# FCC-94-179: William E. Zimsky (07/11/94): William E. Zimsky

> Federal · Rulings · In force

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_FCC_94_179

## Section

- **Citation:** FCC-94-179: William E. Zimsky (07/11/94)
- **Heading:** William E. Zimsky
- **Jurisdiction:** Federal
- **Kind:** Rulings
- **Status:** In force
- **Text as of:** August 14, 2026
- **Source:** Compiled text
- **Location:** FCC Declaratory Rulings / William E. Zimsky

## Text

9 FCC Red No. 15
Federal Communications Commission Record
FCC 94-179
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
WILLIAM E. ZIMSKY
Request for Attorney's
Fees in Connection with
the Interactive Video and
Data Service Proceeding
DECLARATORY RULING
Adopted: June 29, 1994;
Released: July 11, 1994
By the Commission:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this declaratory ruling, we deny a request by Wil
liam E. Zimsky, a communications lawyer, for a deter
mination that he is entitled to attorney's fees in connection
with his participation in the interactive video and data
service (IVDS) proceeding (Gen. Docket No. 91-2). Zimsky
claims that, because he filed a petition for reconsideration
challenging the fding fee originally established for IVDS,
he is entitled to between 20 and 30 percent of the money
due to be refunded after we reduced the fee. His claim is
based on the "common fund doctrine," which, when it
applies, allows attorneys whose work product benefits a
class of persons to claim a portion of funds produced by
the attorneys' efforts as compensation for services. See
Boeing Co. v. Van Cemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).' We find
that the Commission lacks authority to apply the common
fund doctrine to determine that Zimsky is entitled to attor
ney's fees in this case.
II. BACKGROUND
2. On February 13, 1992, the FCC established a new
radio service, known as the interactive video and data
service (IVDS), to piermit two-way interaction with com
mercial and educational programming, along with informa
tional and data services. Report and Order, 7 FCC Red 1630
ity to apply the common
fund doctrine to determine that Zimsky is entitled to attor
ney's fees in this case.
II. BACKGROUND
2. On February 13, 1992, the FCC established a new
radio service, known as the interactive video and data
service (IVDS), to piermit two-way interaction with com
mercial and educational programming, along with informa
tional and data services. Report and Order, 7 FCC Red 1630
(1992). The Commission established a filing fee of $1,400
per applicant. Id. at 1639-40 f H 69-71. This fee reflected a
decision by the FCC to require applicants to apply for a
blanket license for a system that it assumed would include
40 cell transmitter stations (CTS), each with a separate call
sign and a $35 filing fee. ($35 x 40 = $1,400) See 47
U.S.C. § 158(g); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1102(7) (fee schedule).
3. Subsequently, four parties — not including Zimsky —
filed timely pleadings contending that the $1,400 filing fee
was excessive. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red
4923, 4924 f 8 (1992). On August 4, 1992, the Commission
denied those petitions and reaffirmed the use of a $1,400
filing fee. Id. at 4925 f 15. At about the same time, the
Commission began accepting applications for IVDS in nine
of the top-ten service areas. Most, though not all, of the
applicants tendered the $1,400 fee with their applications.
4. On September 3, 1992, Zimsky filed a petition for
reconsideration of the Commission's August 4 Memoran
dum Opinion and Order on behalf of the Committee to
Preserve Statutory Fees (CPSF), which consisted of certain
applicants who did not file the $1,400 filing fee. Although
Zimsky and the CPSF challenged the propriety of the fee,
they did not ask the Commission to refund any of the fees
already paid, because the CPSF members were not entitled
to refunds.
5. On April 23, 1993, the Commission granted Zimsky's
petition. While the Commission rejected the arguments
that the filing fee was unconstitutional or lacking in statu
tory authority, it ultimately agreed with a third argument
in the petition
ged the propriety of the fee,
they did not ask the Commission to refund any of the fees
already paid, because the CPSF members were not entitled
to refunds.
5. On April 23, 1993, the Commission granted Zimsky's
petition. While the Commission rejected the arguments
that the filing fee was unconstitutional or lacking in statu
tory authority, it ultimately agreed with a third argument
in the petition. Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8
FCC Red 2787, 2788 f 10 (1993). The Commission held
that it agreed with the contention that the requirement to
file based on an assumed minimum number of 40 CTS
stations could be an unnecessary burden on IVDS ap
plicants. Id. Accordingly, the Commission permitted ap
plications for a blanket license under one call sign and
reduced the filing fee to $35 to reflect the single call sign.
Id.
6. The Commission went on to state that any "IVDS
applicants that paid an IVDS application fee based on the
40 CTS requirement shall be refunded the amount greater
than the basic $35 per call sign fee." [Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 2788-89 f II. As a result, 4,126 applicants were each
due a refund of $1,365, for a total of $5,631,990. As already
noted, none of the CPSF applicants represented by Zimsky
are entitled to a refund.^
7. As the Commission was preparing to authorize cer
tification of the refunds for payment, Zimsky sent a letter
to the FCC's Managing Director claiming that he was
entitled to a share of the refunds under the common fund
doctrine. Letter from William E. Zimsky to Andrew S.
Fishel (Jun. II, 1993). Counsel for Zimsky then notified
The common fund doctrine provides that:
. . .
[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund
for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client
is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as
a whole . . .. The common-fund doctrine reflects the
traditional practice in courts of equity. . .
m E. Zimsky to Andrew S.
Fishel (Jun. II, 1993). Counsel for Zimsky then notified
The common fund doctrine provides that:
. . .
[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund
for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client
is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as
a whole . . .. The common-fund doctrine reflects the
traditional practice in courts of equity. . . . The doctrine
rests on the perception that persons who obtain the bene
fit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are un
justly enriched at the successful litigant's expense. . . .
Jurisdiction over the fund involved in the litigation al
lows a court to prevent this inequity by assessing attor
ney's fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees
proportionately among those benefited by the suit. [Cita
tions omitted.]
444 U.S. at 478.
^ Because the CPSF applicants had not submitted the original
$1,400 filing fee, their applications were dismissed and any
partial fees submitted were returned. They thereupon appealed
the dismissal of their applications. Lavanway v. FCC, No.
93-1337 (D.C. Cir., filed May 24, 1993). Eventually, the Com
mission agreed to reinstate the CPSF applications upon payment
of the new $35 filing fee, and the CPSF applicants dismissed
their appeal.
3239

FCC 94-179
Federal Communications Commission Record
9 FCC Red No. 15
the Commission's Acting General Counsel to "identify a
lien" and offer to meet with Commission staff. Letter from
Jacob A. Stein to Rene Licht (Jun. 16, 1993). He later
submitted a more extensive letter claiming 25 percent of
the refunds under the common fund doctrine. Letter from
Jacob A. Stein to Rene Licht (Jul. 19, 1993).
8. The Commission's Acting General Counsel responded
that she disagreed that the common fund doctrine applied
to this proceeding and that she would advise the FCC's
Managing Director to issue full refunds to the applicants.
Letter from Rene Licht to Jacob Stein (Sept. 30, 1993).
9
ng 25 percent of
the refunds under the common fund doctrine. Letter from
Jacob A. Stein to Rene Licht (Jul. 19, 1993).
8. The Commission's Acting General Counsel responded
that she disagreed that the common fund doctrine applied
to this proceeding and that she would advise the FCC's
Managing Director to issue full refunds to the applicants.
Letter from Rene Licht to Jacob Stein (Sept. 30, 1993).
9. Zimsky then filed suit against the Commission in
federal district court seeking an award of 25 percent of the
refunds as attorney's fees. Zimsky v. Hundt. No. 93-2175
(D.D.C., filed Oct. 22, 1993). As part of the lawsuit, the
government stipulated that it would not authorize payment
of the refunds during the pendency of the suit.
10. The District Court, at a status conference on January
6, 1994, stayed proceedings there to permit Zimsky to seek
a final agency ruling on his fees petition, which ruling
would be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals.
Zimsky's motion for declaratory ruling followed on Feb
ruary 24, 1994.
III. MOTION FOR DECLARATORY RULING
11. Zimsky asks the Commission to make a "threshold
determination" that he is entitled to some portion of the
refunds under the common fund doctrine. He further re
quests that the Commission initiate an interpleader action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 for a court to determine the
amount of the refunds to which Zimsky is entitled, which
Zimsky asserts is between 20 and 30 percent of the
refunds.^ Zimsky suggests that the court may appoint a
guardian to represent the interests of the applicants entitled
to refunds.
12. Zimsky contends that he is entitled to reimbursement
under the common fund doctrine on the theory that his
petition for reconsideration created a common fund which
will benefit the applicants entitled to refunds. In this re
gard, he points out that the Commission did not grant the
petitions for reconsideration originally challenging the fil
ing fee
erests of the applicants entitled
to refunds.
12. Zimsky contends that he is entitled to reimbursement
under the common fund doctrine on the theory that his
petition for reconsideration created a common fund which
will benefit the applicants entitled to refunds. In this re
gard, he points out that the Commission did not grant the
petitions for reconsideration originally challenging the fil
ing fee. Zimsky argues that an award of attorney's fees to
him under these circumstances comports with the equi
table justification for the common fund doctrine because,
otherwise, the applicants entitled to refunds would be un
justly enriched by his efforts challenging the filing fee.
13. Zimsky claims that the common fund doctrine ap
plies because: (1) the beneficiaries can be identified; (2) the
benefits (
i.e., the refunds) can be accurately traced; and (3)
the fee can be shifted with exactitude by deducting a per
centage of each refund check and paying it to Zimsky.
14. Although Zimsky acknowledges the Acting General
Counsel's opinion that the Commission lacks the authority
to make a common fund award, he nevertheless maintains
that the Commission can make a "threshold determina
tion" that he is entitled to attorney's fees. He also main
tains, despite the Acting General Counsel's view, that the
Commission may initiate an interpleader action for the
purpose of obtaining an award for him.
IV. COMMENTS
15. The General Counsel afforded interested persons an
opportunity to comment on Zimsky's motion. Public No
tice, Mimeo No. 42103 (Mar. 11, 1994). The Commission
received 19 comments and 281 reply comments, some on
behalf of multiple applicants.' One of the commenting
applicants indicated that he was willing to reimburse
Zimsky. Kunkle Comments.'' The rest of the commenters,
representing over 400 applicants, opposed any payment to
Zimsky.
16. Those commenters opposing Zimsky raised numer
ous objections to Zimsky's common fund theory
, 1994). The Commission
received 19 comments and 281 reply comments, some on
behalf of multiple applicants.' One of the commenting
applicants indicated that he was willing to reimburse
Zimsky. Kunkle Comments.'' The rest of the commenters,
representing over 400 applicants, opposed any payment to
Zimsky.
16. Those commenters opposing Zimsky raised numer
ous objections to Zimsky's common fund theory. The three
most significant arguments are the following; (1) the Com
mission lacks authority to make a common fund award or
to take cognizance of Zimsky's claim; (2) the common
fund doctrine does not apply to Commission rulemakings;
and (3) the facts of this case are inconsistent with the
equitable basis of the common fund doctrine.
V. ANALYSIS
17. Based on our review of Zimsky's motion and the
comments, we find, as did the Acting General Counsel, no
basis to make a determination that Zimsky is entitled to a
common fund award or to initiate an interpleader action.
In this regard, we agree with the principal objections raised
by the commenters opposing Zimsky's motion. We now
turn to a detailed examination of these objections and of
Zimsky's responses.
A. COMMISSION AUTHORITY
18. Opposing Comments. Several commenters argue that
there is no authority to award Zimsky attorney's fees in
this proceeding. FRAC Comments at 7-10; ICC Comments
at 6; North Pointe Comments at 4; Shadowfax Comments
at 4-5; Coughlin Reply Comments at 3; North Pointe Reply
Comments at 2. They point out that there is no statutory
provision for awarding attorney's fees in this proceeding
and that the Commission lacks equitable authority to
award attorney's fees. They contend that the Commission
must make full refunds to the applicants unless ordered to
do otherwise by a court. They maintain that an
interpleader action is unwarranted.
19. Zimsky's Reply. Zimsky refers to a memorandum of
points and authority that addresses similar arguments that
he made before the District Court
ing
and that the Commission lacks equitable authority to
award attorney's fees. They contend that the Commission
must make full refunds to the applicants unless ordered to
do otherwise by a court. They maintain that an
interpleader action is unwarranted.
19. Zimsky's Reply. Zimsky refers to a memorandum of
points and authority that addresses similar arguments that
he made before the District Court. Plaintiff's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
•' The suit was originally fded as Zimsky v. Quello.
^ The interpleader statute provides relief to stakeholders hav
ing custody of money or property to which there are two or
more adverse claimants. By Tding an interpleader, the stake
holder asks the court to determine its liability with respect to
each of the adverse claimants. The stakeholder deposits the
disputed amount in court for the court's judgment. See also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. See generally General Accident Group v.
Gagliardi, 593 P. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 907
(2d Cir. 1985).
These pleadings are listed in the Appendix to this ruling.
^ A second applicant originally indicated that he was willing to
pay but subsequently retracted his support. Compare Mercury
Datanet Comments with Karl W. Hinkle (Mercury Datanet)
Reply Comments.
3240

9 FCC Red No. 15
Federal Communications Commission Record
FCC 94-179
Summary Judgment, filed in Case No. 93-2175 (D.D.C.)
(Plaintiff's Memorandum). In this pleading he asserts that
the common fund doctrine applies to administrative pro
ceedings. Id. at 8. Although he concedes that the Commis
sion lacks equitable power to award attorney's fees, he
maintains that he nevertheless has a property interest in
the fund that the Commission may recognize and bring
before a court for enforcement. Id. at 4-5, 9-10, 12-14.
20. Discussion. We decline to make a "threshold deter
mination" that Zimsky is entitled to attorney's fees
strative pro
ceedings. Id. at 8. Although he concedes that the Commis
sion lacks equitable power to award attorney's fees, he
maintains that he nevertheless has a property interest in
the fund that the Commission may recognize and bring
before a court for enforcement. Id. at 4-5, 9-10, 12-14.
20. Discussion. We decline to make a "threshold deter
mination" that Zimsky is entitled to attorney's fees. We
disagree with Zimsky's assertions that he has an existing
property interest in the refunds which we can recognize or
that such an interest can arise in a purely administrative
context. Our review of the precedents indicates that a
common fund award can arise only in the context of
litigation before an appropriate court exercising its equi
table powers. The FCC, as an administrative agency, has no
authority to make such an award. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit
has explicitly held that the FCC lacks authority to award
attorney's fees without statutory authorization. Turner v.
FCC, 514 F.2d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Because no
court has awarded Zimsky attorney's fees, we have no basis
to take any action contrary to the applicants' right to
receive full refunds.
21. It is clear from the case law that equitable jurisdic
tion in a court is essential to a common fund award. As
the Supreme Court has said; "The common-fund doctrine
reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity . . ." Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478. In this, the Court was referring to:
. . . the power of federal courts in equity suits to
allow counsel fees and other expenses entailed by the
litigation not included in the ordinary taxable costs
recognized by statute.
Allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is
part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
22. The requirement for equitable jurisdiction in a court
led the Federal Circuit, in Knight v. United States, 982 F.2d
1573 (Fed. Cir
iled by the
litigation not included in the ordinary taxable costs
recognized by statute.
Allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is
part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
22. The requirement for equitable jurisdiction in a court
led the Federal Circuit, in Knight v. United States, 982 F.2d
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993), to reject a common fund claim
based purely on administrative action, under circumstances
strikingly similar to Zimsky's claim. In Knight, a law firm
representing four employees of the Department of the Inte
rior successfully petitioned the Department of the Interior
and the Office of Personnel Management to revise the
computation of cost of living allowances for federal em
ployees who were removed from their positions. The firm
claimed as attorney's fees 25 percent of back pay to be
reimbursed as a result of the revised policy.
23. The court rejected the law firm's claim, stating:
. . . a "common fund" is the creature of a court's
inherent equitable power over funds under its con
trol. A common fund does not crystallize at the
moment a single plaintiff prevails on his claim. It is
not created by the parties or their lawyers. A "com
mon fund" is established by a court.
[The government's obligation to honor a common
fund] can only arise from litigation before a court,
adequate representation of all parties in interest,
identification of a common fund as to which the
government is merely a stakeholder, jurisdiction over
the fund by a court directly or through a party
representing those being assessed, and exercise of the
judicial equity power to impose liability on the fund
- none of which are present here.
982 F.2d at 1581-82. (Emphasis in the original.)
24. Knight indicates that, contrary to his claim, Zimsky,
in the absence of any prior judicial action, has no existing
"entitlement", "lien" or "property right" which the Com
mission can or should recognize
y
representing those being assessed, and exercise of the
judicial equity power to impose liability on the fund
- none of which are present here.
982 F.2d at 1581-82. (Emphasis in the original.)
24. Knight indicates that, contrary to his claim, Zimsky,
in the absence of any prior judicial action, has no existing
"entitlement", "lien" or "property right" which the Com
mission can or should recognize. The Commission has the
same obligation here, with respect to the applicants entitled
to refunds, as the government in Knight had with respect to
its employees: "Absent a court order recognizing the valid
ity of [the attorney's claim| . . . the government was
obligated to pay . . . the entirety of the amount it owed to
each one. 982 F.2d at 1580.
25. Moreover, there is no basis for the Commission to
initiate an interpleader. Interpleader is permitted where a
stakeholder faces substantial claims exposing it to a real
risk of multiple liability. See General Accident Group v.
Gagliardi, 593 F. Supp. at 1086-87. Here, because we have
no authority to make an award to Zimsky, an interpleader
action would not be appropriate. As discussed above, there
is no impediment to making full refunds to the applicants.
B. FURTHER ISSUES RELEVANT TO ZIMSKY'S
MOTION
26. The preceding discussion disposes of Zimsky's re
quest. However, the parties also discuss several additional
issues that bear on Zimsky's request, and, for the sake of
completeness, we wish to address those issues. First, we do
not believe that a court would be justified in asserting
jurisdiction over the funds in our custody. Second, we do
not believe that application of the common fund doctrine
applies to our rulemakings. Third, we believe that an
award to Zimsky would be inequitable.
I. Court Jurisdiction
27. Ordinarily, jurisdiction over the question of attor
ney's fees is ancillary to jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a suit. See Sederquist v. Court, 861 F.2d 554, 557 (9th
Cir. 1988)
the funds in our custody. Second, we do
not believe that application of the common fund doctrine
applies to our rulemakings. Third, we believe that an
award to Zimsky would be inequitable.
I. Court Jurisdiction
27. Ordinarily, jurisdiction over the question of attor
ney's fees is ancillary to jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a suit. See Sederquist v. Court, 861 F.2d 554, 557 (9th
Cir. 1988). Thus, attorney's fees may be awarded where
litigation "has conferred a substantial benefit on members
of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award
that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among
them." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394
(1970), cited in, Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478.
(Emphasis added.) See also Weinberger v. Great Northern
Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 523 (1st Cir. 1991); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 320
(D.C. Cir. 1975) ("The award of attorney's fees is not a
separate claim for relief requiring an independent jurisdic-
tional base, but rather is an additional equitable remedy
which under appropriate conditions can be awarded to the
prevailing party"). Accord, Washington Gas Light Co. v.
3241

FCC 94-179
Federal Communications Commission Record
9 FCC Red No. IS
Baker, 195 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (court has equi
table power to award attorney's fees from funds under its
control during a suit).
28. In his pleadings before the District Court, Zimsky
argued that an action for attorney's fees could be brought
independently of a suit on the merits, a contention rejected
by the court in Sederquist. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4-5,
8-9. The cases he cites, however, such as Laffeny v. Hum
phrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 355 U.S.
869 (1957), were not in fact independent, but arose from
related suits on the merits. See Clackamas County, Oregon
V. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D C. Cir. 1954). See also National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers v
ected
by the court in Sederquist. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4-5,
8-9. The cases he cites, however, such as Laffeny v. Hum
phrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 355 U.S.
869 (1957), were not in fact independent, but arose from
related suits on the merits. See Clackamas County, Oregon
V. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D C. Cir. 1954). See also National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Mathews,
546 F.2d 1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 431
"U.S. 954 (1977) (explaining Lafferty). Moreover, the Su
preme "Court has cautioned that requests for attorney's
fees should not result in a second major litigation. Hensley
V. Eckerhardt, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). This would nec
essarily be the result where, as here, a litigant brought an
independent suit for attorney's fees after participating be
fore a forum that had no power to award such fees.
2. Applicability of the Common Fund Doctrine to
Rulcmaklngs
29. Opposing Comments. The commenters assert that the
common fund doctrine does not apply to rulemakings,
such as this one. Coalition Comments at 2-3; North Pointe
Comments at 3-5; Coughlin Reply Comments at 3; FRAC
Reply Comments at 2. They assert that the common fund
doctrine was intended to recognize instances in which a
party prosecuted litigation to vindicate the private rights of
a class of beneficiaries. According to these commenters,
Zimsky's participation in this rulemaking does not fall
within that rationale because the rulemaking was directed
to making a policy decision in the publie interest and not
to vindicating private rights. In their view, the creation of
the refunds was purely incidental to the public interest
function of the rulemaking.
30. Zimsky's Reply. Zimsky denies that the relevant ac
tion here should be considered a rulemaking. He contends
that the order which created the refunds should be char
acterized as an adjudication. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 10.
31. Discussion. In our view, the common fund doctrine
does not apply to our rulemakings
the refunds was purely incidental to the public interest
function of the rulemaking.
30. Zimsky's Reply. Zimsky denies that the relevant ac
tion here should be considered a rulemaking. He contends
that the order which created the refunds should be char
acterized as an adjudication. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 10.
31. Discussion. In our view, the common fund doctrine
does not apply to our rulemakings. Adjudications and
rulemakings have fundamentally different characters. Adju
dications are concerned with the determination of past and
present rights and liabilities. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc. V. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
370-71 (1989). See also Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act at 14. Rulemaking, on the
other hand, is essentially legislative in nature, not only
because it operates in the future but also because it is
primarily concerned with policy considerations. Id. In
making such policy decisions, such as the appropriate
IVDS filing fee, the Commission expects to receive and
assimilate public comment representing diverse stakes in
making its public interest determinations. Under these cir
cumstances, there is no justification for considering a par
ticular participant as entitled to special reimbursement.
We are concerned that application of the common fund
doctrine to Commission rulemakings would simply burden
those proceedings with questions of whether a party's posi
tion in the rulemaking established a compensable claim.
Indeed, as some commenters suggest, it might encourage
participation in rulemakings by speculators hoping to
claim attorney's fees.
32. We reject Zimsky's assertion that the order mandat
ing refunds should be considered adjudicatory and thus
distinct from the rulemaking. Zimsky's petition sought re
consideration of an action revising the Commission's rules
to establish a filing fee for IVDS. The refund of fees
already collected was purely incidental to the eventual
modification of the rule
tors hoping to
claim attorney's fees.
32. We reject Zimsky's assertion that the order mandat
ing refunds should be considered adjudicatory and thus
distinct from the rulemaking. Zimsky's petition sought re
consideration of an action revising the Commission's rules
to establish a filing fee for IVDS. The refund of fees
already collected was purely incidental to the eventual
modification of the rule. Zimsky's petition did not seek
refunds, as his clients, who did not submit the $1,400 filing
fee, were not entitled to any. Indeed, if Zimsky had sought
reconsideration of the original action which instituted the
$1,400 fee (instead of the order reaffirming the fee) there
would have been no refunds, because the Commission
would not yet have collected any fees.
3. The Equities of this Case
33. Opposing Comments. Numerous commenters contend
that a common fund award to Zimsky would be inequi
table. Advanee MobilComm Comments at 1; Been Com
ments at 1-2; Chinese American Comments at 1; FRAC
Comments at 5-7, 10-13; Holt Comments at 1; ICC Com
ments at 3-7; InterVision Comments at 1; Coalition Com
ments at 6-10; Kumari Comments at 1-2; Magnolia
Comments at 1; Shadowfax Comments at 5-9; Sharma
Comments at 1-2; Ashu Vashisht Comments at 1-2; Naresh
^ The only case that Zimsky cites in which a court — not itself
having decided the merits of a case — found an administrative
agency liable to pay attorney's fees under the common fund
doctrine is an intermediate state court case. Taylor v. State
Universities Retirement System, 560 N.E.2d 893 (111. App. 1990).
There, the court overturned the denial of attorney's fees by the
Illinois State University Retirement System (SURS) to an attor
ney who had obtained disability benefits for his client from
which SURS was able to recoup payments it made to the client.
The court's holding rests on legal principles inapplicable here.
The ruling that SURS could be required to pay attorney's fees
is directly contrary to federal law discussed at paragraph 21,
supra
rney's fees by the
Illinois State University Retirement System (SURS) to an attor
ney who had obtained disability benefits for his client from
which SURS was able to recoup payments it made to the client.
The court's holding rests on legal principles inapplicable here.
The ruling that SURS could be required to pay attorney's fees
is directly contrary to federal law discussed at paragraph 21,
supra. Moreover, SURS's obligation to make a common fund
award arose because it was a beneficiary of the attorney's efforts
in the same position as a private insuror, not — as is the FCC --
a stakeholder.
® The D.C. Circuit has held that:
One who is influential in litigation leading to the
announcement of a rule of law does not thereby gain a
right of compensation from all those who benefit from
the application of the rule.
The assertion of a noncontractual claim for compensation
for services rendered in sponsoring favorable legislation
does not deserve prolonged discussion.
Whittier v. Emmet, 281 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert, denied,
364 U.S. 935 (1961). Zimsky cites no case in which the common
fund doctrine has been applied to a rulemaking proceeding.
Indeed, one of his cases, Best v. California Apprenticeship Coun
cil, 193 Ca. App.3d 1448, 1456 (1987), indicates that the doctrine
does not apply to quasi-legislative proceedings.
3242

9 FCC Red No. 15
Federal Communications Commission Record
FCC 94-179
Vashisht Comments at 1-2; Vintage Comments at 1; Alli
ance Reply Comments at 2-4; Coughlin Reply comments at
1-4; FRAC Reply Comments at 2-3; ICC Reply Comments
at 2-4; ITV Reply Comments at 2-4; North Pointe Reply
Comments at 2-3; Osborn Reply Comments at 1, attach
ment.' They urge that Zimsky did not represent them and
that his actions did not benefit them.'" They observe that,
unlike Zimsky's clients, they did not dispute the validity of
the original $1,400 filing fee, which they suggest had the
beneficial effect of discouraging the filing of speculative
applications
ly Comments at 2-4; North Pointe Reply
Comments at 2-3; Osborn Reply Comments at 1, attach
ment.' They urge that Zimsky did not represent them and
that his actions did not benefit them.'" They observe that,
unlike Zimsky's clients, they did not dispute the validity of
the original $1,400 filing fee, which they suggest had the
beneficial effect of discouraging the filing of speculative
applications. E.g., Coalition Comments at 6-8; Shadowfax
Comments at 6-8. They argue that the applicants entitled to
refunds and Zimsky's clients constitute two distinct and
adverse classes. Id. According to these commenters,
Zimsky's clients benefited by being reinstated, while the
applicants entitled to refunds were harmed by increased
competition and delay caused by Zimsky's efforts. Addi
tionally, they argue that in view of the limited nature of
Zimsky's participation — the filing of a single petition for
reconsideration - the award claimed by Zimsky represents
an unjustifiable windfall rather than reasonable reimburse
ment.
34. Zimsky's Reply. Zimsky responds that the applicants
have no cause to oppose his request for attorney's fees.
Zimsky Reply Comments at 2-4. In his view, what is
relevant is that he prosecuted a meritorious action result
ing in the creation of a fund and therefore has a claim for
attorney's fees against the fund. Zimsky attributes the ap
plicants' opposition to his claim to their interest in receiv
ing the full amount of the refunds. Because of the
applicants' "intransigence." Zimsky submits that a neutral
third party should resolve his claim.
35. Discussion. We disagree with Zimsky's contention
that awarding him attorney's fees is necessary to prevent
the unjust enrichment of the applicants entitled to refunds.
On the contrary, we agree with the commenters that an
award of attorney's fees would unjustly enrich Zimsky.
First, Zimsky has not shown that it would be equitable to
treat him as having represented the applicants entitled to
refunds
iscussion. We disagree with Zimsky's contention
that awarding him attorney's fees is necessary to prevent
the unjust enrichment of the applicants entitled to refunds.
On the contrary, we agree with the commenters that an
award of attorney's fees would unjustly enrich Zimsky.
First, Zimsky has not shown that it would be equitable to
treat him as having represented the applicants entitled to
refunds. Second, an award of the magnitude sought by
Zimsky would be an unreasonable windfall.
36. In our view, it would be inequitable to award Zimsky
attorney's fees from the refunds unless, as a matter of
equity, he filed his petition for reconsideration on behalf of
the applicants entitled to refunds. This follows from the
relation of the common fund doctrine to the theory of
quantum meruit." See Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64
(3rd Cir. 1982). Recovery under a theory of quantum
meruit requires that services were accepted and enjoyed by
the person sought to be charged under circumstances that
provided reasonable notice that the person furnishing the
services expected, in so doing, to be paid. See In re San
Juan DuPoni Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 768 F. Supp. 912,
924 n.43.
37. Courts have applied the common fund doctrine con
sistent with this principle. Thus, the Supreme Court noted
in a case where claims were filed which benefited creditors
that: "they had notice by the bill, that suit was brought not
exclusively for the benefit of the complainants therein, but
equally for those of the same class who should come in
and contribute to the expenses of the litigation." Central
Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Petttis, 113 U.S. 116,
126-27 (1885). Here, Zimsky makes no claim that he for
mally sought to represent the applicants entitled to refunds.
38
notice by the bill, that suit was brought not
exclusively for the benefit of the complainants therein, but
equally for those of the same class who should come in
and contribute to the expenses of the litigation." Central
Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Petttis, 113 U.S. 116,
126-27 (1885). Here, Zimsky makes no claim that he for
mally sought to represent the applicants entitled to refunds.
38. In a case in which the party seeking a common fund
award did not sue in a formal, representative capacity,'^ the
court explained the equitable considerations that apply in
such a case:
Whether one professes to sue representatively or for
mally makes a fund available for others may, of
course, be a relevant circumstance in making the
fund liable for his costs in producing it. But when
such a fund is for all practical purposes created for
the benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation
- the absence of an avowed class suit . . . hardly
touch the power of equity in doing justice as between
a party and the beneficiaries of the litigation. . . .
And so, [the relation of the party and the benefi
ciaries of the litigation) must enter into the ultimate
judgment of the District Court as to the fairness of
making an award, or the extent of such award . . . .
In any event such allowances are appropriate only in
exceptional cases and only for dominating reasons of
justice.
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. at 167. We do
not read the court to say, as Zimsky would have it, that
any time a party's litigation incidently benefits others, a
common fund award is appropriate. Rather, we understand
the court to mean that ~ in the absence of formal repre
sentation - a common fund award would be appropriate
only when the relationship between the litigant and the
beneficiaries raises strong equities for treating the litigant as
acting for the benefit of the others
ld have it, that
any time a party's litigation incidently benefits others, a
common fund award is appropriate. Rather, we understand
the court to mean that ~ in the absence of formal repre
sentation - a common fund award would be appropriate
only when the relationship between the litigant and the
beneficiaries raises strong equities for treating the litigant as
acting for the benefit of the others. We consider this en
tirely consistent with our understanding of the principles
of quantum meruit, as described above ~ which require
fair notice to the beneficiaries that services are being
rendered on their behalf.
39. We see nothing in the circumstances in which
Zimsky filed his petition for reconsideration that would
have put the applicants on notice that he was acting on
their behalf. Nothing in his petition indicates that he was
' Numerous other reply comments also took this position.
They assert that they were satisfied with the ,$1,400 fee, that
Zimsky did not represent them, and that Zimsky's efforts have
been to the detriment of the applicants entitled refunds and to
the IVDS industry.
One commenter accuses Zimsky of engaging in "greenmail."
FRAC Comments at 3-5.
" The expression quantum meruit means "as much as he
deserves." Under this doctrine, a person who benefits from the
labor and materials of another should not be unjustly enriched.
Rather, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount
for the labor and materials furnished, even in the absence of a
specific contract. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litigation, 768 F. Supp. 912, 924 n.43 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
In that case, a party, as the beneficiary of a trust fund,
brought an action against banks in receivership to establish a
lien against the banks' assets. As a consequence of stare decisis,
the party's claim necessarily established the claims of other,
similarly situated, beneficiaries of the trust fund
e San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litigation, 768 F. Supp. 912, 924 n.43 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
In that case, a party, as the beneficiary of a trust fund,
brought an action against banks in receivership to establish a
lien against the banks' assets. As a consequence of stare decisis,
the party's claim necessarily established the claims of other,
similarly situated, beneficiaries of the trust fund. The court did
not rule on whether a common fund award should be made in
that case, but held that a District Court erred in refusing even
to entertain a petition for an award of attorney's fees.
3243

FCC 94-179
Federal Communications Commission Record
9 FCC Red No. 15
acting other than for his clients.'^ As the commenters point
out, there is no reason to believe that those applicants who
did not dispute the validity of the $1,400 filing fee sup
ported Zimsky's attempt to seek reconsideration or consid
ered his efforts beneficial. Indeed, as the commenters also
point out, Zimsky's clients, who refused to pay the $1,400
filing fee represent a class distinct from those who did pay,
and the interests of the two groups may be adverse. In
short, we find it equitable to treat Zimsky's petition for
reconsideration as having been filed only for the benefit of
his own clients.''^
40. As an additional matter, we do not believe that
Zimsky has demonstrated that his claim of 20-30 percent of
the refunds — between $1,126,398 and $1,689,597 — repre
sents a reasonable attorney's fee, as required under the
common fund doctrine. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemen, 444
U.S. at 478; Swedish Hospiial Corp. v. Shaiala, 1 F.3d 1261.
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also In re THC Financial Corp.
Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 721, 738 (D. Hawaii 1980) (the reality
and appearance of windfall fees should be avoided)."
41. Zimsky's principle argument for claiming 20-30
percent of the refunds is that such a figure is typical of
common fund awards in class action suits See Swedish
Hospital, 1 F.3d at 1272. Here, however
v. Shaiala, 1 F.3d 1261.
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also In re THC Financial Corp.
Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 721, 738 (D. Hawaii 1980) (the reality
and appearance of windfall fees should be avoided)."
41. Zimsky's principle argument for claiming 20-30
percent of the refunds is that such a figure is typical of
common fund awards in class action suits See Swedish
Hospital, 1 F.3d at 1272. Here, however. Zimsky's limited
participation in the IVDS proceeding is so obviously dif
ferent from full-blown class action litigation that this
precedent provides no guidance as to the reasonableness of
his claim." Compare Trustees v. Greenotigh, 105 U.S. 527,
532 (1882) (common fund award made to compensate
party pursuing litigation benefiting others "at great expense
and trouble"). Although Zimsky goes to some lengths to
document the labor and expertise he applied in preparing
his petition for reconsideration, we agree with the
commenters that these seem no different from those repre
sented by pleadings typically filed on behalf of specific
clients in proceedings such as the IVDS rulemaking. Com
pare Cosgrove v. Sullivan, 759 F. Supp. 166, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (attorney's fees reflect "the extremely high quality of
legal services rendered").
42. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that we have
no authority to find that Zimsky is entitled to attorney's
fees for his participation in the IVDS proceeding. We
therefore find no basis to initiate an interpleader action or
to withhold full refunds from the IVDS applicants (except
as may be appropriate in light of the pendency of judicial
proceedings involving this issue).
VI. ORDER
43. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, That the Mo
tion for Declaratory Ruling, filed February 24, 1994, by
William E. Zimsky IS DENIED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Caton
Acting Secretary
APPENDIX
The following comments were received:
1. Advanced MobileComm, Inc.
2. Ouentin L. Breen (2 applicants)
3. Chinese American Investment Group Partnership
4
eedings involving this issue).
VI. ORDER
43. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, That the Mo
tion for Declaratory Ruling, filed February 24, 1994, by
William E. Zimsky IS DENIED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Caton
Acting Secretary
APPENDIX
The following comments were received:
1. Advanced MobileComm, Inc.
2. Ouentin L. Breen (2 applicants)
3. Chinese American Investment Group Partnership
4. Fee Refund Action Committee (FRAC)
(74 applicants)
5. Florida MIVS Corp.
6. Phillip C. Holt
7. Independent Cellular Consultants (ICC)
(not an applicant)
8. InterVision United Partnership and
InterVision Two
9. IVDS Applicants Coalition (Coalition)
(43 applicants)
10. Ramesh Kumari
11. Donald J. Kunkle
12. Magnolia Communications
13. Mercury Datanet
14. North Pointe Development Corporation et al.
(5 applicants)
15. Shadowfax Cellular Partnership et al.
(27 applicants)
See also paragraph 33, supra.
See .American Association of .Marriage and Family Coun
selors, Inc. V. Brown. 593 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (no
common fund award where attorney's clients were the primary
beneficiaries of litigation and fully capable of bearing the costs,
and where the interests of the clients were not "reasonably
close" to the interests of the alleged beneficiaries). Accord. Jett
V. .Merchants and Planters Bank, 228 P.2d 156, 158 (4th Cir.
1955) (no compelling equities for shifting attorney's fees where
the attorney's efforts were directed to securing his own client's
claims and others benefited incidently).
"
Courts have found it relevant that class members support
the reasonableness a fee determination. See Swedish Hospital, 1
P.3d at 1272. The commenters report that Zimsky attempted to
solicit support for his proposal and supplied draft comments for
them to submit. See ICC Comments, Appendix A, B. Only one
applicant endorsed Zimsky's draft comments, while over 400
joined in comments opposing Zimsky
Courts have found it relevant that class members support
the reasonableness a fee determination. See Swedish Hospital, 1
P.3d at 1272. The commenters report that Zimsky attempted to
solicit support for his proposal and supplied draft comments for
them to submit. See ICC Comments, Appendix A, B. Only one
applicant endorsed Zimsky's draft comments, while over 400
joined in comments opposing Zimsky.
"
Por example, in Swedish Hospital, where the court found an
award of $2,000,000 (20 percent of the fund) reasonable, the
attorney's lodestar (hours reasonably spent times reasonable
hourly rate) was approximately $619,000. 1 P.3d at 1263-64,
1272. Similarly, in Bebchick r. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Commission, 805 P.2d 396, 403-07 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the
court approved an award of $1,675,000 (25 percent of the fund),
where the lodestar was $953,480 (based on 6,053 billable hours).
Here, Zimsky has not attempted to establish his lodestar. How
ever, the commenters suggest that a fee of $10,000-$20,000
would be more than generous for preparing Zimsky's petition
for reconsideration, making Zimsky's claim, at minimum, 56 to
169 times his lodestar. PRAC Comments at 13; Shadowfax Com
ments at 9. Accordingly, regardless of whether a percentage-
of-the-fund aoproach is generally appropriate, the apparent
disparity between the amount of Zimsky's claim and the cus
tomary fee raises serious questions of whether it would be
reasonable here.
3244
Zimsky's petition
for reconsideration, making Zimsky's claim, at minimum, 56 to
169 times his lodestar. PRAC Comments at 13; Shadowfax Com
ments at 9. Accordingly, regardless of whether a percentage-
of-the-fund aoproach is generally appropriate, the apparent
disparity between the amount of Zimsky's claim and the cus
tomary fee raises serious questions of whether it would be
reasonable here.
3244

9 FCC Red No. 15
Federal Communications Commission Record
FCC 94-179
16. Romesh K. Sharma
17. Ashu Vashisht
18. Naresh K. Vashisht
19. Vintage Communications
.17
The following reply commments were received:
1. A.G. Allebach, Inc.
2. Marlene Abe
3. Leslie L. Alexander
4. American IVD Communications
5. Robert Ancha and Ed Van Drunen
6. Annie B. Evans Irrevocable Trust G
7. Anza Communications
8. Anza Communications III
9. Applicants' Alliance for Licensing Fairness (Alli
ance) (4 applicants)
10. James Anning
11. Garrett H. Arizala
12. Gary H. Arizala
13. Kyle Hitoshi Arizala
14. Avanti Communications
15. Avanti Communications III
16. Ax Information Services
17. Harvey Babbitt
18. Diana M. Bailey
19. John V. Bailliet
20. Ball &
Jacobi
21. Belle M. Beem Trust
22. Robert Bitton
23. Murray L. Black.
24. Tom Blady
25. Block Television Incorporated
26. Jeffrey M. Blunt
27. Carl L. Boschult, M.D.
28. Paul D. Boschult
29. Art Boroughs
30. Harold L. Brake
31. Rosita Brandwyn
32. Hayo Broers
33. C&L TV Partnership
34. Robert R. Cak
35. David E. Carlson
36. John M. Carlson, Jr.
37. Roger L. Carpenter
38. James P. Cate
39. Kent Charugundia
40. Derwood Sumner Chase, III et al.
41. Abbas A. Chothia
42. Ed Christie
43. John T. Clarno
44. Dr. Fred A. Clifton
45. Laura Coffey
46. Alden L. Coke
47. Collin Piano General Partnership
48. Eugene R. Connor
49. Corcil Industries
50. The Coughlin Group
51. Carolyn A. Crane
52. Walter W. Cruttenden
53. Lori Czapinski
54. D.A.B.B. Partners
55. Sandra H. Darling
56. DCRM Partners
57. James L. De Guehery
58. Ann G. Deveny
59. Hugh O. Deweese
60. Neal S. Dixon
61. Dolphin Industries
62. James N
Dr. Fred A. Clifton
45. Laura Coffey
46. Alden L. Coke
47. Collin Piano General Partnership
48. Eugene R. Connor
49. Corcil Industries
50. The Coughlin Group
51. Carolyn A. Crane
52. Walter W. Cruttenden
53. Lori Czapinski
54. D.A.B.B. Partners
55. Sandra H. Darling
56. DCRM Partners
57. James L. De Guehery
58. Ann G. Deveny
59. Hugh O. Deweese
60. Neal S. Dixon
61. Dolphin Industries
62. James N. Doolittle
63. Susan M. Downing
64. Thomas T. Dunbar
65. Edward D. McDade Revocable Trust
66. Edward W. Norris Limited Partnership
67. Gregory A. Ekbom
68. Ellis Communications
69. Enakee Partnership
70. Margaretha K. Enderle
71. Robert S. Erwin
72. Essex Family Trust
73. Family Alliance
74. Federal IVD
75. Fee Refund Action Committee
76. Leland E. Finley
77. Jerome M. Fisher
78. Fortuna Communications
79. Forrest Freid
Some of the reply comments were late-filed. However, con
sideration of these brief pleadings will not be disruptive, and
they are accepted. Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of
Time, filed March 31, 1994, by Independent Cellular Consul
tants is dismissed as moot.
3245

FCC 94-179
Federal Communications Commission Record
9 FCC Red No. 15
80. Garland Partners
81. Marguerite Geckler
82. GFTV Partners
83. John T.R. Gillespie
84. Stephen L. Gimbert
85. Wesley L. Gingrich
86. Norman Gorlatz
87. Jan B. Green
88. Jay R. Greider, Jr.
89. Michael J. Gunning
90. Mark D. Hafermann
91. Richard A. Halpern
92. David V. Harmsen
93. Timothy P. Hartley
94. Everett Hartman
95. Jeanne U. Hartman
96. John W. Havranek
97. Hersperger, Sellers, Preisler & Lynn Partnership
98. Karl W. Hinkle (Mercury Datanet)
99. Nathan E. Hodges
100. Troy Hodges
101. Robert T. Hollingsworth, Jr.
102. Rene Horwick
103. The Hoseck Corporation
104. Adrian O. Hubbell
105. Independent Cellular Consultants
106. InteracTiVision, Inc.
107. Interactive Frequencies Partnership
108. Interactive Video Investments, Inc.
109. Roland N. Icke
110. ITV, Inc.
111. I YDS Systems
112. Roy L. Jacobs
113. Marjorie H. Jantzen
114
y Datanet)
99. Nathan E. Hodges
100. Troy Hodges
101. Robert T. Hollingsworth, Jr.
102. Rene Horwick
103. The Hoseck Corporation
104. Adrian O. Hubbell
105. Independent Cellular Consultants
106. InteracTiVision, Inc.
107. Interactive Frequencies Partnership
108. Interactive Video Investments, Inc.
109. Roland N. Icke
110. ITV, Inc.
111. I YDS Systems
112. Roy L. Jacobs
113. Marjorie H. Jantzen
114. Jermiah Chavoen Limited Partnership
115. Wayne C. Johnson
116. Patricia J. Jordan
117. John J. Carney, Joseph D. Carney, John Mineo
& Associates
118. JRV Partnership
119. Darrell Kammer
120. Kala and Leka Karn Partnership
121. Peter Karis
122. Ernest N. Kaye
123. E.G. Kellum
124. Robert E. Kellum
125. Marguerite Keuchkerian
126. Frank B. Kimball
127. Cecil W. King, Sr.
128. Marie S. Kippels
129. Koller Chemical Partners
130. Alois J. Kosch
131. Raveesh K. Kumra
132. Kuravilla Kurien
133. Mani A. Kurien
134. Sosa Kurien
135. Laguardia Partnership
136. Laura Lapa
137. Paul Lapa
138. J.F. Lapinski &
Associates
139. William L. Larson
140. Robert Larsell
141. Laubheim Partnership
142. James Lawrence III
143. Wayne Lebsack
144. Leon M. Le Faivre
145. Michael Le Faivre
146. Jon T. Leffingwell
147. T.J. Leffingwell
148. Liberty Communications Partnership
149. Warren T. Linney
150. Joe D. Long
151. Ronald H. Little
152. Walter Lowman
153. Lyon Communications
154. Lyon Communications III
155. Robert Lyons
156. M&J Partners
157. Maxon Partners
158. Susan D. McCall and Kim A. Kitzke
159. John McLaren
160. Media Data Partners
161. Charles M. Michel
162. Mario Meola
163. Patricia Meola
164. A1 Minkoff
165. William W. Moake
166. Edmund J. Mooney
167. John Montfort
168. Marshall L. Morgan
169. William G. Morgan
170. Philip M. Morris
171. MRD Partnership
172. David J. Myers
173. David Nagradsky
3246
Lyons
156. M&J Partners
157. Maxon Partners
158. Susan D. McCall and Kim A. Kitzke
159. John McLaren
160. Media Data Partners
161. Charles M. Michel
162. Mario Meola
163. Patricia Meola
164. A1 Minkoff
165. William W. Moake
166. Edmund J. Mooney
167. John Montfort
168. Marshall L. Morgan
169. William G. Morgan
170. Philip M. Morris
171. MRD Partnership
172. David J. Myers
173. David Nagradsky
3246

9 FCC Red No. 15
Federal Communications Commission Record
FCC 94-179
174. Nagrodsky Partnership (5 applicants)'®
175. Namaqua Limited Partnership
176. National Interactive Services
177. National IVD Organization
178. Nationwide Communications
179. Felix and Maria T. Norat
180. North Pointe Development Corporation et al.
181. Charles L. Nyman
182. Leiand O. Nyman
183. James J. O Connell
184. John A. Ohlsson
185. George Onaga
186. Steven K. Osborn
187. James E. Oxner
188. P&P Investments
189. Thomas L. Pedersen
190. J. Allen Petersen
191. Dale L. Phillips
192. Kai H. Pihl
193. Emma M. Pinkston
194. Sidney E. Pinkston
195. H. George Pires
196. James W. Popa
197. Wanda Preisler
198. Primrose Partners Limited Partnership
199. Progressive Communications, Inc.
200. Denis A. Radefeld
201. Jeffrey K. Ramsey
202. Jill D. Ramsey
203. Kelly G. Ramsey
204. Kenneth L. Ramsey
205. Scott Ramsey
206. Reading Broadcasting, Inc.
207. John R. Redmond
208. Robin C.A. Rice
209. Tracy R. Richardson
210. Richardson Family Trust
211. Audrey Rietveld
212. Roam Dublin Television
213. M.K. Robbs
214. Stanley B. Roberson
215. Dean M. Rockey
216. Romulus Telecommunications, Inc.
217. Ronald L. Kushner Limited Partnership
218. James M. Ronning
219. Sharron Roth
220. Jill Rozeboom
221. Loren C. Rozeboom
222. RRS Partners
223. Gloria M. Ruggles
224. Jerry E. Ryan
225. H. Carl Ryberg
226. S&W Associates
227. Alice Sage-Pulver
228. Leo J. Santucci
229. Douglas J. Schneider
230. James J. Schneider
231. Mark W. Scott
232. Gary Scholten
233. Samuel Schwartz
234. Robert L. Seaman
235. Ronald C. Sheff
236. Gary T. Shelford
237. John Sheppard
238
219. Sharron Roth
220. Jill Rozeboom
221. Loren C. Rozeboom
222. RRS Partners
223. Gloria M. Ruggles
224. Jerry E. Ryan
225. H. Carl Ryberg
226. S&W Associates
227. Alice Sage-Pulver
228. Leo J. Santucci
229. Douglas J. Schneider
230. James J. Schneider
231. Mark W. Scott
232. Gary Scholten
233. Samuel Schwartz
234. Robert L. Seaman
235. Ronald C. Sheff
236. Gary T. Shelford
237. John Sheppard
238. Sierra Land Group, Inc.
239. Michael 1. Sigesmund
240. John I. Simmons
241. Cody L. Smith
242. Anton Smutko
243. Samuel J. Smyth
244. David G. Stanley, M.D.
245. Robert T. Steller
246. Andrew C. Stenhouse, M.D.
247. Michael E. Suenram
248. K.P. Sukumaran
249. Sunset Instates Ltd.
250. David F. Swain
251. E. Michael Thomas Jr.
252. Thomas J. Reese 111 Partnership
253. Dewey H. Thornton.
254. Randy Toyoshima
255. TV Programs
256. Michael A. Truppo
257. Sharon Turner
258. Karla Vallance
259. S.A. Vallance
260. Peter J. Vaglica
261. Van A Partnership
Reply comments were received from Allison Ehrling,
George Nagrodsky, Sr., George D. Nagrodsky, Jill Nagrodsky,
and Richard Nagrodsky.
3247

FCC 94-179
Federal Communications Commission Record
9 fcc Red No. is
262. J. Spencer Van Alsburg
263. Edward Van Drunen
264. Vista IVDS Partners
265. Gary Vlahovich
266. Darla J. Warner
267. Lincoln A. Warrell
268. Curt A. Weiland
269. William M. Wendell
270. Wildflower Ltd.
271. Joseph W. Wimsatt
272. David L. Williams
273. Greg Winters
274. Albert C. Worner
275. Wunschel Law Firm, P.C.
276. Yankee IVDS Partnership
277. Frank M. Verger
278. Luke E. Yip
279. William E. Zimsky
280. Gary R. Zipper
281. Roberta Zipper
3248

## Nearby sections

- [DA-00-1341: A&E Television Networks For Declaratory Ruling (06/20/00) A&E Television Networks For Declaratory Ruling](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_00_1341.md)
- [DA-01-2234: Request for Declaratory Ruling Removing the Commission's Minimum Carrier Tone Requirement for OFDM Modulation in the Multipoint Distribution and Instructional Television Fixed Services (09/26/01) Request for Declaratory Ruling Removing the Commission's Minimum Carrier Tone Requirement for OFDM Modulation in the Multipoint Distribution and Instructional Television Fixed Services](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_01_2234.md)
- [DA-01-2871: Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan (12/11/01) Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_01_2871.md)
- [DA-02-765: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS AND ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS' EMERGENCY PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OR CLARIFICATION OF BROADCAST CARRIAGE RULES FOR SATELLITE CARRIERS, 47 C.F.R. SECTION 76.66 (04/04/02) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS AND ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS' EMERGENCY PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OR CLARIFICATION OF BROADCAST CARRIAGE RULES FOR SATELLITE CARRIERS, 47 C.F.R. SECTION 76.66](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_02_765.md)
- [DA-02-2078: Time-Telepictures Television (08/26/02) Time-Telepictures Television](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_02_2078.md)
- [DA-03-2865: INFINITY BROADCASTING OPERATIONS INC (09/09/03) INFINITY BROADCASTING OPERATIONS INC](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_03_2865.md)
- [DA-03-4108: Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Petition for Revocation of Certification Request for Expedited Consideration (01/06/04) Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Petition for Revocation of Certification Request for Expedited Consideration](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_03_4108.md)
- [DA-04-970: List of Foreign Telecommunications Carriers that Are Presumed to Possess Market Power in Foreign Telecommunications Markets (04/08/04) List of Foreign Telecommunications Carriers that Are Presumed to Possess Market Power in Foreign Telecommunications Markets](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_04_970.md)
- [DA-04-3201: Amendment of the Commission's Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies (10/06/04) Amendment of the Commission's Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_04_3201.md)
- [DA-04-3576: Thrifty Call, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning BellSouth Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 (11/12/04) Thrifty Call, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning BellSouth Tariff F.C.C. No. 1](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_04_3576.md)
- [DA-05-140: Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities (01/26/05) Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_05_140.md)
- [DA-05-148: CLARIFICATION OF RECONSIDERATION PERIOD AND EFFECTIVE DATE FOR TERMINATIONS OF WIRELESS RADIO SERVICE AUTHORIZATIONS (01/21/05) CLARIFICATION OF RECONSIDERATION PERIOD AND EFFECTIVE DATE FOR TERMINATIONS OF WIRELESS RADIO SERVICE AUTHORIZATIONS](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_05_148.md)
- [DA-05-1618: Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (06/09/05) Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_05_1618.md)
- [DA-05-1667: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (06/15/05) Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991](https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_DA_05_1667.md)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/statutes/FCC_FCC_94_179. Check the current official text before relying on it. Not legal advice.