# NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 11-13: Guideline Memorandum

> Federal · Agency guidance · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC1113

## Section

- **Citation:** NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 11-13
- **Heading:** Guideline Memorandum
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Agency guidance
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** NLRB General Counsel Memoranda / Guideline Memorandum

## Text

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
MEMORANDUM GC 11-13
May 17, 2011
TO: All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge,
and Resident Officers
FROM: Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel
SUBJECT: Guideline Memorandum Concerning Parties’ Obligation
to Provide Information Related to Assertions Made
in Collective Bargaining
I.
Introduction
One of the obligations of good-faith collective
bargaining is to provide, upon request, relevant
information necessary for bargaining. In enforcing this
obligation, two related lines of cases have developed: one
addressing an employer’s general claim of an inability to
pay certain wages or benefits; and another addressing more
limited bargaining claims and requests for specific
information related to those claims. These two lines of
cases may sometimes appear to be similar, and the
analytical distinction between them has not always been
recognized. Some cases have been litigated solely with
regard to whether the employer’s statements amount to a
claim of an inability to pay, without any consideration of
whether there were requests for information that were
directly related to specific claims made in bargaining.
This memorandum explains the appropriate analytical
framework to be applied in all such cases.
Moreover, the analysis discussed below implicates the
obligation to provide relevant and necessary information by
both employers and unions. Thus, we have authorized
complaints against both employers and unions where
requested information was made relevant by a party’s
assertions in bargaining. For example, the Division of
Advice recently found that an employer violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to provide information
concerning its ability to compete for business. The
employer stated in bargaining that it was having problems
getting and keeping customers, given the significance of
labor costs in pricing and bidding
de relevant by a party’s
assertions in bargaining. For example, the Division of
Advice recently found that an employer violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to provide information
concerning its ability to compete for business. The
employer stated in bargaining that it was having problems
getting and keeping customers, given the significance of
labor costs in pricing and bidding. Thus, the employer
directly linked its difficulty getting and keeping
customers and outbidding competitors to its bargaining unit
labor costs. Similarly, the Office of Appeals recently
found that a union violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by
refusing to provide certain specific provisions in its

2
contracts with other employers that it had used to develop
the bargaining proposals it made to the requesting
employer. The requested contract provisions were relevant
because the union had asserted in bargaining that its
proposal was reasonable because other employers had agreed
to the same provisions.
II.
Generally Applicable Principles
All parties engaged in collective bargaining have a
general statutory obligation to provide, upon request,
information which is relevant for the purpose of contract
negotiations or the administration of a collective-
bargaining agreement.1 The duty to furnish information
“stems from the underlying statutory obligation imposed on
employers and unions to bargain in good faith with respect
to mandatory subjects.”2 Thus, an employer is obligated “to
furnish a union, upon request, information relevant and
necessary to enable [the union] to intelligently carry out
its statutory obligations as the employees’ exclusive
bargaining representative,”3 including information related
to contract negotiations.4
Information about bargaining unit employees’ terms and
conditions of employment is presumptively relevant.5 In
contrast, where the requested information concerns matters
outside the bargaining unit, the union bears the burden of

1 See, e.g., NLRB
obligations as the employees’ exclusive
bargaining representative,”3 including information related
to contract negotiations.4
Information about bargaining unit employees’ terms and
conditions of employment is presumptively relevant.5 In
contrast, where the requested information concerns matters
outside the bargaining unit, the union bears the burden of

1 See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-
36 (1967); Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 258, 259
(1994).
2 Cowles Communications, Inc., 172 NLRB 1909, 1909 (1968).
3 Florida Steel Corp., 235 NLRB 941, 942 (1978), enfd. in
relevant part 601 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1979).
4 See, e.g., Day Automotive Group, 348 NLRB 1257, 1257, 1262
(2006); Newcor Bay City Division, 345 NLRB 1229, 1237
(2005); Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 323 NLRB 1182,
1186 (1997), enfd. 157 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998).
5 See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 NLRB 2097
(1954), enfd. 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955); (“[i]t is enough
. . . that the information relate to the wages or fringe
benefits of the employees. Such information is obviously
related to the bargaining process, and the union is
therefore entitled to ask and receive it”); Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 138 NLRB 15 (1962), enfd. 325 F.2d 746, 750
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Pfizer,
Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918 (1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th
Cir. 1985).
information relate to the wages or fringe
benefits of the employees. Such information is obviously
related to the bargaining process, and the union is
therefore entitled to ask and receive it”); Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 138 NLRB 15 (1962), enfd. 325 F.2d 746, 750
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Pfizer,
Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918 (1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th
Cir. 1985).

3
showing the potential relevance of the requested
information.6 However, “that burden is not exceptionally
heavy.”7 The standard for relevance is a “liberal
discovery-type standard.”8 The requested information “need
not be dispositive of the issue between the parties but
must merely have some bearing on it,”9 and the union need
show only “potential or probable relevance . . . to give
rise to an employer’s obligation to provide information.”10
A union’s statutory duty to provide information is
“commensurate with and parallel to an employer’s obligation
to furnish it to a union pursuant to Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act.”11
Thus, for example, the Board has held
that: (1) a “most favored nations” clause establishes both
the necessity and relevancy of information regarding
agreements that a union has with other employers;12

6 See, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB at 258-
259; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 264 NLRB 48, 51-52 (1982),
enfd. 744 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1984) (without information on
wage rates of non-unit employees working at comparable
employer facilities, union could not intelligently
formulate its wage proposal); Leland Stanford Junior
University, 262 NLRB 136, 145 n.13 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d
473 (9th Cir. 1983) (union entitled to non-unit job
description to enable the union to bargain over a related
unit classification); Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 257 NLRB
90, 93-94 (1981) (union entitled to compensation data for
other plants because the employer’s proposals reflected its
consideration of its other plants’ wages and benefits)
ersity, 262 NLRB 136, 145 n.13 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d
473 (9th Cir. 1983) (union entitled to non-unit job
description to enable the union to bargain over a related
unit classification); Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 257 NLRB
90, 93-94 (1981) (union entitled to compensation data for
other plants because the employer’s proposals reflected its
consideration of its other plants’ wages and benefits).
7 Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 262 NLRB at 139; Duquesne
Light Co., 306 NLRB 1042, 1043-1044 (1992).
8 Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. at 435-436; Pfizer Inc., 268
NLRB 916, 918 (1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985).
9 Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105
(1991).
10 Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB at 259. See also,
e.g., Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. at 437 n.6; Press Democrat
Publishing Co., 237 NLRB 1335, 1338 (1978), enfd. 629 F.2d
1320 (9th Cir. 1980).
11 Teamsters Local 500 (Acme Markets), 340 NLRB 251, 252
(2003); Iron Workers Local 207 (Steel Erecting
Contractors), 319 NLRB 87, 90 (1995). See also Fireman &
Oilers Local 288 (Diversy Wyandotte), 302 NLRB 1008, 1009
(1991); Teamsters Local 851 (Northern Air Freight), 283
NLRB 922, 925 (1987).
12 Service Employees Local 144 (Jamaica Hospital), 297 NLRB
1001, 1002-1003 (1990).

4
(2) information relating to the operation of an exclusive
hiring hall and its referral of employees is relevant;13 and
(3) an employer’s “legitimate interest” in determining
whether the union continues to exist may make related
information relevant.14
III. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.
In addition to the presumptive or demonstrated
relevance of information related to unit members’
terms and condition of employment, a party’s
statements and bargaining proposals may make other
information relevant to negotiations. The Board has
noted that, if a party asserts a claim and then
refuses to provide requested information to
substantiate the claim, collective bargaining is
frustrated and rendered ineffective.15
In NLRB v. Truitt Mfg
nce of information related to unit members’
terms and condition of employment, a party’s
statements and bargaining proposals may make other
information relevant to negotiations. The Board has
noted that, if a party asserts a claim and then
refuses to provide requested information to
substantiate the claim, collective bargaining is
frustrated and rendered ineffective.15
In NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,16 the Supreme Court held
that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
refusing to provide the union with information requested to
substantiate the employer’s claim that it could not afford
to grant its employees a wage increase sought by the union
and that such an increase would put the employer out of
business. The Court explained that:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that
claims made by either bargainer should be honest
claims. This is true about an asserted inability
to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument
is important enough to present in the give and
take of bargaining, it is important enough to
require some sort of proof of accuracy.17
The Court noted, however, that it does not automatically
follow that a union is entitled to substantiating evidence

13 Graphic Communications Workers Union, Local 13 (Oakland
Press), 233 NLRB 994, 996 (1977), enfd. 598 F.2d 267 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
14 Service Employees International, Local 715 (Stanford
Hospital), 355 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 3-4 (August 6,
2010).
15 Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 262 NLRB at 145.
16 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
17 Id., at 152–153.
13 Graphic Communications Workers Union, Local 13 (Oakland
Press), 233 NLRB 994, 996 (1977), enfd. 598 F.2d 267 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
14 Service Employees International, Local 715 (Stanford
Hospital), 355 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 3-4 (August 6,
2010).
15 Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 262 NLRB at 145.
16 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
17 Id., at 152–153.

5
in every case in which economic inability is raised as an
argument against increased wages:
Each case must turn on its particular facts. The
inquiry must always be whether or not under the
circumstances of the particular case the
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has
been met.18
Thus, the Supreme Court in Truitt not only made it
clear that an employer’s assertion in collective bargaining
of an inability to pay certain wages or benefits may
require it to provide the union with information on its
overall financial condition, but also emphasized more
generally that, when either party in collective bargaining
makes factual assertions, it may be obligated to provide
the other party with information related to those specific
assertions.19
IV.
Employer Claims of an Inability to Pay
No “magic words” are required to establish an
obligation to provide general financial information, but
the obligation arises whenever the employer’s statements
and actions convey an inability to pay.20 In determining
whether there has been a claim of inability to pay, the
Board evaluates an employer’s claims “in the context of the
particular circumstances in that case.”21
In Nielsen Lithographing Co.,22 the Board held that the
Truitt requirement that an employer provide general
financial information to verify a claim of an inability to
pay does not apply to an employer’s claim that maintaining

18 Id., at 153-154
m of inability to pay, the
Board evaluates an employer’s claims “in the context of the
particular circumstances in that case.”21
In Nielsen Lithographing Co.,22 the Board held that the
Truitt requirement that an employer provide general
financial information to verify a claim of an inability to
pay does not apply to an employer’s claim that maintaining

18 Id., at 153-154.
19 See, e.g., Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 262 NLRB at 145
n.13 (“the Truitt principle is ‘not limited to cases in
which the Company makes an actual plea of poverty, but
[applies] to other situations in which the company
possesses data ‘relevant’ to its bargaining position,’”
citing NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Company, 572 F. 2d 1343,
1348 (9th Cir. 1978)).
20 Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600, 1602 (1984).
21 Lakeland Bus Lines, 335 NLRB 322, 324 (2001), enf. denied
347 F.3d 955 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
22 305 NLRB 697 (1991), affd. sub nom. Graphic
Communications Local 50B v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.
1992).

6
existing employee benefits is necessary to avoid placing
the employer at a competitive disadvantage in the future.
Thus, in Nielsen, the employer acknowledged that it was
still making a profit and was not pleading poverty or an
inability to pay. Rather, it maintained that concessions
were necessary in order to be competitive in the future.
The union requested certain information it deemed necessary
to evaluate the claim that the employer was losing its
ability to compete, including the employer’s balance
sheets, bank loan documents, and analyses of working
capital.23 Although the Board initially found that the
employer was required to provide the requested
information,24 after the Seventh Circuit refused enforcement
of that decision,25 the Board held that “an employer’s
obligation to open its books does not arise unless the
employer has predicated its bargaining stance on assertions
about its inability to pay during the term of the
bargaining agreement under negotiation.”26 The Bo
found that the
employer was required to provide the requested
information,24 after the Seventh Circuit refused enforcement
of that decision,25 the Board held that “an employer’s
obligation to open its books does not arise unless the
employer has predicated its bargaining stance on assertions
about its inability to pay during the term of the
bargaining agreement under negotiation.”26 The Board
emphasized that the obligation to provide general financial
does not arise where the employer “is simply saying that it
does not want to pay.”27
As the Supreme Court did in Truitt, the Board in
Nielsen also cautioned that an employer’s claims must be
evaluated in the context of the particular circumstances in
that case. The Board stated:
We do not say that claims of economic hardship or
business losses or the prospect of layoffs can
never amount to a claim of inability to pay.
Depending on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, the evidence may establish that
the employer is asserting that the economic
problems have led to an inability to pay or will
do so during the life of the contract
negotiated.28

23 Id., 305 NLRB at 698.
24 279 NLRB 877 (1986).
25 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988).
26 305 NLRB at 700.
27 Ibid. See also, e.g., AMF Trucking & Warehousing, 342
NLRB 1125, 1126 (2004) (“‘[i]nability to pay’ means that
the company presently has insufficient assets to pay or
that it would have insufficient assets to pay during the
life of the contract that is being negotiated. Thus,
inability to pay is inextricably linked to nonsurvival in
business”).
28 305 NLRB at 700.
).
26 305 NLRB at 700.
27 Ibid. See also, e.g., AMF Trucking & Warehousing, 342
NLRB 1125, 1126 (2004) (“‘[i]nability to pay’ means that
the company presently has insufficient assets to pay or
that it would have insufficient assets to pay during the
life of the contract that is being negotiated. Thus,
inability to pay is inextricably linked to nonsurvival in
business”).
28 305 NLRB at 700.

7
Since Nielsen, however, there has been no clear
delineation as to what exactly constitutes a statement of
an inability to pay. Indeed, the Board appears to have
often come to differing conclusions on facts that are
difficult to distinguish. For example, in Burruss
Transfer,29 the Board found that the employer did not claim
inability to pay where it said it would “not be able to
survive” if it increased wages or benefits. The following
year, in Shell Co.,30 the Board found that the employer did
claim inability to pay where it characterized its financial
situation as “a matter of survival.” In Lakeland, above,31
the Board found an inability-to-pay claim where the
employer told its employees that acceptance of its offer
would enable it to “retain your jobs and get back in the
black in the short term,” and that the “future of Lakeland
depends on it” while, in AMF Trucking & Warehousing,32 the
Board found no inability-to-pay claim where the employer
said it was “fighting to keep the business alive.” More
recently, in Stella D’oro Biscuit Co.,33 the Board found an
inability-to-pay claim despite the employer’s clear
indications during negotiations that its parent entity
possessed ample funds to pay the Union’s demands, but would
be unwilling to do so without labor-cost concessions.
These seemingly inconsistent results as to what
constitutes an inability-to-pay claim that would require
the providing of general financial information have been
echoed by Circuit Courts. Thus, for example, in Stroehmann
Bakeries v
ions during negotiations that its parent entity
possessed ample funds to pay the Union’s demands, but would
be unwilling to do so without labor-cost concessions.
These seemingly inconsistent results as to what
constitutes an inability-to-pay claim that would require
the providing of general financial information have been
echoed by Circuit Courts. Thus, for example, in Stroehmann
Bakeries v. NLRB,34 the Second Circuit denied enforcement
and found no inability-to-pay claim where the employer
conveyed to the union that it would go out of business but
for its parent company willing to bail it out financially.
In Lakeland Bus Lines v. NLRB,35 the D.C. Circuit denied
enforcement based on evidence that the employer explicitly
stated that it was not asserting an inability to pay, but
was only asserting the existence of short-term business

29 307 NLRB 226, 228 (1992).
30 313 NLRB 133, 133 (1993).
31 335 NLRB at 324-325.
32 342 NLRB at 1126.
33 355 NLRB No. 158, slip op. at 4 (August 27, 2010).
34 95 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1996), denying enforcement in
relevant part to 318 NLRB 1069 (1995).
35 347 F.3d 955, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2003), denying enforcement
to 335 NLRB 322.

8
losses. On the other hand, in International Chemical
Workers Union v. NLRB,36 the Ninth Circuit granted review
and remanded the Board’s finding of no inability-to-pay
claim where the employer had said it couldn’t afford to pay
for the Union’s proposals and would “go broke,” and failed
to adequately disavow such statements by subsequent
conduct.
Notwithstanding the above, we recognize that it may be
difficult to fully articulate a clear bright-line test,
given the necessarily fact-intensive nature of the Truitt
analysis. Thus, as noted above, the Court in Truitt itself
stated that each case must turn on its particular facts,37
and the Board has similarly emphasized that the evaluation
of the employer’s claims must be made in the context of the
particular circumstances in the case.38
V
difficult to fully articulate a clear bright-line test,
given the necessarily fact-intensive nature of the Truitt
analysis. Thus, as noted above, the Court in Truitt itself
stated that each case must turn on its particular facts,37
and the Board has similarly emphasized that the evaluation
of the employer’s claims must be made in the context of the
particular circumstances in the case.38
V.
Claims Other than an Inability to Pay
Other than broad requests for general financial
information in response to alleged employer claims of an
inability to pay, however, the Board has articulated a
clear standard for determining parties’ obligation to
provide specific requested information related to more
limited bargaining claims. In Caldwell Manufacturing Co.,39
the employer asserted that concessions were necessary to
make the facility a viable option to locate contemplated
new products and justified its proposals by claiming a need
to be more competitive in the industry. The Board ordered
the employer to provide competitor data, labor costs, and
other information that was relevant to the claims it had
made during bargaining. The Board stated that while the
information was not presumptively relevant, relevancy was
established because it would have assisted the union in
verifying the employer’s claims regarding its proposals and
allowed the union to make counter proposals.40
Significantly, the Board also noted that while the employer
did not claim an inability to pay, the union did not
request general access to the employer’s financial records.
Instead, the union’s request was tailored to allow the
union to evaluate and verify specific assertions made by

36 467 F.3d 742, 749-754 (9th Cir. 2006), granting review to
American Polystyrene Corp., 341 NLRB 508 (2004).
37 351 U.S. at 153.
38 Lakeland, 335 NLRB at 324; Nielsen, 305 NLRB at 700.
39 346 NLRB 1159, 1160 (2006).
40 Id.
s to the employer’s financial records.
Instead, the union’s request was tailored to allow the
union to evaluate and verify specific assertions made by

36 467 F.3d 742, 749-754 (9th Cir. 2006), granting review to
American Polystyrene Corp., 341 NLRB 508 (2004).
37 351 U.S. at 153.
38 Lakeland, 335 NLRB at 324; Nielsen, 305 NLRB at 700.
39 346 NLRB 1159, 1160 (2006).
40 Id.

9
the employer and assist the union in developing its own
proposals.41
The standard articulated in Caldwell is consistent
with earlier cases applying Truitt's general holding that
good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
important enough to make in the give and take of bargaining
are important enough to require proof of accuracy. For
example, in E. I. du Pont & Co.,42 the Board held that the
employer unlawfully refused to furnish the union with
specific financial information it had made relevant by its
representations during bargaining, such as comparative
production cost data for its other plants, even though the
employer had not pled financial hardship.
More recently, the Board reached a similar result in
A-1 Door and Building Solutions.43 In A-1 Door, the
employer justified its bargaining proposals by contending
that it was not competitive with other companies because it
was paying too much in wages and benefits which affected
its ability to get and receive job bids.44 The union
requested specific information regarding job bidding by the
employer, which the employer refused to provide.45 The
Board, citing Caldwell, above, found that the information
was relevant because it would assist the union in
evaluating the employer’s claims, and that the union had
requested specific information to evaluate the accuracy of
the Respondent’s specific claims, rather than general
financial data.46 Accordingly, the Board found that the
union was entitled to the information that would either
support or disprove the employer’s representations
formation
was relevant because it would assist the union in
evaluating the employer’s claims, and that the union had
requested specific information to evaluate the accuracy of
the Respondent’s specific claims, rather than general
financial data.46 Accordingly, the Board found that the
union was entitled to the information that would either
support or disprove the employer’s representations. The
Board in A-1 Door expressly noted that its holding was
based on the employer’s specific claim -- an inability to
compete – and not on any asserted inability to pay.47

41 Ibid.
42 276 NLRB 335, 335 (1985)
43 356 NLRB No. 76 (2011).
44 Id., slip op. at 3.
45 Id., slip op. at 4.
46 Ibid. The Board in A-1 Door also cited E. I. du Pont &
Co., above, as well as several other cases, in support of
its statement that it “has consistently required the
production of similar information, including information
concerning competitors, labor costs, production costs,
restructuring studies, and income statements.” Ibid.
47 Id., slip op. at 4 n.13.

10
VI.
Conclusion
While both the obligation to provide general financial
information after an employer claim of an “inability to
pay” and the obligation to provide more specific
information made relevant by other bargaining claims arise
out of the good-faith bargaining obligation discussed in
Truitt, it is important to distinguish the two doctrines
and keep them analytically distinct. Although an
employer’s claim of an inability to pay uniquely requires
the employer to furnish general financial information,
because that is what is required to substantiate the
employer’s broad claim, the significance of other requested
information directly related to more limited claims must
not be overlooked
important to distinguish the two doctrines
and keep them analytically distinct. Although an
employer’s claim of an inability to pay uniquely requires
the employer to furnish general financial information,
because that is what is required to substantiate the
employer’s broad claim, the significance of other requested
information directly related to more limited claims must
not be overlooked. It must be remembered that any
particular case may present one or the other issue or, in
some cases, both -- care must be taken to make sure the
appropriate analysis is applied in determining a party’s
obligation to provide information in response to any
particular request. Indeed, within a single information
request, both types of claims may be presented and both
must be evaluated.
This problem is illustrated in North Star Steel Co.,48
where the Board found that a union’s request for
information regarding the employer’s competitors was not
relevant because the employer had not made a claim of an
inability to pay, but instead had only claimed a
“competitive disadvantage” or an “inability to compete.”
The Board in North Star, however, restricted its analysis
solely to whether or not the employer had claimed an
inability to pay. It therefore did not even discuss
whether the employer’s specific claims regarding its
competitors made relevant any of the requested information,
despite the fact that the union there requested both
general financial information and a list of the employer’s
competitors.49 Having so limited its inquiry, the Board did
not separately consider the relevance of the list of
competitors.
In contrast, in E. I. du Pont & Co., above, the Board
appropriately considered both of the contentions at issue
e relevant any of the requested information,
despite the fact that the union there requested both
general financial information and a list of the employer’s
competitors.49 Having so limited its inquiry, the Board did
not separately consider the relevance of the list of
competitors.
In contrast, in E. I. du Pont & Co., above, the Board
appropriately considered both of the contentions at issue.
Thus, although the Board did “not find that the [employer]
made a plea of financial hardship in bargaining over its
proposal,” and therefore found no violation as to the
employer’s refusal to provide general financial
information, the Board nonetheless found that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide specific

48 347 NLRB 1364, 1369-1370 (2006).
49 Id., at 1390-1391.

11
information that was made relevant by the employer’s
bargaining proposals, including comparative production cost
data.50 As in Caldwell and A-1 Door, the Board made it
clear that an employer may be required to provide relevant
information in response to specific information requests,
regardless of whether or not it is found to have actually
made an inability–to-pay claim.
Thus, in evaluating information requests related to
claims made during bargaining, Regions should consider both
general claims of an inability to pay and other more
limited claims that could be subject to specific
verification. Regions should examine the particular
information requests at issue and determine whether they
are targeted to the bargaining claims made by the other
party and are specifically tailored to those claims. Any
questions should be directed to the Division of Advice.
/s/
L.S.
cc: NLRBU
Release to the Public
MEMORANDUM GC 11-13

50 276 NLRB at 335, 341.

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- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 00-06 Impact Analysis Program Modifications](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0006.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 00-07 Reimbursement for Excess Federal and State Income Taxes which Discriminatees owe as a result of receiving a lump-sum backpay award](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0007.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-01 Pro Bono Program](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0101.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-02 "Casehandling in light of Fleming Cos., 332 NLRB No. 99 (October 31, 2000)"](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0102.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-03 "Report on Utilization of Section 10(j) Injunction Proceedings March 3, 1998 through January 15, 2001"](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0103.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-04 Guidelines for Response to Beck-Related Public Inquiries](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0104.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-05 "Unfair Labor Practice Complaints Issued December 19, 2000 – April 20, 2001"](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0105.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 01-06 Fundraising Following Recent Tragedy](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0106.md)
- [NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 02-01 Guidelines Memorandum Concerning Levitz](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC0201.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_GCGC1113. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.