# 70 FR 43661: Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation > Federal · Regulations · In force URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FR_PRORULE_05-14850 ## Section - **Citation:** 70 FR 43661 - **Heading:** Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation - **Jurisdiction:** Federal - **Kind:** Regulations - **Status:** In force - **Text as of:** August 14, 2026 - **Source:** Compiled text - **Location:** Federal Register / Vol. 70 / 70 FR 43661 ## Text hen submitting comments electronically, you must include the AAG/A Order No. in the subject box. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary E. Cahill, (202) 307-1823. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the notice section of today's Federal Register , the FBI provides a description of the “Terrorist Screening Records System, JUSTICE/FBI-019” in compliance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4). The Terrorist Screening Records System is a system of records established pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 to support the mission of the FBI's TSC to consolidate the government's approach to terrorist screening. The TSC maintains the government's consolidated watchlist of known and suspected terrorists and supports agencies that engage in terrorist screening of individuals. Additional information about the TSC and its operations is provided in the Federal Register notice referenced above. Regulatory Flexibility Act This proposed rule relates to individuals, as opposed to small business entities. Nevertheless, pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, the proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Small Entity Inquiries The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires the FBI to comply with small entity requests for information and advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within FBI jurisdiction. Any small entity that has a question regarding this document may contact the person listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT . Persons can obtain further information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web page at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_lib.html. Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the FBI consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public rson listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT . Persons can obtain further information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web page at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_lib.html. Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the FBI consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public. There are no current or new information collection requirements associated with this proposed rule. Analysis of Regulatory Impacts This proposed rule is not a “significant regulatory action” within the meaning of Executive Order 12886. Because the economic impact should be minimal, further regulatory evaluation is not necessary. Moreover, the Attorney General certifies that this rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, because the reporting requirements themselves are not changed and because it applies only to information on individuals. Unfunded Mandates Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), (Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48), requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. UMRA requires a written statement of economic and regulatory alternatives for proposed and final rules that contain Federal mandates. A “Federal mandate” is a new or additional enforceable duty, imposed on any State, local, or tribal government, or the private sector. If any Federal mandate causes those entities to spend, in aggregate, $100 million or more in any one year the UMRA analysis is required. This proposed rule would not impose Federal mandates on any State, local, or tribal government or the private sector. Executive Order 13132, Federalism The FBI has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism ctor. If any Federal mandate causes those entities to spend, in aggregate, $100 million or more in any one year the UMRA analysis is required. This proposed rule would not impose Federal mandates on any State, local, or tribal government or the private sector. Executive Order 13132, Federalism The FBI has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. This action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and therefore will not have federalism implications. Environmental Analysis The FBI has reviewed this action for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347) and has determined that this action will not have a significant effect on the human environment. Energy Impact The energy impact of this action has been assessed in accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). This rulemaking is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA. List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16 Administrative practices and procedures, Courts, Freedom of Information Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, Privacy Act. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order 793-78, it is proposed to amend 28 CFR part 16 as follows: PART 16—[AMENDED] 1. The authority citation for part 16 continues to read as follows: Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701. Subpart E—Exemption of Records Systems under the Privacy Act 2. Section 16.96 is amended to add new paragraphs (r) and (s) to read as follows: § 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems—limited access. citation for part 16 continues to read as follows: Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701. Subpart E—Exemption of Records Systems under the Privacy Act 2. Section 16.96 is amended to add new paragraphs (r) and (s) to read as follows: § 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems—limited access. (r) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g): (1) Terrorist Screening Records System (TSRS) (JUSTICE/FBI-019). (2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the counterterrorism purposes of this system, and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion. (s) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons: (1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g. , destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation. (2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d). by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g. , destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation. (2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d). (3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation pertaining to terrorism of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the FBI and/or other intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised. ence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised. (4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSC to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected terrorist. Also, because TSC and the FBI may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response. (5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities. (6) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSC to provide notice to an individual if TSC receives information about that individual from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity. to an individual if TSC receives information about that individual from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity. (7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for the FBI and the TSC to vouch for their compliance with this provision, however, the TSC has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, TSC supports but does not conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to terrorist identities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct terrorism investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. The TSC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. The TSC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. (8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and the TSC and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known. (9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act. Dated: July 22, 2005. Paul R. Corts, Assistant Attorney General for Administration. 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