking place, in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1245, in order to obtain an
expedited police response. In re Schaeffer, 45 A.3d 149 (Del. 2012)
, 43 A.3d
856 (Del. 2012).
Sanction of a public reprimand of attorney was the appropriate where
the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), (c) and (d); the attorney
had made a false report to the police in a 9-1-1 call that a hostage situation
was taking place, in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1245, in order to obtain an
expedited police response. In re Schaeffer, 45 A.3d 149 (Del. 2012).
Attorney was suspended for 2 years under Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d)
where the attorney pled guilty to possession of controlled substances and
drug paraphernalia (both misdemeanors) with no aggravating factors; there
were, however, a number of mitigating factors including political
involvement and substantial pro bono work. In re Nixon, 49 A.3d 1193
(Del. 2012).
Denial of a petition for discipline against an attorney was proper because
Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b) implicated only criminal conduct that
reflected adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law; there was no
such case where the offensive touching was committed by the attorney in
an attempt to prevent that attorney’s child from running away from
home. In re Michaels, 67 A.3d 1023 (Del. 2013).
Because an attorney knowingly executed Department of Housing and
Urban Development settlement statements containing false information
which ensured loan funding by lenders, such constituted a criminal act that

reflected adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects in violation of the rules of professional conduct.
In re Sanclemente, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014).
Attorney who violated the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, as
well as 18 U.S.C. § 1010, by making false certifications in Department of
Housing and Urban Development settlement statements (HUD-1
statements) was disbarred; the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating
22 real estate closings that defrauded those who relied on the accuracy of
the HUD-1 statements. In re Sullivan, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014)
the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, as
well as 18 U.S.C. § 1010, by making false certifications in Department of
Housing and Urban Development settlement statements (HUD-1
statements) was disbarred; the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating
22 real estate closings that defrauded those who relied on the accuracy of
the HUD-1 statements. In re Sullivan, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014).
Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on Professional
Responsibility that an attorney’s misappropriation of legal fees constituted
theft under the criminal code, which was an ethical violation. In re
Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).
Lawyer was properly suspended for 15 months because: (1) the lawyer
knowingly carried a concealed weapon, drove under the influence of
alcohol and illegally possessed a controlled substance, reflecting adversely
on honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness, causing potential injury to the
public and actual injury due to resources expended to prosecute the lawyer;
(2) the presumptive sanction was suspension; and (3) mitigating factors
of lack of prior discipline or selfish motive, personal problems, effort to
rectify misconduct, cooperation, inexperience, character, other sanctions
and remorse outweighed aggravating factors of a pattern of misconduct and
illegal conduct. In re Vavala, 207 A.3d 564 (Del. 2019).
— Obligations toward the tribunal.
Where attorney who had practiced for over 20 years and was found to be
a good lawyer committed professional misconduct by failing to appear at a
scheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two other
teleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law.
R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that
attorney was already serving for prior misconduct was extended for an
additional year. In re Solomon, 847 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2004)
ted professional misconduct by failing to appear at a
scheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two other
teleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law.
R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that
attorney was already serving for prior misconduct was extended for an
additional year. In re Solomon, 847 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2004).
Office of Disciplinary Counsel established by clear and convincing
evidence that an attorney engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, in violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d)

where: (1) the attorney wasted judicial resources in continuing to request
to withdraw from appointments as attorney of record; (2) asked the court
to put “on the record” and disclose to clients the fact that the attorney
should not be appointed, but that the court was making the appointment
anyway; (3) caused clients to believe that the attorney could not represent
them and that they needed other counsel; and (4) failed to obtain substitute
counsel or to even contact the 2 attorneys whose names were provided by
the court for just that purpose. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972 (Del. 2012).
While it was true that an attorney’s language did not amount to the
inflammatory language of other cases where public reprimand was
ordered, the attorney did send discourteous letters to the court in 3 different
cases and violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 3.5 and 6.2 in each of those
cases; because the Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) violation for the wasting
of judicial resources in attempting to avoid court appointment was not de
minimus, public reprimand was appropriate. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972
(Del. 2012)
lic reprimand was
ordered, the attorney did send discourteous letters to the court in 3 different
cases and violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 3.5 and 6.2 in each of those
cases; because the Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) violation for the wasting
of judicial resources in attempting to avoid court appointment was not de
minimus, public reprimand was appropriate. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972
(Del. 2012).
Where an attorney engaged in lateness or failure to appear at scheduled
court appearances, tardy requests for postponements, failure to comply
with court-imposed deadlines, “sloppy work and complete disregard to the
Court’s rules and procedure” and wasted judicial resources in 3 Delaware
Courts, in addition to violating the duty of candor to the Supreme Court of
Delaware, the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 3.3, 3.4 and
8.4. In re: Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2012).
Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Law. Prof. Conduct R.
8.4(d) to mean that although not all crimes are “prejudicial to the
administration of justice,” crimes involving “violence, dishonesty, breach
of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice” are
categorically Rule 8.4(d) violations; an attorney’s theft constituted a
violation thereof. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).
Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s client
charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney retrieved it
from the codefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client
privilege; the disclosure constituted a violation of the professional conduct
rules relating to the confidentiality of information
re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).
Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s client
charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney retrieved it
from the codefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client
privilege; the disclosure constituted a violation of the professional conduct
rules relating to the confidentiality of information

and conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re
Lyle, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013).
Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s
client charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney
retrieved it from the codefendant’s file, did not involve dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation;
despite the attorney’s mere “knowing”
conduct, the attorney was trying to zealously defend the client and had no
intent to engage in dishonest behavior. In re Lyle, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013).
Where an attorney, in order to benefit a client, knowingly violated the
Chancery Court’s seizure order enjoining persons from bringing claims
relating to an insurer except in that Court, thereby causing injury to the
insurer and the Insurance Commissioner and prejudice to the judicial
system, the presumptive sanction of suspension was nevertheless reduced
to public reprimand; mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors
in the case. In re Brown, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014).
Office of Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence
that an attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly
causing images from a sexual abuse victim’s cell phone to be shown to
both the victim’s parent and defendant in violation of a protective order. In
re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015)
avating factors
in the case. In re Brown, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014).
Office of Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence
that an attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly
causing images from a sexual abuse victim’s cell phone to be shown to
both the victim’s parent and defendant in violation of a protective order. In
re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015).
Thirty-day suspension of a deputy attorney general was appropriate
because the attorney’s conduct, cajoling a bailiff to enter a room in a
courthouse brandishing a firearm as an ill-conceived prank, involved
breaches of duties owed to the legal system and to the legal profession. In
re Gelof, 142 A.3d 506 (Del. 2016).
Board on Professional Responsibility erred in finding that the attorney’s
admitted violation of the terms of private probation did not also constitute
a violation of the rule of professional misconduct with respect to
obligations to the tribunal; there was clear and convincing evidence that
the attorney’s violation thereof was prejudicial to the administration of
justice. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del. 2016).
Sanctions.
— Disbarment.

Lawyer was disbarred for the misappropriation of client funds for the
lawyer’s personal use, and the failure to establish a separate account for
the proceeds of the sale of a client’s house, despite evidence of the lawyer’s
personal and emotional problems. In re Carey, 809 A.2d 563 (Del. 2002).
Attorney was disbarred for knowingly violating the terms of a prior
suspension by failing to turn all files over to an active member of the bar,
by failing to notify all parties of attorney’s suspension, and by paying
attorney’s fees from estates during the suspension; that misconduct caused
potential injury to the estate beneficiaries. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087
(Del. 2005)
63 (Del. 2002).
Attorney was disbarred for knowingly violating the terms of a prior
suspension by failing to turn all files over to an active member of the bar,
by failing to notify all parties of attorney’s suspension, and by paying
attorney’s fees from estates during the suspension; that misconduct caused
potential injury to the estate beneficiaries. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087
(Del. 2005).
Attorney was disbarred in part because of failure to: (1) maintain proper
books and records relating to client funds, but falsely certified compliance
for 3 years; (2) timely file and pay federal and state payroll taxes, but
falsely certified compliance for 6 years; and (3) pay personal state and
federal income taxes. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087 (Del. 2005).
Because there was evidence to support the finding that a suspended
attorney knowingly practiced law multiple times over more than 1 year
during a disciplinary suspension, the lawyer violated multiple disciplinary
rules; the appropriate sanction in the circumstances was disbarment. In re
Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Del. Feuerhake, 89 A.3d 1058
(Del. 2014).
Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on Professional
Responsibility that an attorney committed multiple ethical violations by
misappropriating fees received for legal services to clients while the
attorney was engaged in the private practice of law and failing to disclose
the fees during prior disciplinary proceedings; disbarment was warranted.
In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).
— Disciplinary proceedings.
No statute of limitation applies to a professional disciplinary proceeding
and, therefore, no basis exists in such proceedings to assert the affirmative
defense of laches. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).
— Dismissal of claim.
sclose
the fees during prior disciplinary proceedings; disbarment was warranted.
In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).
— Disciplinary proceedings.
No statute of limitation applies to a professional disciplinary proceeding
and, therefore, no basis exists in such proceedings to assert the affirmative
defense of laches. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).
— Dismissal of claim.

Because the integrity of the proceedings and the court’s truth-finding
function involving company management disputes between the parties was
threatened by plaintiffs’ actions, based on their payments to witnesses in
exchange for certain testimony, threats against witnesses and threats of
civil litigation on baseless claims, their conspiracy claims were dismissed
against all defendants; certain adverse inferences were also drawn as to
other claims. OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 26, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 137 A.3d 970 (Del. 2016).
— Reprimand.
When an attorney handling 2 estates violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(d), because the attorney had aggravating factors of a prior private
admonition, multiple counts, and substantial legal experience, and
mitigating factors of remorse and lack of dishonest motive, the attorney
was publicly reprimanded, prevented from representing a personal
representative or serving as 1, and required to cooperate and pay costs. In
re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
The appropriate sanction was a public reprimand and 1 year probation
period where: (1) an attorney violated the conditions of a previously
imposed
private admonition
by
failing
to
provide a required
precertification and not promptly paying various payroll taxes; (2) the
attorney admitted to violating Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and Law Prof. Conduct
R
In
re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).
The appropriate sanction was a public reprimand and 1 year probation
period where: (1) an attorney violated the conditions of a previously
imposed
private admonition
by
failing
to
provide a required
precertification and not promptly paying various payroll taxes; (2) the
attorney admitted to violating Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and Law Prof. Conduct
R. 1.15(b), 1.15(d), 5.3, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d); (3) the attorney’s violations
were not isolated incidents but were repeat violations; (4) the attorney
failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant to assure an accurate
accounting of the firm’s books and records; and (5) the attorney
disregarded the conditions imposed on the private admonition. In re
Martin, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011).
Attorney who committed various disciplinary violations with respect to
the failure to complete continuing legal education requirements and
reporting obligations relating thereto was publicly reprimanded with
conditions, because: (1) the attorney acted knowingly and had no remorse;
(2) the attorney did not cause injury to a client; and (3) the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating ones. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d 960 (Del.
2013).

Attorney who had knowingly violated a protective order was properly
sanctioned to public reprimand because the misconduct was serious,
caused potential injury to the vulnerable teenage victim and caused actual
injury to the legal system. In re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015).
Attorney committed professional misconduct by failing to comply with
the conditions of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books
and records properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to
compliance with that obligation; public reprimand and probation for 3
years with conditions were imposed upon the attorney’s immediate
reinstatement to the practice of law. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del.
2016).
When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R
of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books
and records properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to
compliance with that obligation; public reprimand and probation for 3
years with conditions were imposed upon the attorney’s immediate
reinstatement to the practice of law. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del.
2016).
When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),
8.4(c) and (d) by failing to properly maintain law firm’s books and records
for 3 consecutive years, filing inaccurate certificates of compliance for 3
consecutive years, and failing to give flat fee clients proper notice that the
fee was refundable if not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period
of probation was appropriate; this was true, even considering the
mitigating factors, given a lawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books
and records. In re Castro, 160 A.3d 1134 (Del. 2017).
The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Board on Professional
Responsibility’s findings and recommendation for discipline, publicly
reprimanding and placing the attorney on a 2-year period of probation with
the imposition of specific conditions, because the attorney failed to
provide the client with a fee agreement and/or statement of earned fees
withdrawn from the trust account, to identify and safeguard client fund, to
maintain financial books and records or to supervise nonlawyer assistants;
the attorney had engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation,
prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Malik, 167 A.3d 1189
(Del. 2017).
Attorney was publicly reprimanded with a 2-year probation, subject to
conditions; the attorney acted with “wilfulness” and did not comply with 3
conditions of a prior disciplinary sanction by failing to inform the firm’s
supervising attorney of the conditions of the attorney’s reinstatement,
including the need for a practice monitor. In re Grandell, 189 A.3d 1288
(Del. 2018).
(Del. 2017).
Attorney was publicly reprimanded with a 2-year probation, subject to
conditions; the attorney acted with “wilfulness” and did not comply with 3
conditions of a prior disciplinary sanction by failing to inform the firm’s
supervising attorney of the conditions of the attorney’s reinstatement,
including the need for a practice monitor. In re Grandell, 189 A.3d 1288
(Del. 2018).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded, subject to specific conditions,
because: (1) the attorney failed to maintain the firm’s books and records,
resulting in the firm’s trust accounts being exposed to fraud; (2) the
attorney’s certificates of compliance contained misrepresentations
concerning the status of the firm’s books and records; and (3) the attorney
was already the subject of discipline for similar conduct to the conduct at
issue. In re A Mbr. of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware Glancy,
246 A.3d 1140 (Del. 2021).
— Suspension.
Where a lawyer engaged in a pattern of knowing misconduct over a
period of several years by commingling client funds, failing to maintain
the lawyer’s law practice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing
on certificates of compliance that the lawyer complied with the record-
keeping requirements and paid taxes, the lawyer violated Del. Law. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.5(f), 1.15(a), (b), (d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer
was suspended for 3 years. In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003).
Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and who violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.2(a),
1.4(a), 1.15(a), 8.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and Law. Disc. P. R
e lawyer violated Del. Law. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.5(f), 1.15(a), (b), (d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer
was suspended for 3 years. In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003).
Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and who violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.2(a),
1.4(a), 1.15(a), 8.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c),
was suspended from the practice of law in Delaware for 3 years after the
Board on Professional Responsibility found that the attorney’s problems
appeared to be getting worse and included: co-mingling client trust funds;
inadequate bookkeeping and safeguarding of client funds; inadequate
maintenance of books and records; knowingly making false statements of
material fact to the ODC; false representations in Certificates of
Compliance for 3 years; and failure to file corporate tax returns for 3
years. In re Becker, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008).
Attorney whose misconduct involved false notarizations, failure to
safeguard fiduciary funds, failure to pay taxes on real estate transactions,
and other misrepresentations committed violations Law. R. Prof. Conduct
1.15(a), (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); based on knowing, rather than
negligent, conduct in committing the violations, a 1-year suspension as
well as a public reprimand and permanent practice restrictions were

deemed appropriate sanctions to impose. In re Member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court, 974 A.2d 170 (Del. 2009).
Attorney whose multiple federal actions for assorted clients were
dismissed due to failure to respond to dismissal or summary judgment
motions violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,
warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions
where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had
undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-
sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced
engagement in a pattern of misconduct
nt
motions violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,
warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions
where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had
undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-
sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced
engagement in a pattern of misconduct. In re Feuerhake, 998 A.2d 850
(Del. 2010).
Suspension for 6 months and 1 day was warranted where an attorney:
(1) violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 3.3, 3.4 and 8.4; (2) had a
record of 2 prior private admonitions; (3) engaged in a pattern of
misconduct consisting of multiple offenses; (4) suffered from personal or
emotional problems; (5) cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel in connection with the hearing; (6) was generally of good
character, as evidenced by willingness to represent those who might not
otherwise have had representation; and (7) exhibited remorse. In re:
Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2012).
Based on an experienced attorney’s misappropriation on multiple
occasions of clients’ funds and the attorney’s use of a deficient retainer
agreement, which constituted a violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b)
and (d) as well as violations of other disciplinary rules, a suspension of 1
year was deemed appropriate; in the circumstances, a public reprimand
was too lenient. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).
Lawyer was suspended for 21 months, retroactive to the date of the
attorney’s transfer to disability inactive status, for violating this rule after
the attorney injured another driver as a result of DUI; the attorney
demonstrated aggressive and consistent rehabilitation since the accident,
implementing the appropriate and necessary life changes and counseling
to maintain sobriety for over 1 year. In re Cairns, 132 A.3d 1160 (Del.
2016)
ve to the date of the
attorney’s transfer to disability inactive status, for violating this rule after
the attorney injured another driver as a result of DUI; the attorney
demonstrated aggressive and consistent rehabilitation since the accident,
implementing the appropriate and necessary life changes and counseling
to maintain sobriety for over 1 year. In re Cairns, 132 A.3d 1160 (Del.
2016).
Attorney who committed numerous ethical violations, including
neglecting multiple client matters, making misrepresentations to the court

and failing to properly safeguard clients’ funds, was suspended for 18
months, based on a determination that the mitigating factors significantly
outweighed the aggravating factors. In re Carucci, 132 A.3d 1161 (Del.
2016).
Attorney was suspended for an additional 6 months where: (1) the
attorney filed 2 complaints in Superior Court without maintaining a
Delaware office, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; (2)
the attorney created a false impression by testifying in a prior disciplinary
matter that the attorney did not currently have any suits pending in
Delaware; (3) the violations were knowing and caused potential harm to
the legal system; (4) suspension was the presumptive sanction; and (5) the
aggravating factors did not sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors to
warrant disbarment. In re Lankenau, 158 A.3d 451 (Del. 2017).

Del. Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 8.5

## Nearby sections

- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.0 Rule 1.0. Terminology](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_0.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.1 Rule 1.1. Competence](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_1.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.2 Rule 1.2. Scope of representation](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_2.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.3 Rule 1.3. Diligence](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_3.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.4 Rule 1.4. Communication](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_4.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.5 Rule 1.5. Fees](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_5.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.6 Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of information](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_6.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.7 Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_7.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.8 Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_8.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.9 Rule 1.9. Duties to former clients](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_9.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.10 Rule 1.10. Imputation of conflicts of interest: General rule](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_10.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.11 Rule 1.11. Special conflicts of interest for former and current government officers and employees.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_11.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.12 Rule 1.12. Former judge, arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral.](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_12.md)
- [Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.13 Rule 1.13. Organization as client](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R1_13.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_DE_DELRPC_R8_4. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.