# NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 27-CA-203915 (Colorado Professional Security Services): Colorado Professional Security Services (27-CA-203915)

> Federal · Agency guidance · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_27-CA-203915

## Section

- **Citation:** NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 27-CA-203915 (Colorado Professional Security Services)
- **Heading:** Colorado Professional Security Services (27-CA-203915)
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Agency guidance
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** NLRB Division of Advice Memoranda (rolling 10-year window) / Colorado Professional Security Services (27-CA-203915)

## Text

United States Government
National Labor Relations Board
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Advice Memorandum

DATE:
August 7, 2018
TO:
Paula S. Sawyer, Regional Director
Region 27
FROM:
Jayme L. Sophir, Associate General Counsel
Division of Advice
SUBJECT: Colorado Professional Security Services, LLC
(COPSS)
Cases 27-CA-203915, -206097, -206104
512-5009-6767
512-5012-0125
512-5036-6720
512-7550-6000

These cases were submitted for advice as to whether the Employer violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: (1) discharging one of the Charging Parties pursuant to
unlawfully overbroad Employer rules; and (2) filing and maintaining a lawsuit
against the Charging Parties, allegedly in retaliation against their participation in
federal and state wage-and-hour lawsuits against the Employer. We conclude that
the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining overbroad work rules. We
further conclude that the Employer did not violate the Act by discharging one of the
Charging Parties or by filing and maintaining its lawsuit against the Charging
Parties.

FACTS

Colorado Professional Security Services, LLC (“the Employer”) provides armed
security services to shopping malls, car dealerships, and other clients in and around
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Among its other policies, the Employer maintains the
following provision:

Harm to Business or Reputation: Employees must refrain from
engaging in conduct that could adversely affect the Company’s business
or reputation. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to:

1. publicly criticizing the Company, its management or its
employees . . .
* * *

Beginning in
2016, Charging Party 1, a former security guard employee
of the Employer, filed federal and Colorado state court lawsuits against the Employer
st refrain from
engaging in conduct that could adversely affect the Company’s business
or reputation. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to:

1. publicly criticizing the Company, its management or its
employees . . .
* * *

Beginning in
2016, Charging Party 1, a former security guard employee
of the Employer, filed federal and Colorado state court lawsuits against the Employer
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 4 -
Employer’s clients and their workers/clients; and (4) insidious remarks regarding the
Employer’s company name, business, security officers, and clients while working. The
termination notices emphasized that Charging Party 2 had made the insidious
remarks in the Facebook video while on duty and in uniform. The Employer’s
position statement expressly states that Charging Party 2 was terminated, inter alia,
for the remarks and conduct that hurt the Employer’s reputation, and cites the
Employer’s “Harm to Business or Reputation” policy. In addition, the Employer’s
owner expressly cited the policy in
explanation for discharging Charging Party 2.
The Employer’s owner has also stated that, to
knowledge, the client at the
location where Charging Party 2 worked was not aware of
Facebook video and did
not complain about it.

C. The Employer Files a State Court Lawsuit against Charging Party 1,
Charging Party 1’s
, and Charging Party 2

On
, the Employer filed a state court lawsuit against Charging Party 1,
Charging Party 1’s
and Charging Party 2, alleging that the defendants’
Facebook posts constituted defamation, interference with contractual relations, and
interference with business relations. The Employer’s state law complaint does not
allege that Charging Party 1, Charging Party 1’s
, or Charging Party 2 acted with
malice, and the complaint does not specify any actual damages the Employer may
have suffered from their statements
alleging that the defendants’
Facebook posts constituted defamation, interference with contractual relations, and
interference with business relations. The Employer’s state law complaint does not
allege that Charging Party 1, Charging Party 1’s
, or Charging Party 2 acted with
malice, and the complaint does not specify any actual damages the Employer may
have suffered from their statements. The complaint in the Employer’s lawsuit
emphasizes the federal wage-and-hour lawsuit that Charging Party 1 initiated,
although the Employer’s lawsuit is not a counterclaim to the wage-and-hour lawsuit,
but instead is an entirely independent legal action. In particular, the Employer’s
lawsuit states:

* * * *

8. In 2016 a claim was filed in the US District Court for Colorado, case
number 1
by three Plaintiffs, one of whom was and
is [Charging Party 1], alleging any number of violations by COPSS of
Federal and State of Colorado employment laws. It was originally filed
with the expectation by the plaintiffs in that matter that a group of
employees and former employees of COPSS could be assembled into a
class action against COPSS. That effort has so far failed and the
plaintiffs in that lawsuit are now deemed an Opt-In Collective.
[Charging Party 2] is now one of the plaintiffs in the Federal court
action.

9. Since joining in the Federal matter, [Charging Party 1] and
wife,
[ ] have made efforts to encourage other employees of COPSS to join
the lawsuit and have made statements to any number of clients of
COPSS that they should also join the Federal lawsuit. It is unclear
(b) (6), (b) (7
(b) (6), (b)
(b) (6), (b) (
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C
(b) (6), (b) (7)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
in the Federal matter, [Charging Party 1] and
wife,
[ ] have made efforts to encourage other employees of COPSS to join
the lawsuit and have made statements to any number of clients of
COPSS that they should also join the Federal lawsuit. It is unclear
(b) (6), (b) (7
(b) (6), (b)
(b) (6), (b) (
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C
(b) (6), (b) (7)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 5 -
how COPSS clients could join the lawsuit involving former and current
employees, but that fact did not deter [Charging Party 1 and
]
from making the requests.

10. As part of the effort by [Charging Party 1 and
to
encourage others to join the Federal lawsuit, both of those Defendants
have made a number of statements about COPSS that are both untrue
and defamatory.[5]

* * * *

The Employer has offered no direct evidence that would indicate that any of the
statements it alleges as defamatory were false, and has offered no evidence at all that
Charging Party 1, Charging Party 1’s
or Charging Party 2 acted with malice, or
that the Employer had any actual damages from the statements at issue in the
lawsuit.

ACTION

Initially, we conclude that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining
unlawfully overbroad rules. Second, we conclude that the Employer’s discharge of
Charging Party 2 did not violate Section 8(a)(1) because
conduct did not constitute
protected concerted activity and was gross misconduct. Finally, while the Employer’s
state court lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis, we conclude that it was not filed with an
unlawful retaliatory motive.

I.
The Employer Maintains Overbroad Rules that Violate Section 8(a)(1)

We conclude that the Employer’s “Harm to Business or Reputation” policy
prohibiting employees from criticizing the Employer, and the standard disciplinary
letter language prohibiting employees from discussing their discipline with coworkers
or clients, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
unlawful retaliatory motive.

I.
The Employer Maintains Overbroad Rules that Violate Section 8(a)(1)

We conclude that the Employer’s “Harm to Business or Reputation” policy
prohibiting employees from criticizing the Employer, and the standard disciplinary
letter language prohibiting employees from discussing their discipline with coworkers
or clients, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Under Boeing,6 these provisions are
Category 2 rules that violate Section 8(a)(1) because the impact on employee NLRA
rights outweighs the Employer’s business justification. Regarding the policy, by
prohibiting any public criticism of the Employer or its management, the Employer is

5 The allegation in paragraph 10 of the Employer’s lawsuit does not appear to refer to
any of the particular statements alleged as defamatory in the Employer’s lawsuit, as
none of those statements would have been related to encouraging others to join in the
federal wage-and-hour lawsuit.

6 365 NLRB No. 154, slip op. at 3-5 (Dec. 14, 2017).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C
(b) (6), (b)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

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III. The Employer’s State Court Lawsuit

In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB,11 the Supreme Court held that the Board
may enjoin as an unfair labor practice the filing and prosecution of a lawsuit only
when the lawsuit: (1) lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact; and (2) was commenced
with a retaliatory motive. In BE & K Construction Co.,12 the Board clarified that a
baseless lawsuit, whether ongoing or completed, violates the Act if the motive for
initiating the lawsuit was to retaliate against Section 7 rights, but that a reasonably
based lawsuit does not violate the Act regardless of the motive for bringing it.13

A
asonable basis in law or fact; and (2) was commenced
with a retaliatory motive. In BE & K Construction Co.,12 the Board clarified that a
baseless lawsuit, whether ongoing or completed, violates the Act if the motive for
initiating the lawsuit was to retaliate against Section 7 rights, but that a reasonably
based lawsuit does not violate the Act regardless of the motive for bringing it.13

A.
The Employer’s state court lawsuit is baseless

A lawsuit is objectively baseless when its factual or legal claims are such that “no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”14 The analysis of
this issue requires “[an examination of] the plaintiff’s evidence to determine whether
it raises any material questions of fact.”15 The burden rests on the court plaintiff to
present the Board with evidence showing genuine issues of material fact and that
there is prima facie evidence supporting each cause of action alleged.16

In Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114,17 the Supreme Court held that a state
court has jurisdiction to apply state remedies against defamation in a lawsuit brought
by “either party to a labor dispute” against the other party only where the state
complainant “pleads and proves that the [allegedly defamatory] statements were
made with malice and injured him.”18 The Court and the text of the Act itself have

11 461 U.S. 731, 748–49 (1983).

12 351 NLRB 451 (2007).

13 See also, e.g., Ashford TRS Nickel, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 6, slip op. at 4, 6 (2018)
(employer’s retaliatory, baseless, and preempted lawsuit attacking union’s Section 7-
protected consumer boycott violated Section 8(a)(1)); Atelier Condominium & Cooper
Square Realty, 361 NLRB 966, 968 (2014), enforced, 653 Fed. Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2016).

14 BE & K, 351 NLRB at 457.

15 Geske & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 F.3d 1366, 1376 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Bill
Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 745–47.

16 Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 746, n.12
d lawsuit attacking union’s Section 7-
protected consumer boycott violated Section 8(a)(1)); Atelier Condominium & Cooper
Square Realty, 361 NLRB 966, 968 (2014), enforced, 653 Fed. Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2016).

14 BE & K, 351 NLRB at 457.

15 Geske & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 F.3d 1366, 1376 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Bill
Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 745–47.

16 Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 746, n.12.

17 383 U.S. 53 (1966).

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 9 -
made it clear that the term “labor dispute” is to be broadly interpreted in this
context,19 and would include a wage-and-hour lawsuit pursued by current or former
employees against an employer. In order to prove malice, the plaintiff must show
that the statements were made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of
whether the statements were true or false.20 Demonstrating the federal overlay of
actual malice is a “heavy burden” that must be shown by “clear and convincing
proof.”21 And, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges harm to its reputation, the plaintiff
must also show evidence of actual damages or loss due to any such reputational
harm.22 The Board has recognized that Bill Johnson’s and Linn are to be read
together, and that in a defamation case arising out of a labor dispute, a plaintiff must
prove the “[f]ederal overlay of both actual malice and damages” to have its lawsuit
treated as reasonably based.23 In addition, the Linn standard equally applies to

18 383 U.S. at 55
Board has recognized that Bill Johnson’s and Linn are to be read
together, and that in a defamation case arising out of a labor dispute, a plaintiff must
prove the “[f]ederal overlay of both actual malice and damages” to have its lawsuit
treated as reasonably based.23 In addition, the Linn standard equally applies to

18 383 U.S. at 55. See also Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 331 NLRB 960,
961 n.3, 963 (2000) (“where a party to a labor dispute circulates false and defamatory
statements, a state court defamation lawsuit is not preempted by the Act ‘if the
complainant pleads and proves that the statements were made with malice and
injured him.’”), reconsideration denied, Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 336
NLRB 332, 333 (2001) (“where the plaintiff has alleged and can prove actual malice
and damages, the defamation suit is not preempted” and “the Board cannot enjoin it
unless and until the Board determines that it lacks a reasonable basis and is
retaliatory”).

19 See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 278–79 (1974) (“whether Linn’s
partial pre-emption of state libel remedies is applicable obviously cannot depend on
some abstract notion of what constitutes a ‘labor dispute’; rather, application of Linn
must turn on whether the defamatory publication is made in a context where the
policies of the federal labor laws leading to protection for freedom of speech are
significantly implicated”); Section 2(9) of the Act (“[t]he term ‘labor dispute’ includes
any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee”).

20 Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.

21 Id.

22 Id.; Intercity Maint. Co. v
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee”).

20 Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.

21 Id.

22 Id.; Intercity Maint. Co. v. Service Employees Local 254, 241 F.3d 82, 89-90 (1st Cir.
2001) (despite evidence of malice, plaintiff alleging defamation in labor dispute “could
not rest on the common law presumption of damages” and failed to show “evidence of
actual loss due to reputational harm and consequent lost profits”).

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 10 -
allegations of tortious interference with contract or business relations, which are also
at issue here.24

Thus, to determine if the filing and maintenance of a defamation lawsuit
constitutes an unfair labor practice, the Board examines whether the plaintiff has
pled and can prove malice and actual damages.25 For instance, in Beverly Health &
Rehabilitation Services, the Board dismissed aspects of the ULP complaint that
alleged that the employer had unlawfully maintained a preempted lawsuit, because
the employer there had satisfied the Linn framework by pleading malice and
damages.26

Here, the Employer’s state court lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact
because the Employer has entirely failed to plead the required Linn elements, and
has failed to present the Region with any evidence demonstrating that the Charging
Parties’ statements were made with malice, or that it has some reason to believe that
it may be able to demonstrate malice before the court.27 Indeed, the Employer has
not even offered any proof, as required by state law, that the allegedly defamatory
statements were false.28

23 Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 336 NLRB at 333
arties’ statements were made with malice, or that it has some reason to believe that
it may be able to demonstrate malice before the court.27 Indeed, the Employer has
not even offered any proof, as required by state law, that the allegedly defamatory
statements were false.28

23 Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 336 NLRB at 333.

24 See Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 655, 39 F.3d
191, 196 (8th Cir. 1964) (“the malice standard required for actionable defamation
claims during labor disputes must equally be met for a tortious interference claim
based on the same conduct or statements”).

25 See Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 331 NLRB at 963.

26 Id.

27 See Ashford TRS Nickel, 366 NLRB No. 6, slip op. at 6 (“[N]ot only did the
Respondent fail to adequately plead actual malice, the Respondent did not assert any
facts that, if proven, would have established actual malice . . . . Thus, from the
beginning, an essential element of the lawsuit was lacking, preordaining the lawsuit’s
failure.”); Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 331 NLRB at 963 (Board
examines whether defamation suit raises a genuine issue of material fact under Bill
Johnson’s and whether plaintiff’s pleadings are adequate under Linn).

28 Under Colorado law, defamation and interference with contract or business
relations can only be found where the defendant has made statements of “verifiable
facts . . . capable of being proved true or false.” Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293,
1300 (Colo. 1994). Thus, mere opinions, even derogatory opinions, cannot be found to
be defamatory. See, e.g., Fry v. Lee, 408 P.3d 843, 855-56 (Colo. App. 2013)
n and interference with contract or business
relations can only be found where the defendant has made statements of “verifiable
facts . . . capable of being proved true or false.” Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293,
1300 (Colo. 1994). Thus, mere opinions, even derogatory opinions, cannot be found to
be defamatory. See, e.g., Fry v. Lee, 408 P.3d 843, 855-56 (Colo. App. 2013)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 11 -

Additionally, the Employer has not pled any specific damages or offered any proof
that it suffered any actual damages. There is no evidence showing damages from the
Charging Party 2’s Facebook video; indeed, the Employer
has stated that, to
knowledge, the client at the location where Charging Party 2 worked was not
aware of
Facebook video and did not complain about it. The Employer’s
has
claimed, without offering any evidentiary support, that some employees of one of the
Employer’s clients saw Charging Party 1’s
Facebook posts and that the
Employer “ended up cutting ties with this client.” But there is no evidence that would
indicate any causal linkage between the Facebook posts and the end of the business
relationship, particularly where the Employer’s
says that
cut ties with the
client, not that the client did so. The Employer has presented no other evidence that
would indicate any damages or actual harm. Therefore, because the Employer has
not shown that it possesses or reasonably believes it can obtain evidence to support
essential elements of its cause of action -- that the Charging Parties’ statements were
made with malice and that the Employer experienced actual harm as a result of the
Defendants’ statements -- the Employer’s lawsuit is baseless under Bill Johnson’s.

B
or actual harm. Therefore, because the Employer has
not shown that it possesses or reasonably believes it can obtain evidence to support
essential elements of its cause of action -- that the Charging Parties’ statements were
made with malice and that the Employer experienced actual harm as a result of the
Defendants’ statements -- the Employer’s lawsuit is baseless under Bill Johnson’s.

B.
The Employer’s state court lawsuit is not unlawful because it is
not directed at any protected conduct and has not been otherwise
shown to retaliate against the Charging Parties’ protected conduct

Factors for discerning an employer’s unlawful retaliatory motive for initiating a
state court lawsuit include whether the lawsuit targeted protected concerted
activity;29 evidence of the plaintiff’s prior animus toward protected rights;30 whether
the lawsuit is baseless;31 and any claim for excessive damages.32

(“[a]lternative torts cannot be used to evade the constitutional requirements for
defamation actions”); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F.Supp. 356, 357 (D. Colo.
1987) (a “claim of intentional interference with contract cannot be predicated on [an]
expression of opinion”) (citing Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985), for the proposition that “since the defendants could
not be liable for defamation arising out of their statements of opinion, the intentional
interference with contractual relations claim was likewise not actionable”), affirmed,
876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, even statements by a Charging Party considered
to be insults would not satisfy the Employer’s burden under state law.

29 See, e.g., Ashford TRS Nickel, 366 NLRB No. 6, slip op. at 6; Summitville Tiles, 300
NLRB 64 (1990).

30 See, e.g., Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty, 361 NLRB at 970

31 Id.; Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 747.
(b) (6), (b) (7
(b) (6), (b)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
even statements by a Charging Party considered
to be insults would not satisfy the Employer’s burden under state law.

29 See, e.g., Ashford TRS Nickel, 366 NLRB No. 6, slip op. at 6; Summitville Tiles, 300
NLRB 64 (1990).

30 See, e.g., Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty, 361 NLRB at 970

31 Id.; Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 747.
(b) (6), (b) (7
(b) (6), (b)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 12 -

Here, while the Employer’s lawsuit in the instant cases is clearly baseless, it is
not itself directed at any protected conduct, and there is insufficient evidence to show
that the Employer commenced its suit to retaliate against the Charging Parties’
Section 7 activity. In this regard, we particularly note the timing here -- the
Employer’s lawsuit came soon after Charging Party 1’s
and Charging Party 2’s
Facebook posts and almost one year after Charging Party 1 first filed the wage-and-
hour lawsuits. This supports the Employer’s assertion that it was the Facebook posts
that were the reason for its state court lawsuit, and not the Charging Parties’ earlier
lawsuits.

Moreover, although the Employer’s state court complaint references the Charging
Parties’ participation in the federal wage-and-hour lawsuit against it, that in itself
does not demonstrate animus toward their participation in the wage-and-hour suit.
Rather, it appears to be an attempt to provide context for the Employer’s state court
lawsuit and to show that what the employees were doing on Facebook was actually
not in furtherance of their lawsuit, because the Charging Parties would not be able to
add the Employer’s clients to their lawsuit which is limited to former and current
employees of the Employer (i.e., the Employer appears to have been defending in
advance against an argument the Charging Parties would be likely to use in defense
of the statements at issue in the Employer’s lawsuit)
actually
not in furtherance of their lawsuit, because the Charging Parties would not be able to
add the Employer’s clients to their lawsuit which is limited to former and current
employees of the Employer (i.e., the Employer appears to have been defending in
advance against an argument the Charging Parties would be likely to use in defense
of the statements at issue in the Employer’s lawsuit). And, while the Employer’s
lawsuit does target former employees who were prominent in the federal and state
wage-and-hour lawsuits against the Employer, it is undisputed that these employees
also made the allegedly defamatory statements, and there is no evidence that any
other employees or former employees made any similar statements targeting the
Employer.

In addition, we note that, although the Board will consider a lawsuit’s lack of a
reasonable basis as a factor in its analysis of motive, that factor alone is insufficient to
prove unlawful retaliation.33 Finally, in the absence of any clear demand for excessive
punitive damages or injunctive relief, we would not rely on the speculativeness of the
damages sought by the Employer. Therefore, despite the clear lack of merit to the
Employer’s state court lawsuit, the allegation that it violated Section 8(a)(1) should be
dismissed, absent withdrawal.

Accordingly, the Region should issue complaint, absent settlement, alleging that
the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining unlawfully overbroad rules. The

32 See, e.g., Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty, 361 NLRB at 971, 1006;
H.W. Barss Co., 296 NLRB 1286, 1287 (1989).

33 Allied Mechanical Services, 357 NLRB 1223, 1234 (2011), enforcement denied, 734
F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2013).
alleging that
the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining unlawfully overbroad rules. The

32 See, e.g., Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty, 361 NLRB at 971, 1006;
H.W. Barss Co., 296 NLRB 1286, 1287 (1989).

33 Allied Mechanical Services, 357 NLRB 1223, 1234 (2011), enforcement denied, 734
F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2013).
(b) (6), (b) (7)

Cases 27-CA-203915, et al.

- 13 -
Region should dismiss, absent withdrawal, the allegations regarding the Employer’s
discharge of Charging Party 2 and the Employer’s state court lawsuit.

/s/
J.L.S.

ADV.27-CA-203915.Response.CoPSS

(b) (6), (b) (7)(

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- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-182019 (Epiq Document Review) Epiq Document Review (02-CA-182019)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-182019.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-183801 (The Trump Corp.) The Trump Corp. (02-CA-183801)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-183801.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-199415 (Trade Off, LLC) Trade Off, LLC (02-CA-199415)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-199415.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-204176 (Libra Services) Libra Services (02-CA-204176)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-204176.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-231984 (Nusr-Et Steakhouse) Nusr-Et Steakhouse (02-CA-231984)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-231984.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CA-262630 (Fox Television Stations) Fox Television Stations (02-CA-262630)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CA-262630.md)
- [NLRB Division of Advice Memorandum, Case No. 02-CB-184756 (Electrical Workers Local 3 (Time Warner Cable New York)) Electrical Workers Local 3 (Time Warner Cable New York) (02-CB-184756)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_02-CB-184756.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/NLRB_ADVICE_27-CA-203915. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.