# OCC Interpretive Letter No. 939: Letter concludes that federal law would preempt laws in Massachusetts and Florida that purport to limit or restrict a national bank from establishing deposit-taking ATMs

> Federal · Agency guidance · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0939

## Section

- **Citation:** OCC Interpretive Letter No. 939
- **Heading:** Letter concludes that federal law would preempt laws in Massachusetts and Florida that purport to limit or restrict a national bank from establishing deposit-taking ATMs
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Agency guidance
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** OCC Interpretive Letters / Letter concludes that federal law would preempt laws in Massachusetts and Florida that purport to limit or restrict a national bank from establishing deposit-taking ATMs.

## Text

O
Comptroller of the Currency
Administrator of National Banks
Washington, DC 20219
October 15, 2001 Interpretive Letter #939
July 2002
12 USC 24(7)
Dear [ ]:
This responds to your letter of June 28, 2001, on behalf of [ ] (“the
Bank"). In your letter, you request confirmation by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency of your view that federal law preempts the laws of Massachusetts and Florida that
purport to restrict or prohibit a national bank from establishing deposit-taking ATMs.1 For the
reasons discussed below, we conclude that federal law would preempt those state laws.
BACKGROUND
The Bank is considering establishing deposit-taking ATMs in a number of states,
including Massachusetts and Florida. The Bank has no branches or offices in either state, but
contemplates installing unmanned, deposit-taking ATMs in publicly accessible areas of buildings
at which certain of its affiliates have operations. The Bank’s customers will be able to access
their accounts through the Bank’s ATMs or ATMs owned and operated by other financial
institutions in the networks, and customers of these other financial institutions will be able to
access their accounts through the Bank’s ATMs.
The Massachusetts Statute
Under Massachusetts law, an out-of-state bank may establish an ATM only if the laws of
the state in which it has its main office would permit a bank with its main office in
Massachusetts to establish an ATM in that state:
No [non-Massachusetts] financial institution . . .shall purchase, establish, install,
operate, lease or use individually or with any financial institution or organization

1 As explained below, the issue presented by the Bank’s request is essentially identical to the issue addressed in
Bank One v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999). For that reason, the publication and comment requirements of 12
U.S.C
purchase, establish, install,
operate, lease or use individually or with any financial institution or organization

1 As explained below, the issue presented by the Bank’s request is essentially identical to the issue addressed in
Bank One v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999). For that reason, the publication and comment requirements of 12
U.S.C. § 43 are not applicable to the Bank’s request. See 12 U.S.C. § 43(c)(1). The OCC provided an opportunity
for regulators in the affected states to comment, however, and this letter therefore takes into account comments on
the Bank’s request the OCC received from the Florida Division of Banking and Finance and the Massachusetts
Office of Consumer Affairs.

- -
2
or share with any financial institution or organization any such electronic branch
in the commonwealth unless the financial institution . . . has its main office in one
of the states of the United States, and the laws of such state expressly authorize,
under conditions no more restrictive than those imposed by this chapter as
determined by the commissioner, financial institutions or organizations organized
under the laws of the commonwealth to purchase, establish, install, operate,
lease, use or share electronic branches in such other state; provided, however,
that any such financial institution . . . shall have applied to and obtained approval
of the commissioner prior to engaging in any activity pursuant to this section.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 167B, §§ 1 and 3 (West 2001) (emphasis added). The Massachusetts
Division of Banks enforces this reciprocity statute by requiring an out-of-state bank to “submit a
completed application, along with a copy of the relevant statute from the state in which it has its
main office, and an affidavit signed by such bank’s counsel affirming that such statute would
authorize a bank which has its main office in Massachusetts to establish an electronic branch
within that state.” Massachusetts Division of Banks Opinion 96-161
requiring an out-of-state bank to “submit a
completed application, along with a copy of the relevant statute from the state in which it has its
main office, and an affidavit signed by such bank’s counsel affirming that such statute would
authorize a bank which has its main office in Massachusetts to establish an electronic branch
within that state.” Massachusetts Division of Banks Opinion 96-161.
According to your letter, you have been advised by staff at the Massachusetts Division of
Banks that the Division would enforce the application and reciprocity requirements against a
national bank that has its home office outside Massachusetts. The Bank’s home state of New
Jersey prohibits out-of-state financial institutions from establishing ATMs in New Jersey. It has
no reciprocity exception to this prohibition. Thus, if the Massachusetts statute applied to the
Bank, the Bank would be prohibited from establishing an ATM in Massachusetts.
The Florida Statute
Florida’s “remote financial service units” statute prohibits an out-of-state bank from
establishing and operating a deposit-taking ATM in Florida:
Any bank which is not authorized to do business in [Florida] or does not have its
principal office and place of business in [Florida] is prohibited from using in
[Florida] any remote financial service unit or any associated system by which a
remote financial service unit is operated. However, any bank which is not
authorized to do business in [Florida] or does not have its principal office and
place of business in [Florida] may use in [Florida] any remote financial service
unit or any associated system within [Florida] by which such a remote service unit
is operated if . . . such bank does not take deposits, either directly or indirectly,
from any source whatsoever by use of the remote financial service unit or
associated system.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 658.65 (West 2000) (emphasis added)
and
place of business in [Florida] may use in [Florida] any remote financial service
unit or any associated system within [Florida] by which such a remote service unit
is operated if . . . such bank does not take deposits, either directly or indirectly,
from any source whatsoever by use of the remote financial service unit or
associated system.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 658.65 (West 2000) (emphasis added). Although the term “remote
financial service unit” is not defined in the Florida statutes or regulations, staff at the
Florida Banking Department have opined that the term includes an ATM. According to
your letter, Department staff also interpret the phrase “authorized to do business” to
mean, in the context of an out-of-state bank, a bank that has established a branch in

- -
3
Florida pursuant to Florida’s branching laws.2 Thus, if applied to the Bank, the Florida
law would prohibit the Bank from establishing deposit-taking ATMs in Florida unless the
Bank first establishes a branch there.
ANALYSIS
Permissibility of the activity
The threshold question in any preemption analysis is whether the activities in
question are permissible for a national bank under federal law. If they are not, then there
is no preemption issue.
National banks are authorized to establish and operate ATMs.3 The banking services
provided through ATMs represent long-established banking activities: receiving deposits,
disbursing cash from bank accounts, and extending credit in the form of cash advances. Each of
these activities lies at the heart of national bank authority under 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh), whether
as part of the enumerated national bank power to receive deposits, as part of the authority to
engage in the “business of banking,” or as an activity incidental to permissible banking activity.4
As the OCC has expressly reaffirmed in a recently adopted regulation, 12 C.F.R
of cash advances. Each of
these activities lies at the heart of national bank authority under 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh), whether
as part of the enumerated national bank power to receive deposits, as part of the authority to
engage in the “business of banking,” or as an activity incidental to permissible banking activity.4
As the OCC has expressly reaffirmed in a recently adopted regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4003,5 the
power to deploy and operate ATMs is implicit in the National Bank Act’s authorization of
national banks to receive deposits, make loans and carry on the “business of banking.” ATMs
and other electronic media simply represent a different means of exercising established banking
powers. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1019.
Moreover, a national bank’s authority to establish and operate ATMs is
unaffected by the federal branching law. Congress has specifically directed that state law
will apply, in certain respects, to a national bank’s authority to branch interstate. The
McFadden Act, as amended, provides that national banks may establish “branches” only
to the extent that state law authorizes state banks to establish branches.6 However, the
McFadden Act, as revised, expressly excludes ATMs from the definition of “branch,”

2 In his letter responding to the OCC’s request for Florida’s comments on the Bank’s preemption request, Richard T.
Donelan, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the Florida Division of Banking and Finance, did not address this staff
interpretation of the Florida statute. Mr. Donelan did, however, confirm that Florida “provides criminal penalties for
the taking of deposits by financial institutions that are not authorized to do business in Florida. . . .”
3 12 C.F.R. § 7.4003.
4 The powers clause of section 24(Seventh) provides that a national bank may “exercise by its board of directors or
duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh)
eposits by financial institutions that are not authorized to do business in Florida. . . .”
3 12 C.F.R. § 7.4003.
4 The powers clause of section 24(Seventh) provides that a national bank may “exercise by its board of directors or
duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh). See NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Corp., 513 U.S.
251 (1995) (the “business of banking” is not limited to the list of powers enumerated in section 24(Seventh)).
5 64 Fed. Reg. 60092 (Nov. 4, 1999).
6 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c)-(g).

- -
4
thereby removing national bank ATMs from the reach of state-law-based restrictions.7
Accordingly, § 7.4003 of the OCC’s rules provides that an ATM is not a branch “and is
not subject to state geographic or operational restrictions or licensing laws.”
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the Bank’s proposed activities through
ATMs in Massachusetts and Florida are permissible under well-settled federal authority.
Preemptive effect of federal law
In our opinion, federal law preempts the Massachusetts and Florida statutes that
purport to restrict or prohibit a national bank’s authority to establish ATMs in those
states, because the statutes conflict with federal law authorizing the Bank to engage in the
activities in question and with the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers over national banks.
These points are addressed in more detail below, following a brief summary of the law
governing preemption and the OCC’s visitorial powers.
Preemption and visitorial powers
bank’s authority to establish ATMs in those
states, because the statutes conflict with federal law authorizing the Bank to engage in the
activities in question and with the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers over national banks.
These points are addressed in more detail below, following a brief summary of the law
governing preemption and the OCC’s visitorial powers.
Preemption and visitorial powers. When the federal government acts within the sphere of
authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, federal law is paramount over, and may preempt,
state law.8 Federal authority over national banks stems from several constitutional sources,
including the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.9
The United States Supreme Court has identified several bases for federal preemption of
state law. First, Congress may expressly state that it intends to preempt state law.10 Second, a
federal statute may create a scheme of federal regulation “so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”11 Third, the state law may
conflict with a federal law.12 In Barnett Bank v. Nelson,13 the Supreme Court elaborated on this
third test:

7 See Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2205(a), 110 Stat. 3009-
405 (Sept. 30, 1996); see also Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom., Foster
v. Bank One, Utah, 120 S. Ct. 1718 (2000) (Iowa location, registration, and advertising restrictions on national bank
ATMs preempted).
8 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821)
(Marshall, C.J.).
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
10 E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
11 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
12 See, e.g., Franklin National Bank, 347 U.S
Ms preempted).
8 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821)
(Marshall, C.J.).
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
10 E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
11 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
12 See, e.g., Franklin National Bank, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Davis v Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896).
13 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).

- -
5
Federal law may be in “irreconcilable conflict” with state law. Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654, 659 (1982). Compliance with both statutes, for
example, may be a “physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963); or, the state law may “stan[d] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
The Court in Barnett went on to state that --
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting a power to
national banks, these cases [i.e., national bank preemption cases] take the view
that normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly,
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to
deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where ... doing so does not
prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.14
A conflict between a state law and federal law need not be complete in order for federal
law to have preemptive effect
d, or to impair significantly,
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to
deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where ... doing so does not
prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.14
A conflict between a state law and federal law need not be complete in order for federal
law to have preemptive effect. Where a federal grant of authority is unrestricted, for example,
state law that attempts to place limits on the scope and exercise of that authority will be
preempted.15 Thus, federal law preempts not only state laws that purport to prohibit a national
bank from engaging in an activity permissible under federal law but also state laws that condition
or confine the exercise by a national bank of its express or incidental powers. As the Court
stated in Barnett,
. . . where Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of “power” upon a
grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition
applies. In Franklin Nat. Bank, the Court made this point explicit. It held that
Congress did not intend to subject national banks’ power to local restrictions,
because the Federal power-granting statute there in question contained “no
indication that Congress [so] intended . . . as it has done by express language in
several other instances.”16

Moreover, the preemption may arise because of a conflict between a state law and a
federal regulation. As stated by the Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n
v. de la Cuesta17:
Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are

14 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33.
15 See, e.g., New York Bankers Association, Inc. v. Levin, 999 F. Supp. 716 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
16 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
17 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
ss pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are

14 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33.
15 See, e.g., New York Bankers Association, Inc. v. Levin, 999 F. Supp. 716 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
16 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
17 458 U.S. 141 (1982).

- -
6
subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory
authority or acted arbitrarily. * * * A pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover, whether the
administrator failed to exercise an option to promulgate regulations which did not disturb
state law is not dispositive.
458 U.S. at 153-154 (citations omitted).
Congress vested the OCC with the authority to determine whether a national bank is
engaging in permissible activities. Under 12 U.S.C. § 484 and other federal statutes,18 the OCC
has exclusive visitorial powers over national banks except as otherwise expressly provided by
federal law.19 These powers include the right to examine a bank, inspect a bank's books and
records, regulate and supervise activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking
law, and enforce compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those
activities.20
Application of federal law to state statutes. If applied to the Bank, the state laws at issue
would prohibit the Bank from establishing ATMs in Massachusetts and Florida, respectively.
Given that the Bank's home state has no provision in its banking laws that would satisfy the
Massachusetts reciprocity requirement, the laws of Massachusetts would, if applied to the Bank,
preclude it from establishing ATMs in that state. Similarly, the Bank does not have its principal
place of business in Florida and is not "authorized to do business" as the Florida Banking
Department interprets that term
the Bank's home state has no provision in its banking laws that would satisfy the
Massachusetts reciprocity requirement, the laws of Massachusetts would, if applied to the Bank,
preclude it from establishing ATMs in that state. Similarly, the Bank does not have its principal
place of business in Florida and is not "authorized to do business" as the Florida Banking
Department interprets that term. Thus, the Florida law would prohibit the Bank from
establishing deposit-taking ATMs in that state.
In Guttau, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered
similar state restrictions imposed in Iowa on a national bank’s authority to deploy and
operate ATMs. In that case, a national bank operated several ATMs in Iowa but
maintained no branches in that state and sought to enjoin the enforcement of Iowa’s ATM
restrictions. Iowa prohibited the operation of an ATM by any bank without an office in
Iowa, required ATM operators to apply for state approval, and prohibited the display of
financial institution advertising upon ATM terminals. The Court of Appeals held that the
Iowa restrictions were preempted by the National Bank Act:
Congress has made clear in the NBA its intent that ATMs are not to be subject to
state regulation, and thus the provisions of the Iowa [law] that would prevent or

18 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 93, 481, and 1818.
19 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Patterson, No. 3:93-CV-1081-G (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 1994), aff’d 68 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1995).
20 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2). See also First National Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740-41 (1881).
e Iowa [law] that would prevent or

18 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 93, 481, and 1818.
19 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Patterson, No. 3:93-CV-1081-G (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 1994), aff’d 68 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1995).
20 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2). See also First National Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740-41 (1881).

- -
7
significantly interfere with Bank One’s placement and operation of its ATMs
must be held to be preempted.21
Like the state laws at issue in Guttau, the Massachusetts and Florida laws in
question here would prohibit the Bank's exercise of its permissible federal powers. For
this reason, it is our opinion that the state laws are preempted by federal law.22
Nor would the Massachusetts or Florida statutes at issue be immune from preemption
under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act23 (“EFTA”). The EFTA allows states to retain control
over electronic transfers:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect the laws of any State relating to
electronic funds transfers, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent
with the provisions of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency. A state law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the
protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection afforded
by this subchapter.24
However, as explained by the court in Guttau,
this anti-preemption provision is specifically limited to the provisions of the federal
EFTA, and nothing therein grants the states any additional authority to regulate national
banks. State regulation of national banks is proper where "doing so does not prevent or
significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its powers." Barnett Bank, 116
S. Ct. at 1109. Congress has made clear in the [National Bank Act] its intent that ATMs
are not to be subject to state regulation, and thus the provisions of the Iowa EFTA that

21 Id
regulation of national banks is proper where "doing so does not prevent or
significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its powers." Barnett Bank, 116
S. Ct. at 1109. Congress has made clear in the [National Bank Act] its intent that ATMs
are not to be subject to state regulation, and thus the provisions of the Iowa EFTA that

21 Id. at 850; see also Metrobank, N.A., et al. v. Foster, No. 4-01-CV-10226, order at 12, n.7 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 21,
2001) (Guttau persuasive in determining that it is appropriate for the District Court to address similar question of
whether Iowa prohibition on ATM fees is preempted).
22 See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 34; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4003. Even if the Bank were able to satisfy the requirements
imposed by Massachusetts and Florida, the barriers to entry presented by these states' laws would constitute
an impermissible exercise of visitorial powers over the Bank. As explained above, Congress intended to
permit national banks to receive deposits and to have “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh). Federal regulations expressly interpret this
grant to include the authority to use ATMs. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4003. Massachusetts provides that an out-of-
state bank, including a national bank, must “have applied to and obtained approval of the commissioner
prior to” establishing an ATM. Similarly, the Florida statute requires an out-of-state bank, including a
national bank, to become “authorized” by the Banking Department before establishing a deposit-taking
ATM in Florida. A state requirement that a national bank obtain state approval or license to exercise a
power authorized under Federal law is an assertion by the state that it has supervisory or regulatory
authority over national banks. This is in direct conflict with the Federal law providing that the OCC has
exclusive visitorial powers over national banks except as otherwise provided by Federal law. 12 U.S.C
A state requirement that a national bank obtain state approval or license to exercise a
power authorized under Federal law is an assertion by the state that it has supervisory or regulatory
authority over national banks. This is in direct conflict with the Federal law providing that the OCC has
exclusive visitorial powers over national banks except as otherwise provided by Federal law. 12 U.S.C. §
484; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. A state law that purports to vest this authority in a state is preempted.
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r.
24 15 U.S.C. § 1693q.

- -
8
would prevent or significantly interfere with Bank One's placement and operation of its
ATMs must be held to be preempted.25
Thus, the preemption analysis articulated above is unaffected by a state's EFTA.
CONCLUSION
Because ATMs are not branches under 12 U.S.C. § 36(j), state law geographic
restrictions are inapplicable to ATMs. Congress has placed no other restrictions upon
ATMs in the National Bank Act, and, therefore, a state may not prevent, restrict, or
condition a national bank's authority to establish ATMs. Accordingly, we conclude that
the Massachusetts reciprocity statute and the Florida prohibition on the establishment of
deposit-taking ATMs by out-of-state banks are preempted by federal law.
Sincerely,
-signed-
Julie. L. Williams
First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel
cc:
Richard T. Donelan, Jr.
Chief Banking Counsel
Office of Comptroller
Florida Department of Banking and Finance
Thomas J. Curry
Commissioner of Banks
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Jennifer Davis Carey, Director
Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

25 Guttau, 190 F. 3d at 850.

## Nearby sections

- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 719 Letter concludes that an ESOP is a "company' for purposes of 12 U.S.C. 371c and that an ESOP that controls at least 25% of a bank's voting stock is an "affiliate" under sec. 371c (supersedes existing OCC interpretive letter #261). (10/26/89)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0719.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 720 Group of affiliate national banks may collectively own, through operating subsidiaries, minority interest in a merchant credit card processing subsidiary. (01/26/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0720.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 722 A national bank may invest CIF assets in mutual funds, including mutual funds that pay the bank a servicing fee, without the bank having to reduce its trustee fees, if the bank concludes, based upon a reasoned opinion of trust counsel, that such an arrangement is authorized by applicable state law, is consistent with the trust instrument, is appropriate for the particular trust accounts, and is consistent with OCC regulations, including in particular 12 C.F.R. 9.18(b)(12). (03/12/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0722.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 724 Bank can sell vehicle service contracts to customers who use home equity loan proceeds to purchase a vehicle, and the maturity of the service contract may be different from the maturity of the loan. (04/22/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0724.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 725 National bank to establish an operating subsidiary to engage in permissible derivatives-related activities. (05/10/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0725.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 726 Letter concerns the application of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations to financial institutions' support of microenterprise lending programs. (06/21/96).](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0726.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 730 Letter concludes that loans proposed by the bank to an unaffiliated distributor of mutual funds would not be subject to interaffiliate lending restrictions contained in 12 U.S.C. 371C. (05/29/96).](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0730.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 732 National bank may make a 5.5% investment in software company which is engaged in the design, development, marketing and maintenance of a network for electronic funds transfers and electronic data interchange, including transacting electronic commerce and marketing software products for use on its world-wide electronic commerce network. (05/10/96).](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0732.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 733 National bank receiver is subject to the rights of secured creditors and creditors entitled to setoff. U.S. legal principles regarding enforcement of security interests are applicable to a receivership of a federal branch or agency conducted under National Bank Act. Therefore, receiver of an uninsured federal branch or agency does not have the right to interfere with the rights of secured creditors, including application of collateral held in U.S. to obligations of a non-U.S. office of the bank. (06/19/96).](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0733.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 736 Lending limit exception for participations not limited to banks. Non-banks may act as participants. (07/25/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0736.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 737 Huntington National Bank's acquisition of minority interest in a limited liability company providing stored value systems. (08/19/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0737.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 738 National bank's participation in a guaranty issued by an agent for a syndication of lenders with respect to their borrower's letter of credit reimbursement obligations to another bank or financial institution is permissible under I.R. 7.1016. (08/14/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0738.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 740 Letter advises the Bank as follows: 1) The question of whether "salary" as used in 12 C.F.R. 2.4 includes an officer's base salary, bonuses, director's fees and/or any other compensation paid by the Bank must be determined by the Bank's management; 2) the question of whether the payment bonuses for credit life sales under 12 C.F.R. 2.4 is based on salary received by the recipient in a calendar year, a fiscal year, or any 12-month period must be determined by the Bank's management; and 3) pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 2.4, if the Bank's CEO is a loan officer and the CEO participates in the bonus plan under which payments based on credit life insurance sales are made, the CEO must be included in averaging the salaries of loan officers that participate in the Bank's bonus or incentive plan. (08/19/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0740.md)
- [OCC Interpretive Letter No. 741 National bank may acquire majority interest in company which operates call center facility which operates programs by which potential customers for new or used automobiles may access databases containing information on the used and new car inventories of numerous automobile dealerships in its metropolitan area. (08/19/96)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0741.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/OCC_INT0939. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.