# 91 FR 61074: Implementing the Safe Explosives Act

> Federal · Regulations · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2026-19693

## Section

- **Citation:** 91 FR 61074
- **Heading:** Implementing the Safe Explosives Act
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Regulations
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** September 30, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Federal Register / Vol. 91 / 91 FR 61074

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 27 CFR Part 555 [ATF No. 2002R-341F] RIN 1140-AA00 and 1140-AA20 Implementing the Safe Explosives Act AGENCY:
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Department of Justice.

ACTION:
Final rule.

SUMMARY:
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) is finalizing two Department of Justice (“Department”) interim final rules (“IFRs”) implementing the Safe Explosives Act. This rule formally ends those rules' interim status, responds to public comments from 2003 on the IFRs, rescinds ATF Ruling 2003-5 issued in response to IFR comments, and makes certain revisions to IFR provisions in response to the comments. They clarify when federal licensees/permittees must report changes in responsible persons and authorized employees; eliminate verifying identity of persons accepting delivery on behalf of distributees; and amend regulatory exemption language governing aspects of transporting explosive materials.

DATES:
This rule is effective October 26, 2026.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Office of Regulatory Affairs, by email at ORA@atf.gov, by mail at Office of Regulatory Affairs; Enforcement Programs and Services, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Department of Justice; 99 New York Avenue NE; Washington, DC 20226; or by telephone at (202) 648-7070.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary II. Background III. Analysis of Comments and Decisions for Interim Rule IFR 1 A. Reporting Changes in Responsible Persons and Employees Authorized To Possess Explosive Materials B. eZ-Check System C. Relief From Disabilities D. Limited Permittee Transaction Report, ATF Form 5400.4 E. Explosives Employee Possessor Questionnaire, ATF Form 5400.28 F. Rocket Motors G. Warrantless Inspections H. Transportation Issues I. Safe Storage and Retaining Records J. License/Permit Requirements for Treatment, Storage, Disposal Facilities K. Possessing Explosives Prior to Completing a Background Check L. Meaning of “Possess” M. Safely Handling Explosives and Record-Keeping Manual N. Errors in Regulatory Text O. IFR Costs and Benefits Section P. IFR Paperwork Reduction Act Section IV. Analysis of Comments and Decisions for Interim Final Rule (IFR) 2 A. Obligations To Verify Persons Accepting Explosives Delivery and ATF Ruling 2003-5 B. “Private” Carriers and Common/Contract Carriers C. Carriers of Non-Placarded Loads D. Request To Use Company Identification Card V. Final Rule A. Amendment to § 555.57 B. Amendment to §§ 555.103 and 555.105 C. Technical Amendments D. Guidance Documents Affected by This Final Rule VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
The Safe Explosives Act (“SEA”), Title XI, Subtitle C of Public Law 107-296, of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (November 25, 2002) (“HSA”), amended the federal explosives laws in 18 U.S.C. chapter 40 to, among other things: (1) include a federal licensing/permitting requirement for all explosive materials purchased or received on or after May 24, 2003; (2) create additional categories of persons prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing explosive materials; and (3) create a new “limited permit” for certain types of explosives purchasers.
On March 20, 2003, ATF published an interim final rule in the Federal Register implementing the SEA, Implementation of the Safe Explosives Act, Title XI, Subtitle C of Public Law 107-296, 68 FR 13768 (Mar. 20, 2003) (“IFR 1”). On September 11, 2003, ATF published another interim final rule in the Federal Register , Implementation of the Safe Explosives Act, Title XI, Subtitle C of Public Law 107-296—Delivery of Explosive Materials by Common or Contract Carrier, 68 FR 53509 (Sep. 11, 2003) (“IFR 2”), which removed the requirement set forth in IFR 1 that all common/contract carriers making deliveries on or after May 24, 2003, complete ATF Form 5400.8, Explosives Delivery Record (“Form 5400.8”), prior to taking possession of explosive materials for delivery to a federal explosives licensee/permittee. This final rule adopts the regulations set forth in both interim final rules (collectively, “IFRs”) with minor technical amendments for purposes of clarity and some modifications in response to comments received.
B. Summary of the Major Provisions of This Rule
The SEA and its implementing regulations created important benefits to public security and safety. Prior to the SEA, ATF performed background checks on licensee/permittee responsible persons (“RPs”), but not on other employees who were authorized to possess explosive materials in the course of their employment. The SEA introduced a requirement that ATF also perform background checks on employees authorized to possess explosive materials to ensure that these employees are not prohibited by law from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing explosive materials. 1 This requirement was added to enable ATF to prevent a prohibited person, who otherwise might be hired if no background check was performed, from gaining access to and possessing explosives while employed by an explosives licensee/permittee. Moreover, the required background checks were introduced to help to ensure that criminals and other prohibited persons are not permitted to obtain explosive materials for illicit use. Thus, the SEA, as implemented through the two IFRs, introduced preventative tools to increase public safety and security.
1 The Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the SEA. The Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for administering and enforcing the SEA and federal explosives laws to the Director of ATF, subject to the direction of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. 847; 28 CFR 0.130(a).
The SEA also added that all persons who wish to acquire, but not deal in, explosive materials must obtain, at minimum, a “limited permit.” Further, the SEA added a requirement that ATF inspect all licensee/permittee storage facilities. This mandate was introduced to authorize ATF to verify that explosive materials are stored in accordance with the regulations and that stored explosive materials do not pose a threat to public safety. These changes were also implemented via the two IFRs in 2003.
This final rule adopts most provisions from IFRs 1 and 2 without change. However, this final rule does modify the verification requirements that apply when explosive materials are delivered via common/contract carrier. IFR 1 required common/contract carriers to verify the identity of the person accepting delivery on behalf of the distributee, verify that the person was authorized to accept on behalf of the distributee, note the type and number of the identification document furnished by the person, and report that information to the distributor. When IFR

1 was issued, explosives and transportation industry members informed ATF that these requirements placed an undue burden on common/contract carriers, and drivers were concerned that the requirements would be overly time consuming and potentially cause them to be held personally liable if the explosives were delivered to unauthorized persons. 2
2 See ATF Ruling 2003-5 (May 23, 2003), Distribution of Explosives to Limited Permittees, https://www.atf.gov/media/19706/download [ https://perma.cc/3RCR-SDKR ].
ATF acknowledged these concerns in two subsequent documents, issuing ATF Ruling 2003-5 in May 2003 and IFR 2 in September 2003. Pursuant to 27 CFR 555.22, which allows ATF to approve alternative procedures or variations from requirements, Ruling 2003-5 created a variance from the IFR 1 requirement to verify the identity of the person accepting explosive materials on behalf of a limited permittee. The ruling authorizes a variance from the requirements of § 555.105(b)(6)(iii) for federal explosives licensees/permittees distributing explosive materials to limited permittees via common/contract carrier. As an alternative method or procedure, such distributors may verify receipt of the explosive materials by telephone, facsimile, email, or other means within three business days after shipping the materials, in lieu of requiring the common/contract carrier to verify the identity of the individual accepting delivery of the explosives. In such cases, the distributor must note on ATF Form 5400.4, Limited Permittee Transaction Report (“Form 5400.4”), when delivery occurred and when they contacted the distributee. The ruling, however, did not remove the regulatory requirement from § 555.105(b)(6)(iii) and did not address the identity verification requirements for common/contract carriers when delivering to licensees/user permittees. IFR 2 removed the requirement from § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) that common/contract carriers must verify the identity of persons accepting on the licensee/user permittee distributee's behalf but also did not remove the requirement from § 555.105(b)(6)(iii).
The remaining requirements that the recipient's identity be verified by the common/contract carrier or the distributor when such carriers delivered to a limited permittee remained a concern for industry. Industry members raised burden issues and expressed concern about reconciling the ruling and the regulatory provision, as well as concerns about the different requirements for different distributees, in public comments ATF received on both IFRs 1 and 2. Having considered the concerns expressed in the comments, ATF is issuing this final rule to remove the remaining IFR 1 verification and reporting requirement for common/contract carriers and to rescind ATF Ruling 2003-05 and its variance.
II. Background
Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (“OCCA”), Public Law 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), added chapter 40 (Importation, Manufacture, Distribution, and Storage of Explosive Materials) to title 18 of the U.S. Code. 3 This act established the foundational federal framework for regulating manufacturing, distributing, and storing explosive materials. One of title XI's stated purposes was to reduce the “hazard to persons and property arising from misuse and unsafe or insecure storage of explosive materials.” Public Law 91-452, sec. 1101, 84 Stat. at 952. The Attorney General is responsible for implementing title XI. See 18 U.S.C. 847. Congress and the Attorney General have delegated that responsibility to the Director of ATF (“Director”), subject to the direction of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. 4 See 28 U.S.C. 599A(b)(1), (c)(1); 28 CFR 0.130(a)(1)-(2); Treas. Order No. 221(2)(a), (d), 37 FR 11696-97 (June 10, 1972). Accordingly, ATF has promulgated regulations implementing title XI in 27 CFR part 555.
3 Some provisions of 18 U.S.C. chapter 40 still refer to the “Secretary of the Treasury.” However, the HSA transferred the functions of ATF from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice, under the general authority of the Attorney General. 26 U.S.C. 7801(a)(2)(A); 28 U.S.C. 599A(c)(1). Thus, for ease of reference, this rule refers to the Attorney General where relevant.
4 In Attorney General Order Number 6353-2025, the Attorney General has delegated authority to the Director to issue regulations pertaining to matters within ATF's jurisdiction, including under OCCA, the National Firearms Act, and the Gun Control Act. ATF's jurisdiction also includes the Arms Export Control Act and the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act.
The Safe Explosives Act (“SEA”), Title XI, Subtitle C of Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2280, of the HSA (November 25, 2002), amended the federal explosives laws in 18 U.S.C. chapter 40 to, among other things, (1) include a federal licensing/permitting requirement for purchasing and receiving explosive materials on or after May 24, 2003; (2) create additional categories of persons prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing explosive materials; and (3) create a new “limited permit” for certain types of explosives purchasers. In general, the provisions of the HSA became effective 60 days after the date enacted, on January 24, 2003.
A. Provisions of SEA Effective January 24, 2003
Pursuant to section 4 of the HSA, the following provisions of the SEA became effective on January 24, 2003, the general effective date provision for the entire HSA:
• Adding three categories of persons (citizen renunciants, aliens with certain exceptions, and persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces) who may not lawfully ship, transport, receive, or possess explosive materials (HSA sec. 1123(a), (b));
• Specifying that it violates the law if a prohibited person ships or transports explosives or materials for explosives, or receives or possesses explosives or materials for explosives that have been shipped or transported, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce (HSA sec. 1123(b)(3));
• Providing ATF with the authority to require licensed manufacturers, licensed importers, and persons who manufacture or import explosive materials or ammonium nitrate to provide ATF with samples, information on chemical composition, and other information relevant to identifying the product (HSA sec. 1124);
• Adding to the types of property which it is a crime to maliciously damage or destroy, or attempt to do the same, particularly when tied to explosives, property owned, possessed by, or leased to any institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance (HSA sec. 1125);
• Expanding ATF's authority to grant relief from disabilities to all categories of prohibited persons if the applicant is found not to be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that such relief is not contrary to the public interest (HSA sec. 1126); and
• Adding a new theft-reporting violation, providing felony penalties for a licensee/permittee who fails to report a theft of explosives within 24 hours of discovery (HSA sec. 1127).
B. Provisions of SEA Effective May 24, 2003
Pursuant to section 1122(i)(1) of the HSA, the following provisions of the SEA became effective on May 24, 2003, 180 days after the date the HSA was enacted:
• Requiring each person receiving explosives to obtain a federal license/permit (HSA sec. 1122(b));
• Creating a new type of permit, the “limited permit” (HSA sec. 1122(c)(1)(A));
• Providing that only licensees and holders of user permits must post their licenses and permits and make them available for inspection (HSA sec. 1122(g));
• Requiring applicants to include specified identifying information for employees authorized to possess explosive materials, as well as fingerprints and photographs of “responsible persons,” in applications for licenses and permits (HSA sec. 1122(c)(1)(B));
• Requiring ATF to conduct background checks on responsible persons and employees authorized to possess explosive materials (HSA sec. 1122(h));
• Extending the time for ATF to act on an application for a license/permit from 45 days to 90 days (HSA sec. 1122(e)); and
• Authorizing warrantless inspections of explosives storage for applicants of limited permits and holders of limited permits (HSA sec. 1122(f)).
C. Interim Rules
On March 20, 2003, ATF published IFR 1, implementing the SEA. 68 FR 13768. The IFR 1 comment period ran through June 18, 2003. On September 11, 2003, ATF published IFR 2, which removed the requirement from IFR 1 that common/contract carriers complete Form 5400.8 prior to taking possession of explosive materials for delivery to a licensee/user permittee, regardless of whether the carrier was hired by the distributor or distributee. 68 FR 53509. ATF believed that this requirement was unduly burdensome and unnecessary due to Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) regulations that became effective after IFR 1 was published. 5
5 See Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Hazardous Materials Transportation Security, 68 FR 23832 (May 5, 2003) (DOT interim final rule); Limitations on the Issuance of Commercial Driver's Licenses with a Hazardous Materials Endorsement, 68 FR 23844 (May 5, 2003) (DOT interim final rule); Security Threat Assessment for Individuals Applying for a Hazardous Materials Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers License, 68 FR 23852 (May 5, 2003) (DHS interim final rule).
Once the DOT and TSA rules were published, certain employees of motor, water, air, and rail carriers were no longer subject to 18 U.S.C. 842(i) while commercially transporting explosives. Rather, these employees became subject to DOT and TSA security threat assessment standards. To evaluate relevant security threat assessments, DOT and TSA began to collect specific information to ensure that employees of common/contract carriers transporting explosives do not pose a security threat. Thus, ATF determined that there was a significantly diminished need to collect similar information via Form 5400.8 to ensure that explosives were not handed to prohibited persons for possible diversion to criminal or terrorist use. However, ATF continued to require that distributors verify the identity of persons accepting explosive materials on behalf of the common/contract carriers and required distributors to record the name of the common/contract carrier and the full name of the driver in their permanent records. The comment period for IFR 2 closed on October 14, 2003.
III. Analysis of Comments and Decisions for IFR 1
In response to IFR 1, ATF received 20 comments. Comments were submitted by explosives industry members; mining, ski, and transportation associations; model hobby rocket enthusiasts; and individuals. Most commenters expressed specific concerns regarding the interim regulations, which are addressed below.
A. Reporting Changes in Responsible Persons and Employees Authorized To Possess Explosive Materials
Effective May 24, 2003, the SEA required ATF to conduct background checks on RPs and employees authorized to possess explosive materials, upon request by a licensee/permittee. The regulations at 27 CFR 555.57(b) therefore specify that all persons who have been issued licenses/permits since May 24, 2003, “must report to the Chief, Federal Explosives Licensing Center, any change in responsible persons or employees authorized to possess explosive materials.”
Comments Received
Three commenters expressed concerns regarding the phrase “any change.” An explosives industry technical association stated that the reporting requirement should apply only when a new RP or “possessor employee” is added.
Another commenter, a trade association for ski resorts, asked whether the reporting requirement applies to both additions and deletions to a permittee's list of authorized employees. The commenter requested that deletions be limited to employees not eligible for rehire so that employers would not have to delete and then re-add the same seasonal employees that return year after year.
Similar concerns were raised by an explosives industry representative organization. This commenter contended that the phrase “any change” was very broad and could be interpreted to mean retirement, resignation, dismissal, reassignment, or promotion. The commenter believed that ATF intended the reporting requirement to apply only when a new RP or employee, not previously reported to ATF, is authorized to possess explosive materials, and suggested that the regulation be amended to reflect this.
ATF Response
ATF acknowledges commenters' concerns about IFR 1's reporting requirements for changes in RPs and employees authorized to possess explosive materials. ATF recognizes that the commenters may be interpreting “any change” to mean they must report only new RPs and employees authorized to possess explosive materials because § 555.57(b) does not specify the method for reporting other changes in employment. However, there is a public safety risk and potential harm to the licensee/permittee of not reporting RPs or employees who are no longer authorized by the licensee/permittee. Former RPs have, in some such cases, removed all other persons from the licensee/permittee or put the licensee/permittee out of business, and formerly authorized employees, in some such cases, have acquired explosives in the name of the licensee/permittee, also causing them to incur charges for such purchases. Due to the risks that former RPs or former employees authorized to possess explosive materials could pose if not reported to ATF and removed from authorized actions, ATF intended that the regulations at § 555.57(b) require a licensee/permittee to report to ATF (1) new RPs or employees authorized to possess explosive materials, (2) RPs that cease to be employed by, or otherwise vacate their positions as RPs with, the licensee/permittee, and (3) any employee authorized to possess explosive materials that leaves or otherwise ceases to be an employee of, or ceases to need to possess explosives as part of their employment with, the licensee/permittee.
Accordingly, this final rule amends § 555.57(b) to clarify that the licensee/permittee must report each new and each removed RP to the Chief, Federal Explosives Licensing Center (“FELC”), 6 within 30 days of adding or removing the RP. The licensee/permittee must report each new RP by submitting ATF

Form 5400.13A/5400.16 (now changing to Form 5400.27), Explosives Responsible Person Questionnaire (“Form 5400.13A/5400.16”), but may just notify ATF in writing when they remove an RP. This final rule also amends § 555.57(c) to clarify that the licensee/permittee must report each new and each removed employee authorized to possess explosive materials to the Chief, FELC, within 30 days of adding or removing the employee or the employee's authorization to possess explosive materials for that licensee/permittee. The licensee/permittee must report each new employee authorized to possess explosive materials by submitting ATF Form 5400.28, Explosives Employee Possessor Questionnaire (“Form 5400.28”), but may just notify ATF in writing when the licensee/permittee wants to remove an employee. Finally, the rule amends § 555.57(d) to clarify that new RPs and employees authorized to possess explosive materials may possess explosive materials as part of their job duties from the time they are hired, as long as the licensee/permittee submits the required form to add them, along with all accompanying items, as required by the regulations, and unless or until the Chief, FELC, notifies the licensee/permittee that the individual is prohibited from doing so.
6 On August 11, 2014, ATF issued a final rule titled “Technical Amendments to Regulations,” which, among other things, updated this position title in § 555.57 and wherever it appeared in 27 CFR part 555. 79 FR 46690.
B. eZ-Check System
The SEA mandates that each person who wishes to acquire explosives, whether in interstate or intrastate commerce, obtain a federal explosives license/permit. In general, the interim regulations at § 555.103(b)(1)(ii) provide that a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer selling or otherwise distributing explosive materials must verify the license/permit status of the distributee prior to releasing the explosive materials to them. Section 555.103(b)(2)(i) requires that, prior to or with the first order of explosive materials, the distributee must provide the distributor with a certified copy of the distributee's license/permit.
With respect to firearms, ATF has established a system that federal firearms licensees (“FFLs”) may voluntarily use to verify the validity of a license held by another FFL. This system, the FFL eZ-Check system, is accessed via ATF's website. The eZ-Check system is popular with FFLs and is an efficient method of verifying license status. ATF believed a similar system would be useful for verifying the explosives license/permit status of persons ordering explosives. Accordingly, in IFR 1 ATF requested comments on the feasibility and utility of such a system and whether it should be used in conjunction with the procedures set forth in the regulations.
Comments Received
Two commenters addressed this subject and endorsed establishing an eZ-Check-type system for explosives licenses/permits.
ATF Response
Although this rule does not establish or mandate the use of such a system, ATF separately agreed with the commenters and developed a federal explosives licensee/permittee eZ-Check system. Since 2017, ATF has made available to federal explosives licensees/permittees an eZ-Check system on its website. Although creating the eZ-Check system was responsive to the comments on this topic, it did not affect the regulations. As a result, ATF is not making any changes in this final rule in response to these comments.
C. Relief From Disabilities
Prior to the SEA, federal law authorized ATF to grant relief from prohibitions that disable a person from distributing, receiving, possessing, and shipping or transporting explosives. However, this authority applied only to prohibited persons disabled because they were under indictment for or convicted of a felony. The SEA amended 18 U.S.C. 845(b), expanding ATF's authority to grant relief from disabilities to all categories of prohibited persons if ATF finds that the applicant is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that granting such relief is not contrary to the public interest. The Attorney General delegated this authority to the Director, and IFR 1 implemented this provision of the law in 27 CFR 555.142.
Section 555.142 also specifies categories of persons to whom the Director generally will not grant relief unless there are extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need, where granting such relief is consistent with the public interest. Such categories of persons generally presumed ineligible for relief include persons who have not been discharged from parole or probation for at least two years, fugitives from justice, prohibited aliens, persons who are unlawful users of or addicted to any controlled substances, persons adjudicated as “mental defective” or committed to a mental institution (with certain exceptions), and persons prohibited by the law of the state where the person resides from receiving or possessing explosive materials. Section 555.142 also provides that the Director may grant relief to aliens who have been lawfully admitted to the United States or to persons who have not been discharged from parole or probation for a period of at least two years if the Director determines that the applicant has a compelling need to possess explosives, such as for purposes of employment.
Comments Received
Four commenters expressed concerns regarding the provisions of § 555.142. One commenter argued that there is a group of individuals for whom granting relief from disability is in the public interest, for whom there is a compelling need to possess explosives, and for whom special processing of relief from disability applications is warranted. The commenter stated that each year, ski resorts employ citizens of Australia, New Zealand, France, and Canada to work in the U.S. as ski patrollers. According to the commenter, many of these employees are highly skilled and experienced avalanche-control workers who return to the same resorts in the U.S. year after year to work specifically in avalanche control.
The commenter contended that the expertise and skill these international employees provide to the ski industry and the resulting benefit to public safety warrant them having relief from disability. The commenter requested that ATF allow these employees to apply for relief from disability before they arrive in the U.S. for the season, with some provision that approving their seasonal visa would act as the final step in their clearance to possess explosives at resorts and to work in avalanche control. In addition, the commenter stated that once such employees are granted relief from disability, they should not be required to reapply for relief for subsequent ski seasons or, alternatively, they should have to reapply for relief from disability only every three to five years. The commenter added that if its suggested revisions to the regulation do not appear workable, an expedited relief from disability process should be established to accommodate these employees.
Another commenter, a professor who works in the mining engineering arena, expressed similar concerns. The commenter stated that the commenter's university has developed an international reputation for explosives engineering and has had many foreign students and scholars visit its department over the past 20 years. According to the commenter, several students have only student visas and, in light of the SEA, are unable to take any “hands-on” explosives classes or do research in explosives. The commenter

noted that some students had applied for relief from disabilities in accordance with the regulations, but that the application process is very lengthy. Accordingly, the commenter recommended “a relief process that only takes a couple of weeks” or “a guided step-by-step process given on the web with an example so that applicants have something to go by.”
Except as provided in § 555.142(c)(3), the regulations specify that the Director will not grant relief if the applicant is prohibited by the law of the state where the applicant resides from receiving or possessing explosive materials. A third commenter argued that because Congress has granted DOT authority to preempt state and local requirements as to transporting hazardous materials, the requirement that the Director not grant relief if there is conflict with state law should apply only in very limited circumstances. A fourth commenter expressed similar concerns and stated that the requirement should apply only to aliens handling explosives incidental to, and in connection with, the commercial export of explosives by rail or truck to Canada from the U.S.
ATF Response
ATF disagrees that the regulations need to be revised as suggested. As described above, the Director may grant relief to an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the U.S. if the Director determines that (1) the alien is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, (2) granting such relief is not contrary to the public interest, and (3) the alien has a compelling need to possess explosives, such as for employment. To receive relief, the alien must submit ATF Form 5400.29 (now 5400.31), Application for Restoration of Explosives Privileges (now Request for Relief from Explosives Disability) (“Form 5400.29”), and include certain additional documentation.
The SEA does not require that relief applications be submitted from a location within the U.S. Therefore, an alien who has been lawfully authorized to enter the U.S. may submit the alien's relief application from a location outside the U.S. before arriving in the U.S. However, in submitting a relief application, whether from a location within or outside the U.S., the alien must be able to show that they have been lawfully admitted to the U.S. ( See § 555.142(f)(1)(ix)). 7 In addition, the alien must provide certification that they are legally authorized to work in the U.S., or other purposes for which they are required to possess explosives; certification from an appropriate law enforcement agency in the applicant's country of citizenship stating that the applicant does not have a criminal record; and, if applicable, certification from a federal explosives licensee/permittee or other employer (including a university or college) stating that the applicant is employed by the employer and must possess explosive materials for purposes of employment.
7 Although an alien may begin the application process to request a relief from disability while still outside the United States, they cannot receive the relief until they have been lawfully admitted. Certain steps of ATF's assessment process must also occur after the alien has been admitted to the United States.
The regulation at § 555.142(d) states that any person who has been granted relief is relieved of all disabilities disclosed on the application for relief. This paragraph further states that the relief from disabilities granted to aliens will be effective only so long as the aliens retain their lawful immigration status. Therefore, provided that aliens have not failed to disclose any prohibitive disabilities in their initial relief applications, do not incur any new disabilities, and retain lawful immigration status on each subsequent or intermittent return to the U.S., the aliens would not be required to reapply for relief.
In response to commenters requesting an expedited process or step-by-step instructions, ATF has detailed instructions in Form 5400.29 (now 5400.31) that identify additional documents that aliens must include with their applications. Further, ATF also provides detailed information on completing a relief application on its website. 8 While considering and reviewing each application, ATF relies not only on the information provided with the application, but also on information provided by other sources to verify that the information received with the application is accurate. Processing delays often occur as a result of an incomplete or improperly completed relief application package; ATF's inability to contact, locate, or schedule in-person interviews with persons identified within the relief application; and delays in responses from other federal, state, or foreign government law enforcement agencies. Public safety requires that ATF obtain information from other agencies and through personal interviews; any expedited processes or shortened timelines could negatively affect ATF's ability to obtain vital information. Despite these requirements, ATF attempts to process relief applications as quickly as possible, and in less than the 120 days that applicants are told to expect. Therefore, ATF declines to adopt the commenter's suggestion to develop an expedited relief process for foreign visitors studying at academic institutions. However, due to some confusion expressed about when aliens may begin the relief request process, ATF is amending § 555.142(f)(1)(ix) to clarify that aliens can begin the request process before they enter the U.S., although it cannot be completed until they have been lawfully admitted.
8 See ATF, Apply for Relief from Federal Explosives Disabilities (Mar. 13, 2025), https://www.atf.gov/explosives/tools-services-explosives-industry/current-licensees/apply-relief-federal-explosives-disabilities [ https://perma.cc/P26U-HC48 ].
The other commenters suggested that ATF, when evaluating relief from explosives disability applications, should disregard state prohibitions as they relate to persons transporting explosive materials within the U.S. and under the regulation of DOT. The commenters refer to a specific example where DOT was authorized to exempt specific state transportation laws that regulate the transportation of hazardous materials. Federal law, at 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1), exempts from ATF regulation any aspect of transporting explosive materials via railroad, water, highway, or air that pertain to safety, including security, and that are regulated by DOT or the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). In other words, if DOT or DHS have issued regulations on safety or security aspects of transporting explosive materials by those means, ATF will not also issue regulations on that topic. Following the publication of IFR 1, DOT and DHS published regulations generally exempting persons from the application of 18 U.S.C. 842(i) while they are commercially transporting explosives. 9
9 See footnote 5, supra.
ATF believes the provision at 27 CFR 555.142(c)(2)(vi), which generally prohibits granting relief if the person is prohibited by the law of the state where the person resides from receiving or possessing explosive materials, is an effective and appropriate interpretation of the “public interest” standard of 18 U.S.C. 845(b)(2). It is not in the public interest to expend federal resources to investigate and act on a relief application if the applicant is barred from possessing explosives in his or her state of residence. In addition, ATF believes it is appropriate to recognize the state's interest in determining the categories of persons who may lawfully possess explosives while residing within that state. ATF declines to second-guess state officials by

conducting investigations of individuals who have categorically been prohibited from receiving and possessing explosives under state law.
ATF also believes the contentions of these commenters relating to DOT preemption of state law are not relevant to relief from disability applications. To the extent that prohibited persons receive or possess explosives during aspects of transporting them that are regulated by DOT and relate to safety and security, the preemption provisions of 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1) would apply, and such possession in these circumstances would not be prohibited under this chapter. Because it is not relevant if a person transporting explosives during aspects covered by DOT regulations is prohibited from possessing explosives, the person does not need relief from ATF to possess explosives while under the DOT regulations. As a result, ATF neither disregards nor considers state prohibitions as they relate to persons transporting explosive materials within the U.S. under DOT's regulation.
For these reasons, ATF declines to adopt these commenters' recommendations relating to relief applicants and state law disabilities.
D. Limited Permittee Transaction Report, ATF Form 5400.4
Prior to the SEA, intrastate purchasers of explosives could acquire explosives without a federal license/permit but needed to complete ATF Form 5400.4, Explosives Transaction Record (“Form 5400.4”). The form required the intrastate purchaser to certify that the purchaser was not a prohibited person. Effective May 24, 2003, ATF revised the Explosives Transaction Record form and retitled it as Limited Permittee Transaction Report. Limited permittees complete the form when purchasing explosive materials from licensees/permittees within their state of residence. Among other things, the form requires that the limited permittee provide information regarding their intended use of the explosive materials. ATF stated in IFR 1 that the form also provides an option for the distributor to document information concerning the manufacturer's or importer's identification marks and the size of the explosives to be distributed. In addition, ATF solicited comments as to whether this optional information should be mandatory.
Comments Received
Three commenters expressed concerns with respect to Form 5400.4. One contended that ATF's use of the same form number, Form 5400.4, for two different information collections was confusing and that ATF should have issued a new information collection utilizing a new form number. Specifically, the commenter stated, “Over the last 30 years, the explosives industry has become very familiar with the present Form 5400.4, completing the form almost 23,000 times annually.” The commenter added that the new Form 5400.4 would be “completed by a different population of explosive users, have different content, and have different subsequent procedures than the present form.”
With respect to the revised Form 5400.4, the commenter acknowledged that recording identification marks could be helpful to law enforcement officials in tracing explosives. However, the commenter recommended against a requirement to identify the size of explosives. According to the commenter, ATF could look up the identification marks in the inventory records, taking only a few minutes, while it would take the regulated community hours to record the same information on the form.
Another commenter recommended that the option for the distributor to document information concerning identification marks and explosives size be removed from the form or, as an alternative, clearly highlighted as not being required by law. According to the commenter, IFR 1 did not show how this information would benefit ATF nor did it provide data or information on why the optional information was added to the form.
A third commenter expressed concern regarding the availability of the revised Form 5400.4. This commenter stated that the form was not available until shortly before the time designated for compliance. Although the form could be obtained by downloading copies from ATF's website, the commenter argued that a large number of explosives distributors were located in areas where they might not have access to the internet. Accordingly, the commenter stated that ATF should allow licensees additional time to comply with use of the form. Similar concerns were raised by another commenter.
ATF Response
ATF declines to assign a different form number to the Limited Permittee Transaction Report. Over the 20-plus years since the interim rules were issued, ATF has seen no evidence that using the old explosives transaction form number for the new Limited Permittee Transaction Report has caused confusion among industry members, nor have there been any enforcement problems associated with the use of the form number.
ATF agrees that ATF can readily locate information regarding the size of the explosives listed on Form 5400.4 in other required explosives records at the premises. Therefore, entry of this information on the form will remain optional. ATF also agrees with the suggestion that the form should clearly note that this information is optional. As a result, Form 5400.4 was revised in 2003 to prominently include the term “optional” next to the “size” column heading on the form.
ATF recognizes that the revised Form 5400.4 was not made available to the public until immediately prior to the effective date of the applicable SEA provisions. This was primarily due to the short time frame to implement the SEA. The new forms were made available as soon as possible, and ATF took steps to inform the industry of new or revised requirements that affected their conduct of business. 10
10 See ATF Explosives Industry Newsletter (May 2003), https://www.atf.gov/media/28951/download [ https://perma.cc/PY78-9YTW ], and ATF Explosives Industry Newsletter (December 2003), https://www.atf.gov/media/29071/download [ https://perma.cc/988D-WNY6 ].
Regarding the topic of entering the identification marks on the Limited Permittee Transaction Report, ATF has determined that it will remain optional to complete this section of the form because ATF can readily locate information regarding the identification marks listed on the report in other required explosives records at the premises. Form 5400.4 was revised to show that this information is optional.
E. Employee Possessor Questionnaire, ATF Form 5400.28
The interim regulations at 27 CFR 555.45 specified that license/permit applications postmarked on or after March 20, 2003, must be accompanied by Form 5400.28. Prior to May 24, 2003, responsible persons, i.e., applicants and others who had the authority to direct the policies of the applicant with respect to explosive materials, were required to answer on this form whether they fell within any of the categories of persons prohibited from possessing explosive materials. The interim regulations also provided that on and after May 24, 2003, Form 5400.28 (which was retitled in 2003 as the Employee Possessor Questionnaire and has since been retitled in 2021 as the Explosives Employee Possessor Questionnaire), must be completed by each individual who will possess explosive materials in the course of his or her employment. Employees

completing the Form 5400.28 must provide appropriate identifying information, including residence address and name of employer, and must declare whether they fall within any of the categories of persons prohibited from possessing explosive materials. Beginning from that same time in 2003, RPs no longer completed Form 5400.28 because the identifying information for RPs was collected on ATF Form 5400.13/5400.16 (now changing to Form 5400.13), Application for an Explosives License/Permit (“Form 5400.13/5400.16”). In 2023, ATF received approval from the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to collect the identifying information for RPs on Form 5400.13A/5400.16 (now Form 5400.27) and no longer collects this information on Form 5400.13/5400.16 (now Form 5400.13).
Comments Received
Two commenters expressed concerns regarding Form 5400.28. One commenter contended that using the same form number for a completely different information collection was confusing and that ATF should have used a different form number for the Employee Possessor Questionnaire. The commenter also argued that the new Form 5400.28 is not necessary for ATF's performance of its duties. According to the commenter, “The FEL [federal explosives law] entitles ATF to obtain `the names of and appropriate identifying information regarding all employees who will be authorized by the applicant to possess explosive materials [18 U.S.C. 843(a)]' from a license or permit applicant.” The commenter added that the FEL does not give ATF explicit authority to obtain the extensive information required by the new Form 5400.28.
The second commenter expressed similar concerns, stating that “ATF should only ask for the minimum identifying information necessary in order to properly conduct the background check to determine qualification.” The other commenter also claimed that approximately one half of the information required on the form was unnecessary for ATF to perform its duties and recommended that ATF obtain only the names and appropriate identifying information of employees authorized to possess explosive materials, and do so through the license/permit application form instead.
ATF Response
ATF does not believe that using an existing form number for the Explosives Employee Possessor Questionnaire, Form 5400.28, has caused confusion or hindered proper execution of the form. Form 5400.28 has been in use since May 2003, and ATF has not been apprised of any logistic or administrative problems as a result of retaining the number Form 5400.28 for this form. Therefore, ATF is not adopting the suggestion that ATF change the form number.
Additionally, ATF does not agree with the commenters' assertion that Form 5400.28 seeks to collect more than the minimum identifying information necessary to efficiently and appropriately carry out ATF's statutory mandate to conduct background checks on employees authorized to possess explosive materials. The commenters did not provide any specifics on the identifying information in the Form 5400.28 fields that they believe is unnecessary. The SEA amended several provisions of the federal explosives laws, and Form 5400.28 is directly related to implementing these provisions. For example, the SEA (1) added in 18 U.S.C. 842(i) new categories of persons prohibited from receiving or possessing explosive materials; (2) required in section 843(a) that all applicants for a license/permit submit the names of, and appropriate identifying information regarding, all employees who will be authorized by the applicant to possess explosive materials; and (3) required in section 843(h)(1) that ATF determine if any RP or employee authorized to possess explosive materials is a prohibited person under section 842(i). Further, 18 U.S.C. 847 authorizes the Attorney General to issue rules and regulations she deems reasonably necessary to implement the law.
ATF uses Form 5400.28 to assist in background checks and the application process. Some of the requested information is applicable to specific prohibiting factors, such as the U.S.-issued alien registration number if an employee is not a U.S. citizen. ATF requires this and other requested information to address the broad range of circumstances that may be encountered when conducting background checks. A thorough and accurate background check ensures public safety and security by keeping explosives out of the hands of felons and other prohibited persons. In addition, obtaining thorough information results in quicker background checks so employers can be assured they are not placing explosives in the hands of prohibited persons.
With regard to the commenter's statement that certain information could be obtained from the license/permit application rather than through Form 5400.28, ATF does not agree. Form 5400.28 is the only document where this information is requested from an employee being authorized to possess explosive material. Although ATF asks for similar information for RPs, that reporting pertains only to RPs, not employees. Accordingly, ATF does not believe that Form 5400.28 is duplicative, and this final rule does not adopt the commenters' recommendation.
F. Rocket Motors
The SEA requires that all persons receiving explosives on or after May 24, 2003, obtain a federal explosives license/permit. In addition, even before the SEA, licensees/permittees were required to comply with the provisions of part 555 including, among other things, storage and other safety requirements, as well as record-keeping and theft-reporting. In the past, ATF took the position that these requirements of the SEA and part 555 applied to ammonium perchlorate composite propellant (“APCP”), including when APCP is used as a component of a rocket motor. (A rocket motor consists essentially of APCP, black powder, or other low explosives encased by a cardboard, plastic, or metallic cylinder.)
On March 16, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated ATF's classification of APCP as an explosive as defined under 18 U.S.C. 841(d). Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n, Inc. v. ATF, No. 00-0273, 2009 WL 10737191 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2009). On July 17, 2009, ATF issued an open letter to all federal explosives licensees/permittees informing them that rocket motors that contain only APCP are no longer regulated under the federal explosives laws; that no one is required to obtain a federal explosives license/permit to manufacture, import, purchase, distribute, transport, or receive APCP; and that these types of rocket motors are not subject to regulatory requirement under 27 CFR part 555.
1. Rocket Motors and Rocket Propellants Are Not Explosives
Comments Received
Five commenters argued that rocket motors and rocket propellants (including APCP) are not explosives and should not be regulated by ATF. One of the commenters stated, “[e]xtensive testing by [the National Association of Rocketry Standards and Testing Committee] of ammonium perchlorate involving irradiation by radio waves, high temperatures (>100 °C), physical shock, static discharge (several

thousand volts), and unconfined burning has not revealed any explosive-like properties. Furthermore, the burn rate for ammonium perchlorate is well below that considered to be deflagration.”
ATF Response
The definition of explosive materials as it pertains to APCP and rocket motors was not affected by the enactment of the SEA. Under 18 U.S.C. 841(d), the term “explosives” is defined as “any chemical compound[,] mixture, or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion.” The definition states that the term “includes, but is not limited to, dynamite and other high explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, igniter cord, and igniters.” ATF is also required under the law to publish an annual list of items that fall within the definition of explosives. Beginning with the publication of the first “Explosives List” in 1971, ATF classified APCP as an explosive. This classification was based upon the statutory definition of “explosives,” which contemplates that items can “function by explosion” either by detonating (dynamite and other high explosives detonate) or by deflagrating (low explosives, such as black powder, pellet powder, and rocket propellants, deflagrate, or burn very quickly). Because APCP deflagrates when confined, ATF classified it as an explosive. The SEA had no impact on this definition or classification, so at the time the IFRs were published, APCP remained an explosive.
In 2006, three years after the IFRs were published, ATF addressed the subject of rocket motors in a final rule, Commerce in Explosives-Hobby Rocket Motors, 71 FR 46079 (Aug. 11, 2006) (“hobby rocket motors rule”). In this rule, ATF affirmed and reinstated into its regulations an exemption for rocket motors containing 62.5 grams or less of APCP and other explosive propellants. In 1981, ATF exempted from regulation Class C explosives, which included “common fireworks” and certain other explosives designated by DOT regulations, one of which was originally termed “toy propellant devices and toy smoke devices” that contained a “small charge” of slow-burning propellant or smoke-producing powder. DOT subsequently renamed these devices “model rocket motors.” However, between 1996 and 1998, when ATF updated its regulations to reflect various DOT revisions, it inadvertently removed the exemption language. Despite this administrative error, ATF continued to exempt sport rocket motors containing 62.5 grams or less of propellant, and in the 2006 final rule, it reinstated the exemption in 27 CFR 555.141(a)(10). The exemption is for model rocket motors that consist of APCP, black powder, or other similar low explosives, contain no more than 62.5 grams of total propellant weight, and are designed as single-use motors or as reload kits capable of reloading no more than 62.5 grams of propellant into a reusable motor casing. Id.
However, as discussed above, on March 16, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated ATF's classification of APCP as an explosive as defined under 18 U.S.C. 841(d). Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n, Inc., 2009 WL 10737191. Accordingly, APCP is no longer classified by ATF as an explosive material, and rocket motors that consist solely of APCP, irrespective of the total APCP weight contained therein, are no longer regulated by ATF.
Notwithstanding the court's decision on APCP, black powder and other low explosives used to manufacture and assemble rocket motors continue to be subject to ATF regulations. As noted above, ATF exempts single-use rocket motors or reload kits containing 62.5 grams or less of black powder or other low explosives or propellants. However, persons purchasing, storing, or engaging in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in these materials (other than APCP) remain subject to the federal explosives laws and regulations.
2. Model Rockets/Rocket Motors Containing APCP Are “Propellant-Actuated Devices” and, as Such, Are Exempt From ATF Regulation
Propellant-actuated devices manufactured, imported, or distributed for their intended purposes are exempt from explosive regulations pursuant to 27 CFR 555.141(a)(8). Prior to amendment in 2009, 11 the term “propellant-actuated device” was defined in § 555.11 as “[a]ny tool or special mechanized device or gas generator system which is actuated by a propellant or which releases and directs work through a propellant charge.” In applying that regulatory definition, ATF classified certain specific aircraft slide inflation cartridges, inflatable automobile occupant restraint systems, nail guns, and diesel and jet engine starter cartridges as propellant-actuated devices. The comments discussed below were submitted during the time this definition was still in effect. It has since been revised.
11 Commerce in Explosives—Amended Definition of “Propellant Actuated Device,” 74 FR 1878 (Jan. 14, 2009) (“2009 propellant rule”).
Comments Received
Two commenters asserted that model rocket motors met the definition of a propellant-actuated device and, as such, were exempt from ATF regulation. According to one of the commenters, the intended purpose of model rocket motors is not to function by explosion. Rather, their intended purpose is to propel a model rocket. The second commenter stated the following:
[P]ropellant actuated devices are exempted from BATFE regulation. As any first year aeronautical student can tell you, rocket motors function by the expulsion of propellant mass according to the mass equation[—]
F = −c (dm e )/(dt) They do not explode. Under these definitions, rocket motors are exempt from BATFE regulation.
ATF Response
The definition of a propellant-actuated device was not affected by the enactment of the SEA. The comments regarding rocket motors' status as a propellant-actuated device were submitted when ATF's regulations did not address rocket motors as propellant-actuated devices. The question of whether a rocket motor is a propellant-actuated device is now moot. ATF amended the definition of “propellant actuated device” in the 2009 propellant rule to exempt from the term “hobby rocket” motors consisting of APCP, black powder, or other similar low explosives, regardless of amount, and rocket-motor reload kits that can be used to assemble hobby rocket motors containing APCP, black powder, or other similar low explosives, regardless of amount.
3. Exemption of Rocket Motors Containing 62.5 Grams or Less of Propellant
Comments Received
As stated above, at the time of the interim final rule in 2003, ATF had exempted from regulation rocket motors containing 62.5 grams or less of explosive propellant, including APCP. One commenter requested that ATF continue this exemption, stating that “[a]ll of my rockets have been, and will be within that limit.” Another commenter indicated that the 62.5-gram exemption threshold should be increased in order to launch larger model rockets.
ATF Response
The passage of the SEA did not affect ATF's exemption of rocket motors containing 62.5 grams or less of propellant. This final rule maintains the existing regulatory exemption.
In the hobby rocket motors rule, published August 11, 2006, ATF explained its historical determination of using 62.5 grams as an appropriate threshold for the amount of propellant exempt from explosive regulations. 71 FR 46079. In keeping with guidelines published by the National Fire Protection Association, and with regulations promulgated by the predecessor of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and at the request of both the National Association of Rocketry (“NAR”) and Estes Industries, ATF determined that 62.5 grams was an appropriate ceiling for what could be considered a “small charge” of propellant for these “toy” devices. 71 FR 46084. As explained in that same rulemaking, ATF believes that rockets utilizing motors containing 62.5 grams of propellant or less have a shorter range and are less likely to be used as weapons against a particular target without detection. In addition, rockets powered by motors containing 62.5 grams of propellant or less have less power to cause significant damage when used against a target. ATF further believes that rocket motors containing more than 62.5 grams of propellant pose a significant threat to public safety because they can be modified for use as weapons. The 62.5-gram limit achieves a reasonable balance between ATF's goal of allocating its resources in the most efficient and effective manner and its goal of maintaining public safety. Therefore, ATF will not revisit the weight threshold for the exemption of rocket motors at this time.
4. Model Rocket Propellant Is Not a Threat to Public Safety or Homeland Security
Comments Received
One commenter argued that model rocket propellant should not be regulated because it does not pose a significant risk to public safety and is not a threat to homeland security. According to the commenter, due to the cost and limited use of hobby rocket propellent in “toy” rockets, criminals are not going to buy hobby rocket motors for nefarious activities. Since hobby rocket motors do not have guidance systems and warheads, they are, according to the commenter, useless as weapons.
ATF Response
ATF already addressed the issue of the potential for model rocket propellants to pose a risk to homeland security when it published the 2009 propellant rule (described above), affirming ATF's long-standing policy of 62.5 grams as an appropriate threshold for exempting rocket model propellant from explosive regulations. Therefore, further discussion of this issue is unnecessary.
5. IFR 1 Fails To Recognize Its Economic Effects on Businesses
Comments Received
Two commenters argued that IFR 1 will have a significant economic impact on businesses. One commenter stated that many people are unable to get a permit due to storage requirements and would need to purchase land to build a magazine, which is beyond what a typical person can afford. The commenter argued that permitting, storage, and other requirements for rocket motors containing more than 62.5 grams of propellant are overly burdensome for the average sport rocketry hobbyist. Furthermore, the commenter asserted that reduced participation in the hobby will have a negative effect: “Businesses will die. They've already started collapsing.”
The second commenter challenged ATF's certification, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, that IFR 1 would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The commenter stated that commercial shipping companies will not ship hobby rocket motors because the interim rule requires that these companies ensure their employees who handle explosive materials are not prohibited persons under the law. According to the commenter, shipping companies do not want to risk fines or criminal prosecution if a prohibited person might have access to explosives in the process. This makes the cost of shipping rocket motors more expensive.
ATF Response
ATF disagrees with the commenters' assertion that the interim regulations were likely to result in significant reduction in participation by rocketry hobbyists, which, in turn, would have had a negative effect on small businesses. A review of NAR Board of Trustees' meeting minutes dated February 6, 2004 (on file with ATF), stated that the organization's membership base had remained statistically flat for the preceding three years, even though IFR 1 was issued and became effective nearly one year before that period ended. In addition, a review of NAR's meeting minutes dated July 28, 2008, indicated that its membership was holding between 4,500 and 4,600 and that membership dues income was stable. These figures showed no decrease in numbers during the time in which APCP was regulated, before ATF's classification was overturned. In August 2009, the NAR Board of Trustees stated that membership had increased to 4,750. 12 Further, NAR's Board meeting minutes from February 2013 noted that membership had risen to over 5,670. 13 As of 2025, NAR's website states that it has over 9,000 members. 14 Although ATF has no specific data on rocketry sales, ATF has seen no evidence that participation in the sport has declined or that small businesses were negatively impacted by IFR 1. ATF acknowledges that the increase in NAR membership numbers after 2009 may have been partly due to the removal of APCP as a regulated explosive material, but, as noted above, even when APCP was still regulated, NAR membership remained steady following the promulgation of IFR 1. This suggests that IFR 1 did not in fact negatively impact small businesses such as those dealing in model rockets.
12 NAR, Board of Trustees' Meeting Minutes (Aug. 6-7, 2009).
13 NAR. Board of Trustees' Meeting Minutes (Feb. 21-22, 2013).
14 NAR, About the National Association of Rocketry, https://www.nar.org/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=114127&module_id=667398 (last visited July 23, 2025) [ https://perma.cc/8Y8V-CX89 ].
The commenter's concern regarding the interim rule's requirements for shipping companies to ensure that prohibited persons are not handling explosives is also moot. In IFR 2, published in 2003, ATF made clear that as a result of the publication of certain rules by DOT and DHS, employees of motor, water, air, and rail carriers were no longer subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 842(i) regarding prohibited persons while they are engaged in the commercial transportation of explosives.
ATF also disagrees with the underlying premise of the comment asserting that many rocketry hobby enthusiasts would leave the sport, in part as a result of burdensome storage requirements of the SEA. ATF notes that the SEA made no changes to the requirements for proper storage of regulated explosives as they relate to participants within the rocketry hobby or the explosives industry. All such persons have been required to properly store regulated explosive materials since the inception of the federal explosives

regulations in January 1971. The federal explosives regulations relating to the proper storage of regulated explosives can be found at part 555, subpart K—Storage.
ATF also disagrees with the same commenter's assertion that the costs of licensing or permitting would be prohibitive. Even prior to enactment of the SEA, persons wishing to obtain explosive materials from out-of-state sources or to transport materials in interstate commerce were required to obtain an ATF license/permit, and those wishing to engage in the business of manufacturing, importing, and dealing regulated rocket motors were required to obtain the appropriate ATF license. In contrast, persons could acquire explosive materials in the state where they resided, including rocket motors containing greater than 62.5 grams of propellant, without needing to obtain a federal explosive license/permit. The enactment of the SEA and the implementing regulations primarily affected only these latter persons engaging in intrastate acquisitions and transportation of explosive materials, including rocket motors containing greater than 62.5 grams of propellant. With these persons in mind, Congress created the limited permit, which allows a person to acquire explosive materials up to six times per year and transport the materials within their own state. This permit costs $25 for the original permit for a one-year period and is renewable each year for $12. It is unlikely that these minimal costs will be so onerous as to cause a significant percentage of hobbyists to abandon their rocketry activities.
6. Burdens of the Permit and Storage Requirements on Model Rocket Hobbyists
The SEA requires that any person receiving, shipping, transporting, or causing the transportation or distribution of explosive materials on or after May 24, 2003, obtain a federal license/permit. A federal explosives license is required to authorize continual explosives distributions. A federal explosives permit authorizes a person to distribute only surplus explosives stock; it does not authorize the distribution of explosive materials as a matter of continual business operations. There are two types of explosives permits: (1) a “user permit,” which allows the holder to transport, ship, or receive explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce; and (2) a “limited permit,” which allows the holder to receive explosive materials only within his or her state of residence on no more than six separate occasions during the one-year period of the permit. Although applicants for a federal explosive license/permit have always been required to have a place of storage for explosive materials, the SEA amended 18 U.S.C. 843(b)(4), to require that ATF, prior to issuing a license/permit, verify by inspection “that the applicant has a place of storage for explosive materials which meets such standards of public safety and security against theft as the Attorney General by regulations shall prescribe.”
Comments Received
Several commenters expressed concerns regarding the impact of permit and storage requirements on the model rocket hobby. A couple of commenters indicated that the compliance requirements for rocket motors containing more than 62.5 grams of propellant were overly burdensome and would result in reduced participation in the hobby. One commenter stated that, since obtaining a permit would require a background check, fingerprints and photographs, and interviews, hobbyists would quit the hobby rather than apply for the permit.
A few commenters stated that rocket model hobbyists would be unable to obtain a federal permit because of storage requirements and the fees associated with obtaining a permit. In particular, they stated that many cities would not allow explosives to be stored in a residential area. According to one commenter, purchasing land and constructing an explosives magazine was not a viable option. Another commenter stated that he had had an explosives license since 1997 and had never been required to have storage 15 but indicated that storage was not an issue for him because “I manage my acquisition of `explosives' [rocket motors] so that I never have excess stock.” According to the commenter, the effect of the interim rule would be that he would either obtain an explosives magazine or not renew his license.
15 Explosives regulations were first issued by the IRS (before ATF was created as a bureau) in 1971 and codified at 26 CFR part 181; those regulations included the requirement that all applicants for an explosives license/permit have a place of storage. See Title 26—Internal Revenue, 36 FR 658 (Jan. 15, 1971). That storage requirement has remained in effect continuously since then, although ATF's explosives regulations have since moved to 26 CFR part 555. However, ATF also allows applicants to use a contingency storage agreement to meet this requirement. See, e.g., ATF Explosives Industry Newsletter at 2 (Jan. 2014), https://www.atf.gov/media/29021/download; ATF Form 5400.13/5400.16 (now becoming Form 5400.13), Application for Explosives License or Permit (which has included a contingency plan option since at least 2003), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/form-and-information-collection-notices/application-explosives-license-or-permit-atf-f-5400-13/5400-16. These contingency storage agreements are between the applicant (including renewal applicants) and an active licensee/permittee, who agrees to provide the applicant access to their magazine if the applicant needs to store explosives. The commenter might have been referring to this practice.
Another commenter stated the limited permit was not useful because many states did not have a vendor that sold high-power rocket motors. Rocket model hobbyists would therefore be required to obtain a user permit (to acquire and transport explosive materials interstate), which would be cost prohibitive.
Lastly, one model rocket hobbyist stated that he was in the process of applying for a user permit. The commenter noted that he was having difficulty completing the application because it requested information that did not pertain to rocket hobbyists. For example, the commenter stated that he was not in the business of selling explosives and, as such, did not have “business hours.”
ATF Response
ATF disagrees that the compliance requirements for rocket motors containing more than 62.5 grams of propellant are overly burdensome. As previously stated, the propellants contained within model rocket motors has been regulated by ATF since 1971 (including APCP until March 2009). Therefore, since 1971, any person receiving rocket motors containing more than 62.5 grams of propellant in interstate commerce was required to obtain a federal explosives license/permit and maintain all appropriate storage and records for their rocket motors. Moreover, ATF no longer classifies APCP as an explosive, and thus rocket motors consisting solely of APCP (regardless of the weight of the APCP) are not currently subject to regulation by ATF.
Individuals do not appear to be discouraged in pursuing the rocket model hobby despite requirements that they undergo a background check and submit fingerprints and photographs as part of obtaining a federal explosives license/permit. Membership in groups such as the NAR has increased over time since implementation of the SEA, as discussed in section III.F.5 of this preamble. With passage of the SEA, Congress made clear that all persons acquiring non-exempt explosive materials must obtain a license/permit from ATF and submit information to enable ATF to conduct background checks. ATF believes that the information it requires applicants to submit is part of a reasonable process that helps to ensure that prohibited

persons do not gain access to explosive materials.
ATF also believes that the storage requirements are not overly burdensome or inappropriate. Prior to the SEA, the federal explosives laws and regulations required that all persons store explosive materials in conformity with the regulations at part 555. See 18 U.S.C. 842(j); 27 CFR 555.29. These provisions remain unchanged post-SEA enactment. Additionally, ATF storage regulations in 27 CFR part 555, subpart K, have always prohibited any person from storing explosives within a residence or dwelling, and require that all persons store explosives in accordance with the tables of distances to inhabited buildings, highways, passenger railways, and other magazines. Compliance with the federal explosives laws and regulations confers no right or privilege for persons to store explosives contrary to state or local laws that may impose additional storage requirements. Other than a new verification and a requirement for inspection prior to issuing a federal explosives license/permit, neither the SEA, the SEA interim regulations, nor this final rule changed the storage requirements. Congress added the verification requirement to provide tighter security over explosive materials and to ensure that storage requirements are being met.
Though ATF is cognizant of the cost of a new explosives storage magazine, ATF has provided the industry with alternate means of storing explosive materials in place of individually purchased and owned storage magazines. These alternatives include shared storage arrangements, off-site storage, and club and association storage arrangements. See ATF Explosives Industry Newsletter at 2-3 (Jan. 2014); ATF Form 5400.13, Application for Explosives License or Permit. As a result, ATF does not believe that the requirement to obtain and substantiate the proper and secure storage of explosive materials is overly burdensome or inappropriate.
Although some rocketry enthusiasts without in-state access to rocket motors would need to obtain a user permit to go out of state to acquire and transport explosive materials, ATF notes that persons, including rocket model hobbyists, acquiring or transporting regulated explosive materials from out-of-state sources have already been required since 1971 to obtain a federal explosives license/permit. The fee for a user permit, which is valid for three years, is $100, or about $33.33 per year. 27 CFR 555.43. The user permit fee has remained unchanged since 1998. See 27 CFR 55.43; Commerce in Explosives (95R-036P), 63 FR 44999, 45002 (Aug. 24, 1998).
To defray costs, rocketry enthusiasts may join or form rocketry clubs. These clubs can be set up to take responsibility for obtaining all appropriate licenses or permits, as well as storage. Notably, in such club arrangements, the club may not “distribute” explosives to its members; rather, one of the club's RPs must oversee all explosives activities of its members. In addition, the club members may incur the cost of membership dues, but as members they may participate in their hobby without having to individually bear the costs of complying with storage, licensing, or permitting requirements. Sharing the cost of compliance reduces the cost and burden to any individual club member. Accordingly, ATF disagrees that fees to obtain the appropriate license/permit are overly burdensome or cost prohibitive.
Another commenter stated that he was having difficulty completing the explosives permit application because it appears that some portions may not pertain to his proposed activities. ATF is aware that some individuals may have questions regarding proper completion of the form. Therefore, ATF FELC's telephone number and address are included with each application packet. Additionally, ATF's website contains general information regarding the application process.
7. Exemption for Black Powder in Small Quantities
Comments Received
One commenter suggested that an exemption be given for small amounts of black powder for use in model rocket ejection systems, i.e., to deploy the parachute. The commenter stated that he uses about 20 to 30 grams of black powder per year to release the parachute on his model rockets.
ATF Response
ATF cannot grant an exemption for small quantities of black powder used in model rockets because black powder is an explosive material. In exempting up to 50 pounds of commercially manufactured black powder, Congress limited the exemption to that black powder intended for use solely in sporting, recreational, or cultural purposes in antique firearms and antique devices. 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(5); 27 CFR 555.141(b). However, rocket motors and other rocket component parts ( e.g., parachute ejection systems) are not antique firearms or antique devices, and, therefore, the black powder used in these devices does not fall under this statutory exemption. The implementation of the SEA had no effect on the black powder exemption specified at 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(5) and therefore it is not within ATF's statutory authority to grant the requested exemption.
G. Warrantless Inspections
The SEA authorized warrantless inspections of places of storage maintained by federal explosives licensees, permittees, and applicants for limited permits. 18 U.S.C. 843(f). Regulations that implement this provision of the law are in 27 CFR 555.24.
Comments Received
One commenter objected to warrantless inspections, stating that “[w]arrantless searches of any sort are prohibited by the constitution. This phrase should be struck for that reason.”
ATF Response
ATF declines to adopt the commenter's suggestion to strike from the regulations the reference to warrantless inspections. Contrary to the commenter's assertion, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that only “unreasonable searches” without a warrant are prohibited, and therefore some warrantless searches of business, residences, and private property are constitutional. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined `by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' ” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
The Court has specifically recognized the validity of warrantless regulatory inspections of business premises when they are limited in time, place, and scope and when there is express statutory authority to conduct such inspections. For instance, in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), a pawnbroker licensed under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) sought to exclude evidence obtained during a warrantless inspection of his business premises. The pawnbroker alleged that the provision of the GCA authorizing warrantless searches of business premises was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless inspection, noting that close scrutiny of the traffic in firearms is essential to prevent violent crime and to assist the

states in regulating firearms within their borders. Id. at 315. The Court also stated that inspections for compliance with the requirements of the GCA posed limited threats to the pawnbroker's justifiable expectations of privacy because of pervasive federal regulation of the firearms industry. Id. at 316.
The Supreme Court also has recognized the validity of warrantless searches of residences and private property. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Court held that the warrantless search of a probationer's residence was “reasonable” because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. Id. at 880. The Court's holding was based on the proposition that the government operation of a probation system, like its supervision of a regulated industry, presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. Id. at 875-76.
Such “special needs” have been extended to drug testing of students and federal employees. Citing Griffin, the Supreme Court has explained:
[I]n certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion. Therefore, in the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Applying this standard, the Court in Earls found a school's drug testing policy constitutional because of the student's diminished expectation of privacy in school and the school's interests in the testing. The lower federal courts also have applied the “special needs” to an individual's property outside of the home. In Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004), the court noted that warrantless searches have been allowed when conducted under a regulatory scheme where there was a reduced expectation of privacy. Id. at 79. Applying the test outlined in Earls, the Second Circuit held that the special needs exception applied to an individual's property surrounding his home because of the government's interest in regulating construction on protected wetlands, the minimal intrusion at issue, and the individual's diminished expectation of privacy, which resulted from a combination of the plain view doctrine and the individual's voluntary application for a permit to build on wetlands and notice that the process would require some form of on-site inspection. Id. at 81-83.
One of the purposes of Title XI of the OCCA is to reduce hazards to individuals and property arising from the misuse and unsafe or insecure storage of explosive materials. In furtherance of Congress's intention to provide tighter security over explosive materials, the SEA amended the OCCA to include provisions that authorize warrantless inspections of places of storage of applicants for federal explosives licenses/permits, 18 U.S.C. 843(f), and that require the Attorney General, prior to issuing a license/permit, to verify by inspection that “the applicant has a place of storage for explosive materials which meets such standards of public safety and security against theft as the Attorney General by regulations shall prescribe,” id. 843(b)(4). ATF's authority to conduct an inspection and examination of a licensee's/permittee's premises pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 843(f) is generally limited to normal business hours, even where a permittee may not have business hours.
Just as the courts have recognized the governmental interest in regulating probationers and construction on wetlands, there is a substantial government interest in regulating the storage of explosive materials, including those stored in a residential area: explosives present a substantial and immediate threat to all people in the vicinity, and the government accordingly has a substantial interest in reducing that threat.
Licensees/permittees who voluntarily seek the privilege to receive and possess explosives, a highly regulated activity, accept the legal responsibility of complying with federal explosives laws. As discussed, the SEA and implementing regulations explicitly provide for warrantless inspection of storage locations to ensure public safety, and such inspections are limited to both normal business hours and the storage location. Through the application process, applicants learn of their responsibilities in storing the explosives and keeping accurate acquisition and disposition records. Applicants are required to confirm that they understand these requirements. Accordingly, applicants are aware that by voluntarily taking on this responsibility, they have a reduced expectation of privacy in the records they are required to maintain and in the storage location.
An individual applicant is responsible for choosing the storage location. The indoor storage of explosives in, or directly adjacent to, a residence or dwelling is generally prohibited and will only be allowed if the applicant applies to ATF for and is approved a variance from the storage regulations to do so. 16 If an applicant chooses to store explosives at or near a residence and is granted a variance by ATF to do so, the applicant is aware that the storage area will be inspected as provided by law, which includes the possibility of a warrantless inspection.
16 See 27 CFR 555.22, 555.208(b)(1), 555.210(b)(1), 555.211(b)(1); ATF Ruling 2002-3, Indoor Storage of Explosives in a Residence or Dwelling (Aug. 23, 2002), https://www.atf.gov/explosives/docs/ruling/2002-3-indoor-storage-explosives-residence-or-dwelling/download [ https://perma.cc/668W-XQEN ]; ATF Ruling 2002-4, Indoor Storage of Explosives in Business Premises Directly Adjacent to a Residence or Dwelling (Aug. 23, 2002), https://www.atf.gov/explosives/docs/ruling/2002-4-indoor-storage-explosives-business-premises-directly-adjacent/download [ https://perma.cc/2PHV-7VZ7 ].
The leading case on the “closely regulated” or “pervasively regulated” industry exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The Court held that the automobile junkyard industry was a “closely regulated” business and that a warrantless inspection was reasonable and thereby comported with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 712.
The Burger analysis has four parts. As a threshold matter, a court examines the nature and extent of government regulation of the relevant industry to determine whether the industry is in fact “closely regulated.” Id. at 703-05. Then, if the industry is indeed closely regulated, a warrantless inspection will be constitutional if (1) there is a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme giving rise to the inspection, (2) the warrantless inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and (3) the regulatory scheme includes a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, such as by giving regulated parties notice that inspections will occur and defining the scope of the inspections. Id. at 708-12.
At the threshold, the explosives industry is “closely regulated.” In Burger, the Court determined that junkyards were pervasively regulated because the provisions regulating the industry were extensive: operators could not engage in the industry without first obtaining a license, including meeting registration

requirements and paying a fee; they had to maintain acquisition and disposition records and make the records and inventory available for inspection; they had to display their registration number at the place of business; and they were subject to criminal penalties, losing the license, or receiving civil fines for not complying. Id. at 704-05. In addition, the Court noted that the regulatory scheme's duration was also relevant to the “closely regulated” inquiry. Id. at 705.
Federal explosives regulations, enforced by ATF and other agencies, are just as extensive as the regulatory scheme in Burger. The regulations touch all aspects of the industry, including storing and inventorying, licensing, permitting, and record-keeping, consumer and occupational safety, transporting, and environmental impact, among others. In addition, the explosives statute and regulations include all characteristics that the Court itemized for junkyards in Burger, including licenses, records, inspections, and penalties. And as to duration, the federal government has regulated explosives since at least the Federal Explosives Act of 1917, Public Law 65-68, 40 Stat. 385 (Oct. 6, 1917) (previously codified at 50 U.S.C. 121-144), which was significantly amended in 1941, see Act of Dec. 26, 1941, Public Law 77-381, 55 Stat. 863 (Dec. 26, 1941). Although the Federal Explosives Act was repealed by OCCA in 1970, see 84 Stat. at 960, OCCA simultaneously replaced it with 18 U.S.C. chapter 40, which continues to regulate explosives, and which was modified by the SEA in 2003. Given the extent and duration of explosives regulation, the explosives industry is a closely regulated industry within the meaning of Burger. Indeed, the regulatory scheme governing the explosives industry is entirely analogous to that regulating the firearms industry, see e.g., United States v. Fillman, 162 F.3d 1055, 1057 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding 18 U.S.C. 842(i) of the explosives statute “ in pari materia with 18 U.S.C. 922(n),” a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968)), which industry has already been found to be a pervasively regulated industry, see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1977). Because the explosives industry is “closely regulated,” the question is then whether the regulatory scheme satisfies the remaining three requirements of Burger. It does. Regarding the first requirement, there is a substantial government interest in ensuring that explosives do not fall into the hands of prohibited persons, are not lost or stolen or used in terrorist activities, and are stored and transported in ways that minimize risk to public safety. Regarding the second requirement, inspecting licensee/permittee operations and records is necessary to further these substantial government interests because doing so allows ATF to observe the explosives, assess how they are stored, compare them with records to ensure all explosives are accounted for, and ensure the regulatory safeguards are being met. Finally, regarding the third requirement, federal explosives laws at 18 U.S.C. 842 and 843(f) and 27 CFR part 555 provide an adequate substitute for a warrant because they clearly describe the responsibilities of federal explosives licensees; define the scope of ATF's inspection authority; and place licensees/permittees on notice of the fact and frequency of inspections. The explosives industry thus also satisfies these last three steps in the Burger test, such that warrantless inspections are reasonable.
The federal explosives laws were patterned after the GCA, and the warrantless inspection provisions of 18 U.S.C. 843(f) are substantially similar to those of the GCA upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Biswell. As with explosives licensees/permittees, firearms licensees whose business premises and places of storage are located in a residence or private property are subject to warrantless inspection. See, e.g., United States v. Cerri, 753 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1985). The rationale set forth in the Biswell case is applicable to federal explosives licensees/permittees. The inspections conducted to ensure that explosive licensees/permittees are complying with federal law and the regulatory scheme, are non-criminal in nature and are minimal in that they are limited to the places where records and explosives are stored. Under these circumstances, there is a limited invasion of privacy, and no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
H. Transportation Issues
1. Regulatory Exemption Language Should Track Statutory Language
Comments Received
Under 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1), “aspects of the transportation of explosive materials via railroad, water, highway, or air that pertain to safety, including security, and are regulated by the Department of Transportation or the Department of Homeland Security” are exempted from the federal explosives laws (except for specified plastic explosives and bombing and arson offenses). To avoid any confusion regarding the impact of the interim rule implementing the SEA on the transportation and shipping of explosives, several commenters recommended that the regulatory language at 27 CFR 555.141(a)(1) track the text of the statute.
ATF Response
ATF believes that amending the regulatory language to reflect that of the statute will improve clarity for regulated parties. Therefore, ATF is revising the regulation at § 555.141(a)(1) to read as, “[a]spects of transporting explosive materials via railroad, water, highway, or air that pertain to safety, including security, and are regulated by the Department of Transportation or the Department of Homeland Security.”
2. Explosives Delivery Record, ATF Form 5400.8
In the preamble of IFR 1, ATF stated that, on and after May 24, 2003, all common/contract carriers, prior to taking possession of explosive materials for delivery to a federal explosives licensee/permittee (including a limited permittee), were to complete Form 5400.8 (68 FR at 13771). The implementing regulations required all distributors to document and certify certain identifying information of the individual accepting possession of the explosive materials for the common/contract carrier.
Comments Received
A few commenters expressed concerns regarding the delay in issuing the form and its availability. They stated that the form was not available to the public until approximately two weeks before the effective date. Furthermore, the commenters disagreed with ATF's recommendation at the time that licensees download the form and make copies of it until they received their supply of the forms. The commenters contended that many explosives distributors are located in remote areas where they may not have access to the internet. One commenter stated that these distributors might not be able to obtain, or might have difficulty in obtaining, the form as a result.
Furthermore, the same commenter added that, subsequent to publication of IFR 1, DOT and DHS published interim final rules that affected the transportation exception at 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1). 17 According to the commenter, “DOT/DHS rules now occupy the field of transporter qualification and credentialing . . . . Consequently, Form 5400.8 has no effect.” The commenter urged ATF to eliminate those aspects of the form that

impose obligations on individuals who have been qualified to transport commercial explosives pursuant to DOT's regulations.
17 See footnote 5, supra.
ATF Response
ATF recognizes that the revised Form 5400.8 was not made available to the public until immediately prior to the effective date of the applicable SEA provisions. This was due primarily to the short time frame for implementation of the SEA. ATF made the new forms available as soon as possible and took steps to inform the industry of new or revised requirements that affected their conduct of business.
ATF's publication of IFR 2 on September 11, 2003, made Form 5400.8 obsolete. In that IFR, ATF amended ATF regulations to remove the procedures related to the use of Form 5400.8 in transactions among licensees, user permittees, and limited permittees. ATF explained its conclusion that the information required on Form 5400.8 was not needed to trace delivery of explosives to a common/contract carrier. 68 FR 53511. Furthermore, in light of rules published by DOT and DHS, ATF concluded there was no longer a significant reason to collect all of the information required by the form. Instead, ATF stated that it was continuing certain verification requirements (addressed in comment responses in section III.H.3 of this preamble) but was instead allowing distributors to record the relevant information in their permanent records, which are subject to inspection. ATF stated that it did not believe that elimination of the form would result in diversion of explosive materials to criminal or terrorist use. Id. Because Form 5400.8 has been obsolete since 2003, ATF believes this issue was resolved through IFR 2, and the comments were addressed through that process.
3. Transporter Obligations To Verify Identity of Person Accepting Delivery
The SEA mandated that all persons who wish to acquire explosive materials, whether in interstate or intrastate commerce, must obtain a federal explosives license/permit. IFR 1, which implemented the SEA, required distributors to verify certain information prior to relinquishing possession of explosive materials.
As implemented by IFR 1, § 555.103, which regulates transactions among licensees/user permittees, included in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) a requirement that distributees must provide the distributor a list of individuals authorized to accept delivery on behalf of the distributee and keep it updated. In addition, this paragraph prohibited a distributor from transferring explosive materials to any person whose name does not appear on the current version of that list. These requirements continue to remain in effect. In addition, § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) required that, in all instances, the distributor was required to verify the identity of the person accepting possession of explosive materials on behalf of the distributee by examining an identification document before relinquishing possession.
As written in IFR 1, these last two requirements (distributor must not transfer to unauthorized person and must verify identity of person accepting) also applied to common/contract carriers of explosive materials, because they could be deemed to be filling both the role of distributee when accepting possession of explosive materials from a licensee/user permittee and the role of distributor when transferring possession of explosive materials to a licensee/user permittee. Therefore, a few months after IFR 1, ATF issued IFR 2, which amended § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) to explicitly except common/contract carriers from the requirement to verify the identity of the accepting person during deliveries to licensees/user permittees. It did so by adding “except as provided by paragraph (b)(3) of this section” before the phrase “in all instances.” Paragraph (b)(3) was titled “Delivery of explosive materials by common or contract carrier.” The exception for common/contract carriers from the § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) requirement to verify the identity of persons accepting explosive materials on behalf of licensee/user permittee distributees is still in effect.
Section 555.103(b)(3), as implemented in IFR 1, also specifically required that prior to relinquishing explosive materials, distributors had to verify the identity of the person accepting possession on behalf of the common/contract carrier and required the common/contractor carrier to complete Form 5400.8 (discussed in section III.H.2 of this preamble) for this purpose. A similar requirement also existed in § 555.105, Distributions to limited permittees, in § 555.105(b)(6)(iii)-(iv). The requirement in both §§ 555.103 and 555.105 for the distributor to verify the identity of the common/contract carrier and driver remains in effect, but IFR 2 removed the requirement to use Form 5400.8 in both.
In addition, as implemented by IFR 1, § 555.105(b)(6)(iii) required that, if the common/contract carrier was hired by the distributor, then the common/contract carrier was required to verify the identity of the person accepting delivery on behalf of the limited permittee distributee and provide that information back to the distributor. This requirement was premised on ATF's view, at the time of IFR 1, that the common/contract carrier was acting as an agent of the distributor.
However, shortly after IFR 1 became effective on March 20, 2003, and before the comment period for IFR 1 closed, ATF issued ATF Ruling 2003-5 18 on May 23, 2003, to reduce the identity verification burden placed by § 555.105(b)(6)(iii) on common/contract carriers when transporting to limited permittees. Ruling 2003-5 provided an alternate method for meeting the identity verification obligations in deliveries to limited permittees from those in the regulation, and allowed the distributors, rather than the common/contract carriers, to verify that the explosive materials were received by limited permittees no later than three business days after shipment. This change was further reinforced by ATF guidance. 19 Both the regulatory requirement for common/contract carriers to verify the recipient's identity and the ruling's alternative option for distributors to verify instead remain in effect.
18 See footnote 2, supra.
19 ATF Explosives Industry Newsletter at 6 (June 2005), https://www.atf.gov/media/28996/download.
Comments Received
In 2003, several commenters raised concerns about carrier obligations under these provisions as implemented through IFR 1. These commenters argued that the requirement for carriers to verify the identity of the person accepting possession of explosive materials was burdensome, impractical, and created potential liability issues for carriers. One commenter expressed concerns that it would be both burdensome and impractical for carriers, in either a distributor or a distributee role, to be prohibited from receiving or relinquishing explosive materials unless they had a current list of persons authorized to accept such materials. This commenter stated that the carrier would not be able to verify, at the time the explosive materials are loaded in the vehicle, the identity of the person who would later accept delivery because the carrier would not have that person's identification to match against the list provided to the distributor. The commenter added that the carrier driver could not be presumed to later check the identification against the list at the time of delivery. The commenter stated

that ATF would therefore need to provide instructions on how identification credentials would be exchanged to enable the distributor to verify the accepter's identity before delivery.
Another commenter also described the impracticalities of requiring a carrier, in a distributor role, to verify the identity of the person accepting the explosive materials. This commenter stated it was not always possible for carriers to verify the identity of the person accepting possession because of the complex and various methods of distribution and transportation used by the industry. They asked ATF to clarify how identification credentials were to be exchanged between the distributor and the distributee to meet these obligations.
One commenter recommended an alternative method in which the distributees (rather than the carrier or the distributor) would be required to confirm delivery of an explosives shipment via common carrier by the end of the next business day after the explosives were delivered. If the distributee did not confirm delivery by the end of the next business day after the scheduled delivery date, distributors would be required to check the status of the shipment with the distributee by the end of the second business day after the scheduled delivery.
A third commenter raised concerns that focused on the similar requirements of § 555.105(b)(6)(iii). This commenter stressed that the time and complications involved in requiring carrier drivers to verify identity would cause delays that would seriously compromise both the “just in time” delivery system relied upon by manufacturers and retailers, and one of the central principles of hazardous materials transportation safety— i.e., minimizing travel time. The commenter also noted that delays in delivery were contrary to the hazardous materials regulations and provided some examples of delays caused by the named recipient being out sick, no longer employed, or married with a different last name, thereby preventing delivery until the situation was resolved.
Although ATF issued Ruling 2003-5, described above, to provide an alternative method to the carrier verification requirements for limited permittee transactions in § 555.105(b)(6)(iii), this commenter contended that the ruling did not address the larger issue that distributors were still required to verify the identity of recipient licensee/user permittee distributees under § 555.103(b)(2)(ii), even though almost all such transfers were performed by carriers. This comment was made before IFR 2 was issued a few months later, in which § 555.103's requirement was addressed. The commenter concluded by stating that ATF's interim regulations “impose burdens on transporters of explosives regulated by the DOT.” In addition to concerns that verification would be overly time consuming, commenters were also concerned that they could be held personally liable for delivering explosives to persons not authorized to receive them.
Several commenters argued that ATF did not have the authority to impose the requirement that carriers, whether common or private, verify and confirm the identity of the person accepting on behalf of a distributee. Lastly, where regulations required that a distributor have a current list of the names of “persons” authorized to accept delivery, one commenter asked that ATF clarify whether “person” means “person” as defined in the law (18 U.S.C. 841(a)) or if it refers to an “individual.”
ATF Response
ATF acknowledges that the regulations at §§ 555.103(b)(2)(ii) and 555.105(b)(6)(iii), as implemented through IFR 1, placed additional duties on common/contract carriers by requiring them to verify identity and delivery. Therefore, as mentioned above, after issuing IFR 1 in March 2003, ATF issued Ruling 2003-5 in May 2003 and IFR 2 in September 2003 to address these concerns.
With regard to § 555.103, ATF agrees with the commenter's contention that Ruling 2003-5 did not address the issue that distributors were still compelled to verify the identity of individuals accepting explosives on behalf of licensees/user permittees because Ruling 2003-5 provided an alternative only to requirements in § 555.105. However, ATF believes that IFR 2 resolved this commenter's concern with the requirement in § 555.103(b)(2)(ii). IFR 2 amended § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) to except common/contract carriers from the identity and delivery verification requirements when delivering to licensee/user permittee distributees by adding “except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)” before the distributor's requirement to verify the identity of the person accepting delivery “in all instances.” IFR 2 also amended paragraph (b)(3) of the section, covering deliveries made via common/contract carrier, to remove the requirement for the common/contract carrier to verify the identity of the person authorized to accept delivery of the explosive materials on behalf of licensee/user permittee distributees.
For clarity, ATF notes that these amendments did not affect the distributor's requirement under § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) to verify the identity of the individual accepting the explosive materials on behalf of the distributee prior to relinquishing them when the distribution occurs “by distributor”—directly between the distributor and the distributee or their authorized person, whether at the distributor's premises or via delivery by the distributor or their employee (not involving a common/contract carrier). That requirement remains in effect.
With regard to § 555.105, Ruling 2003-5 allowed a variance from the requirement under § 555.105(b)(6)(iii) that a common/contract carrier must verify the identity of persons accepting delivery on behalf of a limited permittee distributee. Specifically, Ruling 2003-5 allowed an alternative method by which distributors of explosives, rather than the carriers, could verify no later than three business days after shipment that the limited permittee distributee received the explosive materials. The ruling did not remove the requirement from the regulation, however, and the provision at § 555.105(b)(6)(iii), still requires that carriers, if hired by a distributor, verify the identity of the person accepting the delivery on behalf of the distributee and provide that information back to the distributor. ATF agrees with commenters that the existence of this regulatory provision along with the variance in Ruling 2003-5 is not the clearest way to address the situation.
ATF, therefore, sees merit in making further clarifying amendments to §§ 555.103(b) and 555.105(b) in light of the above comments and pursuant to discussions with industry members. In this final rule, ATF is amending these sections in a manner that provides greater consistency, reduces burden on common/contract carriers and distributors, and still addresses Congress's concern that the explosives regulations provide for substantial security. Specifically, the final rule amends §§ 555.103 and 555.105 to make clearer the verification procedures applicable under the following circumstances: (a) distribution of explosive materials by distributor; and (b) distribution of explosive materials via common/contract carrier. The revised regulations thus differentiate between two clear circumstances, improving on the somewhat confusing current divisions between four circumstances.
With regard to distributions effected “by distributor”—at the distributor's premises or by distributor delivery—this final rule does not change the requirement in either §§ 555.103 or 555.105 that the distributor must verify the identity of the distributee, or the person accepting on the distributee's behalf. This rule makes the following edits with regard to “by distributor” distributions in both sections for clarity: (1) to combine distributions at the distributor's premises and via distributor delivery into one set where they have previously been split, and (2) to change the word “person” to “individual” in response to comments requesting that ATF clarify which requirements apply to a “person” (which by definition can include a corporation, etc.) versus an “individual” (which does not include corporations or other entities).
However, this final rule eliminates any remaining requirement in either section for a distributor or a common/contract carrier to verify the identity of a person accepting possession on the distributee's behalf when distributions occur via common/contract carrier. This rule also makes the following edits, parallel to those for “by distributor” distributions, with regard to “via common/contract carrier” distributions in both §§ 555.103 and 555.105 for clarity: (1) to combine carriers hired by distributor and carriers hired by distributee into one set where they have previously been split, and (2) to change the word “person” to “individual” in response to comments requesting that ATF clarify which requirements apply to a “person” (which by definition can include a corporation, etc.) versus an “individual” (which does not include corporations or other entities).
Under this rule, when the distribution occurs via a common/contract carrier, the distributor must still verify the identity of the carrier's driver and record that information, as before. However, the rule removes the requirements for the common/contract carrier or the distributor (as previously required by IFR 1 or alternatively by Ruling 2003-5, respectively) to verify the accepting person's identity or to verify that the delivery occurred. Removing the common/contract carrier requirement to verify will now apply consistently to distributions involving licensee/user permittee distributees and ones involving limited permittee distributees, rather than having differing requirements for each.
For security and law enforcement reasons, ATF believes it would be best to have verification occur for all distributions. However, ATF recognizes the need to balance those concerns with the verification limitations inherent in common/contract carrier deliveries. ATF considers there to still be value in verifying identity whenever feasible, so ATF continues to retain the verification requirements for “by distributor” distributions and the identity verification requirements for common/contract carrier drivers.
Although removing the requirement to verify distributee identity when the distribution occurs via common/contract carrier presents a risk, ATF believes that this approach to such deliveries is preferable to the two-part option suggested by one of the commenters and will more smoothly fit into standard business practices. Some of the risk arising from not verifying in these cases can be offset by the fact that the distribution will occur at the distributee's premises, where certain actions will naturally occur as part of standard business practices and other obligations. For example, the distributee has a vested interest in ensuring that it receives the explosive materials it ordered and paid for, and already, as a matter of standard business practice, will check to ensure delivery occurred. If it does not receive the expected delivery, the distributee will reach out to the distributor and/or carrier to notify them that the delivery did not occur and find out what happened. This will help ensure that any potential diversion of the explosives for criminal or other improper purposes does not go unnoticed and can instead be reported to the proper authorities.
Furthermore, the distributee also already has the responsibility of ensuring that it designates individuals authorized to accept explosives on its behalf and provides a list of authorized individuals to the distributor. ATF still considers this an important accountability step in light of the statute's requirement that explosives be distributed only to licensees/permittees. So, the requirement that distributors must verify that they are distributing to an authorized individual when they do so directly (not via a common/contract carrier) remains, even when the distributor is delivering to the distributee, because both ends of the equation in this situation (unlike in situations involving common/contract carriers) have an obligation in this regard. However, the distributee also has a responsibility on its end to ensure that an authorized person is present and accepts the delivery, even when a common/contract carrier is delivering. In addition, the distributee must still record the delivery in its acquisition record, which helps ensure the delivery went to the permitted person.
In response to other comments, ATF also concurs that the regulation at § 555.103(b)(2)(ii) should be clarified with regard to individuals accepting on the distributee's behalf. This section would better achieve the objectives of the SEA by changing the term “persons” in this section to “employees and responsible persons” (the term “responsible person” is defined, and ATF is therefore not changing the word “person” to “individual” in this context). The language in § 555.103 is being amended accordingly in this final rule.
4. Definition of “Possess” as It Applies to Transportation
Comments Received
In IFR 1, ATF stated its belief that it is essential that Form 5400.8 be executed in all instances when licensees/permittees transfer possession of explosive materials to a truck driver who is not an employee of the distributor. Completing Form 5400.8 would “help ensure that explosives are not placed in the hands of prohibited persons for possible diversion to criminal or terrorist use.” 68 FR 13772. This requirement was in effect until May 24, 2003. After that date, ATF continued to require common/contract carriers taking possession of explosive materials, whether hired by the distributor or distributee, to complete Form 5400.8. But ATF no longer required employees of purchasers to complete the form. 68 FR 13771.
Two commenters interpreted ATF's requirements to mean that persons who transport explosives are “possessors.” They both argued that federal law makes a clear distinction between those who transport and those who receive or possess explosive materials, with one of these commenters noting that, “Congress would not have distinguished these classes of persons if they were deemed to be one and the same.” Both commenters believed that persons who transport explosives should not be considered possessors and should not be subject to the disqualifications imposed by 18 U.S.C. 842(i). One commenter stated that “ATF should affirmatively renounce its interpretation that persons engaged in transportation in commerce also `possess' explosives” within the meaning of federal explosives law.
ATF Response
ATF agrees that Congress did not intend the terms “transport or ship” and “receive or possess,” as applied to

persons, to have identical meanings. However, ATF disagrees with the commenters' conclusions that these terms must necessarily apply to completely separate and exclusive groups of persons. Rather, both of these terms can apply to the same person at the same time. For example, a person who manufactures explosive materials, places them on a vehicle, and drives this vehicle to another location in order to use the materials both “possesses” and “transports or ships” the materials. Therefore, ATF is not adopting the suggestion that ATF generally interpret these terms as having exclusive applications to different groups of persons. Additionally, common/contract carriers are exempted from provisions of the SEA that are regulated by DOT or DHS. See 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1).
As stated above, ATF amended ATF regulations with the publication of IFR 2, making Form 5400.8 obsolete.
5. Selective Application of Statutory Provisions
Comments Received
ATF regulations at 27 CFR 555.26(a) provide that, “[n]o person, other than a licensee/permittee knowingly may transport . . . any explosive materials.” Two commenters claimed that there is some confusion as to whether common carriers are required to obtain a permit to transport explosives. One commenter argued that this confusion is based, in part, on information ATF provided on its website regarding implementation of the SEA. The commenter argued that “If the permit requirements of the statute and regulations are not being applied [to commercial transportation], ATF needs to clarify if it is because the transportation exception [in the federal explosives law] is effective . . . or because ATF has chosen not to exercise its authority.”
ATF Response
Both the statute at 18 U.S.C. 845(a)(1) and the regulations at 27 CFR 555.141(a)(1) make clear that a common/contract carrier that is regulated by DOT, and whose explosives activities are limited to commercial transportation, is not required to obtain a federal explosives license/permit. Therefore, ATF is not amending the regulation.
I. Safe Storage and Retaining Records
The regulations at § 555.121 provide that licensees/permittees must keep records pertaining to explosive materials in permanent form ( e.g., commercial invoices, record books). Such records must be kept on the business premises for five years from the date a transaction occurs or until the licensee/permittee discontinues business or operations.
Comments Received
A commenter expressed concerns about protecting personally identifiable information (“PII”) in the required records. The commenter noted that ATF did not provide guidance on how to store or protect mandated records that contain PII, which created privacy concerns, particularly when, the commenter explained, those records are delivered to the custody of a private entity. The commenter did not explain why they thought PII might be delivered to the custody of a private entity, but ATF notes that it does not require records be transferred to anyone other than ATF. The commenter requested that ATF provide information on safekeeping and eventually destroying the required records. Another comme

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2026-19693. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.
