# 75 FR 62640: Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneous Amendments

> Federal · Regulations · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-24862

## Section

- **Citation:** 75 FR 62640
- **Heading:** Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneous Amendments
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Regulations
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** Federal Register / Vol. 75 / 75 FR 62640

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Parts 1, 91, 120, and 135 [Docket No. FAA-2010-0982; Notice No. 10-13] RIN 2120-AJ53 Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneous Amendments AGENCY:
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:
Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY:
This proposed rule addresses air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations, part 91 helicopter operations, and load manifest requirements for all part 135 aircraft. From 2002 to 2008, there has been an increase in fatal helicopter air ambulance accidents. To address these safety concerns, the FAA is proposing to implement operational procedures and require additional equipment on board helicopter air ambulances. Many of these proposed requirements currently are found in agency guidance publications and would address National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations. Some of these safety concerns are not unique to the helicopter air ambulance industry and affect all commercial helicopter operations. Accordingly, the FAA also is proposing to amend regulations pertaining to all commercial helicopter operations conducted under part 135 to include equipment requirements, pilot training, and alternate airport weather minima. The changes are intended to provide certificate holders and pilots with additional tools and procedures that will aid in preventing accidents.

DATES:
Send your comments on or before January 10, 2011.

ADDRESSES:
You may send comments identified by docket number FAA-2010-0982 using any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001
ntified by docket number FAA-2010-0982 using any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov , including any personal information you provide. Using the search function of our docket web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov .
Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time and follow the online instructions for accessing the docket, or, the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays
visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov .
Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time and follow the online instructions for accessing the docket, or, the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For technical questions concerning this proposed rule contact Edwin Miller, Flight Standards Service, Part 135 Air Carrier Operations Branch, AFS-250, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166; facsimile (202) 267-5229; e-mail edwin.miller@faa.gov.
For legal questions concerning this proposed rule contact Dean Griffith, Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC-220, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; facsimile (202) 267-7971; e-mail dean.griffith@faa.gov .

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Later in this preamble under the Additional Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal and how we will handle your comments. Included in this discussion is related information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of proprietary or confidential business information. We also discuss how you can get a copy of related rulemaking documents.
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), which requires the Administrator to promulgate regulations in the interest of safety for the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen and other employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C
for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), which requires the Administrator to promulgate regulations in the interest of safety for the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen and other employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.
List of Terms and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AC—Advisory Circular ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee CFIT—Controlled flight into terrain CVR—Cockpit voice recorder EMS—Emergency medical service FDR—Flight data recorder GPS—Global positioning system HTAWS—Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System IFR—Instrument flight rules IMC—Instrument meteorological conditions LARS—Light-weight aircraft recording system NM—Nautical mile NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board NVG—Night vision goggles NVIS—Night-vision imaging system SAFO—Safety Alert for Operators TAWS—Terrain Avoidance and Warning System TSO—Technical Standard Order VFR—Visual flight rules VMC—Visual meteorological conditions Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary II. Background A. Statement of the Problem B. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations C. FAA Actions D. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations E. Congressional Action III. Discussion of the Proposal A. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations 1. Operational Procedures a. Part 135 Applicability (§ 135.1) b. Operations Control Centers (§ 135.617) c. VFR/IFR Procedures i. Increase VFR Weather Minima (§ 135.607) ii. IFR Operations at Airports and Heliports Without Weather Reporting (§ 135.609) iii. IFR to VFR/Visual Transitions (§ 135.611) iv. VFR Flight Planning (§ 135.613) d. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (§ 135.615) e
ir Ambulance Operations 1. Operational Procedures a. Part 135 Applicability (§ 135.1) b. Operations Control Centers (§ 135.617) c. VFR/IFR Procedures i. Increase VFR Weather Minima (§ 135.607) ii. IFR Operations at Airports and Heliports Without Weather Reporting (§ 135.609) iii. IFR to VFR/Visual Transitions (§ 135.611) iv. VFR Flight Planning (§ 135.613) d. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (§ 135.615) e. Medical Personnel Pre-Flight Briefing (§ 135.619) 2. Equipment Requirements a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) (§ 135.605) b. Light-Weight Aircraft Recording System (LARS) 3. Pilot Requirements a. Instrument Rating (§ 135.603) b. Flight and Duty Time Limitations (§§ 135.267 and 135.271) B. Commercial Helicopter Operations (Including Air Ambulance Operations) 1. Operational Procedures a. IFR Alternate Airport Weather Minima (§ 135.221) 2. Equipment Requirements a. Radio Altimeter (§ 135.160) b. Safety Equipment for Over-Water Flights (§§ 1.1, 135.167, and 135.168) 3. Training—Recovery From Inadvertent Flight Into IMC (§ 135.293) C. Miscellaneous 1. Part 91 Weather Minima (§ 91.155) 2. Load Manifest Requirements for all Part 135 Aircraft (§ 135.63) IV. Paperwork Reduction Act V. International Compatibility VI. Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment VII. Executive Order 13132, Federalism VIII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska IX. Environmental Analysis X. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use XI. Availability of Rulemaking Documents XII. Additional Information Appendix to the Preamble—Additional Accident Discussions The Proposed Amendment I. Executive Summary
This NPRM proposes requirements for all part 135 aircraft, part 91 helicopter operations, and air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations. The proposal aims to address safety concerns arising from an increase in air ambulance related fatalities from 2002 to 2008
XII. Additional Information Appendix to the Preamble—Additional Accident Discussions The Proposed Amendment I. Executive Summary
This NPRM proposes requirements for all part 135 aircraft, part 91 helicopter operations, and air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations. The proposal aims to address safety concerns arising from an increase in air ambulance related fatalities from 2002 to 2008.
As described in further detail throughout this document, the NPRM proposes the following requirements:
Affected entities Proposal Part 135—All Aircraft • Permit operators to transmit a copy of load manifest documentation to their base of operations, in lieu of preparing a duplicate copy. • Specify requirements for retaining a copy of the load manifest in the event that the documentation is destroyed in an aircraft accident. Part 91—Helicopter Operations • Revision of part 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather minimums. All Commercial Helicopter Operations (Operating Requirements) • Revision of commercial helicopter instrument flight rules (IFR) alternate airport weather minimums. • Require helicopter pilots to demonstrate competency in recovery from inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions. • Require all commercial helicopters to be equipped with radio altimeters. • Change definition of “extended over-water operation,” and require additional equipment for these operations. Air Ambulance Operations (Operating Requirements and Equipage) • Require air ambulance flights with medical personnel on board to be conducted under part 135, including flight crew time limitation and rest requirements. • Require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances to establish operations control centers. • Require helicopter air ambulance certificate holders to implement pre-flight risk-analysis programs. • Require safety briefings for medical personnel on helicopter air ambulances
nnel on board to be conducted under part 135, including flight crew time limitation and rest requirements. • Require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances to establish operations control centers. • Require helicopter air ambulance certificate holders to implement pre-flight risk-analysis programs. • Require safety briefings for medical personnel on helicopter air ambulances. • Amend helicopter air ambulance operational requirements to include VFR weather minimums, IFR operations at airports/heliports without weather reporting, procedures for VFR approaches, and VFR flight planning. • Require pilots in command to hold an instrument rating. • Require equipage with Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS), and possibly light-weight aircraft recording systems (LARS). In aggregate, the FAA estimates the mean present value of the total monetizable costs of these proposals (over 10 years, 7% discount rate) to be $225 million, with a range of total monetizable benefits from $83 million to $1.98 billion (over 10 years, 7% discount rate).
The table below summarizes the present value range of total aggregate monetizable costs and benefits the FAA estimates as a result of this rule:
Summary of monetizable costs and benefits 1 Range (in millions) (over 10 years, 7% discount rate) Air Ambulance $62 to $1,500. Commercial $21 to $480. Total Benefits $83 to $1,980. Air Ambulance $136. Commercial $89. Total Costs $225. The FAA requests comments on the analysis underlying these estimates, as well as possible approaches to reduce the costs of this rule while maintaining or increasing the benefits. While the FAA has concluded that the aggregate benefits justify the aggregate costs, under some scenarios, the monetizable benefits may fall short of the monetizable costs. The FAA seeks comments on possible changes or flexibilities that might improve the rule.
1 “Air ambulance” applies to helicopter air ambulance operations
ce the costs of this rule while maintaining or increasing the benefits. While the FAA has concluded that the aggregate benefits justify the aggregate costs, under some scenarios, the monetizable benefits may fall short of the monetizable costs. The FAA seeks comments on possible changes or flexibilities that might improve the rule.
1 “Air ambulance” applies to helicopter air ambulance operations. “Commercial” applies to all part 135 aircraft operations, excluding helicopter air ambulance operations.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
The helicopter air ambulance industry experienced a significant increase in fatal accidents in 2008, making it the deadliest year on record for the industry. During that year, six accidents claimed 24 lives, including those of 2
2 GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns (2009).
Helicopter accidents, however, have not been limited to the air ambulance industry. The FAA identified 75 commercial helicopter accidents, occurring from 1994 through 2008 with causal factors that are addressed in this proposal. These accidents involving commercial helicopter operations resulted in 88 fatalities. These accidents do not include the helicopter air ambulance accidents discussed above.
After reviewing the accident data, the FAA identified controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), loss of control (LOC), inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and accidents during night conditions as four common factors in helicopter air ambulance accidents. A review of commercial helicopter accidents also demonstrated that these accidents may have been prevented if pilots and helicopters were better equipped for encounters with inadvertent flight into IMC, flat-light, 3 whiteout, 4 and brownout 5 conditions, and for flights over water
conditions (IMC), and accidents during night conditions as four common factors in helicopter air ambulance accidents. A review of commercial helicopter accidents also demonstrated that these accidents may have been prevented if pilots and helicopters were better equipped for encounters with inadvertent flight into IMC, flat-light, 3 whiteout, 4 and brownout 5 conditions, and for flights over water. The FAA also determined that enhancements to safety equipment for over-water operations and establishing more stringent instrument flight rules (IFR) alternate airport weather minima would enhance the safety of all part 135 helicopter operations.
3 The NTSB describes flat-light conditions in NTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-33 as “the diffuse lighting that occurs under cloudy skies especially when the ground is snow covered. Under flat light conditions, there are no shadows cast, and the topography of snow-covered surfaces is impossible to judge. Flat light greatly impairs a pilot's ability to perceive depth, distance, altitude, or topographical features when operating under visual flight rules (VFR).”
4 AC 00-6A, Aviation Weather for Pilots and Flight Operations Personnel, describes whiteout conditions as a “visibility restricting phenomenon that occurs in the Arctic when a layer of cloudiness of uniform thickness overlies a snow or ice-covered surface. Parallel rays of the sun are broken up and diffused when passing through the cloud layer so that they strike the snow surface from many angles. The diffused light then reflects back and forth countless times between the snow and the cloud eliminating all shadows. The result is a loss of depth perception.”
5 Brownout conditions occur when sand or other particles restrict visibility and depth perception
el rays of the sun are broken up and diffused when passing through the cloud layer so that they strike the snow surface from many angles. The diffused light then reflects back and forth countless times between the snow and the cloud eliminating all shadows. The result is a loss of depth perception.”
5 Brownout conditions occur when sand or other particles restrict visibility and depth perception.
Prior to developing this proposed rule, the FAA undertook initiatives to address the common factors that contribute to helicopter air ambulance accidents including issuing notices, handbook bulletins, operations specifications, and advisory circulars (ACs); this proposed rule would codify many of these initiatives.
Additionally, this proposal addresses National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations and recommendations made by the Part 125/135 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) concerning helicopter air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations. This includes a proposal to adopt amendments to load manifest requirements for single-engine part 135 operations, consistent with an NTSB Safety Recommendation developed in response to a 1997 accident.
B. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
The helicopter air ambulance industry is relatively young but has experienced rapid growth during its existence. The industry's evolution has not produced a uniform model of operations; rather certificate holders vary in size and scope of operations. In addition, as discussed below, helicopter air ambulance operations present unique challenges meriting regulation beyond that traditionally applied to part 135 commercial helicopter operations.
Helicopter air medical transportation was first used prominently during the Korean War to move injured soldiers from the battlefield. Since then, helicopters have been used to transport critically injured patients and donor organs to hospitals because of their capability to provide rapid transportation over long distances from remote locations
pplied to part 135 commercial helicopter operations.
Helicopter air medical transportation was first used prominently during the Korean War to move injured soldiers from the battlefield. Since then, helicopters have been used to transport critically injured patients and donor organs to hospitals because of their capability to provide rapid transportation over long distances from remote locations. The first commercial helicopter air ambulance program began operation in 1972. The industry grew significantly in the 1980s, and is continuing to grow. 6 Between 2003 and 2008, the Association of Air Medical Services reported a 54 percent increase in the number of helicopters used by its members in helicopter air ambulance operations. 7 The NTSB estimates that 400,000 patients and transplant organs are now transported by helicopter each year. 8
6 National Transportation Safety Board: Safety Study— Commercial Emergency Medical Service Helicopter Operations, NTSB/SS-88/01 (Jan. 28, 1988), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09SH001/410702.pdf.
7 See GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns 4 (2009).
8 Testimony of the Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt, III, Board Member NTSB, Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, April 22, 2009, available at http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/hearingDetail.aspx?NewsID=865; transcript URL: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:49001.pdf.
As of February 2009, the FAA authorized 74 certificate holders to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations. These certificate holders operate approximately 850 helicopters in air ambulance operations. The size of these operations varies greatly. The smallest operators only have one or two helicopters and operate in one region; the largest operators may have hundreds of helicopters across the United States
ary 2009, the FAA authorized 74 certificate holders to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations. These certificate holders operate approximately 850 helicopters in air ambulance operations. The size of these operations varies greatly. The smallest operators only have one or two helicopters and operate in one region; the largest operators may have hundreds of helicopters across the United States. Of the 50 largest certificate holders operating under part 121 or 135, as measured by the number of aircraft operated, six conduct helicopter air ambulance operations. The tenth largest air carrier in the United States, Air Methods Corporation, is a helicopter air ambulance operator.
The following is a breakdown of the number of helicopter air ambulances operated by the 74 certificate holders permitted to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations as of February, 2009: 38 certificate holders have 5 or fewer helicopters; 14 certificate holders have 6 to 10 helicopters; 6 certificate holders have 11 to 15 helicopters; and 16 certificate holders have more than 16 helicopters.
Certificate holders' air ambulance programs and operational practices vary as to whether they conduct IFR or VFR operations, perform formal pre-flight risk analyses, or use operations control centers. In addition, certificate holders equip their helicopters differently. For example, some helicopters are permanently configured for full-time air ambulance operations while others are not; some are equipped for IFR operations while others are equipped for VFR-only operations; and helicopter air ambulances have varying situational-awareness technology (such as night vision goggles, HTAWS, radio altimeters, etc.) on board.
Helicopter air ambulance operations present several unique operating characteristics that make them distinct from other types of part 135 helicopter operations
t; some are equipped for IFR operations while others are equipped for VFR-only operations; and helicopter air ambulances have varying situational-awareness technology (such as night vision goggles, HTAWS, radio altimeters, etc.) on board.
Helicopter air ambulance operations present several unique operating characteristics that make them distinct from other types of part 135 helicopter operations. Such operations are often time-sensitive and crucial to getting a critically ill or injured patient to a medical facility as efficiently as possible, which may influence flight crews to fly under circumstances that they otherwise would not. In addition,
As described in the section below, the FAA has taken steps through non-regulatory means to improve helicopter air ambulance safety; however, in consideration of the industry's accident history, characteristics unique to helicopter air ambulance operations, and the lack of standardization among certificate holders' practices, the FAA believes that additional regulations are necessary to ensure the safety of these flights.
C. FAA Actions
In response to the increasing number of accidents involving helicopter air ambulances, the FAA has developed standards over the years for weather minima and for helicopter terrain awareness and warning systems (HTAWS), and formalized dispatch procedures. In addition, the FAA has issued guidance for operational improvements in areas that address Crew Resource Management (CRM), CFIT, inadvertent flight into IMC, operational control, improved access to weather information, risk management, improvement of organizational safety culture, and aeronautical decisionmaking skills. The following provides a summary of many of the actions taken by the FAA.
On April 8, 2003, the FAA formed the Part 125/135 ARC to perform a comprehensive review of parts 125 and 135 and provide recommendations on rule changes
to IMC, operational control, improved access to weather information, risk management, improvement of organizational safety culture, and aeronautical decisionmaking skills. The following provides a summary of many of the actions taken by the FAA.
On April 8, 2003, the FAA formed the Part 125/135 ARC to perform a comprehensive review of parts 125 and 135 and provide recommendations on rule changes. ARC members included aviation associations, industry representatives, employee groups, the FAA, and other participants to obtain a balance of views, interests, and expertise. The ARC made recommendations pertaining to helicopter air ambulance operations and other commercial helicopter operations that form the basis of several of the proposals in this NPRM, including equipping helicopters with radio altimeters, increasing weather minima for helicopter air ambulance operations, requiring additional safety equipment for over-water operations, requiring pilot testing on recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC, and revising IFR alternate airport weather requirements.
In August 2004, the FAA established a task force to review and guide government and industry efforts to reduce helicopter air ambulance accidents. The task force review of commercial helicopter air ambulance accidents for the period of January 1998 through December 2004 revealed that CFIT, night operations, and inadvertent flight into IMC were the predominant factors contributing to those accidents.
On January 28, 2005, the FAA issued Notice 8000.293, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations, addressing CRM, adherence to procedures, and pilot decisionmaking skills in helicopter air ambulance operations. This notice was later incorporated into Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06001, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Operations (Jan. 28, 2006)
tributing to those accidents.
On January 28, 2005, the FAA issued Notice 8000.293, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations, addressing CRM, adherence to procedures, and pilot decisionmaking skills in helicopter air ambulance operations. This notice was later incorporated into Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06001, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Operations (Jan. 28, 2006). On August 1, 2005, the FAA issued Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, providing guidance on operational risk assessment programs, including training of flightcrews and medical personnel.
In AC 00-64, Air Medical Resource Management, issued September 22, 2005, the FAA recommended minimum guidelines for air medical resource management training for all air medical service operations team members, including pilots, maintenance personnel, medical personnel, communications specialists, and other air medical team members. In Notice 8000.307, Special Emphasis Inspection Program For Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, issued September 27, 2005, the FAA addressed a special emphasis inspection program for helicopter air ambulance operators, focusing on operational control, risk assessment, and training programs. On January 24, 2006, the FAA issued handbook bulletin HBAT 06-02, Helicopter Emergency Services (HEMS) Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Accident Avoidance Programs, to FAA inspectors describing acceptable models for LOC and CFIT accident avoidance programs.
In January 2006, the FAA amended Operations Specification A021, which is issued to all certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations, to establish VFR weather requirements, including consideration of adverse effects of ambient lighting at night and mountainous terrain
dance Programs, to FAA inspectors describing acceptable models for LOC and CFIT accident avoidance programs.
In January 2006, the FAA amended Operations Specification A021, which is issued to all certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations, to establish VFR weather requirements, including consideration of adverse effects of ambient lighting at night and mountainous terrain. Following the 2008 accidents, the FAA again amended Operations Specification A021 to address VFR weather requirements, applied those weather requirements to all flights with medical personnel on board, required a flight planning requirement, and allowed IFR approaches when a pilot could consult a weather reporting source within 15 miles of the landing location.
In 2006, RTCA, Inc., 9 at the FAA's request, established a special committee to develop HTAWS standards. In December 2008, the FAA issued Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS), based on the minimum operational performance standards developed by the committee. This TSO establishes the technical baseline for the HTAWS requirement in this proposal.
9 RTCA, Inc. is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system issues. RTCA, Inc. functions as a Federal Advisory Committee.
The FAA issued AC 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations (May 5, 2008), that provides guidance to certificate holders for establishing operations control and dispatch centers. The information in AC 120-96 formed the foundation of this proposal's requirement for certain certificate holders to establish operations control centers
ee.
The FAA issued AC 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations (May 5, 2008), that provides guidance to certificate holders for establishing operations control and dispatch centers. The information in AC 120-96 formed the foundation of this proposal's requirement for certain certificate holders to establish operations control centers.
In 2008, through Notice 8900.57, Part 135 Helicopter Training Program and Manual Revisions, the FAA implemented several pilot training program revisions applicable to part 135 helicopter training programs in response to NTSB safety recommendations A-02-34 and A-02-35, including procedures for mitigating and recovering from brownout, whiteout, and flat-light conditions.
On January 12, 2009, through Notice 8900.63, Validation of HEMS Safety Initiatives, the FAA, in an effort to identify how well its voluntary programs had been accepted, surveyed the operators through their Principal Operations Inspectors. Survey results indicated that 94 percent of the
D. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations
In 1988, the NTSB conducted a safety study of emergency medical service operations that examined 59 accidents. 10 This study determined that the helicopter air ambulance accident rate was almost twice the estimated accident rate of non-scheduled part 135 helicopter air taxi operations, and were 3.5 times more likely to be fatal. 11 The NTSB found reduced visibility to be the most common factor associated with such crashes.
10 Commercial Emergency Medical Service Helicopter Operations, Safety Study NTSB/SS-88/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1988).
11 Id. at 7.
In January 2006, the NTSB conducted a special investigation of emergency medical services operations and issued four recommendations to the FAA. 12 These recommendations are discussed in sections III.A.1.a., III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d., III.A.2.a., and III.A.3.b
dical Service Helicopter Operations, Safety Study NTSB/SS-88/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1988).
11 Id. at 7.
In January 2006, the NTSB conducted a special investigation of emergency medical services operations and issued four recommendations to the FAA. 12 These recommendations are discussed in sections III.A.1.a., III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d., III.A.2.a., and III.A.3.b.
12 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB/SIR-06/01) (Jan. 25, 2006).
In February 2009, the NTSB held a public hearing on “Helicopter Emergency Medical Services” to examine the safety issues associated with these operations and gather testimony from government, operators, industry associations, manufacturers, and hospitals. 13 In September 2009, the NTSB issued a series of safety recommendations based on the findings of the February hearing. The recommendations that are addressed by this rulemaking are discussed in sections III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d., III.A.2.b., and III.B.3. The FAA has determined that the remaining September 2009 recommendations are not ready for rulemaking at this time.
13 NTSB, Public Hearing Summary, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/Hearing-HEMS/HEMS_Summary.pdf.
The NTSB also made recommendations to public aircraft operators, the Federal Interagency Emergency Medical Services Committee, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
As a result of its investigations and studies, the NTSB identified several probable causes of helicopter accidents, such as spatial disorientation, lack of general awareness, loss of control, poor decision making, failure to maintain clearance of obstacles, inadequate planning, and improper execution of standard operating procedures
h and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
As a result of its investigations and studies, the NTSB identified several probable causes of helicopter accidents, such as spatial disorientation, lack of general awareness, loss of control, poor decision making, failure to maintain clearance of obstacles, inadequate planning, and improper execution of standard operating procedures.
NTSB safety recommendations addressed by this rulemaking include the following:
Recommendations on Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
A-06-12: Recommends that the FAA require all emergency medical services operators to comply with 14 CFR part 135 operations specifications during the conduct of all flights with medical personnel on board. (Discussed in sections III.A.1.a. and III.A.3.b.)
A-06-13: Recommends that the FAA require all emergency medical services operators to develop and implement flight-risk evaluation programs that include training all employees involved in the operation, procedures that support the systematic evaluation of flight risks, and consultation with others in emergency medical service (EMS) flight operations if the risks reach a predefined level. (Discussed in section III.A.1.d.)
A-06-14: Recommends that the FAA require emergency medical services operators to use formalized dispatch and flight-monitoring procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions. (Discussed in section III.A.1.b.)
A-06-15: Recommends that the FAA require emergency medical services operators to install terrain awareness and warning systems on their aircraft and to provide adequate training to ensure that flight crews are capable of using the systems to safely conduct EMS operations
t include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions. (Discussed in section III.A.1.b.)
A-06-15: Recommends that the FAA require emergency medical services operators to install terrain awareness and warning systems on their aircraft and to provide adequate training to ensure that flight crews are capable of using the systems to safely conduct EMS operations. (Discussed in section III.A.2.a.)
A-09-87: Recommends that the FAA develop criteria for scenario-based helicopter emergency medical services pilot training that includes inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions and hazards unique to helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) operations, and determine how frequently this training is required to ensure proficiency. (Discussed in section III.B.3.)
A-09-89: Recommends that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance operators implement a safety management system program that includes sound risk management practices. (Discussed in sections III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d, and III.A.2.b.)
A-09-90: Recommends that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance operators install flight data recording devices and establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues. (Discussed in section III.A.2.b.)
The FAA notes that the NTSB used the term “emergency medical services operators” or “EMS operators” in its recommendations. However, the FAA uses the term “helicopter air ambulance operators” in this proposed rulemaking. The FAA also notes that NTSB Safety Recommendations A-06-12 through A-06-14 addressed both fixed-wing and helicopter air ambulance operations. As previously noted, while some provisions of the proposal extend to other types of aircraft and commercial helicopter operations more broadly, the FAA is focusing largely on helicopter air ambulance safety in this rulemaking
s” in this proposed rulemaking. The FAA also notes that NTSB Safety Recommendations A-06-12 through A-06-14 addressed both fixed-wing and helicopter air ambulance operations. As previously noted, while some provisions of the proposal extend to other types of aircraft and commercial helicopter operations more broadly, the FAA is focusing largely on helicopter air ambulance safety in this rulemaking. Although this proposed rule primarily focuses on helicopter air ambulance safety, it also addresses additional NTSB recommendations, listed below.
Recommendations on Commercial Helicopter Operations
A-02-33: Recommends that the FAA require all helicopter pilots who conduct commercial, passenger-carrying flights in areas where flat-light or whiteout conditions routinely occur to possess a helicopter-specific instrument rating and to demonstrate their competency during initial and recurrent 14 CFR 135.293 evaluation check rides. (Discussed in section III.B.3.)
A-02-34: Recommends that the FAA require all commercial helicopter operators conducting passenger-carrying flights in areas where flat-light or whiteout conditions routinely occur to include safe practices for operating in flat-light or whiteout conditions in their approved training programs. (Discussed in section III.B.3.)
A-02-35: Recommends that the FAA require the installation of radio altimeters in all helicopters conducting commercial, passenger-carrying operations in areas where flat-light or whiteout conditions routinely occur. (Discussed in section III.B.2.a.)
A-06-17: Recommends that the FAA require all rotorcraft operating under [14 CFR] parts 91 and 135 with a transport-category certification to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR)
meters in all helicopters conducting commercial, passenger-carrying operations in areas where flat-light or whiteout conditions routinely occur. (Discussed in section III.B.2.a.)
A-06-17: Recommends that the FAA require all rotorcraft operating under [14 CFR] parts 91 and 135 with a transport-category certification to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR). (Discussed in section III.A.2.b.)
A-07-87: Recommends that the FAA require all existing and new turbine-powered helicopters operating in the Gulf of Mexico and certificated with five or more seats to be equipped with externally mounted life rafts large
A-07-88: Recommends that the FAA require all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with personal flotation devices equipped with a waterproof, global-positioning-system-enabled 406 megahertz personal locater beacon, as well as one other signaling device, such as a signaling mirror or strobe light. (Discussed in section III.B.2.b.)
Other Recommendations
A-99-61: Recommends that the FAA amend recordkeeping requirements in § 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as well as multiengine aircraft. (Discussed in section III.C.2.)
E. Congressional Action
Legislation has been introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 111th Congress, and in earlier Congresses, addressing several of the issues raised in this rulemaking. In addition, on April 22, 2009, the House Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing on oversight of helicopter medical services. The Subcommittee heard from a variety of government, industry, and public representatives who testified on the House helicopter air ambulance safety legislation, NTSB safety recommendations, and FAA actions to mitigate helicopter air ambulance accidents.
III
2, 2009, the House Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing on oversight of helicopter medical services. The Subcommittee heard from a variety of government, industry, and public representatives who testified on the House helicopter air ambulance safety legislation, NTSB safety recommendations, and FAA actions to mitigate helicopter air ambulance accidents.
III. Discussion of the Proposal
In determining how to improve the safety of helicopter air ambulance operations, as well as all other commercial helicopter operations, the FAA reviewed approximately 4,000 accidents that involved helicopters in the United States (excluding U.S. territories). Of those accidents, the FAA identified 75 commercial helicopter accidents and 127 helicopter air ambulance accidents that occurred between 1994 and 2008 with causal factors that are addressed in this proposal. The accidents involving commercial helicopter operations resulted in 88 fatalities, 29 serious injuries, and 42 minor injuries; 28 (approximately 37 percent) involved one or more fatalities, and 47 had no fatalities. The accidents involving helicopter air ambulance operations resulted in 126 fatalities, 50 serious injuries, and 42 minor injuries; 46 (approximately 36 percent) involved one or more fatalities, and 81 had no fatalities. In addition to injuries and fatalities, there also was significant damage or complete hull loss for these accidents.
A comparison of the accidents that occurred between 2000 and 2008 reveals that there were 66 commercial helicopter accidents (including 23 fatal accidents resulting in 65 fatalities) and 98 helicopter air ambulance accidents (including 35 fatal accidents resulting in 94 fatalities) during that time. The percentage of fatalities between the two categories was essentially the same
these accidents.
A comparison of the accidents that occurred between 2000 and 2008 reveals that there were 66 commercial helicopter accidents (including 23 fatal accidents resulting in 65 fatalities) and 98 helicopter air ambulance accidents (including 35 fatal accidents resulting in 94 fatalities) during that time. The percentage of fatalities between the two categories was essentially the same. Given the equivalent risk of fatality if involved in an accident, the FAA has determined that it must focus its efforts on reducing the higher risk of helicopter air ambulances being involved in an accident in the first place.
This proposal, if adopted, would implement new regulations, and revise existing regulations, to address the causes and factors of commercial and helicopter air ambulance accidents identified by the FAA and the NTSB. The FAA notes that compliance dates of the proposed regulations would vary, as noted in discussions below. The FAA believes that many of the accidents reviewed could have been prevented if these proposals had been in place during this 19-year period.
The FAA has also determined that the safety of commercial air operations could be enhanced by requiring a load manifest for all part 135 operations and is proposing to amend its rules accordingly.
A. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
The following provisions would apply to all helicopter air ambulance operations, conducted under part 135. These proposals include new operational and equipment requirements for these certificate holders. This rule does not address fixed-wing air ambulance operations. The FAA chose to focus on helicopter air ambulance operations because a predominance of the accidents involved helicopter air ambulances, 14 and approximately 74 percent of the air ambulance fleet is composed of helicopters. 15
14 41 of the 55 air ambulance accidents highlighted by the NTSB in its 2006 Special Investigation Report involved helicopters
address fixed-wing air ambulance operations. The FAA chose to focus on helicopter air ambulance operations because a predominance of the accidents involved helicopter air ambulances, 14 and approximately 74 percent of the air ambulance fleet is composed of helicopters. 15
14 41 of the 55 air ambulance accidents highlighted by the NTSB in its 2006 Special Investigation Report involved helicopters. See NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations, App'x B (2006).
15 See GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns 1 (2009).
1. Operational Procedures
a. Part 135 Applicability (§ 135.1)
The FAA is proposing to amend § 135.1 to require that all helicopter air ambulance operations with medical personnel on board be conducted under the operating rules of part 135. This includes instances where the medical personnel are employees of the operator. The safety of helicopter air ambulance flights, including the welfare of the medical personnel and patients on those flights, would be increased if operators were required to comply with the more stringent part 135 rules.
Helicopter air ambulance operations generally consist of two- or three-leg flights. Currently, the non-patient-carrying legs of those operations may be conducted under part 91 because certificate holders consider medical personnel on board the aircraft to be crewmembers and the non-patient transport legs to be positioning flights. This approach is consistent with current FAA guidance to inspectors, which notes that if medical personnel are crewmembers, they are not considered passengers, and that flights with only crewmembers on board may be conducted under part 91. 16
16 Order 8900.1, vol. 4, chapter 5, section 4
rsonnel on board the aircraft to be crewmembers and the non-patient transport legs to be positioning flights. This approach is consistent with current FAA guidance to inspectors, which notes that if medical personnel are crewmembers, they are not considered passengers, and that flights with only crewmembers on board may be conducted under part 91. 16
16 Order 8900.1, vol. 4, chapter 5, section 4.
However, the FAA notes that the primary purpose of having medical personnel on board helicopter air ambulance flights is to provide medical care to the patients being transported, and they “cannot be expected to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process to enhance flight safety or to significantly contribute to operational control of the flight.” 17 Accordingly, the FAA believes these individuals should be afforded the same safety protections of part 135 as those given to patients on board helicopter air ambulance flights.
17 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006).
Air ambulance accidents have occurred during all phases of flight. The NTSB found that 35 of the 55 accidents it studied for its Special Investigation Report occurred during part 91 operations with medical personnel, but no patient, on board. 18 The NTSB cited two examples of fatal accidents that may have been prevented if the operations had been conducted according to the weather minima contained in the part 135 operations specifications issued to certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations in effect at the time of the investigation. The first accident, which took place in Salt Lake City, UT, in 2003, involved a helicopter air ambulance that crashed into terrain when weather conditions were below part 135 minima. The other accident occurred in Redwood Valley, CA, when a helicopter air ambulance crashed into mountainous terrain during high winds and heavy rain. The NTSB concluded
18 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006)
Salt Lake City, UT, in 2003, involved a helicopter air ambulance that crashed into terrain when weather conditions were below part 135 minima. The other accident occurred in Redwood Valley, CA, when a helicopter air ambulance crashed into mountainous terrain during high winds and heavy rain. The NTSB concluded
18 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006).
The major differences between operations conducted under part 91 and part 135 are the applicable weather minima and flightcrew rest requirements. The FAA acknowledges that these more stringent requirements may result in operators turning down air ambulance flights that would meet part 91 weather requirements but not part 135 weather requirements, or if the flight would put a flightcrew member over the maximum daily hours of flight time. Helicopter air ambulance operations are a form of air transportation, and the improvements in air transportation safety that would result from this proposal justifies the more stringent part 135 requirement. This proposal should not require helicopter air ambulance certificate holders to make major operational changes because their operations generally include a part 135 leg on each flight. Nevertheless, the FAA calls for comments on measures that it could take to address this proposed rule's impact on the availability of air ambulance services.
The FAA is proposing in § 135.601 to define the term “helicopter air ambulance operation” to clarify that helicopter air ambulance operations include more than just patient-transport legs. The definition would establish that any flight, including a positioning or repositioning flight, conducted for the purpose of transportation of patients or donor organs is a helicopter air ambulance flight, and clarify, through a non-exclusive list, the types of operations considered to be helicopter air ambulance operations
r air ambulance operations include more than just patient-transport legs. The definition would establish that any flight, including a positioning or repositioning flight, conducted for the purpose of transportation of patients or donor organs is a helicopter air ambulance flight, and clarify, through a non-exclusive list, the types of operations considered to be helicopter air ambulance operations. For example, a flight initiated for patient transport but terminated before patient pick up would be considered a helicopter air ambulance operation. However, maintenance, service flights for refueling, or training flights could still be conducted under part 91 when no medical personnel are on board.
The FAA also is proposing to define the term “medical personnel” in § 135.601 with language based on that found in AC 135-14A, with modifications. Unlike AC 135-14A, the proposed definition does not address the types of duties performed by medical personnel on the helicopter other than providing medical care. The proposal would not preclude medical personnel from participating in or assisting the pilot with certain duties (for example, reading checklists, tuning radios, and securing doors) as long as the individuals have been trained by the certificate holder in accordance with its FAA-approved training program. Additionally, the FAA notes that such medical personnel would not be considered to be performing safety-sensitive functions under 14 CFR part 120 Industry Drug and Alcohol Testing Program, and would therefore not be required to undergo drug testing.
Certificate holders would be required to comply with this provision by the effective date of the final rule.
b. Operations Control Centers (§ 135.617)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.617 to require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopters engaged in helicopter air ambulance operations to establish operations control centers
nd would therefore not be required to undergo drug testing.
Certificate holders would be required to comply with this provision by the effective date of the final rule.
b. Operations Control Centers (§ 135.617)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.617 to require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopters engaged in helicopter air ambulance operations to establish operations control centers. Certificate holders would be required to staff these operations control centers with operations control specialists trained and equipped to communicate with pilots, advise pilots of weather conditions, and monitor the progress of each flight. Each certificate holder covered by this requirement would be responsible for establishing its own individual operations control center. Each certificate holder would be required to provide enough operations control specialists at each operations control center to ensure proper operational control of each flight.
FAA regulations currently do not require helicopter air ambulance operators to have an operations control center. In 2008, the FAA issued AC 120-96, which provides recommendations to assist helicopter air ambulance operators with the development, implementation, and integration of an operations control center, and enhanced operational control procedures similar to those found in part 121. Members of the helicopter air ambulance industry have noted that the AC is a “product of a survey of best practices in the air medical industry and gives guidance to other air medical services as to the benefits of this type of operation.” 19 In developing this proposal, the FAA sought to standardize operations control centers by codifying the concepts of AC 120-96 into a framework appropriate for helicopter air ambulance operations. The FAA notes that a January 2009 FAA survey of inspectors with oversight of helicopter air ambulance operations showed that 89 percent of helicopter air ambulance operators have voluntarily established some type of operations control center
sought to standardize operations control centers by codifying the concepts of AC 120-96 into a framework appropriate for helicopter air ambulance operations. The FAA notes that a January 2009 FAA survey of inspectors with oversight of helicopter air ambulance operations showed that 89 percent of helicopter air ambulance operators have voluntarily established some type of operations control center.
19 Statement from the Association of Air Medical Services, Helicopter Association International, and Air Medical Operators Association to the NTSB 14 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09SH001/default.htm .
The NTSB, in its 2006 Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations, identified the following four fatal accidents, which may have been prevented if formalized dispatch and flight-monitoring procedures had been in place. 20
20 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB/SIR-06/01) 7 (Jan. 25, 2006).
(1) In a 2004 Pyote, TX, accident in which a helicopter air ambulance transporting a patient crashed into terrain while maneuvering in reduced-visibility conditions, the pilot was not aware of expected thunderstorm activity in the area because he did not obtain a weather briefing before departure.
(2) In the 2003 Salt Lake City, UT, accident in which a helicopter air ambulance crashed into terrain when weather conditions were below part 135 minima, the operator's dispatcher encouraged the pilot to accept the flight in spite of the fact that another company had refused it because of low visibility conditions. The NTSB stated that a flight dispatcher with specific knowledge of flight requirements would likely have been able to more fully comprehend the importance of the other company's refusal, independently gathered and correctly interpreted pertinent weather information from all available sources, and provided appropriate advice to the pilot.
mpany had refused it because of low visibility conditions. The NTSB stated that a flight dispatcher with specific knowledge of flight requirements would likely have been able to more fully comprehend the importance of the other company's refusal, independently gathered and correctly interpreted pertinent weather information from all available sources, and provided appropriate advice to the pilot.
(3) In a 2004 accident in Newberry, SC, a helicopter air ambulance collided with trees in poor weather conditions. Three flightcrews had declined the mission based on their awareness of unsafe weather conditions, specifically the presence of fog. A 911 dispatcher that communicated with the pilot did not inform the pilot that the other three flightcrews had declined the mission because of fog.
(4) A helicopter air ambulance that crashed into mountainous terrain in 2004 in Battle Mountain, NV, was not reported overdue until approximately four hours after its departure. The flight crossed from one county to another, and 911 dispatch centers from the two
The NTSB concluded that “[f]ormalized dispatch and flight-monitoring procedures, including a dedicated dispatcher with aviation-specific knowledge and experience, would enhance the safety of emergency medical services flight operations by providing the pilot with consistent and critical weather information, assisting in go/no go decisions, and monitoring the flight's position.” This resulted in NTSB Safety Recommendation A-06-14 that air ambulance operators be required to “use formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.” This proposal would address that safety recommendation
al weather information, assisting in go/no go decisions, and monitoring the flight's position.” This resulted in NTSB Safety Recommendation A-06-14 that air ambulance operators be required to “use formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.” This proposal would address that safety recommendation.
This proposed regulation, which would also partially address NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-89 regarding the implementation of sound risk management practices, could contribute to a certificate holder's overall safety program because it would be a method of incorporating risk management practices into a company's flight operations. In particular, an operations control specialist would provide additional input on proposed operations and be able to monitor flights, potentially helping pilots avoid dangerous situations.
Under this proposal, operations control specialists would perform the following functions: (1) Maintain two-way communications with pilots; 21 (2) provide pilots with weather information to include current and forecasted weather along the planned route of flight; (3) monitor the flight progress; and (4) participate in pre-flight risk analysis. 22 This proposal is intended to provide an additional measure to help prevent CFIT, loss of control, inadvertent flight into IMC, and accidents at night.
21 The FAA notes that this proposal is not intended to limit two-way communication between the operations control specialist and the pilot to traditional two-way radio communication. Rather, other means of communication, such as satellite phone or data link, also would be acceptable.
22 See section III.A.1.d. of the preamble to this NPRM.
The FAA is proposing to require certificate holders with 10 or more air ambulance helicopters to establish operations control centers for several reasons
rations control specialist and the pilot to traditional two-way radio communication. Rather, other means of communication, such as satellite phone or data link, also would be acceptable.
22 See section III.A.1.d. of the preamble to this NPRM.
The FAA is proposing to require certificate holders with 10 or more air ambulance helicopters to establish operations control centers for several reasons. The FAA's analysis of current helicopter air ambulance operators shows that the vast majority of operations are conducted by operators with these larger fleets. The FAA's review of operations specifications issued to the 74 certificate holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations shows that, as of February 2009, there were 24 certificate holders with 10 or more helicopters in their fleets. Those certificate holders operated 620 of the 884 total helicopters in helicopter air ambulance operations. Additionally, the level of operational complexity and management detail required for safe operations is greater for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances.
Although certificate holders with nine or fewer helicopter air ambulances are not covered by this provision, the FAA finds that the pre-flight risk analysis requirement proposed under § 135.615 may provide a sufficient alternative for these operators because of their limited scope of operations. 23
23 See section III.A.1.d. of the preamble to this NPRM.
The FAA requests comments on whether the requirement should be dependent on fleet size or number of operations conducted. The agency asks that comments be accompanied by data regarding the number of operations conducted by helicopter air ambulances and/or the typical number of hours flown per aircraft.
The FAA is proposing in § 135.617 to require the staffing of operations control centers with operations control specialists, rather than certificated aircraft dispatchers
fleet size or number of operations conducted. The agency asks that comments be accompanied by data regarding the number of operations conducted by helicopter air ambulances and/or the typical number of hours flown per aircraft.
The FAA is proposing in § 135.617 to require the staffing of operations control centers with operations control specialists, rather than certificated aircraft dispatchers. 24 The training program associated with FAA-certificated aircraft dispatcher licensing is primarily focused on large, fixed-wing, transport category aircraft operating under part 121. While aspects of this training, such as weather information and radio communication, are relevant to helicopter operations, this proposal is designed to permit certificate holders to create training programs directly applicable to helicopter air ambulance operations. Accordingly, the FAA sought to incorporate the more general elements of part 65-certificated aircraft dispatcher training into the proposed requirements for training operations control specialists. Although the FAA is not proposing to require formal certification of operations control specialists, it may consider formal FAA certification of these individuals in the future if appropriate.
24 Aircraft dispatchers, certificated under part 65, generally are employed by part 121 air carriers and specialize in scheduled air carrier transportation.
The FAA notes that certificate holders could be subject to enforcement action for using inadequately trained operations control specialists, or may be responsible for errors committed by an operations control specialist. Likewise, an operations control specialist also could be subject to enforcement action or civil penalties if he or she failed a drug test, functioned as an operations control specialist without completing training or passing examinations, or verified false entries on a pre-flight analysis worksheet
control specialists, or may be responsible for errors committed by an operations control specialist. Likewise, an operations control specialist also could be subject to enforcement action or civil penalties if he or she failed a drug test, functioned as an operations control specialist without completing training or passing examinations, or verified false entries on a pre-flight analysis worksheet.
Certificate holders may want to hire certificated aircraft dispatchers, or others with general aviation or weather knowledge, to serve as operations control specialists. This proposal would allow a certificate holder to offer individuals with recent, relevant experience an initial training course that features a reduced number of hours of initial training, focusing on the certificate holder-specific training topics addressed below. A reduced training program would be permissible because of the knowledge these individuals have obtained through training for other positions that is applicable to the operations control specialist position. This benefit would be extended to the following persons with specific aviation-related training—(1) Military pilots, flight navigators, and meteorologists; (2) civilian pilots, flight engineers, meteorologists, air traffic controllers, and flight service specialists involved in air carrier operations; and (3) certificated aircraft dispatchers involved in part 121 operations. This provision is similar to 14 CFR 65.57, which permits individuals who have not graduated from an aircraft dispatcher school, but who have relevant aviation experience, to apply for an aircraft dispatcher certificate.
In addition, with respect to the pre-flight risk analysis that would be required under this proposal for all helicopter air ambulance operations, 25 the operations control specialist would ensure that the pilot completed the pre-flight risk analysis worksheet, confirm and verify the entries on the worksheet, and work with the pilot to mitigate any identified risk
aircraft dispatcher certificate.
In addition, with respect to the pre-flight risk analysis that would be required under this proposal for all helicopter air ambulance operations, 25 the operations control specialist would ensure that the pilot completed the pre-flight risk analysis worksheet, confirm and verify the entries on the worksheet, and work with the pilot to mitigate any identified risk. The operations control specialist, along with the pilot in command, would be required to acknowledge in writing (by signing, initialing, or another method as defined in the certificate holder's operations manual) that the worksheet had been completed accurately. The FAA believes that the operations control specialist's
25 Id.
Operations control specialists would be performing safety-sensitive functions such as providing pre-flight weather assessment, assisting with fuel planning, alternate airport weather minima, and communicating with pilots regarding operational concerns during flight. These duties are similar to those of an aircraft dispatcher, and therefore, operations control specialists would be subject to the restrictions on drug and alcohol use, and to a certificate holder's drug and alcohol testing program as described in 14 CFR part 120.
To ensure operations control specialists are capable of performing safety-sensitive functions, § 135.617 would require certificate holders to establish and implement an FAA-approved initial and recurrent training and testing program for operations control specialists. Operations control specialists would be required to undergo training and testing on— (1) General aviation topics such as weather, navigation, flight-monitoring procedures, air traffic control procedures, aircraft systems, and aircraft limitations and performance; and (2) topics specific to each certificate holder, such as aviation regulations and operations specifications, crew resource management, and the local flying area
sts would be required to undergo training and testing on— (1) General aviation topics such as weather, navigation, flight-monitoring procedures, air traffic control procedures, aircraft systems, and aircraft limitations and performance; and (2) topics specific to each certificate holder, such as aviation regulations and operations specifications, crew resource management, and the local flying area. Initial training would address both the general aviation and certificate holder-specific topics. Recurrent training would focus on certificate holder-specific topics. The FAA believes that the certificate holder-specific topics are more likely to change from year to year than the more general topics, justifying a more frequent rate of testing.
An individual would need to receive initial training and pass an FAA-approved written and practical test developed and given by the certificate holder before performing duties as an operations control specialist. An individual would not be able to continue as an operations control specialist unless he or she completed annual recurrent training and passed a written and practical test given by the certificate holder. The certificate holder would be responsible for maintaining records of the training and tests given to each operations control specialist for the duration of that individual's employment and for 90 days thereafter.
This proposal also would establish daily duty periods for operations control specialists which are based on the part 121 aircraft dispatcher duty time requirement. A certificate holder could schedule an operations control specialist for a maximum of 10 consecutive hours of duty. If an operations control specialist's duty time exceeds 10 hours in a 24-hour period, then the certificate holder would be required to provide at least 8 hours of rest before that individual's next duty period. Such a circumstance may occur if a flight monitored by the operations control specialist is not complete until after the end of his or her scheduled 10-hour duty period
utive hours of duty. If an operations control specialist's duty time exceeds 10 hours in a 24-hour period, then the certificate holder would be required to provide at least 8 hours of rest before that individual's next duty period. Such a circumstance may occur if a flight monitored by the operations control specialist is not complete until after the end of his or her scheduled 10-hour duty period. The operations control specialist would be required to remain on duty until each flight he or she is monitoring is complete, until those flights have left the operations control specialist's jurisdiction, or until relieved by another operations control specialist. The certificate holder must provide adequate time at the beginning of a shift to allow the operations control specialist to become familiar with current and expected weather conditions for the area of operations. The certificate holder must also establish a checklist of the subjects to be discussed during shift changes. The checklist should contain subjects such as current and forecasted weather, helicopter maintenance status, helicopter operations in progress, and other relevant information. In addition to duty time limitations, this proposal would require that every 7 consecutive days, an operations control specialist be provided 24 consecutive hours of rest.
This requirement would take effect 2 years after the effective date of the final rule. The FAA believes that this would provide certificate holders with ample time to establish operations control centers, develop training and testing programs, and to hire and provide the estimated 80 hours of training required of operations control specialists.
Although not specifically proposed here, the FAA seeks comment on whether to require operations control specialists to obtain a certificate of demonstrated proficiency from the FAA
ertificate holders with ample time to establish operations control centers, develop training and testing programs, and to hire and provide the estimated 80 hours of training required of operations control specialists.
Although not specifically proposed here, the FAA seeks comment on whether to require operations control specialists to obtain a certificate of demonstrated proficiency from the FAA. The FAA is considering this requirement because it would enable the agency to suspend or revoke an operations control specialist's certificate of demonstrated proficiency, thereby ensuring that person could not continue to hold the operations control specialist position if his or her actions merited such a response. Individuals would not be permitted to serve as an operations control specialist without obtaining a certificate of demonstrated proficiency.
It the FAA were to adopt this approach, the agency anticipates that it would issue a certificate of demonstrated proficiency to an individual upon notification by a certificate holder that the individual has successfully completed the certificate holder's FAA-approved initial training and testing requirements. Anticipating that there may be a period of time between notification and issuance of a certificate of demonstrated proficiency, the FAA would permit a person to serve as an operations control specialist from the date the certificate holder notifies the FAA that the person has met the training and testing requirements.
Certificates of demonstrated proficiency would be valid for the length of time that an operations control specialist works for a certificate holder. If a certificated operations control specialist were to leave one certificate holder to work for another, he or she would need to obtain a new certificate following completion of the new employer's training and testing program
testing requirements.
Certificates of demonstrated proficiency would be valid for the length of time that an operations control specialist works for a certificate holder. If a certificated operations control specialist were to leave one certificate holder to work for another, he or she would need to obtain a new certificate following completion of the new employer's training and testing program.
In the full Regulatory Evaluation in the public docket for this rulemaking, the FAA estimates that the proposed requirement for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopters engaged in helicopter air ambulance operations to establish operations control centers could cost $97 million or $60 million present value to implement over 10 years. The FAA specifically requests comments, accompanied by data, on the accuracy of this cost estimate. In addition, the agency requests comments on how effective this requirement would be in preventing accidents, as well as suggested alternatives for achieving comparable safety benefits.
c. VFR/IFR Procedures
The FAA is proposing a series of operational initiatives to increase the safety of helicopter air ambulance operations. Specifically, the FAA is proposing to—(1) Increase VFR weather minima, (2) allow IFR operations at locations without weather reporting, (3) specify procedures for VFR/visual transitions from instrument approaches, and (4) require additional VFR flight planning. These proposals are intended to reduce accidents due to CFIT, obstacle collisions, accidents during night operations, and accidents resulting from inadvertent flight into IMC by prescribing more stringent VFR requirements and providing more opportunity for IFR operations. These rules are proposed only for helicopter air ambulance operations because of the unique environment in which those operations are conducted, including off-airport or heliport landings and potentially time-sensitive operations. The FAA notes that these proposals address recommendations made by the Part 125/135 ARC
ore stringent VFR requirements and providing more opportunity for IFR operations. These rules are proposed only for helicopter air ambulance operations because of the unique environment in which those operations are conducted, including off-airport or heliport landings and potentially time-sensitive operations. The FAA notes that these proposals address recommendations made by the Part 125/135 ARC.
The FAA believes that the following accident is indicative of the type that this section of the proposal is intended to prevent. On January 11, 1998, a Bell 222UT, operating under part 135 with no filed flight plan and originating near Sandy, UT, encountered inadvertent IMC due to extremely poor weather. Shortly after take off, the helicopter collided with mountainous terrain resulting in fatal injuries to all on board. The NTSB cited the cause of the accident as the pilot's failure to “maintain sufficient clearance or altitude from mountainous terrain,” and continuing into known adverse weather. NTSB Accident Report FTW98FA093 (Oct. 30, 1998).
The FAA proposes for these provisions to take effect at the effective date of the final rule.
i. Increase VFR Weather Minima (§ 135.607)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.607 to prescribe more stringent VFR weather minima for helicopter air ambulance operations in uncontrolled airspace than those currently established in part 135.
Currently, § 135.205 requires visibility of at least 1/2 statute mile during the day and 1 statute mile at night for VFR helicopter operations at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface in Class G airspace. For certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations, Operations Specification A021 sets forth more stringent weather minima for VFR operations conducted in uncontrolled airspace. This rule would codify the weather requirements of Operations Specification A021
e mile at night for VFR helicopter operations at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface in Class G airspace. For certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations, Operations Specification A021 sets forth more stringent weather minima for VFR operations conducted in uncontrolled airspace. This rule would codify the weather requirements of Operations Specification A021.
The NTSB cited in its 2006 Special Investigation Report two examples of fatal accidents that may have been prevented if the operations had been conducted according to the weather minima contained in the part 135 helicopter air ambulance operations specifications in effect at the time of the investigation. The first was the 2003 Salt Lake City, UT, accident in which a helicopter air ambulance crashed into terrain when weather conditions were below part 135 minima. The other accident occurred in Redwood Valley, CA, when a helicopter air ambulance crashed into mountainous terrain during high winds and heavy rain. The Safety Board concluded that EMS operations would be improved if all emergency medical services were operated under part 135. The NTSB subsequently issued Safety Recommendation A-06-12 recommending that the FAA require all emergency medical services operators to comply with part 135 operations specifications while conducting flights with medical personnel on board. This proposal would address that safety recommendation.
The proposed weather minima for uncontrolled airspace are determined by whether the flight is taking place in a mountainous or non-mountainous area, and whether, within those classifications, the flight is taking place in a certificate holder's local flying area or is a cross-country flight. As defined in proposed § 135.601, a local flying area is an area that the certificate holder designates as one in which its pilots are familiar with the terrain and other obstacles
hether the flight is taking place in a mountainous or non-mountainous area, and whether, within those classifications, the flight is taking place in a certificate holder's local flying area or is a cross-country flight. As defined in proposed § 135.601, a local flying area is an area that the certificate holder designates as one in which its pilots are familiar with the terrain and other obstacles. Weather minima are less stringent in local flying areas because of pilots' increased familiarity with obstacles and the operating environment as compared with other cross-country areas. A local flying area would be limited to a 50-nautical mile (NM) radius because the FAA believes that a pilot would not be able to demonstrate detailed knowledge of hazards such as towers and high-altitude terrain within a larger area. The local flying area definition would codify the language of Operations Specification A021 issued on January 23, 2006.
Table 1 shows the proposed VFR minimum altitudes and visibility requirements.
Table 1—VFR Minimum Altitudes and Visibility Requirements Location Weather Minima Day Night Night using an approved NVIS or HTAWS Nonmountainous local flying areas 800-foot ceiling, 2 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility. Nonmountainous cross-country flying areas 800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility. Mountainous local flying areas 800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,500-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility. Mountainous cross-country flying areas 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,500-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles visibility
y 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility. Mountainous local flying areas 800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,500-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility. Mountainous cross-country flying areas 1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles visibility 1,500-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles visibility 1,000-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles visibility. In all flying areas, certificate holders conducting operations in a helicopter equipped with an FAA-approved night-vision imaging system (NVIS) or FAA-approved HTAWS could apply lower weather minima during night operations. Those requirements would be less stringent than the basic night operations minima because of the obstacle and CFIT avoidance benefits obtained from those devices. An approved NVIS would require, at minimum, a night vision goggle (NVG) system as defined in paragraph 1.2 of RTCA/DO-275, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment, which states that the NVIS system includes not only the NVGs themselves, but also interior and exterior lighting, windshield and windows, and general crew station design requirements. RTCA/DO-275, paragraph 1.6.1, defines NVGs as binocular systems. Under this proposal the FAA does not intend to change the term “NVIS” to include systems other than NVGs. Therefore, unless equipped with HTAWS, operators using systems that do not meet the definition of “NVIS” would not be permitted to use the NVIS weather minima in § 135.607.
Because of the requirement proposed in § 135.605 for all helicopter air ambulances to be equipped with HTAWS within 3 years of the effective date of the final rule (discussed in section III.A.2.a.), it is anticipated that all certificate holders would eventually operate under these reduced night operations weather minima. The FAA seeks comment on the interrelationship of these two proposed requirements
se of the requirement proposed in § 135.605 for all helicopter air ambulances to be equipped with HTAWS within 3 years of the effective date of the final rule (discussed in section III.A.2.a.), it is anticipated that all certificate holders would eventually operate under these reduced night operations weather minima. The FAA seeks comment on the interrelationship of these two proposed requirements.
The FAA believes that requiring all VFR legs of a helicopter air ambulance operation to comply with more stringent weather requirements would be an effective method of increasing safety in helicopter air ambulance operations. The FAA does not believe that certificate holders would need to make significant changes to their operations because this proposed rule would
ii. IFR Operations at Airports and Heliports Without Weather Reporting (§ 135.609)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.609 to allow helicopter air ambulance operators to conduct IFR operations at airports and heliports without a weather reporting facility. Currently, the regulations only permit IFR operations into and out of airports with an on-site weather reporting source. The proposed rule would allow certificate holders to obtain operations specifications permitting IFR operations into and out of locations without a weather reporting facility if they are able to obtain weather reports from an approved weather reporting facility located within 15 NM of the destination landing area. The FAA believes that this provision would increase the use of IFR by helicopter air ambulance operators and result in more aircraft operating in a positively controlled environment, thereby increasing safety.
The FAA has granted exemptions from these regulations to helicopter air ambulance operators and based this proposal on those exemptions. 26 In Exemption No
of the destination landing area. The FAA believes that this provision would increase the use of IFR by helicopter air ambulance operators and result in more aircraft operating in a positively controlled environment, thereby increasing safety.
The FAA has granted exemptions from these regulations to helicopter air ambulance operators and based this proposal on those exemptions. 26 In Exemption No. 9490, the FAA determined it was “safer and in the public interest to conduct operations under IFR rather than VFR particularly in low and marginal weather conditions” because IFR operation is an effective method of countering CFIT accidents. Additionally, this provision would codify a similar provision in Operations Specification A021 issued to helicopter air ambulance operators.
26 Exemption Nos. 9490 and 9490B (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2006-26407); Exemption No. 9665 (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2008-0169); Exemption No. 6175 (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2001-9195) (granting authority for departures only); Exemption No. 6175G (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2001-9195).
The FAA notes that this proposal would not relieve a pilot from the requirement to assess the landing conditions before descending below the minimum descent altitude set forth in § 91.175. To operate in this environment, certificate holders also would be required to implement additional safety measures beyond those otherwise required for IFR flight to ensure the pilot has the appropriate tools to operate the helicopter safely into locations without weather reporting. For example, helicopters used in these operations would have to be equipped with an autopilot and navigation equipment appropriate to the approach to be flown, such as an IFR-certified global positioning system (GPS) or wide area augmentation system (WAAS) receiver. Additionally, to help the pilot ascertain the weather in the aircraft's vicinity, § 135.609 would require helicopters to be equipped with severe weather detection equipment, such as weather radar or lightning detection equipment
nd navigation equipment appropriate to the approach to be flown, such as an IFR-certified global positioning system (GPS) or wide area augmentation system (WAAS) receiver. Additionally, to help the pilot ascertain the weather in the aircraft's vicinity, § 135.609 would require helicopters to be equipped with severe weather detection equipment, such as weather radar or lightning detection equipment. The “navigation equipment appropriate to the approach to be flown” is necessary because, for example, although an ILS approach at the nearby municipal airport may provide the lowest planning minima, if the aircraft is equipped with only a GPS, the lower planning minima of the ILS are unusable.
Section 135.609 not only establishes aircraft equipment requirements to ensure a higher level of safety and to mitigate the associated risk, but also requires certain training of the flightcrew. That training is tailored to the operating environment and the weather observations needed at those locations. These equipment and training requirements are found in the exemptions referenced above. The FAA believes that these additional equipment and training requirements are necessary to compensate for the lack of specific weather information available at the destination.
iii. IFR to VFR/Visual Transitions (§ 135.611)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.611 to establish weather minima for transitions to the VFR segment of an instrument approach. 27 Pilots conducting an IFR approach would, upon reaching a point in space at a minimum descent altitude, continue the flight to the landing area under VFR if conditions permit. This provision would facilitate operations under IFR with their associated safety benefits.
27 The approaches permitted under IFR PinS Copter Special Instrument Approach Procedures, and IFR Standard and certain Special Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) are developed by the FAA using standardized methods associated with the U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPs)
ions permit. This provision would facilitate operations under IFR with their associated safety benefits.
27 The approaches permitted under IFR PinS Copter Special Instrument Approach Procedures, and IFR Standard and certain Special Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) are developed by the FAA using standardized methods associated with the U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPs). IFR Standard and PinS Copter Special Instrument Approach Procedures are publicly available approaches for use by appropriately qualified pilots operating properly equipped and airworthy aircraft. Special IAPs generally service private-use airports or heliports, and the FAA authorizes only certain individual pilots or pilots in individual organizations to use these procedures. Special IAPs may require additional crew training and/or aircraft equipment or performance, and may also require the use of landing aids, communications, or weather services not available for public use. Instrument approach procedures that service private use airports or heliports are generally special IAPs.
Proposed § 135.611(a)(1) establishes the requirements for instrument approaches containing the instruction to “proceed visually” from the missed approach point (MAP). For these approaches, the weather minima reflected on the approach chart would apply.
For PinS Copter Special Approaches, proposed 135.611(a)(2) would permit operations under lower weather minima than currently allowed for cruise flight in uncontrolled airspace when transitioning from IFR to a VFR segment on approach. These approaches contain the instruction to “proceed VFR.” The applicable minima are based on the distance from the MAP to the landing area. The pilot would therefore need to evaluate the proximity of the MAP to the landing area to determine the appropriate VFR minima, which are based on the distance from the landing area
ontrolled airspace when transitioning from IFR to a VFR segment on approach. These approaches contain the instruction to “proceed VFR.” The applicable minima are based on the distance from the MAP to the landing area. The pilot would therefore need to evaluate the proximity of the MAP to the landing area to determine the appropriate VFR minima, which are based on the distance from the landing area. Under proposed § 135.611(a)(2)(i), the visibility must be at least 1 statute mile if the MAP is within 1 NM of the heliport of intended landing. To make the transition from IFR flight to VFR from a point in space 3 NM or less from the destination, a pilot would need to have 2 statute miles of visibility and a 600-foot ceiling during the day, or 3 statute miles of visibility and a 600-foot ceiling at night in accordance with § 135.611(a)(3).
The FAA recognizes that the area between the MAP and the “heliport of intended landing” (i.e. the heliport reflected on the approach chart as no deviation to another location is authorized in this case) has been flight checked but may not meet the requirements to “proceed visually.” The FAA recognizes that obstacles in the vicinity of an instrument approach are flight-checked and marked on instrument approach charts. Approach charts are updated more frequently than the sectional charts used in VFR operations. Therefore, it is less likely that pilots would encounter unexpected obstacles when following an approach documented on an instrument approach chart than when en route using a sectional chart.
The FAA recognizes that a helicopter air ambulance operator may follow a special or standard instrument approach to a heliport or airport to descend below weather and then transition to VFR flight to land at another location. In that case, the minima of § 135.611(a)(3) or § 135.611(a)(4) would apply, depending on the distance to the intended landing area, which could be an off-site location
art.
The FAA recognizes that a helicopter air ambulance operator may follow a special or standard instrument approach to a heliport or airport to descend below weather and then transition to VFR flight to land at another location. In that case, the minima of § 135.611(a)(3) or § 135.611(a)(4) would apply, depending on the distance to the intended landing area, which could be an off-site location.
Lastly, if a pilot transitions from IFR to VFR from a point in space more than 3 NM from the destination, the higher weather minima of proposed § 135.607 would apply. The FAA selected 3 NM because that distance is the standard amount of visibility required for VFR
This proposed rule also sets forth standards for pilots departing a destination if they used the provisions of this section to access that location. The same weather minima would apply to the departure if the pilot has filed an IFR flight plan and will obtain IFR clearance within 3 NM of the departure location, and if the pilot departs following an FAA-approved obstacle departure procedure. However it is important to note that a pilot who simply flies the reverse course of the approach used when landing would not be following an FAA-approved obstacle departure procedure, as this procedure has not been flight-checked to specific departure criteria.
The FAA believes that flights conducted under IFR obtain many safety benefits such as obstacle clearance, aircraft separation, and possible weather avoidance, thereby reducing obstacle collisions, CFIT, and wire strikes. The proposed rule would benefit pilots by enabling them to access more destinations by flying within the IFR structure, and then continuing on a VFR segment that has been flight checked for obstacles by the FAA. If the flight can be continued, then the pilot would have the benefit of operating through an area where obstacles have been flight checked and marked by the FAA
s, CFIT, and wire strikes. The proposed rule would benefit pilots by enabling them to access more destinations by flying within the IFR structure, and then continuing on a VFR segment that has been flight checked for obstacles by the FAA. If the flight can be continued, then the pilot would have the benefit of operating through an area where obstacles have been flight checked and marked by the FAA. If the flight cannot continue under VFR, then the pilot must maintain IFR flight and continue to an alternate destination consistent with current regulations.
This proposal would implement Part 125/135 ARC recommendations. Also, this proposal would codify the provision of Operations Specification A021 regarding weather minima to be used during transitions to VFR flight with changes pertaining to Copter Special Instrument Approaches.
iv. VFR Flight Planning (§ 135.613)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.613 to require helicopter air ambulance pilots to perform pre-flight planning to determine the minimum safe altitude along the planned en route phase of flight when conducting VFR operations.
The FAA is proposing to require pilots to evaluate, document, and plan to clear terrain and obstacles along the planned route of flight by no less than 300 feet for day operations, and 500 feet for night operations. The pilot would use this minimum safe cruise altitude when determining the minimum required ceiling and visibility for the planned flight. If the weather minima would not permit VFR flight at the minimum safe cruise altitude, the pilot could either conduct the flight under IFR, or not conduct the flight. Pilots could deviate from the planned flight path if conditions or operational considerations necessitate a deviation. However, during such deviations, the pilot would not be relieved from weather or terrain/obstruction clearance requirements
ather minima would not permit VFR flight at the minimum safe cruise altitude, the pilot could either conduct the flight under IFR, or not conduct the flight. Pilots could deviate from the planned flight path if conditions or operational considerations necessitate a deviation. However, during such deviations, the pilot would not be relieved from weather or terrain/obstruction clearance requirements.
If changes to the planned flight occur during flight, the pilot could continue along the new route until reaching his or her destination without re-planning the flight using the requirements of proposed § 135.613. However, upon reaching an intermediate stop, the pilot would have to evaluate the new route for terrain and obstacle clearance while the aircraft is on the ground before departure.
This proposal is intended to prevent obstacle collisions by requiring pilots to be aware of the terrain and highest obstacles along a planned route. The proposal would codify a provision of Operations Specification A021, issued to all helicopter air ambulance certificate holders, which requires the identification and documentation of the highest obstacle along the planned route before VFR operations.
d. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (§ 135.615)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.615 to require certificate holders to implement pre-flight risk-analysis programs. The FAA believes that pre-flight risk analysis may prevent accidents by mitigating risks before flight. This proposal is intended to provide certificate holders with the means to assess risk and make determinations regarding the flight's safety before launch.
Pre-flight risk assessment has been the subject of FAA guidance, industry best practices, and an NTSB study. On August 1, 2005, the FAA published Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, which provided guidance to inspectors on risk-assessment programs used in helicopter air ambulance operations
regarding the flight's safety before launch.
Pre-flight risk assessment has been the subject of FAA guidance, industry best practices, and an NTSB study. On August 1, 2005, the FAA published Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, which provided guidance to inspectors on risk-assessment programs used in helicopter air ambulance operations. The notice discussed concepts used in a risk management and assessment program, and provided examples of risk variables that a certificate holder could consider in the decision to launch a flight. These variables included weather, flight crewmember performance, operating environment, airworthiness status of the helicopter, and weather. The notice also included several examples of risk-assessment matrices that certificate holders could use in their operations, and included the concept of consulting with management personnel if the risk level reached a certain level. The notice also encouraged pilots to obtain information pertaining to a planned operation from a number of sources, including mechanics, communications specialists, and flight medical personnel, when determining risks associated with a flight operation.
Notably, a basic concept of a risk assessment program articulated in the notice is that the pilot's authority to decline a flight assignment is supreme, while his or her decision to accept a flight is subject to review if risks are identified. The notice stated that once the pilot has declined a flight assignment, other parties, such as a certificate holder's management personnel, should not continue the risk assessment pertaining to that flight in an effort to override the pilot's decision to decline the assignment
a flight assignment is supreme, while his or her decision to accept a flight is subject to review if risks are identified. The notice stated that once the pilot has declined a flight assignment, other parties, such as a certificate holder's management personnel, should not continue the risk assessment pertaining to that flight in an effort to override the pilot's decision to decline the assignment.
On January 28, 2006, the FAA published SAFO 06001, which recommended that certificate holders apply “safety attributes or risk management/assessment strategies to each flight.”
In AC 120-96 (May 5, 2008), the FAA recognized that operations control centers provide improvements in pre-flight risk analysis and conceptualized joint mission responsibility shared by pilots and operations control centers. This AC also provides practical examples of pre-flight risk analyses and how such analyses can be integrated into helicopter air ambulance operations. The AC discusses that operations control specialists may assist helicopter air ambulance pilots by participating in risk analysis, providing supplementary information regarding weather, route information, and landing zones, monitoring flight information such as weather, and monitoring flight progression. 28
28 The FAA has issued other ACs relevant to this topic. Advisory Circular 135-14A Emergency Medical Services/Helicopter (EMS/H) (June 20, 1991) included guidance on “Judgment and Decisions,” and Advisory Circular 120-51E Crew Resource Management Training (Jan. 22, 2004) discussed the importance of developing pilot-error management skills and procedures.
A January 2009 FAA survey of inspectors with oversight of helicopter air ambulance operations found that 94 percent of helicopter air ambulance operators have some type of decision-making and risk-analysis programs in place
cisions,” and Advisory Circular 120-51E Crew Resource Management Training (Jan. 22, 2004) discussed the importance of developing pilot-error management skills and procedures.
A January 2009 FAA survey of inspectors with oversight of helicopter air ambulance operations found that 94 percent of helicopter air ambulance operators have some type of decision-making and risk-analysis programs in place. The survey did not reveal the extent of these decision-making and risk-analysis programs; however, the FAA believes that the models currently in use incorporate government, industry, 29 and military risk-analysis
29 The International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) and the Helicopter Association International (HAI) have developed resources, such as IHST's
The NTSB also has addressed the need for pre-flight risk analysis. In its 2006 Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations, the NTSB concluded, based in part on its investigations of three fatal helicopter air ambulance accidents, that the “implementation of flight risk evaluation before each mission would enhance the safety of emergency medical services operations.” 30 With regard to the 2003 Salt Lake City, UT, accident in which a helicopter air ambulance crashed into terrain in poor weather conditions, the NTSB noted that had the pilot been required to perform a systematic evaluation of the flight risks (including assessments of weather minima and route of flight), the pilot may not have accepted the mission. The NTSB also cited the 2004 Battle Mountain, NV, fatal accident in which a helicopter air ambulance transporting a patient crashed into mountainous terrain while on a direct route in deteriorating weather conditions, and believed that if the pilot had performed a risk evaluation, he may have chosen a different route, and the accident may have been prevented
ilot may not have accepted the mission. The NTSB also cited the 2004 Battle Mountain, NV, fatal accident in which a helicopter air ambulance transporting a patient crashed into mountainous terrain while on a direct route in deteriorating weather conditions, and believed that if the pilot had performed a risk evaluation, he may have chosen a different route, and the accident may have been prevented. The NTSB also identified the 2004 Pyote, TX, fatal accident, in which a helicopter air ambulance transporting a patient crashed into terrain while maneuvering in reduced-visibility conditions and noted that the pilot had not performed a risk assessment.
30 NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations ((NTSB/SIR-06/01) 4 (Jan. 25, 2006).
The FAA's proposal is intended to provide standard guidelines for the implementation of pre-flight risk analysis procedures. Under the proposal, the pilot in command of a helicopter air ambulance would be required to conduct a pre-flight risk assessment before the first leg of each helicopter air ambulance operation. Helicopter air ambulance operations generally consist of two legs, such as a hospital-to-hospital transfer, or three legs, in which the helicopter departs its base to pick up a patient, transfers the patient to a hospital, then returns to base. The pre-flight analysis only would need to be conducted before departure on the first leg, but should be conducted with consideration for each leg of the operation. The pilot also would be required to sign the completed risk analysis worksheet, and provide the date and time of signing. Through this requirement, the FAA intends to highlight that the pilot is responsible for accurately completing this worksheet.
The FAA proposes to require certificate holders to establish their risk assessment procedures and document them in their operations manuals
peration. The pilot also would be required to sign the completed risk analysis worksheet, and provide the date and time of signing. Through this requirement, the FAA intends to highlight that the pilot is responsible for accurately completing this worksheet.
The FAA proposes to require certificate holders to establish their risk assessment procedures and document them in their operations manuals. A pre-flight risk analysis would consist of at least the following: (1) Flight considerations (for example, a review of any obstructions and terrain along the entire intended route, altitude considerations for the area being flown, and fuel considerations); (2) human factors (for example, whether a pilot may be affected by personal stress, knowledge of the patient's injuries ( e.g., pediatric, or critical injury), fatigue, and experience in the type of operation to be conducted); (3) weather along the intended route (for example, weather for take off, en route, and destination airports to include forecasts); (4) whether another operator has refused or rejected the flight request; and (5) strategies for mitigating identified risk, including obtaining and documenting the certificate holder's management personnel's approval of the decision to accept a flight when the risks are elevated. Certificate holders would be permitted to add additional categories to mitigate risks associated with their specific operations.
As previously noted, certificate holders would be required to develop a method to determine whether the flight request had been offered to another company. This provision is intended to combat the practice of “helicopter shopping” in which a flight request turned down by one company will be offered to another. If another company had been offered and refused the flight, it is important to understand why the flight was refused. If a flight was refused because of weather considerations, that information should feature prominently in the second company's pre-flight risk analysis
d to combat the practice of “helicopter shopping” in which a flight request turned down by one company will be offered to another. If another company had been offered and refused the flight, it is important to understand why the flight was refused. If a flight was refused because of weather considerations, that information should feature prominently in the second company's pre-flight risk analysis. However, if the first company turned down the flight because its helicopter was inoperative, then that refusal likely would not impact the risk assessment for the second company in determining whether to accept the flight. The FAA notes that the helicopter air ambulance industry has taken steps to address this problem, for example by creating a Web site ( http://www.weatherturndown.com ) where companies can report when they do not accept a flight and the basis for the decision. Nevertheless, the FAA is proposing a requirement to ensure that this practice is adopted by all certificate holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations.
In addition, the proposal would require certificate holders to establish a procedure for obtaining and documenting management personnel's decision to launch a flight when the risk reaches a predetermined level. This provision is designed so that pilots will seek a second opinion regarding whether to launch. This would be particularly effective where the risk is not so great that it is clear that the flight should be refused, but rather when it is at a level where a pilot may be unsure about the flight's safety, and the pilot may feel personal pressure to perform the flight and perhaps save a life despite the identified risks. The FAA emphasizes the basic concept articulated in Notice 8000.301 that risk analysis forms should not be used by a certificate holder's management personnel, or others within an organization, to override a pilot's decision to decline a flight assignment
about the flight's safety, and the pilot may feel personal pressure to perform the flight and perhaps save a life despite the identified risks. The FAA emphasizes the basic concept articulated in Notice 8000.301 that risk analysis forms should not be used by a certificate holder's management personnel, or others within an organization, to override a pilot's decision to decline a flight assignment.
The FAA's proposal also would require certificate holders to retain the original or a copy of completed pre-flight risk analysis worksheets for at least 90 days from the date of the operation. Certificate holders would be permitted to determine where the completed worksheets will be kept, but the procedures for collecting the worksheets and maintaining the records would need to be outlined in certificate holders' operations manuals.
The FAA notes that this proposal would respond to NTSB Safety Recommendation A-06-13 in which the NTSB recommended that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance operators “to develop and implement flight risk evaluation programs that include training all employees involved in the operation, procedures that support the systematic evaluation of flight risks, and consultation with others in EMS flight operations if the risks reach a predefined level.” This proposal also may contribute to a certificate holder's overall safety program because a pre-flight risk assessment would be a method of incorporating proactive safety methods into a company's flight operations. Accordingly, this proposal also would partially address NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-89 regarding the implementation of sound risk management practices.
Certificate holders would be required to comply with this provision by the effective date of the final rule.
e
ause a pre-flight risk assessment would be a method of incorporating proactive safety methods into a company's flight operations. Accordingly, this proposal also would partially address NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-89 regarding the implementation of sound risk management practices.
Certificate holders would be required to comply with this provision by the effective date of the final rule.
e. Medical Personnel Pre-Flight Briefing (§ 135.619)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.619 to require that medical personnel on board a helicopter air ambulance flight receive a supplemental pre-flight safety briefing with information specific to helicopter air
The following accidents exemplify the types of accidents that this proposal is intended to prevent.
On November 9, 2004, the pilot of a Bell 206L1 helicopter, operated under part 91 near Tulsa, OK, lost control during cruise flight and crashed causing substantial damage to the helicopter. The pilot stated that the medical personnel added two oxygen tanks in the cargo area before takeoff. The oxygen tanks were stacked and reached approximately the same height as the cargo area's latch release. The NTSB noted the accident was caused by the loss of tail rotor drive as a result of a blanket coming in contact with the tail rotor blades after the baggage compartment door unlatched during flight. NTSB Accident Report DFW05LA019 (Feb. 24, 2005).
On March 6, 2003, a pilot operating a Bell 206L-3 under part 91 lost control of the helicopter. No injuries were sustained by the flightcrew or medical personnel on board. Before takeoff to pick up a patient in Llano, TX, medical personnel opened and closed the aft cargo compartment. The NTSB noted that the accident was caused by a blanket from the aft cargo compartment that entered into the tail rotor blades causing the pilot's loss of control. The NTSB determined that the aft cargo compartment lock was fully operational, and a contributing cause of the accident was medical personnel improperly securing this compartment
l personnel opened and closed the aft cargo compartment. The NTSB noted that the accident was caused by a blanket from the aft cargo compartment that entered into the tail rotor blades causing the pilot's loss of control. The NTSB determined that the aft cargo compartment lock was fully operational, and a contributing cause of the accident was medical personnel improperly securing this compartment. NTSB Accident Report FTW03LA104 (Aug. 26, 2003).
Under the proposal, certificate holders would be required to brief medical personnel before flight on specific topics including the physiological aspects of flight (how flight affects the human body), patient loading and unloading, safety in and around the aircraft, and emergency procedures. This briefing would supplement the passenger briefing requirements found in § 135.117(a) and (b). The FAA believes that an additional safety briefing is warranted because of the unique role of medical personnel on helicopter air ambulance flights, which may include working around an operating helicopter, patient loading and unloading, and providing medical care within a compact, moving, vehicle. The FAA would permit the briefing to be provided once per shift for medical personnel assigned to a helicopter air ambulance base.
The FAA is proposing to allow certificate holders the option to provide safety training to medical personnel in lieu of the pre-flight briefing. Training topics would include the same topics addressed in the proposed pre-flight safety briefing. The FAA believes that it would be advantageous to certificate holders to implement medical personnel training programs. Training programs would help ensure that medical personnel serving on board their helicopters have enhanced knowledge of the required training topics and a greater familiarity with the aircraft than those who receive only the pre-flight briefing
oposed pre-flight safety briefing. The FAA believes that it would be advantageous to certificate holders to implement medical personnel training programs. Training programs would help ensure that medical personnel serving on board their helicopters have enhanced knowledge of the required training topics and a greater familiarity with the aircraft than those who receive only the pre-flight briefing. The FAA anticipates that certificate holders who fly with a consistent group of medical personnel would take advantage of this provision to expedite operations. The proposal would require that the certificate holder's training program be approved by the FAA, and that medical personnel receive training every 24 months. The training program would include a minimum of 4 hours of ground training and 4 hours of training in and around a helicopter air ambulance. In the event some medical personnel on board a helicopter air ambulance flight have received this training, but others have not, the pilot in command would be required to provide the proposed supplemental pre-flight safety briefing.
The FAA notes that these provisions incorporate aspects of agency guidance in AC 135-14A, Emergency Medical Services/Helicopter, which includes suggested training for medical personnel in aviation terminology, use of medical equipment in the aircraft, physiological aspects of flight, and patient loading and unloading. This proposal also incorporates aspects of AC 00-64, including human factors, training, encouraging communications, and promoting standard operating procedures.
Under the proposal, the FAA would require the certificate holder to document the training it provides to each individual who serves as medical personnel, and maintain a record of that training for 26 calendar months following the individual's completion of training. This record would include the individual's name, the most recent date that training was completed, and a description, copy, or reference to the training materials used
require the certificate holder to document the training it provides to each individual who serves as medical personnel, and maintain a record of that training for 26 calendar months following the individual's completion of training. This record would include the individual's name, the most recent date that training was completed, and a description, copy, or reference to the training materials used. The FAA is proposing this period of time because the training provided to medical personnel would expire after 24 months, and the additional 60-day period would ensure that the records would be available for review by the FAA after the training had expired, if necessary.
Certificate holders would be required to comply with this provision by the effective date of the final rule.
2. Equipment Requirements
a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) (§ 135.605)
The FAA is proposing to add § 135.605(a) to require that all helicopters used in air ambulance operations be equipped with HTAWS. The FAA believes that HTAWS would assist helicopter air ambulance pilots in maintaining situational awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles, and therefore help prevent accidents caused by CFIT, loss of control, inadvertent flight into IMC, and night operations. HTAWS has particular relevance to helicopter air ambulance operations, which often are conducted at night and into unimproved landing sites.
HTAWS 31 is a helicopter-specific application of TAWS technology. TAWS technology originally was developed for airplanes and is required on turbine-powered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats used in part 135 operations. In 2005, the FAA recommended that helicopter air ambulance

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- [75 FR 316 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife; 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Insular Population of Hawaiian False Killer Whales as an Endangered Species](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_E9-31297.md)
- [75 FR 1555 National Organic Program; Proposed Amendments to the National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances (Crops)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-165.md)
- [75 FR 1574 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-month Finding on a Petition To Revise Critical Habitat for the Florida Manatee (Trichechus manatus latirostris)](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-325.md)
- [75 FR 1731 Airworthiness Directives; Sicma Aero Seat 9140, 9166, 9173, 9174, 9184, 9188, 9196, 91B7, 91B8, 91C0, 91C2, 91C3, 91C4, 91C5, and 9301 Series Passenger Seat Assemblies; and Sicma Aero Seat 9501311-05, 9501301-06, 9501311-15, 9501301-16, 9501441-30, 9501441-33, 9501311-55, 9501301-56, 9501441-83, 9501441-95, 9501311-97, and 9501301-98 Passenger Seat Assemblies; Installed on Various Transport Category Airplanes](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-484.md)
- [75 FR 2466 State Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Action Plans](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-684.md)
- [75 FR 2821 Personnel Records](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-809.md)
- [75 FR 3182 Intake Screening](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-878.md)
- [75 FR 3434 Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast Skate Complex Fishery; Amendment 3](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-1084.md)
- [75 FR 3666 Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock; Correction](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-1122.md)
- [75 FR 3668 Conditional Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; Ohio; Carbon Monoxide and Volatile Organic Compounds](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-1223.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_2010-24862. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.