# FDIC FIL-32-2025: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds

> Federal · Agency guidance · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL25032

## Section

- **Citation:** FDIC FIL-32-2025
- **Heading:** Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Agency guidance
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** FDIC Financial Institution Letters / Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds

## Text

35449
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 142 / Monday, July 28, 2025 / Proposed Rules
Document
ADAMS
Accession No./
FEDERAL REG-
ISTER Citation
PRM–50–124, Ralph O. Meyer, Petition for Rulemaking, dated August 1, 2022 ...........................................................................
ML22284A087
PRM–50–124, ‘‘Licensing Safety Analysis for Loss-of-Coolant Accidents,’’ notice of docketing and request for comments,
dated November 23, 2022.
87 FR 71531
PRM–50–124, ‘‘Licensing Safety Analysis for Loss-of-Coolant Accidents,’’ extension of comment period, dated February 2,
2023.
88 FR 7012
Nuclear Energy Institute, Request for Extension of the Comment Period for PRM–50–124, dated January 23, 2023 .................
ML23023A275
Comment (001) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated October 12, 2022 ..............................................................................
ML23009B712
Comment (002) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated January 12, 2023 ..............................................................................
ML23031A196
Comment (003) from Zachary Harper of Westinghouse on PRM–50–124, dated February 2, 2023 .............................................
ML23058A228
Comment (004) from Gayle Elliott on behalf of Framatome Inc., dated February 23, 2023 ...........................................................
ML23061A128
Comment (005) from Mike Powell on behalf of Pressurized Water Reactors Owners Group on PRM–50–124, dated March 1,
2023.
ML23062A715
Comment (006) from Frances Pimentel on Behalf of Nuclear Energy Institute on PRM–50–124, dated March 3, 2023 ..............
ML23062A716
Comment (007) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated March 14, 2023 ................................................................................
ML23074A071
Comment (008) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated July 26, 2023 ...................................................................................
f Nuclear Energy Institute on PRM–50–124, dated March 3, 2023 ..............
ML23062A716
Comment (007) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated March 14, 2023 ................................................................................
ML23074A071
Comment (008) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated July 26, 2023 ....................................................................................
ML23209A607
Comment (009) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124, dated September 11, 2023 .........................................................................
ML23254A398
Comment (010) from Ralph Meyer and Wolfgang Wiesenack on PRM–50–124—Licensing Safety Analysis for Loss-of-Coolant
Accidents, dated January 18, 2024.
ML24024A061
Comment (011) from Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124—Licensing Safety Analysis for Loss-of-Coolant Accidents .........................
ML24100A815
Comment (012) Ralph Meyer on PRM–50–124—Licensing Safety Analysis for Loss-of-Coolant Accidents .................................
ML24239A784
SECY–21–0109, ‘‘Rulemaking Plan on Use of Increased Enrichment of Conventional and Accident Tolerant Fuel Designs for
Light-Water Reactors,’’ dated December 20, 2021.
ML21232A237
SRM–SECY–21–0109, ‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–21–0109—Rulemaking Plan on Use of Increased Enrichment of Conven-
tional and Accident Tolerant Fuels Designs for Light-Water Reactors,’’ dated March 16, 2022.
ML22075A103
SECY–16–0033, ‘‘Draft Final Rule—Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Requirements and Related Fuel
Cladding Acceptance Criteria (RIN 3150–AH42),’’ dated March 16, 2016.
ML15238A947
(Package)
SRM–SECY–16–0033, ‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–16–0033—Draft Final Rule—Performance-Based Emergency Core Cool-
ing System Requirements and Related Fuel Cladding Acceptance Criteria (RIN 3150–AH42)
SECY–16–0033, ‘‘Draft Final Rule—Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Requirements and Related Fuel
Cladding Acceptance Criteria (RIN 3150–AH42),’’ dated March 16, 2016.
ML15238A947
(Package)
SRM–SECY–16–0033, ‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–16–0033—Draft Final Rule—Performance-Based Emergency Core Cool-
ing System Requirements and Related Fuel Cladding Acceptance Criteria (RIN 3150–AH42).
ML24102A281
SECY–15–0148, ‘‘Evaluation of Fuel Fragmentation, Relocation and Dispersal Under Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Con-
ditions Relative to the Draft Final Rule on Emergency Core Cooling System Performance During a LOCA (50.46c),’’ dated
November 30, 2015.
ML15230A200
NRC Research Information Letter 2021–13, ‘‘Interpretation of Research on Fuel Fragmentation, Relocation, and Dispersal at
High Burnup,’’ dated December 2021.
ML21313A145
NRC Memorandum from Paul M. Clifford to William H. Ruland, ‘‘ECCS Performance Safety Assessment and Audit Report,’’
dated February 10, 2012.
ML12041A078
G. Hache and H.M. Chung, ‘‘The History of LOCA Embrittlement Criteria,’’ NUREG/CP–0172, May 2001, pp. 205–237 ............
ML011370559
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in this
document, the NRC is denying PRM–
50–124. The petition did not present
any significant new information or
arguments that would warrant the
requested amendment.
Dated: July 24, 2025.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carrie Safford,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2025–14215 Filed 7–25–25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Parts 303, 314, 335, 340, 347,
363, and 380
RIN 3064–AG15
Adjusting and Indexing Certain
Regulatory Thresholds
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is inviting
comment on a proposed rule that would
amend certain regulatory thresholds in
the FDIC’s regulations to reflect
inflation
Parts 303, 314, 335, 340, 347,
363, and 380
RIN 3064–AG15
Adjusting and Indexing Certain
Regulatory Thresholds
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is inviting
comment on a proposed rule that would
amend certain regulatory thresholds in
the FDIC’s regulations to reflect
inflation. Specifically, the proposal
would generally update such thresholds
to reflect inflation from the date of
initial implementation or the most
recent adjustment, and provide for
future adjustments pursuant to an
indexing methodology. The changes set
forth in this proposal would provide a
more durable regulatory framework by
helping to preserve, in real terms, the
level of certain thresholds set forth in
the FDIC’s regulations, thereby avoiding
the undesirable and unintended
outcome where the scope of
applicability for a regulatory
requirement changes due solely to
inflation rather than actual changes in
an institution’s size, risk profile or level
of complexity.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before September 26, 2025.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by RIN 3064–AG15, by any of
the following methods:
• FDIC Website: https://
www.fdic.gov/federal-register-
publications. Follow instructions for
submitting comments on the agency
website.
• Email: Comments@fdic.gov. Include
RIN 3064–AG15 in the subject line of
the message.
• Mail: Jennifer M. Jones, Deputy
Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments—RIN 3064–AG15, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery to FDIC: Comments
may be hand-delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
NW building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: Comments
received, including any personal
information provided, may be posted
without change to https://www.fdic.gov/
federal-register-publications
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery to FDIC: Comments
may be hand-delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
NW building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: Comments
received, including any personal
information provided, may be posted
without change to https://www.fdic.gov/
federal-register-publications.
Commenters should submit only
information that the commenter wishes
to make available publicly. The FDIC
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 142 / Monday, July 28, 2025 / Proposed Rules
1 See e.g., 12 CFR 337.12(b) (classifying
institutions with less than $10 million in assets as
small for examination cycle purpose); 12 CFR
327.8(e) (classifying institutions with assets of $10
billion or more as large for assessment purposes).
2 See e.g., 12 CFR 329.3.
3 For example, for large financial institutions with
total assets of $100 billion or more, capital and
liquidity requirements increase in stringency based
on measures of size, cross-jurisdictional activity,
weighted short-term wholesale funding, nonbank
assets, and off-balance sheet exposure. See 84 FR
59230 (Nov. 1, 2019).
4 Specifically, under 12 CFR 303.227, the
requirements of Section 19 do not apply to covered
offenses where an individual could have been
sentenced to a term of confinement in a correctional
facility of three years or less and/or a fine of $2,500
or less, and that meet the additional criteria set
forth in that section. In addition, the requirements
of section 19 do not apply to ‘‘small dollar, simple
theft,’’ which includes, among other requirements,
the simple theft of goods, services, or currency (or
other monetary instrument) if the value of the
currency, goods, or services involved has a value of
$1,000 or less.
5 5 U.S.C. 553(b); see also 5 U.S.C
et the additional criteria set
forth in that section. In addition, the requirements
of section 19 do not apply to ‘‘small dollar, simple
theft,’’ which includes, among other requirements,
the simple theft of goods, services, or currency (or
other monetary instrument) if the value of the
currency, goods, or services involved has a value of
$1,000 or less.
5 5 U.S.C. 553(b); see also 5 U.S.C. 553(B)
(providing exception where agency for good cause
finds notice and comment is ‘‘impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to public interest’’).
6 See e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1819(a) (Seventh and Tenth).
7 12 U.S.C. 2901 et seq.
8 Specifically, this adjustment corresponds to the
average of the Consumer Price Index for Urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI–W), not
seasonally adjusted, for each 12-month period
ending in November, with rounding to the nearest
million. See Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations Asset-Size Thresholds, 89 FR 106480,
106481 (Dec. 30, 2024).
9 Specifically, this threshold was adjusted to
correspond to the year-to-year change in the average
of the CPI–W, not seasonally adjusted, with
rounding to the nearest $100 million. See 84 FR
54465, 54468 (Oct. 10, 2019).
may review, redact, or refrain from
posting all or any portion of any
comment that it may deem to be
inappropriate for publication, such as
irrelevant or obscene material. The FDIC
may post only a single representative
example of identical or substantially
identical comments, and in such cases
will generally identify the number of
identical or substantially identical
comments represented by the posted
example. All comments that have been
redacted, as well as those that have not
been posted, that contain comments on
the merits of the proposed rule will be
retained in the public comment file and
will be considered as required under all
applicable laws. All comments may be
accessible under the Freedom of
Information Act
ntical or substantially identical
comments represented by the posted
example. All comments that have been
redacted, as well as those that have not
been posted, that contain comments on
the merits of the proposed rule will be
retained in the public comment file and
will be considered as required under all
applicable laws. All comments may be
accessible under the Freedom of
Information Act.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andrew Carayiannis, Chief, Policy &
Risk Analytics Section; Bryan Jonasson,
Deputy Chief Accountant; Keith
Bergstresser, Senior Policy Analyst; Jim
Yu, Senior Policy and Disclosure
Analyst; Rachel Romm-Nisson, Risk
Analytics Specialist, Capital Markets
and Accounting Policy Branch, Division
of Risk Management Supervision;
Christopher Blickley, Counsel, Legal
Division; Ryan Tetrick, Deputy Director,
Division of Complex Institution
Supervision and Resolution; Alex
Greenberg, Assistant Director, Brock
Walker, Assistant Director, Division of
Resolutions and Receiverships;
capitalmarkets@fdic.gov, (202) 898–
6888; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 3701 Fairfax Drive,
Arlington, VA 22203.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
A. Background
B. Considerations for Updating and
Indexing Thresholds
C. Overview of the Proposal and Policy
Objectives
II. Initial Updates
A. 12 CFR Part 303 (Part 303)—Filing
Procedures
B. 12 CFR Part 335 (Part 335)—Securities
of State Nonmember Banks and Savings
Associations
C. 12 CFR Part 340 (Part 340)—Restrictions
on Sale of Assets of a Failed Institution
by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
D. 12 CFR Part 347 (Part 347)—
International Banking
E. 12 CFR Part 363 (Part 363)—Annual
Independent Audits and Reporting
Requirements
F. 12 CFR Part 380 (Part 380)—Orderly
Liquidation Authority
G. Additional Thresholds
III. Indexing Methodology for Future
Threshold Adjustments
A. Description of Methodology
B. Alternatives to the Proposed Indexing
Methodology
1
nsurance
Corporation
D. 12 CFR Part 347 (Part 347)—
International Banking
E. 12 CFR Part 363 (Part 363)—Annual
Independent Audits and Reporting
Requirements
F. 12 CFR Part 380 (Part 380)—Orderly
Liquidation Authority
G. Additional Thresholds
III. Indexing Methodology for Future
Threshold Adjustments
A. Description of Methodology
B. Alternatives to the Proposed Indexing
Methodology
1. Alternative Measures of Inflation
2. Adjustment Frequency Within the
Indexing Methodology
3. Milestone Approach
4. Degree of Automation in Indexing
IV. Economic Analysis
A. Expected Effects
B. Estimates of the Number of Directly
Affected Entities
1. Part 303
2. Part 335
3. Part 340
4. Part 347
5. Part 363
6. Part 380
C. Costs and Benefits of the Proposal
1. Part 303
2. Part 335
3. Part 340
4. Part 347
5. Part 363
6. Part 380
V. Administrative Matters
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
C. Plain Language
D. Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
E. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
F. Providing Accountability Through
Transparency Act of 2023
I. Introduction
A. Background
Thresholds are used to determine the
scope of applicability for certain
regulations promulgated by the FDIC.
The most common threshold is the
amount of total on-balance sheet assets
of an institution (measured in dollars),
which has long served as a proxy for an
institution’s size.1 In some cases, asset-
based size thresholds are combined with
other thresholds to serve as proxies for
an institution’s risk profile or level of
complexity, such as the amount of
nonbank assets or cross-jurisdictional
activities.2 Combining thresholds in this
manner helps to support a regulatory
framework that is tailored to the risks
presented by an individual institution
or categories of institutions.3
While most thresholds set a general
level of applicability for a regulation, in
some instances, thresholds are applied
within a regulation to establish
exclusions
onbank assets or cross-jurisdictional
activities.2 Combining thresholds in this
manner helps to support a regulatory
framework that is tailored to the risks
presented by an individual institution
or categories of institutions.3
While most thresholds set a general
level of applicability for a regulation, in
some instances, thresholds are applied
within a regulation to establish
exclusions, provide for optionality, or to
tailor individual requirements within a
broad-based regulation to the varying
sizes and risk profiles of all in-scope
institutions. For example, as discussed
further below, thresholds of $2,500 and
$1,000 are used to define certain
offenses that are exempt from the
application requirements of section 19
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDI Act), as implemented by 12 CFR
part 303.4
Under the FDIC’s regulations, most
thresholds are static, with no
mechanism for periodic adjustments
over time. To adjust a static threshold,
the FDIC must, in general, provide
notice and seek comment on such
adjustment before it can be
implemented as final.5 However, certain
thresholds within the FDIC regulations
are required by statute and therefore
cannot be adjusted without legislative
changes.6
The FDIC has occasionally revised
discretionary regulatory thresholds or
established a mechanism within a
regulation to allow for adjustments on a
periodic basis. For example, 12 CFR part
345, which implements the Community
Reinvestment Act,7 defines small and
intermediate-small banks by reference to
asset-size criteria expressed in dollar
amounts, which are adjusted annually
based on the year-to-year change in
inflation through a Federal Register
notice.8 As an additional example, the
FDIC adjusted 12 CFR part 348,
Management Official Interlocks (Part
348), in 2019 to increase asset-based
thresholds that had been established in
1996.9 Part 348 further provides that the
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he year-to-year change in
inflation through a Federal Register
notice.8 As an additional example, the
FDIC adjusted 12 CFR part 348,
Management Official Interlocks (Part
348), in 2019 to increase asset-based
thresholds that had been established in
1996.9 Part 348 further provides that the
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10 Part 348 further indicates the FDIC will
announce the revised thresholds by publishing a
final rule without notice and comment in the
Federal Register. 12 CFR 348.3(c).
11 Certain thresholds under the proposal would be
updated initially to reflect other considerations. For
example, as discussed in section II.E of this
Supplementary Information, the proposal would
initially update thresholds in 12 CFR part 363 to
help ensure sound financial management of the
institutions posing the greatest potential risk to the
Deposit Insurance Fund. See infra, n. 45.
12 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes
the CPI–W on a monthly basis. The CPI–W is used
to annually adjust benefits paid to Social Security
beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income
recipients. See, U.S. Social Security
Administration, CPI for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers, available at www.ssa.gov/oact/
STATS/cpiw.html.
13 Any references to inflation in this proposal
refer to inflation as measured under the CPI–W,
unless specifically noted otherwise.
14 The EGRPRA requires that regulations
prescribed by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System be reviewed by the agencies not
less frequently than once every 10 years
nflation as measured under the CPI–W,
unless specifically noted otherwise.
14 The EGRPRA requires that regulations
prescribed by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System be reviewed by the agencies not
less frequently than once every 10 years. The
purpose of the EGRPRA review is to identify
outdated or unnecessary regulations and consider
how to reduce regulatory burden on insured
depository institutions while, at the same time,
ensuring their safety and soundness and the safety
and soundness of the financial system.
15 As discussed in section II.E of this
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the initial updates to
thresholds in part 363 would support a key
underlying objective of the regulation, while
maintaining consistency with the historical scope of
applicability and reducing burden for smaller
institutions. In addition, one threshold under part
363 that is intended to align to listing standards of
the national securities exchanges would not be
subject to the proposed indexing methodology.
FDIC will adjust such asset thresholds,
as necessary, based on inflation.10
B. Considerations for Updating and
Indexing Thresholds
As discussed above, the use of
applicability thresholds allows the FDIC
to differentiate and tailor regulatory
requirements based on an institution’s
size, risk profile, and level of
complexity. However, static dollar-
based thresholds without periodic
adjustments to reflect inflation do not
preserve threshold levels in real terms,
leading to unintended policy
consequences. For example, smaller and
mid-size institutions can become subject
to requirements originally intended for
relatively larger institutions, thereby
increasing burden for reasons unrelated
to changes in their inflation-adjusted
size or risk profile
lds without periodic
adjustments to reflect inflation do not
preserve threshold levels in real terms,
leading to unintended policy
consequences. For example, smaller and
mid-size institutions can become subject
to requirements originally intended for
relatively larger institutions, thereby
increasing burden for reasons unrelated
to changes in their inflation-adjusted
size or risk profile.
Adjusting regulatory thresholds to
reflect inflation would help ensure that
they preserve their intended application
in real terms over time and remain
generally aligned with their intended
policy objectives. However, if not
properly structured, inflation-based
adjustments also can lead to unintended
and undesirable outcomes. For example,
adjusting regulatory thresholds too
frequently and in the absence of
meaningful inflation can result in
inefficiencies, as institutions may incur
cost to frequently realign their balance
sheet management practices to reflect
adjusted thresholds. By contrast,
adjustments that are infrequent and do
not sufficiently keep pace with inflation
result in thresholds that are continually
decreasing in real terms in the time
period between adjustments. Infrequent
adjustments also result in larger, less
gradual adjustments that can impair the
certainty and predictability of a
regulatory framework and create
challenges for regulatory compliance
and balance sheet management
practices.
Properly structured, appropriately
sequenced and predictable inflation-
based threshold adjustments promote
consistent application of regulatory
requirements over time and contribute
to a more durable regulatory framework.
In addition, such adjustments can
enhance transparency and certainty by
providing institutions with a pre-
determined schedule for future
regulatory changes and therefore allow
for more enhanced balance sheet
management practices.
C
ion-
based threshold adjustments promote
consistent application of regulatory
requirements over time and contribute
to a more durable regulatory framework.
In addition, such adjustments can
enhance transparency and certainty by
providing institutions with a pre-
determined schedule for future
regulatory changes and therefore allow
for more enhanced balance sheet
management practices.
C. Overview of the Proposal and Policy
Objectives
The FDIC is proposing to update
certain regulatory thresholds and
provide automatic adjustments to those
thresholds over time using an indexing
methodology. Under the proposal, the
FDIC would initially update such
thresholds to reflect historical
inflation 11 (measured as the percentage
change in the non-seasonally adjusted
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage
Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI–
W)),12 generally based off the date of
initial implementation or the most
recent quantitative adjustment.
Additionally, the FDIC is proposing an
indexing methodology for subsequent,
periodic threshold adjustments that
would be implemented automatically
every two consecutive calendar years, or
during any intervening calendar year
when the cumulative change in CPI–W
since the last adjustment increases by
more than 8 percent.13
The adjustments provided for in this
proposal are intended to help preserve,
in real terms, certain threshold levels in
the FDIC’s regulations, thereby avoiding
the undesirable and unintended
outcome where an institution becomes
subject to additional or more stringent
regulatory requirements due solely to
inflation rather than actual changes in
the institution’s size, risk profile or level
of complexity.
The proposal is the first of a multi-
phase effort to reevaluate thresholds
within the FDIC’s regulations. The
thresholds selected for this initial phase
are thresholds that (1) appear within
regulations issued only by the FDIC, (2)
are not set by statute, and (3) are
relatively straightforward to adjust
than actual changes in
the institution’s size, risk profile or level
of complexity.
The proposal is the first of a multi-
phase effort to reevaluate thresholds
within the FDIC’s regulations. The
thresholds selected for this initial phase
are thresholds that (1) appear within
regulations issued only by the FDIC, (2)
are not set by statute, and (3) are
relatively straightforward to adjust. For
example, the proposal would initially
update and provide for subsequent
periodic adjustments pursuant to an
indexing methodology for a number of
dollar-based thresholds in 12 CFR part
363 related to audit, internal control,
audit committee composition, and
reporting requirements. The FDIC
expects to solicit comment on one or
more subsequent proposals to update
and adjust additional thresholds, and, as
appropriate, will seek to coordinate
with other Federal agencies.
Additionally, the FDIC, together with
the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, commenced a review under the
Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
(EGRPRA) in 2024 to solicit feedback
from the public on potentially outdated
or otherwise unnecessary regulatory
requirements.14 The FDIC expects to
review and consider any comments
received pursuant to this EGRPRA
review that relate to the thresholds
considered within this proposal as part
of any final rulemaking
under the
Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
(EGRPRA) in 2024 to solicit feedback
from the public on potentially outdated
or otherwise unnecessary regulatory
requirements.14 The FDIC expects to
review and consider any comments
received pursuant to this EGRPRA
review that relate to the thresholds
considered within this proposal as part
of any final rulemaking.
As discussed in the sections that
follow, the proposal would initially
update and thereafter periodically
adjust certain thresholds in the
following FDIC regulations:
• 12 CFR Part 303—Filing Procedures
• 12 CFR Part 335—Securities of
Nonmember Banks and State Savings
Associations
• 12 CFR Part 340—Restrictions on Sale
of Assets of a Failed Institution by the
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
• 12 CFR Part 347—International
Banking
• 12 CFR Part 363—Annual
Independent Audits and Reporting
Requirements
• 12 CFR Part 380—Orderly Liquidation
Authority
II. Initial Updates
Except as otherwise provided,15 the
proposal would provide for an initial
increase in the thresholds described
below to reflect historical inflation and
index these thresholds to account for
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16 12 U.S.C. 1829.
17 Note that 12 CFR 303.227 contains 3 different
dollar thresholds setting forth different de minimis
exceptions. The $2,000 or less threshold for bad
checks set forth in 12 CFR 303.227(b)(2)(ii) is set by
statute (see 12 U.S.C. 1829(c)(3)(C)) and is therefore
not within the FDIC’s discretion to adjust and not
included in this proposal.
18 Additional criteria that must be met include (1)
the theft was not committed against an insured
depository institution (IDI) or insured credit union;
s
exceptions. The $2,000 or less threshold for bad
checks set forth in 12 CFR 303.227(b)(2)(ii) is set by
statute (see 12 U.S.C. 1829(c)(3)(C)) and is therefore
not within the FDIC’s discretion to adjust and not
included in this proposal.
18 Additional criteria that must be met include (1)
the theft was not committed against an insured
depository institution (IDI) or insured credit union;
(2) the individual has no more than one other
offense that is considered exempt under this
section; and (3) if there are two offenses—each of
which, by itself, is considered exempt under this
section—each conviction or program entry was
entered at least three years prior to the date an
application would otherwise be required, or at least
18 months prior to the date an application would
otherwise be required if the actions that resulted in
the conviction or program entry all occurred when
the individual was 21 years of age or younger.
Simple theft excludes burglary, forgery, robbery,
identity theft, and fraud. See 12 CFR 303.227(b)(3).
19 For example, in 2018, the FDIC broadened the
application of the de minimis exception to filing an
application due to the minor nature of the offenses
and the low risk that the covered party would pose
to an insured institution based on the conviction or
program entry. By modifying these provisions, the
FDIC stated it believed that there would be a
reduction in the submission of applications where
approval has been granted by virtue of the de
minimis offenses exceptions to filing in the policy
statement. See 83 FR 38143 (Aug. 3, 2018).
20 For example, changes to the de minimis
exception in the final rule published in 2020 would
have reduced past applications by approximately 20
percent. See Fact Sheet: FDIC Issues Rule on
Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(July 2020).
21 12 CFR part 335.
22 17 CFR 229.404.
23 12 CFR 335.801(d).
24 See 44 FR 33077, 33079 (Jun. 8, 1979).
25 See 62 FR 6852, 6855 (Feb. 14, 1997)
For example, changes to the de minimis
exception in the final rule published in 2020 would
have reduced past applications by approximately 20
percent. See Fact Sheet: FDIC Issues Rule on
Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(July 2020).
21 12 CFR part 335.
22 17 CFR 229.404.
23 12 CFR 335.801(d).
24 See 44 FR 33077, 33079 (Jun. 8, 1979).
25 See 62 FR 6852, 6855 (Feb. 14, 1997).
26 For example, growth in the dollar amount of
capital as a result of inflation would impact the
permitted amount extensions of credit under 12
CFR 337.3(b) if an FDIC-supervised institution
provides an extension of credit less than 5 percent
of its unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.
future inflation. Initial updates would
become effective, consistent with
applicable law, at the beginning of the
first calendar quarter following adoption
of the final rule.
A. 12 CFR Part 303 (Part 303)—Filing
Procedures
Section 19 of the FDI Act (section 19)
prohibits, without the prior written
consent of the FDIC, a person convicted
of any criminal offense involving
dishonesty, breach of trust, or money
laundering, or who has entered into a
pretrial diversion or similar program in
connection with a prosecution for such
an offense (collectively, covered
offenses), from becoming or continuing
to serve as an institution-affiliated
party.16
Subpart L of part 303 of the FDIC’s
regulations implements section 19 and
includes separate $2,500 and $1,000 de
minimis thresholds for certain offenses
that are excluded from the scope of
section 19 and for which no section 19
application is required.17 Specifically,
under 12 CFR 303.227, the requirements
of section 19 do not apply to covered
offenses where the individual could
have been sentenced to a term of
confinement in a correctional facility of
three years or less and/or a fine of
$2,500 or less, and that meet the
additional criteria set forth in that
section
e of
section 19 and for which no section 19
application is required.17 Specifically,
under 12 CFR 303.227, the requirements
of section 19 do not apply to covered
offenses where the individual could
have been sentenced to a term of
confinement in a correctional facility of
three years or less and/or a fine of
$2,500 or less, and that meet the
additional criteria set forth in that
section. In addition, the requirements of
section 19 do not apply to ‘‘small dollar,
simple theft,’’ which includes, among
other requirements, the simple theft of
goods, services, or currency (or other
monetary instrument) if the value of the
currency, goods, or services involved
has a value of $1,000 or less.18
For purposes of implementing section
19, an ongoing, significant objective of
the FDIC has been to establish criteria
for the de minimis exception framework
such that it applies to offenses that are
relatively minor in nature and help to
ensure that prior conduct of the covered
party would pose low risk to an insured
institution. Over time, the FDIC has
expanded the scope of the de minimis
framework based on historical analysis
that showed the FDIC routinely
approved section 19 applications
involving minor offenses.19 Every
expansion of the de minimis framework
ultimately provided additional relief to
potential applicants without
undermining the purpose of section 19
or causing undue risk to an institution
or the Deposit Insurance Fund.20
The non-seasonally adjusted CPI–W
has increased by approximately 38
percent since the $2,500 de minimis
threshold was set in 2012; the proposal
would increase this threshold to $3,500.
Similarly, the non-seasonally adjusted
CPI–W has increased by approximately
23 percent since the $1,000 de minimis
threshold was set in 2020; the proposal
would increase this threshold to $1,225
ce Fund.20
The non-seasonally adjusted CPI–W
has increased by approximately 38
percent since the $2,500 de minimis
threshold was set in 2012; the proposal
would increase this threshold to $3,500.
Similarly, the non-seasonally adjusted
CPI–W has increased by approximately
23 percent since the $1,000 de minimis
threshold was set in 2020; the proposal
would increase this threshold to $1,225.
These proposed updates would help
preserve, in real terms, the level of such
thresholds while providing meaningful
relief from barriers to employment
opportunities, consistent with the
purpose of section 19 and prior
amendments to the de minimis
exception framework.
Question 1: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of increasing the de
minimis offense thresholds for purposes
of section 19? Would the proposal
appropriately support objectives of the
de minimis exceptions framework in a
manner consistent with safety and
soundness?
B. 12 CFR Part 335 (Part 335)—
Securities of State Nonmember Banks
and Savings Associations
Part 335 of the FDIC’s regulations
provides securities recordkeeping and
requirements for State nonmember
banks and State savings associations,
and generally applies only to such
institutions with one or more classes of
securities required to be registered
under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), as
amended.21 Part 335 is substantially
similar to Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulations that
implement the securities registration,
disclosure, proxies and proxy
solicitation, information statements,
tender offer, election of directors, and
beneficial ownership and reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act.
The SEC and FDIC regulations both
contain disclosure requirements for
loans to insiders
s substantially
similar to Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulations that
implement the securities registration,
disclosure, proxies and proxy
solicitation, information statements,
tender offer, election of directors, and
beneficial ownership and reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act.
The SEC and FDIC regulations both
contain disclosure requirements for
loans to insiders. The SEC regulations
require disclosure of certain insider
indebtedness in excess of $120,000,
which have preferential terms, were not
made in the ordinary course of business,
or which involve more than the normal
risk of collectability or involve other
unfavorable features.22 By contrast, part
335 requires disclosure of extensions of
credit to insiders in excess of 10 percent
of the capital account of an institution
or $5 million, whichever is less.23 The
FDIC set the $5 million threshold in
1979, stating that the prior threshold of
$10 million was too high to allow for
meaningful disclosure.24 The FDIC
revisited this amount in 1997 and
determined at the time that the overall
benefit to the banking industry resulting
from continuation of the FDIC’s
historical disclosure requirements under
part 335, including the $5 million
threshold, was in the public interest and
appropriate for protection of investors.25
If indexed to inflation since the
FDIC’s most recent consideration of the
indebtedness of management disclosure
provisions in 1997, the $5 million
threshold would be $9.9 million. The
proposal would update the dollar
threshold in 12 CFR 335.801(d) to $10
million to reflect inflation since that
time
lion
threshold, was in the public interest and
appropriate for protection of investors.25
If indexed to inflation since the
FDIC’s most recent consideration of the
indebtedness of management disclosure
provisions in 1997, the $5 million
threshold would be $9.9 million. The
proposal would update the dollar
threshold in 12 CFR 335.801(d) to $10
million to reflect inflation since that
time. The proposed revision would help
to preserve, in real terms, the level of
this threshold.26
Question 2: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of raising the
threshold for the management
indebtedness disclosure provisions
under part 335 to $10 million?
Question 3: Are there any unintended
consequences that the FDIC should
consider in increasing the threshold for
disclosure of extensions of credit to
insiders?
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27 See 12 CFR 340.1(b).
28 12 CFR 340.4(a)(1).
29 See 12 CFR 340.4(c).
30 See 12 CFR 340.2(h).
31 See 65 FR 14816, 14819 (Mar. 20, 2000).
32 As discussed in more detail below, part 340,
including the ‘‘substantial loss’’ provisions and the
$50,000 threshold, was the model for and is
intended to match the substantially similar
provisions applicable to FDIC covered financial
company asset sales under 12 CFR 380.13. See 80
FR 22886 (Apr. 24, 2015) (explaining that, because
of the substantially similar language in the statutes
authorizing the respective rules, part 340 served as
a model for the development of the rules at 12 CFR
380.13.). See also, id., at 80 FR 22887 (describing
the updates to part 340 made to ensure consistency
between part 340 and 12 CFR 380.13).
33 See generally, id.
34 The Purchaser Eligibility Certification form,
available at https://www.fdic.gov/asset-sales/
purchaser-eligibility-certification-pec.pdf
he respective rules, part 340 served as
a model for the development of the rules at 12 CFR
380.13.). See also, id., at 80 FR 22887 (describing
the updates to part 340 made to ensure consistency
between part 340 and 12 CFR 380.13).
33 See generally, id.
34 The Purchaser Eligibility Certification form,
available at https://www.fdic.gov/asset-sales/
purchaser-eligibility-certification-pec.pdf.
35 63 FR 17056 (Apr. 8, 1998).
36 66 FR 54346, 54354 (Oct. 26, 2001); see 12 CFR
211.10(a)(14).
37 66 FR 54346, 54354 (Oct. 26, 2001); see 12 CFR
211.10(a)(15).
38 Id.
39 70 FR 17550 (Apr. 5, 2005).
C. 12 CFR Part 340 (Part 340)—
Restrictions on Sale of Assets of a Failed
Institution by the FDIC
Part 340 of the FDIC’s regulations
addresses restrictions on the FDIC’s sale
of failed IDI assets to individuals or
entities that improperly profited from or
engaged in wrongdoing at the expense
of a failed IDI or that seriously
mismanaged a failed IDI.27 Among other
restrictions, part 340 prohibits a person
from acquiring any assets of a failed IDI
if the person or its associated person has
caused a substantial loss to that failed
institution 28 or has demonstrated a
pattern or practice causing a substantial
loss to one or more failed
institution(s).29 Part 340 defines
‘‘substantial loss’’ to include multiple
types of loss that all use a threshold of
$50,000 for purposes of determining
whether the losses are ‘‘substantial.’’ 30
The FDIC added part 340 to the
FDIC’s regulations in 2000.31
Subsequent updates 32 to part 340 have
not substantively modified the
‘‘substantial loss’’ definition or the
$50,000 threshold.33 The substantial
loss provisions and the $50,000
threshold are also included in the
FDIC’s Purchaser Eligibility
Certification form, which is required
under part 340 for all prospective
purchasers of failed IDI assets.34
The FDIC is proposing to revise the
‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold in part 340
by raising the existing threshold from
$50,000 to $100,000
ion or the
$50,000 threshold.33 The substantial
loss provisions and the $50,000
threshold are also included in the
FDIC’s Purchaser Eligibility
Certification form, which is required
under part 340 for all prospective
purchasers of failed IDI assets.34
The FDIC is proposing to revise the
‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold in part 340
by raising the existing threshold from
$50,000 to $100,000. If indexed to
inflation since the FDIC established the
‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold in 2000, the
$50,000 threshold would be $92,666.
This proposed updated threshold of
$100,000 approximates inflation
adjustments.
Updating the threshold for
‘‘substantial loss’’ would preserve, in
real terms, the level of the threshold,
while allowing more prospective
purchasers to make offers to buy failed
IDI assets. The FDIC does not expect
this proposed adjustment to adversely
affect competition or the prices paid for
failed IDI assets.
More generally, the FDIC has
experienced challenges with
implementation of part 340 and is
considering future amendments to the
regulation, but, in the interim, is
proposing to revise the threshold for
‘‘substantial loss’’ as part of this
rulemaking.
Question 4: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of increasing the
$50,000 substantial loss threshold that
is used to determine whether
individuals or entities are eligible to
purchase assets of a failed institution?
Does the proposal appropriately balance
the potential benefit of increasing
competition for failed institution assets
with any public interest concerns that
may be associated with increasing this
threshold?
D. 12 CFR Part 347 (Part 347)—
International Banking
Part 347 of the FDIC’s regulations
governs international banking
ntities are eligible to
purchase assets of a failed institution?
Does the proposal appropriately balance
the potential benefit of increasing
competition for failed institution assets
with any public interest concerns that
may be associated with increasing this
threshold?
D. 12 CFR Part 347 (Part 347)—
International Banking
Part 347 of the FDIC’s regulations
governs international banking. Subpart
A to part 347, which implements
section 18(d) and 18(l) of the FDI Act,
sets forth the requirements for insured
State nonmember bank investments in
foreign organizations, permissible
foreign financial activities, loans or
extensions of credit to or for the account
of foreign organizations, and the FDIC’s
recordkeeping, supervision, and
approval requirements. Subpart A also
addresses permissible activities for
foreign branches of insured State
nonmember banks.
The FDIC issued a final rule in 1998
amending its international banking
regulations and consolidating them into
part 347.35 Under subpart A of part 347,
a State nonmember bank may hold an
equity interest in one or more foreign
organizations that underwrite, deal, or
distribute equity securities outside of
the United States, subject to certain
limitations. Two of those limitations
include dollar-based thresholds. First,
12 CFR 347.111(a) provides that the
aggregate underwriting commitments by
the foreign organizations for the
securities of a single entity, taken
together with underwriting
commitments by any affiliate of the
State nonmember bank under the
authority of 12 CFR 211.10(b), may not
exceed the lesser of $60 million or 25
percent of the State nonmember bank’s
Tier 1 capital
thresholds. First,
12 CFR 347.111(a) provides that the
aggregate underwriting commitments by
the foreign organizations for the
securities of a single entity, taken
together with underwriting
commitments by any affiliate of the
State nonmember bank under the
authority of 12 CFR 211.10(b), may not
exceed the lesser of $60 million or 25
percent of the State nonmember bank’s
Tier 1 capital. Second, 12 CFR
347.111(b) provides that the equity
securities of any single entity held for
distribution or dealing by the foreign
organizations, taken together with
equity securities held for distribution or
dealing by any affiliate of the insured
State nonmember bank under the
authority of 12 CFR 211.10, must not
exceed the lesser of $30 million or 5
percent of the insured State nonmember
bank’s Tier 1 capital, subject to certain
other requirements.
The dollar-based thresholds under
subpart A of part 347 were established
in 1998 and have not since been
updated. At the time, the FDIC stated
that it intended to maintain parity
between the restrictions governing the
international activities of State
nonmember banks regulated by the
FDIC and member banks subject to the
Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB)
Regulation K. In 2001, the FRB issued
a final rule to adjust certain limitations
on activities of bank holding companies,
State member banks, Edge corporations,
and agreement corporations (FRB-
supervised institutions)
etween the restrictions governing the
international activities of State
nonmember banks regulated by the
FDIC and member banks subject to the
Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB)
Regulation K. In 2001, the FRB issued
a final rule to adjust certain limitations
on activities of bank holding companies,
State member banks, Edge corporations,
and agreement corporations (FRB-
supervised institutions). For example,
the final rule expanded underwriting
limits for well-capitalized, well-
managed FRB-supervised institutions by
tying the limit for underwriting shares
to a single organization to a percentage
of the institution’s Tier 1 capital, and
eliminating the limitation based on a
dollar amount.36 FRB-supervised
institutions that are not well-capitalized
and well-managed remained subject to
the $60 million underwriting
commitment threshold for shares of
individual organizations.37 The final
rule also revised the dealing limit on
shares in which an FRB-supervised
institution can hold in its trading or
dealing accounts for a single issuer from
the lesser of $40 million or 10 percent
of Tier 1 capital, increased from $30
million. The FRB justified this increase
by noting that 10 years had passed since
the $30 million limit was first
established.38
Following the FRB’s revisions to
Regulation K, the FDIC issued a rule on
April 6, 2005,39 transferring these limits
to its current location at 12 CFR
347.111; the dollar-based thresholds
remained unchanged. Since these limits
were established in 1998, the CPI–W has
increased by approximately 95 percent.
If indexed to inflation, the limits on
aggregate underwriting commitments
and on the equity securities of any
entity held for distribution or dealing
would be $118 million and $59 million,
respectively.
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sed by approximately 95 percent.
If indexed to inflation, the limits on
aggregate underwriting commitments
and on the equity securities of any
entity held for distribution or dealing
would be $118 million and $59 million,
respectively.
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40 12 U.S.C. 1831m.
41 Consistent with the statute, the FDIC is
consulting with the other Federal banking agencies
in adjusting these thresholds.
42 See 12 CFR 363.2.
43 See 12 CFR 363.2(b)(3) and 363.3(b).
44 70 FR 71226, 71227 (Nov. 28, 2005).
45 58 FR 31332, 31333 (June 2, 1993).
46 Id.
47 Supra n. 44.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 74 FR 35726 (July 20, 2009). The most
significant amendments to part 363 in 2009
included: (1) extending the time period for a non-
public institution to file its Part 363 Annual Report
by 30 days and replace the 30-day extension of the
filing deadline that may be granted if an institution
(public or non-public) is confronted with
extraordinary circumstances beyond its reasonable
control with a late filing notification requirement
that would have general applicability; (2) providing
relief from the annual reporting requirements for
institutions that are merged out of existence before
the filing deadline; (3) providing relief from
reporting on internal control over financial
reporting for businesses acquired during the fiscal
year; (4) requiring management’s assessment of
compliance with the laws and regulations
pertaining to insider loans and dividend restrictions
to State management’s conclusion regarding
compliance and disclose any noncompliance with
such laws and regulations; (5) requiring an
institution’s management and the independent
public accountant to identify the internal control
framework used to evaluate internal control over
financial reporting and disclose all identifi
d regulations
pertaining to insider loans and dividend restrictions
to State management’s conclusion regarding
compliance and disclose any noncompliance with
such laws and regulations; (5) requiring an
institution’s management and the independent
public accountant to identify the internal control
framework used to evaluate internal control over
financial reporting and disclose all identified
material weaknesses that have not been remediated
prior to the institution’s most recent fiscal year-end;
(6) clarifying the independence standards with
which independent public accountants must
comply and enhance the enforceability of
compliance with these standards; (7) specifying that
the duties of the audit committee include the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the
independent public accountant, including ensuring
that audit engagement letters do not contain unsafe
and unsound limitation of liability provisions; (8)
requiring certain communications by independent
public accountants to audit committees; (9)
establishing retention requirements for audit
working papers; (10) requiring boards of directors
to adopt written criteria for evaluating an audit
committee member’s independence and provide
expanded guidance for boards of directors to use in
determining independence; (11) providing that
ownership of 10 percent or more of any class of
voting securities of an institution is not an
automatic bar for considering an outside director to
be independent of management; (12) requiring the
total assets of a holding company’s insured
depository institution subsidiaries to comprise 75
percent or more of the holding company’s
consolidated total assets in order for an institution
to be eligible to comply with part 363 at the holding
company level; and (13) providing illustrative
management reports to assist institutions in
complying with the annual reporting requirements.
51 85 FR 67427 (Oct. 23, 2020)
g company’s insured
depository institution subsidiaries to comprise 75
percent or more of the holding company’s
consolidated total assets in order for an institution
to be eligible to comply with part 363 at the holding
company level; and (13) providing illustrative
management reports to assist institutions in
complying with the annual reporting requirements.
51 85 FR 67427 (Oct. 23, 2020). In 2020, the FDIC
adopted an interim final rule allowing IDIs to use
total consolidated assets as of December 31, 2019,
for purposes of the asset thresholds in part 363 for
fiscal years ending in 2021.
To preserve the level of these
thresholds in real terms, the FDIC is
proposing to revise the dollar limits in
subpart A of part 347 on aggregate
underwriting commitments and on
equity securities held for distribution or
dealing to $120 million and $60 million,
respectively. The proposed increases in
these limits approximate inflation
adjustments since 1998. The limits on
aggregate underwriting commitments
and the dollar limit on equity securities
held for distribution and dealing, as
percentages of Tier 1 capital, would
remain unchanged. The proposal would
not align these thresholds with those
used in parallel regulations of the FRB.
Question 5: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of updating the
dollar limits in subpart A of 12 CFR part
347 on aggregate underwriting
commitments and on equity securities
held for distribution or dealing to $120
million and $60 million, respectively?
Question 6: Should the FDIC consider
eliminating the limit based on a dollar
amount for underwriting shares to a
single organization for institutions that
are well-capitalized and well-managed
and only include a limit for a percentage
of an institution’s Tier 1 capital,
consistent with FRB Regulation K? What
would be the advantages and
disadvantages of such an approach?
Question 7: What are the potential
unintended consequences, if any, of
establishing a higher limit on equity
securities held for
single organization for institutions that
are well-capitalized and well-managed
and only include a limit for a percentage
of an institution’s Tier 1 capital,
consistent with FRB Regulation K? What
would be the advantages and
disadvantages of such an approach?
Question 7: What are the potential
unintended consequences, if any, of
establishing a higher limit on equity
securities held for dealing or
distribution under part 347 relative to
the limit that applies under Regulation
K?
E. 12 CFR Part 363 (Part 363)—Annual
Independent Audits and Reporting
Requirements
Section 112 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA) added section 36,
‘‘Early Identification of Needed
Improvements in Financial
Management,’’ to the FDI Act.40 Section
36 generally subjects IDIs above a
certain asset size threshold to annual
independent audits, assessments of the
effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting (ICFR), and
compliance with designated laws and
regulations, as well as related reporting
requirements. Section 36 also includes
requirements for audit committees of
these IDIs. Section 36 grants the FDIC
discretion to set the asset size threshold
for compliance with these requirements,
but it also provides that the threshold
shall not be less than $150 million.41
Part 363 of the FDIC’s regulations
implements section 36 and requires any
IDI with total consolidated assets of
$500 million or more at the beginning
of its fiscal year to submit to the FDIC
and other appropriate Federal and State
supervisory agencies an annual report
(part 363 Annual Report) comprised of
audited financial statements, the
independent public accountant’s report
thereon, and a management report
containing a statement of management’s
responsibilities and an assessment by
management of compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.42 The
management report component of the
part 363 Annual Report for an
institution with $1 billion or more in
total assets mus
rt) comprised of
audited financial statements, the
independent public accountant’s report
thereon, and a management report
containing a statement of management’s
responsibilities and an assessment by
management of compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.42 The
management report component of the
part 363 Annual Report for an
institution with $1 billion or more in
total assets must also include an
assessment by management of the
effectiveness of ICFR and an
independent public accountant’s
attestation report on ICFR.43 The FDIC
has not adjusted the $500 million
mandatory compliance threshold for
part 363 since its initial
implementation; however, the $1 billion
threshold was increased from $500
million in 2005.44
When the FDIC initially implemented
part 363, use of a $500 million threshold
captured approximately 1,000 IDIs (out
of 14,000) holding 75 percent of U.S.
banking assets, while exempting
approximately two-thirds of institutions
that would have been subject to section
36 under a $150 million threshold.45 In
addition, at the time of initial
implementation, more than 96 percent
of these covered institutions reported
that they were subject to an annual
audit by an independent public
accountant at the depository institution
or parent company level. The initial
scope of application for part 363 was
intended to help ensure sound financial
management of the institutions posing
the greatest potential risk to the Deposit
Insurance Fund.46
The 2005 amendment to the ICFR
threshold in part 363 reflected a
recognition that compliance with the
audit and reporting requirements had
become more burdensome and costly,
particularly for smaller nonpublic
institutions.47 In addition, due to
consolidation in the banking and thrift
industry and the effects of inflation, the
scope of applicability for part 363 had
increased to cover more than 1,150 (out
of 8,900) insured institutions,
representing approximately 90 percent
of industry assets.48 Following the 2005
amendm
ad
become more burdensome and costly,
particularly for smaller nonpublic
institutions.47 In addition, due to
consolidation in the banking and thrift
industry and the effects of inflation, the
scope of applicability for part 363 had
increased to cover more than 1,150 (out
of 8,900) insured institutions,
representing approximately 90 percent
of industry assets.48 Following the 2005
amendment, about 600 of the largest
insured institutions with approximately
86 percent of industry assets continued
to be covered by the ICFR requirements
of part 363. This change was intended
to achieve meaningful burden reduction
in a manner consistent with safety and
soundness.49 Subsequent amendments
to part 363 in 2009 50 and 2020 51 did
not result in permanent changes to the
regulatory asset thresholds.
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52 In total, the FDIC is proposing increases to 24
regulatory asset thresholds in part 363. Several of
these asset thresholds are similar and are repeated
throughout part 363 pertaining to the general
requirements of part 363, as well as to the holding
company requirements of part 363 (for insured
depository institutions that are subsidiaries of
holding companies), and audit committee
composition requirements.
53 Supra n. 45 at 58 FR 31333.
54 See e.g., AL Code 5–2A–22 (2024); CA Fin Code
502 (2024); Conn. Gen. Stat 36a–86; and Ga. Comp.
R. & Regs. R. 80–1–14–.01.
55 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and its implementing
regulations, 15 U.S.C. 7262.
56 Call Report data, March 31, 2025. The level of
audit work performed on an institution is reported
in the March Call Report each year and can be
found on line M.1 in the Memorandum to Schedule
RC
24); Conn. Gen. Stat 36a–86; and Ga. Comp.
R. & Regs. R. 80–1–14–.01.
55 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and its implementing
regulations, 15 U.S.C. 7262.
56 Call Report data, March 31, 2025. The level of
audit work performed on an institution is reported
in the March Call Report each year and can be
found on line M.1 in the Memorandum to Schedule
RC.
57 The threshold describes situations where the
director has received, or has an immediate family
member who has received, during any twelve-
month period within the last three years, more than
$100,000 in direct and indirect compensation from
the institution, its subsidiaries, and its affiliates for
consulting, advisory, or other services other than
director and committee fees and pension or other
forms of deferred compensation for prior service
(provided such compensation is not contingent in
any way on continued service).
58 Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, Rule 5605(a)(2);
New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual,
section 303A.02(b)(ii).
Most of the dollar-based thresholds in
part 363 have been in place for more
than 30 years. The proposal would raise
the general applicability thresholds
from $500 million to $1 billion, the
ICFR asset threshold from $1 billion to
$5 billion, and thresholds related to
audit committee composition generally
from $500 million to $1 billion, and
from $1 billion and $3 billion to $5
billion.52 Use of these thresholds would
help support a key underlying objective
of part 363—that is, achieving sound
financial management at insured
institutions posing the greatest risk to
the Deposit Insurance Fund 53—and
maintain consistency with the historical
scope of applicability according to
several metrics. The $1 billion and $5
billion thresholds would cover
institutions holding approximately 95
and 89 percent of industry assets,
respectively
ng objective
of part 363—that is, achieving sound
financial management at insured
institutions posing the greatest risk to
the Deposit Insurance Fund 53—and
maintain consistency with the historical
scope of applicability according to
several metrics. The $1 billion and $5
billion thresholds would cover
institutions holding approximately 95
and 89 percent of industry assets,
respectively. In addition, the proposed
increase in the applicability threshold
from $500 million to $1 billion would
result in approximately the same
number of institutions being subject to
part 363 (approximately 1,000
institutions) in 2025 as were subject to
the regulation in 1993 (at its inception)
and in 2005 (when the threshold for the
ICFR requirements was amended), while
removing nearly 800 institutions from
the general scope of applicability for
part 363. Similarly, the proposed
increase in the ICFR threshold from $1
billion to $5 billion would be generally
consistent with the historical
application of such requirements (to
approximately 75 percent of
institutions) at the time of initial
implementation and under the 2005
amendment.
The thresholds set forth in the
proposal also would achieve meaningful
burden reduction for the smallest
institutions, which would be removed
from the scope of applicability for
reporting requirements and internal
control assessments. Furthermore,
experience has demonstrated that
smaller community institutions,
particularly those in rural areas, have
had difficulty complying with the audit
committee composition requirements.
Specifically, these institutions
frequently report that it is increasingly
difficult to attract and retain individuals
who are willing and capable of serving
as a member of an audit committee,
thereby making compliance with the
audit committee composition
requirements of part 363 challenging
in rural areas, have
had difficulty complying with the audit
committee composition requirements.
Specifically, these institutions
frequently report that it is increasingly
difficult to attract and retain individuals
who are willing and capable of serving
as a member of an audit committee,
thereby making compliance with the
audit committee composition
requirements of part 363 challenging.
Irrespective of the proposed changes
to part 363 thresholds, IDIs may still be
required to have an audit and assess
internal controls over financial
reporting by their respective states if the
institution is state chartered.54
Additionally, insured depository
institutions that are public companies or
subsidiaries of public companies that
file annual and other periodic reports as
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 are required to have an audit and
assess internal controls over financial
reporting.55 As of March 31, 2025,
approximately 52 percent of institutions
not subject to part 363 still obtained an
audit.56
The FDIC is also proposing to increase
the $100,000 compensation threshold
under part 363 57 related to the
determination of whether a director is
considered ‘‘independent of
management.’’ Paragraph 28 in
appendix A to part 363, ‘‘Independent
of Management’’ Considerations, sets
forth the criteria a board of directors
should consider when determining the
independence of an outside director for
audit committee purposes. The
independence criteria under part 363,
including the $100,000 compensation
threshold, are intended to be consistent
with those provided under the listing
standards of national securities
exchanges while providing some
flexibility for smaller nonpublic
institutions.
The FDIC implemented the $100,000
threshold under part 363 in 2009
of an outside director for
audit committee purposes. The
independence criteria under part 363,
including the $100,000 compensation
threshold, are intended to be consistent
with those provided under the listing
standards of national securities
exchanges while providing some
flexibility for smaller nonpublic
institutions.
The FDIC implemented the $100,000
threshold under part 363 in 2009. Since
that time, the parallel threshold under
the listing standards of national
securities exchanges has been raised to
$120,000.58 Accordingly, the proposal
would increase the $100,000
compensation threshold under part 363
to $120,00 to realign it with the parallel
threshold set forth in listing standards.
This revision also would address the
potential unintended outcome where a
director could be considered
‘‘independent of management’’ for
purposes of listing standards while at
the same time being considered ‘‘not
independent of management’’ for
purposes of part 363.
In contrast to the other thresholds in
part 363 that are subject to this
proposal, the $120,000 compensation
threshold would not be subject to the
proposed indexing methodology
described in section III of this
Supplementary Information as it is
intended to align with parallel
thresholds under listing standards,
which are not subject to an indexing
methodology. The FDIC expects to
adjust this threshold in the future to
maintain continued alignment with
parallel thresholds in the listing
standards of the national securities
exchanges.
The table below details the proposed
changes to part 363 thresholds.
PART 363 THRESHOLDS PROPOSED TO BE REVISED
Citation
Current threshold
Proposal threshold
363.1(a) ................................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
363.2(b)(3) ...........................................................................................................
T 363 THRESHOLDS PROPOSED TO BE REVISED
Citation
Current threshold
Proposal threshold
363.1(a) ................................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
363.2(b)(3) ............................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.3(b) ................................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.4(a)(2) ............................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.4(c)(3) ............................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.5(a)(1) ............................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.5(a)(2) ............................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
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$5 billion.
363.5(a)(2) ............................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
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59 As discussed above, the proposal also would
raise the threshold set forth in Guideline 28(b)(4)
from $100,000 to $120,000. This threshold was
intended to align with the listing standards of
national securities exchanges for purposes of
making director independence determinations.
60 See Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘Dodd-Frank
Act’’) section 201, et. seq., 12 U.S.C. 5381, et. seq.
61 See Dodd-Frank Act section 202(a), 12 U.S.C.
5382(a) (describing the process for the Secretary of
the Treasury to appoint the FDIC as receiver for a
covered financial company and commence orderly
liquidation of the covered financial company); see
also 12 CFR 380.1.
62 See 12 CFR 380.13(a)(1).
63 See 12 CFR 380.13(a)(2)(i).
64 12 CFR 380.13(c)(1)(i). Section 380.13 defines
material participation in a transaction that caused
substantial loss to a covered financial company in
12 CFR 380.13(c)(2).
65 See 12 CFR 380.13(c)(3).
66 See 12 CFR 380.13(b)(6).
67 See 79 FR 20762, 20766–20767 (Apr. 14, 2014).
68 See id. at 79 FR 20762 (explaining that the 12
CFR 380.13 final rule is modeled after the FDIC’s
regulation at 12 CFR part 340 because the relevant
statutory provisions share substantially similar
statutory language.).
69 See ‘‘Restrictions on Sale of Assets of a
Financial Institution by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporations,’’ 80 FR 22886 (Apr. 24,
2015) at 80 FR 22286, 80 FR 22887 and 12 CFR
380.13
20762 (explaining that the 12
CFR 380.13 final rule is modeled after the FDIC’s
regulation at 12 CFR part 340 because the relevant
statutory provisions share substantially similar
statutory language.).
69 See ‘‘Restrictions on Sale of Assets of a
Financial Institution by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporations,’’ 80 FR 22886 (Apr. 24,
2015) at 80 FR 22286, 80 FR 22887 and 12 CFR
380.13.
PART 363 THRESHOLDS PROPOSED TO BE REVISED—Continued
Citation
Current threshold
Proposal threshold
363.5(a)(2) ............................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
363.5(b) ................................................................................................................
$3 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 8A .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 8A .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 10 .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 18A .......................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 27 .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 27 .........................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion
..........
$5 billion.
Guideline 27 .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 27 .........................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
Guideline 27 .........................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 28(b)(4) ................................................................................................
$100 thousand .....................................
$120 thousand.59
Guideline 30(b) .....................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 30(c) .....................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
Guideline 30(c) .....................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 35(a) .....................................................................................................
$500 million ..........................................
$1 billion.
Guideline 35(b) .....................................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 35(c) .....................................................................................................
$3 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Appendix B item 2(b) ..........................................................................................
..........................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Guideline 35(c) .....................................................................................................
$3 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Appendix B item 2(b) ...........................................................................................
$1 billion ...............................................
$5 billion.
Question 8: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of increasing the
thresholds within part 363, as described
above?
Question 9: Does the proposal
appropriately balance the objectives
preserving the levels of part 363
thresholds on an inflation-adjusted basis
and reducing burden for smaller
institutions with the safety and
soundness benefits of audit and
financial controls requirements? If not,
how could the proposal improve the
balance of these objectives?
Question 10: Would the proposed
thresholds under part 363 help to
address challenges for smaller
institutions in rural areas or other
geographies? Please describe any
elevated challenges associated with
current provisions of part 363 and
whether the proposal would help to
address them. Please provide supporting
data where available.
Question 11: To what extent do the
requirements of part 363 help ensure
that institutions establish and maintain
appropriate lines of defense for
compliance and safety and soundness
purposes? How burdensome are the
requirements for small institutions?
F
th
current provisions of part 363 and
whether the proposal would help to
address them. Please provide supporting
data where available.
Question 11: To what extent do the
requirements of part 363 help ensure
that institutions establish and maintain
appropriate lines of defense for
compliance and safety and soundness
purposes? How burdensome are the
requirements for small institutions?
F. 12 CFR Part 380 (Part 380)—Orderly
Liquidation Authority
Part 380 of the FDIC’s regulations
implements the FDIC’s orderly
liquidation authority,60 which applies
once the FDIC has been appointed
receiver for a covered financial
company.61 Similar to the provisions
regarding the sale and purchase of failed
IDI asset sales under part 340, 12 CFR
380.13 of the FDIC’s regulations sets
forth restrictions on the FDIC’s sale of
failed covered financial company assets
to individuals or entities that
improperly profited from or engaged in
wrongdoing at the expense of a covered
financial company or seriously
mismanaged a covered financial
company.62 The restrictions under 12
CFR 380.13 apply to the sale and
purchase of covered financial company
assets in the FDIC’s capacity as receiver
for a covered financial company or in its
corporate capacity.63
Among other restrictions, 12 CFR
380.13 prohibits a person from
acquiring assets of a covered financial
company from the FDIC if the person or
its associated person has caused a
substantial loss to a covered financial
company 64 or has demonstrated a
pattern or practice causing a substantial
loss to one or more covered financial
companies.65 As in part 340, 12 CFR
380.13 defines ‘‘substantial loss’’ to
include multiple types of loss that all
use a threshold of $50,000 to establish
the losses as ‘‘substantial.’’ 66
The FDIC added 12 CFR 380.13 to the
FDIC’s regulations in 2014.67 From
inception, the FDIC has explicitly
implemented the requirements in 12
CFR 380.13, including the ‘‘substantial
loss’’ provisions and threshold, in a
manner consis
CFR
380.13 defines ‘‘substantial loss’’ to
include multiple types of loss that all
use a threshold of $50,000 to establish
the losses as ‘‘substantial.’’ 66
The FDIC added 12 CFR 380.13 to the
FDIC’s regulations in 2014.67 From
inception, the FDIC has explicitly
implemented the requirements in 12
CFR 380.13, including the ‘‘substantial
loss’’ provisions and threshold, in a
manner consistent with the restrictions
related to failed IDIs asset sales under
part 340.68 Previous revisions to part
340 were also specifically intended to
align the requirements in part 340 and
12 CFR 380.13.69
The FDIC is proposing to revise the
‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold in 12 CFR
380.13 by raising the existing threshold
from $50,000 to $100,000. This
proposed revised threshold
approximates inflation adjustments
since the FDIC created the ‘‘substantial
loss’’ threshold under part 340 in 2000,
which was included in 12 CFR 380.13
in 2014, and will maintain consistency
between the ‘‘substantial loss’’
provisions in part 340 and 12 CFR
380.13.
In addition to maintaining
consistency between these related
requirements, as with part 340, updating
the threshold for ‘‘substantial loss’’ will
preserve, in real terms, the level of the
threshold. The FDIC also does not
expect this proposed adjustment to
adversely affect competition for sales of
covered financial company assets or the
prices paid for those assets.
Question 12: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of the FDIC updating
the $50,000 ‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold
under 12 CFR 380.13 to $100,000?
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for sales of
covered financial company assets or the
prices paid for those assets.
Question 12: What are the advantages
and disadvantages of the FDIC updating
the $50,000 ‘‘substantial loss’’ threshold
under 12 CFR 380.13 to $100,000?
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70 This process to adjust numerical thresholds in
the Code of Federal Regulations would be similar
to the process utilized in the Community
Reinvestment Act in which the FDIC and FRB
publish a final rule without notice and comment.
71 The period in which new thresholds would
apply may differ depending on considerations
specific to each individual regulation. For example,
thresholds within part 363 of FDIC regulations
apply on a fiscal year basis rather than a calendar
year basis and would be made applicable for fiscal
years beginning after the threshold update.
72 For simple illustration, this example ignores
compounding of prior years’ inflation.
G. Additional Thresholds
As discussed above, the proposal is
intended to be the first of a multi-phase
effort to reevaluate thresholds within
the FDIC’s regulations. The FDIC also
seeks comment on which additional
regulatory thresholds, if any, the FDIC
should update and index. Please
identify any such thresholds and
explain which, if any, should be
prioritized and why.
III. Indexing Methodology for Future
Threshold Adjustments
The FDIC is proposing to implement
an indexing methodology to make future
automatic adjustments to most
thresholds discussed above according to
a pre-determined methodology that
reflects inflation. Use of the indexing
methodology would result in a more
consistent and predictable application
of thresholds over time, in further
support of the objectives of this
proposal.
A
ld Adjustments
The FDIC is proposing to implement
an indexing methodology to make future
automatic adjustments to most
thresholds discussed above according to
a pre-determined methodology that
reflects inflation. Use of the indexing
methodology would result in a more
consistent and predictable application
of thresholds over time, in further
support of the objectives of this
proposal.
A. Description of Methodology
Under the proposal, the FDIC would
generally adjust the dollar thresholds
described in section II of this document
at the end of every consecutive two-year
period based on the cumulative percent
change of the non-seasonally adjusted
CPI–W since the effective date of any
final rulemaking. This two-year period
is intended to provide an appropriate
cadence for capturing meaningful
changes in inflation on a timely basis
while balancing the frequency in which
thresholds would be amended.
If, however, the cumulative
percentage change in the non-seasonally
adjusted CPI–W during any intervening
calendar year since the most recent
adjustment exceeds 8 percent, then the
thresholds subject to the indexing
methodology would be adjusted during
the first quarter of the following
calendar year. This feature of the
indexing methodology is intended to
address the possibility that periods of
significant inflation could cause
thresholds to decrease substantially in
real terms before adjustments would
occur under the two-year cadence. By
providing for the thresholds to be
revised on an interim basis during any
year since the prior adjustment in which
the cumulative percent change increases
by more than 8 percent, the proposal
would help ensure threshold amounts
reflect inflation in a timely manner and
avoid the undesirable and unintended
consequences of excessive inflation
between adjustments.
Under the proposal, the FDIC
generally would announce threshold
adjustments pursuant to the indexing
methodology by publishing a final rule
in the Federal Register
change increases
by more than 8 percent, the proposal
would help ensure threshold amounts
reflect inflation in a timely manner and
avoid the undesirable and unintended
consequences of excessive inflation
between adjustments.
Under the proposal, the FDIC
generally would announce threshold
adjustments pursuant to the indexing
methodology by publishing a final rule
in the Federal Register. The final rule
would not be subject to a notice and
comment period, and would amend the
Code of Federal Regulations to reflect
the adjusted numerical threshold.70
While the FDIC would fully expect to
publish a final rule in the Federal
Register as required by the proposal, the
proposal also notes that the adjustment
would occur even in the absence of a
publication in the Federal Register. The
adjusted thresholds would be effective
on April 1 of the year during which the
adjustment occurs.71 For example, an
adjusted threshold that is calculated
based on inflation through the end of
2027 would be published during the
first quarter of 2028 and would become
effective on April 1, 2028.
Under the proposed indexing
methodology, the FDIC would not lower
thresholds in any given year to reflect
periods of deflation. In modern times,
deflation has been rare and limited.
However, as further described below, a
period of deflation would be reflected in
future threshold increases, as in such a
scenario, thresholds would not increase
until the net cumulative change in CPI–
W turns positive. In the event the
economy experiences a period of
sustained deflation, the FDIC may
consider revisiting the proposed
indexing methodology.
Additionally, thresholds adjusted
under the indexing methodology would
be rounded, as appropriate, based on the
size of the threshold (e.g., thousands,
millions, billions), generally, to the
nearest number with two significant
digits. For example, the numbers $9.8
billion; $510 million; $1.1 million;
$520,000; and $2,700 each have two
significant digits
he proposed
indexing methodology.
Additionally, thresholds adjusted
under the indexing methodology would
be rounded, as appropriate, based on the
size of the threshold (e.g., thousands,
millions, billions), generally, to the
nearest number with two significant
digits. For example, the numbers $9.8
billion; $510 million; $1.1 million;
$520,000; and $2,700 each have two
significant digits. As an additional
example, a threshold that would
otherwise be calculated as $5.964
million would be rounded to $6.0
million. In this case, both the ‘6’ and ‘0’
are significant digits because $6.0
million is the value of the adjusted
threshold rounded to the nearest $0.1
million.
Prior to rounding, all adjusted
thresholds would be calculated based
on the cumulative percent change of the
non-seasonally adjusted CPI–W since
the effective date of any final
rulemaking to implement the proposal.
Referring back to a discrete starting
point would ensure that any distortions
due to rounding or non-adjustments for
deflation do not carry forward to future
adjustments. For example, if a final rule
to implement this proposal becomes
effective on December 31, 2025, then
this date would serve as the starting
point for future threshold adjustment
calculations. In addition, to illustrate
the effects of deflation, suppose that
inflation is 0 percent in calendar year
2026 and ¥5 percent (5 percent
deflation) in calendar year 2027. No
adjustment would be made at the end of
calendar year 2026 because inflation did
not exceed 8 percent, and no adjustment
would be made at the end of calendar
year 2027 because, as stated above, the
FDIC would not adjust thresholds lower
in any given year. Suppose also that
inflation is 0 percent in calendar year
2028 and 5 percent in calendar year
2029
deflation) in calendar year 2027. No
adjustment would be made at the end of
calendar year 2026 because inflation did
not exceed 8 percent, and no adjustment
would be made at the end of calendar
year 2027 because, as stated above, the
FDIC would not adjust thresholds lower
in any given year. Suppose also that
inflation is 0 percent in calendar year
2028 and 5 percent in calendar year
2029. The adjusted threshold
calculation for 2029 would consider
cumulative inflation since December 31,
2025, meaning the ¥5 percent inflation
in 2027 would roughly offset the 5
percent inflation in 2029, and no
adjustment would be made.
As an example of how the proposal
would avoid rounding distortions,
consider a $1 million threshold and
consistent 3 percent inflation in each
year from 2026 through 2029.
Cumulative inflation at the end of 2027
would be roughly 6 percent, resulting in
an unrounded adjusted threshold of
$1.06 million ($1 million * 1.06 = $1.06
million), which would then be rounded
to $1.1 million. Cumulative inflation in
the years 2028 and 2029 would also be
roughly 6 percent. If the indexing
methodology were to be based on the
previous adjustment, the new
unrounded adjusted threshold would be
$1.166 ($1.1 million * 1.06 = $1.166
million) and would round to $1.2
million. Thus, the $0.04 million in
rounding at the end of 2027 would carry
forward and add to the $0.034 million
in rounding applied at the end of 2029.
Conversely, under the proposed
methodology, the 2029 adjustment
would be calculated based on the
roughly 12 percent cumulative inflation
in the years 2026–2029.72 The $1
million threshold from December 31,
2025, would be adjusted to an
unrounded threshold of $1.12 million
($1 million * 1.12 = $1.12 million)
ry
forward and add to the $0.034 million
in rounding applied at the end of 2029.
Conversely, under the proposed
methodology, the 2029 adjustment
would be calculated based on the
roughly 12 percent cumulative inflation
in the years 2026–2029.72 The $1
million threshold from December 31,
2025, would be adjusted to an
unrounded threshold of $1.12 million
($1 million * 1.12 = $1.12 million). The
unrounded adjusted threshold would be
rounded to $1.1 million, which would
be equivalent to the current adjusted
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73 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI-Urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (Current
Series)), available at https://datawww.bls.gov/
PDQWebhelp/one_screen/cw.htm.
74 See Social Security Administration, Latest Cost
of Living Adjustments, available at https://
www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/latestCOLA.html.
75 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer
Price Index, available at https://www.bls.gov/ppi/.
76 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal
Expenditures Price Index, available at https://
www.bea.gov/data/personal-consumption-
expenditures-price-index.
77 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross
Domestic Purchases Price Index, available at
https://www.bea.gov/data/prices-inflation/gross-
domestic-purchases-price-index.
78 C–CPI–U has been published since 2000 and is
not included in the three-decade comparison.
79 See § 345.12(u)(2) of appendix G to 12 CFR part
345; see also 12 CFR 1003.2(g)(1)(i).
threshold (established at year-end 2027),
so no adjustment would be made
sis, Gross
Domestic Purchases Price Index, available at
https://www.bea.gov/data/prices-inflation/gross-
domestic-purchases-price-index.
78 C–CPI–U has been published since 2000 and is
not included in the three-decade comparison.
79 See § 345.12(u)(2) of appendix G to 12 CFR part
345; see also 12 CFR 1003.2(g)(1)(i).
threshold (established at year-end 2027),
so no adjustment would be made.
Question 13: Would increasing
thresholds pursuant to the proposed
indexing methodology have any
unintended policy consequences? Are
there other factors that should be
considered as part of any update to
thresholds?
Question 14: Under the proposal, the
FDIC would generally not expect to
adjust thresholds lower in any given
year, for example, following periods of
deflation. Is it appropriate to only adjust
thresholds higher to reflect inflation?
What would be the advantages and
disadvantages of adjusting thresholds to
reflect both inflationary and
deflationary periods?
Question 15: Does the proposal
appropriately address potential
distortions that could result from
rounding? If not, please explain. What
would be the advantages and
disadvantages of not applying rounding?
Question 16: Under the proposal,
adjusted thresholds would be rounded
to the nearest value with two significant
digits. What would be the advantages
and disadvantages of adjusting
thresholds under the indexing
methodology to reflect the exact
numerical threshold amount produced
as a result of changes in inflation
(instead of rounding)?
Question 17: Should the FDIC apply
the proposed methodology consistently
across all regulations or should the FDIC
tailor alternative methodologies to
consider factors specific to each
individual threshold and/or regulation,
or groups of thresholds and/or
regulations? Would the benefits of a
more tailored approach justify the cost
of inconsistent indexing methods?
B
nstead of rounding)?
Question 17: Should the FDIC apply
the proposed methodology consistently
across all regulations or should the FDIC
tailor alternative methodologies to
consider factors specific to each
individual threshold and/or regulation,
or groups of thresholds and/or
regulations? Would the benefits of a
more tailored approach justify the cost
of inconsistent indexing methods?
B. Alternatives to the Proposed Indexing
Methodology
In developing this proposal, the FDIC
considered other factors that could be
used to adjust regulatory thresholds to
preserve the levels of thresholds in real
terms over time. For example, the
approach to adjust thresholds could rely
on an alternative index or measure of
inflation (e.g., core versus non-core
measures). Additionally, rather than
using changes in inflation as a basis for
updating thresholds, the FDIC
considered using changes in economic
growth or banking industry assets since
thresholds were originally
implemented. Another alternative
considered was a methodology for
updating each threshold individually,
based on the factors most relevant to
that threshold. The FDIC also
considered not updating the thresholds
included in section II of this document
from their current levels and instead
relying solely on the proposed
methodology to index thresholds.
Additionally, the mechanics of the
indexing methodology could involve a
less or more frequent cadence, or use of
a process that is less automated. The
FDIC requests feedback on all
alternative approaches discussed below
and any other alternative approaches
that should be considered.
1. Alternative Measures of Inflation
The non-seasonally adjusted CPI–W is
a measure of prices paid by urban wage
earners and clerical workers published
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.73
Among other uses, the CPI–W is used by
the U.S
automated. The
FDIC requests feedback on all
alternative approaches discussed below
and any other alternative approaches
that should be considered.
1. Alternative Measures of Inflation
The non-seasonally adjusted CPI–W is
a measure of prices paid by urban wage
earners and clerical workers published
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.73
Among other uses, the CPI–W is used by
the U.S. Social Security Administration
to make ‘‘cost-of-living adjustments’’ to
benefit payments.74 There are other
consumer price indices that could be
considered for updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations. The
CPI–W is calculated based on the
consumption patterns of urban wage
earners and clerical workers whereas
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI–U) is calculated based
on the consumption patterns of a
broader set of urban consumers. The
Chained CPI–U (C–CPI–U) reflects the
consumption patterns of the broader set
of urban consumers and is designed to
account for consumer substitution
between item categories. The Producer
Price Index (PPI), also published by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, tracks
the selling prices received by domestic
producers.75 The Personal Consumption
Expenditures Price Index (PCEPI) is
published by the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis and tracks the prices
of goods and services purchased by
consumers in the United States.76 The
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis also
publishes a broader domestic price
index, the Gross Domestic Purchases
Price Index (GDPPI), which tracks prices
of goods and services purchased by U.S.
residents.77
In aggregate, there is not a significant
difference in changes over time between
these various consumer price indices
goods and services purchased by
consumers in the United States.76 The
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis also
publishes a broader domestic price
index, the Gross Domestic Purchases
Price Index (GDPPI), which tracks prices
of goods and services purchased by U.S.
residents.77
In aggregate, there is not a significant
difference in changes over time between
these various consumer price indices.
Each of the consumer price indices
discussed above has increased between
55 percent and 67 percent over the last
two decades and has increased between
87 percent and 111 percent over the last
three decades.78
One advantage of using the CPI–W for
updating and indexing thresholds
within FDIC regulations is that the CPI–
W is already commonly used for this
purpose, including by the FDIC and
other Federal agencies.79 One advantage
of using other price indices, such as the
CPI–U, C–CPI–U, PPI, PCEPI, and
GDPPI, may be that they are based on
consumption patterns of a broader set of
consumers, and, in some cases, may
adjust for substitutions in consumption
patterns. Use of price indices that are
based on consumption patterns of a
broader set of consumers could be more
responsive to both household and
business credit expansion relative to the
CPI–W, which may be more reflective of
the types of activities typically financed
through the banking industry and
therefore a potentially more relevant
measure for revising thresholds.
However, these alternatives are less
frequently used by the FDIC and other
Federal agencies and may be less
familiar to the public
esponsive to both household and
business credit expansion relative to the
CPI–W, which may be more reflective of
the types of activities typically financed
through the banking industry and
therefore a potentially more relevant
measure for revising thresholds.
However, these alternatives are less
frequently used by the FDIC and other
Federal agencies and may be less
familiar to the public.
Question 18: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
the CPI–W as the reference index under
the proposed indexing methodology?
What would be the advantages and
disadvantages of using other potential
indices for updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations? Are
there other consumer price indices that
should be considered for updating and
indexing thresholds within FDIC
regulations? If so, please explain the
advantages and disadvantages of those
indices relative to the CPI–W and the
alternatives described above.
In addition to the consumer price
indices discussed above, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis also
publish ‘‘core’’ versions of their
respective consumer price indices,
which exclude prices for food and
energy, as prices in those categories
tend to be more volatile. Core price
indices are often used by monetary
policy authorities, such as the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in seeking to understand
underlying, longer-term inflation
dynamics. However, core price indices,
by their nature as price indices focusing
on a subset of consumer prices, do not
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as the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in seeking to understand
underlying, longer-term inflation
dynamics. However, core price indices,
by their nature as price indices focusing
on a subset of consumer prices, do not
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80 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
Price Index Seasonally Adjusted Data, available at
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/seasonal-adjustment/using-
seasonally-adjusted-data.htm.
81 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1.1.5.
Gross Domestic Product, line 1, available at https://
apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=19&step=
2&isuri=1&categories=survey.
82 Changes in GDP (sometimes referred to as
changes in nominal GDP) can be broken down into
changes in prices inflation plus changes in real
economic output (real GDP).
83 See Financial Accounts of the United States
(Z.1) published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
84 See FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile ending
December 31, 1994 (indicating total assets of $5.02
trillion and total deposits of $3.6 trillion) relative
to FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile ending December
31, 2024 (indicating total assets of $24.1 trillion and
total deposits of $19.2 trillion), available at https://
www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-
quarterly-banking-profiles.
provide as complete of a picture of
inflation as compared to broader indices
and may miss changing trends such as
food and energy prices. One advantage
of using the CPI–W for updating and
indexing thresholds within FDIC
regulations, as opposed to the core CPI–
W or other core price indices, is that the
CPI–W is already commonly referenced,
including by FDIC regulations
-banking-profiles.
provide as complete of a picture of
inflation as compared to broader indices
and may miss changing trends such as
food and energy prices. One advantage
of using the CPI–W for updating and
indexing thresholds within FDIC
regulations, as opposed to the core CPI–
W or other core price indices, is that the
CPI–W is already commonly referenced,
including by FDIC regulations. Another
advantage of the CPI–W relative to the
core CPI–W or other core price indices
is that the CPI–W provides a broader
representation of consumer price
inflation, making its use as an index
more appropriate for thresholds that are
updated to reflect inflation at a cadence
of once-per-year or once-every-two-
years pace, as under the proposal. Using
a core index for purposes of updating
thresholds would not provide a full
reflection of price changes over these
time periods, since core indexes are
designed to reduce the amount of
volatility in the price levels they
measure. Using a core index over a one-
and two-year cadence may therefore not
maintain thresholds in real terms over
time.
Question 19: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
core consumer price indices for
purposes of updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations
relative to using indices that are not
limited to core prices?
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
provides a non-seasonally adjusted and
seasonally adjusted version of the CPI–
W series. The seasonally adjusted data
adjust for recurring seasonal price
trends, due to weather, holidays, etc.,
and are the preferred measure for
examining short-term (less than a year)
price trends in the economy.80 By
comparison, the non-adjusted data do
not include adjustments for recurring
seasonal price trends and reflect all
prices that consumers pay, including as
a result of seasonal patterns
easonally adjusted data
adjust for recurring seasonal price
trends, due to weather, holidays, etc.,
and are the preferred measure for
examining short-term (less than a year)
price trends in the economy.80 By
comparison, the non-adjusted data do
not include adjustments for recurring
seasonal price trends and reflect all
prices that consumers pay, including as
a result of seasonal patterns. The
proposal would adjust thresholds in
FDIC regulations at the end of every
two-year period with the potential for
an interim adjustment in the intervening
year if non-seasonally adjusted inflation
exceeds 8 percent. The FDIC believes
use of the non-seasonally adjusted CPI–
W series would serve as a more
appropriate reference than the
seasonally adjusted CPI–W series for the
purpose of updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations
because such adjustments are intended
to reflect longer-term changes in
inflation.
Question 20: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
seasonally adjusted price indices for
updating and indexing thresholds
within FDIC regulations? What would
be the advantages and disadvantages of
using non-seasonally adjusted price
indices?
In addition to consumer price indices,
the FDIC considered the use of other
types of indices to update and index the
regulatory thresholds subject to this
proposal. The U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis publishes a Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) data series on a quarterly
basis, which measures U.S. economic
activity.81 Historically, the U.S.
economy has expanded in real terms
(outside of recessions), which means the
(nominal) GDP index has typically
increased at a faster rate than the
consumer price indices discussed
above.82 For example, U.S. nominal
GDP has increased by 299 percent over
the past three decades, compared to a
111 percent increase in the CPI–W over
the same period
economic
activity.81 Historically, the U.S.
economy has expanded in real terms
(outside of recessions), which means the
(nominal) GDP index has typically
increased at a faster rate than the
consumer price indices discussed
above.82 For example, U.S. nominal
GDP has increased by 299 percent over
the past three decades, compared to a
111 percent increase in the CPI–W over
the same period. Therefore, if GDP were
used as the basis for updating and
indexing thresholds within FDIC
regulations, such thresholds would be
initially updated to a higher amount
and, going forward, would likely
increase at a faster rate than under the
proposal.
Using changes in inflation as a basis
for updating and indexing thresholds
within FDIC regulations would have the
advantage of specifically targeting price
levels to ensure dollar thresholds
remain relatively consistent, in real
terms, over time. However, financial
activity is closely related to broader
macroeconomic activity and tends to
grow together with the economy. Using
GDP as a basis for updating and
indexing thresholds may provide for
thresholds that more closely reflect the
banking industry’s proportional role in
the economy. However, a disadvantage
of using GDP within an indexing
methodology is that it is subject to
business cycle fluctuations which may
not always correspond with price level
changes, such as in a ‘‘stagflationary’’
environment where stagnant economic
growth occurs simultaneously with
inflation. Using GDP as a basis for
threshold adjustments during such a
scenario may result in thresholds that
are not revised as price levels increase,
potentially limiting the ability to
maintain dollar-based threshold levels
in real terms over time. Another
disadvantage of using GDP within an
indexing methodology is that it is a
lagging indicator that is frequently
revised
ously with
inflation. Using GDP as a basis for
threshold adjustments during such a
scenario may result in thresholds that
are not revised as price levels increase,
potentially limiting the ability to
maintain dollar-based threshold levels
in real terms over time. Another
disadvantage of using GDP within an
indexing methodology is that it is a
lagging indicator that is frequently
revised. As such, depending on the
frequency of revisions, thresholds could
be revised according to a percentage
change in GDP that is subsequently
revised, thereby limiting the indexing
methodology’s accuracy as well as the
durability of revised threshold amounts
in maintaining their levels in real terms.
Additionally, the U.S. economy is
complex and measures of GDP can
consider a wider range of factors than
changes in price level alone. As such,
GDP may be an inappropriate measure
to revise thresholds relative to inflation.
Question 21: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
GDP for updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations?
The FDIC also considered updating
and indexing thresholds within FDIC
regulations using measures of growth in
banking or financial sector activity. The
banking sector and the broader financial
sector have grown faster than GDP over
the last several decades. For example,
total U.S. household financial assets
have grown by approximately 502
percent over the last three decades.83
Total bank assets for all FDIC-insured
institutions have similarly grown by
approximately 380 percent over the last
three decades, while total bank deposits
at those institutions have grown by
approximately 432 percent over the
same period.84 If thresholds within
FDIC regulations were updated based on
growth in banking or financial sector
activity, the proposed thresholds would
be several times larger than those
suggested by the growth in consumer
prices
own by
approximately 380 percent over the last
three decades, while total bank deposits
at those institutions have grown by
approximately 432 percent over the
same period.84 If thresholds within
FDIC regulations were updated based on
growth in banking or financial sector
activity, the proposed thresholds would
be several times larger than those
suggested by the growth in consumer
prices. Although it is difficult to predict
future growth in the banking industry
over the long-term, if recent growth
rates continue, indexing thresholds
within FDIC regulations using measures
of banking activity and financial sector
activity would result in thresholds
growing faster relative to indexing based
on consumer prices. Using a measure of
banking or financial sector activity as a
basis for which thresholds are revised
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85 See FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile for
December 31, 2024, and December 31, 2019,
available at https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-
banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles.
86 See total assets reported for all FDIC-insured
institutions in FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile
ending December 31, 2024, and December 31, 1994,
both inflation-adjusted using the non-seasonally
adjusted CPI–W available at https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CWUR0000SA0L1E.
would have the advantage of more
closely aligning threshold levels with
changes in the banking industry and the
relevance of banks in supporting
broader economic activity. For example,
the FDIC could use changes in total
assets of all IDIs as a measure to revise
thresholds within FDIC regulations,
which would ensure such thresholds
remain relevant to banking industry
dynamics
000SA0L1E.
would have the advantage of more
closely aligning threshold levels with
changes in the banking industry and the
relevance of banks in supporting
broader economic activity. For example,
the FDIC could use changes in total
assets of all IDIs as a measure to revise
thresholds within FDIC regulations,
which would ensure such thresholds
remain relevant to banking industry
dynamics. Using growth in the size of
the banking industry to adjust
thresholds in FDIC regulations would
account for growth trends that are
specific to the banking industry and
may be better correlated with the
characteristics of banks that affect the
costs and benefits of particular
regulations.
Overall, using growth in the size of
the banking industry to adjust
thresholds in FDIC regulations would
keep the proportion of impacted banks
relatively constant since the threshold
would increase with industry size.
However, a disadvantage of this
approach is that many thresholds are
intended to apply to banks of a certain
size, not necessarily a fixed proportion
of the industry. As the banking industry
grows, the increase in thresholds may
outpace actual changes in size and risk
profile for an individual institution.
Further, aggregate changes in industry
growth may not always be
representative of, or broadly consistent
with, changes occurring across banks of
different size ranges. For example, total
banking industry assets grew roughly
$5.45 trillion, or 29 percent, from year-
end 2019 to year-end 2024.85 By
comparison, total assets of banks with
assets between $1 billion to $100 billion
increased by $963 billion, or 19 percent,
over the same time period, while total
assets of banks with assets less than $1
billion decreased by $33 billion, or 3
percent.
Another disadvantage of this
approach is that banking or financial
sector activity reflects both real growth
and changes in inflation
5 By
comparison, total assets of banks with
assets between $1 billion to $100 billion
increased by $963 billion, or 19 percent,
over the same time period, while total
assets of banks with assets less than $1
billion decreased by $33 billion, or 3
percent.
Another disadvantage of this
approach is that banking or financial
sector activity reflects both real growth
and changes in inflation. Accordingly,
the measure of growth used to adjust
and index regulatory thresholds would
have to be discounted for inflation in
order to capture actual, activity-driven
trends within the banking industry. One
method of discounting banking sector
growth for inflation would be to
inflation-adjust total assets prior to
measuring total asset growth. Under this
approach, total real growth in banking
industry assets for all FDIC-insured
institutions that accounts for inflation
from 1995–2005 would be 128 percent
compared to 380 percent from nominal
growth.86 Compared to the use of
inflation alone, such an approach would
be relatively more complex and less
transparent to banks and market
participants.
Another disadvantage of this
approach is that certain thresholds,
including several as part of this
proposal, are set at levels that are
unrelated to asset size. Using total assets
as a basis for revising thresholds may
therefore result in threshold revisions
that are inappropriate and
disadvantageous for certain banks. By
contrast, using inflation as a basis for
revising thresholds would allow for a
more simple, transparent, and
consistent approach across varying
thresholds and banks of varying sizes.
Question 22: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
measures of banking or financial sector
activity for updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations?
The table below presents a
comparison of growth in the various
indices described above across a period
of three decades
ransparent, and
consistent approach across varying
thresholds and banks of varying sizes.
Question 22: What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of using
measures of banking or financial sector
activity for updating and indexing
thresholds within FDIC regulations?
The table below presents a
comparison of growth in the various
indices described above across a period
of three decades. Growth in total assets
across the banking industry exhibited
the largest percentage change, followed
by GDP growth. Seasonal adjustments,
for those indices that applied them as an
alternative measurement, only increased
or decreased percentage changes slightly
compared to their counterparts without
seasonal adjustments.
Percentage change
1995–2005
2005–2015
2015–2025
1995–2025
CPI–W:
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
26.0
22.5
36.3
110.5
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
26.5
22.6
36.3
111.3
Core CPI–W:
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
23.5
20.5
35.8
102.1
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
23.7
20.5
35.8
102.4
CPI–U:
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
26.9
22.6
35.9
111.4
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
27.3
22.5
35.9
112.0
C–CPI–U: *
Non-seasonally adjusted 1 ........................................................................................
N/A
19.9
32.1
N/A
Core CPI–U:
Non-seasonally adjusted .........................................................................................
d .................................................................................................
27.3
22.5
35.9
112.0
C–CPI–U: *
Non-seasonally adjusted 1 ........................................................................................
N/A
19.9
32.1
N/A
Core CPI–U:
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
25.0
20.6
35.4
104.1
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
25.2
20.5
35.4
104.2
PCEPI:
Non-seasonally adjusted 2 ........................................................................................
21.2
18.5
N/A
N/A
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
20.5
19.5
29.6
86.5
Core PCEPI:
Non-seasonally adjusted 2 ........................................................................................
18.9
19.1
N/A
N/A
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
18.9
18.2
29.3
81.6
PPI, all commodities: *
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
22.8
27.2
34.0
109.4
GDPPI ..............................................................................................................................
20.2
22.4
27.1
87.0
GDP:
Non-seasonally adjusted ..........................................................................................
69.5
41.8
66.0
299.0
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
69.7
41.5
66.0
298.5
Banking Industry Assets:
Nominal growth ........................................................................................................
......................................................................................
69.5
41.8
66.0
299.0
Seasonally adjusted .................................................................................................
69.7
41.5
66.0
298.5
Banking Industry Assets:
Nominal growth .........................................................................................................
101.2
53.9
55.0
379.9
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87 See § 345.12(u)(2) of appendix G to 12 CFR part
345; see also 12 CFR 1003.2(g)(1)(i).
Percentage change
1995–2005
2005–2015
2015–2025
1995–2025
Real growth 3 ............................................................................................................
59.7
25.6
13.7
127.9
Percentage changes are based on beginning-of-year measurem

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- [FDIC FIL-3-2003 FILING PROCEDURES](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL03003.md)
- [FDIC FIL-4-2006 Commercial Real Estate Lending Proposed Interagency Guidance](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL06004.md)
- [FDIC FIL-4-2021 Revised Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL21004.md)
- [FDIC FIL-4-2023 Guidance to Help Financial Institutions and Facilitate Recovery in Areas of California Affected by Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Landslides and Mudslides](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL23004.md)
- [FDIC FIL-4-2025 FDIC Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL25004.md)
- [FDIC FIL-5-2000 Consumer Credit Reporting Practices](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL00005.md)
- [FDIC FIL-5-2003 LETTER TO STAKEHOLDERS](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL03005.md)
- [FDIC FIL-5-2021 Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Considerations](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL21005.md)
- [FDIC FIL-6-2000 Special Alert](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL00006.md)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FDIC_FIL25032. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.