# Positive Train Control Systems

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3AE9-17184

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Proposed Rule
- **Published:** July 21, 2009
- **Citation:** 74 FR 35950

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 229, 234, 235, and 236
[Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC03
Positive Train Control Systems

AGENCY:

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY:

FRA proposes regulations implementing a requirement of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 that certain passenger and freight railroads install positive train control systems. The proposal includes required functionalities of the technology and the means by which it would be certified. The proposal also describes the contents of the positive train control implementation plans required by the statute and contains the proposed process for submission of those plans for review and approval by FRA. These proposed regulations could also be voluntarily complied with by entities not mandated to install positive train control systems.

DATES:

(1) Written comments must be received by August 20, 2009. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expenses or delays.

(2) FRA will hold an oral public hearing on a date to be announced in a forthcoming notice.

ADDRESSES:

Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, may be submitted by any of the following methods:

•
Web Site:
Comments should be filed at the Federal eRulemaking Portal,
http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.

•
Fax:
202-493-2251.

•
Mail:
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.

•
Hand Delivery:
Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Instructions:
All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without change to
http://www.regulations.gov
including any personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted comments or materials.

Docket:
For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to
http://www.regulations.gov
at any time or to Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Thomas McFarlin, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Staff Director, Signal & Train Control Division, Federal Railroad Administration, Mail Stop 25, West Building 3rd Floor West, Room W35-332, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6203); or Jason Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, Room W31-217, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6032).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

FRA is issuing this proposed rule to provide regulatory guidance and performance standards for the development, testing, implementation, and use of Positive Train Control (PTC) systems for railroads mandated by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 section 104, Public Law 110-432, 122 Stat. 4854 (Oct. 16, 2008) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) (hereinafter “RSIA08”) to install PTC systems. These regulations may also be voluntarily complied with by entities not mandated to install PTC in lieu of the requirements contained in subpart H of part 236. The proposed rule establishes requirements for PTC system standard design and functionality, the associated submissions for FRA PTC system approval and certification, requirements for training, and required risk-based criteria. The RSIA08 mandates that widespread implementation of PTC across a major portion of the U.S. rail industry be accomplished by December 31, 2015. This proposed rule is intended to provide the necessary Federal oversight, guidance, and assistance toward successful completion of that congressional requirement. This proposed rule also necessitates or results in some minimal revision or amendment to parts 229, 234 and 235, as well as previously existing subparts A through H of part 236.

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Introduction

II. Background

A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology

B. Earlier Efforts to Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation

C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H

III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

IV. RSAC

V. Use of Performance Standards

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

D. Federalism Implications

E. Environmental Impact

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

G. Energy Impact

H. Privacy Act

VIII. The Rule

I. Introduction

This proposed rule provides new performance standards for the implementation and operation of PTC systems as mandated by RSIA08 and as otherwise voluntarily adopted. The proposed rule also details the process and identifies the documents that railroads and operators of passenger trains are to utilize and incorporate in their PTC implementation plans required by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 section 104, Public Law 110-432, 122 Stat. 4854, (Oct. 16, 2008) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) (hereinafter “RSIA08”). The proposal also details the process and procedure for obtaining FRA approval of such plans.

FRA began the process of developing a proposed rule after RSIA08 was signed into law. While developing the proposed rule, FRA applied the performance-based principles embodied in existing subpart H of part 236 to identify and remedy any weaknesses discovered in the subpart H regulatory approach, while exploiting lessons learned from products developed under subpart H. FRA has continued to make performance-based safety decisions while supporting railroads in their development and implementation of PTC system technologies.

Development of the proposed rule was enhanced with the participation of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which tasked a PTC Working Group to provide advice regarding development of implementing regulations for PTC systems and their deployment that are required under RSIA08. The PTC Working Group made a number of consensus recommendations, which have been

identified and included in this proposed rule. The preamble discusses the statutory background, the regulatory background, the RSAC proceedings, the alternatives considered and the rationale for the option selected, the proceedings to date, as well as the comments and conclusions on general issues. Other comments and resolutions are discussed within the corresponding section-by-section analysis.

II. Background

A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology

Since the early 1920s, systems have been in use that can intervene in train operations by warning crews or causing trains to stop if they are not being operated safely because of inattention, misinterpretation of wayside signal indications, or incapacitation of the crew. Pursuant to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—whose safety regulatory activities were later transferred to FRA when it was established in 1967—cab signal systems, automatic train control, and automatic train stop systems were deployed on a significant portion of the national rail system to supplement and enforce the indications of wayside signals and operating speed limitations. However, these systems were expensive to install and maintain, and with the decline of intercity passenger service following the Second World War, the ICC and the industry allowed many of these systems to be discontinued. During this period, railroads were heavily regulated with respect to rates and service responsibilities. The development of the Interstate Highway System and other factors led to reductions in the railroads' revenues without regulatory relief, leading to bankruptcies, railroad mergers, and eventual abandonment of many rail lines. Consequently, railroads focused on fiscal survival, and investments in expensive relay-based train control technology were economically out of reach. The removal of these train control systems, which had never been pervasively installed, permitted train collisions to continue, notwithstanding enforcement of railroad operating rules designed to prevent them.

As early as 1970, following its investigation of the August 20, 1969, head-on collision of two Penn Central Commuter trains near Darien, Connecticut, in which 4 people were killed and 45 people were injured, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked FRA to study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic train control system to protect against operator error and prevent train collisions. Following the Darien accident, the NTSB continued to investigate one railroad accident after another caused by human error. During the next two decades, the NTSB issued a number of safety recommendations asking for train control measures. Following its investigation of the May 7, 1986, rear-end collision involving a Boston and Maine Corporation commuter train and a Consolidated Rail Incorporated (Conrail) freight train in which 153 people were injured, the NTSB recommend that FRA promulgate standards to require the installation and operation of a train control system that would provide for positive train separation. NTSB Recommendation R-87-16 (May 19, 1987),
available at

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/R87_16.pdf.
When the NTSB first established its Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements in 1990, the issue of Positive Train Separation was among the improvements listed, and it remained on the list until just after enactment of RSIA08. Original “Most Wanted” list of Transportation Safety Improvements, as adopted September 1990,
available at

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/original_list.htm.
The NTSB continues to follow the progress of the technology's implementation closely and participated through staff in the most recent PTC Working Group deliberations.

Meanwhile, enactment of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 signaled a shift in public policy that permitted the railroads to shed unprofitable lines, largely replace published “tariffs” with appropriately priced contract rates, and generally respond to marketplace realities, which increasingly demanded flexible service options responsive to customer needs. The advent of microprocessor-based electronic control systems and digital data radio technology during the mid-1980s led the freight railroad industry, through the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the Railway Association of Canada, to explore the development of Advanced Train Control Systems (ATCS). With broad participation by suppliers, railroads, and FRA, detailed specifications were developed for a multi-level “open” architecture that would permit participation by many suppliers while ensuring that systems deployed on various railroads would work in harmony as trains crossed corporate boundaries. ATCS was intended to serve a variety of business purposes, in addition to enhancing the safety of train operations. Pilot versions of ATCS and a similar system known as Advanced Railroad Electronic Systems (ARES) were tested relatively successfully, but the systems were never deployed on a wide scale primarily due to cost. However, sub-elements of these systems were employed for various purposes, particularly for replacement of pole lines associated with signal systems.

Collisions, derailments, and incursions into work zones used by roadway workers continued as a result of the absence of effective enforcement systems designed to compensate for the effects of fatigue and other human factors. Renewed emphasis on rules compliance and Federal regulatory initiatives, including rules for the control of alcohol and drug use in railroad operations, operational testing and inspection programs designed to verify railroad rules compliance, requirements for qualification and certification of locomotive engineers, and negotiated rules for roadway worker protection led to some reduction in risk. However, the lack of an effective collision avoidance system allowed the continued occurrence of accidents, some involving tragic losses of life and significant property damage.

B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation

As the NTSB continued to highlight the opportunities for accident prevention associated with emerging train control technology through its investigations and findings, Congress showed increasing interest, mandating three separate reports over the period of a decade. In 1994, FRA reported to Congress on this problem, calling for implementation of an action plan to deploy PTC systems (Railroad Communications and Train Control, July 1994 (hereinafter “1994 Report”)). The 1994 Report forecasted substantial benefits of advanced train control technology in supporting a variety of business and safety purposes, but noted that an immediate regulatory mandate for PTC could not be justified based upon normal cost-benefit principals relying on direct safety benefits. The report outlined an aggressive Action Plan implementing a public-private sector partnership to explore technology potential, deploy systems for demonstration, and structure a regulatory framework to support emerging PTC initiatives.

Following through on the 1994 Report, FRA committed approximately $40 million through the Next Generation High Speed Rail Program and the Research and Development Program to support development,

testing, and deployment of PTC prototype systems in the Pacific Northwest, Michigan, Illinois, Alaska, and some Eastern railroads. FRA also initiated a comprehensive effort to structure an appropriate regulatory framework for facilitating voluntary implementation of PTC and for evaluating future safety needs and opportunities.

In September of 1997, FRA asked the RSAC to address the issue of PTC. The RSAC accepted three tasks: Standards for New Train Control Systems (Task 1997-06), Positive Train Control Systems—Implementation Issues (Task 1997-05), and Positive Train Control Systems—Technologies, Definitions, and Capabilities (Task 1997-04). The PTC Working Group was established, comprised of representatives of labor organizations, suppliers, passenger and freight railroads, other Federal agencies, and interested state departments of transportation. The PTC Working Group was supported by FRA counsel and staff, analysts from the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and advisors from the NTSB staff.

In 1999, the PTC Working Group provided to the Federal Railroad Administrator a consensus report (“1999 Report”) with an indication that it would be continuing its efforts. The report defined the PTC core functions to include: Prevention of train-to-train collisions (positive train separation); enforcement of speed restrictions, including civil engineering restrictions (curves, bridges,
etc.
) and temporary slow orders; and protection for roadway workers and their equipment operating under specific authorities. The PTC Working Group identified additional safety functions that might be included in some PTC architectures: Provide warning of on-track equipment operating outside the limits of authority; receive and act upon hazard information, when available, in a more timely or more secure manner (
e.g.,
compromised bridge integrity, wayside detector data); and provide for future capability by generating data for transfer to highway users to enhance warning at highway-rail grade crossings. The PTC Working Group stressed that efforts to enhance highway-rail grade crossing safety must recognize the train's necessary right of way at grade crossings and that it is important that warning systems employed at highway-rail grade crossings be highly reliable and “fail-safe” in their design.

As the PTC Working Group's work continued, other collaborative efforts, including development of Passenger Equipment Safety Standards (including private standards through the American Public Transit Association), Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness rules, and proposals for improving locomotive crashworthiness (including improved fuel tank standards) have targeted reduction in collision and derailment consequences.

In 2003, in light of technological advances and potential increased cost and system savings related to prioritized deployment of PTC systems, the Appropriations Committees of Congress requested that FRA update the costs and benefits for the deployment of PTC and related systems. As requested, FRA carried out a detailed analysis that was filed in August of 2004 (“2004 Report”), which indicated that under one set of highly controversial assumptions, substantial public benefits would likely flow from the installation of PTC systems on the railroad system. Further, the total amount of these benefits was subject to considerable controversy. While many of the other findings of the 2004 Report were disputed, there were no data submitted to challenge the 2004 Report finding that reaffirmed earlier conclusions that the safety benefits of PTC systems were relatively small in comparison to the large capital and maintenance costs. Accordingly, FRA continued to believe that an immediate regulatory mandate for widespread PTC implementation could not be justified based upon traditional cost-benefit principles relying on direct railroad safety benefits.
Benefits and Costs of Positive Train Control
(Report in Response to Committees on Appropriations, August 2004).

Despite the economic infeasibility of PTC based on safety benefits alone, as outlined in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Reports, FRA continued with regulatory and other efforts to facilitate and encourage the voluntary installation of PTC systems. As part of the High Speed Rail Initiative, and in conjunction with the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), the AAR, the State of Illinois, and the Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP), FRA created the North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Program, which set out to describe a single standardized open source PTC architecture and system. UP's line between Springfield and Mazonia, Illinois was selected for initial installation of a train control system to support Amtrak operations up to 110 mph, and the system was installed and tested on portions of that line. Although the system did not prove viable as then conceived, the project hastened the development of PTC technology that was subsequently employed in other projects. Promised standards for interoperability of PTC systems also proved elusive.

In addition to financially supporting the NAJPTC Program, FRA continued to work with the rail carriers, rail labor, and suppliers on regulatory reforms to facilitate voluntary PTC implementation. The regulatory reform effort culminated when FRA issued a final rule on March 7, 2005, establishing a technology neutral safety-based performance standard for processor-based signal and train control systems. This new regulation, codified as subpart H to part 236, was carefully crafted to encourage the voluntary implementation and operation of processor-based signal and train control systems without impairing technological development. 70 FR 11052 (Mar. 7, 2005).

FRA intended that final rule—developed in close cooperation with rail management, rail labor, and suppliers—to further facilitate individual railroad efforts to voluntarily develop and deploy cost effective PTC technologies that would make system-wide deployment more economically viable. It also appeared very possible that major railroads would elect to make voluntary investments in PTC to enhance safety, improve service quality, and foster efficiency (
e.g.,
better asset utilization, reduced fuel use through train pacing).

C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H

While FRA and RSAC worked to develop consensus on the regulations that would become subpart H, the railroads continued with PTC prototype development. The technology neutral, performance-based regulatory process established by subpart H proved to be very successful in facilitating the development of other PTC implementation approaches. Although the railroads prototype development efforts were generally technically successful and offered significant improvements in safety, costs of nationwide deployment continued to be untenable. Information gained from prototype efforts did little to reduce the estimated costs for widespread implementation of the core PTC safety functions on the nation's railroads.

Working under subpart H, the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS), and UP undertook more aggressive design and implementation work. The new subpart H regulatory approach also made it feasible for smaller railroads such as the Alaska Railroad and the Ohio Central Railroad to begin voluntary design and implementation work on PTC systems

that best suited their needs. FRA provided, and continues to provide, technical assistance and guidance regarding regulatory compliance to enable the railroads to more effectively design, install, and test their respective systems.

In December 2006, FRA approved the initial version of the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) product for deployment on 35 of BNSF's subdivisions (“ETMS I Configuration”) comprising single track territory that was either non-signaled or equipped with traffic control systems. In a separate proceeding, FRA agreed that ETMS could be installed in lieu of restoring a block signal system on a line for which discontinuance had been authorized followed by a significant increase in traffic. During the same period, BNSF successfully demonstrated a Switch Point Monitoring System (SPMS)—a system that contains devices attached to switches that electronically report the position of the switches to the railroad's central dispatching office or the crew of an approaching train—and a Track Integrity Warning System (TIWS)—a system that electronically reports to the railroad's central dispatching office or the crew of an approaching train if there are any breaks in the rail that might lead to derailments. FRA believes both of these technologies help to reduce risk in non-signaled territory and are forward-compatible for use with existing and new PTC systems. To be forward-compatible, not to be confused with the similar concept of extensibility, a system must be able to gracefully provide input intended for use in later system versions. The introduction of a forward-compatible technology implies that older devices can partly understand and provide data generated or used by new devices or systems. The concept can be applied to electrical interfaces, telecommunication signals, data communication protocols, file formats, and computer programming languages. A standard supports forward-compatibility if older product versions can receive, read, view, play, execute, or transmit data to the new standard. In the case of wayside devices, they are said to be forward compatible if they can appropriately communicate and interact with a PTC system when later installed. A wayside device might serve the function of providing only information or providing information and accepting commands from a new system.

In addition to scheduling the installation of the ETMS I configuration as capital funding became available, BNSF voluntarily undertook the design and testing of complementary versions of ETMS that would support BNSF operations on more complex track configurations, at higher allowable train speeds, and with additional types of rail traffic. Meanwhile, CSXT was in the process of redesigning and relocating the test bed for its Communications Based Train Management (CBTM) system, which it has tested for several years, and UP and NS were working on similar systems using vital onboard processing.

As congressional consideration of legislation that resulted in the RSIA08 commenced, all four major railroads had settled on the core technology developed for them by Wabtec Railway Electronics (“Wabtec”). As the legislation progressed, the railroads and Wabtec worked toward greater commonality in the basic functioning of the onboard system with a view toward interoperability. Accordingly, ETMS is now a generic architectural description of one type of PTC system. Examples of ETMS include the non-vital PTC systems of BNSF's ETMS I and ETMS II, CSXT's CBTM, UP's Vital Train Management System (VTMS), and NS's Optimized Train Control (OTC). Further work is being undertaken by BNSF to advance the capability of ETMS by integrating Amtrak operations (ETMS III). For a description of system enhancements planned by BNSF as per the Product Safety Plan filed in accordance with subpart H, see FRA Docket No. 2006-23687, Document 0017, at pp. 40-43.

While the freight railroads' efforts for developing and installing PTC systems progressed over a relatively long period of time, starting with demonstrations of ATCS and ARES in the late 1980s and culminating in the initial ETMS Product Safety Plan approval in December of 2006, Amtrak demonstrated its ability to turn on revenue-quality PTC systems on its own railroad in support of high speed rail. Beginning in the early 1990s, Amtrak developed plans for enhanced high speed service on the Northeast Corridor (NEC), which included electrification and other improvements between New Haven and Boston and introduction of the Acela trainsets as the premium service from Washington to New York and New York to Boston. In connection with these improvements, which support train speeds up to 150 mph, Amtrak undertook to install the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) as a supplement to existing cab signals and automatic train control (speed control). Together, these systems deliver PTC core functionalities. In support of this effort, FRA issued an order for the installation of the system, which required all passenger and freight operators in the New Haven-Boston segment to equip their locomotives with ACSES.
See
63 FR 39343 (July 22, 1998). ACSES was installed between 2000 and 2002, and has functioned successfully between New Haven and Boston, and on selected high speed segments between Washington and New York for a number of years.

Amtrak voluntarily began development of an architecturally different PTC system, the Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), for installation on its Michigan Line. Amtrak developed and installed ITCS under waivers from specific sections of 49 CFR part 236, subparts A through G, granted by FRA. ITCS was applied to tenant NS locomotives as well as Amtrak locomotives traversing the route. Highway-rail grade crossings on the route were fitted with ITCS units to pre-start the warning systems for high-speed trains and to monitor crossing warning system health in real time. The ITCS was tested extensively in the field for safety and reliability, and it was placed in revenue service in 2001. As experience was gained, FRA authorized increases in speed to 95 mph; and FRA is presently awaiting final results of an independent assessment of verification and validation for the system with a view toward authorizing operations at the design speed of 110 mph.

Despite these successes, the widespread deployment of these various train control systems, particularly on the general freight system, remained very much constrained by prohibitive capital costs. While the railroads were committed to installing these new systems to enhance the safety afforded to the public and their employees, the railroad's actual widespread implementation remained forestalled due to an inability to generate sufficient funding for these new projects in excess of the capital expenditures necessary to cover the ongoing operating and maintenance costs. Accordingly, the railroads continued to plan very slow deployments of PTC system technologies.

III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

On May 1, 2007, the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 2095, which would, among other things, mandate the implementation and use of PTC systems. The bill passed the House on October 17, 2007. The bill was then amended and passed by the Senate on August 1, 2008. While the bill was awaiting final passage, the FRA Administrator testified before Congress that “FRA is a strong supporter of PTC

technology and is an active advocate for its continued development and deployment.” Senate Commerce Committee Briefing on Metrolink Accident, 110th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2008) (written statement of Federal Railroad Administrator Joseph H. Boardman),
available at

http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/PubAffairs/09-23-08FinalStatementFRAAdministratorPTC_Sen_Boxer_Meeting.pdf.

On September 24, 2008, the House concurred with the Senate amendment and added another amendment pursuant to H. Res. 1492. When considering the House's amendment, various Senators made statements referencing certain train accidents that were believed to be PTC-preventable. For instance, Senator Lautenberg (NJ) took notice of the collision at Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005, and Senators Lautenberg, Hutchinson (TX), Boxer (CA), Levin (MI), and Carper (DE) took notice of an accident at Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 2008. According to Senator Levin, Federal investigators have said that a collision warning system could have prevented that crash and the subject legislation would require that new technology to prevent crashes be installed in high risk tracks. Senators Carper and Boxer made similar statements, indicating that PTC systems are designed to prevent train derailments and collisions, like the one in Chatsworth. 154 Cong. Rec. S10283-S10290 (2008). Ultimately, on October 1, 2008, the Senate concurred with the House amendment.

The Graniteville accident referenced by Senator Lautenberg was an early morning collision between two NS trains in non-signaled (dark) territory near the Avondale Mills Textile plant. One of the trains—which was transporting chlorine gas, sodium hydroxide, and cresol on the main track—approached an improperly lined hand-operated switch. As the train diverged through the switch, it ran onto the siding track where it collided with a parked train. Various tank cars ruptured, releasing at least 90 tons of chlorine gas. Nine people died due to chlorine inhalation and at least 250 people were treated for chlorine exposure. In addition, 5,400 residents within a mile of the crash site were forced to evacuate for nearly two weeks while hazardous materials (hazmat) teams and cleanup crews decontaminated the area.

The Chatsworth train collision occurred on the afternoon of September 12, 2008, when a Union Pacific freight train and a Metrolink commuter train collided head-on on a single main track equipped with a Traffic Control System (TCS) in the Chatsworth district of Los Angeles, California. Although NTSB has not yet released its final report, evidence summarized at the NTSB's public hearing suggested that the Metrolink passenger train was operated past a signal displaying a stop indication and entered a section of single track where the opposing UP freight train was operating on a signal indication permitting it to proceed over a switch and into a siding (after which the switch would have been lined for the Metrolink train to proceed). As a consequence of the accident, 25 people died and over 130 more were seriously injured.

Prior to the accidents in Graniteville and Chatsworth, the railroads' slow incremental deployment of PTC technologies—while not uniformly agreed upon by the railroads, FRA, and NTSB—was generally deemed acceptable by them in view of the tremendous costs involved. Partially as a consequence and severity of these very public accidents, coupled with a series of other less publicized accidents, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 into law on October 16, 2008, marking a public policy decision that, despite the implementation costs, railroad employee and general public safety warranted mandatory and accelerated installation and operation of PTC systems.

As immediately relevant to this rulemaking, RSIA08 requires the installation and operation of PTC systems on all main lines, meaning all intercity and commuter lines—with limited exceptions entrusted to FRA—and on freight-only lines when they are part of a Class I railroad system, carrying at least 5 million gross tons of freight annually, and carrying any amount of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH or TIH) materials. While the statute vests certain responsibilities with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Secretary has since delegated those responsibilities to the FRA Administrator.
See
49 CFR 1.49(oo); 74 FR 26,981 (June 5, 2009);
see also
49 U.S.C. 103(g).

In RSIA08, Congress established very aggressive dates for PTC system build-out completion. Each subject railroad is required to submit to FRA by April 16, 2010, an implementation plan indicating where and how it intends to install PTC systems by December 31, 2015. As a result of this accelerated PTC system deployment schedule, railroads must immediately engage in a massive reprogramming of capital funds.

In light of the timetable instituted by Congress, and to better support railroads with their installation while maintaining safety, FRA decided that it is appropriate for mandatory PTC systems to be reviewed by FRA differently than the regulatory approval process provided under subpart H. FRA believes that it is important to develop a process more suited specifically for PTC systems that would better facilitate railroad reuse of safety documentation and simplify the process of showing that the installation of the PTC system did not degrade safety. FRA also believes that subpart H does not clearly address the statutory mandates and that such lack of clarity would complicate railroad efforts to comply with the new statutory requirements. Accordingly, FRA is hereby proposing to amend part 236 by modifying existing subpart H and adding a new subpart I. FRA requests comments on whether this proposed regulation exercises the appropriate level of discretion and flexibility to comply with RSIA08 in the most cost effective and beneficial manner.

IV. RSAC

In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for collaborative rulemaking and program development. The RSAC includes representatives from all of the agency's major stakeholder groups, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop recommendation to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations are developed by consensus. The working group may establish one or more task forces or other subgroups to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The task force, or other subgroup, reports to the working group. If a working group comes to consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff has played an active role at the working group and subgroup levels in discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, and because the RSAC recommendation constitutes the consensus of some of the industry's

leading experts on a given subject, FRA is generally favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goals, is soundly supported, and was developed in accordance with the applicable policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal.

In developing this proposal, FRA adopted the RSAC PTC Working Group approach. As part of this effort, FRA is working with the major stakeholders affected by this subpart in as much a collaborative manner as possible. FRA believes establishing a collaborative relationship early in the product development and regulatory development cycles can help bridge the divide between the railroad carrier's management, railroad labor organizations, the suppliers, and FRA by ensuring that all stakeholders are working with the same set of data and have a common understanding of product characteristics or their related processes production methods, including the regulatory provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. However, where the group failed to reach consensus on an issue, FRA used its authority to resolve the issue, attempting to reconcile as many of the divergent positions as possible through traditional rulemaking proceedings.

On December 10, 2008, the RSAC accepted a task (No. 08-04) entitled “Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems.” The purpose of this task was defined as follows: “To provide advice regarding development of implementing regulations for Positive Train Control (PTC) systems and their deployment under the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.” The task called for the RSAC PTC Working Group to perform the following:

• Review the mandates and objectives of the Act related to deployment of PTC systems;

• Help to describe the specific functional attributes of systems meeting the statutory purposes in light of available technology;

• Review impacts on small entities and ascertain how best to address them in harmony with the statutory requirements;

• Help to describe the details that should be included in the implementation plans that railroads must file within 18 months of enactment of the Act;

• Offer recommendations on the specific content of implementing regulations; and The task also required the PTC Working Group to:

• Report on the functionalities of PTC systems;

• Describe the essential elements bearing on interoperability and the requirements for consultation with other railroads in joint operations; and

• Determine how PTC systems will work with the operation of non-equipped trains.

The PTC Working Group was formed from interested organizations that are members of the RSAC. The following organizations contributed members:

American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AAHSTO)

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

American Public Transportation Association (APTA)

American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)

Association of American Railroads (AAR)

Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED)

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Division (BLETD)

Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen

Federal Transit Administration*

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*

Railway Supply Institute (RSI)

Transport Canada*

Tourist Railway Association Inc.

United Transportation Union (UTU)

*Indicates associate (non-voting) member.

From January to April 2009, FRA met with the entire PTC Working Group five times over the course of twelve days. During those meetings, in order to efficiently accomplish the tasks assigned to it, the PTC Working Group empowered three task forces to work concurrently. These task forces were the passenger, short line and regional railroad, and the radio and communications task forces. Each discussed issues specific to their particular interests and needs and produced proposed rule language for the PTC Working Group's consideration. The majority of the proposals were adopted into the rule as agreed upon by the working group, with rule language related to a remaining few issues being further discussed and enhanced for inclusion into the rule by the PTC Working Group.

The passenger task force discussed testing issues relating to parts 236 and 238 and the definition of “main line” under the statute, including possible passenger terminal and limited operations exceptions to PTC implementation. Recommendations of the task force were presented to the PTC Working Group, which adopted or refined each suggestion.

The short line and regional railroad task group was formed to address the questions pertaining to Class II and Class III railroads. Specifically, the group discussed issues regarding the trackage rights of Class II and III railroads using trains not equipped with PTC technology over a Class I railroad's PTC territory, passenger service over track owned by a Class II or Class III railroads where PTC would not otherwise be required, and railroad crossings-at-grade involving a Class I railroad's PTC-equipped train and a Class II or III railroad's PTC unequipped train. After much discussion, there were no resolutions reached to any of the main issues raised. However, the discussion yielded insights utilized by FRA in preparing this proposed rule.

The radio and communications task force addressed wireless communications issues, particularly as it relates to communications security, and recommended language for proposed § 236.1033.

FRA staff worked with the PTC Working Group and its task forces in developing many facets of this proposal. FRA gratefully acknowledges the participation and leadership of representatives who served on the PTC Working Group and its task forces. These points are discussed to show the origin of certain issues and the course of discussion on these issues at the task force and working group levels. We believe this helps illuminate the factors FRA weighed in making its regulatory decisions regarding this proposed rule and the logic behind those decisions.

In general, the PTC Working Group agreed on the process for implementing PTC under the statute, including decisional criteria to be applied by FRA in evaluating safety plans, adaptation of subpart H principles to support this mandatory implementation, and refinements to subpart H and the part 236 appendices necessary to dovetail the two regulatory regimes and take lessons from early implementation of subpart H, including most aspects of the training requirements. Notable accords were reached, as well, on major functionalities of PTC and on exceptions applicable to passenger

service (terminal areas and main line exceptions). Major areas of disagreement included whether to allow non-equipped trains on PTC lines, extension of PTC to lines not within the statutory mandate, and whether to provide for additional onboard displays when two or more persons are regularly assigned duties in the cab. Some additional areas of concern were discussed but could not be resolved in the time available. It was understood that where discussion did not yield agreement, FRA would make proposals and receive public comment.

V. Use of Performance Standards

Given the statutory mandate for the implementation of PTC systems, FRA intends the proposed rule to accelerate the promotion of, and not hinder, cost effective technological innovation by encouraging an efficient utilization of resources, an increased level of competition, and more innovative user applications and technological developments. FRA believes that, wherever possible, regulation must allow technologies the full freedom to exploit market opportunities, must support the challenges and opportunities resulting from the combination of emerging and varying technologies within an evolving marketplace, and should not discriminate between PTC systems vendors due to the technology or services provided.

Accordingly, wherever possible, FRA has attempted to refrain as much as possible from developing technical or design standards, or even requiring implementation of particular PTC technologies that may prevent technological innovation or the development of alternative means to achieve the statutorily defined PTC functions. If FRA were to implement specific technical standards, emerging technologies may render those standards obsolete. Thus, implementation of systems by the railroads using new technologies that are not addressed by the specific standards would require railroads and FRA to manage the deployment of alternative technologies using a cumbersome and time consuming waiver process. Consequently, for the same reasons FRA expressed in the final rule implementing subpart H (70 FR 11052, 11055-11059 (Mar. 7, 2005)), FRA continues to believe that it is best to pursue a performance-based standard while providing sufficient basic parameters within which the PTC system's architectures and functionalities must be developed, implemented, and maintained.

Like subpart H of part 236, proposed subpart I provides for the same level of product confidence and versatility in determining what PTC technology a railroad may elect to implement and operate, even if the railroad chooses to modify its PTC system over time. Unlike subpart H, however, proposed subpart I requires specific deployment of PTC while simplifying the application process, potentially reducing the size of the regulatory filings through facilitation of safety documentation reuse, and more narrowly defining the required performance targets based on railroad operations and in terms of more specific functional PTC behaviors. The approach under subpart I also reduces the likelihood of continually changing safety targets, which may vary based on each railroad's safety culture, and provides for incremental improvements in safety in coordination with FRA.

To ensure sufficient confidence in each PTC system implemented under subpart I, FRA expects that all safety- and risk-related data be supported by credible evidence or information. Such credible evidence or information may be developed through laboratory or field testing, augmented by appropriate analysis and inspection, which may be monitored or reviewed by FRA. FRA expects that, as a practical matter, lab testing would be performed in the majority of cases. FRA does not believe it is necessary to require any railroad to lab test. However, field testing may be required in certain instances to test certain points of the PTC system in various conditions.

If the railroad or FRA determines that the complexity of the technology or the supporting safety case warrants, credibility of this information may also be evaluated through an assessment of Verification and Validation performed by an acceptable independent third party selected and paid for by the railroad, subject to FRA approval. Ultimately, however, it is FRA's responsibility to determine whether each PTC system's performance results in an acceptable level of safety to railroad employees and the general public and whether any such system shall receive PTC System Certification, as required by statute. In order to provide meaningful flexibility, FRA is prepared to consider use of alternative risk analysis methods and proposals regarding the extent to which a product exhibits fail-safe behavior. FRA still emphasizes that higher speed and higher risk rail service should be supported by more highly competent train control technology and analysis.

FRA recognizes that there may potentially be various PTC system configurations and a variety of operational scopes involved. FRA believes that the information requested under subpart I should be sufficient to permit FRA to predict whether a PTC system is fully adequate from a safety perspective. Subparts H and I require submission of similar technical data. Given the degree of uncertainty associated with the underlying analysis of a complex PTC system and its environs, subpart I—much like subpart H—requires application of FRA's judgment and expertise. Given the complexity of the underlying analysis—and FRA's need to ensure an acceptable level of safety and analytical uniformity between functionally equivalent but architecturally different systems—it is incumbent upon the subject railroad, possibly in concert with the vendor, supplier, or manufacturer of its PTC system, to make a persuasive case in its filings that the applicable performance standards are met. Primarily, the risk assessments required by the proposed rule should provide an objective measure of the safety risk levels involved, which will be reviewed by FRA for comparison purposes. As such, FRA believes that each risk assessment should determine relative risk levels, rather than absolute risk levels, but against a clearly delineated base case acceptable to FRA under the proposed regulation.

Thus, this proposed rule attempts to emphasize the determination of relative risk. FRA believes that the guidelines captured in Appendix B adequately state the objectives and major considerations of any risk assessment it would expect to see submitted under proposed subpart I. FRA also believes that these guidelines allow sufficient flexibility in the conduct of risk assessments, yet provide sufficient uniformity by helping to ensure that final results are presented in familiar units of measurement.

One of the major characteristics of a risk assessment is whether it is performed using qualitative or quantitative methods. FRA continues to believe that both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods may be used, as well as combinations of the two. FRA expects that qualitative methods should be used only where appropriate, and only when accompanied by an explanation as to why the particular risk cannot be fairly quantified. FRA also continues to believe that railroads and suppliers should not be limited in the type of risk assessments they should be allowed to perform to demonstrate compliance with the minimum performance standard. The state of the art of risk

assessment methods could potentially change more quickly than the regulatory process will allow, and not taking advantage of these innovations could slow the progress of implementation of safer signal and train control systems. Thus, as in subpart H, FRA is allowing risk assessment methods not meeting the guidelines of this rule, so long as it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer (hereinafter Associate Administrator) that the risk assessment method used is suitable in the context of the particular PTC system. FRA believes this determination is best left to the Associate Administrator because the FRA retains authority to ultimately prevent implementation of a system whose plans do not adequately demonstrate compliance with the performance standard under the proposed rule.

FRA is aware that some types of risk are more amenable to measurement by using certain methods rather than others because of the type and amount of data available. If a railroad does elect to use different risk assessment methods, FRA will consider this as a factor for PTC System Certification (
see
§ 236.1015). Also, in such cases, when the margin of uncertainty has been inadequately described, FRA will be more likely to require FRA monitored field or laboratory testing (
see
§ 236.1035) or an independent third-party assessment (see § 236.1017).

When FRA issued the final rule establishing subpart H, FRA considered the criteria of simplicity, relevancy, reliability, cost, and objectivity. FRA believes that these criteria remain applicable. FRA has attempted to make the requirements under subpart I simpler than the requirements of subpart H, so that railroads will be provided with a greater amount of flexibility to more easily demonstrate that its PTC system is certifiable by FRA. Like subpart H, subpart I focuses on the safety-relevant characteristics of systems and emphasizes all relevant aspects of product performance. FRA also drafted performance standards that can be applied reliably and precisely in a manner which should yield similar results each time it is applied to the same subject. Although RSIA08 appears to make cost a consideration secondary to safety, FRA believes that demonstrating compliance under subpart I should minimize those costs while not degrading the primary objective of public safety. FRA also believes that subpart I includes an objective performance standard where compliance can be determined through sound engineering analysis, testing, or investigation.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA seeks comments on all proposals made in this NPRM.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

Section 229.135 Event Recorders

Advances in electronics and software technology have not only enabled the development of PTC systems, but have also resulted in changes to the implementation of locomotive control systems. These technological changes have provided for the introduction of new functional capabilities and the integration of different functions in ways that advance the building, operation, and maintenance of locomotive control systems. FRA also recognizes that advances in technology may further eliminate the traditional distinctions between locomotive control and train control functionalities. Indeed, technological advances may provide opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train control systems that run concurrently with locomotive control.

Train control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally different operations with different objectives. FRA does not want to restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and technologies by imposing regulations on locomotive control systems intended to address safety issues associated with train control. Accordingly FRA is reviewing and enhancing the Locomotive Safety Standards (49 CFR part 229) to address the use of advanced electronics and software technologies to improve safe, efficient, and economical locomotive operations when a new or proposed locomotive control system function does not interface or commingle with a safety-critical train control system. In the meantime, FRA proposes to amend § 229.135 to ensure its applicability to subpart I.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 234

Section 234.275 Processor-Based Systems

Section 234.275 of title 49 presently requires that each processor-based system, subsystem, or component used for active warning at highway-rail grade crossings that is new or novel technology, or that provides safety-critical data to a railroad signal or train control system which is qualified using the subpart H process, shall also be governed by those requirements, including approval of a Product Safety Plan. Particularly with respect to high speed rail, FRA anticipates that PTC systems will in some cases incorporate new or novel technology to provide for crossing pre-starts (reducing the length of approach circuits for high speed trains), verify crossing system health as between the wayside and approaching trains, or slow trains approaching locations where storage has been detected on a crossing, among other options. Indeed, each of these functions is presently incorporated in at least one train control system, and others may one day be feasible (including in-vehicle warning). There would appear to be no reason why such a functionality intended for inclusion in a PTC system mandated by subpart I could not be qualified with the rest of the PTC system under subpart I. On the other hand, care should be taken to set an appropriate safety standard taking into consideration highway users, occupants of the high speed trains, and others potentially affected.

In fact, with new emphasis on high speed rail, FRA needs to consider the ability of PTC systems to integrate this type of new technology and thereby reduce risk associated with high speed rail service. Risk includes derailment of a high speed train with catastrophic consequences after encountering an obstacle at a highway-rail grade crossing. To avoid such consequences, as many crossings as possible should be eliminated. To that end, 49 CFR 213.347 requires a warning and barrier plan to be approved for Class 7 track (speeds above 110 mph) and prohibits grade crossings on Class 8 and 9 track (above 125 mph). That leaves significant exposure on Class 5 and 6 track that is currently not addressed by regulation. Comment is requested on how best to approach this issue, ensuring that various FRA regulations, including subpart I, address this safety need effectively and in harmony with one another.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 235

Section 235.7 Changes Not Requiring Filing of Application

FRA proposes to amend this section of the regulation which allows specified changes within existing signal or train control systems be made without the necessity of filing an application. The amendment consists of adding allowance for a railroad to remove an intermittent automatic train stop system

in conjunction with the implementation of a PTC system approved under subpart I of part 236.

The changes allowable under this section, without filing of an application, are those identified on the basis that the resultant condition will be at least no less safe than the previous condition. The required functions of PTC within subpart I provide a considerably higher level of functionality related to both alerting and enforcing necessary operating limitations than an intermediate automatic train stop system does. Additionally, in the event of the loss of PTC functionality (
i.e.,
a failure en route), the operating restrictions required will provide the needed level of safety in lieu of the railroad being expected to keep and maintain an underlying system such as intermittent automatic train stop for only in such cases. FRA therefore believes that with the implementation of PTC under the requirements of subpart I, the safety value of any previously existing intermittent automatic train stop system is entirely obviated. There were no objections in the PTC Working Group to this amendment.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 236

Section 236.0 Applicability, Minimum Requirements, and Penalties

FRA proposes to amend this existing section of the regulation to remove manual block from the methods of operation permitting speeds of 50 miles per hour or greater for freight trains and 60 miles per hour or greater for passenger trains. Manual block rules do create a reasonably secure means of preventing train collisions. However, where the attributes of block signal systems are not present, misaligned switches, broken rails, or fouling equipment may cause a train accident. FRA believes that contemporary expectations for safe operations require this adjustment, which also provides a more orderly foundation for the application of PTC to the subject territories. There were no objections in the PTC Working Group to this change.

Section 236.909 Minimum Performance Standard

FRA is proposing to modify existing § 236.909 to make the risk metric sensitivity analysis an integral part of the full risk assessment required to be submitted with a product safety plan in accordance with § 236.907(a)(7). The proposed amendment of this section would also eliminate an alternative option for a railroad to use a risk metric in which consequences of potential accidents are measured strictly in terms of fatalities.

Currently, § 236.909(e)(1) indicates how safety and risk should be measured for the full risk assessment, but does not accentuate the need for running a sensitivity analysis on chosen risk metrics to assure that the worst case scenarios for the proposed system failures or malfunctions are accounted for in the risk assessment. On the other hand, Appendix B to this part mandates that each risk metric for the proposed product must be expressed with an upper bound, as estimated with a sensitivity analysis. The FRA's experience gained while reviewing product safety plans submitted to FRA in accordance with subpart H, revealed that the railroad's did not understand a sensitivity analysis for the chosen risk metrics to be a mandatory requirement. Accordingly, to ensure clarity regarding FRA's expectations, FRA proposes to amend paragraph (e)(1) to explicitly require the performance of a sensitivity analysis for the chosen risk metrics. The language proposed in this rule explains the need for the sensitivity analysis and describes the key input parameters that must be analyzed.

The proposed modification to paragraph (e)(2) is intended to clarify how the exposure and its consequences, as main components of the risk computation formula, must be measured. Under the proposed rule text, the exposure must be measured in train miles per year over the relevant railroad infrastructure where a proposed system is to be implemented. When determining the consequences of potential accidents, the railroad must identify the total costs involved, including those relating to fatalities, injuries, property damage, and other incidentals. FRA proposes to eliminate the option of using an alternative risk metric, which would allow the measurement of consequences strictly in terms of fatalities. It is FRA's experience that measuring consequences of accidents strictly in terms of fatalities did not serve as an adequate alternative to metrics of total cost of accidents for two main reasons. First, the statistical data on railroad accidents shows that accidents involving fatalities also cause injuries and significant damage to railroad property and infrastructure for both freight and especially passenger operations. Even though the cost of human life is often the highest component of monetary estimates of accident consequences, the dollar estimates of injuries, property losses, and damage to the environment associated with accidents involving fatalities cannot and should not be discounted in the risk analysis. Second, allowing fatalities to serve as the only risk metrics of accident consequences confused the industry and the risk assessment analysts attempting to determine the overall risk associated with the use of certain types of train control systems. As a result, some risk analysts inappropriately converted injuries and property damages for observed accidents into relative estimates of fatalities. This method cannot be considered acceptable because, while distorting the overall picture of accident consequences, it also raises questions on appropriateness of conversion coefficients. Therefore, FRA considers it appropriate to eliminate from the rule the alternative option for consequences to be measured in fatalities only.

Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems

Section 236.1001 Purpose and Scope

This section describes both the purpose and the scope of subpart I. Subpart I provides performance-based regulations for the development, test, installation, and maintenance of Positive Train Control (PTC) Systems, and the associated personnel training requirements, that are mandated for installation by FRA. This subpart also details the process and identifies the documents that railroads and operators of passenger trains are to utilize and incorporate in their PTC implementation plans. This subpart also details the process and procedure for obtaining FRA approval of such plans.

Section 236.1003 Definitions

Given that a natural language such as English contains, at any given time, a finite number of words, any comprehensive list of definitions must either be circular or leave some terms undefined. In some cases, it is not possible and indeed not necessary to state a definition. Where possible and practicable, FRA prefers to provide explicit definitions for terms and concepts rather than rely solely on a shared understanding of a term through use.

Paragraph (a) reinforces the applicability of existing definitions of subparts A through H. The definitions of subparts A through H are applicable to subpart I, unless otherwise modified by this part.

Paragraph (b) introduces definitions for a number of terms that have specific meanings within the context of subpart I. In lieu of analyzing each definition here, however, some of the delineated

terms will be discussed as appropriate while analyzing other sections below.

As a general matter, however, FRA believes it is important to explain certain organizational changes required pursuant to RSIA08. The statute establishes the position of a Chief Safety Officer. The Chief Safety Officer has been designated as the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety. Thus, the use of the term Associate Administrator in this subpart refers to the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer.

Section 236.1005 Requirements for Positive Train Control Systems

RSIA08 specifically requires that each PTC system be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. Section 236.1005 includes the minimum statutory requirements and provides amplifying information defining the necessary PTC functions and the situations under which PTC systems must be installed. Each PTC system must be reliable and perform the functions specified in RSIA08. FRA requests comments on whether the definitions and amplifying information within § 236.1005 are appropriate interpretations of RSIA08 and whether FRA is exercising the appropriate level of discretion and flexibility to comply with RSIA08 in the most cost effective and efficient manner.

Train-to-train collisions.
Paragraph (a)(1)(i) proposes to apply the statutory requirement that a mandatory PTC system must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions. FRA understands this to mean head-to-head, rear-end, and side and raking collisions between trains on the same, converging, or intersecting tracks. PTC technology now available can meet these needs through guidance to the locomotive engineer that is current and continuous and through enforcement using predictive braking to stop short of known targets. FRA notes that the technology associated with currently available PTC systems may not completely eliminate all collisions risks. For instance, a PTC system mandated by this subpart is not required to prevent a collision caused by a train that derails and moves over an area not covered by track and onto a neighboring or adjacent track (known in common parlance as a “secondary collision”).

During discussions regarding available PTC technology, it has been noted that this technology also has inherent limitations with respect to prevention of certain collisions that might occur at restricted speed. In signaled territory, there are circumstances under which trains may pass red signals, other than absolute signals except with verbal authority, either at restricted speed or after stopping and then proceeding at restricted speed. Available PTC technology does not track the rear end of each train as a target that another train must be stopped short of but instead relies on the signal system to indicate the appropriate action. In this example, the PTC system would display “restricted speed” to the locomotive engineer as the action required and would enforce the upper limit of restricted speed (
i.e.,
15 or 20 miles per hour, depending on the railroad). This means that more serious rear end collisions will be prevented, because the upper limit of restricted speed is enforced, and it also means that fewer low speed rear-end collisions will occur because a continuous reminder of the required action will be displayed to the locomotive engineer (rather than the engineer relying on the aspect displayed by the last signal, which may have been passed some time ago). However, some potential for a low-speed rear-end collision will remain in these cases, and the rule is clear that this limitation has been accepted. Similar exposure may occur in non-signaled territory where trains are conducting switching operations or other activities under joint authorities. The PTC system can enforce the limits of the authority and the upper limit of restricted speed, but it cannot guarantee that the trains sharing the authority will not collide. Again, however, the likelihood and average severity of any potential collisions would be greatly reduced. FRA may address this issue in a later modification to subpart I if necessary as technology becomes available.

The proposed rule text does, however, provide an example of a potential train-to-train collision that a PTC system should be designed to prevent. Rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade—otherwise known as diamond crossings—present a risk of side collisions. FRA recognizes that such intersecting lines may or may not require PTC system implementation and operation. Since a train operating with a PTC system cannot necessarily recognize a train not operating with a PTC system or moving on an intersecting track without a PTC system, the PTC system—no matter how intelligent—may not be able to prevent a train-to-train collision in such circumstances.

Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(i) proposes to require certain protections for such rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade. While these locations are specifically referenced in paragraph (a)(1)(i), their inclusion is merely illustrative and does not necessarily preclude any other type of potential train-to-train collision. Moreover, a host railroad may have alternative arrangements to the specific protections referenced in the associated table under paragraph (a)(1)(i), which it must submit in its PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP)—discussed in detail below—and receive a PTC System Certification associated with that PTCSP.

Rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade that have one or more PTC routes intersecting with one or more routes without a PTC system must have an interlocking signal arrangement in place developed in accordance with subparts A through G of part 236 and a PTC enforced stop on all PTC routes. FRA has also determined that the level of risk varies based upon the speeds at which the trains operate through such crossings, as well as the presence, or lack, of PTC equipped lines leading into the crossing. Accordingly, under a compromise accepted by the PTC Working Group, if the maximum speed on at least one of the intersecting tracks is more than 40 miles per hour, then the routes without a PTC system must also have either some type of positive stop enforcement or a split-point derail on each approach to the crossing and incorporated into the signal system, and a permanent maximum speed limit of 20 miles per hour. FRA expects that these protections be instituted as far in advance of the crossing as is necessary to stop the encroaching train from entering the crossing. The 40 miles per hour threshold appears to be appropriate given three factors. First, the frequency of collisions at these rail intersections is low, because typically one of the routes is favored on a regular basis and train crews expect delays until signals clear for their movement. Second, the special track structure used at these intersections, known as crossing diamonds, experiences heavy wear; and railroads tend to limit speeds over these locations to no more than 40 miles per hour. Finally, FRA recognizes that for a train on either intersecting route, elevated speed will translate into higher kinetic energy available to do damage in a collision-induced derailment. Thus, for the relatively small number of rail crossings with one or more routes having an authorized train speed above 40 miles per hour, including higher speed passenger routes, it is particularly important that any collision be prevented. FRA appreciates that a more protective approach could be considered and welcomes any data or

commentary that might bear on this issue.

FRA believes that these more aggressive measures are required to ensure train safety in the event the engineer does not stop a train before reaching the crossing when the engineer does not have a cleared route displayed by the interlocking signal system and higher speed operations are possible on the route intersected. The split-point derail would prevent a collision in such a case by derailing the offending train onto the ground before it reaches the crossing. Should the train encounter a split-point derail as a result of the crew's failure to observe the signal indication, the slower speed at which the unequipped train is required to travel would minimize the damage to the unequipped train and the potential affect on the surrounding area. As an alternative to split-point derails, the non-PTC line may be outfitted with some other mechanism that ensures a positive stop of the unequipped crossing train. If a PTC system or systems are installed and operated on all crossing lines, there are no speed restrictions other than those that might be enforced as part of a civil or temporary speed restriction. However, the crossing must be interlocked and the PTC system or systems must ensure that each of the crossing trains can be brought safely to a stop before reaching the crossing in the event that another train is already cleared through or occupying the crossing.

Overspeed derailments.
Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) proposes that PTC systems mandated under subpart I be designed to prevent overspeed derailments and addresses specialized requirements for doing so. FRA notes that a number of passenger train accidents with significant numbers of injuries have been caused by trains exceeding the maximum allowable speed at turnouts and crossovers and upon entering stations. Accordingly, FRA emphasizes the importance of enforcement of turnout and crossover speed restrictions, as well as civil speed restrictions.

For instance, in the Chicago region, two serious train accidents occurred on the same Metra commuter line when locomotive engineers operated trains at more than 60 miles per hour while traversing between tracks using crossovers, which were designed to be safely traversed at 10 miles per hour. For illustrative purposes, the rule text makes clear that such derailments may be related to railroad civil engineering speed restrictions, slow orders, and excessive speeds over switches and through turnouts and these types of speed restrictions are to be enforced by the system.

Roadway work zones.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) proposes that PTC systems mandated under subpart I be designed to prevent incursions into established work zone limits. Work zone limits are defined by time and space. The length of time a work zone limit is applicable is determined by human elements. Working limits are obtained by contacting the train dispatcher, who will confirm an authority only after it has been transmitted to the PTC server. Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) emphasizes the importance of the PTC systems to provide positive protection for roadway workers working within the limits of their work zone. Accordingly, once a work zone limit has been established, the PTC system must be notified. The PTC system must continue to obey that limit until it is notified from the dispatcher or roadway worker in charge, with verification from the other, either that the limit is released and the train is authorized to enter or the roadway worker in charge authorizes movement of the train through the work zone.

As a way to achieve this technological functionality, FRA's Office of Railroad Development has funded the development of a Roadway Worker Employee in Charge (EIC) Portable Terminal that allows the EIC to control the entry of trains into the work zone. While no rule includes the commonly used term EIC, FRA recognizes that it is the equivalent to the “Roadway Worker In Charge” as used in part 214. With the portable terminal, the EIC can directly control the entry of trains into the work zone and restrict the speed of the train through the work zone. If the EIC does not grant authority for the train to enter the work zone, the train is forced to a stop prior to violating the work zone authority limits. If the EIC authorizes entry of the train into the work zone, the EIC may establish a maximum operating speed for the train consistent with the safety of the roadway work employees. This speed is then enforced on the train authorized to enter and pass through the work zone. The technology is significantly less complex than the technology associated with dispatching systems and the PTC onboard system. In view of this, FRA strongly encourages deployment of such portable terminals as opposed to current approaches which only require the locomotive engineer to in some manner “acknowledge” his or her authority to operate into or through the limits of the work zone (
e.g.,
by pressing a soft key on the onboard display, even if in error).

Pending the adoption of more secure technology such as the EIC Portable Terminal, FRA will scrutinize PTC Safety Plans to determine whether they leave no opportunity for single point human failure in the enforcement of work zone limits. FRA again notes that some approaches in the past have provided that the locomotive engineer could simply acknowledge a work zone warning, even if inappropriately, after which the train could proceed into the work zone. FRA proposes that more secure procedures be included in safety plans under the new proposed subpart.

Movement over main line switches.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) proposes to require that PTC systems mandated under subpart I be designed to prevent the movement of a train through a main line switch in the improper position. Given the complicated nature of switches—especially when operating in concert with wayside, cab, or other similar signal systems—the proposed rule provides more specific requirements in paragraph (e) as discussed further below.

In numerous paragraphs, the proposed rules require various operating requirements based primarily on signal indications. Generally, these indications are communicated to the engineer, who would then be expected to operate the train in accordance with the indications and authorities provided. However, a technology that receives the same information does not necessarily have the wherewithal to respond unless it is programmed to do so. Thus, paragraph (a)(2) requires PTC systems implemented under subpart I to obey and enforce all such indications and authorities provided by these safety-critical underlying systems. The integration of the delivery of the indication or authority with the PTC system's response to those communications must be described and justified in the PTC Development Plan (PTCDP)—further described below—and the PTCSP, as applicable, and then must comply with those descriptions and justifications.

The PTC Working Group had extensive discussions concerning the monitoring of main line switches and came to the following general conclusions:

First, signal systems do a good job of monitoring switch position, and enforcement of restrictions imposed in accordance with the signal system is the best approach within signaled territory (main track and controlled sidings). As a general rule, the enforcement required for crossovers, junctions, and entry into and departure from controlled sidings will be a positive stop, and the enforcement provided for other switches (providing access to industry tracks and

non-signaled sidings and auxiliary tracks) will be display and enforcement of the upper limit of restricted speed. National Transportation Safety Board representatives were asked to evaluate whether this strategy meets the needs of safety from their perspective. They returned with a list of accidents caused by misaligned switches that the Board had investigated in recent years, none of which was in signaled territory. Based on that data, the NTSB staff decided that it was not necessary to monitor individual switches in signaled territory.

Second, switch monitoring functions of contemporary PTC systems provide an excellent approach to addressing this requirement in dark territory. However, it is important to ensure that switch position is determined with the same degree of integrity that one would expect within a signaling system (
e.g.,
fail safe point detection, proper verification of adjustment). The PTC Working Group puzzled over sidings in dark territory and how to handle the requirement for switch monitoring in connection with those situations. (While these are not “controlled” sidings, as such, they will often be mapped so that train movements into and out of the sidings are appropriately constrained.) At the final PTC Working Group meeting, a proposal was accepted that would treat a siding as part of the main line track structure requiring monitoring of each switch off of the siding if the siding is non-signaled and the authorized train speed within the siding exceeds 20 miles per hour.

This issue is more fully discussed below.

Other functions.
While FRA has included the core PTC system requirements in § 236.1005, there is the possibility that other functions may be explicitly or implicitly required elsewhere in subpart I. Accordingly, under paragraph (a)(3), each PTC system required by subpart I must also perform any other functions specified in subpart I. According to 49 U.S.C. 20157(g), FRA must prescribe regulations specifying in appropriate technical detail the essential functionalities of positive train control systems and the means by which those systems will be qualified.

In addition to the general performance standards required under paragraphs (a)(1)-(3), paragraph (a)(4) proposes more prescriptive performance standards relating to the situations paragraphs (a)(1)-(3) intend to prevent. Paragraph (a)(4) defines specific situations where FRA has determined that specific warning and enforcement measures are necessary to provide for the safety of train operations, their crews, and the public and to accomplish the goals of the PTC system's essential core functions. Under paragraph (a)(4)(i), FRA proposes to prevent unintended movements onto PTC main lines and possible collisions at switches by ensuring proper integration and enforcement of the PTC system as it relates to derails and switches protecting access to the main line. Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) intends to account for operating restrictions associated with a highway-rail grade crossing active warning system that is in a reduced or non-operative state and unable to provide the required warning for the motoring public. In this situation, the PTC system must provide positive protection and enforcement related to the operational restrictions of alternative warning that are issued to the crew of any train operating over such crossing in accordance with part 234. Paragraph (a)(4)(iii) concerns the movement of a PTC operated train in conjunction with the issuance of an after arrival mandatory directive. While FRA recognizes that the use of after arrival mandatory directives poses a risk that the train crew will misidentify one or more trains and proceed prematurely, PTC provides a means to intervene should that occur. Further, such directives may sometimes be considered operationally useful. Accordingly, FRA fully expects that the PTC system will prevent collisions between the receiving trains and the approaching train or trains.

FRA recognizes that movable bridges, including draw bridges, present an operational issue for PTC systems. Under subpart C, § 236.312 already governs the interlocking of signal appliances with movable bridge devices and FRA believes that this section should equally apply to PTC systems governing movement over such bridges. While subparts A through H apply to PTC systems—as stated in § 236.1001—paragraph (a)(4)(iv) proposes to make this abundantly clear. Accordingly, in paragraph (a)(4)(iv) and consistent with § 236.312, movable bridges within a PTC route are to be equipped with an interlocked signal arrangement which is also to be integrated into the PTC system. A train shall be forced to stop prior to the bridge in the event that the bridge locking mechanism is not locked, the locking device is out of position, or the bridge rails of the movable span are out of position vertically or horizontally from the rails of the fixed span. Effective locking of the bridge is necessary to assure that the bridge is properly seated and thereby capable to support both the weight of the bridge and that of a passing train(s) and preventing possible derailment or other potential unsafe conditions. Proper track rail alignment is also necessary to prevent derailments, either of which again could result in damage to the bridge or a train derailing off the bridge.

Paragraph (a)(4)(v) proposes that hazard detectors integrated into the PTC system—as required by paragraph (c) of this section or the FRA approved PTCSP—must provide an appropriate warning and associated applicable enforcement through the PTC system. There are many types of hazard detection systems and devices. Each type has varying operational requirements, limitations, and warnings based on the types and levels of hazard indications and severities. FRA expects this enforcement to include a positive stop where necessary to protect the train (
e.g.,
areas with high water, flood, rock slide, or track structure flaws) or to provide an appropriate warning with possible movement restriction be acknowledged (
i.e.,
hot journal or flat wheel detection). The details of these warnings and associated required enforcements are to be specifically addressed within a PTCDP and PTCSP subject to FRA approval, and the PTC system functions are to be maintained in accordance with the system specifications. FRA does not expect that all hazard detectors be integrated into the PTC systems, but where they are, they must interact properly with the PTC system to protect the train from the hazard that the detector is monitoring.

Paragraph (a)(5) addresses the issue of broken rails, which is the leading cause of train derailments. FRA proposes to strictly limit the speed of passenger and freight operations in those areas where broken rail detection is not provided. Under § 236.0(c), as amended in this rule, 24 months after the effective date of a final rule, freight trains operating at or above 50 miles per hour, and passenger trains operating at or above 60 miles per hour are required to have a block signal system unless a PTC system meeting the requirements of this part is installed. Since current technology for block signal systems relies on track circuits—which also provide for broken rail detection—FRA proposes limiting speeds where broken rail detection is not available to the maximums allowed under § 236.0 when a block signal system is not installed.

Deployment requirements.
Paragraph (b) contains proposed requirements for where and when PTC systems must be installed. Under RSIA08, each applicable railroad carrier must implement a PTC system in accordance with its PTC Implementation Plan

(PTCIP), as further discussed below. The PTCIP is statutorily required to be submitted by April 16, 2010, and must explain how the railroad or railroads intend to implement an operating PTC system by December 31, 2015. Essentially, a PTC system must be installed on certain tracks. In addition, except as provided under § 236.1006, onboard components required for and responsive to the PTC system must be installed on each lead locomotive that operates over those tracks.

The lead locomotive means the first locomotive proceeding in the direction of movement. In addition to the lead locomotive that controls the train while moving in a forward direction, a PTC system must be installed on any rear end unit control cab locomotive that is capable of controlling the train when it moves in the reverse direction. These proposed requirements assume that locomotives controlling the train may be placed only at each end. At this time, FRA is unaware of any locomotives not placed at either end of the train that may independently control the train. FRA seeks comments and information regarding these assumptions and understandings.

As a threshold matter, RSIA08 requires that a PTC system be installed on certain main lines of each entity required to file a PTCIP. According to the statute, a main line is, with certain exceptions, a Class I railroad track over which 5 million or more gross tons of railroad traffic is transported annually. Pursuant to the statute, FRA may also designate additional tracks as main line and may provide exceptions for intercity rail or commuter passenger transportation over track where limited or no freight railroad operations occur. The statutory language does not indicate whether the phrase “main line” refers to the route used or actual trackage owned by the subject railroad. It is clear, however, that Congress intended to focus implementation and operation of PTC systems on freight lines owned or used by Class I railroads for operations specifically identified in the statute.

For instance, by referencing Class I railroads—and not referencing any other type of freight railroad—FRA believes that Congress did not intend, as a general matter, to have smaller freight railroads incur the tremendous costs involved in PTC system implementation and operation unless they own track over which is provided regularly schedule intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation. Congress gives the Secretary discretion in 49 U.S.C. 20157(f) to require the installation of PTC systems on railroads other than Class I railroads and intercity or commuter passenger systems.

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) has established a statutory definition for Class I, II, and III railroads based on the reported revenues in 1992. A reference to Class I railroads in this subpart refers to those railroads that have been designated as such by the Surface Transportation Board (STB). According to STB, a Class I railroad has revenues greater than $250 million (adjusted annually for inflation); a Class II railroad has revenues ranging from $20 million to $250 million (adjusted annually for inflation); and a Class III railroad has revenues that are less than $20 million (adjusted annually for inflation). All switching and terminal railroads, regardless of revenue size, are Class III railroads. The STB railroad classification determines the amount of reporting which a carrier must file with the STB. Class I railroads are required to file an annual R-1 Report, a detailed income, expense, and operating data report, quarterly and annual freight carload commodity reports, and reports on types of employees and employee compensation (Wage Form A and B).

From time to time, as some Class II railroads approached the Class I railroad revenue threshold, these carriers petitioned the STB to remain as Class II railroads, so that these carriers would not be burdened with the additional reporting requirements. Generally the STB allowed this exemption. Accordingly, there may be some large railroads—including Montana Rail Link and Florida East Coast—that are Class II railroads “by waiver,” thereby freeing them from having to file Class I railroad reports with the STB.

In drafts of this proposed rule provided to the RSAC PTC Working Group, it was suggested that a Class I railroad's main line be defined as track owned and controlled by the Class I railroad. By also including track “controlled” by the Class I railroad, FRA intended to include tracks not owned by Class I railroads, but used in a manner as if the Class I railroad did own that track. For instance, under the term “controlled,” FRA intended that a track owned by a Class II or III railroad would be considered a main line if a Class I railroad had effective control over the Class II or III railroad or that specific track. Without the “control” requirement, Class I railroads could divest themselves of track ownership while maintaining effective control for the purposes of avoiding PTC system implementation.

The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), however, expressed concern with this provision, instead suggesting that a Class I railroad's main line include only those lines owned and “operated” by the Class I railroad. FRA believes that the underlying ASLRRA concern is that many of its member railroads may go out of business if they are mandated to install PTC systems and incur the associated untenable financial costs. FRA agrees that, from the point of view of the congressional mandate, a narrower concept is appropriate at this time. However, in light of future circumstances relating to railroad revenue, safety opportunities, traffic patterns, and other variables, FRA also recognizes that it may later require PTC system implementation and operation on certain Class II and III railroad tracks.

To avoid confusion, FRA proposes to define main line by standards applicable to a single element. In its effort to define a Class I railroad's main line as track owned and controlled by the Class I railroad, FRA focuses the proposed definition on the status of the track. To also focus on the issue of operations could raise confusion and irreconcilable understandings. Thus, FRA is not comfortable with ASLRRA's suggestion. To accomplish FRA's goal and respond to ASLRRA's concerns, however, FRA has limited a Class I railroad's main lines to tracks and segments documented in the timetables last filed before October 16, 2008, by the Class I railroads with FRA under § 217.7 of this title over which 5 million or more gross tons of railroad traffic is transported annually. For most of its territory, each railroad is already required to track tonnage in order to satisfy the requirements for joint bar and internal rail flaw inspections. See 213.119 (table), 213.237. Thus, FRA does not expect this determination to be difficult for railroads. For railroads that are required to submit a PTCIP by April 16, 2010, the gross tonnage will be based on 2008 year traffic. To the extent rail traffic exceeds 5 million gross tons in any year after 2008, the tonnage shall be calculated for the preceding two calendar years in determining whether a PTCIP or its amendment is required. FRA seeks comments on whether any tracks intended to be covered would be missed under this approach and on whether there is a better approach.

The RSIA08 requires certain tracks to be considered main line where a certain amount of railroad traffic is transported. However, in certain yard or terminal locations, trains are prepared for transportation, but railroad traffic is not “transported.” Moreover, FRA recognizes that in such locations, PTC system operation would be especially cumbersome and onerous and possibly

resulting in a reduction of safety due to inappropriate interventions by the PTC system that could lead to “train handling” derailments or hazards to personnel riding the sides of rolling stock. Accordingly, in such locations, FRA may not consider the subject tracks as main line. For such locations that only include freight operations, FRA proposes to consider these tracks other than main line by definition if all trains in the location are limited to restricted speed.

However, for any tracks used by passenger trains, FRA proposes that any designation of track as other than main line should be performed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with § 236.1019. FRA seeks comments on this issue. FRA also seeks comments on whether this explanation comports with the railroads' understanding of the rule text.

Once a Class I railroad's main lines are determined, a PTC system must be installed and operated on those main line tracks over which passenger trains are operated or any PIH materials are is transported. As a corollary, PTC systems are not required on a Class I railroad's lines over which no PIH materials are transported and no passenger trains are operated. In addition to an applicable Class I railroad's main lines, a PTC system must be implemented and operated on all railroads' main lines over which regularly scheduled intercity rail passenger transportation or commuter rail passenger transportation, as defined by 49 U.S.C. 24102, is provided. However, FRA does not intend to apply this requirement to tracks operated by tourist railroads, as described in 49 U.S.C. 20103(f), because,
inter alia,
they are not Class I railroads and they do not provide regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service.

According to 49 U.S.C. 24102, “intercity rail passenger transportation” means rail passenger transportation, except commuter rail passenger transportation. 49 U.S.C. 24102 defines commuter rail passenger transportation as “short-haul rail passenger transportation in metropolitan and suburban areas usually having reduced fare, multiple-ride, and commuter tickets and morning and evening peak period operations.”

49 CFR 238.5 provides further guidance, defining a long-distance intercity passenger train as “a passenger train that provides service between large cities more than 125 miles apart and is not operated exclusively in the National Railroad Passenger Corporation's Northeast Corridor” and a commuter train as “a passenger train providing commuter service within an urban, suburban, or metropolitan area. The term includes a passenger train provided by an instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.” Section 238.5 also defines passenger service as “a train or passenger equipment that is carrying, or available to carry, passengers. Passengers need not have paid a fare in order for the equipment to be considered in passenger or in revenue service.” According to § 238.5, a passenger train is “a train that transports or is available to transport members of the general public. If a train is composed of a mixture of passenger and freight equipment, that train is a passenger train for purposes of this part.”

While the statute generally limits mandatory PTC system implementation and operation to certain main lines—defined for freight purposes as track over which 5 million or more gross tons of railroad traffic is transported annually—FRA is required to define passenger main line by regulation.
See
49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B). In that regard, FRA has determined that freight density, as such, is not a relevant factor. FRA intends to cover the same intercity and commuter passenger services as 49 CFR part 238 (Passenger Equipment Safety Standards), which excludes tourist railroads (49 CFR 238.3).
See also,
49 CFR part 209, Appendix A.

As a corollary, after December 31, 2015, no intercity or commuter passenger operations may operate on any track that does not have a PTC system installed, except as described in the proposed rule. A PTC system must be installed on any track—regardless of its ownership or the weight of annual traffic—before any intercity or commuter rail passenger operation may operate. Thus, any passenger or freight track over which such passenger trains operate must be PTC-equipped.

The RSIA08 requires each intercity and commuter passenger railroad to implement PTC on “its main line over which intercity rail passenger transportation or commuter rail passenger transportation, as defined in section 24102, is regularly provided.” Section 24102 uses the terms “intercity” and “commuter” in essentially the same way FRA has used the terms for safety regulatory purposes. The single question that has been puzzling in considering this mandate has been the meaning of the possessive article, “its,” before “main line.” It appears clear from the course of congressional consideration that the expression was intended to apply to the passenger railroad's entire route system, regardless of ownership. Amtrak's route system includes predominately trackage owned or controlled by others. Many commuter railroads operate partially or even exclusively over lines owned by freight railroads. On the other hand, FRA is persuaded that the same intention does not apply as to Class I freight railroads. A Class I freight railroad might operate a train under trackage rights over a Class II or III railroad, but it does not appear that was intended to burden the smaller railroad with the responsibility to install PTC.

Accordingly, FRA is proposing to consider as passenger train main lines all tracks across the nation over which intercity or commuter passenger trains are transported. For the purposes of passenger trains, a main line is determined regardless of the amount (
i.e.,
5 million or more gross tons annually), except where temporary rerouting may occur in accordance with §§ 236.1005(g)-(k) as further discussed below. Thus, if an intercity or commuter passenger train is transported over a track, the track requires PTC implementation and operation, regardless of whether the track is owned by a passenger railroad entity, a Class I railroad, or any smaller freight railroads, including Class II and short line railroads.

This approach, permissible under 49 U.S.C. 20157(a)(1)(C), is consistent with both FRA's understanding of congressional intent and FRA's historical safety sensitivity to regulating passenger transportation. For example, in the relatively recent final rule governing continuous welded rail, different schedules were developed for track inspection intervals associated with freight and passenger train operations.
See
71 FR 59,677, 59,681 (Oct. 11, 2006). According to FRA, the different schedules for track inspection were developed to consider the potentially greater severity, especially in terms of loss of life, from possible future track-related passenger train accidents.

If FRA were to otherwise restrict PTC systems to passenger train main lines that are only owned by the passenger railroads, then PTC systems would only be required on 11 percent of all track used by the passenger railroads across the nation, which would mostly include the Northeast Corridor (NEC) and some passenger lines in Michigan. Considering Congress' concern with accidents involving multiple passenger fatalities, which appears to be a significant impetus for Congress' final passage of RSIA08, FRA believes that Congress did not intend in 49 U.S.C. 20157 to limit PTC system operation to this narrow passenger territory.

Nevertheless, while all passenger routes, including those over track owned by freight railroads, are automatically deemed main lines under the proposed rule, the proposed rule also provides an exception for those main lines that would not be main lines but for the existence of passenger trains and are not deemed by FRA main lines due to limited or no freight railroad operations. This exception is permissible pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B). The proposed procedure for such exceptions can be found under §§ 236.1011 and 236.1019, as further discussed below.

In addition to determining which tracks require PTC system implementation and operation, paragraph (b) requires such installation be performed by the “host railroad.” Subpart I makes a distinction between the railroad that has effective operating control over a segment of track, and a railroad that is simply passing its trains across the same segment of track. While the concept of actual ownership of the track segment plays a significant role in determining the host railroad, a PTC system may be required on a track segment that is not owned by a PTC railroad. To avoid confusion, FRA designates the host railroad as the railroad that exercises operational control of the movement of trains on the segment, irrespective of the actual ownership of the segment. This is in contrast to a tenant railroad, which is any railroad that uses a segment of track but does not exercise operational control of the movements of its trains. The terms “host railroad” and “tenant railroad” are defined as such in the definitions listed under § 235.1003.

The requirements for PTC contained in RSIA08 pertaining to freight lines define the intended route structure by reference to the presence or absence of PIH traffic and the annual gross tonnage. The law requires installation and operation of a PTC system where it (1) is part of a Class I railroad system, (2) carries at least 5 million gross tons of rail traffic, and (3) carries at least some PIH traffic. Based upon information available to FRA, and assuming a level of rail operations consistent with normal economic conditions, these requirements describe approximately 45,000 miles of freight-only territory plus almost 18,000 miles where both PIH and passengers are carried. There are another 6,000 miles of track owned by a Class I railroad and used for passenger service that would not otherwise be required to be equipped, for a total build-out of about 69,000 route miles. These lines basically describe the heart or “core” of the Class I freight network, albeit with some gaps.

However, the railroads carry only about 100,000 carloads of PIH products annually (approximately 0.3% of all rail traffic). Facing an extraordinary potential for tort liability associated with this traffic, the railroads have sought through various means to reduce the potential for release of these commodities through safety improvements; but they have also sought to be relieved of their common carrier obligation to carry them. The RSIA08 mandate, which entails an expenditure of billions of dollars, most of it nominally because the lines in question carry PIH, presents an additional enormous incentive for the Class I railroads to shed PIH traffic and, further, to concentrate the remaining PIH traffic on the fewest possible lines of railroad.

FRA is concerned that PIH traffic could be diverted from the rail mode. Although the risks of transporting these commodities can be reduced by product substitution, by coordination of transportation that reduces length of haul, and by other means, and although the U.S. DOT continues to support these means where feasible, for the present there are still realistic and supportable demands for transportation of these PIH commodities that implicate the national interest in a very strong way. Hazardous materials are vital to maintaining the health of the economy of the United States and are essential to the well-being of its people. These materials are used in water purification, farming, manufacturing, and other industrial applications. The need for hazardous materials to support essential services means that transportation of hazardous materials is unavoidable. There are over 20 hazardous materials considered to be PIH that are shipped by rail in tank car quantities. In 2003, over 77,000 tank car loads of PIH materials were shipped by rail.

Examples of PIH materials include anhydrous ammonia and chlorine. Anhydrous ammonia is an important source of nitrogen fertilizer for crops and is used in the continuous cycle cooling units found in various appliances and vehicles and in the production of explosives and manufacturing of nitric acid and certain alkalies, pharmaceuticals, synthetic textile fibers, plastics, and latex stabilizers. Chlorine is used as an elemental disinfectant for over 84 percent of large drinking water systems (those serving more than 10,000 people), according to the American Water Works Association. For pharmaceuticals, chlorine chemistry is essential to manufacturing 85 percent of their products. Chlorine chemistry is also used in 25 percent of all medical plastics, and 70 percent of all disposable medical applications. The single largest use of chlorine is for the production of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), which is used for building and construction materials such as siding, windows, pipes, decks and fences.

The only effective modal alternative for transporting PIH materials is by road, and for the present insufficient capacity exists in the form of suitable packages (tank trucks, intermodal tanks). Further, diversion to highways would entail significantly higher societal costs, including adverse safety trade-offs from more trucks on the highways—even before the potential for accidental release of product or further security vulnerabilities are considered.

FRA is also concerned that PIH traffic could be retained on the railroads but concentrated in such a way as to result in circuitous routings with greater exposure to derailment hazards and security threats. Although security concerns may be addressed to some extent by rerouting during periods of high alert in specified urban areas, these detour routes would inevitably be over lines not equipped with PTC systems. These are the kinds of unfavorable trade-offs that the recent amendments to PHMSA's rail security rule—based on a separate statutory mandate and developed in concert with FRA—were intended to prevent.
See,

e.g.,
73 FR 20752 (April 16, 2008); 73 FR 72182 (Nov. 26, 2008).); 49 CFR 172.820.

Finally, FRA believes that, while the presence of PIH traffic on the rail network was viewed by the Congress as a good proxy for risk sufficient to warrant PTC system installation and operation, FRA is not persuaded that it was the intent of Congress that PIH traffic be driven from the railroads or concentrated on a smaller number of lines with more circuitous routings. The final legislation constituting the RSIA08 emerged following the Chatsworth collision of September 12, 2008, which claimed 25 lives (one rail employee and 24 passengers). However, neither H.R. 2095, as initially passed by the House of Representatives on October 17, 2007, nor the Senate version of the bill passed on August 1, 2008, was limited to PIH routes. All versions of the bill, including that finally enacted, preserved FRA's ability to apply the technology to additional routes.

Although FRA recognizes that the congressional trade-offs in September 2008 were driven by the impending end of the 110th Congress, the Chatsworth accident, and the desire on the part of

some senators to see a rapid deployment of PTC technology (more rapid, in fact, than provided in either the Senate- or House-enacted versions), FRA does not believe that the Congress intended an implementation that would create substantial incentives to drive PIH traffic off of the railroads or concentrate it in such a way that large urban areas would see an increase in volume above that expected using normal, direct routing of the shipments. Accordingly, FRA proposes to use its discretion in crafting implementing regulations to preserve the presumed congressional intent. FRA does this by proposing in paragraph (b) that implementation plans required to be filed by April 16, 2010, be based on 2008 traffic levels. Although rail traffic, including PIH traffic, declined in the second half of the year, 2008 constitutes a much more “normal” base year than 2009 is expected to be due to the current economic conditions. It was also the year during which the Congress enacted the subject mandate.

In taking this action, FRA departs from the PTC Working Group's consensus that 2009 be used as the base year. Since the RSAC initially took up this subject, rail traffic levels have continued to plummet, and that decision now appears to be inappropriate. FRA did advise the PTC Working Group that it reserved the right to “lock in” the PTC route structure as of passage of RSIA08 to prevent unintended consequences. From a technical standpoint, § 236.1005(b) attempts to do just that, but with ample room for adjustment in light of normal changes in market conditions.

Paragraph (b)(2) would require that the determination of Class I freight railroad main lines required to be equipped be initially established and reported as follows using a 2008 traffic base for gross tonnage and determine the presence of PIH traffic based on 2008 shipments and routings. If increases in traffic occur that require a line to be equipped and the PTCIP has already been filed, an amendment would be required. As suggested by the RSAC, gross tonnage would be measured over two years to avoid unusual spikes in traffic driving investments inappropriately. However, if the 5 million gross tons threshold was met based on the prior two years of traffic, and PIH was added to the route, the railroad would be required to promptly file a PTCIP amendment and thereafter equip the line by the end of December 31, 2015 or within two years, whichever is later.

Once a PTC system is installed, it cannot be removed or treated as inoperative unless such discontinuance or modification is approved by FRA in accordance with § 236.1021, as discussed below. This is the case even if the track segment ceases to be defined as a main line in accordance with subpart I due to traffic pattern or consist changes, such as annual traffic levels possibly dipping below the 5 million gross ton threshold referenced in the statute and in §§ 236.1003 and 236.1005 or the rerouting of PIH traffic. This result is consistent with longstanding practice under 49 U.S.C. 20502 (see 49 CFR part 235). To the extent traffic levels decline or PIH traffic ceases prior to April 16, 2010, or during the implementation period, a railroad could ask FRA to except a line segment from the requirement that it be equipped. The railroad would need to provide estimated traffic projections for the next 5 years (
e.g.,
as a result of planned rerouting, coordinations, location of new business on the line). Where the request involves prior or planned rerouting of PIH traffic, the railroad would be required to provide a supporting analysis that takes into consideration the rail security provisions of the PHMSA rail routing rule, including any railroad-specific and interline routing impacts.
See
49 CFR 172.820. For example, the request should include information where multiple railroad carriers may coordinate traffic, especially where there are parallel lines directing traffic in opposite directions. FRA could approve an exception if FRA finds that it would be consistent with safety and in the public interest.

Once a PTC system is required to be installed, it cannot be removed or treated as inoperative unless such discontinuance or modification is approved by FRA in accordance with § 236.1021, as discussed below. This is the case even if the track segment ceases to be defined as a main line in accordance with subpart I due to traffic pattern or consist changes, such as annual traffic levels possibly dipping below the 5 million gross ton threshold referenced in the statute and in §§ 236.1003 and 236.1005 or the rerouting of PIH traffic.

There was discussion in the PTC Working Group regarding how to handle new passenger service. Amtrak in particular suggested that FRA might consider some leeway for new intercity service that could be instituted within a short period if the sponsor (most likely a state government) requested. FRA considered this contingency but concluded that new passenger service should be adequately planned and deliberately executed with safety as its first priority. The proposal in paragraph (b) states that, after December 31, 2015, no intercity or commuter rail passenger service could continue or commence until a PTC system has been installed and made operative. FRA requests comment on this proposal and on whether a new rail passenger service commenced after April 10, 2010, but before December 31, 2015, should be permitted any leeway for installation of PTC after 2015 and, if so, what special circumstances would warrant that treatment.

Paragraph (c) provides amplifying information regarding the installation and integration of hazard detectors into PTC systems. Paragraph (c)(1) reiterates FRA's position that any hazard detectors that are currently integrated into an existing signal and train control system must be integrated into mandatory PTC systems and that the PTC system will enforce as appropriate on receipt of a warning from the detector. Paragraph (c)(2) proposes to require each PTCSP submitted by a railroad to also identify any additional hazard detector to provide warnings to the crew that a railroad may elect to install. The PTCSP must also clearly define the actions required by the crew upon receipt of the alarm or other warning or alert. FRA does not expect a railroad to install hazard detectors at every location where a hazard might possibly exist.

Paragraph (c)(3) proposes, in the case of high speed service (as described in § 236.1007 as any service operating at speeds greater than 90 mph) that FRA will require the hazard analysis to address any hazards on the route, along with a reason why additional hazard detectors are not required to provide warning and enforcement for hazards not already protected by an existing hazard detector. The hazard analysis must clearly identify the risk associated with the hazard, and the mitigations taken if a hazard detector is not installed and interfacing with a PTC system. For instance, in the past, large motor vehicles have left parallel or overhead structures and have fouled active passenger rail lines. Depending upon the circumstances, such events can cause catastrophic train accidents. Although not every such event can be prevented, detection of obstacles such as this may make it more likely that the accident could be prevented.

Under paragraph (d), FRA proposes that each lead locomotive operating with a PTC system be equipped with an operative event recorder that captures safety-critical data routed to the engineer's display that the engineer must obey, as well as the text of mandatory directives and authorized

speeds. FRA intends that this information be available in the event of an accident with a PTC-equipped system to determine root causes and the necessary actions that must be taken to prevent reoccurrence. Although FRA expects implemented PTC systems will prevent PTC-preventable accidents, in the event of system failure FRA believes it is necessary to capture available data relating to the event. Further, FRA sees value in capturing information regarding any accident that may occur outside of the control of a PTC system as it is currently designed—including the prevention of collisions with trains not equipped with PTC systems—and accidents that could otherwise have been prevented by PTC technology, but were unanticipated by the system developers, the employing railroad, or FRA.

The data may be captured in the locomotive event recorder, or a separate memory module. If the locomotive is placed in service on or after October 1, 2009, the event recorder and memory module, if used, shall be crashworthy, otherwise known as crash-hardened, in accordance with § 229.135. For locomotives built prior to that period, the data shall be protected to the maximum extent possible within the limits of the technology being used in the event recorder and memory module.

As required by the RSIA08 and by paragraph (a)(1)(iv), as noted above, a PTC system required by subpart I must be designed to prevent the movement of a train through a main line switch in the wrong position. Paragraph (e) provides amplifying information on switch point monitoring, indication, warning of misalignment, and associated enforcement. According to the statute, each PTC system must be designed to prevent “the movement of a train through a swi

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3AE9-17184. Public record. Not legal advice.