# 77 FR 69934: Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

> Federal · Regulations · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2012-27235

## Section

- **Citation:** 77 FR 69934
- **Heading:** Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Regulations
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Federal Register / Vol. 77 / 77 FR 69934

## Text

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 47 CFR Parts 1, 27, and 73 [Docket No. 12-268; FCC 12-118] Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions AGENCY:
Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION:
Proposed rule.

SUMMARY:
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions” ( NPRM ), released October 2, 2012, the Commission considers matters related to the implementation of Congress's mandate to conduct an incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum as set forth in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Spectrum Act).

DATES:
Comments for this proceeding are due on or before December 21, 2012; reply comments are due on or before February 19, 2012. Written PRA comments on the proposed information collection requirements contained herein must be submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other interested parties on or before January 22, 2013.

ADDRESSES:
You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. 12-268 and/or FCC 12-118, by any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov . Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• Federal Communications Commission's Web Site: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ . Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• Mail: Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail (although we continue to experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail.) All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
• People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432
experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail.) All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
• People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any PRA comments on the proposed collection requirements contained herein should be submitted to the Federal Communications Commission via email to PRA@fcc.gov and to Cathy.Williams@fcc.gov and also to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of Management and Budget, via email to Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov or via fax at 202-395-5167.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For further information about this NPRM, please contact Jennifer Manner at (202) 418-3619, Jennifer.Manner@fcc.gov . For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to PRA@fcc.gov or contact Cathy Williams at (202) 418-2918, or via email at Cathy.Williams@fcc.gov .

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
This is a summary of the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 12-118, Docket No. 12-268, adopted on September 28, 2012, and released on October 2, 2012. The full text of this document is available for public inspection and copying during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street SW., CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. These documents will also be available via ECFS ( http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ )
FCC 12-118, Docket No. 12-268, adopted on September 28, 2012, and released on October 2, 2012. The full text of this document is available for public inspection and copying during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street SW., CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. These documents will also be available via ECFS ( http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ ). (Documents will be available electronically in ASCII, Word 97, and/or Adobe Acrobat.) The complete text may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, 445 12th Street SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554. To request this document in accessible formats (computer diskettes, large print, audio recording, and Braille), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Pursuant to §§ 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using: (1) The Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), (2) the Federal Government's eRulemaking Portal, or (3) by filing paper copies. See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
• Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ or the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov . Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments.
• For ECFS filers, if multiple docket or rulemaking numbers appear in the caption of this proceeding, filers must transmit one electronic copy of the comments for each docket or rulemaking number referenced in the caption. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking number
ting comments.
• For ECFS filers, if multiple docket or rulemaking numbers appear in the caption of this proceeding, filers must transmit one electronic copy of the comments for each docket or rulemaking number referenced in the caption. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking number. Parties may also submit an electronic comment by Internet email. To get filing instructions, filers should send an email to ecfs@fcc.gov, and include the following words in the body of the message, “get form.” A sample form and directions will be sent in response.
• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and four copies of each filing. If more than one docket or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, filers must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking number.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail (although we continue to experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail). All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
• The Commission's contractor will receive hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary at FCC Headquarters building located at 445 12th Street SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20054. The filing hours at this location are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.
• Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
• U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington DC 20554
be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.
• Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
• U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington DC 20554.
To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty). To view or obtain a copy of this information collection request (ICR) submitted to OMB: (1) Go to this OMB/GSA Web page: http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain, (2) look for the section of the Web page called “Currently Under Review,” (3) click on the downward-pointing arrow in the “Select Agency” box below the “Currently Under Review” heading, (4) select “Federal Communications Commission” from the list of agencies presented in the “Select Agency” box, (5) click the “Submit” button to the right of the “Select Agency” box, and (6) when the list of FCC ICRs currently under review appears, look for the OMB control number of this ICR as shown in this section (or its title if there is no OMB control number) and then click on the ICR Reference Number. A copy of the FCC submission to OMB will be displayed.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis
This document contains proposed revised information collection requirements. As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burden and as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), the Federal Communications Commission invites the general public and other Federal agencies to comment on the following information collection(s). Public and agency comments are due January 22, 2013
ins proposed revised information collection requirements. As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burden and as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), the Federal Communications Commission invites the general public and other Federal agencies to comment on the following information collection(s). Public and agency comments are due January 22, 2013. Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might “further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.”
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Reimbursement of Repacking Expenses, Section 73.3700, FCC Form 399.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 399.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 4,166 respondents; 4,166 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 0.5-2 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement; On occasion reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 7,124 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $249,600.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits
ntities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 4,166 respondents; 4,166 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 0.5-2 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement; On occasion reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 7,124 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $249,600.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, eligible stations (full power and Class A television) that are repacked and multichannel video programming distributors (MPVDs) that incur expenses as a result of repacking will be eligible for reimbursement. The Incentive Auction NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —All effected entities will be required to file FCC Form 399. It is proposed that stations and MVPDs will have the option of choosing to either be reimbursed with an advance payment based on estimated expenses or reimbursed for their actual, documented expenses. Stations and MVPDs will have to submit a reimbursement request and those requesting advance payments will have to later certify that all funds were properly expended.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Channel Sharing Agreements, Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: Not applicable.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government
t a reimbursement request and those requesting advance payments will have to later certify that all funds were properly expended.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Channel Sharing Agreements, Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: Not applicable.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,254 respondents; 2,254 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1 hr.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 2,254 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $1,217,400.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that channel sharing bidders be required to include certain terms in their channel sharing agreements (CSAs) and to file their CSAs with the Commission. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Channel sharing bidders be required to include certain terms in their CSAs and to file their CSAs with the Commission.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Band Transition Activity Station Report, Section 73.3700; FCC Form 390.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 390.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 4,508 respondents; 4,508 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-85 hours
rol Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Band Transition Activity Station Report, Section 73.3700; FCC Form 390.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 390.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 4,508 respondents; 4,508 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-85 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; one time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 87,719 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $134,400.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, stations that are repacked to new channel assignments will be required to conduct consumer education, including on-air announcements of their new channel assignments, and to submit a Form 390 to report on their activities. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Stations that are repacked to new channel assignments will be required to conduct consumer
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: MVPD Notice, Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: Not applicable.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,254 respondents; 2,254 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-2 hours
e required to conduct consumer
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-XXXX.
Title: MVPD Notice, Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: Not applicable.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,254 respondents; 2,254 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-2 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement; Third party disclosure requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 4,283 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $135,000.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, stations that are repacked to new channel assignments will be required to provide notice to multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) so that MVPDs can make the necessary changes to their channel lineups. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —The MVPD Notice would be provided in the form of a letter by stations to the MVPD and would need to contain certain information.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0027.
Title: Application for Construction Permit for Commercial Broadcast Station, FCC Form 301; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 301.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government
ld need to contain certain information.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0027.
Title: Application for Construction Permit for Commercial Broadcast Station, FCC Form 301; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 301.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 6,387 respondents; 9,823 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-6.25 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; One time reporting requirement; Third party disclosure requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 31,195 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $107,372,573.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 303 and 308 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, all repacked full power television stations will need to file FCC Form 301 for their new channel facility. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Repacked full power television stations will need to file FCC Form 301 for their new channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0932.
Title: Application for Authority to Construct or Make Changes in a Class A Television Broadcast Station, FCC Form 301-CA; 47 CFR Section 74.793(d); 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 301-CA.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government
s: 3060-0932.
Title: Application for Authority to Construct or Make Changes in a Class A Television Broadcast Station, FCC Form 301-CA; 47 CFR Section 74.793(d); 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 301-CA.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 871 respondents; 871 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 2.50-7 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; One time reporting requirement; Third party disclosure requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 8,275 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $5,483,360.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 307, 308, 309 and 319 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012,, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, all repacked Class A television stations will need to file FCC Form 301-CA for their new channel facility. The Incentive Auction NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Repacked Class A television stations will need to file FCC Form 301-CA for their new channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0928.
Title: Application for Class A Television Broadcast Station Construction Permit or License, FCC Form 302-CA; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 302-CA.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government
channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0928.
Title: Application for Class A Television Broadcast Station Construction Permit or License, FCC Form 302-CA; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 302-CA.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 521 respondents; 521 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 2 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; one time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 1,042 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $148,485.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 307, 308, 309 and 319 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, all channel sharing Class A stations will need to file FCC Form 302-CA for their shared channel facility. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Channel sharing Class A stations will need to file FCC Form 302-CA for their shared channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0837.
Title: Application for DTV Broadcast Station License, FCC Form 302-DTV; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 302-DTV.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,083 respondents; 2,083 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-2 hours
DTV Broadcast Station License, FCC Form 302-DTV; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 302-DTV.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,083 respondents; 2,083 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-2 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; One time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 2,561 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $1,132,555.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 303, and 308 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, all channel sharing full power educational stations will need to file FCC Form 302-DTV for their shared channel facility. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Channel sharing stations will need to file FCC Form 302-DTV for their shared channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0029.
Title: Application for Construction Permit for Reserved Channel Noncommercial Educational Broadcast Station, FCC Form 340; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 340.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 3,161 respondents; 3,161 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-6 hours
mercial Educational Broadcast Station, FCC Form 340; 47 CFR Section 73.3700.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 340.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 3,161 respondents; 3,161 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 1-6 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; One time reporting requirement; Third party disclosure requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 7,746 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $30,058,700.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 303 and 308 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, all repacked full power noncommercial educational stations will need to file FCC Form 340 for their new channel facility. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Repacked noncommercial educational stations will need to file FCC Form 340 for their new channel facility.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0016.
Title: Application for Authority to Construct or Make Changes in a Low Power TV, TV Translator or TV Booster Station, FCC Form 346; 47 CFR Section 74.793(d); Section 73.3700, LPTV Repacking Displacement Application.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 346.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 9,600 respondents; 9,600 responses
r TV Booster Station, FCC Form 346; 47 CFR Section 74.793(d); Section 73.3700, LPTV Repacking Displacement Application.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 346.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 9,600 respondents; 9,600 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 2.5-9.5 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement; On occasion time reporting requirement; Third party disclosure requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 30,720 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $15,844,800.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i), 301, 303, 307, 308 and 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, low power television stations and TV translator stations may be displaced from their current operating channel and will be afforded an opportunity to file a displacement application on FCC Form 346. The NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Following the completion of the incentive auction process, low power television stations and TV translator stations may be displaced from their current operating channel and will be afforded an opportunity to file a displacement application on FCC Form 346. There is no change in the FCC Form 346 as a result of the proposed rulemaking being adopted by the Commission.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0386
ollowing the completion of the incentive auction process, low power television stations and TV translator stations may be displaced from their current operating channel and will be afforded an opportunity to file a displacement application on FCC Form 346. There is no change in the FCC Form 346 as a result of the proposed rulemaking being adopted by the Commission.
OMB Control Numbers: 3060-0386.
Title: Special Temporary Authorization (STA) Requests; Notifications; and Informal Filings; Sections 1.5, 73.1615, 73.1635, 73.1740 and 73.3598; CDBS Informal Forms; Section 74.788; Low Power Television, TV Translator and Class A Television Digital Transition Notifications; FCC Form 337; Section 73.3700, Service Rule Waiver in Lieu of Reimbursement.
Form Numbers: FCC Form 337.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not for profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 7,424 respondents; 7,424 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 0.5-4 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement; One time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 7,124 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $2,382,585.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s)
to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 1, 4(i) and (j), 7, 154(i), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 336 and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information.
Privacy Act Assessment: No impact(s).
Needs and Uses: In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, released by the Commission on October 2, 2012, it is proposed that, following the completion of the incentive auction process, eligible stations that are repacked to new channel assignments may request a waiver of the service rules in lieu of seeking reimbursement of their repacking expenses by submitting an informal filing. In addition, stations that need additional time to relocate to their new channel assignments may be required to submit a request for extension of time (FCC Form 337), tolling notification, or request for Special Temporary Authority (STA). The Incentive Auction NPRM adopts the following proposed information collection requirements:
47 CFR 73.3700 —Entities seeking a service rule waiver in lieu of reimbursement would be required to file a request for waiver using the informal filing system. Stations needing additional time to construct would required to submit a request for extension of time (FCC Form 337), tolling notification, or request for Special Temporary Authority (STA).
There is no change in the FCC Form 337 as a result of the proposed rulemaking being adopted by the Commission.
OMB Control Number: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Sections 1.946, 1.949, 27.10, 27.12, 27.17, etc.—Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions—NPRM, FCC 12-118.
Form Number: N/A.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for-profit entities, and state, local, or tribal government.
Number of Respondents: 101 respondents; 101 responses
MB Control Number: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Sections 1.946, 1.949, 27.10, 27.12, 27.17, etc.—Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions—NPRM, FCC 12-118.
Form Number: N/A.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for-profit entities, and state, local, or tribal government.
Number of Respondents: 101 respondents; 101 responses.
Estimated Time per Response: 1 hour.
Frequency of Response: On occasion and once every 10 year reporting requirements, recordkeeping requirements, and other third party disclosure requirements.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain or retain benefits. Statutory authority for these collections are contained in 47 U.S.C. 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Total Annual Burden: 31 hours.
Total Annual Cost: $0.
Privacy Impact Assessment: N/A.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality.
Needs and Uses: The Commission seeks Office of Management and Budget approval for this new information collection for a full three-year clearance. On September 28, 2012, the FCC adopted an Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ), FCC 12-118, GN Docket No. 12-268.
The following is a description of each Wireless Broadband Service Rules section public reporting requirements for Licensees in the 600 MHz Band in the NPRM:
Section 1.946(d) requires 600 MHz licensees to file a construction notification and certify that they have met the applicable performance benchmarks.
Section 1.949 requires 600 MHz licensees to file license renewal applications
. 12-268.
The following is a description of each Wireless Broadband Service Rules section public reporting requirements for Licensees in the 600 MHz Band in the NPRM:
Section 1.946(d) requires 600 MHz licensees to file a construction notification and certify that they have met the applicable performance benchmarks.
Section 1.949 requires 600 MHz licensees to file license renewal applications. Included in the application should be a detailed description of the: (1) Provision of service during the entire license period; (2) level and quality of service provided; (3) date service commenced; (4) whether service was ever interrupted; (5) the duration of any interruption or outage; (6) the extent to which service is provided in rural areas; (7) access to spectrum and service provided to qualifying tribal lands; and (8) any other factors associated with the level of service to the public.
Section 27.10(d) requires 600 MHz licensees to notify the Commission within 30 days if a 600 MHz licensee changes, or adds to, the carrier status on its license.
Section 27.12 requires 600 MHz licensees to comply with certain foreign ownership reporting requirements.
Section 27.17 requires 600 MHz licensees to notify the Commission within 10 days if they permanently discontinue service by filing FCC Forms 601 or 605 and requesting license cancellation.
30 Day Notice Requirement requires 600 MHz licensees, along with TV broadcasters in the 470-698 MHz band, to provide thirty days' notice to all incumbent fixed Broadcast Auxiliary Service (BAS) operations within interference range prior to commencing operations in the vicinity.
The Commission will use the information to ensure 600 MHz licensees' compliance with required filings of notifications, certifications, regulatory status changes, and meeting applicable performance benchmarks
70-698 MHz band, to provide thirty days' notice to all incumbent fixed Broadcast Auxiliary Service (BAS) operations within interference range prior to commencing operations in the vicinity.
The Commission will use the information to ensure 600 MHz licensees' compliance with required filings of notifications, certifications, regulatory status changes, and meeting applicable performance benchmarks. Also, such information will be used to minimize interference, verify whether 600 MHz applicants are legally and technically qualified to hold licenses and to determine compliance with Commission's rules. Any submissions made through the Universal Licensing System (ULS) must be filed electronically.
These proposals are designed to provide for flexible use of this spectrum by allowing licensees to choose their type of service offerings, to encourage innovation and investment in mobile broadband use in this spectrum, and to provide a stable regulatory environment in which broadband deployment would be able to develop through the application of standard terrestrial wireless rules. Without this information, the Commission would not be able to carry out its statutory responsibilities.
OMB Control Number: 3060-XXXX.
Title: Application by a Broadcast Licensee to Participate in a Broadcast Spectrum Incentive Auction (BSIA), FCC Form 177; and Section 1.22002 (NPRM).
Form Number: FCC Form 177.
Type of Review: New collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not-for-profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 2,254 respondents; 2,254 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 3 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 6,762 hours.
Total Annual Cost: N/A.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i) and 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended
sponses: 2,254 respondents; 2,254 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 3 hours.
Frequency of Response: One time reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 6,762 hours.
Total Annual Cost: N/A.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection is contained in sections 154(i) and 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: Pursuant to statute, pending the effective date of related license reassignments and spectrum reallocations, the Commission will take all reasonable steps necessary to protect the confidentiality of Commission-held data of a broadcast licensee participating in the broadcast spectrum incentive auction. The NPRM proposed adopting the following rule to comply with this mandate: 47 CFR 1.22006.
Privacy Act Assessment: N/A.
Needs and Uses: The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 12-118, released October 2, 2012 ( NPRM ) proposes that any broadcast licensee choosing to participate in the broadcast spectrum incentive auction must provide information to demonstrate that it is legally, technically, and financially qualified to participate.
The NPRM proposed adopting the following rules regarding the collection of information collection from such parties: 47 CFR 1.22000 and 1.22004.
Information collection on the form will include information regarding the relevant broadcast license, information regarding parties with an ownership interest in the license, and if applicable, information regarding any agreement that the applicant may have to share a broadcast channel in the event that it relinquishes some of its spectrum usage rights through the auction.
OMB Control Number: 3060-0600.
Title: Application to Participate in a FCC Auction; FCC Form 175; 47 CFR Sections 1.2105, 1.2110 and 1.2112.
Form Number: FCC Form 175.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection
rding any agreement that the applicant may have to share a broadcast channel in the event that it relinquishes some of its spectrum usage rights through the auction.
OMB Control Number: 3060-0600.
Title: Application to Participate in a FCC Auction; FCC Form 175; 47 CFR Sections 1.2105, 1.2110 and 1.2112.
Form Number: FCC Form 175.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other for profit entities; Not-for-profit institutions; State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents/Responses: 500 respondents; 500 responses.
Estimated Hours per Response: 90 minutes.
Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement.
Total Annual Burden: 750 hours.
Total Annual Cost: N/A.
Obligation To Respond: Required to obtain or retain benefits. The statutory authority for this information collection
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: There is no need for confidentiality with this collection of information. Applicants may request confidential treatment of information collected in FCC Form 175 pursuant to 47 CFR 0.459 of the FCC's rules.
Privacy Act Assessment: N/A.
Needs and Uses: The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 12-118, released October 2, 2012 ( NPRM ) proposes that any party applying to participate in any auction specified by statute must certify that it is not barred by the applicable statutory prohibition against specified parties participating in the auction. The NPRM proposed to adopting the following subparagraph to Commission rule 1.2105 regarding the collection of information collection from such parties: 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(xii).
The Commission will revise the FCC Form 175, if the proposal is adopted, to require a party to certify compliance with the statutory requirement prior to submitting the Form.
Synopsis of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
I. Introduction
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ensure that every American has “access to broadband capability.” The resulting National Broadband Plan emphasized the indispensable importance of wireless spectrum in achieving Congress's broadband goals, recommending that the Commission make 300 megahertz of spectrum available for mobile broadband use within five years, including by reallocating a portion of the broadcast television spectrum.
3. The Spectrum Act authorizes the Commission to conduct incentive auctions in which licensees may voluntarily relinquish their spectrum usage rights in order to permit the assignment by auction of new initial licenses subject to flexible use service rules, in exchange for a portion of the resulting auction proceeds. Section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, which is not codified in the Communications Act, requires the Commission to conduct an incentive auction of the broadcast television spectrum and includes specific requirements and safeguards for the required auction.
4. The purpose of the NPRM is to develop rules and policies for the incentive auction process. The incentive auction will have three major pieces: (1) A “reverse auction” in which broadcast television licensees submit bids to voluntarily relinquish certain broadcast rights in exchange for payments; (2) a reorganization or “repacking” of the broadcast television bands in order to free up a portion of the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band for other uses; and (3) a “forward auction” of initial licenses for flexible use of the newly available spectrum—the “600 MHz band.”
II. Proposed Auction Design
5. On October 2, 2012 the Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “ Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions” ( NPRM ), proposing rules and seeking comment on a variety of issues related to the implementation of the congressionally mandated incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum
00 MHz band.”
II. Proposed Auction Design
5. On October 2, 2012 the Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “ Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions” ( NPRM ), proposing rules and seeking comment on a variety of issues related to the implementation of the congressionally mandated incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum. An incentive auction is a voluntary, market-based means of repurposing spectrum by encouraging licensees to voluntarily relinquish spectrum usage rights in exchange for a share of the proceeds from an auction of new licenses to use the repurposed spectrum. The broadcast incentive auction will have three major pieces: (1) A “reverse auction” in which broadcast television licensees submit bids to voluntarily relinquish spectrum usage rights in exchange for payments; (2) a reorganization or “repacking” of the broadcast television bands in order to free up a portion of the ultra high frequency (UHF) band for other uses; and (3) a “forward auction” of initial licenses for flexible use of the newly available spectrum in the UHF band.
6. In the Incentive Auction NPRM, the Commission addresses auction design issues for the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction. The reverse and forward auctions present different challenges, but both can be discussed in terms of three basic auction design elements: (1) Bid collection procedures that determine how bids in the auction are gathered, (2) assignment procedures that determine which bids are accepted, and (3) pricing procedures that determine what each bidder pays, or in the case of the reverse auction, receives in payment. The other major component of the incentive auction, the repacking, will help to determine which reverse auction bids the Commission accepts and, therefore, is discussed in connection with reverse auction assignment procedures.
7. The Commission discusses these auction design issues at a high level and seeks comment on them
bidder pays, or in the case of the reverse auction, receives in payment. The other major component of the incentive auction, the repacking, will help to determine which reverse auction bids the Commission accepts and, therefore, is discussed in connection with reverse auction assignment procedures.
7. The Commission discusses these auction design issues at a high level and seeks comment on them. The Commission invites broadcasters' input on how to design the incentive auction so as to facilitate their participation and make it as easy as possible for them to submit successful bids, as well as how to structure the auction and repacking to take into account the interests of broadcasters that will not participate in the auction. In considering the auction design issues, the Commission also asks commenters to keep in mind their interrelated nature, as well as the different trade-offs they pose.
A. Reverse Auction and Broadcaster Repacking
8. The reverse auction will collect information about the price at which broadcast television spectrum can be cleared. This information, together with information from the forward auction, will enable the Commission to identify a set of bidders that would voluntarily relinquish spectrum usage rights and the compensation each would receive. In economic terms, the reverse auction is the supply side of the market for repurposed broadcast television spectrum. The reverse auction will incorporate three basic auction design elements: it will collect bids, determine which bids are accepted as winning bids, and determine the payments made for those winning bids. The determination of which bids will be accepted depends, in part, on the repacking.
1. Bid Collection Procedures
9. The Incentive Auction NPRM discusses two options for the first auction design element that is, collecting bids to voluntarily relinquish spectrum usage rights in the reverse auction. These relinquishments may include going off the air, sharing a channel, or moving to a lower broadcast television band
hich bids will be accepted depends, in part, on the repacking.
1. Bid Collection Procedures
9. The Incentive Auction NPRM discusses two options for the first auction design element that is, collecting bids to voluntarily relinquish spectrum usage rights in the reverse auction. These relinquishments may include going off the air, sharing a channel, or moving to a lower broadcast television band. The first option is a single round sealed bid procedure, in which bidders would specify, during a single bidding round, the payment they would be willing to accept in exchange for relinquishing various spectrum usage rights.
10. The second option is a multiple round, or dynamic, procedure in which bidders would indicate their willingness to accept iteratively lower payments in exchange for relinquishing rights. For example, in a descending clock auction prices would start high and decline over time. As the price ticks down, stations would indicate whether they would be willing to relinquish certain spectrum rights at the current prices. Those that would still be willing to relinquish rights would remain active in the clock auction, while those that found the current prices for all the relinquishment options too low would decline all the offers, exit the auction, and continue broadcasting in their pre-auction band. The exit decision would be irreversible. The Commission could also offer bidders the option of submitting a “proxy bid” in advance of the clock auction indicating the minimum payment they would be willing to accept in exchange for relinquishing spectrum rights, making it possible for bidders to submit bids just once. The clock auction would then use the proxy bid to generate and submit bids dynamically on behalf of the bidder.
11. From the point of view of bidders, a dynamic procedure such as a clock auction with the option of making proxy bids may be preferable to a single round sealed bid procedure
ccept in exchange for relinquishing spectrum rights, making it possible for bidders to submit bids just once. The clock auction would then use the proxy bid to generate and submit bids dynamically on behalf of the bidder.
11. From the point of view of bidders, a dynamic procedure such as a clock auction with the option of making proxy bids may be preferable to a single round sealed bid procedure. A dynamic format does not require broadcasters to determine an exact bid at the beginning of the auction. They only need to determine their willingness to relinquish rights at the current price, which may make participation simpler and less expensive for bidders. On the other hand, the single round sealed bid procedure may require less complex software than a multiple round auction and thus be easier for the Commission to implement. The Commission seeks comment on these and any other bid collection procedure options commenters may suggest. Commenters advocating a particular option should address its advantages and disadvantages, including cost to bidders and how it would work with the other elements of the reverse auction.
2. Assignment Procedures
12. Assignment Procedures in General. The second auction design element—the assignment procedures used to decide which bids are accepted and which are rejected, thereby determining which stations remain on the air—is significantly more complicated in this reverse auction than in a typical auction. The Commission must solve a complex engineering problem by determining how stations that retain their current spectrum usage rights are assigned channels (“repacked”), taking into account relinquishment options including channel sharing and moves from a UHF to a VHF channel, and consistent with statutory requirements and other constraints. The Incentive Auction NPRM discusses the repacking process as it relates directly to the assignment procedures.
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determining how stations that retain their current spectrum usage rights are assigned channels (“repacked”), taking into account relinquishment options including channel sharing and moves from a UHF to a VHF channel, and consistent with statutory requirements and other constraints. The Incentive Auction NPRM discusses the repacking process as it relates directly to the assignment procedures.
13. The Commission must also analyze whether and how to consider factors in addition to bid amounts in determining which bids are accepted and which are rejected. In a reverse auction where bidders are offering the same good, minimizing the cost of procuring that good leads to a straightforward rule for determining winners: the lowest bids win. When the goods being offered are not homogenous, however, bids are sometimes weighted or scored to account for factors in addition to bid amount. The goods offered in the reverse auction of broadcast television spectrum will not be homogenous. For example, some stations have larger coverage areas and serve greater populations than others, affecting both their economic value to broadcasters and the effect of repacking them. Broadcast stations' bids in the reverse auction could be assigned a score incorporating such factors. Bids from stations that would make the repacking more difficult because they would block more potential channel assignments to other stations could receive a lower score, for example, making them more likely to have their bids accepted and, equivalently, less likely to be assigned a channel in their pre-auction band. The score could also be designed to reflect the fact that the value of a broadcasting license depends in part on its population served. For a bid to move to VHF, the score may also account for the scarcity of VHF spectrum in the station's broadcast area. Selecting bids and paying winning bidders in relation to their population served or other indicators of value may reduce the cost of clearing broadcast television spectrum.
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to reflect the fact that the value of a broadcasting license depends in part on its population served. For a bid to move to VHF, the score may also account for the scarcity of VHF spectrum in the station's broadcast area. Selecting bids and paying winning bidders in relation to their population served or other indicators of value may reduce the cost of clearing broadcast television spectrum.
14. Incorporation of Repacking Into the Assignment Procedures. Repacking stations, which involves determining whether it is feasible, given the applicable constraints, to assign a collection of stations channels in a particular band, is part of the process for determining which broadcaster bids will be accepted in the reverse auction, which bids will not be accepted and what channel numbers will be assigned to the stations that will remain on the air. It may be helpful to think of the repacking of stations with different service areas and bid values into the broadcast television spectrum as being analogous to the process of packing boxes into a trunk when these boxes have different sizes and values.
15. The Commission has considered two alternative assignment procedures. The first uses an integer programming “algorithm” (a mathematical recipe for solving a problem). The second uses a simpler mathematical recipe that the Incentive Auction NPRM refers to as a “sequential” algorithm. Each involves the application of objective criteria to determine, using the analogy above, the best way to pack the trunk.
16. Integer Programming Algorithm Approach to Establishing Assignments. The first procedure would use computer optimization software to try to find the most efficient way of clearing a specified amount of broadcast television spectrum while satisfying all applicable constraints. Integer programming is a collection of mathematical algorithms that work to find and prove that a feasible solution has the best objective value of all feasible alternatives
shing Assignments. The first procedure would use computer optimization software to try to find the most efficient way of clearing a specified amount of broadcast television spectrum while satisfying all applicable constraints. Integer programming is a collection of mathematical algorithms that work to find and prove that a feasible solution has the best objective value of all feasible alternatives. In this case the software would, for a specified amount of spectrum to be cleared, minimize the sum of the reverse auction bids accepted and the relocation costs of stations that are reassigned to new channels. Due to the complexity of the problem, an “ideal” or provably optimal repacking solution using an integer programming model may not be feasible in a timely manner. It may be possible, however, to calculate a close approximation to the optimal solution in a reasonable amount of computing time. The approximate repacking solution may be highly efficient—coming close to minimizing the total bids of the cleared stations, given the amount of spectrum cleared—but it may be less than fully transparent, since the results cannot easily be replicated. This procedure also does not generally minimize the Commission's cost of clearing or maximize the amount of spectrum cleared if the pricing rule does
17. Sequential Algorithm Approach to Establishing Assignments. A second approach whose results may be easier to replicate is to sequentially determine, again based on objective criteria, which stations should be assigned a channel, starting with stations that do not participate in the auction. For stations that do participate in the auction, the determination would be based on the scored bids from highest to lowest, as long as the station can feasibly be assigned a channel. In a descending clock auction, each bidder is faced with a declining sequence of price offers for relinquishing spectrum rights. The bidder can choose to accept an offer, or reject all offers
ticipate in the auction. For stations that do participate in the auction, the determination would be based on the scored bids from highest to lowest, as long as the station can feasibly be assigned a channel. In a descending clock auction, each bidder is faced with a declining sequence of price offers for relinquishing spectrum rights. The bidder can choose to accept an offer, or reject all offers. Once a bidder rejects all offers, it exits the auction and is assigned to its pre-auction band. Prior to each auction round, the auction software determines for each station that has not exited whether it can feasibly be assigned to its pre-auction band, given the assignments of other stations. If a station cannot feasibly be assigned to its pre-auction band, its compensation is set at the last price offer it accepted for its last preferred relinquishment option. Each station that can be assigned to its pre-auction band (but has not exited) submits a bid indicating its preferred relinquishment option at the (reduced) current prices. The rounds continue until every station has either exited the auction or can no longer be assigned to its pre-auction band. When the rounds stop, every bidder that has not exited receives its last preferred relinquishment option. Bidders that have exited and stations that did not participate are assigned specific channels in their pre-auction bands. This sequential algorithm can also be implemented in a sealed-bid auction. At the beginning of each step of the sequential algorithm, for each station that has not yet exited, it would be determined into which bands the station could be feasibly moved. Among all such feasible moves, the algorithm would implement the move that minimizes cost on a scored basis. The process would continue until either the available spectrum is fully packed or there are no more stations to consider. Stations not selected to remain on the air in their pre-auction band would be paid to voluntarily relinquish their broadcasting rights.
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ion could be feasibly moved. Among all such feasible moves, the algorithm would implement the move that minimizes cost on a scored basis. The process would continue until either the available spectrum is fully packed or there are no more stations to consider. Stations not selected to remain on the air in their pre-auction band would be paid to voluntarily relinquish their broadcasting rights.
18. These alternative assignment algorithms present tradeoffs in terms of simplicity, transparency and efficiency that must be considered in determining the auction design. The Commission seeks comment on these options.
19. The Commission further seeks comment on whether it should consider in the repacking and assignment procedures whether a given broadcaster going off the air would create areas without any commercial or noncommercial broadcast television service. Adding an additional technical constraint would increase the complexity of the repacking process, possibly requiring additional time and resources and limiting the efficiency of the outcome. The Communications Act mandates that the Commission distribute licenses to provide a fair, efficient and equitable distribution of service to the several States and communities. Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission has strongly disfavored modification of a broadcast station's facilities that would create a “white” or “gray” area (an area where the population does not receive any over-the-air television service on only one over-the-air service, respectively), or an “underserved” area (where the population in the loss area would receive less than five over-the-air television signals). How great is the risk of creating “white” or “gray” areas where the population receives little or no over-the-air television service as a result of the reverse auction? Should the Commission seek to address any such risk as an auction design matter or through other steps outside of the incentive auction?
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opulation in the loss area would receive less than five over-the-air television signals). How great is the risk of creating “white” or “gray” areas where the population receives little or no over-the-air television service as a result of the reverse auction? Should the Commission seek to address any such risk as an auction design matter or through other steps outside of the incentive auction?
20. Commission staff has continued work on repacking methodologies since June 2010, and further evaluation in light of the technical, policy and auction design issues discussed in the Incentive Auction NPRM will be required. The Commission recognizes that the approach to assigning broadcast television channels in this proceeding is novel, especially because it is part of the incentive auction process. The Commission also recognizes that it is vital to get input from all stakeholders. The Commission staff intends to reach out to engage all stakeholders on issues related to repacking methodologies, in order to ensure transparency and share ideas and information, and the Commission seeks comment on the best timing and agenda for such a process.
3. Procedures To Determine Payments
21. The reverse auction must also determine the amount paid to winning bidders for relinquishing their spectrum rights. Some reverse auctions pay the winning bidder the amount of its bid. Another mechanism, known as “threshold” pricing, would pay a winning bidder the highest amount it could have bid and still have had its bid accepted, as illustrated in Appendix C of the Incentive Auction NPRM. Threshold pricing gives bidders an incentive to bid its station's value regardless of the bids submitted by others: if it bids an inflated value, it may forfeit the opportunity to be bought out at a price at least as high as the station's value, and if it bids an understated value, it may relinquish its rights at a price below the station's value.
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in Appendix C of the Incentive Auction NPRM. Threshold pricing gives bidders an incentive to bid its station's value regardless of the bids submitted by others: if it bids an inflated value, it may forfeit the opportunity to be bought out at a price at least as high as the station's value, and if it bids an understated value, it may relinquish its rights at a price below the station's value.
22. The Incentive Auction NPRM discusses options for conducting the reverse auction in a single round or in a multiple round clock format. The Commission anticipates that in a clock format, a bidder that has its bid to relinquish spectrum rights accepted would be paid the threshold price, which is the prevailing clock price at the time its bid is accepted. In a sealed bid format, the Commission could determine payment either using the bid amount, or the threshold price. In choosing between these payment procedures, the Commission will consider such factors as their likely impact on the cost to the government of clearing spectrum, the efficiency of assignment, whether they would increase the complexity of implementing the assignment process, what impact they may have on bidder incentives, and whether they would encourage participation in the reverse auction. The Commission seeks comment on these choices, the factors the Commission should consider in deciding between them, and on any other considerations it should take into account.
23. Reserve Price. The Commission also will consider implementing a reserve price, or maximum payment, that would be made to broadcasters relinquishing spectrum usage rights. This reserve price could take the form of a maximum dollar payment to a broadcaster based on characteristics of the station such as population or viewership. The Commission seeks comment on the use of a reserve price, and the way it should be calculated.
B. Forward Auction
24. The forward auction will identify the prices that potential users of repurposed spectrum would pay for new licenses to use the spectrum
e could take the form of a maximum dollar payment to a broadcaster based on characteristics of the station such as population or viewership. The Commission seeks comment on the use of a reserve price, and the way it should be calculated.
B. Forward Auction
24. The forward auction will identify the prices that potential users of repurposed spectrum would pay for new licenses to use the spectrum. With this information, together with information from the reverse auction, the Commission can determine the winning bidders for new flexible use licenses and the prices those bidders would pay. In economic terms, whereas the reverse auction defines the supply side of the market, the forward auction defines the demand side. The forward
25. The forward auction will incorporate the three basic auction design elements discussed above: bid collection procedures, assignment procedures, and procedures to determine the prices that winning bidders will pay.
1. Bid Collection Procedures
26. Items Available for Bid. The Commission's typical spectrum license auctions have collected bids specific to a frequency block in a geographic area. That is, in auctions with multiple blocks of spectrum available, bids were collected separately for each block in each geographic area. Alternatively, where there are multiple blocks of spectrum available in a geographic area, as the Commission expects to be the case in the forward auction, it could collect bids for one or more “generic” categories of licenses, such as paired or unpaired licenses, in a geographic area. Rather than indicating that a bid is for a specific frequency block in an area, bidders would indicate their interest in, for example, one or more paired 5 megahertz uplink and 5 megahertz downlink (“5 + 5”) blocks.
27. Multiple Round Bidding Formats. The Commission proposes to collect forward auction bids using a dynamic auction design format, for the same reasons that it typically uses a multiple round ascending auction design in spectrum license auctions
lock in an area, bidders would indicate their interest in, for example, one or more paired 5 megahertz uplink and 5 megahertz downlink (“5 + 5”) blocks.
27. Multiple Round Bidding Formats. The Commission proposes to collect forward auction bids using a dynamic auction design format, for the same reasons that it typically uses a multiple round ascending auction design in spectrum license auctions. Multiple rounds permit a process of price discovery, allowing bidders to modify their bidding strategies in response to changes over the course of the auction in the absolute and relative prices of different licenses.
28. Two dynamic format options for the forward auction are a simultaneous multiple round ascending (SMR) auction and an ascending clock auction. In each, a bidder would indicate the license or licenses it seeks in a series of ascending price rounds, and would be required to satisfy an activity requirement, which provides an incentive for consistent bidding throughout the auction. The two formats differ in several ways.
29. Bidders submit price bids for specific licenses in the SMR design typical of past Commission auctions. At the end of each round the Commission identifies a provisionally winning bidder for each license that has received bids. When the auction closes (typically after a round passes where there are no new bids on any licenses), the provisionally winning bids become final.
30. In contrast, in an ascending clock auction format the Commission would announce prices for generic licenses in each category in each geographic area, and bidders would submit quantity bids for the number of licenses they seek. Prices may differ across categories and geographic areas, but within each category in each geographic area every license would sell at the same price. If total demand for the licenses in a category exceeds supply, the price would be increased for the next round, but no provisional winners would be chosen. The rounds would continue until demand for licenses no longer exceeds supply
enses they seek. Prices may differ across categories and geographic areas, but within each category in each geographic area every license would sell at the same price. If total demand for the licenses in a category exceeds supply, the price would be increased for the next round, but no provisional winners would be chosen. The rounds would continue until demand for licenses no longer exceeds supply. In a clock auction, when prices are increased between rounds, the quantity of licenses sought by bidders could fall so much in a category that instead of exceeding the supply, the demand is less than the supply. This possibility of overshooting can be avoided by permitting intra-round bidding, whereby bidders can indicate their change in demand in each category at specified prices between the opening and closing prices in each round.
31. Bidding for generic blocks would be expected to speed up the forward auction, reducing the time and, therefore, the cost of bidder participation, since bidders would no longer need to iteratively bid on the least expensive of several specific but substitutable licenses, as in a typical Commission SMR auction. The Commission believes that speed is important to the successful design of the incentive auction for a number of reasons, including the interdependence of the reverse and forward auctions.
32. Package Bidding. Bid collection procedures in the forward auction could include provisions for package bidding—that is, bidders could be permitted to indicate a single, all-or-nothing bid amount that would apply to a group of licenses, such as more than one block in a geographic area or the same block in multiple geographic areas. Package bidding could be particularly helpful to bidders that face a risk of winning certain licenses but losing complementary licenses they consider essential to their business plans. Package bidding options generally complicate an auction, although such complexity can be limited if certain restrictions apply to the ways bidders can group licenses
a or the same block in multiple geographic areas. Package bidding could be particularly helpful to bidders that face a risk of winning certain licenses but losing complementary licenses they consider essential to their business plans. Package bidding options generally complicate an auction, although such complexity can be limited if certain restrictions apply to the ways bidders can group licenses. Package bidding could take a number of specific forms, and its feasibility and potential usefulness to bidders would depend on auction design details. The Commission seeks comment on whether bidders are likely to have interests that may be addressed by package bidding, and on how package bidding options might work with the other auction design elements.
2. Assignment Procedures
33. For the forward auction, the assignment procedures will determine which bidders win which new licenses to use repurposed broadcast television spectrum, with the number of available licenses in the forward auction depending on the quantity of spectrum recovered from the reverse auction. In general, winning forward auction bidders will be those that place the highest bids on the available licenses. If bidders are allowed to specify packages or other contingencies, the assignment procedures would take those conditions into account in determining a set of best bids that are consistent with the Commission's forward auction objective of maximizing the aggregate amount of the bids that the Commission accepts for the available licenses.
34. The Commission anticipates that if generic blocks are made available in the forward auction, the assignment procedures would assign contiguous blocks to bidders that bid for multiple blocks in the same geographic area and could take into account the need to coordinate frequencies across adjacent areas. There could also be an additional auction phase to assign specific frequencies for generic licenses, which could be based on accepting additional bids
made available in the forward auction, the assignment procedures would assign contiguous blocks to bidders that bid for multiple blocks in the same geographic area and could take into account the need to coordinate frequencies across adjacent areas. There could also be an additional auction phase to assign specific frequencies for generic licenses, which could be based on accepting additional bids. The specific frequencies that will be available in each area will be determined by the incentive auction process itself, and bidding on generic blocks facilitates conducting an auction given those interdependencies. Further, bidding based on generic blocks will speed completion. The Commission invites comment on these proposals and, alternatively, on how it could conduct an auction that would allow bids on specific frequencies rather than generic blocks.
3. Procedures To Determine License Prices
35. Generally, under the two forward auction design formats discussed in the Incentive Auction NPRM, the SMR-type auction and a clock auction, final license prices would be the highest
C. Integration—Putting the Reverse and Forward Auction Components Together
36. The reverse and forward auctions must be integrated to determine how much broadcast television spectrum is to be cleared and licensed for new uses. The timing of the reverse and forward auctions will affect the information available when bidding in each auction, and may also affect the length of the auction process.
37. An option that would provide reverse and forward auction bidders relevant information from the other side of the market while they are bidding would be to run the reverse and forward auctions concurrently in a series of stages. In each stage, the Commission would specify a provisional quantity of spectrum to be cleared in the reverse auction and a corresponding quantity of new licenses available in the forward auction. The first stage would be conducted with the provisional quantities set at the maximum possible amount of spectrum
idding would be to run the reverse and forward auctions concurrently in a series of stages. In each stage, the Commission would specify a provisional quantity of spectrum to be cleared in the reverse auction and a corresponding quantity of new licenses available in the forward auction. The first stage would be conducted with the provisional quantities set at the maximum possible amount of spectrum. The Commission would compare the provisional outcomes of the forward and reverse auctions and determine whether the auction closing conditions had been met—for example, the closing conditions would fail if total clearing costs in the reverse auction were greater than the revenue from the forward auction. If the closing conditions are met, the incentive auction process would end. If not, the Commission would continue running the forward auction to see if the closing conditions can be met. If the closing conditions cannot be met, another auction stage would be run, this time using a smaller provisional quantity of cleared spectrum and correspondingly smaller number of licenses available in the forward auction. If closing conditions were met at the end of this stage, the process would end. If not, additional stages would be run with the quantity of spectrum sought to be cleared further reduced, until the auction results met them. In addition to providing both reverse and forward auction participants with relevant information from the other side of the market while they are bidding, this approach is likely to take less time than conducting the auctions sequentially.
38. If the reverse and forward auctions are run sequentially, conducting the reverse auction first may be preferable, because it would allow greater certainty about the number of licenses available in each geographic area in the forward auction, based on broadcaster participation in the reverse auction. The Commission invites comment on these issues.
39. Closing Conditions
ctions sequentially.
38. If the reverse and forward auctions are run sequentially, conducting the reverse auction first may be preferable, because it would allow greater certainty about the number of licenses available in each geographic area in the forward auction, based on broadcaster participation in the reverse auction. The Commission invites comment on these issues.
39. Closing Conditions. Section 6403(c)(2) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Public Law 112-96, 125 Stat. 156 (2012) (Spectrum Act) requires that the forward auction generate proceeds sufficient to pay successful bidders in the reverse auction, cover the Commission's administrative costs, and cover the estimated costs of reimbursements required by the statute. The Commission seeks comment on the best way to implement this statutory requirement, and whether there are additional statutory, policy or other considerations that should be addressed in establishing the closing conditions.
40. Auctionomics and Power Auctions Report. The Commission has attached, as Appendix C of the Incentive Auction NPRM, a proposal developed by its team of expert auction consultants. It suggests an integrated approach to the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction: a reverse auction using a descending clock auction procedure using a sequential algorithm approach for repacking to determine supply; a forward auction using an ascending clock auction format to determine demand; and a clearing rule which links the outcome of the forward and reverse auctions by establishing closing conditions. This proposal illustrates one potential approach to addressing the auction design issues discussed in the Incentive Auction NPRM, and the Commission invites comment on it, as well as other proposed approaches.
41. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. In connection with its Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Commission also seeks comment on the cost-effectiveness of the various auction design elements
ions. This proposal illustrates one potential approach to addressing the auction design issues discussed in the Incentive Auction NPRM, and the Commission invites comment on it, as well as other proposed approaches.
41. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. In connection with its Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Commission also seeks comment on the cost-effectiveness of the various auction design elements. In particular, are there auction design choices the Commission can make that would make it significantly less costly for bidders to participate in either the reverse or the forward auction? Are there hidden costs associated with any of the auction design elements of which the Commission should be aware?
III. Reverse Auction—Eligibility and Bid Options
A. Eligibility
42. The Incentive Auction NPRM proposes to propose to limit participation in the reverse auction to full power and Class A television licensees and to exclude non-Class A low power television stations and TV translators (collectively, “low power television stations”). The Spectrum Act definitions and its repacking and reimbursement provisions limit participation to only full power and Class A television licensees. Further, because low power television stations have secondary interference rights, these facilities do not impede the band clearing and repacking process, and therefore there is no reason to facilitate their relinquishment through participation in the reverse auction. The Incentive Auction NPRM proposes that Class A television licensees whose status has been changed from Class A to low power television will be ineligible to participate in the reverse auction—like all other low power television stations.
43. It is proposed that noncommercial educational television stations may participate in the reverse auction
ent through participation in the reverse auction. The Incentive Auction NPRM proposes that Class A television licensees whose status has been changed from Class A to low power television will be ineligible to participate in the reverse auction—like all other low power television stations.
43. It is proposed that noncommercial educational television stations may participate in the reverse auction. The Spectrum Act does not prohibit participation and the prohibition on subjecting NCEs to auction in Section 309(j) of the Communications Act would not apply because the reverse auction is being conducted under a separate Section 309(j) provision. Allowing NCEs to participate will ensure greater participation in the reverse auction and a return of a greater number of television channels for reallocation.
44. The Incentive Auction NPRM proposes that entities with original construction permits be allowed to participate in the reverse auction if they become licensees before the deadline for submission of the application to participate in the auction. There are only a very few entities in this category, and allowing the few original construction permit holders to participate in the incentive auction, so long as they receive a license by the deadline specified above, will maximize the amount of spectrum available for auction.
45. For the reverse auction bidding, it is proposed that the Commission only examine the spectrum usage rights held by stations in their licenses as of February 22, 2012. This conforms to the mandate in Section 6403 of the Spectrum Act that the Commission protect in repacking the coverage area and population served by a licensee as of the Spectrum Act enactment date. In contrast, it is proposed that full power and Class A television licensees with expired, cancelled or revoked licenses are ineligible to participate in the reverse auction. The Incentive Auction NPRM seeks comment on these matters.
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on 6403 of the Spectrum Act that the Commission protect in repacking the coverage area and population served by a licensee as of the Spectrum Act enactment date. In contrast, it is proposed that full power and Class A television licensees with expired, cancelled or revoked licenses are ineligible to participate in the reverse auction. The Incentive Auction NPRM seeks comment on these matters.
46. For a new station permittee not licensed on February 22, 2012 (but Incentive Auction NPRM seeks comment on these proposals.
47. Although the Commission seeks to maximize the spectrum reclaimed in the reverse auction process, it does not want to compensate a broadcaster for relinquishing spectrum rights to which it may no longer be entitled as the result of its license having expired, or having been cancelled or revoked in an enforcement proceeding. Therefore, the Commission proposes that any full power or Class A station with an expired, cancelled or revoked license should not be eligible to bid in the reverse auction. On the other hand, the Commission does not want to let the existence of such pending proceedings impede the auction process. The Commission seeks comment on how to address enforcement actions that are pending against a station whose bid to relinquish all usage rights is accepted (winning license termination bidder). The Commission seeks to identify processes that would accommodate both its interest in structuring an efficient auction mechanism and its interest in enforcing broadcasters' compliance with their legal obligations. As one possible approach to pending enforcement actions, the Commission seeks comment on whether license termination bidders should be required to enter into escrow arrangements to cover the potential costs of forfeitures. In this regard, the Commission seeks comment on whether to require license termination bidders to enter into such escrow arrangements either as a qualification for bidding in the auction, or after being selected as a winning license termination bidder
eks comment on whether license termination bidders should be required to enter into escrow arrangements to cover the potential costs of forfeitures. In this regard, the Commission seeks comment on whether to require license termination bidders to enter into such escrow arrangements either as a qualification for bidding in the auction, or after being selected as a winning license termination bidder. Should a ceiling for the escrow amount that a bidding station could face (in total or per violation) in the event it is a winning license termination bidder be established in advance, so that stations would be able to consider that maximum exposure in advance of developing a reverse auction bid? As an alternative for winning license termination bidders, the Commission seeks comment on the option to settle any pending enforcement proceedings at a fixed amount based on the nature of the alleged violation. Are there other approaches that would enable disposal of pending cases in an expedited fashion, while not delaying or overburdening the auction process? Should the same procedures apply to a winning license termination bidder that will continue to hold other broadcast station licenses? Are there other options for handling pending enforcement actions that would address the concerns and priorities identified above, short of offering to close the enforcement actions pending against a winning license termination bidder, with the legal and policy issues that would raise.
B. Bid Options
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ning license termination bidder that will continue to hold other broadcast station licenses? Are there other options for handling pending enforcement actions that would address the concerns and priorities identified above, short of offering to close the enforcement actions pending against a winning license termination bidder, with the legal and policy issues that would raise.
B. Bid Options
48. Section 6403(a)(2) of the Spectrum Act provides that the reverse auction of broadcast television spectrum “shall include” three bid options for participants: (1) Voluntary relinquishment of “all usage rights with respect to a particular television channel without receiving in return any usage rights with respect to another television channel * * *” (license termination bid); (2) voluntary relinquishment of “all usage rights with respect to an ultra high frequency television channel in return for receiving usage rights with respect to a very high frequency television channel * * *” (UHF to VHF bid); and (3) voluntary relinquishment of “usage rights in order to share a television channel with another licensee” (channel sharing bid). The Commission invites comment on whether to establish additional bid options for participants in the reverse auction. Regarding option (2) above, comment is invited on whether to also allow UHF to VHF bidders to limit their bids to a “high VHF channel” (channels 7-13). The Commission proposes allowing stations to participate in the reverse auction by agreeing to relinquish a “high VHF channel” (channels 7-13) in exchange for a “low VHF channel” (channels 2-6). Because high VHF spectrum may be more desirable than low VHF spectrum to a UHF to VHF bidder, making additional high VHF spectrum available by encouraging high VHF to low VHF moves may result in a greater reverse auction participation.
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ations to participate in the reverse auction by agreeing to relinquish a “high VHF channel” (channels 7-13) in exchange for a “low VHF channel” (channels 2-6). Because high VHF spectrum may be more desirable than low VHF spectrum to a UHF to VHF bidder, making additional high VHF spectrum available by encouraging high VHF to low VHF moves may result in a greater reverse auction participation.
49. The Commission also seeks comment on whether to allow licensees to participate in the reverse auction by relinquishing spectrum usage rights through the acceptance of additional interference from other broadcast stations or reduce their service area or population covered by a set amount. If licensees were allowed to participate in the reverse auction by bidding to accept interference from which they otherwise would be entitled to protection, then would the Commission be able to accommodate more broadcast stations in the same amount of spectrum during the repacking process, enabling the clearing of more spectrum? Similarly, if broadcast licensees were allowed to bid to reduce their service areas or populations served, could it accommodate tighter repacking of the broadcast stations? 88. Similarly, should broadcasters be allowed to bid to accept additional interference from wireless broadband providers, or to accept a different antenna pattern or to deploy a distributed transmission system in order to reduce their signal strength in portions of their service areas and reduce the size of their service areas? By permitting this type of creative arrangement, the Commission believes it can potentially create an unencumbered wireless broadband service area license while still permitting a broadcast licensee to cover a portion of its service area. Commenters are invited to address these and other potential bid options in addition to those required by the statute, as well as the potential costs and benefits associated with them.
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creative arrangement, the Commission believes it can potentially create an unencumbered wireless broadband service area license while still permitting a broadcast licensee to cover a portion of its service area. Commenters are invited to address these and other potential bid options in addition to those required by the statute, as well as the potential costs and benefits associated with them.
50. The Commission also proposes to prohibit a licensee to effectuate a channel sharing arrangement that would result in a change in the station's community of license and/or DMA. The Commission proposes this limitation because it believes that allowing changes in community of license in addition to changes in channel assignments would raise section 307(b) issues such as the fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of service, and would complicate its repacking efforts. The Commission proposes that a winning reverse auction bidder that relinquishes all of its spectrum usage rights with respect to its pre-incentive auction television channel will retain no
IV. Repacking
51. It is critical, to enable repacking of the broadcast spectrum, that the Commission determine how to preserve the coverage area and population served as required by the Spectrum Act. Accordingly, the Commission seeks comment on engineering and other technical aspects of the repacking process, in particular Congress's mandate in Section 6403(b)(2) of the Spectrum Act that it make all reasonable efforts to preserve the coverage area and population served of television stations in the repacking. The broadcast television spectrum incentive auction and the associated repacking process could impact both the coverage area and the population served of television stations. If a station is assigned to a different channel, then its technical facilities must be modified in order to replicate its coverage area, because radio signals propagate differently on different frequencies
s in the repacking. The broadcast television spectrum incentive auction and the associated repacking process could impact both the coverage area and the population served of television stations. If a station is assigned to a different channel, then its technical facilities must be modified in order to replicate its coverage area, because radio signals propagate differently on different frequencies. These varying propagation characteristics also mean that a new channel assignment may change the areas within a station's noise-limited service area affected by terrain loss. Channel reassignments, and stations going off the air as a result of the reverse auction, also may change the interference relationships between stations, which relationships in turn affect population served. Stations going off the air can eliminate existing interference to the stations that remain on the air. Likewise, new channel assignments generally will eliminate interference that the reassigned stations are now causing or receiving. At the same time, new channel assignments create a potential for new interference between nearby stations on the same channel or a first adjacent channel. The Commission seeks comment on a repacking methodology that takes in account all of these impacts in order to carry out Congress's mandate in section 6403(b)(2).
52. The Commission proposes that, during repacking, it would only preserve the service areas of full power and Class A television stations with regard to stations' facilities that were licensed, or for which an application for license to cover authorized facilities already was on file with the Commission, as of February 22, 2012. Further, the Commission proposes to protect the facilities set forth in unbuilt construction permits for new full power television stations as of February 22, 2012. It did not propose to protect the facilities contained in pending facility modification applications
for which an application for license to cover authorized facilities already was on file with the Commission, as of February 22, 2012. Further, the Commission proposes to protect the facilities set forth in unbuilt construction permits for new full power television stations as of February 22, 2012. It did not propose to protect the facilities contained in pending facility modification applications. The Commission found that consideration of all pending facility modification applications would greatly complicate the repacking analysis by increasing the amount of facilities under consideration in the repacking process. Additionally, protection of both a licensed facility and a modification thereto that would expand or alter the station's service area would further encumber the spectrum.
53. Coverage Area. The Commission proposes to interpret the statutory term “coverage area” to mean a full power television station's “service area” as defined in section 73.622(e) of the Commission's rules. The rules governing Class A stations do not define a “service area” for such stations. The Commission proposes to use a Class A station's “protected contour”—the area within which it is protected from interference under our rules—as its “coverage area” for purposes of the repacking. The Commission's Office of Engineering and Technology has software that calculates the power and antenna pattern adjustments necessary to replicate a station's coverage area on a different channel. The Commission proposes to use that software in the repacking methodology to replicate the coverage areas of stations assigned to different channels. Construction of a transmitting antenna that matches precisely the antenna pattern created by the software is impractical in some cases, and that the closest practical design might slightly extend a station's coverage contour (that is, the area within which the station is protected from interference) in some directions and decrease it in others
rage areas of stations assigned to different channels. Construction of a transmitting antenna that matches precisely the antenna pattern created by the software is impractical in some cases, and that the closest practical design might slightly extend a station's coverage contour (that is, the area within which the station is protected from interference) in some directions and decrease it in others. To address such circumstances, the Commission proposes that a station assigned to a new channel in the repacking be allowed to continue to use the station's existing antenna pattern, and to adjust its power level so that the station's coverage area in total square kilometers is the same as it was before the repacking, without regard to whether that area is served or unserved by the station's existing operation. The Commission also proposes to allow stations to propose alternative transmission facilities to those specified by its replication software, provided that such facilities would not extend the coverage area in any direction beyond those specified by the replication software or cause new interference. 102. The fact that signal propagation characteristics vary from channel to channel also means that new channel assignments may change the portions of a station's coverage area that are affected by terrain losses. Therefore, the Commission seeks comment on whether it would be consistent with the Spectrum Act to consider a station's signal to be receivable at all locations within its noise-limited or protected contour (depending on whether it is a full power or Class A station) for purposes of the repacking. If the Commission does not adopt this approach, how should it accommodate stations whose coverage areas change as a result of new channel assignments?
54. Population Served. The Commission proposes three alternative approaches to fulfilling the requirement to make all reasonable efforts to preserve population served in the repacking process
ower or Class A station) for purposes of the repacking. If the Commission does not adopt this approach, how should it accommodate stations whose coverage areas change as a result of new channel assignments?
54. Population Served. The Commission proposes three alternative approaches to fulfilling the requirement to make all reasonable efforts to preserve population served in the repacking process. The first approach would allow no new interference to a station's population served as of February 22, 2012. Under this approach, the Commission would apply the existing standard in section 73.616 that treats interference of 0.5 percent or less as “no new interference” in evaluating potential channel reassignments. In the second approach, the statutory mandate would be interpreted to require all reasonable efforts to preserve service to the same specific viewers for each eligible station. Under this approach, no individual channel reassignment, considered alone, could reduce another station's specific population served on February 22, 2012 by more than 0.5 percent. The second approach differs from the first approach in two ways. First, it allows “replacement interference” only where interference existed as of February 22, 2012. Second, it is calculated on a station-to-station rather than aggregate basis. The Commission seeks comment on this second approach, including whether to calculate interference on a per station basis if this approach is adopted. The Commission also seeks comment on a third option that, like the second option, would consider interference on a station-to-station, rather than an aggregate, basis. Under this approach, any interference between two individual stations, considered by themselves, that
55. For each of the options, the Incentive Auctions NPRM seeks comment on the costs and benefits, including quantitative estimates, of each repacking option in comparison to the others
, like the second option, would consider interference on a station-to-station, rather than an aggregate, basis. Under this approach, any interference between two individual stations, considered by themselves, that
55. For each of the options, the Incentive Auctions NPRM seeks comment on the costs and benefits, including quantitative estimates, of each repacking option in comparison to the others. In that regard, commenters are invited to address the computational complexity of the channel assignment process under the first, second and third options—in determining whether a particular channel assignment is permissible, the second and third options would require examination of interference only between channel pairs, whereas the first option would require examination of all channel assignments—and how that factor should be considered. In addition, commenters are invited to suggest additional approaches that would fulfill the statutory mandate while permitting an efficient repacking of stations. Commenters are invited to submit appropriate economic studies to support their views or proposals on these issues. The Commission anticipates that whatever approach adopted to preserving population served will have a significant impact on the amount of spectrum available to repurpose for mobile broadband use, as well as on the overall costs of clearing broadcast television spectrum. For each of the three options proposed above, therefore, the Incentive Auctions NPRM invites comment on those assumptions, and on the potential magnitude of the impact on the amount of spectrum made available for mobile broadband, as well as the cost of doing so.
56. Protection of Certain Authorized Facilities. In the repacking process, the Commission proposes to protect the facilities authorized in unbuilt construction permits for new full power television stations as of February 22, 2012. The Commission proposes that Class A stations elect which facilities they would like protected in repacking
ble for mobile broadband, as well as the cost of doing so.
56. Protection of Certain Authorized Facilities. In the repacking process, the Commission proposes to protect the facilities authorized in unbuilt construction permits for new full power television stations as of February 22, 2012. The Commission proposes that Class A stations elect which facilities they would like protected in repacking. Because Class A stations are in the middle of a Commission-mandated digital transition that will not conclude until September 1, 2015, the Commission found that failing to offer repacking protection to those digital transition facilities not licensed by February 22, 2012 would be fundamentally unfair. Moreover, failure to protect these facilities could make it impossible for certain Class A stations to effectuate their conversion plans, thus stalling the digital transition. The Commission seeks comment on this proposed procedure, as well as whether any other authorized full power or Class A television station facilities should be protected in the repacking process. The Commission does not propose to extend any protection to facilities proposed in pending petitions for rulemaking for which a notice of proposed rulemaking has not been issued, nor does it propose to extend protection in the repacking process to low power television and translator stations.
V. Forward Auction—Reconfiguring the UHF Band
A. Allocations
57. Prior to the enactment of the Spectrum Act, the Commission sought comment in ET Docket No. 10-235 on adding new fixed and mobile allocations to the UHF and VHF bands. The Commission seeks further comment on its proposals in light of the Spectrum Act's passage. Its goal is to adopt a band plan that will provide for flexible use of these bands for new wireless broadband services while continuing to support existing uses. In particular, the Commission invites comment on the views expressed by broadcasters advocating retention of some of the UHF and VHF television bands exclusively for broadcast use
t on its proposals in light of the Spectrum Act's passage. Its goal is to adopt a band plan that will provide for flexible use of these bands for new wireless broadband services while continuing to support existing uses. In particular, the Commission invites comment on the views expressed by broadcasters advocating retention of some of the UHF and VHF television bands exclusively for broadcast use. What are the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach? What effect would it have on the Commission's future flexibility to manage the spectrum? As a practical matter, how could such an approach be implemented, given that the amount of broadcast spectrum recovered in any specific geographic area depends on the results of the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction?
58. In addition, the Commission considers whether to relocate existing radio astronomy and wireless medical telemetry systems on channel 37 (608-614 MHz) to new spectrum. In the event that it decides to do so, it also proposes to add fixed and broadcast allocations to the channel 37 spectrum and modify the existing land mobile allocation in the UHF band, which is limited to medical telemetry and telecommand, to the more general mobile allocation. Similarly, if the Commission were to make changes to allocations for the channel 37 spectrum, it asks whether it should remove the radio astronomy allocation from that spectrum.
B. 600 MHz Band Plan
59. 600 MHz Spectrum Band. We seek comment on the establishment of a 600 MHz band plan approach using 5 megahertz blocks, in which the uplink band begins at channel 51 (698 MHz), and, depending on the amount of spectrum available from the spectrum usage rights that broadcasters voluntarily relinquish in the reverse auction, will expand downward toward channel 37. Similarly, the downlink band would begin at channel 36 (608 MHz) and expand downward based on the amount of reclaimed spectrum
ach using 5 megahertz blocks, in which the uplink band begins at channel 51 (698 MHz), and, depending on the amount of spectrum available from the spectrum usage rights that broadcasters voluntarily relinquish in the reverse auction, will expand downward toward channel 37. Similarly, the downlink band would begin at channel 36 (608 MHz) and expand downward based on the amount of reclaimed spectrum. Under this approach, the downlink band would start at channel 36, in order to take advantage of the natural separation between television and wireless operations, given that channel 37 is presently used for non-broadcast operations. We also propose establishing guard bands between mobile broadband use and broadcast use when necessary to create spectrum blocks that are as technically and functionally interchangeable as possible to allow for enhanced substitutability among building blocks and flexibility in our auction design choices. We propose to make the guard band spectrum available for unlicensed use. We seek comment on this proposal, and on alternative uses for the guard bands, including approaches that involve licensing and/or auctioning this spectrum. We note that the Spectrum Act constrains the Commission to guard bands “no larger than is technically reasonable to prevent harmful interference between licensed services outside the guard bands,” and requires a forward auction in which “the Commission assigns licenses for the use of the spectrum that the Commission reallocates.” See Spectrum Act at 6407(b), 6403(c). Under these provisions, we must license the spectrum we recover through the broadcast television spectrum reorganization, with the exception of guard bands.
1. Spectrum Block Size
60. To allow for the greatest amount of flexibility and efficiency, we propose to license the 600 MHz spectrum in 5 megahertz “building blocks.” Five megahertz blocks can support a variety of wireless broadband technologies
hese provisions, we must license the spectrum we recover through the broadcast television spectrum reorganization, with the exception of guard bands.
1. Spectrum Block Size
60. To allow for the greatest amount of flexibility and efficiency, we propose to license the 600 MHz spectrum in 5 megahertz “building blocks.” Five megahertz blocks can support a variety of wireless broadband technologies. Licensing spectrum in 5 megahertz blocks also promotes efficiency in converting broadcast television licenses to flexible-use mobile channels because it is close in size to the 6 megahertz television channels that will be relinquished. Five megahertz blocks will optimize efficiency in the rebanded spectrum, allowing wireless spectrum demand in a given market to more closely match the amount of spectrum supplied by participating broadcasters. We seek comment on our proposal and whether this block size offers the best opportunity to use the spectrum efficiently.
61. We also seek comment on licensing the 600 MHz spectrum in six
62. Some prospective 600 MHz licensees may want to obtain spectrum in larger spectral units—for example, in 10 megahertz blocks. As discussed above, we are seeking comment on auction design options that would facilitate the aggregation of larger contiguous blocks composed of multiple 5 megahertz building blocks. We also anticipate that licensees could aggregate larger blocks post auction through the secondary market or using technological approaches such as channel aggregation. With these aggregation mechanisms in mind, we seek comment on the extent to which bidders view 5 megahertz building blocks as an acceptable balance between network performance and our ability to convert the 6 megahertz broadcast spectrum blocks into terrestrial wireless spectrum
e larger blocks post auction through the secondary market or using technological approaches such as channel aggregation. With these aggregation mechanisms in mind, we seek comment on the extent to which bidders view 5 megahertz building blocks as an acceptable balance between network performance and our ability to convert the 6 megahertz broadcast spectrum blocks into terrestrial wireless spectrum. Would the use of larger blocks ( e.g., 10 megahertz blocks) reduce the amount of spectrum that could be reclaimed in an auction? Do secondary markets or carrier aggregation technologies provide sufficient options for aggregating 5 megahertz building blocks?
2. Block Configuration
63. Our proposed band plan provides a general framework that will allow us to license different amounts of wireless spectrum in different license areas. We propose to offer a uniform amount of downlink spectrum nationwide on spectrum formerly allocated for broadcast use with no in-band television stations, so that wireless service providers can use uniform mobile device filters and so we can ensure that there is no interference between television and wireless services. We also propose to offer varying amounts of uplink spectrum in each service area, depending on the amount of spectrum available, due to the greater flexibility to accommodate different filters in base stations than in mobile terminals. Thus, our band plan aims to pair spectrum for FDD operations when possible, but may yield varying amounts of unpaired downlink spectrum blocks in different areas.
64. Paired Blocks. Existing transmission procedures for mobile broadband FDD operations generally operate on paired spectrum bands, so pairing spectrum, where possible, will allow mobile broadband providers to deploy and expand 4G wireless broadband services quickly and efficiently. We seek comment on our proposal to pair licensed spectrum when possible. Where we are able to make paired spectrum blocks available, we propose to auction and license these blocks on a paired basis
ations generally operate on paired spectrum bands, so pairing spectrum, where possible, will allow mobile broadband providers to deploy and expand 4G wireless broadband services quickly and efficiently. We seek comment on our proposal to pair licensed spectrum when possible. Where we are able to make paired spectrum blocks available, we propose to auction and license these blocks on a paired basis. Are there any advantages to ensuring that a certain amount of spectrum is paired in each license area?
65. Unpaired Spectrum. Although we plan to provide paired spectrum blocks wherever possible, the relinquished broadcast television spectrum usage rights that allow us to offer wireless spectrum licenses will not always fit neatly into pairs in each license area. In order to maximize the amount of spectrum we can make available, as described above, where we have excess wireless spectrum that cannot be paired we propose to offer unpaired downlink spectrum that can serve as supplemental downlink expansion for FDD operations. In keeping with our proposed approach of offering a uniform amount of downlink spectrum nationwide, while allowing variable amounts of uplink spectrum on a more local basis, we propose to license the unpaired downlink spectrum in 5 megahertz increments too. These downlink expansion blocks would be located immediately adjacent to the downlink portion of paired blocks to minimize interference issues. We seek comment on our proposal to license unpaired spectrum blocks for downlink expansion. Alternatively, we seek comment on whether we should auction and license uplink and downlink spectrum separately. In discussing the amount of paired and unpaired spectrum that should be allocated for wireless broadband, commenters should discuss the relative costs and benefits of each approach.
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issues. We seek comment on our proposal to license unpaired spectrum blocks for downlink expansion. Alternatively, we seek comment on whether we should auction and license uplink and downlink spectrum separately. In discussing the amount of paired and unpaired spectrum that should be allocated for wireless broadband, commenters should discuss the relative costs and benefits of each approach.
66. Because wireless broadband traffic tends to be asymmetrical ( i.e., downlink Internet traffic is greater than uplink traffic because users download more data than they upload), we anticipate that wireless providers could use this excess downlink spectrum to support their wireless broadband services in this spectrum band, or supplement their spectrum holdings in other bands. We seek comment on the extent to which mobile wireless traffic today is symmetrical or asymmetrical and on how these patterns are expected to evolve in the future. To what extent do traffic patterns support the notion of unpaired downlink expansion blocks?
67. Block Locations. In deciding where to place the uplink and downlink spectrum bands, we aim to provide the best technical solution to reduce interference issues between adjacent bands and wireless operations. We propose an uplink band starting at channel 51 (698 MHz), and a downlink band beginning at channel 36 (608 MHz) to greatly reduce interference concerns, and consequently, our need for guard bands. Specifically, the 600 MHz uplink band will be adjacent to the 700 MHz uplink band, and therefore we are not proposing a guard band between the two uplink bands. In addition, we do not anticipate needing a guard band between the downlink band and existing channel 37 operations (radio astronomy and wireless medical telemetry), because they currently operate adjacent to broadcast television bands without interference
600 MHz uplink band will be adjacent to the 700 MHz uplink band, and therefore we are not proposing a guard band between the two uplink bands. In addition, we do not anticipate needing a guard band between the downlink band and existing channel 37 operations (radio astronomy and wireless medical telemetry), because they currently operate adjacent to broadcast television bands without interference. By designating downlink and uplink operations in specific frequencies, we reduce potential interference with adjacent operations, thus minimizing the need for guard bands; and we also minimize interference between wireless operations. We seek comment on this proposal, including the expected costs and benefits.
3. Offering Different Amounts of Spectrum in Different Markets
68. As explained above, our proposed band plan approach would accommodate non-uniform amounts of relinquished broadcast TV spectrum in each geographic area. The alternative—requiring the same amount of broadcast spectrum to be cleared in all markets—would limit the total amount of spectrum usage rights that broadcasters can choose to relinquish and that wireless providers can use for wireless broadband services.
69. On the other hand, proliferation of band plans is often considered undesirable from a technical perspective. Multiple band plans are undesirable because each band plan typically requires a different design of the filters and/or duplexers in mobile devices to support those band plans. To balance these two goals, we propose creating “families” of related band plans, and depending on the amount of spectrum that is relinquished, “extended families” of band plans.
a. Band Plan “Families” With Consistent Nationwide Downlink Bandwidth
70. A band plan “family” is a group of possible band plans with a consistent amount of nationwide downlink
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evices to support those band plans. To balance these two goals, we propose creating “families” of related band plans, and depending on the amount of spectrum that is relinquished, “extended families” of band plans.
a. Band Plan “Families” W

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2012-27235. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.