# The following civil case summaries include decisions in which the Court discussed substantive legal issues, and (2018)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/tribal%3Aho-chunk%3A14ff807006b3d983

## Record

- **Collection:** Tribal code
- **Document type:** Tribal code

## Text

The following civil case summaries include decisions in which the Court discussed substantive legal issues, and
excludes purely procedural and repetitive orders that retain little persuasive authority. The case summaries also exclude a
majority of child support, Child/Incompetent Trust Fund releases, and civil garnishment decisions, but these orders appear
within other compilations. Furthermore, the public may access all non-confidential orders through direct access to the case file.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion, judgment or order of the Court, but has been prepared by the Staff
Attorney of the Judiciary for the purpose of facilitating research on various topics. Individuals should not rely upon the below
summaries, but rather utilize the summaries as a starting point to further research. Judicial staff will assist in retrieval of the full
opinions upon request.
HO-CHUNK NATION TRIAL COURT
1995 OPINIONS
Case No.

Case

Decided

CV-95-003
CV-95-004
CV-95-005
CV-95-006
CV-95-009
CV-95-010

Joyce Warner v. Ho-Chunk Election Board
ORDER (SCHEDULING CONFERENCE)
Election challenge on denial of absentee ballot; President elect participated as a defendantintervenor for issues affecting the Presidential election only. Defendant’s Motion to Recuse
Judge was denied due to lack of personal or direct financial interest. The Judge has no
immediate family involved and will not benefit from per capita distribution campaign.
Cases were consolidated due to similarity of issues and judicial economy.

June 26, 1995

CV 95-03, CV 95-10

Joyce Warner and others v. Ho-Chunk Election Board
ORDER (Allow Appearances by Counsel)

CV-95-003
CV-95-004
CV-95-005
CV-95-006
CV-95-009
CV-95-010

Joyce Warner v. Ho-Chunk Election Board
ORDER (Granting Stay)
Election dispute

Trial court has jurisdiction;

Petitioner must prove Election Board violated the Election Ordinance or
conducted an unfair election, and the outcome of the election could have been
different but for the violation;

Preliminary injunction requires: 1) no adequate remedy at law, 2) threatened injury
outweighs the threatened harm of the injunction, 3) petitioner has reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, and 4) serves the public interest;

Election challenge must be filed within ten days of certification of the election
results;

To issue a Stay of the swearing-in ceremony, the challengers of such election must
show: 1. there is no adequate remedy at law; 2. the threatened injury to the
challenger outweighs the threatened harm of the injunction; 3. the challengers
have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; 4. that the granting of the
stay serves the public interest.
Plaintiffs alleged irregular voting procedures and requested a stay. Plaintiffs’ challenged
the Election Board’s interpretation of the HCN CONSTITUTION requiring the President,
Legislators, and Supreme Court Justices be elected by majority vote of the eligible voters.
The challengers assert that some voters were denied the right to vote. Plaintiffs lacked an
adequate remedy at law because money cannot compensate the denial of a fundamental
right. The stay merely preserves the status quo, the harm of the stay would not outweigh
the harm to the challengers. Plaintiffs have a reasonable chance of success on the merits
because of a possible incorrect interpretation of the majority vote requirement. A Stay
ensures the candidates are sworn in legitimately.

July 3, 1995

CV-95-003

Joyce Warner v. Ho-Chunk Election Board
JUDGEMENT

Voting is a fundamental right;

July 5, 1995

Page 1 of 251



A restriction on the right to vote and exercise of the elective franchise will be
examined under the strict scrutiny;

The Election Ordinance’s ten day cut-off prior to the election for requesting
absentee ballots is unconstitutional;

The Government must use the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate
governmental end;

A plaintiff challenging an election must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the Election Board violated the Election Ordinance, or otherwise conducted
an unfair election, and that the outcome of the election would have been different.
Plaintiff claimed her right to vote had been denied. The Court held that her right had been
denied due to the unconstitutional cut-off time. Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof
that the Election board violated the Election Ordinance or conducted an unfair election.
Plaintiff was unable to show that her vote would have changed the outcome of the election.
Plaintiff’s appeal was denied.

CV-95-05

Jones v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board. & Lowe
JUDGEMENT

Election by majority vote;

Run-off Election Ordered;

Candidates for public office are not entitled to confidential information (e.g.,
mailing list) about members of the Ho-Chunk Nation as a matter of law;

Clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing on the part of a candidate must be
present for the Court to exclude such candidate from a run-off election;

The HCN CONSTITUTION requires the President to be elected by 50% or greater of
the votes cast in an election.
Plaintiff filed this election challenge alleging that the lack of a 50% or greater vote for
Chloris Lowe violated the HCN CONSTITUTION and that Lowe improperly used a mailing
list in his campaign. The use of the mailing list was not improper. Mr. Lowe had obtained
the list 12-14 years prior to the election, had subsequently updated it himself, the Nation
had not assisted him in obtaining the list, and the Election Board’s policy of not releasing
such lists had been applied equally to all candidates. Clear and convincing evidence did
not exist that the outcome of the election would have changed. Under the HCN
CONSTITUTION, the President must be elected by a 50% or greater of the votes cast.

July 6, 1995

CV-95-04

Robert Funmaker, Jr. v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board
JUDGEMENT

Right to vote was denied;

HCN CONSTITUTION, ART. V, § 6, requires a majority vote;

Under the HCN CONSTITUTION, Legislators must be elected by a 50% or greater
amount of the votes casts in their districts;

The denial of the right to vote, although a violation of the Constitution, does not
affect the validity of an election absent a showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the denied votes would have changed the outcome of the election.
Plaintiff challenged the election on the grounds that two voters had been denied the right to
vote. Absent clear and convincing evidence that these votes would have changed the
outcome, the election was valid. The Court ordered a run-off election between the plaintiff
and the top vote getter due to the Constitutional requirement that Legislators be elected by
a 50% or greater amount of the votes cast in their area.

July 6, 1995

CV-95-006

Janet Muir v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Bd.
JUDGEMENT

Violation of majority vote requirement;

The right to have one’s vote counted is fundamental and will not be taken away
for technicalities.
Plaintiff challenged the election. Plaintiff’s claim regarding “majority of eligible voters”

July 7, 1995

Page 2 of 251

means 50% or greater amount of the votes cast. Matter was remanded to the Election Board
for investigation on bias claim.
CV-95-10

Gail Funmaker v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Bd.
JUDGEMENT

Interpretation of “majority vote”;

Court has no authority to disqualify a candidate from an election;

A fine is the only remedy the Court may grant for improper conduct in the use of
official position to influence eligible voters;

The Election Board is a political sub-entity of the Ho-Chunk Nation, and is
immune from suit unless waived by the Legislature.
Plaintiff sued the HCN Election Board claiming that its interpretation of the HCN
CONSTITUTION requiring that Legislators be elected by majority vote of members in their
area, and alleging misuse of the Area V Office and mailing list. “Majority” means 50%
or more of the votes cast. The Election Board was not responsible for the potential misuse
of the Area V Office and mailing list. The Court may not disqualify a candidate for office.
Case remanded back to the Election Board to determine whether disqualification was
warranted because potential misuse. Monetary relief was denied, Court may impose fine.

July 7, 1995

CV-95-09

Dennis Funmaker and Wally Funmaker v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Bd.
JUDGEMENT

A “majority vote” is required under HCN CONSTITUTION, ART. VII, § 10;

Challengers must prove a violation by “clear and convincing evidence.”;
Furthermore, the alleged violation should be more than a mere technicality.
Plaintiffs challenge the election for an Associate Justice position. For this election only the
Constitution provides that the two candidates who receive the most votes will be assigned 4
and 2 year terms. After this election a majority of votes (more than 50% of the votes cast),
will be used to determine the winner of the election. Plaintiff was unable to prove
violations by the Election Board, rather he only presented mere technical concerns which
are not basis for the court to overturn a decision.

July 7, 1995

CV 95-10

Gail Funmaker v. Ho-Chunk Election Board
 The court will respectfully wait to make a decision until the Ho-Chunk Election Board
revises the Status Report.
In the case decided on July 7, 1995 the court asked the Election Board to conduct an
investigation before the court decided whether it shall levy a fine for election tampering
against Diane Lonetree in pursuant to 12 HCO § 12.01 (b). The Court feels that the Status
Report was not sufficient in answering the question above. Therefore, the court asked the
Election Board to clearly give a recommendation as to what action the court should take.
ORDER (Supplementary Status Report)

July 20, 1995

CV 95-12

Catherine Shegonee v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
 An appeal from the Ho-Chunk Gaming commission must first go to the Legislative
Secretary.
Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Gaming Ordinance of the Wisconsin Winnebago
Nation as amended 6-8-94, Sec.802A. , Plaintiff appealed to the Legislative Secretary on a
decision made by the Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission. However, the Legislature
apparently granted the Plaintiff the relief she requested (see, 5-31-95H). Therefore, since
the Trial Court was apparently no longer needed the case was dismissed.
DISMISSAL

Aug. 16, 1995

CV 95-14

Lisa Herman v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Dismissal
This case began as an appeal by the appellant from a decision of the Ho-Chunk Gaming
Commission temporarily suspending her. However, Ms. Herman was granted relief by
the predecessor to the Trial Court in Gaming appeals under 802A of the Gaming

Aug. 16, 1995

Page 3 of 251

Ordinance, i.e., Ho-Chunk Legislature. That resolution denominated 5-3-95C appears
to have granted Ms. Herman the relief she requested in her appeal. Therefore the Court
needs not to be involved in this matter any further.
CV-95-016

Tracy Thundercloud v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board
ORDER (Granting Preliminary Injunction)

HCN CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, § 8 allows any voter to file an election
dispute within ten days after the results of an election have been certified;

A preliminary injunction may be granted if: (1) no adequate remedy at law (money
will not cure harm), (2) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm of the
injunction, (3) the Challenger has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
and (4) granting of the injunction serve the public interest;

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy not to be issued lightly.
Plaintiff sued the HCN Election Board to prevent the swearing in of election winners as
required by the HCN CONSTITUTION. The preliminary injunction was granted on plaintiff’s
lack of an adequate remedy at law, the harm of the potential invalidation of Presidential
and Legislative action by a Constitutional challenge outweighed the harm of delaying the
swearing in, plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of success given the clear Constitutional
language in question, and the public interest is served by preserving the Constitutional
method and allowing time for meritorious challenges to be filed and decided before the
election winners takes office.

August
1995

PRC95-006

Clifford Riddle v. Ho-Chunk Nation: Rainbow Casino
JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff must demonstrate good cause to avoid dismissal of case for failure to
appear and prosecute;
Plaintiff failed to appear. Plaintiff did not ask for time-off because it would inconvenience
his new employer. Inconvenience does not meet the good cause requirement.

September 11,
1995

CV 95-07

Harry Cholka v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Order (Petition of Review)
The Court submits the entire pleading and record to the apellee to ensure the presence
of due process i.e., Notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Ed Cournoyer v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Order (Petition of Review)
The Court ordered that this case was going to be decided upon solely on the official record
since the appellant failed to send in a statement in support of the Petition.
Ray Brenny v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Administrative Order
The Court ordered that the appellant provide a copy of the cost that was imposed by the
Gaming Commission was paid.

Oct. 3, 1995

CV 95-15

Stephan J. Bremner v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Gaming Ordinance of the Wisconsin Winnebago
Nation as amended 6-8-94, Sec.802A. , Plaintiff (“Mr. Bremner”) appealed to the
Legislative Secretary on a decision made by the Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission. Mr.
Bremner failed to show to the Legislative Gaming Committee hearing. The Trial Court
gave notice to Mr. Bremner that he had 45 days from September 19,1995 to file a
statement with the Court stating why his case should be heard and not dismissed for failing
to appear to the Legislative Committee. Mr Bremner did not file a statement. Therefore, the
Court dismissed his case with prejudice.
JUDGMENT

Nov. 7, 1995

CV-95-013

Cournoyer v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
OPINION (Remanded aff’d in part rev’d in part)

The Court defers to the administrative expertise of the Gaming Commission in
reviewing its decision to levy a fine for non-disclosure of arrests;

December
1995

CV 95-13

CV 95-22

Page 4 of 251

28,

Oct. 4, 1995

Oct. 25, 1995

7,



Gaming Commission may levy a fine against non-key employees for nondisclosure of arrests;

Deference to administrative agency decisions requires the agency to explain its
decision in a rational and coherent manner that is supported by evidence and
linked to a specific power given to it by the Legislature.
Plaintiff appealed Gaming Commission decision levying a fine against him and banning
future advancement. Plaintiff did not contest the fine, and the Court upheld the authority of
the Gaming Commission to levy such fines when an employee fails to disclose a prior
arrest record. Issue of plaintiff’s advancement remanded due to inadequacy of the record
and contradictory findings of the Gaming Commission.

CV 95-07

Harry Cholka v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Order (Supplemental Record)
The Court ordered that the Commission supplement the record to include the missing
material or file an affidavit stating what notice there was to Mr. Cholka in the record.

Dec. 13, 1995

HO-CHUNK NATION TRIAL COURT
1996 OPINIONS
Case No.

Case

Decided

PRC93040

Lona Decorah v. Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Dismissing Case)

Motion to Reopen precluded by res judicata;

The decision of the Wisconsin Winnebago Personnel Review Commission
(WWPRC) was final and binding;

The WWPRC dismissed case for want of jurisdiction in 1994;

Plaintiff received compensation for wrongful termination. The compensation, per
the terms of the agreement, served as a “full and fair settlement” of all claims for
damages during the shutdown.
Plaintiff attempted to revive a case dismissed by the WWPRC. Plaintiff had been unlawfully
laid off and received $2000 compensation, impingement of personnel record, and refunded
$35 filing fee. Plaintiff requested restoration of sick and annual leave she would have
earned, credit for length of service, additional compensation, and punitive damages. The
Work’s decision was final and binding, and plaintiff had received the maximum remedy
available to her.

Jan. 2, 1996

CV 95-25

Mark Stressed v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board & HCN Legislature
JUDGEMENT
Plaintiff challenged redistricting plans put forward by the Ho-Chunk Legislature. HoChunk members voted against the redistricting plans making this case moot.

Jan. 4, 1996

CV 95-28

Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature v. Chloris A. Lowe Jr. President of the Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Regarding Recusal)
 There must be a demonstrable direct financial interest, not a theoretical financial interest
in order to recluse a Judge from a case.
 Direct personal relation alone is not cause for Recusal., and does not meet the test of a
direct personal interest within the meaning of the HO-CHUNK NATION
CONSTITUTION, ART. VII., SECTION 13.
There are six charges, which the defendant is disputing. One of the charges alleges that
Defendant refused to demote or dismiss his sister from employment. The Judge presiding
over the case was a close personal friend of Defendant’s sister. This alone does not require
Recusal from the case. However, there is some concern that the Judge is expecting back pay
as agreed to by JoAnn Jones, Chloris Lowe Jr.’s predecessor.. This raises 2 questions: 1) If
there is a financial interest that could theoretically pose a conflict, is that cause for recusal?
2) If there is a direct financial interest must the Judge recuse himself from the whole case?

Jan. 17, 1996

Page 5 of 251

To question 1: No, there is no cause for recusal when the financial interest is theoretical, the
interest must be direct. To question 2: No, the Judge may recuse himself from only a portion
of a case. In the current case the Defendant’s attorney implied that the Judge recuses himself
from the whole case. The Judge decided that he would recuse himself only from count II;
however, he will hear counts III, IV, V, VI, and I. Count II is assigned to Judge pro tem
Kittecon.
CV-95-07

Harry Cholka v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
JUDGEMENT

Deference is accorded the expertise of an agency charged with administering a
statute provided that its interpretation is reasonable;

A “Primary Management Official” may not gamble at any of the Nation’s Gaming
Operations;

Fundamental fairness requires that an employee be informed of the reason for a
summary suspension at the time he is being suspended, or as soon as practical if
there is clear and present danger to the facility which requires immediate action.
Notice must be given at all times prior to a “show cause” hearing.

Notice must inform an individual of the charges against him to afford the accused
the opportunity to defend.
Appellant was a slot manager at Ho-Chunk Casino suspended for gambling at Rainbow
Casino during work hours. Appellant is a Primary Management Official, which bars him
from gaming at the Nation’s casinos pursuant to the Gaming Commission’s interpretation of
the GAMING ORDINANCE. The interpretation was reasonable. Appellant was not unequally
treated. Notice of the accusations was defective. Appellant posed no clear and present
danger to the casino, and the notice was deficient. The 10-day suspension was reversed. The
$100 fine was upheld, and the Gaming Commission was ordered to distribute copies of the
GAMING ORDINANCE to all employees.

Feb. 5, 1996

CV-95-08

Ralph Babcock v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
JUDGEMENT

A primary management official sets policy or has the power to hire or fire
employees;

The party alleging a violation of the GAMING ORDINANCE carries the initial burden
to establish a prima facie case of violation;

Once a prima facie case of violation has been established, the burden to rebut the
charge is shifted to the person or entity;

The scope of this decision is limited to the “show cause” context.

Where notice of suspension is defective, the suspension violates due process right
to notice.
A Ho-Chunk Casino Employee appealed a Gaming Commission decision suspending him
and ordering him to pay a $100 fine for gambling during work hours at Rainbow Casino.
The employee, a lead slot technician, was not a Primary Management Official. There was no
evidence to suggest that he had the power to set policy, or hire or fire employees. The
employee was not barred from gaming at a facility other than where he is employed. The
notice failed to specifically allege the violation plaintiff committed, undermining plaintiff’s
ability to defend. The Gaming Commission decision was reversed. The Department of
Justice failed to meet its prima facie burden showing a violation to the Gaming
Commission.
Also See Babcock v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission, CV-95-08, Motion to Reconsider
(March 14, 1996).

Feb. 5, 1996

CV-95-23

Loa Porter v. Chloris Lowe, Jr.
ORDER (Denying Motion to Dismiss and Reassigning Case)

Plaintiff must show direct individual and particular injury or harm;

March 1, 1996

Page 6 of 251



On a Motion to Dismiss the facts are to be construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party;

Standing to sue requires that the plaintiff show: (1) a personal, actual or threatened
injury caused by the defendant, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s
actions, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Plaintiff sued the President, alleging an Executive Order is unlawful under the Social
Services Act. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss Since all factual allegations must be
taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party at the
pleading stage, as all factual allegations must be taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party at the pleading stage. Plaintiff alleged that the
Executive Order reorganizing the Social Services department caused emotional turmoil and
chaos, impaired her ability to work and caused anxiety, these allegations were sufficient to
confer standing.

PRC-95-09

Edward Creapeau v. Ho-Chunk Nation/Rainbow Casino
JUDGEMENT

The Personnel Procedures Manual requires written notice of suspension to the
employee within three working days of the disciplinary action, not the incident the
suspension arose out of;

Sovereign immunity is waived, if not raised as a defense.
Plaintiff sued Rainbow Casino alleging his suspension was in violation of the PERSONNEL
PROCEDURES. The three-day notice requirement referred to the day the action was taken,
rather than the day of the incident. Plaintiff had received proper notice. There was no
violation of the law. Management employees are required by the PERSONNEL PROCEDURES
to exercise “due diligence” when giving notice of disciplinary actions.

March
1996

13,

CV-95-08

Ralph Babcock v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
ORDER (Granting Motion for Reconsideration)

The Court may grant a Motion to Reconsider if it is timely filed within 10 days of
the issuance of the Order to be reconsidered and that the Court has (1) overlooked,
misapplied or failed to consider a directly controlling statute, decision, or principle,
(2) overlooked or misconceived some material fact or proposition of law, (3)
overlooked or misconceived a material question in the case, or (4) the law applied
in the ruling has been subsequently changed by court decision or statute.
The Court misapplied the applicable law. The AMENDED AND RESTATED GAMING
ORDINANCE, WHICH ALLOWS EMPLOYEES TO GAMBLE AT CLASS III GAMING FACILITIES,
was not the law at the time of the violation. The AMENDED AND RESTATED GAMING
ORDINANCE prior to June 14, 1995 did not permit the appellant to gamble at Class III
facilities. The portion of the ruling returning the $100 fine imposed on appellant is vacated.
See also Babcock v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission, CV-95-08, Judgment, (February 5,
1996).

March
1996

14,

Page 7 of 251

CV-95-018

Pierre Decorah v. Rainbow Casino
JUDGEMENT (Granting Motion to Dismiss)

When a person has been given the power to make discretionary decisions, the Court
is without authority to determine if such decisions are in violation of the law;

HCN CONSTITUTION, gives the Trial Court subject matter jurisdiction over matters
arising under PERSONNEL PROCEDURES;

Subject matter jurisdiction over personnel grievances lies with the Trial Court;

The Trial Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine if the doctrine of
sovereign immunity applies to a particular case;

Sovereign immunity extends to tribal enterprises unless clearly and unequivocally
waived by the U.S. Congress or the HCN Legislature, unless the suit is permitted by
the HCN CONSTITUTION;

The Tribal Court did not inherit the Personnel Review Commission’s power to
adjudicate employment disputes against the Nation due to the lack of a clear and
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for such actions;

HCN officials are not protected by sovereign immunity when acting outside the
scope of their authority;

Plaintiff must prove that the supervisor abused power or acted outside the scope of
his authority;

The court will not grant monetary damages unless a statute requires or the
Legislative policy behind it would be frustrated without such an award.
The plaintiff was terminated for an alleged forgery of leave slips. Plaintiff subsequently
appealed to his supervisor, and was denied relief. The Trial Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case, conferred by the HCN CONSTITUTION, but the doctrine of
sovereign immunity prevented the suit from going forward. Rainbow Casino, a tribal
enterprise, is immune from suit absent a clear and unequivocal waiver. The discretionary
nature of the decision to terminate the plaintiff prevents a showing that the official
responsible for the decision acted outside the scope of his authority. The plaintiff alleged no
violation of the Personnel Manual or the HCN CONSTITUTION, plaintiff failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. No statute provided for monetary damages, and
there was no Legislative policy to warrant the award of monetary damages.
ERRATUM

March
1996

15,

CV-95-019

Lewis Frogg v. Ho-Chunk Casino/Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT

All cases and controversies arising under Ho-Chunk law are within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Trial Court;

A supervisor who fails to comply with the Personnel Procedures is not protected by
sovereign immunity;

Failure to object to an untimely filing of an employee grievance constitutes a waiver
of such objection.
Employee/plaintiff sued Ho Chunk Casino, alleging that the HCN Personnel Policies and
Procedures were violated, misinterpreted and applied inequitably in reference to his
termination. The Trial Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity was
not a bar if the supervisor of an employee had acted outside the law. Plaintiff failed to prove
a violation of Personnel Procedures and that portion of the case was dismissed. The Court
found for plaintiff on the issue of his overdue performance review and remanded to Dept. of
Business to reconsider based on untimely performance evaluation.

March
1996

15,

CV 95-17

Gail White v. Department of Personnel
ORDER

March
1996

18,

Page 8 of 251



WWPRC Ordinance and Personal Policy and Procedures Manual does not waive the
sovereign immunity of the Ho-Chunk Nation.



If a Plaintiff is able to show that there is a violation of the Personal Policy and
Procedures Manual sufficient to show that the official or employee acted outside the
scope of their authority then sovereign immunity is not a bar for declaratory or
injunctive relief.
The Trial Court allowed both parties to amend their complaint using the two rules of law
above.

CV 95-29

Kathleen Mallo v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
Order
The Court requested that the parties brief the following issue: whether the Gaming
Commission violates the Equal Protection Clause and infringes upon an individual’s
right to petition for redress of grievances if it charges an appellant with fines and costs of
the proceedings, but declines to do so for non-appellants of Gaming Commission
decisions.
HCN Legislature v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr.,
Order (Motion to Deny Injunction)
The Court found that the harm complained of by the President is irreparable in nature as
the actions complained of could upset the balance of power as mandated in the HoChunk Constitution and directly affect the Executive Branch of Government. The Court
finds that it is within its constitutional parameters to review the actions as complained of
in this matter. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s motion to deny injunction based on political
question doctrine is denied.

Mar. 27, 1996

PRC 93026

Nettie Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation, Personnel Dept.
JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof;

Individual must attempt to mitigate their damages

Comparable position requires similar duties, responsibility and pay

Principle of damages is to restore the injury party, as near as possible, to the
position he or she would have been in had they not been harmed;

The right to damages is limited to the time a “prudent person” would have replaced
what had been lost;

Court’s jurisdictional limit for monetary compensation under the Wisconsin
Winnebago Personnel Review Commission (WWPRC) is capped at $2,000;

WWPRC Ordinance forecloses issue of additional monetary relief.
Plaintiff was found to have been wrongfully terminated from her employment in accordance
to the WWPRC. Plaintiff seeks enforcement of an Order, relating to plaintiff being placed in
a “comparable position.” Plaintiff contends she was not placed in a comparable position nor
received a salary equal to what she “would have gotten” had she not been terminated. The
Court held that no position of similar responsibility or duties in gaming was legally available
to plaintiff that plaintiff failed to mitigate harm, and plaintiff was not entitled to a salary
increase. Trial Court is limited by jurisdictional cap on the award of monetary compensation
under the WWPRC ORDINANCE.

April 10, 1996

PRC 95011

Susan Rowlee v. Majestic Pines Casino
JUDGEMENT

On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must consider all well pled factual allegations as
true and must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff;

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof;

An affirmative defense is waived if not properly pled;

Personnel Policies and Procedures obligates an disabled employee to provide a
medical release;
Plaintiff raised a discrimination claim of unfair treatment and failure to make adequate

April 10, 1996

CV 95-28

Page 9 of 251

Apr. 3, 1996

accommodations of a disability in employment. The defendant did not act unreasonably in
laying-off plaintiff. Requiring an employee to provide a medical release prior to returning to
work allows the Nation to make the reasonable accommodation of a disability.
CV 95-11

Orrin Cloud v. Ho-Chunk Casino
ORDER
Attorneys for both Plaintiff and Defendant had reached a settlement prior to the end of trial.
Pursuant to WWPRCO all settlements had to be reduced to writing and submitted. The Trial
Court has not received a submission of the settlement agreement and has ordered the
agreement to be submitted to the Court in 10 days or the Attorneys will incur a fine of $10
per day until submitted.

April 30, 1996

CV-96-22

Coalition for Fair Government II v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr., as Chairman of the April 27, 1996
General Council, and Kathyleen Lone Tree Whiterabbit, as Secretary of the April 27, 1996
General Council
ORDER (Re: Preliminary Injunction)

A preliminary injunction requires: “ 1) no adequate remedy at law; 2) threat of
injury outweighs the harm of the preliminary injunction; 3) petitioner has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and 4) the injunction serves the
public interest;”

The Court has the responsibility of interpreting the law;

General Council must act within the HCN CONSTITUTION;

General Council may not exercise judicial power;

General Council may review actions of the Judiciary that do not involve
Constitutional interpretation;

Courts should avoid reaching Constitutional issues, if not required to resolve the
dispute or rose in the complaint.
Plaintiffs alleged that the actions of the General Council of April 27, 1996, violated the
Constitution. The suit seeks to prevent the removal of legislators purportedly removed under
HCN CONSTITUTION, ART. IX, § 1, and declare acts by that General Council void. The
plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin a special election. A preliminary injunction
was granted. Plaintiffs had a reasonable likelihood of success on the issue of defective
notice to the removed legislators. The public interest would be served by preventing the
possibility of six people claiming three offices in the Legislature. This case did not present
a non justiciable political question. The Judiciary is to interpret the Constitution. The Court
is capable of determining the factual questions presented in this case. There is no disrespect
shown to another branch of the government when the Court exercises its power within its
Constitutional limits.
ERRATUM

May 21, 1996

CV-96-19

Donaldson A. June v. Kate Doornbos, Ho-Chunk Nation Administration Dept.
DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

Answer must be filed with the Court within 20 calendar days from date of receipt of
service. HCN Int. R. Civ. P., Rule 6.

Failure to file an Answer may result in entry of Default Judgment.
Plaintiff grieved the “indefinite lay-off” status and subsequent separation from employment.
The Complaint and Summons were served on the defendant on April 10, 1996. An Answer
was not filed by the twentieth day from receipt of service.

May 22, 1996

TC 96-08

Dallas Rudy White v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Office,
JUDGEMENT of the Traditional Court

Decisions of the Traditional Court are final and binding. HCN Int. R.Civ.P., Rule
70.
An adjudication of paternity by the Traditional Court determined that petitioner is 4/4ths

May 29, 1996

Page 10 of 251

May 31, 1996

Winnebago blood, born of the Winnebago fireplace. The Oral Order of the Traditional
Court was reduced to writing and is confirmed by a written Order issued by the Trial Court.
CV-96-21

Roger Littlegeorge v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr., and Kathyleen Lone Tree - Whiterabbit, as
Chairman and Secretary of the April 27, 1996 General Council
ORDER

General Council cannot remove employee or terminate employment of tribal
employee;

Removal of employee from employment is beyond the constitutional authority of
the General Council.
An employment grievance submitted directly to the trial court without proceeding through
the administrative grievance process. Plaintiff challenged his removal from employment by
the General Council. Parties stipulated that action of removal by the General Council was
beyond General Council’s constitutional authority in the HCN CONSTITUTION, ART. IV, § 4.
Plaintiff was reinstated as Election Board Chairman, awarded wages and reimbursement of
costs.

June 4, 1996

CV-96-18

Melissa A. Johnson v. Ho-Chunk Nation Education Department
ORDER (Granting Motion to Dismiss)

Granting of a dispositive motion requires procedural due process;

Motion to Dismiss granted on party’s failure to appear after Notice.
Plaintiff filed an employment grievance of termination from the HCN Education dept. The
Complaint and Summons were served. Plaintiff failed to appear at preliminary hearing.
Plaintiff had notice of a Motion to Dismiss and Answer, and proper notice of the hearing.
Motion is granted.

June 5, 1996

CV-96-11

Edward Fronk v. Ho-Chunk Tours
DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff bears the burden of prosecuting a case.

Failure to show good cause for failing ro appear could result in an award of costs to
the other parties to an action.
This case involves an employment dispute. The plaintiff failed to appear at the pretrial
hearing and the trial. The Court found that plaintiff received proper notice of the trial and
dismissed the case, with an award of costs for the defendant’s counsel and witness, if any.

June 19, 1996

CV-96-19

Donaldson June v. Kate Doornbos, Ho-Chunk Nation Administration Dept.
JUDGEMENT (Granting Motion for Reconsideration)

Default judgments may be entered when a party fails to file a timely answer or
appear at a hearing if notice is proper.

Courts may set aside a default judgment only upon a timely showing of good cause.

Entry of a default judgment is governed by whether: 1) plaintiff will be prejudiced
if default is denied; 2) defendant has a meritorious defense; and 3) default was a
product of defendant’s culpable conduct.

Whether conduct is culpable is a factual determination and should be decided on a
case by case basis to ensure justice and fairness.

An employee of the Ho-Chunk Nation is required to exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing suit.
This is an employment dispute. A Default Judgment was entered against the Nation for
failure to comply with time limits set by the HCN In. R. Civ. P. The defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration was granted. The Default Judgment was upheld on the grounds that
plaintiff, who appeared pro se, would be prejudiced in the denial of entry of default, that the
defense of sovereign immunity had been expressly waived by statute and therefore not
meritorious, and defendant’s late filing of an Answer disabled the plaintiff’s preparation of
the suit was akin to culpable conduct. Plaintiff was found to have exhausted his
administrative remedies as required.

June 24, 1996

Page 11 of 251

ERRATUM
CV-96-09

Laura C. Rozek v. Ho-Chunk Casino, Ho-Chunk Nation
DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff bears the burden to prosecute.
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging wrongful termination. Plaintiff was given proper notice but
failed to appear for the pretrial conference. Plaintiff failed to appear for the trial, after
receiving proper notice, and a default judgment was entered against her pursuant to HCN
Int. R. Civ. P.

June 25, 1996

PRC95003
PRC95002

Tracy Schnick v. Ho-Chunk Nation
Raymond Thundercloud v. Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT (Dismissal)

Dismissal without prejudice may afford the plaintiff the opportunity to re-file their
suit.
After numerous extensions, plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed without prejudice due to their
failure to state the legal basis for their complaint.

June 26, 1996

CV 95-19

Lewis Frogg v. Ho-Chunk Casino/Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER
Plaintiff was not given a 90 day performance evaluation which ONLT INCLUDED THE
PLAINTIFF’S CONDUCT W/IN HIS FIRST 90 DAYS. Had the defendant not used the
events after those 90 days in the evaluation the plaintiff would have been entitled to a 4%
raise. The Trial Court ordered the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff his 4% pay raise as back
pay starting from the day the evaluation should have taken place to May 13, 1995 which
totals 17 weeks. Furthermore, defendant must pay interest on the amount owed to be paid to
Plaintiff at the rate of 6% calculated from May 15, 1995 to June 27, 1996.

June 27, 1996

CV-96-19

Geraldine Y. Deere v. Ho-Chunk Nation Personnel Department
ORDER (Dismissal)

Plaintiffs may voluntarily withdraw cases at any time prior to the filing of an
Answer by the defendant.

If an Answer or responsive pleading has been filed, dismissal is left to the discretion
of the trial court.

Res Judicata precludes review of claims previously decided.

Tribal court remedies must be exhausted.
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the HCN Personnel Department failed to comply with an
Order of the WWPRC. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss this action without prejudice
after the defendant had filed an Answer. The Court granted the Motion with prejudice based
on the merits of the case. Plaintiff failed to state how the defendant had not complied with
the WWPRC’s Order. Plaintiff had been paid $2000, had her employment record expunged,
and had been placed in a comparably paid position. Res Judicata and the HCN Constitution
precludes relitigating this action.

July 9, 1996

CV-95-29

Kathleen Mallo v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
ORDER (RE: Gaming Appeal Costs)

Equal protection of the laws is not denied by the imposition of costs as a precursor
to judicial review when the Legislature has a rational basis for imposing such costs.

There is no denial of due process when the statutorily conferred right of access to
appeal is denied based on ability to pay costs unless there is no other avenue to
relief.

The term “costs” must be strictly construed and does not include things that are
ordinary burdens of a government.
Appellant sought review of the HCN Gaming Commission decision to revoke her gaming

July 12, 1996

Page 12 of 251

license due to her failure to provide information on her federal and state taxes. The costs of
investigation and proceedings before the Gaming Commission must be paid prior to judicial
review of this appeal. The Court held that appellant’s right to equal protection of the laws
had not been denied based on her inability to pay the assessed costs because the legislature
had the rational bases of recouping a portion of the Nation’s costs and insuring payment.
The Court further held that appellant’s right to due process was not denied due to inability
to pay the costs although the right of access to appeal is guaranteed, the appellant had
another avenue to relief. The salaries of gaming commissioners and compliance personnel
were improperly assessed against the appellant as these costs are ordinary burdens of the
government.
CV-95-30

Diane Kirby v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
ORDER (RE: Gaming Appeal Costs)

Imposition of costs prior to judicial review does not deny equal protection when the
Legislature has a rational basis;

The term “costs” must be strictly construed and does not include things that are
ordinary burdens of a government.

Due process is not denied when the right of access is denied based on inability to
pay unless there is no other avenue to relief and there is no adjustment fundamental
human relationship involved.
Appellant sought relief of the HCN Gaming Commission’s denial of a transfer. The costs of
investigation and proceeding before the Gaming Commission must be paid prior to judicial
review. The Court held that equal protection is not denied by the imposition of costs as a
precursor to judicial review when the Legislature had a rational basis for requiring such
payment. However, salaries of Gaming Commissioners and compliance personnel are not
properly included as costs because they are ordinary burdens of the government. The Court
further held that appellant’s right of due process had not been denied by the imposition of
costs because there is no adjustment of a fundamental human relationship involved.

July 17, 1996

CV-95-23

Loa L. Porter v. Chloris Lowe, Jr.
ORDER (Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss)

Three elements must be met for a plaintiff to have standing to sue: 1) there must be
an injury in fact; 2) there must be a causal connection between the alleged injury
and the action the plaintiff complains of; and 3) it must be likely that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.

An “injury in fact” requires that the injury be concrete and particularized and either
actual or imminent.

An injury need not be economic in nature to confer standing.

At the pleading stage, the factual allegations within the pleadings must be taken as
true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff when considering a
Motion to Dismiss.

The HCN Constitution enumerates no executive privilege.

The principles of statutory construction require that a Court interpret words
according to their commonly understood meaning.
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant had illegally acted outside the scope of his
authority in reorganizing the legislatively created Department of Social Services. The Court
found that plaintiff has standing to sue as a citizen of the Nation and an employee of the
DSS, that the injury of impaired job performance due to departmental chaos was sufficient
to constitute an “injury in fact,” that this injury was causally connected to the restructuring
ordered by the President, and the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The
Court further held that an organizational chart used during deliberations on the restructuring
was not protected by executive privilege or the Ho-Chunk Nation Discovery Act because the
chart did not involve business matters.

July 18, 1996

CV 96-22

Coalition for Fair Government II v. Chloris Lowe Jr., Kathaleen Lonetree-Whiterabbit

July 23, 1996

Page 13 of 251

ORDER (Re: Preliminary Injunction)
A preliminary injunction requires: “ 1) no adequate remedy at law; 2) threat of
injury outweighs the harm of the preliminary injunction; 3) petitioner has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and 4) the injunction serves the
public interest;”

The Court has the responsibility of interpreting the law;

General Council must act within the HCN CONSTITUTION;

General Council may not exercise judicial power;

General Council may review actions of the Judiciary that do not involve
Constitutional interpretation;

Courts should avoid reaching Constitutional issues, if not required to resolve the
dispute or raised in the complaint.
This a corrected version per the erratum dated May 31, 1996. Plaintiffs alleged that the
actions of the General Council of April 27, 1996, violated the Constitution. The suit seeks to
prevent the removal of legislators purportedly removed under HCN CONSTITUTION, ART.
IX, § 1, and declare acts by that General Council void. The plaintiffs seek a preliminary
injunction to enjoin a special election. A preliminary injunction was granted. Plaintiffs had a
reasonable likelihood of success on the issue of defective notice to the removed legislators.
The public interest would be served by preventing the possibility of six people claiming
three offices in the Legislature. This case did not present a non-justiciable political
question. The Judiciary is to interpret the Constitution. The Court is capable of determining
the factual questions presented in this case. There is no disrespect shown to another branch
of the government when the Court exercises its power within its Constitutional limits.


CV 96-15

Jean Day, et al. v. Ho-Chunk Nation Personnel Dept.
ORDER (Granting Summary Judgement)

Summary judgement has a baseline test that there be “no issue of material fact in
dispute”;

Issuance of an Executive Order is at the Executive’s discretion;

An Executive Order is binding but limited by the Executive’s lawful authority;

Executive Director of Personnel has the authority to “provide interpretations on the
Policy and Procedures” of the Nation;
Plaintiffs asserted a violation of the HCN PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES and a
denial of notice imposing differential treatment for similarly situated employees affecting
emergency leave policies.

August
1996

21,

CV 96-02;
CV 96-03

Anne Rae Funmaker v. Kathryn Doornbos and the Ho-Chunk Nation;
Dennis Funmaker v. Kathryn Doornbos and the Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Re: Motion to Dismiss)

There is no right to an interview;

The right to be interviewed is not alone a basis sufficient to survive a Motion to
Dismiss;

The power to employ, hire, demote, promote or discharge an employee is within the
discretion of the person granted those responsibilities.

Judicial review is permissible of employment actions for alleged violations of law,
contradictory statutory interpretations, or where there is a charge of abuse of
discretion or where an employee or official acts beyond the scope of their authority.
Employment disputes filed by the plaintiffs were consolidated to form one case as both
matters asserted violations of the HCN PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES arising
from the same incident and actions of the defendant. Both plaintiffs asserted discrimination
as the basis for their suit. The plaintiff Dennis Funmaker did not survive the Motion to
Dismiss, as his claim of discrimination was not based on a protected classification, and that
he lacked standing, since there is no direct injury nor any violation of any interest or

August
1996

22,

Page 14 of 251

protected right reserved to him. The plaintiff Anne Rae Funmaker specified age
discrimination. However, the matter was dismissed, as there was no violation of law based
on the evidence.
CV 96-27

Marian Blackdeer v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Re: Special Need)
HCN Per Capita Distribution Ordinance Fiscal Year 1995-1996, adopted by Ho-Chunk
Nation Legislature, Resolution 08/29/95C provides that “Funds in the CTF of a minor or
legally incompetent member shall be available for the benefit of a beneficiary’s health,
education and welfare when the needs of such person are not being met from other Tribal
funds or other state or federal public entitlement program, and upon a finding of special
need by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

§ 880.21(2), Wis. Stats., as instructive and should be read in conjunction with the
HCN PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION ORDINANCE;

Trust funds for the minor or adult incompetent shall be available for the
beneficiary’s health, education and welfare when the needs of such minor or adult
incompetent are not being met from other tribal funds or state and federal
entitlement programs;

Must show a substantial benefit to minor or incompetent;

Supplementation of a parent’s support of an incompetent may be considered where
a minor or incompetent has property which is sufficient for his or her maintenance
and education, in a manner his or her parents cannot reasonably afford, the
expenses of the minor’s education and maintenance may be defrayed out of his or
her property, as shall be judged reasonable and be directed by a court of competent
jurisdiction. § 880.21(2), Wis. Stats.

Any minor or legal incompetent who has property, including trust funds, which is
sufficient for his or her maintenance, health, education and welfare shall be
available for the benefit of the minor or legal incompetent.

Children’s Trust Funds or Per Capita Distributions shall be available when the (1)
needs of such person are not being met from other Tribal funds, or other state or
federal public entitlement program, and (2) upon a finding of special need by a
court of competent jurisdiction.

To determine special need the petitioner must show that: (a) distribution of per
capita money is necessary for the health, education or welfare of the adult
incompetent; (b) the needs of the adult incompetent are not being met from other
Tribal, state or federal entitlement programs; and (c) the interest(s) of the adult
incompetent are protected and preserved by releasing such monies to a legal
guardian or trustee.
Petitioner Marian Blackdeer has come before the HCN Trial Court on behalf of her
daughter, Renee Debra Blackdeer, who is in her care, for a determination of “special need”
pursuant to the HCN PER CAPITA ORDINANCE, PART VI, § 6.01(b).

August
1996

CV 96-31

Roger Littlegeorge v. Jo Deen Lowe and Brian Pierson
Order (re: Hearing on Motion for Entry of Default Judgment)
The Court made this Order to serve clarity that there will be a hearing on September 9, at
1:30 p.m. at the Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court in Black River Falls, Wisconsin.

Aug. 23, 1996

CV 95-26;
CV 95-27;
CV 96-05

Lonnie Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Department of Health;
Linda Severson v. Ho-Chunk Department of Health;
Carol J. Ravet v. Ho-Chunk Nation Department of Health
ORDER (Granting Motion for Summary Judgement)

August
1996




Employment disputes require that an aggrieved party exhaust all administrative
remedies prior to seeking judicial redress.
The exhaustion requirement may be waived if there is no reasonable prospect that the
applicant could obtain any relief by pursuing them.

Page 15 of 251

22,

29,




Employers must notify their permanent employees in writing about the right to displace
a less senior employee.
The Ho-Chunk Nation is a sovereign nation and is protected from suits by sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity will operate as a bar to suit unless that immunity is
expressly waived. However, the HCN legislature passed HCN Resolution 3/26/96-A
which constitutes a limited waiver of immunity in employment actions.

Plaintiffs were laid off from their positions with the Ho-Chunk Nation Department of
Health. The defendants failed to advise plaintiffs of their right to grieve pursuant to the
HCN Policy and Procedures Manual. Defendants argue that plaintiffs were notified of their
right to grieve. However, the court finds that failure to inform plaintiff of their right to
displace less senior workers, or of their right to grieve their layoff is ineffective notice of
plaintiffs’ right to grieve. Plaintiff also attempted to grieve the termination through the
Administrative Review process, however, plaintiffs were denied this process by the
defendant. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgement. Defendant did not file an
answer to the motion. After review the Trial Court granted plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The Ho-Chunk Nation is a sovereign nation and is protected from suits by sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity will operate as a bar to suit unless that immunity is expressly
waived. However, the HCN legislature passed HCN Resolution 3/26/96-A which constitutes
a limited waiver of immunity in employment actions. In accordance with that resolution, the
court may award monetary compensation up to $2000 dollars to any one employee.
The Trial Court held that the Plaintiffs had been wrongfully terminated because they were
not told that they could displace less senior employees and awarded them each the statutory
limit of $2000. Furthermore, since the order came from the President’s office the court
ordered that the funds to pay the judgment come out of the Presidential budget. The Trial
Court has not rendered a decision on the discrimination claim and a trial will be held on that
issue at a later time.
CV 96-31

Roger Littlegeorge v. Jo Deen B. Lowe, & Brian Pierson
ORDER (Re: Hearing on Motion for Default Entry of Default Judgment)

Aug 23, 1996



In entering a default judgment the Court will look at whether the plaintiff is prejudiced
if the default is denied, or whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, or whether
default is a product of the defendant’s culpable conduct
Plaintiff made a Motion for a Default Judgment. This order is to schedule a hearing for the
aforementioned motion. In entering a Default Judgment the Court will look at whether the
plaintiff is prejudiced if the default is denied, whether the defendant has a meritorious
defense, and whether default is a product of the defendant’s culpable conduct. The
Defendant failed to file an answer in a timely manner; however, the court wants to decide
this case on the merits and will give the defendant an opportunity to orally argue in front of
the court. Nevertheless, the defendant has the burden of proof to provide to the Court
substantial grounds for avoidance of a default judgment.
Defendant also asked the Trial Court to consolidate the present case with Ho-Chunk Nation
Legislature v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr. and Jo Deen Lowe, CV 95-28. The motion to
consolidate was denied.

CV 96-22

Coalition for Fair Government II v. Chloris Lowe, Jr., as Chairman and Kathyleen
Whiterabbit as Secretary of General Council held April 27, 1996 and Ho-Chunk Nation
Legislature v. Chloris Lowe Jr., as Chairman and Kathyleen Whiterabbit as Secretary of
General Council held April 27, 1996 General Council Planning Committee and HCN
Election Board
Order (Seeking Clarification)
The Court requested briefing on two issues, namely, whether attorneys without BIA
approved contracts may represent tribal entities or officials and whether the proposed 80/20percapita-distribution plan would comport with federal law.

Page 16 of 251

Sept. 3, 1996

CV 96-22

Coalition for Fair Government II v. Chloris Lowe, Jr., as Chairman and Kathyleen
Whiterabbit as Secretary of General Council held April 27, 1996 Ho-Chunk Nation
Legislature v. Chloris Lowe Jr., as Chairman and Kathyleen Whiterabbit as Secretary of
General Council held April 27, 1996 General Council Planning Committee and HCN
Election Board
Order Denying Recusal
The motion of recusal by the defendant’s has been denied due to untimeliness, violation
of HCN Int. R. Civ. P. 19 and lack of standing.

Sept. 11, 1996

CV 95-02

Jason Reimer v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
JUDGEMENT

Sept. 16, 1996



HCN gaming ordinance Sec. 913(b) provides that applicants for gaming licenses are not
entitled to a hearing prior to suspension for good cause.



The Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission, prior to conducting a show cause hearing must
provide subjects with proper notice of what they might need to address or defend
against or the Gaming Commission will be in violation of Gaming Ordinance sec. 819.
Defendant requested 1993 income tax forms from plaintiff in order to complete plaintiff’s
application for a gaming license. Defendant made several requests for the income tax forms.
After several proceedings defendant held a hearing and suspended plaintiff from
employment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s failure to properly sequence the request forms
was in part the cause his of not getting the forms to defendant. This Court disagrees finding
that plaintiff had ample time to get the document to the defendant office.
The Plaintiff alleges that defendant-violated plaintiff’s confidentiality. The court disagrees,
finding that all of Plaintiff’s documents were secured, by the Gaming Commission after the
relationship with the private detective firm was dissolved therefore, there was no
confidentiality breach.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to provide proper notice of subject of a show cause
hearing. The Court agrees, finding that the plaintiff did not receive.
Therefore, this Court affirms defendant’s first decision to suspend the plaintiff, However,
the Court remands the decision back to the Gaming Commission since the Court finds it is
improper to suspend the plaintiff when his due process rights were violated.

CV 96-31

Roger Littlegeorge v. Jo Deen Lowe and Brian Pierson
JUDGEMENT (Remedy on Default Judgment)
 Procedural omissions, errors or substantial non-compliance are cause for a default
judgment.
 The Ho-Chunk Constitution and the enactments of the Ho-Chunk Legislature are
subject to federal review and approval when required by federal law.
The Trial Court assigned a remedy for default judgment based on the hearing scheduled on
September 9, 1996. Plaintiff sought a restraining order to keep defendant from serving as
Attorney General. The Trial Court in accordance with the Ho-Chunk Nation Constitution
has the authority to hear this case and to enter a judgment. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment based on defendant’s failure to timely answer and
failure to timely file a reply to defendant’s Motion to Entry of Default Judgment.
Furthermore, the Trial Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order or Temporary
Injunction preventing defendant form returning to work until defendant receives approval
form the Secretary of the Interior in pursuant to 25 U.S.C.§ 81. The temporary injunction is
for a thirty-day period without pay. Once an approved attorney contract is presented to the
Court, this case will be moot.

Sept. 20, 1996

CV 96-32

U.W. Stevens Point v. Orbert S. Goodbear
ORDER (Granting Registration & Enforcement of Foreign Order/Order)

Sept. 27, 1997



The HCN Trial Court may enforce claims against per capita distributions only for

Page 17 of 251

federal tax levies, child support orders, and money or debts owed to the Ho-Chunk
Nation.
The Trial court ordered 20% of the defendant’s wages at the Ho-Chunk Casino in Baraboo
garnished in order to fulfill a Sauk County judgment that Plaintiff had been granted. The
plaintiff asked the HCN Trial Court to enforce the Judgment and garnish his per capita.
Pursuant to the CLAIMS AGAINST PER CAPITA ORDINANCE the HCN cannot enforce
any claim against per capita distribution unless it is to satisfy FEDERAL tax levies, child
support, or a debt owed to the HCN. However, the HCN will garnish the wages of one of its
employees in order to satisfy a judgment.
CV 95-23

Loa Porter v. Chloris Lowe, Jr.
JUDGEMENT

Four elements must be met for determining when a preliminary injunction is
properly issued and is a suitable temporary remedy: (1) that there be no adequate
remedy at law; (2) that the threat of injury outweighs the harm of the preliminary
injunction, (3) that the petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of success based on
the merits; and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest. Coalition for Fair
Government II v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr., as Chairman of the April 27, 1996 General
Council, and Kathyleen Lonetree Whiterabbit, as Secretary of the April 27, 1996
General Council CV-96-22 Order (HCN Tr. Ct. May 21, 1996).
·
HCN CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III separates the function of each branch of
government and provides that no branch shall exercise the powers or functions of
another.
·
The Legislature establishes the departments and the missions of each executive
department, while the Executive seeks to more efficiently administer these
departments within the structural framework provided by legislative enactments.
Any changes to the organization and structure of a legislatively created department
must be done with legislative approval, if such re-organizing in any way affects the
legislative design, mission or internal organization.

A violation of law by an Executive Branch official that impinges upon the stability
and security of the government would constitute sufficient grounds to grant the
issuance of an injunction.
·
The President does not have the ability to impound funds or alter the budgets
approved by the HCN Legislature.
·
The PERSONNEL PROCEDURES governs all employment related actions.
·
An injunction can be a temporary measure to sort out the facts and determine
whether a full development of the facts and arguments will indicate whether further
action is warranted.
·
Where the Executive is allowed to exercise the Legislature’s power, all actions
performed by the Executive might be improper; therefore, the granting of the injunction
would avoid the possibility of instability in government actions and the usurpation of
powers.

Oct. 2, 1996

CV 96-45

Kathy Ruditys, Tammy Schoone & Jim Wanty v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Department
ORDER

Oct. 2, 1996



When appealing a decision from enrollment that denies a plaintiff enrollment in the
HCN, the plaintiff must provide the court with a copy of the decision denying plaintiff’s
enrollment in the HCN.



When appealing to the Trial Court is designed to act as a check on arbitrary and
capricious decisions by enrollment.
The court ordered a stay on the review of plaintiff’s denial of enrollment in the HCN
because plaintiff failed to provide the court with a copy of the decision from enrollment
denying plaintiffs’ enrollment.

CV 96-28

Charles Percy and William Miner III v. Geraldine Swan

Page 18 of 251

Oct. 4, 1996

Order (Denying Motion to Dismiss)
The case filed holds in question the transfer and ownership of two military burial flags,
which were those of the plaintiff’s father and grandfather. Upon interment the flags were
given to the defendant. The plaintiffs argue that under Ho-Chunk tradition the flags should
have went to the widow of the deceased that in this case the flags did not. The Court denied
the motion to dismiss. The Court also denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
found that the plaintiff’s have standing to bring the case.
CV 96-38

In re: Julia Hare York by Walter I. Hare
ORDER (Granting Per Capita Distribution in Part for Special Need)

A trustee is required and obligated under Ho-Chunk law to “maintain records that
sufficiently demonstrates any disbursed funds were expended as required by HCN
PER CAPITA DISBURSEMENT ORDINANCE, § 6.01(b). and any applicable Federal
law.”
·
The PER CAPITA ORDINANCE allows a minor’s trust funds to be made available for
the benefit of a beneficiary’s health, education and welfare when the needs of such
person are not being met from other Tribal funds or other state or federal public
entitlement programs and upon a finding of special need by a court of competent
jurisdiction . . ..
·
The parent or legal guardian shall maintain records sufficient to demonstrate that
the funds disbursed were expended as required by this Ordinance and any
applicable federal law.
The Court founds that a case of special circumstance sufficient to meet the special needs
finding because J.H.Y. is a married emancipated minor who set up her own household and
was responsible for all bills and obligations incurred.

Oct. 9, 1996

CV 96-15

Jean Day, et al. v. Ho-Chunk Nation Personnel Dept.
ORDER (Granting Motion for Reconsideration)
Plaintiff asserted a continuing violation of the HCN PERSONNEL POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, specifically that the Executive Director of Personnel was not authorized nor
empowered to interpret the HCN PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. The Court
granted the Motion for Reconsideration based on the misapplication of the law.

Oct. 10, 1996

CV 95-17

Gale S. White v. Department of Personnel and Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT
 Suspension without pay absent prior disciplinary action or disclosure of why it was
levied violated the progressive discipline policy of the HCN.
 Employment in the HCN is terminable only for cause, creates a reasonable bilateral
expectation of entitlement, which can only be taken away after due process.
 Sufficient facts justifying the need for summary suspension, rather than suspension after
notice and a hearing must be in the record.
 A notice of suspension given to the employee must give them a sufficient understanding
of the facts behind the suspension so that they can consider whether to grieve the
suspension.
 All tribal members are constructively charged with the knowledge of the HCN
constitution
Plaintiff was suspended without pay from her work with the Department of Personnel, and
shortly thereafter she was terminated the court found that the suspension was premature due
to the progressive discipline policy, furthermore the suspension failed to inform plaintiff of
her violation. A notice of suspension given to the employee must give them a sufficient
understanding of the facts behind the suspension so that they can consider whether to grieve
the suspension. The Trial Court held that the suspension failed due to defective notice,
which is a violation of employee’s due process. Therefore the court ordered back pay plus
interest accrued.
Shortly after the suspension, plaintiff was terminated, the court upheld the termination. The

Oct. 14, 1996

Page 19 of 251

notice of termination was clear and therefore, the termination was supported by substantial
evidence.

CV 96-39

In the Interest of Gary Alan Funmaker, Sr.
JUDGEMENT (Denying Petition for Release of Per Capita Distribution)

Pursuant to the HO-CHUNK NATION PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION ORDINANCE, §
6.01(b) funds held in trust for a minor or legally incompetent member shall be
available for the benefit of a beneficiary’s health, education and welfare when the
needs of such person are not met from other Tribal funds or other state or federal
public entitlement programs and upon a finding of special need by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

The per capita ordinance authorizes the Court to release a portion or all of a Minor
Member’s Children’s Trust Fund (CTF) upon finding: (1) that such distribution is
necessary or appropriate for the health, education and welfare of the minor member
beneficiary; (2) that the minor member beneficiary’s needs are not being met by
other programs of the Nation, or programs of federal, state or local governments
available to the minor member; (3) that the distribution of funds held in the CTF
better serves and protects the immediate and long term interests and needs of the
minor member than retaining the funds to be distributed in said minor’s CTF until
the member reaches 18; and (4) that the distribution does not discharge a parental
obligation of support for which parental resources are reasonably available.
·
The debts of a parent should not be imposed on or put off onto their minor children,
nor should parental debts encumber or diminish the property of minor’s held in
trust for their future benefit.
Petitioner was denied his request for the release of CTF monies from the trust funds of his
two children because he failed to show how a CTF release would benefit the minors’ health,
education and welfare. Furthermore, he did not show sufficient evidence that he sought to
exhaust or utilize other tribal, state or federal programs. Finally, the Court found that the
use of the funds were to pay for the petitioner’s own personal debts and would not directly
or substantially benefit the health, education or welfare of the minor children involved.

Oct. 18, 1996

CV 95-23

Loa Porter v. Chloris Lowe Jr.,
Order (Motion Denied)
The Court denied the Motion to Register and Enforce due to the instance that the plaintiff
was motioning for a third party and not herself. The court denied this case because the
plaintiff had lack of standing.
HCN Legislature v. Chloris Lowe Jr., President of the Ho-Chunk Nation and Jo Deen
Lowe, Attorney General of the Ho-Chunk Nation
Order (Memorandum of Hearing)
This memorandum by the Court made clear to all parties that Judge Butterfield would
“only be involved to make sure that a Judge was assigned to this case and that such an
assignment is appropriate within the fiscal requirements of the Judicial Branch.” Judge
Butterfield’s involvement in this case evolved from the removal of Judge Kittecon.

Oct. 29, 1996

CV 96-42

Kim Getts v. Ho Chunk Casino
JUDGEMENT(Dismissed without prejudice)
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant after she exhausted the Administrative
Review Process; However plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and therefore, the court dismissed the claim without prejudice.

Nov. 4, 1996

CV 96-43

Kelly Hammes v. Chloris Lowe, Karena Day, Gloria Logan John Steindorf , et al
ORDER

Nov. 5, 1996

CV 95-28



If in conflict with a rule from the Int. R. Civ. P,, a Pre-Trial Order qualifies the Int. R.

Page 20 of 251

Oct. 29, 1996

Civ. P, and does not contradict it. Therefore, must follow Pre-Trial Order, and may only
deviate from such Order after seeking leave of the court.
CV 96-47

Jeremy Rockman v. Jo Anne Jones
ORDER (Granting Voluntary Dismissal)
Following the plaintiff’s request for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice or costs, the
defendant raised an objection and asserted that the case - at minimum - should be dismissed
with costs and fees.

Nov. 8, 1996

CV 96-49

In re: Roberta A. Goodbear by Shirley Sahr, Guardian
ORDER (Granting Per Capita Distribution in Part for Special Need)
Pursuant to HCN amended per capita distribution ordinance § 6.01(b), the Trial Court
granted plaintiff use of her Incompetent Trust Fund for special need. The Plaintiff was
legally incompetent and received state funds for living. However, her allowance did not
adequately cover the cost of heating through a harsh winter. Plaintiff was allowed to
withdraw funds for clothes, heating costs, and other miscellaneous items that the Court
deemed reasonable.

Nov. 14,1996

CV 96-35

Anna Belle Lowe v. Serena Yellow Thunder
Order
The plaintiff filed a Complaint requesting that the defendant repay a loan that was taken
out for and at the request of the defendant. The Court found the defendant guilty of
breaching a financial agreement with the plaintiff. The Court suggested that the
defendant repay the amount of the loan to the plaintiff in small increments, at no less
than $100 every three months. Thus forth all relief requested by the plaintiff is hereby
granted.

Nov. 15, 1996

CV 96-46

In re: Bruce Patrick O’Brien by Elethe Nichols, Guardian v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Per Capita Distribution in Part for Special Need)
Pursuant to HCN Amended Per Capita Distribution Ordinance § 6.01(b), The Trial Court
granted plaintiff use of his Incompetent Trust Fund for special need. After exhausting all
other resources, plaintiff requested various items, which the court deemed reasonable.

Nov. 15, 1996

CV 96-06

C & B Investments v. Ho-Chunk Department of Health and Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT

Nov. 21, 1996



Pursuant to HCN constitution, ART. VII § 5(a) any case or controversy arising within
the jurisdiction of the Ho-Chunk Nation must file be filed in the HCN Trial Court.



Waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.



The tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity simply because it entered into a binding
contract
Plaintiff leased commercial space to Defendant an entity of the HCN and therefore within
the protection of sovereign immunity. Defendant allegedly breached the lease agreement
and plaintiff brought action in the Wisconsin state court. The state court held that the action
was barred due to defendant’s sovereign immunity. Plaintiff argued that by entering into a
lease agreement with plaintiff, defendant implicitly waives their defense of sovereign
immunity. The Juneau County Circuit Court, The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court all disagreed with the plaintiff on this issue.
Plaintiff then brought this action into the HCN trial court. The Trial court agrees with the
state court that the defendant is protected by sovereign immunity and cannot be sued.
Furthermore, the action is barred according to the principles of res judicata.

CV96-02
CV96-03

Anne Rae Funmaker v. Kathryn Doornbos and the Ho-Chunk Nation;
Dennis Funmaker v. Kathryn Doornbos and the Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Re: Motion to Dismiss)


There is no authoritative law that requires the HCN to interview applicants who apply

Page 21 of 251

Nov. 22, 1996

for a posted job position.


A four-prong test is used to decide whether to impose a temporary injunction. The four
prong test determines for resolution: whether there is no adequate remedy at law,
whether the threat of injury outweighs the harm of the injunction, whether the petitioner
has a reasonable likelihood of success based on the merits, and whether the injunction
serves the public interest
Plaintiff applied for a job in response to notice advertising an open position. Defendant
filled the position with a person who had likewise applied for the position. Plaintiff was not
granted an interview, and wherefore she consequently filed several grievances exhausting
the Administrative Review Process. Plaintiff then brought this action to the HCN Trial
Court. The HCN Trial Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted because there is no authoritative law that requires the HCN to
interview applicants who apply for a posted job position.
Plaintiff also brought an age discrimination claim. However, the court finds no basis or
supporting evidence for that claim. Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof required in
such an action.
Plaintiff claimed that she was harmed in that she did not receive a promotion and resulting
pay raise. The Trial Court entertained the idea of ordering a Temporary Injunction that
would prevent further harm to all employees of the Historic Preservation Department. The
Court utilized the four prong test.: whether there is no adequate remedy at law, whether the
threat of injury outweighs the harm of the injunction, whether the petitioner has a reasonable
likelihood of success based on the merits, and whether the injunction serves the public
interest. The court found there was no adequate remedy at law, the threat of injury does not
outweigh the harm of the temporary injunction, the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits, and the injunction does not serve the public interest. Therefore, since there was no
violation of law, the court held that an injunction would be improper.

CV96-41

CV 96-43

In the Interest of Harold J. Funmaker v. Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER
Pursuant to HCN Amended Per Capita Distribution Ordinance § 6.01(b), the Trial Court
granted plaintiff use of his Incompetent Trust Fund for special needs. After exhausting all
other resources, plaintiff requested various items, which the court deemed reasonable.
Kelly Hammes v. Chloris Lowe, Karena Day, Gloria Logan, John Steindorf et al.,
Order (Payment of Court Costs)
The plaintiff shall pay $206.00 in court costs to the Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court, pursuant
to the fee waiver agreement.

Dec. 2, 1996

Dec. 5, 1996

CV 96-16

Andrea Gale Storm v. John Steindorf, Robert Mann, & Daniel Brown
JUDGEMENT
Plaintiff (employee) brings this suit against Defendant (employer). Plaintiff claims
defendants discriminated against her and abused their powers. Plaintiff never filed any
grievance as is required by the HCN personnel policies and procedures manual. Since
plaintiff failed to file a grievance the Trial Court cannot decide the case. Furthermore,
plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof required in either a claim of racial or sex
discrimination, conspiracy, or to support a claim deprivation of equal protection. Judgment
is rendered in favor of the defendants.

Dec. 6, 1996

CV 96-10

Sandra Sliwicki v. Rainbow Casino, Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT (Reversed and remanded)
 A notice of termination must inform an employee of what they did wrong so that they
might properly present their side in the grievance process. Furthermore, the notice
should include specific incidence noting the date and place.
 An employee has a due process right to know why they are being fired or terminated so

Dec. 9, 1996

Page 22 of 251

they might appeal it in a meaningful way.
 The HCN must clearly make it known how appeals are to be filed including stating how
many days an employee has to appeal and where an employee must go to perfect an
appeal.
 The plaintiff alleged incidents were insufficient to warrant a departure from progressive
discipline
Plaintiff was terminated from her work for a laundry list of reasons. However, the Trial
Court found none of the reasons specific enough in instance, time or place to afford plaintiff
substantial due process in order to defend herself against the allegations. Furthermore,
plaintiff, filed grievances. In addition, the Trial Court found that since the grievance process
at level 1 and 2 were futile, principles of estoppel bar the defendant from requiring strict
adherence to the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the Administrative Review
Process.
The Trial Court found that plaintiff’s termination notice was not proper notice of wrong
doing as is required by the HCN. Furthermore, the Trial Court found that since the Chief
Gaming Officer was not plaintiff’s direct supervisor he exceeded his authority by ordering
the plaintiff’s supervisor terminate her and improperly restricted the supervisor’s options in
dealing with her own employee. The Personnel Policy manual states that the decision to
suspend an employee is typically the responsibility of the supervisor.
Furthermore, the Trial Court held that the defendant violated the progressive discipline
policy without sufficient evidence to warrant such a departure The Plaintiff had never been
disciplined prior to termination.
The Trial Court ordered that the plaintiff be reinstated to the same or comparable position.
In addition, The Trial Court awarded plaintiff the maximum relief within the jurisdiction of
the Court, $2000. In addition, the case is remanded to defendant for more appropriate
disciplinary action if any.
CV 96-52

David Abangan, HCN Wo-Lduk Editor, v. Karen Day, HCN Exec. Admin. Officer
ORDER

Dec. 17, 1996



A Settlement Agreement without request for modification or change, is permanent until
leave is given by the Court
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant because defendant wrongfully assigned an
employee to a position, against a Settlement Agreement entered into between plaintiff and
said employee. The HCN Trial Court held that a Settlement Agreement without request for
modification or change, is permanent until the Court gives leave. The Trial Court ordered
briefs from both parties and ordered the affected employee to be removed and barred from
work per the Settlement Agreement until resolution of this case.
CV95-24

In Re: Diane Lonetree
JUDGEMENT (Re: Contempt of Court )
·
The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly and not arbitrarily,
capriciously, or oppressively.
·
In determining whether a respondent neglected and/or avoided the requirements of
a Court Order subpoena, the standard applied is by a preponderance of the evidence
shown.
·
To gain the respect of the court, and compel a witness, party or other persons to
comply with the demands of providing all persons’ due process rights, failure to
testify or appear before and comply with the Court’s order is to be punishable by
contempt powers.
Respondent ordered to serve five hours of community service for failure to comply with a
Court Order subpoena.

Dec. 18, 1996

CV 95-28

Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature v. Chloris Lowe, Jr.
Administrative Order

Dec. 20, 1996

Page 23 of 251

The purpose of this order is to brief the parties that the newly assigned Judge is
Associate Trial Court Judge Greendeer-Lee.

HO-CHUNK NATION TRIAL COURT
1997 OPINIONS
Case No.

Case

Decided

CV96-22

Coalition for Fair Government II v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr. and Kathyleen Lone Tree
Whiterabbit

Jan. 3, 1997

CV96-24

Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature v. Chloris A. Lowe, Jr., Kathyleen Lone Tree Whiterabbit,
General Council Planning Committee and Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board
JUDGEMENT

For a notice to be legitimate, it must: 1) be prepared and served by people with the
authority to prepare and serve such notices; 2) give sufficient information to allow
a meaningful reply; and 3) afford adequate time to prepare a reply.

The interest a public employee has in his job constitutes property. Thus, he cannot
be fired without the rudiments of fair procedure. Under the HCN Constitution, a
legislator cannot be removed absent malfeasance or recall. Legislators are entitled
to due process, which requires sufficient notice and a fair hearing to protect their
property interest in their job.
The removal of the three legislators deprived them of the right to due process. Thus, their
removal was invalidated.

CV96-60

In the interest of Maxine P. Johnson v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)

In order to release trust funds for special needs from a trust account, a two-prong
test must be met: 1) the needs of the trust beneficiary are not being met from any
other Tribal fund, or any state or federal entitlement; and 2) upon a finding of
special need by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Plaintiff provided evidence of meeting the test through financial billing statements, a Court
ordered Annual Accounting statement, two foreign Court orders, and trial testimony.

Jan. 3, 1997

CV96-30

Sheila White Eagle v. Ho-Chunk Nation
JUDGEMENT (Dismissed)
·
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof, and must demonstrate (1) that a harm
exists (2) that the defendant caused the harm, and (3) that there is an available
remedy for the harm within the power of the Court to grant;
·
In considering a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must accept all well pleaded factual
allegations as true and must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, in
this case the grievant. Susan Rowlee v. Majestic Pines Casino, PRC95-011, (HCN
Tr. Ct., April 10, 1996), quoting Pierre Decorah v. Rainbow Casino, CV 95-018
(HCN Tr. Ct., March 15, 1996);
·
The Court is permitted to “look beyond the jurisdictional allegations to the
complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to
determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Id.; Pierre Decorah v.
Rainbow Casino, CV 95-018, quoting Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d at
191 citing with approval Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th
Cir. 1979).
·
Under the dictates of the HCN CONSTITUTION and the TRIBAL ENROLLMENT AND
MEMBERSHIP ACT OF 1995, the HCN Judiciary may only award an equitable
remedy in actions based on enrollment disputes.
Was the plaintiff, on behalf of her minor children, entitled to benefits bestowed by the HCN

Jan. 27, 1997

Page 24 of 251

in the absence of sufficient proof to demonstrate entitlement to benefits alleged to be
accumulated prior to proof of enrollment? The plaintiff challenged the denial of medical
assistance and sought clarification of the enrollment status of her children. She had the
burden of proof to demonstrate that both she and her minor children were been harmed.
The grant of retroactive benefits, prohibited by the TRIBAL ENROLLMENT AND
MEMBERSHIP ACT OF 1995, would violate the ART. II § 6, provision of the Constitution.
Since a retroactive award would likely include the grant of past per capita distributions and
payments, the case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
CV96-78

In the interest of Mercedes Blackcoon by Dale Hazard v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment
Department
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
The appointment of the plaintiff as “conservator” provided evidence of the need for a
guardian to protect the interests of the trust’s beneficiary.

Jan. 30, 1997

CV97-76

In the interest of Jessica Loredo by Mary Decorah v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Denying Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)

All attempts to receive federal, state and tribal entitlements must be exhausted
before trust funds can be released.
The Plaintiff acknowledged ignorance about the possibility of Tribal, federal and state
entitlement programs which might meet the needs of the trust beneficiary. Trust monies
cannot be used to assist with citizenship or pay telephone costs not directly related to the
welfare of the trust beneficiary.

Jan. 30, 1997

CV96-19

Donaldson A. June v. Kate Doornbos, HCN Administration Dept.
ORDER
·
[T]he trial court is given the discretion to enter a default judgement if an answer is
not timely filed.” June v. Doornbos, et al., SU96-03 at 2 ¶ 2 (HCN S. Ct., Oct. 15,
1996).
This matter was appealed to the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court, and having granted
appellate review the trial court decision was reversed and remanded on procedural grounds
and an interpretation of the Ho-Chunk Nation (HCN) Interim Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jan. 30, 1997

CV-95-28

Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature v. Chloris A. Lowe Jr., President of the Ho-Chunk Nation
and Jo Deen B. Lowe, Attorney General of the Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER

Jan. 30, 1997



In deciding whether an appeal or motion is filed within the required deadline, The
Court will not count weekends, and will consider the motion filed the date it is
postmarked,



Tribal Courts must exhaust all tribal remedies in dealing with issues in Indian Country



Federal Law is merely persuasive authority on tribal law issues arising in tribal court.
Federal Law is only required when a relevant federal question is at issue.

 Clan affiliation is not basis for recusal.
The defendant/executive of the HCN appointed the Tribal Attorney. The HCN legislature
has the authority to approve Tribal Attorneys contracts. This gives the Plaintiffs the
Constitutional authority to bring this claim. The Supreme Court held that the Executive
Branch does not have the ability to hire and employ legal council only the legislative branch
has that authority.
The Trial Court denied a motion to recuse, because the defendants have failed to show a
personal or financial interest.
CV-96-60

In the interest of Maxine P. Johnson v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granted Motion to Modify)

Page 25 of 251

Jan. 30, 1997



HCN members receiving per capita distribution shall be informed of their responsibility
to pay applicable taxes.
This is an order to release funds from plaintiffs trust account.

CV-96-59

Steven Camden v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
ORDER (Granting Stay)
The HCN gaming commission decided that plaintiff was unsuitable for working in gaming
operations. The plaintiff is attempting to keep that information from going into a databank
run by the National Indian Gaming Commission. The Judge ordered a stay to gather more
information regarding the court’s jurisdiction. To decide this case.

Feb. 12, 1997

CV96-67

In the interest of Mary Littlegeorge by Sara Abbott v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
The Plaintiff showed special need by giving proof. Evidence included a foreign Court
order appointing her legal guardian, real estate records, property tax assessments, SSI
reports, and her testimony at trial.

Feb. 14, 1997

CV97-03

In Re: Lucinda L. Littlesoldier by Helen Littlesoldier v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs In Part)
Showing of sufficient need being met, special steps should be taken to mitigate loss of one
month’s SSI payment, when that loss is triggered by the release of trust funds.

Feb. 19, 1997

CV96-15

Jean Day et al., v. HCN Personnel Dept.
ORDER (Motion to Reconsider and Decision)
·
For a Motion for Reconsideration, the moving party must show that the court has
one or more of the following factors:
(1) overlooked, misapplied or failed to consider a statute, decision or principle
directly controlling; (2) overlooked or misconceived some material fact or
proposition of law; (3) overlooked or misconceived a material question in the case;
or (4) the law applied in the ruling has been subsequently changed by court
decision or statute.
The Court used Specific Performance as a remedy for plaintiffs, who sought to regain lost
annual leave hours when they were harmed by short notice in a shortened work week.
Using the standards for a Motion for Reconsideration, which were established by the Court
in Babcock v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission, CV-95-08 (HCN Tr. Ct., March 14, 1996),
the Court held that the plaintiffs could choose to work the lost hours without additional
compensation.

Feb. 27, 1997

CV96-87

In the interest of Myron A. Funmaker by Judith Ann Thundercloud v. Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
·
Special need requires that the petitioner demonstrate a ward has special needs, i.e.,
health, education and welfare, that cannot be satisfied by resort to State, Federal or
other Tribal entitlement programs.
The requested purchases were found commercially reasonable and, considering the age of
the guardians, present vehicle, necessary for safe, reliable and efficient transportation to
medical appointments. In addition, insurance was also required to protect the ward’s
property once acquired, e.g., automobile and personal property insurance.

Feb. 28, 1997

CV-97-03

Interest in Lucinda L. Littlesoldier v. by Helen Littlesoldier, Guardian v. Ho-Chunk Nation
Enrollment
JUDGMENT (Supplemental Order)
The Court denied the petition by Petitioner due to lack of purpose to purchase a vehicle
with ITF monies.

Mar. 11, 1997

Page 26 of 251

CV97-12

Chloris A. Lowe, Jr. v. HCN, HCN Legislature, HCN General Council
ORDER (Denying Preliminary Injunction)

Mar. 21, 1997

The President is barred from suing the Ho-Chunk Nation (“HCN”) or the HCN
legislature unless the nation or the legislature waive their sovereign immunity., or an
official is acting outside the scope of their authority.
Plaintiff was removed from the executive office after which he brought this case against
the general council, and the legislators. Plaintiff claims that he was not given adequate
notice of the general council hearing and that was a violation of his due process. However,
plaintiff’s vigorous defense of the allegations at prior occasions, is indicative o f the fact
the plaintive had notice and had ample time to defend himself from the claims brought by
the general council. Nevertheless, the Trial Court held that both the general council and the
legislature are protected from suit in accordance with sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff also claimed that the Vie-President was to young to serve as president because he
was only 34. However, the Trial Court did not hear this case because of the bar of sovereign
immunity.


CV-96-29

Jean M. Stacy Snow v. Barry L. Blackhawk
JUDGMENT (Dismissal)

Mar. 21, 1997

 It is the burden of the plaintiff to prosecute this case.
The court dismissed this case due to plaintiff’s failure to take action to prosecute this case.
CV-96-40

Angie Waege v. Steven Camden
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant claiming defamation, because plaintiff
claims that defendant had harassed plaintiff in the past and then defamed her by seeking a
restraining order in Monroe County court . However, the judge dismissed the case. The
HCN Trial Court stated that it had no jurisdiction since plaintiffs had not claimed that the
actions occurred on tribal land and the claim was between 2 private citizens.

Mar. 26, 1997

CV 97-12

Chloris A. Lowe, Jr., v. Ho-Chunk Nation, Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature, and Ho-Chunk
Nation General Council
Order (Erratum)
This Order was established to correct minor factual and grammatical errors to the order
dated March 21, 1997.

Apr. 3, 1997

CV96-45

Kathy Ruditys et al., v. Ho-Chunk Nation Enrollment Dept.
JUDGEMENT (Dismissal)
Case dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available administrative remedy and
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Apr. 7, 1997

CV97-05

Ho-Chunk Housing Authority v. Lucinda Naquayoma
JUDGEMENT
·
CAPC provides that any debt or monetary obligation then due or owing by a tribal
member to the Nation shall be recognized and enforced by the Nation against the
Per Capita Share at the time of Payment of the Per Capita Distribution.
Withholding brought under the CLAIMS AGAINST PER CAPITA ORDINANCE [CAPC] for
debt owed to HCN Housing Authority.

Apr. 9, 1997

CV 97-03

In the interest of Lucinda Littlesoldier, by Helen Littlesoldier v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration
The plaintiff brought this order to the Court for reconsideration of a ITF monies release
for Lucinda Littlesoldier for a vehicle, the Court granted the request and released the
monies.

Apr. 9, 1997

CV-96-77

Brian Hobart v. Majestic Pines Casino

Apr.21, 1997

Page 27 of 251

ORDER (Granting Motion to Dismiss)


The Parol Evidence Rule does not allow the court hear extrinsic evidence on a contract
which the parties had intended to be final.
Plaintiff an employee at defendant’s casino was discharged from his position after
numerous unexcused absences which was a violation of the HCN PERSONNEL
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES manual. Defendant brought this motion to have the
case dismissed on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Trial
Court granted that motion.

CV96-33

Francis P. Rave, Sr., v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
JUDGEMENT
·
A gaming license is not a constitutionally protected right but a privilege granted for
a limited period of time. HCN GAMING ORDINANCE § 212; Cholka v. HC Gaming
Comm’n, CV 95-07 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 5, 1996).
·
Despite the fact that a gaming license is not a liberty or property interest within the
meaning of the HCN CONSTITUTION, a gaming license is sufficiently important to
hold the Commission strictly to the standards as outlined in the HCN GAMING
ORDINANCE.
·
The Commission’s right to summarily suspend a licensee without informing him
why prior to the hearing is strictly limited by considerations of fundamental
fairness unless a clear and present danger to the gaming enterprise or other exigent
circumstance justifying the summary suspension.

Apr. 23, 1997

CV95-30

Diane Kirby v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Commission
ORDER (Intent to Dismiss)
Notice to parties of Court’s Intent to Dismiss, under HCN R. Civ. P. 56, for failure to
prosecute.

Apr. 25, 1997

CV-97-31

Roy Littlegeorge v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
ORDER (Granting Judicial Review)
Petitioner claimed that respondent was exceeding their scope of authority and violated the
Ho-Chunk constitution.

May 3, 1997

CV96-94

Joelene Smith v. Tammy Lang and HCN
JUDGEMENT
·
What constitutes a comparable position or comparable employment that requires
that there be facts sufficient for the Court to rely upon in making a factually based
determination.
·
It is not for the judiciary to make an initial determination of what is comparable
employment. It is the employer’s responsibility to place a wrongfully terminated
employee or a former employee.
·
If the employee is dissatisfied or aggrieved by the placement, then the employee
must return to court providing a factual basis claim to assert that the new
placement position is not a comparable placement.
·
A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled by the HCN PERSONNEL POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES to be restored not to a position which would be the precise
equivalent of that which she had been terminated, but rather to a position which,
on considering the terms and conditions affecting that particular employment,
would be comparable to the position which she would have held if she had
remained continuously employed.
·
The employment standard applied by the Court provides that any person who is
restored to a position in accordance with the law or a settlement agreement should
be so restored in such a manner as to give her such status in her employment as she
would have enjoyed if she had continued in such employment continuously from

May 7, 1997

Page 28 of 251

the time of her termination from employment until the time of her restoration to
such employment.
In establishing comparable position, the Court cited Sandra Sliwicki v. Rainbow Casino,
CV96-10 (HCN Tr. Ct., Dec. 9, 1996) and Simplot, Severson, Ravet v. HCN Department of
Health, CV95-26, 27, CV96-05 (HCN Tr. Ct., Aug. 29, 1996)(rewarding plaintiffs
reinstatement of the same or a “comparable position”). The Court distinguished Nettie
Kingsley v. HCN Personnel Department PRC93-026 (HCN Tr. Ct., Apr. 10, 1996)(plaintiff
unqualified to resume her former position because she lacked a required gaming license). In
Kingsley, the Court stated “comparable” meant a job with similar duties and
responsibilities, along with a similar rate of pay. Since the Head Start program did not have
licensing requirements and a reorganized position was available at the same rate of pay,
with similar duties and responsibilities, the Court reasoned that Smith could return to work
within the Head Start Program.
The Court also examined whether the defendant as a HCN official had the authority to
eliminate the plaintiff’s position within the Head Start Program. The Head Start Manual
provides that the Health Nutrition Coordinator, Family Services Coordinator and Education
Disabilities Coordinator are permanent full time employees; therefore, elimination of any of
these positions would require an amendment to or revision of Head Start’s personnel
policies and procedures law by the legislature.
CV97-65

Roberta Greendeer v. HCN Election Board
MOTION TO DISMISS (Granted)
Challenge of Election was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner failed to bring the election
challenge within the statutorily allowed 10 days from the date of election result
certification.

May 8, 1997

CV 97-69

HCN Home Ownership Program v. Scott Hindes
Order (re: Impound)
The defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff; therefore, HCN Home Ownership Program
wishes to hold the Per Capita Distribution from the plaintiff in order to satisfy the debt.
The Court ordered that the Per Capita monies be impounded.

May 16, 1997

CV97-64

Nettie Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board
ORDER
Case dismissed on Motion of Defendant for failure to prosecute.

May 16, 1997

CV-96-88

Joan Whitewater v. Millie Decorah, as Finance Director and Sandy Martin, as Executive
Director of Personnel
Stipulation and Order for Partial Settlement
Plaintiffs brought this action because of an unfair wage cut. Defendant agrees to raise
plaintiffs wage but not to the satisfaction of the plaintiff. The Trial Court will decide on
what constitutes a fair wage. The Court will also decide whether the plaintiff should receive
litigation expenses as a remedy.

May 20, 1997

CV-96-41

In the interest of Harold J. Funmaker, by Carol Naquayouma v. Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
·
A guardian is required and obligated under Ho-Chunk law to “maintain records
sufficient to demonstrate that the funds disbursed were expended as required by
this Ordinance and any applicable Federal law.”
HCN PER CAPITA
DISBURSEMENT ORDINANCE, § 6.01(b).
·
[A guardian should] specifically ask for supplemental money, if detailed requests
have not been made.
·
Under the INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., the
guardian is responsible for the filing of any federal income tax reports that may be
incurred by the release of said funds.
The Court appointed guardian of a 95 year old Ho-Chunk, previously found legally

June 6, 1997

Page 29 of 251

incompetent, returned to Court requesting the release of additional trust funds from the
ward’s per capita trust to pay for the items previously approved by this Court. In support of
this request, the guardian submitted a financial report. The report indicated that the
guardian had exceeded the amount of funds allocated for Mr. Funmaker’s benefit by
$694.34. This amount had been paid out of the guardian’s own funds. Moreover, the
petitioner incurred greater expenses and bought fewer items than approved. The Court
recognized the requests filed met the “special needs” criteria.
CV-97-75

In the interest of David Le Sieur, Dustin Constino, Nicole Halfaday, and Dale Halfaday by
Madeline Misek v. Adam Hall
JUDGEMENT (Dismissed)
·
The HCN Tribal Enrollment and Membership Act of 1995, HCNL 015-95,
requires a final determination rejecting an individual for enrollment prior to
seeking an appeal in the tribal court.
·
The HCN CONSTITUTION, ART. II §6 states explicitly that “[a]ny person who has
been rejected for enrollment or who has been removed from the Membership Roll
shall have the right to appeal to the Judiciary for remedy in equity consistent with
this Constitution.”
Plaintiff, on behalf of four minor children, sought a court order to compel the HCN
Enrollment Office to enroll the children. Although the Complaint provided undisputed
information that the four minor children were the offspring of an enrolled member of the
HCN and that the children were not enrolled with the HCN, the paternity of the father,
Agatha Constino, was in dispute and subject to challenge. Because the plaintiff did not
provide proof of rejection for enrollment nor any documentation that she had exhausted the
available administrative remedies, the Court denied the plaintiff’s request. The matter was
dismissed until the minor children have been rejected for enrollment and the plaintiff can
show that available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

June 10, 1997

CV 97-22

In the Matter of the Estate George Thunder Hindsley
Order
Due to the passing of Mr. George Thunder Hindsley the petitioner requests the release
of CTF monies. The Court granted the release of $1000 to the petitioner.

Jun. 19, 1997

CV-97-29

Gloria Visintin v. Ho-Chunk Nation and Office of the President
ORDER

June 19, 1997



Ho-Chunk Nation employees are not allowed to grieve disciplinary matters while on
probation.
The Trial Court remanded this case to be heard through an administrative review process.
The distinction to be decided is whether this promoted employee was temporary or
permanent since while being promoted an employee is always on probation.
CV-97-84

James Greendeer v. HCN Election Board, Wade Blackdeer, Kathy Blackdeer, Tara
Blackdeer Walter and one or more John Does
JUDGEMENT (Dismissed)

Since every voter enjoys an automatic right to challenge an election pursuant to the
HCN Constitution, the Election Board does not have a per se claim of sovereign
immunity in this instance.

The court cannot award monetary damages, but can utilize equitable remedies -like nullifying an election -- in cases against the Election Board.

To prove defamation against a public figure, one must show 1) information
concerning the public figure was circulated; 2) the information circulated was
false; 3) the information was designed to injure his reputation; and 4) that the
information was prepared and broadcast with either actual malice or reckless
disregard of the truth. (See N.Y. Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).)

The Election Board cannot require that a recall petition include “charges” against a
Legislator. A recall is not a removal for malfeasance, and only needs a general

Page 30 of 251

July 7, 1997

reason, if any at all.

“Political speech” merits the highest protection.
Plaintiff alleged a recall petition contained “defamatory” information, making the recall
election “unfair.” The issues in the case contrast critical questions of the right to free speech
and the need to protect legislators against false and defamatory statements. The plaintiff
failed to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the information was wholly false, or
that the information was broadcast with “reckless disregard” or “actual malice.” Moreover,
the recall process is essentially political, so the Court should scrupulously avoid
interference.
CV-97-31

Roy Littlegeorge v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
ORDER & Decision to Review the Appeal


Jul. 08, 1997

In accordance with HCN AMENDED AND RESTATED GAMING ORDINANCE
THE Trial Court has jurisdiction to review all decisions except decisions denying
license.



In Order to appeal a gaming ordinance the Plaintiff must submit a bond of $178.97 in
order for the court to review the appeal.
The Trial Court will hear a case where plaintiff is appealing a decision by the HCN gaming
commission.

CV-97-50

Martin Henry v. HCN Gaming Commission
ORDER (Denying Motion to Waive Fees)

July 18, 1997



Plaintiff is obligated to submit a bond or promissory note in the amount of a fine and
the cost of hearing regarding a review of the HCN Gaming Commission.
The Trial Court denied plaintiff the waiver of any fine and will not proceed with the
hearing until plaintiff post a bond or a promissory note in the amount owed to the Gaming
Commission.

CV 97-49

CV-97-48

Gary Snowadzki v. Ho-Chunk Casino, et al.,
Order (Case Consolidation)
After the initiation of his cause of action, the plaintiff failed to appear in Court, and also
failed to offer a brief opposing the Motion to Consolidate. The Court had no choice but
to stand in for the plaintiff and consolidate plaintiff’s action by default.
Emmett Walker, Jr. v. Ho-Chunk Casino et.al.
ORDER for Case Consolidation

July 21, 1997

July 21, 1997



When consolidating cases the court will look to whether the separate cases arise out of
the same action and involves common questions of law and fact.
The Trial Court denied the motion not to consolidate.

CV-97-30

Eric Lonetree v. Ho-Chunk Casino et al.
ORDER for Case Consolidation

July 21, 1997



When consolidating cases the court will look to whether the separate cases arise out of
the same action and involve common questions of law and fact.
The Trial Court denied the motion not to consolidate.

CV-97-93

Vicki J. Houghton v. HCN Election Board
JUDGEMENT (Dismissed)

In order to invalidate an election, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The
plaintiff must show that “but for” the alleged violation by the election Board, the
outcome of the election would have been different.

Insufficient publication of an election by the Election Board might constitute a
violation by giving too little notice to voters.
The Plaintiff failed to show that the alleged violation would have changed the outcome of
the election, so the election was upheld.

Page 31 of 251

July 21, 1997

CV-96-53

Carol Smith v. Bernice Cloud & Rainbow Bingo
JUDGMENT


In discrimination case the plaintiff has the burden of proving that defendants conduct
was motivated by animosity based on a suspect classification or perceived
classification.



In harassment case the plaintiff has the burden of proof in demonstrating harassment by
defendant.



The Trial Court views unfair treatment as actions of one employee abusing their
position by treating another employee significantly differently than his peers, who are
similarly situated, effecting employee’s work conditions, compensation or benefits.

July 24, 1997



When reviewing a claim for general harassment it is not appropriate for an employer to
use the standard of review used for sexual harassment
Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s action at the workplace constituted harassment and
discrimination. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove a discrimination case,
but was able to show a case of harassment, the Trial Court awarded certain reprimands to
be removed from the plaintiff’s files and plaintiff was awarded $2000.

CV 97-29

Gloria Visintin v. Ho-Chunk Nation and Office of the President
Order (Stipulation and Dismissal)
This case ended in a settlement where the Plaintiff received compensation in the amount
of $2000 to all claims against the defendants. Plaintiff also had her termination
expunged from her work record.
Roxanne Price v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Social Services
Order (Stipulation and Dismissal)
This case was settled. The plaintiff received compensation and had her termination
changed to a resignation.

Jul. 29, 1997

CV-96-47

Jeremy Rockman v. Jo Ann Jones
ORDER (Garnishing Wages to Satisfy Judgement)
Garnishing wages can be a better route to satisfy a judgment than seizing a car.

Aug. 8, 1997

CV-97-13

Richard Mann v. Ho-Chunk Nation Housing and Public Works Department
ORDER Dismissing For Failure To Pay Filing Fees
Plaintiff failed to pay the required filing fee. Therefore, the Trial Court dismissed his case.

Aug. 18, 1997

CV 97-22

Richard Mann v. Ho-Chunk Nation Housing and Public Works Dept.
Order (Dismissing for failure to pay filing fees)
This order deals with an employment dispute; the Court issued an affidavit. The plaintiff
agreed to pay the fees upon the receipt of his next Per Capita distribution. The payment
was never received, therefore, the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice.
In the Matter of the Estate of George Thunder Hindsley
Order
The Court granted that the decease’s CTF monies be released to the petitioner.

Aug. 18, 1997

In re: Annette Funmaker by Doris Wateski and Doreen Jungen v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs In Part)

To release funds for an adult incompetent, the plaintiff mush show: 1) the funds
are necessary for the health, education or welfare of the adult incompetent; 2) the
needs are not being met by any other Tribal, federal, or state entitlement; and 3) the
interests of the adult incompetent are best served by releasing said moneys to a
guardian.
A sun porch may afford some health benefit, but is insufficient to justify releasing trust
funds.

Sept. 11, 1997

CV 97-53

CV 96-10

CV-97-79

Page 32 of 251

Aug. 3, 1997

Sept. 3, 1997

CV-97-31

Roy Littlegeorge v Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
ORDER (Motion for Reconsidertion Denied)

Sept. 15, 1997



Motion for reconsideration requires a 4 prong test: (1) Did the court overlook,
misapply, or fail to consider a directly controlling statute, decision, or principle? (2)
Did the Court overlook or misconceive some material fact or proposition of law? (3)
Did the court overlook or misconceive a material question in the case? (4) Has the law
applied in the ruling been subsequently changed by court decision or statute?
The plaintiff failed to address the above issues and therefore, the Trial Court denies the
motion for Reconsideration.

CV-97-49

In re: Roberta Goodbear by Shirley Sahr, Guardian v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs In Part)
The Plaintiff showed special need and deserved some compensatory payment to offset the
lost SSI benefits from the trust-fund release.

Sept. 16, 1997

CV-97-58

In re: Roberta Goodbear, Shirley Sahr, Guardian v. HCN Enrollment
Order (Granting Per Capita by Distribution in Part)
This is a petition asking for the release of ITF monies for Roberta Goodbear. The Court
ordered the HCN Treasury Department to release the funds care of Shirley Sahr for the
purchase of a vehicle.

Sept. 16, 1997

CV-97-117

In the interest of Oliver Rockman by Jeremy Rockman v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
Evidence showing the need for special funds included: the plaintiff’s appointment as legal
guardian, and testimony from the trust’s beneficiary, requesting disbursal of trust funds to
guardian.

Sept. 23,1997

CV-97-133

Diane Lone Tree v. Elliott Garvin, Dallas White Wing, Gerald Cleveland, Kevin
Greengrass, Robert Mudd, Wade Blackdeer, Clarence Pettibone, and Robert Funmaker,
Jr.
JUDGEMENT (Denying Petition for Stay and TRO)

The applicable standard for issuing a stay is identical to the standard for issuing a
preliminary injunction: 1) no adequate remedy at law in the form of monetary
damages; 2) the benefit to the plaintiff from granting the injunction outweighs the
harm of the injunction to the defendant; 3) the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits of the action; 4) and the issuance of the stay would serve
the public interest.

In determining the likelihood of success in actions relating to removal of a
legislator by the legislature, two issues stand out: 1) the definition of good cause,
and 2) adequate notice to the one removed. As long as some kind of notice is
provided with some kind of hearing, the procedural requirements are met.
Plaintiff failed to show she had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.

Sept. 26, 1997

CV-97-22

In the Matter of the Estate of George Thunder Hindsley
ORDER (Granting Final Petition for Release of Minor’s Trust Fund)

It is against the public policy of the Nation to permit one member of the Nation
charged with the death of another to benefit by the estate of the deceased member.
A father pled guilty to first degree intentional homicide in the death of his son. Upon the
plea of guilty, the Court released all the trust funds of the deceased son to the mother.

Oct. 3, 1997

CV-97-129

Robert A. Mudd v. HCN Election Board
JUDGEMENT

The HCN Constitution should be read in its entirety, reconciling all relevant
sections to the same effect.

A majority vote means “greater than 50% of the votes cast.” There is no exception

Oct. 3, 1997

Page 33 of 251

for Special Elections or vacant seats.

The 30 day requirement for Special Elections for a vacant seat only mandates that
an election be held within 30 days, not that the vacancy, itself, be filled in 30 days.

Expediency is an improper factor when considering the seating of a Legislatorelect or President-elect.
Run-off election ordered to insure majority-vote winner.
CV-96-33

Francis P. Rave, Sr. v. HCN Gaming Comm’n
JUDGEMENT (Modified After Completion of Remand)

Due process protections require notice and an opportunity to be heard.

An administrative body cannot make arbitrary, capricious decisions or abuse its
discretion. Agency decisions must be reasonable under the circumstances. This
standard of reasonableness requires the agency show a consideration of all the
relevant factors, with a logical and articulated basis for the final decision. The
focus is not the “should” of the decision, but the “how” and the “why” of the
decision. The agency must keep a record sufficient to justify its conclusions.

Statutory interpretation includes a consideration of the purpose of the statute, such
that “justice” should not be the “slave” of grammar.

Remedial statutes should be liberally construed to give effect to the remedy.

Oct. 9, 1997

CV-97-101

In the interest of Susan Redfearn by William Turner v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Petition for Trust Funds)
Foreign court order and testimony provided sufficient evidence of need.

Oct. 10, 1997

CV-97-140

In the Interest of Susan Redfearn by William Turner v. Ho-Chunk nation Enrollment Office
Order (Petition for Trust Funds Granted)
The Court ordered the release of ITF funds to the Petitioner due to the amount of debt the
incompetent was in due to not receiving Per Capita for an extended period of time.

Oct. 10, 1997

CV-96-33

Francis P. Rave, Sr. v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Commission
JUDGMENT (Clarified)
The Trial Court clarifies a previous judgment wherein the judge ordered that the HCN
gaming commission reinstate petitioner into his former position. However, on clarification
the court acknowledges that the HCN Gaming Commission does not have the authority to
hire or fire personnel. Therefore, the Court does not impose this obligation on the Gaming
Commission. Rather, the Court encourages petitioner’s former employment to reconsider
petitioner and after review place him in a position that becomes available.

Oct. 27, 1997

CV-97-140

Robert A. Mudd v. HCN Election Board
ORDER (Invalidating Special Election)

“Clear and convincing evidence” constitutes “proof which results in reasonable
certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy.”
Require new Special Election due to violations of elections rules.

Oct. 27, 1997

CV-97-43

In the interest of Sterling Cloud by Lionel Cloud v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER ( Petition for Minor Per Capita Distribution Denied)

Cannot grant funds for potential violation of federal law.
No funds to finance job training of 14 year old when that job training violates federal labor
laws.

Oct. 30, 1997

CV-96-94

Joelene Smith v. Tammy Lang & HCN
ORDER (Declaration of Suitable Offers)

Goal of judicial remedy is to make plaintiff whole. Can only make plaintiff whole
in employment case by restoring party to rightful place of employment position.

Right terminated when comparable position offered.

Oct. 31, 1997

Page 34 of 251

Plaintiff failed to take comparable position, so no right to remedy.
CV-97-87

In the interest of Myron A. Funmaker by Judith Ann Thundercloud v. Ho-Chunk Nation
ORDER (Granting Petition for Release of Trust funds for Special Needs In Part)
It is imprudent to expend funds for equipment purchases prior to the time of their need.
Paying the advocate fee is reasonable, as the advocate’s actions are “integral” to the
initiation and continuation of the proceeding.

Oct. 31, 1997

CV-97-117

In the interest of Oliver Rockman by Jeremy Rockman v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Granting Supplemental Request for Special Needs)
Plaintiff met burden of proof.

Nov. 3, 1997

CV-97-131

In the interest of Stuart Taylor, Jr. by Stuart Taylor, Sr. v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Denying Petition for Release of Trust Funds for Special Needs)
Class ring does not equal “special need.”

Nov. 3, 1997

CV-97-72

In the interest of Zachary Mitchell by Celena Mitchell v. HCN Enrollment Dept.
ORDER (Denying Petition for Minor Per Capita Distribution))
The plaintiff failed to exhaust all other income sou

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/tribal%3Aho-chunk%3A14ff807006b3d983. Public record. Not legal advice.