# 84 FR 44976: Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Interagency Cooperation

> Federal · Regulations · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-17517

## Section

- **Citation:** 84 FR 44976
- **Heading:** Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Interagency Cooperation
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Regulations
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** September 30, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Federal Register / Vol. 84 / 84 FR 44976

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Fish and Wildlife Service DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 50 CFR Part 402 [Docket No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0009; FXES11140900000-189-FF09E300000; Docket No. 180207140-8140-01; 4500090023] RIN 1018-BC87; 0648-BH41 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Interagency Cooperation AGENCY:
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Interior; National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Commerce.

ACTION:
Final rule.

SUMMARY:
FWS and NMFS (collectively referred to as the “Services” or “we”) revise portions of our regulations that implement section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (“Act”). The revisions to the regulations clarify, interpret, and implement portions of the Act concerning the interagency cooperation procedures.

DATES:
This final rule is effective on September 26, 2019.

ADDRESSES:
This final rule is available on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov at Docket No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0009. Comments and materials we received on the proposed rule, as well as supporting documentation we used in preparing this rule, are available for public inspection at http://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gary Frazer, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC 20240, telephone 202/208-4646; or Samuel D. Rauch, III, National Marine Fisheries Service, Department of Commerce, 1315 East-West Highway, Silver Spring, MD 20910, telephone 301/427-8000. If you use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD), call the Federal Relay Service at 800-877-8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background
Title 50, part 402, of the Code of Federal Regulations establishes the procedural regulations governing interagency cooperation under section 7 of the Act, which requires Federal agencies, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce (the “Secretaries”), to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agencies is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat of such species.
On July 25, 2018, the Services published a proposed rule to amend our regulations that implement section 7 of the Act (83 FR 35178). The proposed rule addressed alternative consultation mechanisms; the definitions of “destruction or adverse modification” and “effects of the action”; certainty of measures proposed by action agencies to avoid, minimize, or offset adverse effects; and other improvements to the consultation process. The proposed rule also sought comment on: The advisability of addressing several other issues related to implementing section 7 of the Act; the extent to which the proposed changes outlined would affect timeframes and resources needed to conduct consultation; anticipated cost savings resulting from the proposed changes; and any other specific changes to any provisions in part 402 of the regulations. The proposed rule requested that all interested parties submit written comments on the proposal by September 24, 2018. The Services also contacted Federal and State agencies, certain industries regularly involved in Act section 7(a)(2) consultation, Tribes, nongovernmental organizations, and other interested parties and invited them to comment on the proposal.
In this final rule, we focus our discussion on changes from the proposed regulation revisions, including changes based on comments we received during the comment period. For background relevant to these regulations, we refer the reader to the proposed rule (83 FR 35178, July 25, 2018).
This final rule is one of three related final rules that the agencies are publishing in this issue of the Federal Register. All of these documents finalize revisions to various regulations that implement the Act. The revisions to the regulations in this rule are prospective; they are not intended to require that any previous consultations under section 7(a)(2) of the Act be reevaluated at the time this final rule becomes effective (see DATES , above).
Final Regulatory Revisions
Discussion of Changes From Proposed Rule
Below, we discuss the changes between the proposed regulatory text and regulatory text that we are finalizing with this rule. We did not revise the regulatory text between the proposed and final rules for the definitions of “Destruction or adverse modification,” “Director,” and “Programmatic consultation”. Therefore, we do not address those definitions within this portion of the preamble.
Section 402.02—Definitions
Definition of “Effects of the Action”
The Services proposed to revise the definition of “effects of the action” in a manner that simplified the definition by collapsing the terms “direct, “indirect,” interrelated,” and “interdependent” and by applying a two-part test of “but for” and “reasonably certain to occur.”
Effects of the action was proposed to be defined as all effects on the listed species or critical habitat that are caused by the proposed action, including the effects of other activities that are caused by the proposed action. An effect or activity is caused by the proposed action if it would not occur but for the proposed action and it is reasonably certain to occur. Effects of the action may occur later in time and may include effects occurring outside the immediate area involved in the action.
The Services requested comments on (1) the extent to which the proposed revised definition simplified and clarified the definition of “effects of the action”; (2) whether the proposed definition altered the scope of effects considered by the Services; (3) the extent to which the scope of the proposed revised definition was appropriate for the purposes of the Act; and (4) how the proposed revised definition may be improved. We received numerous comments regarding the proposed revision to the definition of “effects of the action,” including the two-part test, and the scope of the definition as proposed. Some commenters felt that the proposed two-part test for both effects and activities caused by the proposed action was either inappropriate or still subject to misapplication and misinterpretation. Others were concerned that the changed definition would narrow the scope of effects of the action, resulting in unaddressed negative effects to listed species and critical habitat. As stated in the proposed rule, the Services' intended purpose of the revised definition of effects of the action was to
In response to comments and upon further consideration, the Services are adopting a revised, final definition of “effects of the action” to further clarify that effects of the action include all consequences of a proposed action, including consequences of any activities caused by the proposed action. We revised the definition to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of the document.
The principal changes we have made in this final rule include: (1) Introducing the term “consequences” to help define what we mean by an effect; and (2) emphasizing that to be considered the effect of the action under consultation, the consequences caused by the action would not occur but for the proposed action and must be reasonably certain to occur.
The Services believe that the definition of “effects of the action” contained in this final rule will reduce confusion and streamline the process by which the Services identify the relevant effects caused by a proposed action. The Services do not intend for these regulatory changes to alter how we analyze the effects of a proposed action. We will continue to review all relevant effects of a proposed action as we have in past decades, but we determined it was not necessary to attach labels to various types of effects through regulatory text. That is, we intend to capture those effects (consequences) previously listed in the regulatory definition of effects of the action—direct, indirect, and the effects from interrelated and interdependent activities—in the new definition. These effects are captured in the new regulatory definition by the term “all consequences” to listed species and critical habitat.
We introduced the term “consequences,” in part, to avoid using the term “effects” to define “effects of the action”. Consequences are a result or effect of an action, and we apply the two-part test to determine whether a given consequence should be considered an effect of the proposed action that is under consultation. Requiring evaluation of all consequences caused by the proposed action allows the Services to focus on the impact of the proposed action to the listed species and critical habitat, while being less concerned about parsing what label to apply to each effect ( e.g., direct or indirect effect, or interdependent or interrelated activity).
As discussed in the proposed rule, the Services have applied the “but for” test to determine causation for decades. That is, we have looked at the consequences of an action and used the causation standard of “but for” plus an element of foreseeability ( i.e., reasonably certain to occur) to determine whether the consequence was caused by the action under consultation. In this final rule, we have added regulatory text to confirm that, by definition, “but for” causation means that the consequence in question would not occur if the proposed action did not go forward. This added regulatory language does not add a more stringent standard than what was applied already under our current “but for” causation, but is meant to clarify and reinforce the standard we currently implement and will do so in the future. Additionally, there are several relevant considerations where the proposed action is not the “but for” cause of another activity (not included in the proposed action) because the other activity would proceed in the absence of the proposed action due to the prospect of an alternative approach ( e.g., if a Federal right-of-way (proposed action) is not granted, a private wind farm on non-federal lands (other activity) would still be developed through the building of a road on private lands (alternative approach)). In particular, the Services consider case-specific information including, but not limited to, the independent utility of the other activity and proposed action, the feasibility of the alternative approach and likelihood the alternative approach would be undertaken, the existence of plans relating to the activity and whether the plans indicate that an activity will move forward irrespective of the action agency's proposed action, and whether the same effects would occur as a result of the other activity in the absence of the proposed action. In other words, if the agency fails to take the proposed action and the activity would still occur, there is no “but for” causation. In that event, the activity would not be considered an effect of the action under consultation.
Consequences to the species or critical habitat caused by the proposed action must also be reasonably certain to occur. The term “reasonably certain to occur” is not a new or heightened standard, but it was not clearly defined or given any parameters in previous regulations. Experience has taught us that the failure to provide a definition and any parameters to the term “reasonably certain to occur” left the concept vague and occasionally produced determinations that were inconsistent or had the appearance of being too subjective. As such, there were sometimes disagreements between the Services and action agencies as to what constituted “reasonably certain to occur.” Our intention in these regulations is to provide a solid framework, with specific factors for both action agencies and the Services to evaluate, in order to determine whether a consequence is “reasonably certain to occur.” In addition, we added a regulatory requirement that this framework be reviewed and followed by both the action agency and the Services. See § 402.17(c). When the Services write an incidental take statement for a biological opinion, under section 7(b)(4)(iv) of the Act they can assign responsibility of specific terms and conditions of the incidental take statement to the Federal action agency, the applicant, or both taking into account their respective roles, authorities, and responsibilities. The Services have worked with Federal action agencies in the past, and will continue to do so into the future, to ensure that a reasonable and prudent measure assigned to a Federal action agency does not exceed the scope of a Federal action agency's authority.
As discussed below in our discussion of changes to § 402.17, we have clarified that for a consequence or an activity to be considered reasonably certain to occur, the determination must be based on clear and substantial information. The term “clear and substantial” is used to describe the nature of information needed to determine that a consequence or activity is reasonably certain to occur. By clear and substantial, we mean that there must be a firm basis to support a conclusion that a consequence of an action is reasonably certain to occur. The determination of a consequence to be reasonably certain to occur must be based on solid information and should not be based on speculation or conjecture. This added term also does not mean the nature of the information must support that a consequence must be guaranteed to occur, but rather, that it must have a degree of certitude.
We revised § 402.17 to help guide the determination of “reasonably certain to occur.” The “reasonably certain to occur” determination applies to other
We also continue to emphasize that effects may occur beyond the proposed action's footprint. This concept was reflected in the proposed rule and the final definition states that effects may include consequences occurring outside the immediate area involved in the action.
As discussed above, we articulated a two-part test for effects of the action that is consistent with our existing practice and prior interpretations. This test for determining effects includes effects resulting from actions previously referred to as “interrelated or interdependent” activities. In order for consequences of other activities caused by the proposed action to be considered effects of the action, both those activities and the consequences of those activities must satisfy the two-part test: They would not occur but for the proposed action and are reasonably certain to occur. As a result, when we discuss effects or effects of the action throughout the rest of this rule, we are referring only to those effects that satisfy the two-part test. For further discussion of the application of the “reasonably certain to occur” test to activities included within the definition of effects of the action, see our discussion of changes to proposed § 402.17, below.
Definition of Environmental Baseline
We proposed a stand-alone definition for “environmental baseline” as referenced in the discussion above in the proposed revised definition for effects of the action.
Environmental baseline was proposed to be defined to include the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in process.
In the proposed rule, we also sought comment on potential revisions to the definition of “environmental baseline” as it relates to ongoing Federal actions. The Services received numerous comments regarding the proposed definition of “environmental baseline” and the consideration of ongoing Federal actions.
In response to these comments and upon further consideration, through this final rule, we are revising the definition of “environmental baseline” to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of this document.
We revised the definition of environmental baseline to make it clear that “environmental baseline” is a separate consideration from the effects of the action. In practice, the environmental baseline should be used to compare the condition of the species and the designated critical habitat in the action area with and without the effects of the proposed action, which can inform the detailed evaluation of the effects of the action described in § 402.14(g)(3) upon which the Services formulate their biological opinion.
In addition, we added a sentence to clarify that the consequences of ongoing agency activities or existing agency facilities that are not within the agency's discretion to modify are included in the environmental baseline. This third sentence is specifically intended to help clarify environmental baseline issues that have caused confusion in the past, particularly with regard to impacts from ongoing agency activities or existing agency facilities that are not within the agency's discretion to modify.
We added this third sentence because we concluded that it was necessary to explicitly answer the question as to whether ongoing consequences of past or ongoing activities or facilities should be attributed to the environmental baseline or to the effects of the action under consultation when the agency has no discretion to modify either those activities or facilities. The Courts and the Services have concluded that, in general, ongoing consequences attributable to ongoing activities and the existence of agency facilities are part of the environmental baseline when the action agency has no discretion to modify them. With respect to existing facilities, such as a dam, courts have recognized that effects from the existence of the dam can properly be considered a past and present impact included in the environmental baseline, particularly when the Federal agency lacks discretion to modify the dam. See, e.g., Friends of River v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 293 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2018). Having the environmental baseline include the consequences from ongoing agency activities or existing agency facilities that are not within the agency's discretion to modify is supported by the Supreme Court's conclusion in National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667-71 (U.S. 2007) (“Home Builders”). In that case, the Court held that it was reasonable for the Services to narrow the application of section 7 to a Federal agency's discretionary actions because it made no sense to consult on actions over which the Federal agency has no discretionary involvement or control. It follows, then, that when a Federal agency has authority for managing or operating a dam, but lacks discretion to remove or modify the physical structure of the dam, the consequences from the physical presence of the dam in the river are appropriately placed in the environmental baseline and are not considered an effect of the action under consultation.
We distinguish here between activities and facilities where the Federal agency has no discretion to modify and those discretionary activities, operations, or facilities that are part of the proposed action but for which no change is proposed. For example, a Federal agency in their proposed action may modify some of their ongoing, discretionary operations of a water project and keep other ongoing, discretionary operations the same. The resulting consultation on future operations analyzes the effects of all of the discretionary operations of the water project on the species and designated critical habitat as part of the effects of the action, even those operations that the Federal agency proposes to keep the same. We also note that the obligation is on the Federal action agency to propose actions for consultation and while they should not improperly piecemeal or segment portions of related actions, a request for consultation on one aspect of a Federal agency's exercise of discretion does not de facto pull in all of the possible discretionary actions or authorities of the Federal agency. This is a case-by-case specific analysis undertaken by the Services and the Federal action agency as needed during consultation.
Attributing to the environmental baseline the ongoing consequences from activities or facilities that are not within the agency's discretion to modify does not mean that those consequences are ignored. As discussed in more detail below, the environmental baseline is a
Section 402.13—Deadline for Informal Consultation
The Services sought comment on potentially establishing a 60-day deadline, subject to extension by mutual consent, for informal consultations. More specifically, we sought comment on (1) whether a deadline would be helpful in improving the timeliness of review; (2) the appropriate length for a deadline (if not 60 days); and (3) how to appropriately implement a deadline ( e.g., to which portions of informal consultation the deadline should apply [ e.g., technical assistance, response to requests for concurrence, etc.], when informal consultation begins, the ability to extend or “pause the clock” in certain circumstances, etc.).
The Services received numerous comments regarding the establishment of a deadline for informal consultation. A summary of those comments and our responses are below at Summary of Comments and Recommendations. In response to these comments and upon further consideration, through this final rule, we are revising § 402.13, Informal consultation, to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of this document.
These changes institute a new § 402.13(c), which is a process framework for the Federal agency's written request for concurrence and the Service's response. The changes to the informal consultation process are limited to only the written request for concurrence and the Service's response. This preserves the flexibility in discussions and timing inherent in the portion of the informal consultation process that is intended to assist the Federal agency in determining whether formal consultation is required. In the new framework, we require in § 402.13(c)(1) that the written request for our concurrence should contain information similar to that required in § 402.14(c)(1) for formal consultation, but only at a level of detail sufficient for the Services to determine whether or not it concurs. Consistent with past practice, the Services determine whether the information provided by the Federal agency provides sufficient information upon which to make its determination whether to concur with Federal agency's request for concurrence. We anticipate that this level of detail will often be less than that required for the initiation of formal consultation and the evaluation of adverse effects to species and designated critical habitat. Second, we establish in § 402.13(c)(2) a timeline for the written request and concurrence process. As stated in the new § 402.13(c)(2), upon receipt of an adequate request for concurrence from a Federal agency, the Services shall provide their written response within 60 days. The 60-day response period may be extended, with the mutual consent of the Federal agency (or its designated representative) and any applicant, for up to an additional 60 days, bringing the total potential timeframe for this written request and response process to 120 days. The intent of the 60-day, and no more than 120-day, deadline is to increase regulatory certainty and timeliness for Federal agencies and applicants.
The changes at § 402.13(c) do not alter or apply to the Services' review of and response to biological assessments prepared for major construction activities, as outlined at § 402.12. For those consultations, the response would be required within 30 days, as outlined at § 402.12(j) and (k).
Section 402.14—Formal Consultation
The Services proposed several amendments to § 402.14. Consistent with the Services' existing practice, we proposed to revise § 402.14(c) to clarify what is necessary to initiate formal consultation and to allow the Services to consider documents such as those prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ) to be considered as initiation packages, as long as they meet the requirements for initiating consultation. We also proposed to: (1) Revise portions of § 402.14(g) that describe the Services' responsibilities during formal consultation; (2) revise § 402.14(h) to allow the Services to adopt all or part of a Federal agency's initiation package, or all or part of the Services' own analyses and findings that are required to issue a permit under section 10(a) of the Act, in its biological opinion; and (3) add a new provision titled “Expedited consultations” at § 402.14(l) to offer opportunities to streamline consultation, particularly for actions that have minimal adverse effects or predictable effects based on previous consultation experience.
The Services received numerous comments related to our proposed amendments to § 402.14, Formal consultation, as set forth at 83 FR 35192, July 25, 2018. A summary of those comments and our responses are below at Summary of Comments and Recommendations.
In response to these comments and upon further consideration, in this final rule, we are finalizing the proposed revisions to § 402.14(g)(2) and (4) and (l), and we are amending § 402.14(c), (g)(8), and (h) to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of this document.
The Services are making a non-substantive edit to the proposed regulatory text at § 402.14(c)(1)(iii). This non-substantive edit clarifies that the Services are referring to information about both the species and its habitat, including any designated critical habitat.
The Services are also making edits to the proposed regulatory text at § 402.14(g)(8) to simplify the text while maintaining the intent of the proposed regulatory revisions. More specifically, we are striking the proposed text that referenced “specific” plans and “a clear, definite commitment of resources” with respect to measures intended to avoid, minimize or, or offset the effects of an action. Instead, the Services are simplifying the regulatory text to indicate that such measures are considered like other portions of the action and do not require any additional demonstration of binding plans.
The simplified regulatory text avoids potential confusion between the need to sufficiently describe measures a Federal agency is committing to implement as part of a proposed action to avoid, minimize, or offset effects pursuant to § 402.14(c)(1), and how those measures are taken into consideration after consultation is initiated. Any type of action proposed by a Federal agency receives a presumption that it will occur, but it must also be described in sufficient detail that the Services can both understand the action and evaluate its adverse and beneficial effects. By eliminating the word “specific” in § 402.14(g)(8), we reinforce that an appropriate level of specificity regarding the description of measures included in the proposed action may be necessary to provide sufficient detail to assess the effects of the action on listed species and critical habitat. However, inclusion of measures to avoid, minimize, or offset adverse effects as part of the proposed action does not result in a requirement for an additional demonstration of binding plans. To simplify the regulatory text and improve clarity, we also eliminated the reference to “a clear, definite commitment of resources.” That change is not meant to imply that an
The Services are also revising the proposed regulatory text at § 402.14(h) by adding a new paragraph (h)(1)(ii); redesignating the existing (h)(1)(ii) and (iii) as (h)(1)(iii) and (iv), respectively; and making a non-substantive edit at § 402.14(h)(4). New § 402.14(h)(1)(ii) clarifies that the biological opinion will also include a detailed discussion of the environmental baseline because a proper understanding of the environmental baseline is critical to our analysis of the effects of the action, as well as our determination as to whether a proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. Inclusion of a detailed description of the environmental baseline is consistent with existing practice (see Services' 1998 Consultation Handbook at pp. 4-13 and 4-15) and, therefore, this requirement will not change how the Services prepare biological opinions.
Section 402.16—Reinitiation of Consultation
We proposed two changes to this section. First, we proposed to remove the term “formal” from the title and text of this section to acknowledge that the requirement to reinitiate consultation applies to all section 7(a)(2) consultations. Second, we proposed to amend this section to address issues arising under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 293 (2016), by making non-substantive redesignations and then revising § 402.16 by adding a new paragraph (b) to clarify that the duty to reinitiate does not apply to an existing programmatic land management plan prepared pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., or the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., when a new species is listed or new critical habitat is designated. In addition to seeking comment on the proposed revision to 50 CFR 402.16, we sought comment on whether to exempt other types of programmatic land or water management plans in addition to those prepared pursuant to FLPMA and NFMA, and on the proposed revision in light of the recently enacted Wildfire Suppression Funding and Forest Management Activities Act, H.R. 1625, Division O, which was included in the Omnibus Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2018 (“2018 Omnibus Act”).
In the proposed revisions to § 402.16, reinitiation of consultation would be required and would need to be requested by the Federal agency or by the Service. Moreover, an agency would not be required to reinitiate consultation after the approval of a land management plan prepared pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 1712 or 16 U.S.C. 1604 upon listing of a new species or designation of new critical habitat, provided that any authorized actions that may affect the newly listed species or designated critical habitat will be addressed through a separate action-specific consultation.
The Services received numerous comments related to our proposed amendments to this section. Comments were generally evenly divided in support of and in opposition to the proposed § 402.16(b), including whether we are precluded from expanding relief from reinitiation due to the 2018 Omnibus Act as well as to whether to extend the exemption to other types of plans. A summary of those comments and our responses are below at Summary of Comments and Recommendations.
In response to these comments and upon further consideration, we revised § 402.16, Reinitiation of consultation, to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of this document.
We modified the language at § 402.16(a)(3) to correct the inadvertent failure of our proposed rule to reference the written concurrence process in this criterion for reinitiation of consultation. This criterion references the information and analysis the Services considered, including information submitted by the Federal agency and applicant, in the development of our biological opinion or written concurrence and not just the information contained within the biological opinion or written concurrence documents. The remaining three reinitiation criteria at § 402.16(a)(1), (2), and (4) were unchanged. We also took this opportunity to clarify the meaning of the reference to the Service in the current and adopted, final version of § 402.16(a) that reads, “Reinitiation of consultation is required and shall be requested by the Federal agency or by the Service, . . .”. The reference to the Service in this language does not impose an affirmative obligation on the Service to reinitiate consultation if any of the criteria have been met. Rather, the reference here has always been interpreted by the Services to allow us to recommend reinitiation of consultation to the relevant Federal action agency if we have information that indicates reinitiation is warranted. It is ultimately the responsibility of the Federal action agency to reinitiate consultation with the relevant Service when warranted. The same holds true for initiation of consultation in the first instance. While the Services may recommend consultation, it is the Federal agency that must request initiation of consultation. See 50 CFR 402.14(a).
In addition, we clarified that initiation of consultation shall not be required for land management plans prepared pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 1712 or 16 U.S.C. 1604, upon listing of a new species or designation of new critical habitat, in certain specific circumstances, provided that any authorized actions that may affect the newly listed species or designated critical habitat will be addressed through a separate action-specific consultation. This exception to reinitiation of consultation shall not apply to those land management plans prepared pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1604 if 15 years have passed since the date the agency adopted the land management plan and 5 years have passed since the enactment of Public Law 115-141 [March 23, 2018], or the date of the listing of a species or the designation of critical habitat, whichever is later.
The language at § 402.16(b) is revised from the proposed amendment to follow the time limitations imposed by Congress for the relief from reinitiation when a new species is listed or critical habitat designated for forest management plans prepared pursuant to NFMA. Because Congress did not address land management plans prepared pursuant to FLPMA in the 2018 Omnibus Act, the Services have determined that we may exempt any land management plan prepared pursuant to FLPMA from reinitiation when a new species is listed or critical habitat is designated as long as any action taken pursuant to the plan will be subject to its own section 7 consultation.
Section 402.17—Other Provisions
We proposed to add a new § 402.17 titled “Other provisions.” Within this new section, we proposed a new provision titled “Activities that are reasonably certain to occur,” in order to clarify the application of the “reasonably certain to occur” standard referenced in § 402.02 (defining effects of the action and cumulative effects). The proposed revisions are set out at 83 FR 35193, July 25, 2018.
The Services received numerous comments related to the proposed provision, many of which stated the Services should further clarify the language of the provision. In response to these comments and upon further consideration, we revised § 402.17 to read as set out in the regulatory text at the end of this document.
The revisions to the language in § 402.17 are intended to clarify several aspects of the process of determining whether an activity or consequence is “reasonably certain to occur.”
First, we clarified that for a consequence or an activity to be considered reasonably certain to occur, the determination must be based on clear and substantial information. The term “clear and substantial” is used to describe the nature of information needed to determine that a consequence or activity is reasonably certain to occur. We do not intend to change the statutory requirement that determinations under the Act are made based on “best scientific and commercial data available.” By clear and substantial, we mean that there must be a firm basis to support a conclusion that a consequence of an action is reasonably certain to occur. This term is not intended to require a certain numerical amount of data; rather, it is simply to illustrate that the determination of a consequence to be reasonably certain to occur must be based on solid information. This added term also does not mean the nature of the information must support that a consequence is guaranteed to occur, but must have a degree of certitude.
To be clear, these regulations do not amend a Federal agency's obligation under the Act's section 7(a)(2); nor do they change the regulatory standard that action agencies must “insure” that their actions are not likely to jeopardize listed species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. See H.R. Conference Report 96-697 (1979) (confirming section 7(a)(2) requires all federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species or result in the adverse modification of critical habitat).
Second, in response to requests made in public comments for clarification of the factors to consider, we revised § 402.17(a)(1) and (2) to further elaborate what we meant in the original proposed versions of those factors. In particular, we revised § 402.17(a)(1) to describe that the Services would include past experience with “activities that have resulted from actions that are similar in scope, nature, and magnitude to the proposed action” when considering whether an activity might be reasonably certain to occur as a result of the proposed action under consultation. This is intended to capture the important knowledge developed by the action agencies and Services over their decades of consultation experience. We also made minor revisions to clarify § 402.17(a)(2). The proposed language used the phrase “any existing relevant plans” but did not reference to the activity itself. We recognize that this language may have been confusing and vague for readers and therefore have modified the text to clarify that we are referencing plans specific to that activity, not general plans that may contemplate a variety of activities or uses in an area.
Finally, we added a new paragraph to § 402.17 to emphasize other considerations that are important and relevant when reviewing whether a consequence is also reasonably certain to occur. These are not exhaustive, new, or more stringent factors than what we have used in the past to determine the likelihood of a consequence occurring nor are they meant to imply that time, distance, or multiple steps inherently make a consequence not reasonably certain to occur. See Riverside Irrigation v. Andrews, 758 F2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' determination that it properly reviewed an effect downstream from the footprint of the action).
Each consultation will have its own set of evaluations and will depend on the underlying factors unique to that consultation. For example, a Federal agency is consulting on the permitting of installation of an outfall pipe. A secondary, connecting pipe owned by a third party is to be installed and would not occur “but for” the proposed outfall pipe, and existing plans for the connecting pipe make it reasonably certain to occur. Under our revised definition for effects of the action, any consequences to listed species or critical habitat caused by the secondary pipe would be considered to fall within the effects of the agency action. As the rule recognizes, however, there are situations, such as when consequences are so remote in time or location, or are only reached following a lengthy causal chain of events, that the consequences would not be considered reasonably certain to occur.
Summary of Comments and Recommendations
Section 402.02—Definitions
Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification
We revised the definition of “destruction or adverse modification” by adding the phrase “as a whole” to the first sentence and removing the second sentence of the prior definition. The Act requires Federal agencies, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretaries, to insure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat of such species. In 1986, the Services established a definition for “destruction or adverse modification” (51 FR 19926, June 3, 1986, codified at 50 CFR 402.02) that was found to be invalid by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth (2001) and Ninth (2004) Circuits. In 2016, we revised the definition, in part in response to these court rulings (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016).
In this final rule, we have further clarified the definition. The addition of the phrase “as a whole” to the first sentence reflects existing practice and the Services' longstanding interpretation that the final destruction or adverse modification determination is made at the scale of the entire critical habitat designation. The deletion of the second sentence removes language that is redundant and has caused confusion about the meaning of the regulation. These revisions are unchanged from the proposed rule, and further explanation of their background and rationale is provided in the preamble text of the proposed rule.
Comments on the Destruction and Adverse Modification Definition
Comment: Several commenters disagreed with defining “destruction or adverse modification” at all, saying that such a definition was unnecessary and that we should rely only on the statutory language. Others suggested creating separate definitions for “destruction” and “adverse modification,” and suggested that not doing so is an impermissible interpretation of the Act.
Response: The term “destruction or adverse modification” has been defined by regulation since 1978. We continue to believe it is appropriate and within
Comment: One commenter asserted that the definition should not include the phrase “or indirect” because it would allow for “speculative actions to be used as determining factors.”
Response: The final rule does not alter the use of the phrase “or indirect” which has been in all prior versions of this definition. In addition, we note that the phrase has long been included in, and continues to be used in, the definitions of “jeopardize the continued existence of” and “action area.” We continue to believe its inclusion is appropriate in this context and takes into account that some actions may affect critical habitat indirectly. The Services use the best scientific and commercial data available and do not rely upon speculation in determining the effects of a proposed action or in section 7(a)(2) “destruction or adverse modification” determinations. The standards for determining effects of a proposed action are further discussed above under Definition of “Effects of the Action”.
Comment: One commenter said that a lead agency should defer to cooperating agencies in evaluating potential impacts on critical habitat when the cooperating agencies have jurisdiction over the area being analyzed.
Response: The term “cooperating agency” arises in the NEPA context. Generally speaking, the lead agency under NEPA may also be a section 7 action agency under the Act. Cooperating agencies can be a valuable source of scientific and other information relevant to a consultation and may play a role in section 7 consultation. The Federal action agency, however, remains ultimately responsible for its action under section 7. Under 50 CFR 402.07, where there are multiple Federal agencies involved in a particular action, a lead agency may be designated to fulfill the consultation and conference responsibilities. The other Federal agencies can assist the lead Federal agency in gathering relevant information and analyzing effects. The determination of the appropriate lead agency can take into account factors including their relative expertise with respect to the environmental effects of the action.
Comment: Some commenters said that the revised definition creates uncertainty and potential lack of consistency regarding when formal or informal consultation is required, or that it revised the triggers for initiating consultation.
Response: The revisions to this definition should not create any additional uncertainty about when formal or informal consultation is required, because these revisions do not change the obligations of action agencies to consult or the circumstances in which consultation must be initiated.
Comment: Several commenters offered their own, alternative re-definitions of the phrase “destruction or adverse modification.” For example, one commenter suggested the phrase should be defined to mean “a direct or indirect alteration caused by the proposed action that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat as a whole for the conservation of a listed species.”
Response: We recognize that there could be more than one permissible, reasonable interpretation of this phrase. The definition we have adopted is an incremental change that incorporates longstanding approaches, modified from the 2016 definition (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016) to improve clarity and consistency of application. Our adopted definition also has the value of being succinct. We do not view the proposed alternative definitions as improving upon clarity, and they may also contain unnecessary provisions or incorporate additional terminology that could itself be subject to multiple or inappropriate meanings.
Comment: Several commenters suggested that the definition should clarify that the only valid consideration in making a “destruction or adverse modification” determination is the impact of an action on the continued survival of the species, and that it should not take into consideration the ability of the species to recover. Conversely, some commenters said the definition improperly devalues or neglects recovery.
Response: Our definition focuses on the value of the affected habitat for “conservation,” a term that is defined by statute as implicating recovery (see 16 U.S.C. 1532(3)). “Conservation” is the appropriate focus because critical habitat designations are focused by statute on areas or features “essential to the conservation of the species” (16 U.S.C. 1532(5); see also 50 CFR 402.02 (defining “recovery”)).
Comment: Several commenters said that the Services should do more to identify how they assess the value of critical habitat for the conservation of a species. They recommend measures such as identifying specific metrics of conservation value, providing guidance on the use of recovery or planning tools to identify targets for preservation or restoration, and defining de minimis thresholds or standardized project modifications that could be applied to recurring categories of projects in order to avoid triggering a “destruction or adverse modification” determination.
Response: As noted in the proposed rule preamble, the value of critical habitat for the conservation of a listed species is described primarily through the critical habitat designation itself. That designation itself will identify and describe, in occupied habitat, “physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection” (16 U.S.C. 1532(5)(A)(i)). Similarly, designations of any unoccupied habitat will describe the reasons that such areas have been determined to be “essential for the conservation of the species” (16 U.S.C. 1532(5)(A)(ii)). Critical habitat designations, recovery plans, and related information often provide additional and specific discussions regarding the role and quality of the physical or biological features and their distribution across the critical habitat in supporting the recovery of the listed species.
Regarding concepts such as defining metrics of value or pre-defined de minimis standards, the Services often assist action agencies in developing conservation measures during consultation that would work to reduce or minimize project impacts to critical habitat. The final rule contains provisions on programmatic consultations that could facilitate establishing and applying broadly applicable standards or guidelines based on recurring categories of actions whose effects can be understood and anticipated in advance. However, predefined metrics, standards, and thresholds for categories of action in many instances are not feasible, given variations in the actions, their circumstances and setting, and evolving scientific knowledge.
Comments on the Addition of the Phrase “As a Whole”
Comment: Some comments supported the change, saying that the addition of this phrase was consistent with existing Services practice and guidance, or said the addition improved the definition and clarified the appropriate scale at which the “destruction or adverse modification” determination applies. Some commenters noted that the addition helps place the inquiry in its proper functional context and observed that alteration of critical habitat is not necessarily a per se adverse modification.
Response: We agree that the addition of “as a whole” helps clarify the application of the definition, without changing its meaning or altering current policy and practice.
Comment: One commenter said that the addition of “as a whole” could cause confusion as to whether it referred to the critical habitat or the species.
Response: The phrase “as a whole” is intended to apply to the critical habitat designation, not to the phrase “a species.”
Comment: Some commenters asserted that adding “as a whole” to the definition meant that small losses would no longer be considered “destruction or adverse modification” because they would be viewed as small compared to the “whole” designation. Some of these comments asserted that under this definition, “destruction or adverse modification” would only be found if an action impacted the entire critical habitat designation or a large area of it. Some also noted that effects in small areas can have biological significance ( e.g., a migration corridor), and that impacts in a small area could be significant to a small, local population or important local habitat features.
Response: The addition of “as a whole” clarifies but does not change the Services' approach to assessing critical habitat impacts, as explained in the preamble to the proposed rule and in the 2016 final rule on destruction and adverse modification (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016). In that 2016 rule, we elected not to add this phrase, but made clear that the phrase did describe and reflect the appropriate scale of “destruction or adverse modification” determinations. Consistent with longstanding practice and guidance, the Services must place impacts to critical habitat into the context of the overall designation to determine if the overall value of the critical habitat is likely to be appreciably reduced. The Services agree that it would not be appropriate to mask the significance of localized effects of the action by only considering the larger scale of the whole designation and not considering the significance of any effects that are occurring at smaller scales (see, e.g., Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1075). The revision to the definition does not imply, require, or recommend discounting or ignoring the potential significance of more local impacts. Such local impacts could be significant, for instance, where a smaller affected area of the overall habitat is important in its ability to support the conservation of a species ( e.g., a primary breeding site). Thus, the size or proportion of the affected area is not determinative; impacts to a smaller area may in some cases result in a determination of destruction or adverse modification, while impacts to a large geographic area will not always result in such a finding.
Comment: Some comments expressed concern that the “as a whole” language, along with the preamble interpretation of “appreciably diminish,” undermined conservation because it would allow more piecemeal, incremental losses that over time would add up cumulatively to significant losses or fragmentation (referred to by many comments as “death by a thousand cuts”). One commenter further expressed concern that such accumulated losses would add to the regulatory burden faced by private landowners with habitat on their lands. Some commenters asserted that the “as a whole” language would be difficult or burdensome to implement, because the Services lacked sufficient capacity to track or aggregate losses over time and space.
Response: As already noted, the revisions to the definition will not reduce or alter how the Services consider the aggregated effects of smaller changes to critical habitat. It should be emphasized that the revisions to this definition also do not alter or impose any additional burdens on action agencies or applicants to provide information on the nature of the proposed action or that action's effects on critical habitat or listed species. The regulations require the Services' biological opinion to assess the status of the critical habitat (including threats and trends), the environmental baseline of the action area, and cumulative effects. The Services' summary of the status of the affected species or critical habitat considers the historical and past impacts of activities across time and space. The effects of any particular action are thus evaluated in the context of this assessment, which incorporates the effects of all current and previous actions. This avoids situations where each individual action is viewed as causing only relatively minor adverse effects but, over time, the aggregated effects of these actions would erode the conservation value of the critical habitat.
In this final rule, we are also clarifying the text at § 402.14(g)(4) regarding status of the species and critical habitat to better articulate how the Services formulate their opinion as to whether an action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. This clarification will help ensure the “incremental losses” described by the commenters are appropriately considered in our jeopardy and destruction or adverse modification determinations.
The Services also make use of tracking mechanisms and tools to help track the effects of multiple agency actions. The Services have long recognized that tracking the effects of successive activities and projects is a significant challenge and continue to prioritize improvement of the methods for doing so. We also note that the use of programmatic consultations, as addressed elsewhere in this rule, can help with this challenge by encouraging consultation at a broad scale across geographic regions and programs encompassing multiple activities and actions. Finally, in response to concerns that this change would impose additional burdens on private landowners, the Services remind the public that critical habitat designation creates no responsibilities for the landowner unless the landowner proposes an activity that includes Federal funding or authorization of a type that triggers consultation. Otherwise, the designation of critical habitat requires no changes to the landowner's use or management of their land.
Comment: Some commenters said that adding the phrase “as a whole” would make application of the definition more subjective and less consistent.
Response: The comment appears to be motivated by the belief that any adverse effect to critical habitat should be considered, per se, “destruction or adverse modification,” and that the change introduces a new element of subjectivity. We do not agree. As with under the prior definition, the Services are always required to exercise judgment and apply scientific expertise when making the ultimate determination as to whether adverse effects rise to the level of “destruction or adverse modification.”
Comment: Some commenters said that this change would impermissibly render the definition of “destruction or adverse modification” too similar or the same as the definition of “jeopardize the continued existence of,” while the statute intends them to have different meanings. Some also said that this addition conflicted with case law stating that the two phrases have distinct meanings.
Response: The Services do not agree that the addition of “as a whole” leads to improper conflation of the meanings of “jeopardize the continued existence of” and “destruction or adverse modification.” The terms “destruction or adverse modification” and “jeopardize the continued existence of” have long been recognized to have distinct meanings yet implicate overlapping considerations in their application. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001); Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F.Supp.2d 1248, 1265 (W.D. Wash.1999); Conservation Council for Hawai`i v. Babbitt, 2 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1287 (D. Haw. 1998). The phrase “jeopardize the continued existence of” focuses directly on the species' survival and recovery, while the definition of “destruction or adverse modification” is focused first on the critical habitat itself, and then considers how alteration of that habitat affects the “conservation” value of critical habitat. Thus, the terms “jeopardize the continued existence of” and “destruction or adverse modification” involve overlapping but distinct considerations. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the critical habitat analysis is more directly focused on the effects on the designated habitat and has a “more attenuated” relationship to the survival and recovery of the species than the “jeopardize” analysis).
Comment: Several commenters provided arguments or recommendations regarding the geographic scale at which “destruction or adverse modification” determinations should focus and asserted that the “as a whole” was not necessarily the right scale. One commenter said the appropriate scale was the critical habitat unit or larger, especially for wide-ranging species. Some commenters said that the “as a whole” language was inappropriate because the appropriate geographic scale for assessing “destruction or adverse modification” was a scientific question. Similarly, one comment asserted the Services must use a “biologically meaningful” scale. A group of State governors questioned how scale would be treated when there was a portion of critical habitat in one State that was geographically unconnected to critical habitat in other States.
Response: The use of the phrase “as a whole” is not solely meant to establish a geographic scale for “destruction or adverse modification” determinations. The phrase applies to assessing the value of the whole designation for conservation of the species. Effects at a smaller scale that could be significant to the value of the critical habitat designation will be considered. As the preamble to the proposed rule notes, “the Services must [then] place those impacts in context of the designation to determine if the overall value of the critical habitat is likely to be reduced” (83 FR 35178, July 25, 2018, p. 83 FR 35180). Thus, while the destruction or adverse modification analysis will consider the nature and significance of effects that occur at a smaller scale than the whole designation, the ultimate determination applies to the value of the critical habitat designation as a whole.
Comment: One commenter said that the addition of “as a whole” was inconsistent with the following language in the 1998 Consultation Handbook: “The consultation or conference focuses on the entire critical habitat area designated unless the critical habitat rule identifies another basis for analysis, such as discrete units and/or groups of units necessary for different life cycle phases, units representing distinctive habitat characteristics or gene pools, or units fulfilling essential geographic distribution requirements.” See 1998 Consultation Handbook at p. 4-42.
Response: The revised definition is not inconsistent with the quoted 1998 Consultation Handbook guidance. As we stated in our preamble to the proposed rule, under the revised definition, “if a particular project would cause adverse effects to a portion of critical habitat, the Services must place those impacts in context of the designation to determine if the overall value of the critical habitat is likely to be reduced. This could occur where, for example, a smaller affected area of habitat is particularly important in its ability to support the conservation of a species ( e.g., a primary breeding site). Thus, the size or proportion of the affected area is not determinative; impacts to a smaller area may in some cases result in a determination of destruction or adverse modification, while impacts to a large geographic area will not always result in such a finding” (83 FR 35178, July 25, 2018, p. 83 FR 35180). In other words, it may be appropriate to focus on a unit of analysis that is smaller than the entire designation, but it would not be appropriate to conclude the analysis without relating the result of the alterations at that scale back to the listed entity, which is the designation “as a whole,” in order to assess whether the value of that designation to the conservation of a listed species is appreciably diminished.
Comment: Some commenters disagreed with the addition of “as a whole” because they said it conflicted with the plain language of the statute. In particular, some asserted that, by statute, critical habitat is “essential to the conservation of the species.” They reason that, accordingly, any adverse effect is therefore per se “destruction or adverse modification” since it is the loss or reduction of something that is “essential.” Some of these commenters also focused similar criticism on the preamble discussion of the phrase “appreciably diminish,” as discussed further below.
Response: The Services do not agree that any adverse effect to critical habitat is per se “destruction or adverse modification,” a subject further discussed in the discussion of “appreciably diminish” in the preamble to the proposed rule and the discussion of comments on that preamble provided below. Nor do the Services agree that the use of the term “essential to the conservation of the species” in the Act's definition of critical habitat requires such an interpretation. The phrase “essential to the conservation of the species” guides which areas will be designated but does not require that every alteration of the designated critical habitat is prohibited by the statute. Just as the determination of jeopardy under section 7(a)(2) of the Act is made at the scale of the entire listed entity, a determination of destruction or adverse modification must ultimately consider the diminishment to the value for conservation at the scale of the entire critical habitat designation. As the 1998 Consultation Handbook states, adverse effects on elements or segments of critical habitat “generally do not result in jeopardy or adverse modification determinations unless that loss, when added to the environmental baseline, is likely to result in significant adverse effects throughout the species’ range, or appreciably diminish the ability of the critical habitat to satisfy essential requirements of the species.” See 1998 Consultation Handbook at p. 4-36. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “a determination that critical habitat would be destroyed was thus not inconsistent with [a] Butte Envir. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 620 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2010).
Deletion of the Second Sentence
Comment: Some commenters claimed that removal of the sentence was unnecessary, and that doing so would eliminate important guidance embedded in the definition for appropriate factors to consider in the destruction or adverse modification analysis. Some suggested removing the provision about “preclusion or delay” of features, while keeping the remainder. One commenter suggested keeping the second sentence and expanding it to include additional language about cumulative loss of habitat required for recruitment. However, other commenters agreed with removing the second sentence, saying it was duplicative of the content of the first sentence, was vague and confusing, or that it contained provisions that overstepped the Services' authority. One commenter stated that removal of the second sentence will help place the focus on whether or not a project would “appreciably diminish” the value of critical habitat as a whole for the conservation of the species.
Response: This revision was made because the second sentence of the definition adopted in the 2016 final rule (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016) has caused controversy among the public and many stakeholders. The revised definition streamlines and simplifies the definition. We agree with the commenters who stated that the second sentence was unnecessary—it had attempted to elaborate upon meanings that are already included within the first sentence. We also agree with the commenters who said that removing the second sentence will appropriately focus attention on the operative first sentence, which states that in all cases, the analysis of destruction or adverse modification must address whether the proposed action will result in an “alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat as a whole for the conservation of a listed species.”
Comment: Some commenters were concerned that removal of the second sentence meant that the Services were stating that a destruction or adverse modification determination must always focus only on existing features, or that the Services intended to downplay the fact that some designated habitat may be governed by dynamic natural processes or be degraded and in need of improvement or restoration to recover a species. Such commenters also pointed out that species' habitat use and distribution can also be dynamic and change over time. Some commenters similarly asserted that this change improperly downgraded the importance of unoccupied critical habitat for recovery or asserted that the revision showed the Services were lessening their commitment to habitat improvement and recovery efforts.
Response: As already noted, the deletion of the second sentence was meant to clarify and simplify the definition, but not to change the Services' current practice and interpretation regarding the applicability of the definition. Nor does the change mean that the recovery role of unoccupied critical habitat will not be considered in destruction or adverse modification determinations. As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the intended purpose of the language about precluding or delaying “development of such features” was to acknowledge “that some important physical or biological features may not be present or are present in a sub- optimal quantity or quality. This could occur where, for example, the habitat has been degraded by human activity or is part of an ecosystem adapted to a particular natural disturbance ( e.g., fire or flooding), which does not constantly occur but is likely to recur.” See also 79 FR 27060, May 12, 2014, p. 27061. Nor do the revisions mean that the Services are lessening their commitment to programs and efforts designed to bring about improvements to critical habitat.
Comment: In contrast to commenters who opposed removing the second sentence, some commenters favored the removal of the second sentence because it would remove the phrase “preclude or significantly delay development of such features.” Some asserted this phrase was confusing or could lead to inconsistent or speculative application of the definition; others said that this phrase overstepped the Services' statutory authority and that “destruction or adverse modification” had to focus on existing features and could not be based on the conclusion that an action would “preclude or significantly delay” the development of such features. Some of these commenters also disputed language in the preamble of the proposed rule that they said indicated that the Services would improperly consider potential changes to critical habitat in making “destruction or adverse modification” determinations, rather than focusing solely on existing features.
Response: The Services agree that the second sentence was unnecessary and that its removal will simplify and clarify the definition. The Services agree that it is important in any destruction or adverse modification assessment to focus on adverse effects to features that are currently present in the habitat, particularly where those features were the basis for its designation. However, as noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, there may also be circumstances where, within some areas of designated critical habitat at the time of consultation, “some important physical or biological features may not be present or are present in a sub-optimal quantity or quality. This could occur when, for example, the habitat has been degraded by human activity or is part of an ecosystem adapted to a particular natural disturbance ( e.g., fire or flooding), which does not constantly occur but is likely to recur” (79 FR 27060, May 12, 2014, p. 27061). The extent to which the proposed action is anticipated to impact the development of such features is a relevant consideration for the Services' critical habitat analysis. The Services reaffirm their longstanding practice that any destruction or adverse modification determination must be grounded in the best scientific and commercial data available and should not be based upon speculation.
Appreciably Diminish
In order to further clarify application of the definition of “destruction or adverse modification,” the preamble to the proposed rule discussed the term “appreciably diminish.” The proposed rule did not contain any revisions to regulatory text defining this phrase or changing how it is used in the regulations. The preamble discussion was thus not intended to provide a new or changed interpretation of the Act's requirements, but instead was intended to help clarify how the Services apply the term “appreciably diminish” and to discuss some alternative interpretations that the Services do not believe correctly reflect the requirements of the statute or the Services' regulations. Below is discussion of comments received on this proposed rule preamble discussion of “appreciably diminish,” as well as related comments on the preamble discussion of associated topics of “baseline jeopardy” and “tipping point.”
Comment: A number of commenters expressed agreement with this section of the preamble, and the Services' interpretation that not every adverse effect to critical habitat constitutes “destruction or adverse modification” (and relatedly, that not every adverse effect to a species “jeopardizes the continued existence of” a listed species). Some commenters noted that this interpretation comports with case Butte Env. Council, 620 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2010).
Response: We appreciate that these commenters found this preamble discussion helpful.
Comment: Some commenters criticized the preamble language as creating too broad of a standard. Those commenters asserted that the preamble language implied that any effect, as long as it could be measured, could trigger an adverse modification opinion. For example, one commenter asserted that the Services were lowering the standard so that “any measurable or recognizable effect” on critical habitat would be considered destruction or adverse modification.
Response: It was not our intention to imply, or state in any manner, that any effect on critical habitat that can be measured would amount to adverse modification of critical habitat. To the contrary, our experience with consultations has demonstrated that the vast majority of consultations that involved an action with adverse effects do not amount to a determination of adverse modification of critical habitat.
We believe some of the confusion expressed by these comments can be alleviated by providing more explanation of where in the consultation process the “appreciably diminish” concept comes into play. The consultation process sets up a multiple-stage evaluation process of effects to critical habitat. The first inquiry—even before consultation begins—is whether any effect of an action “may affect” critical habitat. In order to determine if there is an effect, of course, it would have to be something that can be described or detected. The second consideration, then, would be whether that effect has an adverse effect on the critical habitat within the action area. To make that determination, the effect would need to be capable of being evaluated, in addition to being detected or described (see 1998 Consultation Handbook at pp. 3-12-3-13 (noting that “insignificant” effects will not even trigger formal consultation, and that at this step, the evaluation is made of whether a person would “be able to meaningfully measure, detect, or evaluate” the effects)). The finding that an effect is adverse at the action-area scale does not mean that it has met the section 7(a)(2) threshold of “destruction or adverse modification”; rather, that is a determination that simply informs whether formal consultation is required at all. Therefore, an adverse effect is not, by definition, the equivalent of “destruction or adverse modification,” and further examination of the effect is necessary. As noted above, courts have also endorsed this view; see, e.g., Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 620 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a determination that critical habitat would be destroyed was thus not inconsistent with [a] finding of no `adverse modification’ ”).
After effects are determined to be adverse at the action-area scale, they are analyzed with regard to the critical habitat as a whole. That is, the Services look at the adverse effects and evaluate their impacts when added to the environmental baseline and cumulative effects on the value of the critical habitat for the conservation of the species, taking into account the total and full extent as described in the designation, not just in the action area. It is at this point that the Services look to whether the effects diminish the role of the entire critical habitat designation. As discussed further above in our discussion of the phrase “as a whole,” the Services must place impacts to critical habitat into the context of the overall designation to determine if the overall value of the critical habitat is likely to be reduced.
Even if it is determined that the effects appear likely to diminish the value of the critical habitat, a determination of “destruction or adverse modification” requires more than adverse effects that can be measured and described. At this stage in the consultation's multi-staged evaluations, the Services will need to evaluate the adverse effects to determine if the adverse effects when added to the environmental baseline and cumulative effects will diminish the conservation value of the critical habitat in such a considerable way that the overall value of the entire critical habitat designation to the conservation of the species is appreciably diminished. It is only when adverse effects from a proposed action rise to this considerable level that the ultimate conclusion of “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat can be reached.
Comment: Several commenters suggest that in addition to defining “destruction or adverse modification,” the Services should adopt a new regulatory definition of “appreciably diminish.” For example, one comment suggests the definition should read “means to cause a reasonably certain reduction or diminishment, beyond baseline conditions, that constitutes a considerable or material reduction in the likelihood of survival and recovery.”
Response: The Services believe our revised definition of “destruction or adverse modification” will be clearer than before, while retaining continuity by keeping important language from prior versions of the definition. We do not think the various proposed definitions for “appreciably diminish” would improve upon the “destruction or adverse modification” definition, and we conclude they would themselves introduce additional undefined, ambiguous terminology that would not likely improve the clarity of the definition or the consistency of its application.
Comment: Some commenters suggest the Services state in rule text or preamble that “appreciably diminish” should be defined as it was in the 1998 Consultation Handbook: “to considerably reduce the capability of designated or proposed critical habitat to satisfy requirements essential to both the survival and recovery of a listed species.” Some commenters further assert that the Services should disavow language in the 2016 final rule preamble (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016) to the effect that “considerably” means “worthy of consideration” and that it applies where the Services “can recognize or grasp the quality, significance, magnitude, or worth of the reduction in the value of” critical habitat. They assert this language is too broad and gives the Services too much discretion or will cause the Services to find “destruction or adverse modification” in inappropriate circumstances. One commenter notes that some courts have affirmed the 1998 Consultation Handbook definition and held the term “appreciably” means “considerable” or “material.” See, e.g., Pac. Coast Feds. of Fishermen's Assn's v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Forest Guardians v. Veneman, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1092 (D. Ariz. 2005).
Response: We believe the interpretation provided in our proposed rule preamble and as described above in detail is consistent with the guidance provided in the 1998 Consultation Handbook and the language used in the 2016 final rule (81 FR 7214; February 11, 2016). The preamble language in the draft rule did not seek to raise or lower the bar for making a finding of destruction or adverse modification. As with the 2016 definition and prior practice on the part of the Services, and as discussed above, destruction or adverse modification is more than a noticeable or measurable change. As we have detailed above, in order to trigger adverse modification, there must be an alteration that appreciably diminishes
Comment: Some comments sought for the Services to develop a more exact or quantifiable method of determining destruction or adverse modification. One commenter requested that the Services develop regulations setting forth quantifiable “statistical tools appropriate for the attribute of interest” to guide such determinations, based on “defensible science that leads to reliable knowledge in quantifying the impacts of proposed or extant alterations related to habitat or populations of listed species.”
Response: Where appropriate, the Services use statistical and quantifiable methods to support determinations of “destruction or adverse modification” under the “appreciably diminish” standard, but the best scientific and commercial data available often does not support this degree of precision. As such, the Services are required to apply the statute and regulations, and reach a conclusion even where such data and methods are not available.
Comment: Some commenters asserted that the preamble discussion of “appreciably diminish” stated an interpretation that was inconsistent with the statute, insufficiently protective of critical habitat, and would make the bar too high for making findings of “destruction or adverse modification.” Many of these comments linked the “appreciably diminish” language in the preamble with the “as a whole” change to the first sentence of the definition and concluded that these operated together to raise the tolerance for incremental and cumulative losses that would over time degrade critical habitat and undermine conservation. Thus, some of these comments are also addressed above in the discussion of “as a whole.” These comments often also raise issues about the concepts of “tipping point” and “baseline jeopardy” addressed further below.
Response: Our preamble discussion does not raise or lower the bar for finding “destruction or adverse modification.” The Services believe that this discussion of “appreciably diminish” comports with prior guidance and with the statute.
Baseline Jeopardy and Tipping Point
As discussed in our proposed rule's preamble, the definitions of “destruction or adverse modification” and “jeopardize the continued existence of” both use the term “appreciably,” and the analysis must always consider whether impacts are “appreciable,” even where critical habitat or a species already faces severe threats prior to the action. We thus noted that the statute and regulations do not contain any provisions under which a species should be found to be already (pre-action) in an existing status of being “in jeopardy” “in peril,” or “jeopardized” by baseline conditions, such that any additional adverse impacts must be found to meet the regulatory standards for “jeopardize the continued existence of” or “destruction or adverse modification.” As we explained, the terms “jeopardize the continued existence of” and “destruction or adverse modification” are, in the plain language of section 7(a)(2), determinations that are made about the effects of Federal actions. They are not determinations made about the environmental baseline for the proposed action or about the pre-action condition of the species.
The proposed rule's preamble also explains the Services' view that, contrary to the implications of some court opinions and commenters, they are not, in making section 7(a)(2) determinations, required to identify a “tipping point” beyond which the species cannot recover from any additional adverse effect. Neither the Act nor our regulations state any requirement for the Services to identify a “tipping point” or recovery benchmark for making section 7(a)(2) determinations. Section 7(a)(2) provides the Services with discretion as to how it will determine whether the statutory prohibition on jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification is exceeded. We also noted that the state of science often does not allow the Services to identify a “tipping point” for many species.
Comment: Some commenters stated opposition to the Services' interpretation and said it would undermine conservation. In particular, many commenters asserted that some species are so imperiled or rare that they are in fact in a state of “baseline jeopardy” and cannot sustain any additional adverse effects. Such species, they asserted, should be considered to be in a state of “baseline jeopardy” or “baseline peril.”
Response: The Services do not dispute that some listed species are more imperiled than others, and that for some very rare or very imperiled species, the amount of adverse effects to critical habitat or to the species itself that can occur without triggering a “jeopardize” or “destruction or adverse modification” determination may be small. However, the statute and regulations do not contain the phrase “baseline jeopardy.” Nor does the statute or its regulations recognize any state or status of “baseline jeopardy.” While the term “jeopardy” is sometimes used as a shorthand, the statutory language is “jeopardize the continued existence,” and it applies prospectively to the effects of Federal actions, not to the pre-action status of the species. As we stated in our proposed rule preamble, “[t]he terms `jeopardize the continued existence of' and `destruction or adverse modification' are, in the plain language of section 7(a)(2), determinations that are made about the effects of Federal agency actions. They are not determinations made about the environmental baseline or about the pre-action condition of the species. Under the [Act], a listed species will have the status of `threatened' or `endangered,' and all threatened and endangered species by definition face threats to their continued existence” (83 FR 35178, July 25, 2018, p. 83 FR at 35182). For the “jeopardize” determinations, as with the “destruction or adverse modification” determinations, a determination that there are likely to be adverse effects of a Federal action is the starting point of formal consultation. The Services are then obliged to consider the magnitude and significance of the effects they cause, when added to the environmental baseline and cumulative effects, and the status of the species or critical habitat, before making our section 7(a)(2) determination.
Comment: Some commenters asserted that it is not possible to rationally analyze whether an action jeopardizes a species without identifying a “tipping point.”
Response: Different commenters, as well as prior court opinions, have offered varying interpretations of what the term “tipping point” means. For example, one commenter on the proposed rule says that “[t]ipping points for species are when the environment degrades itself to where the population growth is too low to support a viable population.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described the concept as “a tipping point beyond which the species cannot recover.” See Oceana, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 705 F. App'x 577, 580 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 527 (9th Cir. 2010) (referring to a “tipping point precluding recovery”). Another Ninth Circuit case described the issue as one of determining “at what point survival and recovery will be placed at risk” ( Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir. 2008)), in order to avoid “tipping a listed species too far into danger.” Id. We disagree that a rational analysis of whether an action is likely to jeopardize a species necessarily requires identification of such a “tipping point.” e.g., California condor). In addition, there are myriad variables that affect species viability, and it would not likely be the case that one could reduce the inquiry to a single “tipping point.” For example, species viability may be closely tied to abundance, reproductive rate or success, genetic diversity, immunity, food availability or food web changes, competition, habitat quality or quantity, mate availability, etc. In those cases, the attempt to define a tipping point could undermine the rationality of the determination, bind the Services to base their judgment on overly rigid criteria that give a misleading sense of exactitude, and unduly limit the ability to exercise best professional judgment and factor in the actual scientific uncertainties. The Services do not dispute that, in some cases, there could be a species that is so rare or imperiled that it reaches a point where there is little if any room left for it to tolerate additional adverse effects without being jeopardized by the action. But even in those cases, the Services would apply the necessary “reduce appreciably” standard to the “jeopardize” determination. The Services' final determination should be judged according to whether it reasonably applied the governing statutory and regulatory standards and used the best scientific and commercial data available. There is no de facto or automatic requirement that a reasonable conclusion must include an artificial requirement, ungrounded in the statute, to identify a “tipping point.”
Comment: Some commenters asserted that the preamble, particularly with respect to “tipping point” and “baseline jeopardy,” was inconsistent with the interpretation stated in a 1981 “Solicitor's opinion” referenced as Appendix D to the 1998 Consultation Handbook. The commenters call attention to a statement in that memorandum describing how, when a succession of Federal actions may affect a species, “the authorization of Federal projects may proceed until it is determined that further actions are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat.” That memo further states that “[i]t is this `cushion' of natural resources which is available for allocation to [Federal] projects until the utilization is such that any future use may be likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify or destroy its critical habitat. At this point, any additional Federal activity in the area requiring a further consumption of resources would be precluded under section 7.” Commenters assert that this language recognizes the existence of “baseline jeopardy” and/or recognizes that the Services must utilize the tipping point concept in performing a section 7(a)(2) analysis.
Response: The subject matter of the referenced memorandum was the treatment of cumulative effects. In any case, the guidance provided in that memorandum is not in conflict with the preamble discussion provided in the proposed rule on “appreciably diminish,” “tipping point,” and “baseline jeopardy,” or in conflict with the Services' long-standing interpretations stated in the recent proposed rule's preamble. The position of the Services is that there is nothing in the Act or its regulations, or necessitated under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring that a section 7(a)(2) analysis quantify or identify a “tipping point.”
Definition of Director
Comment: Some commenters agreed with the proposed revised definition. One commenter expressed concern that revising the definition would require consultations to be finalized at the Services' Headquarters offices and result in delays. Another commenter suggested the definition make clear that any “authorized representative” of the Director meet the respective eligibility requirements for political appointment to the position of Assistant Administrator for Fisheries for NMFS and Director of FWS.
Response: While we understand the commenter's observation regarding occasional lapses in Senate-confirmed agency leadership, we are unaware of any actual issues related to either the existing or revised definition; therefore, we decline to make any additional changes. As stated in the proposed rule, the purpose of revising the definition is to clarify and simplify it, in accordance with the Act and the Services' current practice. The revised definition designates the head of both FWS and NMFS as the definitional Director under the Act section 7 interagency cooperation regulations. The change does not revise the current signature delegations of the Services in place that allow for signature of specified section 7 documents ( e.g., biological opinions and concurrence letters) at the regional and field levels and will not increase the completion time for consultation.
Definition of Effects of the Action
The Services proposed to revise the definition of “effects of the action” in a manner that simplified the definition by collapsing the terms “direct, “indirect,” interrelated,” and “interdependent” and by applying a two-part test of “but for” and “reasonably certain to occur.” Related to this revised definition, we also proposed to make the definition of environmental baseline a stand-alone definition within § 402.02 and moved the instruction that the effects of the proposed action shall be added to the environmental baseline into the regulations guiding the Services' responsibilities in formal consultation in § 402.14(g). In addition, we proposed to add a new § 402.17 titled “Other provisions” and, within that new section, add a new provision titled “Activities that are reasonably certain to occur” in order to clarify the application of the “reasonably certain to occur” standard referenced in two specific contexts: activities caused by but not included as part of the proposed action, and activities under “cumulative effects.” As discussed above under Discussion of Changes from Proposed Rule, the Services received numerous comments on the proposed definition of “effects of the action” and the new provision at § 402.17(a) “Activities that are reasonably certain to occur.” We have adopted a final, revised definition of “effects of the action” and revised text at § 402.17(a) in response to those comments. Below, we summarize other comments received on the scope of the “effects of the action” and the proposed two-part test for effects of the action of “but for” and “reasonably certain to occur” and present our responses. We address changes to the environmental baseline definition in a separate discussion below.
Scope of Effects of the Action
Comment: Some commenters were concerned that removal of the terms “direct,” “indirect,” “interrelated,” and “interdependent” would hamper discussions because those terms could no longer be used.
Response: The terms are not prohibited from use in discussion, as they can be useful when discussing the mode or pathway of the effects of an action or activity. However, as discussed above, elimination of these terms simplifies the definition of “effects of the action” and causes fewer concerns about parsing what label applies to each consequence. Now consequences caused by the proposed
Comment: A commenter questioned the ability of the proposed two-part test to capture the risks of low probability but high consequence impacts such as an oil spill and welcomed an explanation of this scenario.
Response: As discussed throughout this rule and in the proposed rule, the Service's overall approach to “effects of the action” has been retained. During consultation, the consequences of the Federal agency action are reviewed in light of specific facts and circumstances related to the proposed action. If appropriate, those effects are then considered in the effects of the action analysis. Therefore, the Services expect that scenarios such as that mentioned by the commenter will be subject to review just as they have been in current consultation practice.
Comment: One commenter believed that it is critical to clarify that consultation is focused on the actual effects of the agency action on listed species and designated critical habitat, and that those effects are to be differentiated from the environmental baseline. They recommended adding “[e]ffects of the action shall be clearly differentiated from the environmental baseline” to the definition of “effects of the action.”
Response: The Services decline to make the suggested addition to the definition of “effects of the action.” In the proposed rule, the Services made clear that the “environmental baseline” is a separate consideration from the effects of the proposed Federal action by both proposing to separate the definition of the term into a standalone definition and by clarifying the instruction to add the effects of the action to the environmental baseline as part of amendments to the language at § 402.14(g). As discussed above, the Services also have added an additional sentence to the definition of environmental baseline to help further clarify when the consequences of certain ongoing agency facilities and activities fall within the environmental baseline and would therefore not be considered in “effects of the action.”
Comment: A few commenters requested that if the distinction between non-Federal “activities” and “effects” is maintained, the background to the final rule should more clearly explain the purpose and meaning of the distinction, and that the Services should clarify that discretionary Federal actions currently characterized as “interrelated and interdependent” remain subject to the consultation requirement.
Response: The Services are adopting a revised definition of effects of the action, as described above. The distinction between activities and effects (now “consequences”) in this definition is intended to capture two aspects of the analysis of the “effects of the action.” First, a proposed Federal action may cause other associated or connected actions, which are referred to as other activities caused by the proposed action in the definition to differentiate them from the proposed Federal “action.” These activities would have been called “interrelated” or “interdependent” actions or “indirect effects” under the prior definition codified at § 402.02. In large part due to the three possible categories these activities could have fallen into, and the debates that regularly ensued while attempting to categorize them, we chose to collapse those three possible categories and “direct effects” into “all consequences” caused by the proposed action. Second, both the proposed action and the other activities caused by the proposed action may have physical, chemical, or biotic consequences on the listed species and critical habitat. Both the proposed action and other activities caused by the proposed action must be investigated to determine the physical, chemical, and biotic consequences. In the case of an activity that is caused by (but not part of) the proposed action, the two-part test must be examined twice—once for the activity and then again for the consequences of that activity. Additionally, if Federal activities caused by the Federal agency action under consultation are identified, those additional activities should be “combined in the consultation and a lead agency . . . determined for the overall consultation” (1998 Consultation Handbook at p. 4-28).
Comment: One commenter argued that, by eliminating the language directing the Services to consider direct and indirect effects together with interrelated or interdependent actions, the Services have revised the language to account only for direct effects. They argue that this proposed revision is inconsistent with the intent of the Act and its scientific underpinnings, as it ignores the fact that many imperiled species face multiple threats that compound one another.
Response: The proposed definition of “effects of the action” neither ignored the multiple threats facing listed species and critical habitats nor did it reduce all effects analysis only to the consideration of direct effects. The Services have adopted a revised, final definition of “effects of the action” that clarifies that all of the consequences of a proposed action must be evaluated, and that the causation tests are applied to all effects of the proposed action. Contrary to the commenter's assertion, a complete assessment of the “effects of the action” would require, where appropriate, the consideration of multiple stressors and consequences resulting from any synergistic, or compounding factors. These consequences would then be added to the environmental baseline and cumulative effects per the provisions now found at § 402.14(g)(4).
Comment: One commenter suggested the final regulations explicitly recognize an obligation to consider “spillover effects”: “In some contexts, efforts to modify or condition an action in order to reduce the impacts of the activity may result in `spillover effects' that, ultimately, result in more adverse impacts to the species. A `spillover effect' is the unintended consequence that occurs when an action in one market results in a corollary effect in another market. For example, a closure of the Hawaii-based shallow-set longline fishery in the early 2000s was demonstrated to result in thousands of additional sea turtle interactions due to the replacement of market share by foreign fisheries that do not implement the same protected species measures as the U.S. fishery and consequently interact with many more turtles.”
Response: The purpose and obligation of section 7(a)(2) of the Act is that Federal agencies are required to insure their proposed actions are not likely to jeopardize listed species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. This obligation is directed solely at the Federal action and may not be abrogated because of the potential response of other agencies or entities engaged in the same or similar actions. In the case of proposed Federal actions, the consequences of the proposed action, such as the incidental capture of sea turtles in Hawaii-based longline fishing gear from the commenter's example, must be evaluated. Other consequences could possibly include such “spillover effects” if they meet the “but for” and “reasonably certain to occur” causation tests applied to consequences caused by the proposed action under the revised, final definition of effects of the action, but this would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Further, the effects of other actions such as those described in the example may already be included in the overall jeopardy analysis as part of the status of the species, environmental baseline, and/or cumulative effects.
Comment: A few commenters were concerned that we were proposing a different standard when evaluating the effects of “harmful” or “beneficial” actions or activities, or conversely, that we were not proposing a different standard when we should hold “beneficial actions” to a higher certainty standard given their importance in minimizing or offsetting the adverse effects of proposed actions.
Response: Commenters pointed to examples in case law or past projects where actions or measures to avoid, minimize, or offset the effects of agency actions were held to an expectation of “specific or binding plans.” While the Services appreciate the concern raised, the Services do not intend to hold beneficial activities or measures offsetting adverse effects to either a higher or lower standard than any other type of action or measure proposed by a Federal agency. Any type of action proposed by a Federal agency first receives a presumption that it will occur, but it must also be described in sufficient detail that FWS or NMFS can both understand the action and evaluate the effects of the action. Similarly, whether considered beneficial or adverse, the consequences of the various components of the Federal agency's action are governed by the same causation standard set forth in the definition of “effects of the action.”
Comment: A few commenters suggested that the “effects” of the action should not include “effects” that an agency lacks the legal authority to lessen, offset, or prevent in taking the action.
Response: As we further discuss below under § 402.03, Applicability, the Services decline to limit the “effects of the action” to only those effects or activities over which the Federal agency exerts legal authority or control. As an initial matter, section 7 applies to actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control (50 CFR 402.03). Once in consultation, all consequences caused by the proposed action, including the consequences of activities caused by the proposed action, must be considered under the Services' definition of “effects of the action.” These may include the consequences to the listed species or designated critical habitat from the activities of some party other than the Federal agency seeking consultation, provided those activities would not occur but for the proposed action under consultation, and both the activities and the consequences to the listed species or designated critical habitat are reasonably certain to occur. Where this causation standard is met, the action agency has a substantive duty under the statute to ensure the effects of its discretionary action are not likely to jeopardize a listed species or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. We recognize that the Services and action agencies sometimes struggle with the concept of reviewing the consequences from other activities not under the action agency's control in a consultation. However, including all relevant consequences is not a fault assessment procedure; rather, it is the required analysis necessary for a Federal agency to comply with its substantive duties under section 7(a)(2). When the Services write an incidental take statement for a biological opinion, under section 7(b)(4)(iv) of the Act they can assign responsibility of specific terms and conditions of the incidental take statement to the federal agency, the applicant, or both. As the Supreme Court noted in Home Builders, “ TVA v . Hill thus supports the position . . . that the [Act]'s no-jeopardy mandate applies to every discretionary agency action— regardless of the expense or burden its application might impose” (551 U.S. at 671 [emphasis added]).
The legislative history of section 7 of the Act confirms the Services' position. In particular, National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (1976) is a case often cited to support the proposition that indirect effects outside the authority and jurisdiction of an action agency are a relevant consideration in determining if the agency action is likely to jeopardize a listed species or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. The Act's legislative history from 1979 indicates that Congress was fully aware of the Coleman decision when they changed the definition from “does not jeopardize” to “is not likely to jeopardize.” In fact, the House Conference Report 96-697 to the 1979 amendments specifically references the case. In referencing the relevant amendments to section 7, the Conference Report says, “The conference report adopts the language of the house amendment to section 7(a) pertaining to consultation by federal agencies with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. The amendment, which would require all federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species or result in the adverse modification of critical habitat, brings the language of the statute into conformity with existing agency practice, and judicial decisions, such as the opinion in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman. H.R. Conference Report 96-697 (1979).”
“But for” Causation
Comment: Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed application of the “but for” test to the effects of the proposed action would result in a simplistic evaluation of effects that would miss important considerations of the consequences of multiple effects, synergistic effects, or other more complex pathways by which an action may affect listed species or critical habitat.
Response: As noted elsewhere, the Services have revised the definition of “effects of the action” to indicate that all consequences of the proposed action must be considered and to apply the two-part test of “but for” and “reasonably certain to occur” to all effects. This approach is, in application, consistent with the prior regulatory definition, and the Services accordingly anticipate the scope of their effects analyses will stay the same.
As with current practice, the Services intend to evaluate the appropriate pathways of causation specific to the action and its effects for the purposes of the assessment of impacts to the species and critical habitat. This is not a liability test but an assessment of the expected consequences of an action using, for example, well-founded, physical, chemical, and biotic principles that are relevant to Act consultations. For a consequence to be considered an effect of the action, it must have a causal relationship with the action or activity. “But for” causation does not impair the Services' inquiry into other complex scenarios. As we noted above, a complete assessment of the “effects of the action” would require, where appropriate, the consideration of multiple stressors and overlapping, synergistic, or contributing factors. All of these considerations are important in ecology, sufficiently captured in the application of the “but for” test, and routinely serve as the foundation for section 7(a)(2) analyses. In addition, these consequences would then be added to the environmental baseline, which along with cumulative effects, status of the species and critical habitat, are used to complete our section 7(a)(2) assessment.
Comment: A few commenters urged the Services to adopt a “proximate cause” standard as the appropriate standard for determining the effects of the action.
Response: Although the term “proximate cause” was used by several commenters, the term itself and its application to the determination of the Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), Justice O'Connor described proximate cause as “introducing notions of foreseeability.” Id. at 709. As set out below, the “reasonably certain to occur” test in our definition of “effects of the action” imparts similar limitations on causation as an explicit foreseeability test. Additionally, the “but for” causation standard is in essence a factual causation standard. The Services' test to determine the effects of the action, therefore, adopts analogous principles to those identified by courts for proximate causation.
Comment: Several commenters cited to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) case law, such as Department of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (“ Public Citizen” ) in support of their view of the proper scope of the analysis of the effects of the action and the use of proximate causation to determine those effects.
Response: The Services decline to adopt the sort of “proximate cause” standard in the context of section 7 of the Act that has been applied by courts in the NEPA context. A “proximate cause” standard has been invoked by courts in the NEPA context (for example, see Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767). We reviewed the relevant NEPA case law, including Public Citizen, and do not think it is determinative in the context of section 7(a)(2) of the Act. The Services concluded that the cases cited were focused on a different issue than what is required when determining the “effects of the action.” As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008), Public Citizen “stands for nothing more than the intuitive proposition that an agency cannot be held accountable for the effects of actions it has no discretion not to take.” Id. at 1144. In addition, many of these cases emphasized that the NEPA and Act are not similar statutes and have different underlying policies and purposes. For example, in Public Citizen, the Supreme Court emphasized that NEPA's two purposes (to inform the decision-maker and engage the public) would not be served by analyzing those actions over which the action agency had no discretion. Id. at 767-68. We agree that the same is true for actions under the Act; that is, by regulation, the Act only applies to actions in which there is “discretionary Federal involvement or control” (50 CFR 402.03). See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667 (U.S. 2007) (holding section 7(a)(2) applies to only discretionary Federal actions but distinguishing Public Citizen on the grounds that Act “imposes a substantive (and not just a procedural) statutory requirement”).
With regard to that distinction, the cited cases point to the underlying policy differences between NEPA and the Act, with an emphasis on the affirmative burden on Federal action agencies with regard to endangered species. This is a significant distinction as the Supreme Court noted in Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), “courts must look to the underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.” Id. at 774 n. 7. The underlying policy of a statute and legislative intent must shape the causation nexus. In that regard, section 7(a)(2) of the Act imposes an affirmative and substantive duty on Federal agencies to avoid actions that are likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify/destroy critical habitat. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 671 (“the [Act]'s no-jeopardy mandate applies to every discretionary agency action—regardless of the expense or burden its application might impose”). In light of the above, and the related reasons the Services discussed in rejecting a “jurisdiction or control” limit to the effects of discretionary agency actions, the Services decline to impose an additional proximate causation requirement applicable in the NEPA context for effects of the action under section 7(a)(2).
Comment: One commenter requested that the Services explain how the “effects of the action” assessment changes the consideration of “indirect effects,” which does not currently use “but for” causation.
Response: The original definition of “indirect effects” in regulation at § 402.02 refers to effects that are “caused by” the proposed action whereas the Services' 1998 Consultation Handbook includes the phrase “caused by or results from,” both of which require an assessment of a causal connection between an action and an effect. The “but for” causation test in the revised, final definition of “effects of the action” is similar to “caused by” or “caused by or results from” in that both tests speak to a connection between the proposed action and the consequent results of that action, whether they be physical, chemical, or biotic consequences to the environment, the species, or critical habitat, or activities that would not occur but for the proposed action. Both tests require a determination of factual causation, and we do not anticipate a change in the Services' practice in applying “but for” causation to consequences once termed “indirect effects” compared to the regulatory term “caused by.” As we noted in the preamble of the proposed rule, “[i]t has long been our practice that identification of direct and indirect effects as well as interrelated and interdependent activities is governed by the `but for' standard of causation. Our [1998] Consultation Handbook states . . . `In determining whether the proposed action is reasonably likely to be the direct or indirect cause of incidental take, the Services use the simple causation principle: i.e., `but for' the implementation of the proposed action. . . .' ([1998] Consultation Handbook, page 4-47)” (83 FR 35178, July 25, 2018, p. 83 FR 35183).
Comment: One commenter expressed concerns that the use of the “but for” test could result in a determination of “effects” that is over inclusive. They supported the retention of the current rules governing the “effects of the action” and advocated their application in conjunction with the multi-factor test for effects described in the 1998 Consultation Handbook. Conversely, one other commenter felt that the test was narrowing the scope and we should retain the term originally used in “indirect effects,” “or result from” in our 1998 Consultation Handbook definition—in other words “effects or activities that are caused by or result from.”
Response: The Services requested comment whether the proposed definition altered the scope of the effects of the action. With the revisions we are making in this final rule and as discussed elsewhere in this rule, there will not be a shift in the scope of the effects we consider under our new definition of “effects of the action,” and, therefore, our analyses will be neither over nor under inclusive. Some of the commenters expressing concerns about over-inclusivity refer to a multi-factor
“Reasonably Certain to Occur”
Comment: Several commenters requested that we articulate a set of factors to apply in determining what effects are reasonably certain to occur from a proposed action.
Response: We agree with the commenters' suggestion. Please see our discussion of changes to § 402.17 under Section 402.17—Other Provisions, above.
Comment: Some commenters suggested that the test for effects of the action should also include “reasonably foreseeable” as a means of further avoiding speculation or over inflation of the effects of an action or activities.
Response: The Services responded to similar comments in the preambles to the 1986 regulation (51 FR 19926, June 3, 1986, p. 51 FR 19932) and the 2008 regulation (73 FR 76272, December 16, 2008, p. 73 FR 76277). Again in this rule, we decline to make this change. The Services view “reasonably certain to occur” to be a higher threshold than “reasonably foreseeable,” a term that is more in line with the scope of effects analysis under NEPA. As stated in the 1986 preamble, “NEPA is procedural in nature, rather than substantive, which would warrant a more expanded review of . . . effects” than the Act, which imposes “a substantive prohibition” (51 FR 19926, June 3, 1986, p. 51 FR 19933). The Act's prohibitions against Federal actions that are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat calls for a stricter standard than “reasonably foreseeable.”
Comment: Some commenters requested that the Services elaborate on the factors to consider when determining whether an activity is reasonably certain to occur as part of the two-part test for effects of the action. Others provided proposals of appropriate factors or specificity that should be contained in such an assessment. These included: (1) The extent to which a prior action that is similar in scope, nature, magnitude, and location has caused a consequent action or activity to occur; (2) any existing plans for the initiation of an action or activity by the consulting action agency, the permit or license applicant or another related entity that is directly connected to, and dependent upon, implementation of the proposed action; and (3) the extent to which a potential action or activity has intervening or necessary economic, administrative, and legal requirements that are prerequisites for the action to be initiated and the level of certainty that can be attributed to the completion of such intervening or necessary steps. A few commenters suggested that the only factor should be whether the activity was “definitely planned and concretely identifiable,” while others suggested the only factor should be the use of the best scientific and commercial data available.
Response: Identifying activities that are “reasonably certain to occur” is one part of the two-part test when evaluating the consequences of a proposed Federal action. As discussed in the proposed rule, this two-part test identifies activities previously captured under “indirect effects” and “interrelated and interdependent actions” that are now included within “all consequences” caused by the proposed action. “Reasonably certain to occur” is also the current test in the identification of non-Federal activities that should be included as cumulative effects. Our intent with the proposed factors to consider was to provide a general, but not limiting, guideline to inform the assessment. However, upon consideration of the comments and suggestions, the Services have revised the factors under § 402.17(a) to further elaborate on the factors related to the Service's past experience with identifying activities that are reasonably certain to occur as a result of a proposed action and the type of plans that would be indicative of an activity that is reasonably certain to occur. Suggestions to limit the consideration of activities that are reasonably certain to occur to only those that are “definitely planned and concretely identifiable” would inappropriately narrow the scope of our consideration of the effects of a proposed Federal action. For the factors we have identified, we also note that this list of factors is neither exhaustive nor a required minimum set of considerations.
Additionally, the Services have specified that the conclusion that an activity is reasonably certain to occur must be based on clear and substantial information, using the best scientific and commercial data available. We believe these revisions help clarify the potentially relevant

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

## Nearby sections

- [84 FR 7283 Utility Allowance Submetering](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03827.md)
- [84 FR 7292 Security Zone; Corpus Christi Ship Channel, Corpus Christi, TX](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03833.md)
- [84 FR 7302 Atlantic Highly Migratory Species; Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03816.md)
- [84 FR 7303 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod by Catcher Vessels Greater Than or Equal to 50 Feet Length Overall Using Hook-and-Line Gear in the Central Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03813.md)
- [84 FR 7808 Modification of Class E Airspace for the Following Alaska Towns; Hooper Bay, AK; Kaltag, AK; King Salmon, AK; Kodiak, AK; Manokotak, AK; and Middleton Island, AK](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03837.md)
- [84 FR 7810 Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan (RSFPP)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03889.md)
- [84 FR 7991 Food Additives Permitted in Feed and Drinking Water of Animals; Selenomethionine Hydroxy Analogue](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03909.md)
- [84 FR 7998 Air Plan Approval; Tennessee; NOX SIP Call and CAIR](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-03956.md)
- [84 FR 8029 Commercial Driver's License Upgrade from Class B to Class A](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04044.md)
- [84 FR 8262 Approval of State Plans for Designated Facilities and Pollutants; Kansas; Sewage Sludge Incineration Units](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04051.md)
- [84 FR 8420 Safety Zone; Oregon Inlet, Dare County, NC](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04219.md)
- [84 FR 8443 Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 Bands](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04055.md)
- [84 FR 8474 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod by Hook-and-Line Catcher/Processors in the Central Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04217.md)
- [84 FR 8605 Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer) Airplanes](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-04312.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_RULE_2019-17517. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.
