# Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 5: Rule 5. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity

> Alaska · Court rules · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R5

## Section

- **Citation:** Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 5
- **Heading:** Rule 5. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity
- **Jurisdiction:** Alaska
- **Kind:** Court rules
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Alaska Rules of Court / Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct / Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 5

## Text

A. All Judges and Candidates.
(1) Except as authorized in Sections 5B(2) and 5C, a
judge or a candidate* for appointment to judicial office shall
not:
(a) act as a leader of or hold office in a political
organization.*
(b) publicly endorse or publicly oppose a candidate for
any public office. However, when false information
concerning a judicial candidate* is made public, a judge or
candidate having knowledge* of contrary facts may make the
facts public.
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization.*
(d)  attend political gatherings.
(e)  solicit funds for any political organization* or
candidate for public office, pay an assessment or make a
contribution to a political organization or candidate for public
office, purchase tickets for a political organization’s dinners or
other functions.
Commentary.—A judge or candidate for judicial office retains
the right to participate in the political process as a voter.
Section 5A(1)(b) does not prohibit a judge or judicial
candidate from privately expressing his or her views on
judicial candidates or other candidates for public office. Nor
does this section restrict the Chief Justice, acting in the role of
Chair of the Alaska Judicial Council, when explaining the
Judicial Council’s retention recommendations to the public.
Judges should be able to take part in the public debate over
proposals to change the legal system or the administration of
justice; judges’ training and experience make them a valuable
resource to the electorate wishing to decide these issues. Since
many speeches are given in forums sponsored by political
organizations, a question arises concerning the relationship
between, on the one hand, a judge’s right to speak publicly on
issues concerning the legal system and the administration of
justice, and, on the other hand, the prohibition contained in
Section 5A(1)(d)—that a judge shall not attend the gathering
of a political organization
many speeches are given in forums sponsored by political
organizations, a question arises concerning the relationship
between, on the one hand, a judge’s right to speak publicly on
issues concerning the legal system and the administration of
justice, and, on the other hand, the prohibition contained in
Section 5A(1)(d)—that a judge shall not attend the gathering
of a political organization. Despite a judge’s freedom to speak
on legal issues, a judge shall not do so on behalf of a political
organization or at a political gathering.
(2)  A judge shall resign upon becoming a candidate* in
either a primary or general election for any non-judicial office
except the office of delegate to a state or federal constitutional
convention.
(3) A candidate for judicial office:*
(a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial
office and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and
independence of the judiciary, and shall encourage members of
the candidate’s family to adhere to the same standards that
apply to the candidate. “Members of the candidate’s family”
means the candidate’s spouse,* children, grandchildren,
parents, grandparents, and other relatives or persons with
whom the candidate maintains a close familial relationship.
Commentary.—Although a judicial candidate must encourage
members of his or her family to adhere to the same standards
of political conduct in support of the candidate that apply to
the candidate, family members are free to participate in other
political activity.
(b) shall prohibit employees and officials who serve at
the pleasure of the candidate, and shall discourage all other
employees and officials subject to the candidate’s direction and
control, from doing anything on the candidate’s behalf that is
forbidden to the candidate under these rules.
ate that apply to
the candidate, family members are free to participate in other
political activity.
(b) shall prohibit employees and officials who serve at
the pleasure of the candidate, and shall discourage all other
employees and officials subject to the candidate’s direction and
control, from doing anything on the candidate’s behalf that is
forbidden to the candidate under these rules.
(c) shall not authorize or permit any person to take
actions forbidden to the candidate under these rules, except
when these rules specifically allow other people to take actions
that would be forbidden to the candidate personally.
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in judicial
office other than to faithfully and impartially perform the
duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate to a particular view or decision with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court;
or
(iii) knowingly* misrepresent any fact concerning the
candidate or an opposing candidate for judicial office.
Commentary.—Section 5A(3)(d) prohibits a candidate for
judicial office from making statements that appear to commit
the candidate regarding cases, controversies, or issues likely
to come before the court. As a corollary, a candidate for
judicial office should emphasize in any public statement the
candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her
personal views. See also Section 3B(9), the general rule on
public comment by judges. Section 5A(3)(d) does not prohibit a
candidate from making pledges or promises respecting
improvements in court administration. Nor does this Section
prohibit an incumbent judge from making private statements to
other judges or court personnel in the performance of judicial
duties
regardless of his or her
personal views. See also Section 3B(9), the general rule on
public comment by judges. Section 5A(3)(d) does not prohibit a
candidate from making pledges or promises respecting
improvements in court administration. Nor does this Section
prohibit an incumbent judge from making private statements to
other judges or court personnel in the performance of judicial
duties. This Section applies to any statement made in the
process of securing judicial office, such as statements to
commissions charged with judicial selection and tenure and
legislative bodies confirming appointment. See also Rule 8. 2
of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.
In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F. 2d 224
(7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit ruled that the ABA’s
proposed Section 5A(3)(d)(i) and the 1972 predecessor to the
ABA’s
proposed
Section
5A(3)(d)(ii)
represent
an
unconstitutional abridgement of judicial candidates’ right of
free speech.
The Illinois rule at issue in Buckley prohibited judges and
judicial candidates from making “pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office” and further prohibited
judges and judicial candidates from “announc[ing] [their]
views on disputed legal or political issues.” These same
restrictions are currently the law of Alaska: see Alaska Code
of Judicial Conduct, Section 7B(1)(c). The Seventh Circuit held
that
these
two
restrictions
on
judges’
speech
are
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Buckley involved two plaintiffs
he office” and further prohibited
judges and judicial candidates from “announc[ing] [their]
views on disputed legal or political issues.” These same
restrictions are currently the law of Alaska: see Alaska Code
of Judicial Conduct, Section 7B(1)(c). The Seventh Circuit held
that
these
two
restrictions
on
judges’
speech
are
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Buckley involved two plaintiffs. The first plaintiff was a judge
from the intermediate appeals court who ran for the state
supreme court; the Judicial Inquiry Board disciplined him for
declaring, during the campaign, that he had “never written an
opinion reversing a rape conviction.” The second plaintiff was
a legislator who campaigned for (and was elected to) a seat on
the Cook County Circuit Court; he sought relief because “the
risk of being sanctioned for violating [the judicial conduct
rule] deterred him from speaking out in his campaign on issues
that he believed to be important to Illinois voters, including
capital punishment, abortion, the state’s budget, and public
school education.”
The Seventh Circuit noted that Buckley presented the collision
of two competing political principles: First, “Candidates for
public office should be free to express their views on all
matters of interest to the electorate.” Second, “Judges [must]
decide cases in accordance with law rather than [in
accordance] with any express or implied commitments that
they may have made to their campaign supporters or to
others.” Buckley, 997 F. 2d at 227.
The court declared that “only a fanatic would suppose
that…freedom of speech should . . . entitle a candidate for
judicial office to promise to vote for one side or another in a
particular case or class of cases[.]” On the other hand, the
court likewise disavowed the idea “that the principle of
impartial
legal
justice
should…prevent
a
[judicial]
candidate…from furnishing any information or opinion to the
electorate beyond his name, rank, and serial number.” Id
h should . . . entitle a candidate for
judicial office to promise to vote for one side or another in a
particular case or class of cases[.]” On the other hand, the
court likewise disavowed the idea “that the principle of
impartial
legal
justice
should…prevent
a
[judicial]
candidate…from furnishing any information or opinion to the
electorate beyond his name, rank, and serial number.” Id. The
court went on to state:
The difficulty with crafting a rule to prevent [a judicial
candidate
from
making
commitments] is
that
a
commitment can be implicit as well as explicit… The
candidate might make an explicit commitment to do
something that was not, in so many words, taking sides in
a particular case or class of cases but would be so
understood by the electorate; he might for example
promise always to give paramount weight to public safety
or to a woman’s right of privacy. Or he might discuss a
particular case or class of cases in a way that was
understood as a commitment to rule in a particular way,
even though he avoided the language of pledges,
promises, or commitments.
The “pledges or promises” clause is not limited to
pledges or promises to rule a particular way in particular
cases or classes of case; all pledges and promises are
forbidden except a promise that the candidate will if
elected faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of
his judicial office. The “announce” clause is not limited
to declarations as to how the candidate intends to rule in
particular cases or classes of case; he may not “announce
his views on disputed legal or political issues,” period.
The rule certainly deals effectively with the abuse that the
draftsmen were concerned with; but in so doing it gags
the judicial candidate. He can say nothing in public about
his judicial philosophy, he cannot, for example, pledge
himself to be a strict constructionist, or for that matter a
legal realist. He cannot promise a better shake for
indigent litigants or harried employers
” period.
The rule certainly deals effectively with the abuse that the
draftsmen were concerned with; but in so doing it gags
the judicial candidate. He can say nothing in public about
his judicial philosophy, he cannot, for example, pledge
himself to be a strict constructionist, or for that matter a
legal realist. He cannot promise a better shake for
indigent litigants or harried employers. He cannot
criticize Roe v. Wade. He cannot express his views about
substantive due process, economic rights, search and
seizure, the war on drugs, the use of excessive force by
police, the conditions of the prisons, or products
liability—or for that matter about laissez-faire economics,
race relations, the civil war in Yugoslavia, or the proper
direction of health-care reform . . . All these are disputed
legal or political issues.
The rule this reaches far beyond speech that could
reasonably be interpreted as committing the candidate in a
way that would compromise his impartiality should he be
successful in the election. Indeed, the only safe response
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)(1)(c) is silence.
True, the silencing is temporary. It is limited to the
duration of the campaign. But [the rule’s] interference
with the marketplace of ideas and opinions is at its zenith
when the “customers” are most avid for the market’s
“product.” The only time the public takes much interest in
the ideas and opinions of judges or judicial candidates is
when an important judicial office has to be filled . . . .
Id. at 228-29. The Seventh Circuit noted, but expressed no
opinion on, the ABA’s proposed revision of the “announce his
views” clause
and opinions is at its zenith
when the “customers” are most avid for the market’s
“product.” The only time the public takes much interest in
the ideas and opinions of judges or judicial candidates is
when an important judicial office has to be filled . . . .
Id. at 228-29. The Seventh Circuit noted, but expressed no
opinion on, the ABA’s proposed revision of the “announce his
views” clause. In the 1990 version of the model Code, the ABA
has amended this Section so that it now prohibits a judge or
judicial candidate from making “statements that commit or
appear to commit the judge to a particular view or decision
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues… likely to come
before [the judge’s] court.” According to the ABA commentary
to Section 5A(3)(d)(ii), the predecessor “announce” rule was
felt to be too broad.
The Seventh Circuit points out in Buckley that, even with this
change, the ABA provisions may run afoul of First Amendment
protections. For example, read too broadly, a Section that
prohibits a judge from making any pledge or promise (other
than to do a good job) could be used as a basis for disciplinary
action against a judicial candidate who declared that he or she
believed the courts should actively pursue sentencing
alternatives to imprisonment. Conceivably, this same provision
could subject a judge to discipline for declaring, as Ruth
Ginsberg told the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 20,
1993 [as reported in the Anchorage Daily News of 7/21/93],
“My approach [to service on the supreme court] is rooted in
the [belief] that the place of the judiciary . . . in our
democratic society [is] third in line behind the people and
their elected representatives”—a comment that might be
construed as a pledge to broadly construe the powers of the
legislative branch and to narrowly circumscribe the reach of
the Bill of Rights as a check on legislative activity. The Code
should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First
Amendment rights.
. . in our
democratic society [is] third in line behind the people and
their elected representatives”—a comment that might be
construed as a pledge to broadly construe the powers of the
legislative branch and to narrowly circumscribe the reach of
the Bill of Rights as a check on legislative activity. The Code
should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First
Amendment rights.
(e) may respond to personal attacks or attacks on the
candidate’s record, as long as the response contains no
knowing misrepresentation of fact and does not violate Section
5A(3)(d).
B.  Candidates Seeking Appointment to Judicial or
Other Governmental Office.
(1) A candidate* for appointment to judicial office or a
judge seeking appointment to another governmental office
shall not solicit or accept any funds, personally or through a
committee or otherwise, to support his or her candidacy.
(2) A candidate* for appointment to judicial office or a
judge seeking appointment to another governmental office may
not engage in any political activity* to secure appointment,
with the following exceptions:
(a) subject to Section 5A(3), such persons may:*
(i) communicate with the appointing authority, including
any selection, screening, or nominating bodies;
(ii) seek privately-communicated support or endorsement
from organizations and individuals; and
(iii) provide
information
regarding
his
or
her
qualifications for office to organizations and individuals from
whom the candidate seeks support;
(b) a non-judge candidate* for appointment to judicial
office may, in addition, unless otherwise prohibited by law:*
eening, or nominating bodies;
(ii) seek privately-communicated support or endorsement
from organizations and individuals; and
(iii) provide
information
regarding
his
or
her
qualifications for office to organizations and individuals from
whom the candidate seeks support;
(b) a non-judge candidate* for appointment to judicial
office may, in addition, unless otherwise prohibited by law:*
(i) retain an office in a political organization,*
(ii) attend political gatherings, and
(iii) continue to pay ordinary assessments and dues to
political organizations* and to purchase tickets for political
party dinners or other functions.
Commentary.—Section 5B(2) provides a limited exception to
the restrictions imposed by Sections 5A(1) and 5D. Under
Section 5B(2), candidates seeking reappointment to the same
judicial office or appointment to another judicial office or
other governmental office may support their own candidacy
and seek appropriate support from others.
Sections 5B(2)(a)(ii) and (iii) should be read to allow judicial
candidates, including judges who are candidates for
appointment to other judicial office, to promote their
candidacy by circulating letters to the general membership of
the bar and to organizations interested in judicial selection.
Similarly, a judge need not object when individual lawyers or
groups of lawyers decide to circulate a letter in support of the
judge’s candidacy. However, these letters must not contain
promises or statements forbidden by Section 5A(3)(d)
(regarding the candidate’s likely decisions or action if
appointed), must not contain false statements, and, in general,
must not violate any other provision of the Code.
A different problem is presented when a judicial candidate
approaches individual lawyers or organizations and seeks
their endorsement of his or her candidacy
not contain
promises or statements forbidden by Section 5A(3)(d)
(regarding the candidate’s likely decisions or action if
appointed), must not contain false statements, and, in general,
must not violate any other provision of the Code.
A different problem is presented when a judicial candidate
approaches individual lawyers or organizations and seeks
their endorsement of his or her candidacy. Even though Canon
5 generally tries to make the rules of political conduct uniform
for all judicial candidates (both current judges and lawyers
applying to be judges), a sitting judge’s approach to individual
lawyers inevitably presents problems that do not arise when a
non-judge candidate approaches other members of the bar.
Because a sitting judge will wield judicial power whether or
not the judge’s campaign for a different office is successful, a
judge who asks individuals for political support runs the risk
that the request will give the appearance of abuse of office.
Because there is a latent potential for subtle coercion in such
requests, a judge’s request for the personal endorsement of a
lawyer must be circumspect and framed cautiously. A judge
must take pains to avoid even giving the appearance that he or
she is using or threatening to use the power of judicial office to
obtain endorsements.
Section 5B(2)(a)(ii) allows a candidate to seek privately-
communicated support or endorsement. Under this provision,
a candidate may ask individuals and organizations to send a
letter to the Alaska Judicial Council or to the governor, or to
speak in support of the candidate at a public hearing held by
the Judicial Council or at a private meeting with the governor
or the governor’s staff. However, a candidate may not ask or
authorize individuals or organizations to run newspaper
advertisements endorsing the candidate or to send letters to
their membership or to other organizations encouraging them
to support the candidate
or to
speak in support of the candidate at a public hearing held by
the Judicial Council or at a private meeting with the governor
or the governor’s staff. However, a candidate may not ask or
authorize individuals or organizations to run newspaper
advertisements endorsing the candidate or to send letters to
their membership or to other organizations encouraging them
to support the candidate. If the candidate is a judge, the
candidate should ask individuals and organizations not to send
copies of endorsement letters to the candidate.
Although under Section 5B(2)(b) non-judge candidates seeking
appointment to judicial office are permitted during their
candidacy to retain office in a political organization, attend
political gatherings and pay ordinary dues and assessments,
they remain subject to other provisions of this Code during
their candidacy. See Sections 5E and Application Section.
C. Judges Seeking Retention.
(1) A judge who is a candidate* for retention in judicial
office may engage in the following political activity to secure
retention:
(a) submit a photograph and a statement supporting his
or her candidacy for inclusion in the state election pamphlet
under AS 15.58;
(b) in response to an unsolicited request,
(i) speak to public gatherings on behalf of his or her
candidacy;
(ii) appear on television and radio programs to discuss
his or her candidacy; and
(iii) grant interviews regarding his or her candidacy;
(c) form an election committee of responsible persons to
conduct an election campaign in anticipation of active
opposition to the judge’s candidacy; and
(d) reserve media space, domains, and locations, and
design and prepare campaign materials in anticipation of active
opposition to the judge’s candidacy and spend necessary funds
for these activities.
(2) A judge who is a candidate* for retention in judicial
office may engage in the following additional political activity
when there is active opposition to the judge’s candidacy:
idacy; and
(d) reserve media space, domains, and locations, and
design and prepare campaign materials in anticipation of active
opposition to the judge’s candidacy and spend necessary funds
for these activities.
(2) A judge who is a candidate* for retention in judicial
office may engage in the following additional political activity
when there is active opposition to the judge’s candidacy:
(a) advertise in newspapers, on television, and in other
media in support of his or her candidacy; and
(b) distribute pamphlets and other promotional literature
supporting his or her candidacy.
Commentary.—Sections 5C(1) and (2) permit a judge who is a
candidate for retention to be involved in limited political
activity. Section 5D, applicable solely to incumbent judges,
would otherwise bar this activity.
Section 5C(2) allows judges seeking retention in office to
engage in overt political activity if there is “active opposition”
to their candidacy. This Code, like the prior Code, does not
define “active opposition.” However, the term is meant to be
broadly construed. A negative recommendation by the Alaska
Judicial Council constitutes active opposition. Holding a press
conference, advertising, distributing brochures or leaflets, and
sending letters to voters are all forms of active opposition. On
the other hand, statements made by individual speakers at
Judicial Council meetings rarely constitute active opposition,
regardless of what is said. Active opposition may be conducted
by individuals acting alone as well as by groups. The
opposition need not be specifically targeted at one particular
judge or at a discrete group of judges—a newspaper
advertisement urging the rejection of all judges standing for
retention would be viewed as active opposition to the
candidacy of each individual judge
opposition,
regardless of what is said. Active opposition may be conducted
by individuals acting alone as well as by groups. The
opposition need not be specifically targeted at one particular
judge or at a discrete group of judges—a newspaper
advertisement urging the rejection of all judges standing for
retention would be viewed as active opposition to the
candidacy of each individual judge. If a judge has information
and believes that active opposition is imminent, the judge may
document the basis of this belief to the Judicial Conduct
Commission and may then proceed as if there were active
opposition to the judge’s candidacy.
(3) A judge who is a candidate* for retention in judicial
office shall not personally solicit or accept any funds to
support his or her candidacy or personally solicit publicly
stated support for his or her candidacy. However, if there is
active opposition to the judge’s candidacy, the judge’s election
committees may engage in media advertisements, brochures,
mailings, candidate forums, and any other legal methods of
pursuing the judge’s election. Such committees may solicit and
accept reasonable campaign contributions, manage and expend
these funds on behalf of the judge’s election campaign and
solicit and obtain public statements of support for the judge’s
candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting
and accepting reasonable campaign contributions and public
support from lawyers. A candidate’s committee may solicit
contributions and public support for the candidate’s campaign
preceding the election and for 90 days thereafter. A judge shall
not make private use of campaign funds raised by an election
committee or use these funds for the private benefit of any
other person or permit anyone else to use these funds for the
private benefit of any person
port from lawyers. A candidate’s committee may solicit
contributions and public support for the candidate’s campaign
preceding the election and for 90 days thereafter. A judge shall
not make private use of campaign funds raised by an election
committee or use these funds for the private benefit of any
other person or permit anyone else to use these funds for the
private benefit of any person.
Commentary.—Section 5C(2) permits a judge who is a
candidate for retention to establish a campaign committee to
solicit and accept public support and reasonable financial
contributions if there is active opposition to the judge’s
candidacy. At the start of the campaign, the judge must instruct
his or her campaign committee to solicit or accept only
contributions that are reasonable under the circumstances.
Though not prohibited, campaign contributions of which a
judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear
before the judge, may be relevant to disqualification under
Section 3E.
Campaign committees established under Section 5C(2) should
manage campaign finances responsibly, avoiding deficits that
might necessitate post-election fundraising, to the extent
possible.
Section 5C(2) does not prohibit a judge who is a candidate for
retention from initiating an evaluation by a judicial selection
commission or bar association, or, subject to the requirements
of this Code, from responding to a request for information
from any organization.
Sections 5C and 5D are intended to restrict fundraising by and
on behalf of individual judges. These Sections are not intended
to prohibit an organization of judges from soliciting money
from judges to establish a campaign fund to assist judges who
face active opposition to their retention.
They are not intended to restrict the ability of judges to spend
their own funds in support of their own candidacies.
5D are intended to restrict fundraising by and
on behalf of individual judges. These Sections are not intended
to prohibit an organization of judges from soliciting money
from judges to establish a campaign fund to assist judges who
face active opposition to their retention.
They are not intended to restrict the ability of judges to spend
their own funds in support of their own candidacies.
(4) A judge who is a candidate* for selection as a
delegate to a federal or state constitutional convention may
engage in any political activity* to secure election allowed to
other candidates for that office.
D. Incumbent Judges. A judge shall not engage in any
political activity* except (i) as authorized under any other
Section of this Code, (ii) on behalf of measures to improve the
law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice, or (iii)
as expressly authorized by another provision of law.
Commentary.—Neither Section 5D nor any other Section of
the Code prohibits a judge in the exercise of administrative
functions from engaging in planning and other official
activities with members of the executive and legislative
branches of government. With respect to a judge’s activity on
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice, see Commentary to Section 4B
and Section 4C(1) and its Commentary.
E. Applicability. Canon 5 applies to all incumbent
judges and judicial candidates.* A successful candidate,
whether or not an incumbent, is subject to judicial discipline
for his or her campaign conduct; an unsuccessful candidate
who is a lawyer is subject to lawyer discipline for his or her
campaign conduct. A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial
office is subject to Rule 8.2(b) of the Alaska Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(Adopted by SCO 1322 effective July 15, 1998; amended by
SCO 1762 effective July 2, 2011)
APPLICATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
A. Full-Time Judicial Officers
an unsuccessful candidate
who is a lawyer is subject to lawyer discipline for his or her
campaign conduct. A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial
office is subject to Rule 8.2(b) of the Alaska Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(Adopted by SCO 1322 effective July 15, 1998; amended by
SCO 1762 effective July 2, 2011)
APPLICATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
A. Full-Time Judicial Officers. The following judicial
officers shall comply with all provisions of this Code:
(1) active justices of the supreme court and active judges
of the court of appeals, the superior court, and the district court
(including acting district court judges);
(2) full-time magistrate judges;
(3) committing magistrate judges; and
(4) standing masters.
B. Senior Judges.
(1) Senior judges (retired justices of the supreme court
and retired judges of the court of appeals, the superior court,
and the district court who are eligible for judicial service under
Administrative Rule 23) shall comply with all provisions of
this Code except:
(a) 4D(1)(b) (transactions with persons likely to come
before the judge’s court);
(b) 4D(4) (management of financial resources to
minimize disqualification);
(c) 4E(1) (fiduciary service for persons other than family
members);
(d) 4E(2) (fiduciary service where proceedings likely
before judge’s court);
(e) 4F (service as arbitrator or mediator). However, a
senior judge who serves as an arbitrator or mediator must
comply with Administrative Rule 23(f); and
ge’s court);
(b) 4D(4) (management of financial resources to
minimize disqualification);
(c) 4E(1) (fiduciary service for persons other than family
members);
(d) 4E(2) (fiduciary service where proceedings likely
before judge’s court);
(e) 4F (service as arbitrator or mediator). However, a
senior judge who serves as an arbitrator or mediator must
comply with Administrative Rule 23(f); and
(f) a senior judge may speak publicly regarding the
qualification of a judge seeking retention who faces active
opposition.
(2) In addition, a senior judge need not comply with
Section 4C(2) (appointment to government positions) except
during periods of appointment to active judicial service under
Administrative Rule 23.
(3) Senior judges who serve as members of a judicial
assistance committee have additional ethical obligations to
maintain the confidentiality of communications received in
that capacity, including the identities of those seeking the
services of the committee or those referring matters to the
committee. Consequently, senior judges serving in this
capacity may not report any failure of a judge referred to the
committee to admit the problem or submit to treatment.
Commentary.—A senior judge—a retired justice or judge who
is eligible for judicial service under Administrative Rule 23—
must comply with all provisions of the Code except those
listed. Thus, a senior judge may engage in financial and
business dealings with any person and has no duty to manage
investments and business and financial interests to minimize
the number of cases in which the judge is disqualified. A senior
judge may serve as a personal representative, trustee,
guardian, or other fiduciary for persons other than family
members. Although senior judges may not engage in the
practice of law, they may serve as private arbitrators or
mediators and may maintain private arbitration and mediation
businesses, even during periods of pro tem service
er of cases in which the judge is disqualified. A senior
judge may serve as a personal representative, trustee,
guardian, or other fiduciary for persons other than family
members. Although senior judges may not engage in the
practice of law, they may serve as private arbitrators or
mediators and may maintain private arbitration and mediation
businesses, even during periods of pro tem service. However,
in order to be eligible for judicial service, a judge who
performs private arbitration or mediation must comply with
the disclosure requirements and employment restrictions set
out in Administrative Rule 23(e).
Senior judges may publicly speak regarding the qualifications
of judges facing active opposition. This limited exception to
Canon 5A(1)(b) preserves the general insulation of judges
from political pressures while allowing for an informed public
debate on the qualifications of a judge up for retention.
A senior judge may serve on a government committee or
commission or hold a government position except during
periods of pro tem service.
Despite the relaxation of restrictions on senior judges’
financial dealings, they remain subject to the disqualification
provisions of Section 3E.
The special confidentiality obligations when serving as a
member of a judicial assistance committee are narrowly
tailored to provide for candid reporting to the judicial
assistance committee.
C. Part-Time
Magistrate
Judges
and
Deputy
Magistrates.
Part-time
magistrate
judges
and
deputy
magistrates shall comply with all provisions of this Code
except:
(1) Section 4C(1) (appearance before or consultation
with executive or legislative bodies) if the magistrate judge or
deputy magistrate holds an office or position of profit under
the United States, the state, or its political subdivisions and
must engage in Section 4C(1) activities in order to perform the
duties of this office or position;
(2) Section
4C(2)
(appointment
to
government
positions);
4C(1) (appearance before or consultation
with executive or legislative bodies) if the magistrate judge or
deputy magistrate holds an office or position of profit under
the United States, the state, or its political subdivisions and
must engage in Section 4C(1) activities in order to perform the
duties of this office or position;
(2) Section
4C(2)
(appointment
to
government
positions);
(3) Section 4D(1)(b) (transactions with persons likely to
come before the judge’s court);
(4) Section 4D(3)(c) (participation in business activity
that has major effect on economic life of community);
(5) Section 4E(1) (fiduciary service for persons other
than family members);
(6) Section 4G (practice of law);
(7) Section 5A(1)(d) (attendance at political gatherings)
if the magistrate judge or deputy magistrate holds or is seeking
non-judicial public office;
(8) Section 5A(1)(e) (solicitation and contribution of
campaign funds) to the extent that the magistrate judge or
deputy magistrate is soliciting funds for or contributing funds
to the magistrate judge’s own campaign for non-judicial public
office;
(9) Section 5A(2) (resignation upon becoming a
candidate for nonjudicial office); and
(10) Sections 5B (political activity to secure appointment
to public office).
Commentary.—AS 22.15.210(b) guarantees magistrates a
conditional right to seek and hold any other office or position
of profit under the United States, this State, or its political
subdivisions, and to engage in the conduct of any profession or
business that does not interfere with the performance of
judicial duties or necessitate repeated disqualifications.
Because of this statute, part-time magistrates are exempt from
the restrictions on holding non-judicial public office. They are
also permitted to engage in political activity necessary to
secure and perform the duties of non-judicial public office.
Note, however, that political activity by court system
employees is also limited by Personnel Rule PX9.O
necessitate repeated disqualifications.
Because of this statute, part-time magistrates are exempt from
the restrictions on holding non-judicial public office. They are
also permitted to engage in political activity necessary to
secure and perform the duties of non-judicial public office.
Note, however, that political activity by court system
employees is also limited by Personnel Rule PX9.O. Under this
rule, a court system employee forfeits his or her position upon
becoming a candidate for state or national elective political
office, other than the office of delegate to a state or federal
constitutional convention.
The Code exempts part-time magistrates from two restrictions
on business activity, the duty to avoid financial and business
dealings with persons likely to come before the magistrate’s
court, and the duty to avoid business activity that has a major
effect on the economic life of the community. In a small
community, it may be difficult for a magistrate to avoid
business dealings with persons likely to come before the
magistrate’s court, and even a moderately-sized business
venture may have a major effect on the community’s economic
life. Thus, these restrictions could make it impossible for a
part-time magistrate to carry on outside business activity in
order to supplement his or her part-time judicial salary. Part-
time magistrates remain subject to Section 4D(4), which
requires that they manage their financial dealings to minimize
the number of cases in which they are disqualified. They also
remain subject to the disqualification provisions of Section 3E.
They are also subject to Personnel Rule PX5.04, which
regulates outside employment by court system employees.
A part-time magistrate may serve as a fiduciary for persons
other than family members, subject to Sections 4E(2) and
4E(3)
ir financial dealings to minimize
the number of cases in which they are disqualified. They also
remain subject to the disqualification provisions of Section 3E.
They are also subject to Personnel Rule PX5.04, which
regulates outside employment by court system employees.
A part-time magistrate may serve as a fiduciary for persons
other than family members, subject to Sections 4E(2) and
4E(3). A part-time magistrate who is an attorney may practice
law, subject to Administrative Rule 2(d), which prohibits court
system employees from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the
practice of law in any of the courts of this state.
D. Special Masters.
(1) A special master who is not an active judge,
magistrate judge, or standing master shall comply with the
following provisions of this Code:
(a) Canon 1 (duty to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary);
(b) Canon 3 (judicial duties); however, a special master
need not comply with Section 3B(9) to the extent this Section
would prohibit the special master from commenting about
pending or impending proceedings that are unrelated to the
proceeding in which he or she is a special master;
(c) Section 4A (extra-judicial activities in general);
(d) Section 4B (avocational activities);
(e) Section 4C(1); however, a special master need not
comply with Section 4C(1) to the extent this Section would
prohibit the special master from appearing at public hearings
or lobbying on matters that are unrelated to the proceeding in
which he or she is a special master;
(f) Section 4D(1)(a) (financial or business dealings that
appear to exploit judicial position);
(g) Section 4E(3) (restrictions on financial activity that
apply personally also apply while acting as fiduciary); and
s Section would
prohibit the special master from appearing at public hearings
or lobbying on matters that are unrelated to the proceeding in
which he or she is a special master;
(f) Section 4D(1)(a) (financial or business dealings that
appear to exploit judicial position);
(g) Section 4E(3) (restrictions on financial activity that
apply personally also apply while acting as fiduciary); and
(h) Section 4I (financial affairs are private except where
disclosure required by law).
(2) In addition, during periods of appointment as a
master, a special master must comply with Section 2A (duty to
avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety) and 2B
(inappropriate influence and misuse of judicial office).
(3) A person who has been a special master in a
proceeding shall not act as a lawyer in that proceeding or in
any other proceeding related thereto, except as otherwise
permitted by Rule 1.12(a) of the Alaska Rules of Professional
Conduct.
E. Time for Compliance. A person to whom this Code
becomes applicable shall comply immediately with all
provisions of this Code except Sections 4D(2) and 4D(3)
(which pertain to business activities) and Section 4E (which
pertains to fiduciary activities) and shall comply with these
Sections as soon as reasonably possible and shall do so in any
event within the period of one year.
Commentary.—If serving as a fiduciary when selected as a
judge, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in
Section 4E, continue to serve as fiduciary but only for that
period of
time necessary
to
avoid
serious
adverse
consequences to the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship
and in no event longer than one year. Similarly, if engaged at
the time of judicial selection in a business activity that is not
permitted by Section 4D(3), a new judge may, notwithstanding
the prohibitions in Section 4D(3), continue in that activity for a
reasonable period but in no event longer than one year
id
serious
adverse
consequences to the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship
and in no event longer than one year. Similarly, if engaged at
the time of judicial selection in a business activity that is not
permitted by Section 4D(3), a new judge may, notwithstanding
the prohibitions in Section 4D(3), continue in that activity for a
reasonable period but in no event longer than one year.
(Adopted by SCO 1322 effective July 15, 1998; amended by
SCO 1427 effective April 15, 2001; by SCO 1762 effective
July 1, 2011; by SCO 1768 effective October 14, 2011; and by
SCO 1829 effective October 15, 2014)
TERMINOLOGY
Terms defined below are marked with an asterisk in the
Sections where they appear. In addition, each definition
cross-references the Sections where the defined term
appears.
“Appropriate
disciplinary
authority”
means
the
governmental
or
quasi-governmental
agency
whose
responsibility for initiation of the disciplinary process covers
the violation to be reported. See Sections 3D(1), 3D(2), and
3D(3).
“Bias or prejudice” does not include references to or
distinctions based upon race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, marital status, changes in marital status,
pregnancy, parenthood, sexual orientation, or social or
economic status when these factors are legitimately relevant to
the advocacy or decision of the proceeding, or, with regard to
administrative matters, when these factors are legitimately
relevant to the policies or decisions involved. See Sections
3B(5), 3B(6), 3C(1), and 3C(2).
Commentary.—The definition of “bias or prejudice” was
written in an exclusionary manner to allow courts to
countenance legitimate distinctions relevant to litigation
before them. See Section 3B(6).
The definition implies the obvious— that a court demonstrates
impermissible bias or prejudice if it uses constitutionally or
statutorily protected categories as a basis for unfairly
discriminating
ommentary.—The definition of “bias or prejudice” was
written in an exclusionary manner to allow courts to
countenance legitimate distinctions relevant to litigation
before them. See Section 3B(6).
The definition implies the obvious— that a court demonstrates
impermissible bias or prejudice if it uses constitutionally or
statutorily protected categories as a basis for unfairly
discriminating. Bias or prejudice may also arise from other
than legally impermissible categorization and still be
something a court should recognize and avoid.
As the symbols and bastions of justice in our society it is
important for courts to provide their services to all on
essentially the same basis.
“Candidate” means a person seeking any public office. A
person becomes a candidate as soon as he or she makes a
public announcement of candidacy, or declares or files as a
candidate with the election or appointment authority, or
authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions or public
support. See Preamble and Sections 5A(1), 5A(2), 5B(1),
5B(2), 5B(2)(b), 5C(1), 5C(2), 5C(3), and 5C(4).
“Candidate for judicial office” means a candidate seeking
selection for or retention in judicial office, whether by election
or appointment. This term is used interchangeably with
“judicial candidate.” See Sections 5A(1)(b), 5A(3), and 5E.
“De minimis interest” means an insignificant interest that
would not lead reasonable persons to question a judge’s
impartiality. See Sections 3E(1)(c) and 3E(1)(d).
“Economic interest” means ownership of a more than de
minimis legal or equitable interest or a relationship as an
officer, director, advisor, or other legal participant in the affairs
of a party, except that:
b), 5A(3), and 5E.
“De minimis interest” means an insignificant interest that
would not lead reasonable persons to question a judge’s
impartiality. See Sections 3E(1)(c) and 3E(1)(d).
“Economic interest” means ownership of a more than de
minimis legal or equitable interest or a relationship as an
officer, director, advisor, or other legal participant in the affairs
of a party, except that:
(i) ownership of an interest in a mutual or common
investment fund that holds securities is not an economic
interest in such securities unless the judge participates in the
management of the fund or a proceeding pending or impending
before the judge could substantially affect the value of the
interest;
(ii) service by a judge as an officer, director, advisor, or
other active participant in an educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization, or service by a judge’s spouse,
parent, or child as an officer, director, advisor, or other active
participant in any organization does not create an economic
interest in securities held by that organization;
(iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary
interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a
depositor in a mutual savings association or of a member in a
credit union, or a similar proprietary interest, is not an
economic interest in the organization unless a proceeding
pending or impending before the judge could substantially
affect the value of the interest;
iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary
interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a
depositor in a mutual savings association or of a member in a
credit union, or a similar proprietary interest, is not an
economic interest in the organization unless a proceeding
pending or impending before the judge could substantially
affect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is not an
economic interest in the issuer unless a proceeding pending or
impending before the judge could substantially affect the value
of the securities.
See Sections 3E(1)(c) and 3E(2).
“Fiduciary” means a person who has undertaken a duty to
conduct financial or other affairs for another person’s benefit.
The term includes any person acting as executor, administrator,
personal representative, trustee, guardian, or attorney in fact
for another. It also includes any other person who, because of
his or her relationship to another person, is obliged to give
paramount consideration to the benefit of that other person and
to abide by duties of care, good faith, and candor in the
conduct of matters falling within the scope of the relationship,
even when doing so conflicts with the self-interest of the
fiduciary. See Sections 3D(2), 3E(1)(c), 3E(2), 4E(1), 4E(2),
and 4E(3).
“Governmental office” means the four types of office a
judge may seek without resigning:
(i) retention in the judge’s current judicial office;
(ii) selection to a different judicial office;
(iii) selection as a delegate to a constitutional convention;
or
ip,
even when doing so conflicts with the self-interest of the
fiduciary. See Sections 3D(2), 3E(1)(c), 3E(2), 4E(1), 4E(2),
and 4E(3).
“Governmental office” means the four types of office a
judge may seek without resigning:
(i) retention in the judge’s current judicial office;
(ii) selection to a different judicial office;
(iii) selection as a delegate to a constitutional convention;
or
(iv) selection to an appointive non-judicial public office.
See Sections 5B(1) and 5B(2).
Commentary.—Canon 5 speaks of judges who are candidates
for government office—both appointive government office
(Section 5B) and elective government office (Section 5C(4)).
However, Section 5A(2) requires judges to resign upon
becoming a candidate for elective non-judicial office. Thus, the
phrase “governmental office” is necessarily limited to the four
types of office a judge may seek without resigning.
“Judicial duties” means all the duties of a judge in
connection with judicial proceedings and acts of the judge in
discharge of disciplinary responsibilities required or permitted
by Section 3D. See Sections 3A, 3B(5), 3B(11), 3D(4), 4A(3),
4D(5)(b), 4E(1), and 4H(2).
“Knowingly,” “knowledge,” “known,” and “knows” mean
that a person is aware of the existence of the fact or
circumstance in question, or is aware of the substantial
probability of its existence. However, a person does not
“know” or have “knowledge” or act “knowingly” if the person
actually believes, despite any indications to the contrary, that
the fact or circumstance does not exist. See Sections 2B, 2C,
3D(1), 3E(1)(a), 3E(1)(c), 3E(1)(d), 5A(l)(b), and 5A(3)(d).
“Law” means court rules as well as statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisional law. See Sections 2A, 3A, 3B(2),
3B(7), 3B(7)(a), 3C(2), 4B, 4C(1), 4C(2), 4C(3), 4C(3)(b),
4D(5)(a), 4F, 4I, 5B(2)(b), and 5D
y believes, despite any indications to the contrary, that
the fact or circumstance does not exist. See Sections 2B, 2C,
3D(1), 3E(1)(a), 3E(1)(c), 3E(1)(d), 5A(l)(b), and 5A(3)(d).
“Law” means court rules as well as statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisional law. See Sections 2A, 3A, 3B(2),
3B(7), 3B(7)(a), 3C(2), 4B, 4C(1), 4C(2), 4C(3), 4C(3)(b),
4D(5)(a), 4F, 4I, 5B(2)(b), and 5D.
“Member of the judge’s family” means a spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person
with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.
See Sections 2B, 3E(1)(c), 4E(1), and 4G.
“Nonpublic information” means information that, by law,
is not available to the public. Nonpublic information may
include but is not limited to: information that is sealed by
statute
or
court
order,
information
impounded
or
communicated in camera, and information offered in grand
jury proceedings, presentencing reports, dependency cases, or
psychiatric reports. See Section 3B(11).
“Political activity” means:
(i) becoming a candidate for elective public office;
(ii) serving as an officer of a political party, a member of
a national, state, or local committee of a political party, an
officer or member of a committee of any other political
organization, or becoming a candidate for any of these
positions;
(iii) serving as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political
party convention;
(iv) addressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar
gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a
candidate for public office or political party office;
party, an
officer or member of a committee of any other political
organization, or becoming a candidate for any of these
positions;
(iii) serving as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political
party convention;
(iv) addressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar
gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a
candidate for public office or political party office;
(v) organizing or re-organizing a political party or
organization;
(vi) taking part in a political campaign to elect someone
to public office or political party office, to recall someone from
such an office, or to enact or defeat a ballot proposition;
(vii) taking any other part in the management of a political
party or organization, or a political candidate, or a group for or
against a ballot proposition;
(viii) soliciting votes in support of or in opposition to a
candidate’s election to public office or political party office, or
in support of or in opposition to an incumbent’s recall from
such an office, or in support of or in opposition to a ballot
proposition;
(ix) publicly endorsing or opposing a candidate for public
office or political party office, or publicly endorsing or
opposing a ballot proposition, whether in a speech, a published
letter, a political advertisement or broadcast, campaign
literature, or any similar material;
(x) initiating or circulating a nominating petition, recall
petition, or petition to put a ballot proposition before the
voters.
(xi) directly or indirectly soliciting, receiving, collecting,
handling,
disbursing,
or
accounting
for
assessments,
contributions, or other funds for a political purpose;
(xii) organizing, selling tickets to, promoting, or actively
participating in a fund-raising activity of a candidate, political
party, or political organization; or
tion to put a ballot proposition before the
voters.
(xi) directly or indirectly soliciting, receiving, collecting,
handling,
disbursing,
or
accounting
for
assessments,
contributions, or other funds for a political purpose;
(xii) organizing, selling tickets to, promoting, or actively
participating in a fund-raising activity of a candidate, political
party, or political organization; or
(xiii) acting as a recorder, watcher, challenger, or similar
officer at the polls on behalf of a political party or a candidate,
or driving voters to the polls on behalf of a political party or a
candidate, or doing any other act as an official or unofficial
representative of a political party or candidate;
(xiv) but “political activity” does not include:
(a) being a member of a political party;
(b) registering and voting;
(c) expressing one’s opinion in private on political
subjects and candidates;
(d) participating in the non-partisan activities of a civic,
community, social, labor, or professional organization; or
(e) speaking or writing in support of or in opposition to
proposals to change the legal system or the administration of
justice.
See Sections 5B(2), 5C(4), and 5D.
“Political organization” means a party, committee,
association, club, foundation, fund, or any other organization,
whether incorporated or not, whose primary purpose is to:
(i) influence the selection, nomination, election or
appointment of any individual to public office or to office in a
political party, or
(ii) influence the outcome of any recall effort or ballot
proposition, or
nd 5D.
“Political organization” means a party, committee,
association, club, foundation, fund, or any other organization,
whether incorporated or not, whose primary purpose is to:
(i) influence the selection, nomination, election or
appointment of any individual to public office or to office in a
political party, or
(ii) influence the outcome of any recall effort or ballot
proposition, or
(iii) further or defeat proposals to change the law in
matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice.
See Sections 5A(1)(a), 5A(1)(c), 5A(1)(e), and 5B(2)(b).
The words “shall” and “shall not” mean a binding
obligation on judicial officers, and a judge’s failure to comply
with this obligation is a ground for disciplinary action.
The words “should” and “should not” mean conduct or a
course of action to which judicial officers should aspire, but a
judge’s failure to meet such an aspirational goal is not a
ground for disciplinary action.
“Spouse” includes not only a husband or wife but also any
person with whom the judge maintains a shared household and
conjugal relations. See Sections 3E(1)(c), 3E(l)(d), 3E(2),
4D(5)(a), 4D(5)(b), 4H(1)(b), 4H(3), and 5A(3)(a).
Commentary.—Because the same potential conflicts of
interest and loyalty arise when a judge maintains a shared
household and conjugal relations with another person to whom
the judge is not married, the provisions of Canons 3 and 4
should apply more broadly than simply to legally recognized
spouses. Rather than try to reword each affected provision,
this Code retains the ABA’s use of “spouse” but includes an
expanded definition of spouse in the Terminology Section.
“Third degree of relationship.” The following persons are
relatives within the third degree of relationship: great-
grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister,
child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, and niece. See
Section 3E(1)(d).
CJC

## Nearby sections

- [Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 1 Rule 1. A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R1.md)
- [Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2. A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All the Judge’s Activities](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R2.md)
- [Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3 Rule 3. A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R3.md)
- [Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 4 Rule 4. A Judge Shall So Conduct the Judge’s Extra-Judicial Activities as to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R4.md)
- [Alaska Code Jud. Conduct Canon 5 Rule 5. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R5.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/SRULES_AK_CJC_R5. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.