# Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control and Accounting Requirements > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3AE7-24346 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Proposed Rule - **Published:** December 20, 2007 - **Citation:** 72 FR 72522 ## Text NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 73, and 74 RIN 3150-AI06 Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control and Accounting Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule. SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to revise the security requirements and material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements for a geologic repository operations area (GROA). The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that effective security measures are in place for the protection of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and other radioactive material at a GROA given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New requirements for specific training enhancements, improved access authorization, enhancements to defensive strategies, and enhanced reporting requirements would be incorporated. The proposed rule would establish general performance objectives and corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In addition, the proposed rule would require the emergency plan to address radiological emergencies. DATES: The comment period expires March 4, 2008. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. Please include the number RIN 3150-AI06 in the subject line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made available to the public in their entirety on the NRC rulemaking Web site. Personal information such as name, address, telephone, e-mail address, etc., will not be removed from your submission. Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us directly at (301) 415-1677. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) 415-1677). Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 415-1101. Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking, including comments, may be viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merri Horn, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8126, e-mail, mlh1@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background II. Discussion A. What Action Is the NRC Taking? B. Whom Would This Action Affect? C. Why Do the Requirements Need to be Revised? D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted? E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security and MC&A Requirements? F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements? G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the MC&A Program? H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent Measurements Be Required for Receipts? I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A Program? J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve? K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if DOE Possesses Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form Other Than as Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel? L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist? M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security Requirements? N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against? O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects of a GROA? P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and What Would They Cover? Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA? R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements? S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA? T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA Operations? U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for the GROA Facility? V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA After Receipt of HLW Begins? W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste to a GROA? X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure? Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for a GROA? Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents? AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards? BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan Requirements? CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC? III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section IV. Criminal Penalties V. Agreement State Compatibility VI. Plain Language VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement X. Public Protection Notification XI. Regulatory Analysis XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification XIII. Backfit Analysis I. Background On November 2, 2001 (66 FR 55732), the NRC published its final rule governing disposal of HLW in a potential geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must comply with these regulations for NRC to authorize construction and license operation of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The security requirements applicable to a GROA in these regulations were developed prior to September 11, 2001, under a previous and very different threat environment. Currently, there is no distinction between the security and MC&A requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and the requirements for larger, more complicated geologic repositories for permanent disposal of HLW. At the time the security provisions were established, the NRC used the same regulatory approach for protecting a GROA as that for protecting spent nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 72. GROA operations, at least those conducted in surface facilities, seemed vulnerable to the same kinds of potential threats that were characteristic of the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The same level of protection was deemed sufficient to protect against acts that might be inimical to the common defense and security. The same reasoning applies to the MC&A requirements. The NRC's regulatory approach was predicated on maintaining the physical integrity of the SNF rods. In the event the physical integrity of the SNF rods could not be maintained, the staff planned to address the additional security measures that would be necessary by incorporating conditions into the license. Potential surface operations at a GROA have become more complex over the years. For example, the DOE has indicated that it now plans to include bare SNF handling operations within a spent fuel pool to transfer SNF from a non-TAD (transfer, aging, disposal) canister to a TAD canister, which would then be utilized for emplacement and permanent disposal of the SNF in the Yucca Mountain repository. Because both the threat environment and the plans for surface operations at the GROA have changed, the NRC now believes that a separate regulatory approach for protecting and safeguarding a GROA is necessary. The DOE has not set forth a final concept of operations for the GROA. Therefore, it is not clear what types of facilities will be part of the surface operations or what type of handling of the HLW within the surface facilities may occur. The new security and MC&A requirements also should be broad enough and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of possible types of non-HLW radioactive materials without the need for additional rulemaking. The DOE, in its Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, considered the possibility that radioactive waste types other than SNF and HLW, such as Greater-Than-Class-C low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and Special-Performance-Assessment-Required LLW might be disposed of in a geologic repository. See Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, February 2002, Vol. II, A-1, A-57-A-64. Disposal of such non-HLW could require new legislation or a determination by the NRC that these wastes require permanent isolation. The NRC is not making such a determination in this rulemaking. However, the security and MC&A requirements being proposed for a GROA take account of the possibility that the geologic repository might be used for the disposal of radioactive materials which are not SNF or HLW. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a thorough review of its security requirements to ensure that special nuclear material (SNM) at fixed sites and in transit continued to have effective security measures in place given the changing threat environment. Through a series of security orders issued to certain NRC licensees, the Commission specified changes to the Design Basis Threat (DBT) for power reactor and Category I Strategic SNM licensees, and implemented enhanced requirements for specific training, access authorization, defensive strategies, and security. Through generic communications, the Commission specified expectations about enhanced notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious activities. These enhancements resulted in some licensees revising their physical security plans, security personnel training and qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans to defend against the supplemental DBT requirements. These security orders specifically required certain licensees to: (1) Increase patrols; (2) augment the security force capabilities and security posts; (3) add and modify existing physical security barriers; (4) move vehicle check points to a greater standoff distance; (5) enhance coordination with local law enforcement agency (LLEA) and military authorities; (6) augment their security and emergency response training, equipment, and communications; and (7) strengthen off-site access controls, including additional background and screening checks of employees. The enhanced security measures have yet to be imposed on a GROA. This rulemaking is the mechanism the NRC is using to impose the new requirements on the DOE for operations at a GROA. This rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection of HLW and other radioactive materials at a GROA combines lessons learned, current/best practices, and requirements based on those contained in security orders issued to NRC licensees that address the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. The security orders, as well as other ongoing security rulemakings, are used as the basis for upgrading the GROA security requirements. Specifically, the security requirements for power reactors are being used as the starting point for the security requirements for this proposed rule. The reactor requirements are used as the stating point because of the similarity in material, the material's attractiveness for malevolent use, and the potential consequences of its malevolent use. The security requirements should provide protection equivalent to a power reactor. The reactor requirements have been proposed in a rule entitled “Power Reactor Security Requirements” (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006). Section 653 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), signed into law on August 8, 2005, allows the NRC to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-automatic assault weapons. Section 653 requires that all security personnel with access to any weapons undergo a background check that includes fingerprinting and a check against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) database. Under Section 161k. of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended, the DOE has authority for authorization of weapons. The NRC does not plan to use its authority under Section 653 of the EPAct. The DOE, under its own authority under Section 161k. of the AEA, may authorize the use of an expanded weapons arsenal and the use of force in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 1047. The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that effective security measures are in place for the protection of HLW and other radioactive materials given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New requirements for specific training enhancements, improved access authorization, and enhancements to defensive strategies would be incorporated. The proposed rule would establish general performance objectives and corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating into 10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In addition, the proposed rule would require the emergency plan to address radiological emergencies. II. Discussion A. What Action Is the NRC Taking? The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations primarily to establish new physical security and MC&A requirements for HLW and other radioactive materials at a GROA. The requirements specified in this rulemaking would establish the objectives and minimum performance standards that the DOE must meet to protect against each threat (theft or diversion and radiological sabotage) at a GROA, and the objectives and minimum capabilities for the MC&A program. The proposed rule is risk-informed and performance-based. B. Whom Would This Action Affect? Only the DOE, as the potential operator of any repository, would be impacted by this proposed rule. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 63 are specific for the Yucca Mountain repository. C. Why Do the Requirements Need To be Revised? The current regulations for MC&A and security for a GROA were developed under a different threat environment, and the threat environment has changed, as have the plans for surface operations at a GROA. The NRC now believes that a new regulatory approach for protecting a GROA is necessary. In addition, the DOE has not set forth a final concept of operations document for the GROA; therefore, the types and forms of material to be handled and disposed of at a GROA have not been finalized. The current security and MC&A requirements for a GROA are not adequate to protect the common defense and security or the public health and safety. The new security and MC&A requirements must be broad enough and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of possible activities without the need for additional rulemaking. This rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection of HLW and other radioactive materials at a GROA capitalizes on the lessons learned, current/best practices, and security orders issued to NRC licensees to address the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. The security orders, as well as ongoing security rulemakings, have been used as the basis for upgrading the GROA security requirements. The proposed rule would also establish general performance objectives and corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating into 10 CFR part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted? The DOE should include a description of the security and MC&A plans in its license application when it is submitted. The actual plans would be submitted no later than 180 days after the Commission grants the construction authorization for the GROA. A description of the security and MC&A plans is necessary at the time of the application to demonstrate that the DOE can adequately address and meet the NRC requirements for security and MC&A. Additionally, there may be some aspects that would be better integrated during construction. Submitting the plans after the Commission grants a construction authorization allows the DOE to take advantage of any new technology and concepts that may not be available at the time the construction application is submitted. The timing still allows some aspects, if appropriate, to be addressed during construction. The plans would not need to be implemented until the Commission grants a license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA. E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security and MC&A Requirements? This rule would cover the security and MC&A aspects for the radioactive material at both surface and subsurface areas where waste handling activities are conducted. This radioactive material can include HLW in the form of irradiated reactor fuel and reprocessing wastes. Section 63.102(b)(4) provides that if the DOE proposes to use the GROA for storage of radioactive waste other than HLW, the storage of this radioactive waste is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 63. Irradiated reactor fuel contains SNM and fission byproducts. Depending on the enrichment and quantity, the SNM may be considered strategic special nuclear material, SNM of moderate strategic significance, or SNM of low strategic significance. The higher the enrichment of the SNM, the more attractive the material may be for malevolent purposes. While it is expected that the primary waste to be handled at a GROA is irradiated reactor fuel, it is possible that the DOE may propose the storage of other types of radioactive waste. Therefore, the Commission has attempted in this proposed rule to develop security and MC&A requirements that are broad enough to cover the spectrum of waste materials that could potentially be dispositioned at a GROA without the need for future rulemaking. The security requirements that would be established are, in part, based on the attractiveness of the waste material, shape, size, and the potential consequences if the waste were used for malevolent purposes. The MC&A requirements pertain to the SNM content of the waste. F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements? The proposed rule would establish general performance objectives and corresponding systems capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating in 10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. Proposed objectives for the GROA MC&A program would center on detecting and responding to a potential loss of SNM, including theft and diversion, commensurate with the strategic worth of the SNM. The DOE would be required to submit an MC&A plan describing how those objectives would be achieved through the implementation of specified system capabilities commensurate with safeguards risks. G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the MC&A Program? The DOE would be required to establish and maintain internal control, inventory, auditing, and recordkeeping capabilities. Internal controls would include comprehensive measures for management structuring, personnel qualification and training, validating receipts and any shipments, item control, collusion protection, measurements, and measurement control for resolving anomalies (as needed). This would include an overall detection and response program and a collusion program to thwart theft or diversion and would include incorporating checks and balances that are sufficient to detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal the theft or diversion of SNM. Item control of SNM and continuous assurance of its integrity from receipt to emplacement would be important. If necessary, additional item control and physical inventory measures may be required for recovery of waste packages or retrieval of waste packages from emplacement in Yucca Mountain to an alternate storage or an area for possible examination or external shipment. H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent Measurements Be Required for Receipts? No, the DOE would not be required to conduct independent measurements on receipts of HLW or SNM at a GROA. The DOE would be allowed to accept the originator-assigned values. However, the DOE would be required to routinely assure the validity of each originator's assigned SNM content values and the integrity of receipts (with validating physical checking of unique identity, intactness, and tamper-safing) accepted at a GROA. No routine nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of receipts would be required. The DOE would be required to closely coordinate with originators to adequately understand the technical basis for assigning SNM content and procedures to be followed for packaging and assuring item identification and integrity, (e.g., with reactor fuel burnup calculations, unique serial numbers, and the tamper-safing of canisters and shipment overpacts). Tamper-safing refers to the use of devices on containers in a manner that ensures a clear indication if the device has been removed to allow opening of the container. For shipments of commercial SNF to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, the DOE is currently expected to be the shipper as the DOE is expected to take possession of the material at the nuclear reactor. However, for the purposes of reporting to the Nuclear Material Management Safeguards System (NMMSS), power reactor utilities would be expected to complete and file the DOE/NRC Form-741 for transferring the SNM to the GROA using their respective NRC Reporting Identification Symbol (RIS). As a result, following the instructions in NUREG/BR-0007 and NMMSS Report D-24, the transfer for MC&A technical purposes would be made between two NRC RISs—from a power reactor utility RIS to that assigned to the GROA for receiving and possessing SNM under license. This is not a new requirement as licensees are currently required to report transfers of SNM. In their reference to shippers, the MC&A regulations at § 74.15 are addressing the licensed utilities who are originating and reporting the transfers with SNM content values technically assigned by the utility. Any required tamper-safing of shipments to assure their integrity (e.g., the welding of canisters or the affixing of tamper-indicating devices on shipping overpacts) would also be done by such originating shippers from a shipper-receiver validation/comparison. I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A Program? As warranted, independent confirmatory weight and NDA measurements of HLW and SNM would be required for off-normal circumstances (e.g., in resolving certain types of anomalies that may arise and trigger investigations and special reporting of safeguards events). The state-of-the-art for NDA and other practical limitations shall be considered for such nonroutine measurements (e.g., at a wet transfer facility where bare spent fuel assemblies may be handled). At this point, no routine onsite measurements are foreseen as necessary to further validate/accept SNM content values assigned to receipts by the originators. J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve? The focus would be on rapidly detecting and responding to indications of SNM loss, including possible theft or diversion. This includes triggering investigations and resolving action on anomalies, as well as a way to thwart any attempts to covertly steal or divert SNM by insiders acting individually or in collusion. The design of measures to counter such a potential internal threat is to include a diversion path analysis or risk analysis of postulated scenarios considering conceivable ways and means potential insiders might try to steal or divert SNM at a GROA. As background, the general diversion path analysis method that has been used by the NRC is described in the open literature (R. Hawkins, S. Baloga, N. Zack, W. Stanbro, and J. Markin, “Diversion Path Analysis—A New Approach,” INMM Proceedings XXI, 763-769, 1992). This technical paper expanded on diversion path analysis methods originally developed by the U.S. Bureau of Standards and published by the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (M. Maltese, K. Goodwin, and J. Scheter, “Diversion Path Analysis Handbook,” ERDA, October 1976). In addition, diversion path analysis methods have been extensively applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for designing and implementing its safeguards strategy under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Regarding the generic safeguarding of geologic repositories, the IAEA has published a comprehensive, multi-volume document (“Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories,” STR-312, IAEA, Department of Safeguards, September 1998), which identifies and analyzes, in considerable detail, resulting diversion paths for a hypothetical facility. K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if the DOE Possesses Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form Other Than as Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel? Additional requirements would be included for specified system capabilities for strategic SNM. These requirements include additional measures for item monitoring and more rigorous access control, quality assurance, and alarm resolution in concert with any enhanced physical protection to be provided under 10 CFR Part 73. L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist? There is a need to consider risk-informed, performance-based alternatives for resolving anomalies, particularly onsite NDA measurements by the DOE in cases where item identity and integrity may have been compromised. Another need is the extent of item control and physical inventorying that would be necessary for SNM (in HLW and other radioactive waste) in underground drifts and at aging pads, especially from a containment, surveillance, and access control perspective, and a worker perspective that involves reducing radiation exposure to personnel to as low as is reasonably achievable, as well as other impact aspects. The MC&A plan also needs to address SNM control and accounting functional aspects of retrievability and alternate storage capabilities that are required by §§ 60.21(c)(12) and 63.21(c)(7). M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security Requirements? The objective of the proposed physical security requirements is to provide high assurance that activities at a GROA are not inimical to the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. In order to provide a high assurance of protection, the NRC's philosophy is to use a defense-in-depth strategy towards the protection of HLW. Defense-in-depth relies on a holistic approach towards the protection of these materials and other radioactive materials, which includes using people, processes, equipment, and facilities to protect HLW and other radioactive materials from theft or diversion or radiological sabotage for malevolent purposes. The GROA physical security requirements would be determined using a graded approach related to the projected risk from radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion of HLW and other radioactive materials. N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against? The design basis threat defined in § 73.1(a) would apply to a GROA in the specific circumstances where a radiological sabotage or theft and diversion event may involve formula quantities of SNM. Under the proposed rule, the threat to a GROA is largely defined by specific security scenarios which represent the greatest threats against which GROA security forces must be able to defend against, with a high assurance of success. A GROA would have graded security measures based on the material, waste form, and operations within a particular facility at a GROA. Therefore, depending on the material content, quantity, and consequence from a radiological sabotage event, as well as the theft or diversion of certain material, the security measures may rely on the design basis threat defined in § 73.1(a) or may rely on other Commission requirements. The NRC specifically invites comment on the physical protection protocol for a GROA. We are interested in information concerning: Do we need a specific physical protection protocol for a GROA or should we apply the existing DBT and increased controls as appropriate. O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects of a GROA? The consequences of radiological and theft or diversion security events are highly dependent on the characteristics and packaging of the HLW and other radioactive materials and their location within a GROA. The activities and operations at a GROA aid in defining the physical security requirements and protective strategies that would be implemented. At this time, the GROA concept of operations has not been fully defined by the DOE; therefore, the NRC is establishing physical security requirements that would be dependent upon the consequences of a potential radiological event and the theft or diversion of certain material. These physical security requirements would be based on five proposed protection levels. The highest protection level would be for waste containing strategic SNM with the protection system designed to protect the material against the design basis threat for both theft or diversion and radiological sabotage. The next protection level would be for radioactive material that could result in a significant radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the lesser of the controlled area boundary or 400 meters from the source could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.25 Sv (25 rem). For these materials, the protection system must be designed to protect against the design basis threat for radiological sabotage. The third protection level would be for radioactive material that could result in a moderate radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the lesser of the controlled area boundary or 400 meters from the source could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.05 Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem). For these materials, the protection system must be designed to protect the material against radiological sabotage. The fourth protection level would be for all other radioactive material containing SNM. The physical protection system would be designed to protect the material against security-related events specified for theft and diversion. The lowest protection level would be for other solidified radioactive material and material that would meet the criteria in appendix P to 10 CFR part 110 (Categories 1 and 2 radioactive materials). The protective strategy for these materials would be equivalent to the increased controls (i.e., prevent or impede removal, locate and prompt recovery, and mitigation of any potential consequence). P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and What Would They Cover? Yes, access authorization requirements would apply to a GROA. The facilities that possess large radiation sources, such as irradiated nuclear reactor fuels (e.g., SNF), are attractive targets for those who seek to commit radiological malevolent acts. Insiders who have unescorted access to facilities that possess such radiation sources, including a GROA, could pose a threat to the public health and safety or the common defense and security because they may have the ability to commit radiological malevolent acts. Therefore, imposing access authorization requirements is a prudent security measure to ensure that individuals who are granted unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA: (1) Are trustworthy and reliable; (2) do not impose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security (as a result of increasing the likelihood of an insider threat); and (3) do not pose a potential threat to commit radiological malevolent acts or theft or diversion of HLW. Fingerprints are required of any individual granted unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA. Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA? Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the AEA to require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation identification and criminal history records check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to regulation by the Commission, and which the Commission determines to be of such significance to the public health and safety or the common defense and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks. The Commission has determined that the radioactive material at a GROA is of such significance and is proposing to implement the requirement for fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal history records check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials at a GROA. Background investigations, which include criminal history checks, represent a key element of the access authorization program ensuring that individuals who have unescorted access to a GROA are trustworthy and reliable. To accomplish this task, requirements were developed that focused on accumulating data on an individual's past that would produce an overall perspective of the individual's character and allow the licensee to make a determination of trustworthiness and reliability. R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements? The key aspects of the security requirements for a GROA are similar to the security requirements for similar types of NRC-licensed material and facilities. The proposed regulations would require an integrated security plan that would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective strategies based on protecting target sets from various threat scenarios. The requirements are performance based and include an access authorization program and a physical protection system to detect, delay, and respond to postulated threat scenarios in such a way that prevents or mitigates undesirable consequences of malevolent actions. The postulated threat scenarios include the theft or diversion of SNM and HLW as well as radiological sabotage. The access authorization program requirements include measures necessary to assure that personnel having critical safety or security functions or having access to certain nuclear materials remain trustworthy and reliable. The physical protection system requirements for detection measures include intrusion sensing, alarm communication, alarm assessment, and entry or access controls. Detection would be provided through the use of detection equipment, patrols, access controls, and other program elements required by this proposed rule. It also would provide notification to the licensee that a potential threat is present and where the threat is located. Alarm assessment is the mechanism through which the licensee obtains the information necessary to identify the nature of the threat detected and to determine how to respond. There are access control requirements for personnel, vehicles, and hazardous materials. The requirements for delay measures include barriers to delay adversarial actions to allow a timely response by security personnel. The requirements for responding to malevolent events allow the DOE to develop effective response strategies to challenge intruders so they cannot accomplish actions that are necessary to achieving undesirable consequences. In some instances, the strategy may include neutralizing adversaries to deny access to the nuclear material. The proposed rule uses a risk-informed approach for response requirements that permits protective strategies to be tailored to the type of material being protected, operations that involve handling this material and the potential consequences of postulated threat scenarios. Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of the radioactive waste would be required to meet minimum requirements and performance criteria. The DOE would have to meet general criteria requirements for selection, training, equipping, testing, qualification, and contingency plans of security forces involved in GROA operations. These requirements would include hiring personnel who function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure that security forces are trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the security force and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates the DOE's ability to execute the protective strategy as described in the site security plans. As for contingency plans, the information required in the safeguards contingency plans includes responses to threats, up to and including design basis threats, as described in § 73.1(a). The DOE would be required to submit for NRC approval a plan detailing how the prescribed criteria are going to be met. S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA? As it applies to a GROA, target set means the combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant operational disruption or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action by site operators. For a GROA, a target set means the quantities and form of HLW and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative measures to protect against potential large scale releases of fission products from malevolent actions. For example, a target set with respect to spent fuel sabotage at a GROA could be draining the spent fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of time, allowing spent fuel to heat up, and the associated potential for release of fission products. Due to the sensitivity of this information, specific target sets to the GROA will not be available in a public document. T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA Operations? There are two ways weapons may be authorized for use at a GROA. First, section 161A of the AEA allows the NRC to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns. Section 161A was added to the AEA under the EPAct. Secondly, under section 161k. of the AEA, the DOE has separate authority for authorization of weapons on any of its sites. The DOE, under its own authority under section 161k. of the AEA, may authorize the use of an expanded weapons arsenal, limited arrest authority, and the use of force in accordance with the DOE's current regulations under 10 CFR part 1047. The NRC does not plan to use its authority under Section 161A of the AEA. U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for the GROA Facility? Yes, some type of force-on-force exercises are necessary to test the effectiveness of the DOE's protective strategies for the high-consequence target sets. The requirement for annual force-on-force exercises only applies to formula quantities of strategic SNM and significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets. V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA After Receipt of HLW Begins? A license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA may only be issued by the Commission on a finding that construction of the GROA has been substantially completed. Construction may be considered substantially complete if the construction of surface and interconnecting structures, systems, and components and any underground storage space required for initial operation are substantially complete. Some construction activities could continue once receipt of material begins. The NRC's security requirements are designed to protect all material at a GROA. Handling, storage, and emplacement operations for HLW and other radioactive materials shall be conducted inside a protected area. The NRC's security requirements are flexible enough to allow the DOE to establish a protected area that could separate remaining construction activities from operations involving HLW and other radioactive material. Any construction activity occurring within the protected area would be subject to the NRC's security requirements. Any construction activities outside the protected area, but within the DOE controlled area, would be subject to some NRC security controls and DOE security orders. The protected area and security plans would be expanded to include new facilities or areas before radioactive material could be received in that new facility or area. W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste to a GROA? No, the NRC's regulatory authority is limited to the operations at a GROA. As an independent Federal Agency, the DOE must comply with its own internal requirements (DOE orders) and Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security regulations when transporting HLW and other radioactive materials to a GROA. However, the DOE must use shipping containers certified by the NRC under the regulations in 10 CFR part 71. Part 71 is not being revised by this proposed rule. X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure? No, these plans would not cover the postclosure period. Once the NRC license is terminated, the NRC would no longer have regulatory authority. However, the DOE plans for continued oversight of the Yucca Mountain site after permanent closure. Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for a GROA? Prompt notification to the NRC of a security event involving an actual or imminent threat would permit the NRC to contact other Federal authorities and other licensees, as appropriate. The Commission would expect the DOE to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after they notify local law enforcement agencies, but within 15 minutes. A written 60-day report would also be required for these notifications. This new reporting requirement would require the DOE to promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent threat at the GROA. Four-hour notification would be proposed for suspicious activities, attempts at access, etc., that may indicate pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering activities targeted against the GROA. This would assist the intelligence and homeland security communities in evaluating threats across critical infrastructure sectors. The current provision for one-hour notifications for certain safeguards events (e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM, significant physical damage to the facility, entry of an unauthorized person into protected areas) would be retained, with some modifications to include attempted actions and to broaden the scope of the language used for specific areas. The provision for events to be recorded in the safeguards log would also be retained. Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents? Yes, the NRC intends to issue guidance documents. The NRC intends to issue a GROA-specific regulatory guidance document. This document would address adversary characteristics for the design basis threats and describe details of the GROA security-related threats. Other guidance documents are under consideration. The publication of the guidance documents is planned after the publication of the final rule. Because the guidance documents may contain Safeguards Information and/or classified information, these documents would only be available to those with a need-to-know, and who are qualified to have access to Safeguards Information and/or classified information, as applicable. However, the NRC has determined that access to these guidance documents is not necessary for the public or other stakeholders to provide informed comment on this proposed rule. AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards? The U.S. Government has not yet made a determination as to whether a GROA can be subject to IAEA safeguards. BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan Requirements? The emergency plan requirements would be changed to reflect the need to respond to radiological emergencies instead of radiological accidents. The term radiological emergencies is more inclusive of the types of situations that the emergency plan may need to address. In addition, § 63.21(c)(21) requires a description of the plan for responding to, and recovering from, radiological emergencies; the proposed change is consistent with this language. CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC? Tips for preparing your comments—when submitting your comments, remember to: i. Identify the rulemaking (RIN 3150-AI06). ii. Explain why you agree or disagree; suggest alternatives and substitute language for your requested changes. iii. Describe any assumptions and provide any technical information and/or data that you used. iv. If you estimate potential costs or burdens, explain how you arrived at your estimate in sufficient detail to allow for it to be reproduced. v. Provide specific examples to illustrate your concerns, and suggest alternatives. vi. Explain your views as clearly as possible. vii. Make sure to submit your comments by the comment period deadline identified. viii. See item N of the Discussion portion of this notice for NRC's specific request for comments on the need for a specific physical protection protocol for a GROA. See Section VI of the preamble for the request for comments on the use of plain language and Section XI for the request for comments on the draft regulatory analysis. III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section Section 60.21 Content of Application Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the security requirements from § 73.51 to the new requirements in § 73.53 and to require a description instead of plans. Paragraph (b)(4) would be revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from § 60.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR Part 74. The actual plans would be submitted after the construction authorization was issued. The security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until SNM is received at the GROA. Section 60.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact Statement Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180 days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual MC&A plan for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight. Section 60.78 Criticality Reporting This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part 74. Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the reference to § 72.74. The section would be revised to include the criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another section. The actual requirements would not change. Section 63.21 Content of Application Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the security requirements from § 73.51 to the new requirements in § 73.53 and would clarify that only a description of the program need be submitted with the construction application. Paragraph (b)(4) would be revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from § 63.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR part 74. The actual security and MC&A plans would be submitted after the construction authorization was issued. The security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until SNM is received at the GROA. Section 63.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact Statement Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180 days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual plans for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight. Section 63.78 Criticality Reporting This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part 74. Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the reference to § 72.74. The section would be revised to include the criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another section. The actual requirements would not change. Section 63.161 Emergency Plan for the Geologic Repository Operations Area Through Permanent Closure This section would be revised to refer to radiological emergencies instead of radiological accidents. The term radiological emergencies is more inclusive of the types of situations that the emergency plan may need to address. In addition, § 63.21(c)(21) requires a description of the plan for responding to, and recovering from, radiological emergencies; the proposed change is consistent with that language. The reference to develop and implement a plan to “cope with radiological accidents” is changed to a plan to “provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and would be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.” Section 73.2 Definitions This section would be revised to incorporate the definition for high-level radioactive waste in 10 CFR part 63 and to add a definition for target set for application to a GROA. Section 73.50 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities This section would be revised to include a reference to § 73.53 to retain the exemption for a GROA from the security requirements listed in the section. Requirements for a GROA are specified in proposed § 73.53. Section 73.51 Requirements for Physical Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste This section would be revised to remove references to a GROA. The security requirements for an ISFSI and a monitored retrievable storage installation would remain unchanged. The requirements for a GROA would be contained in new section 73.53. Section 73.53 Requirements for Physical Protection at a Geologic Repository Operations Area The proposed rule would create a new section for the GROA physical protection requirements. The existing requirements for GROA security are contained in § 73.51(b), (c), and (d). The requirements have been expanded and strengthened to reflect the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and placed in this new section. Paragraph (a) would establish that the physical protection requirements in this section apply to The DOE for the operation of a GROA. Paragraph (b)(1) would require The DOE to submit a Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan that describe how the requirements of the section would be met. The plans would be submitted no later than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for a GROA. Paragraph (b)(1) would also establish the implementation timeframe. Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt the DOE from the security requirements after permanent closure of a GROA. This provision is currently located at § 73.51(e). Paragraph (c) would establish the performance objectives. Paragraph (c)(1) would establish the general performance objective to provide high assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The current general objective does not address common defense and security. Paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) would establish objectives based on the type and form of material and the consequences of a postulated radiological sabotage event. The more risk-significant the material, the higher the level of protection required. Paragraph (d) would establish general requirements for the physical security program. The DOE would be required to design and implement a program to satisfy the performance requirements and to ensure that no single act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to prevent the theft of strategic SNM and significant radiological sabotage. The DOE would also be required to establish and maintain a written performance evaluation program, an access authorization program, an insider mitigation program, and a corrective action program. Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to develop security plans that describe how the physical protection program would prevent the theft or diversion and radiological sabotage of SNM and byproduct material and to protect safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure. The DOE would be required to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures and to have a process for the DOE's approval of implementing procedures. The DOE would be allowed to make changes to the security plans without NRC approval as long as the changes do not decrease the plan's effectiveness. The DOE would be required to establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training and qualification plan and a safeguards contingency plan and to establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved physical security plan. Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish and maintain a security organization designed, staffed, trained, and equipped to provide early detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized activities within any area of the facility. The Commission expectation would be that the management system oversee all aspects of the onsite physical protection program to ensure the effective implementation of Commission requirements through the approved security plans and implementing procedures. The DOE would also be required to ensure that any written agreement with any contractor used to implement the onsite physical protection program was retained as a record for the duration of the contract and that the contract clearly state several conditions related to training, access authorization, and document availability. Provisions regarding the security organization are currently addressed at § 73.51(d)(5). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current requirements. Paragraph (g) would provide a performance-based requirement for determining the use and placement of physical barriers for the protection of personnel, equipment, and systems, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety. The DOE would be required to establish and maintain physical barriers in the controlled area, as necessary, to deter, delay, or prevent unauthorized access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities; and control approach routes to the facility. Paragraph (g) would establish requirements related to physical barriers (paragraph (g)(3)), isolation zones (paragraph (g)(4)), protected areas (paragraph (g)(5)), vital areas (paragraph (g)(6)), vehicle barrier systems (paragraph (g)(7)), and unattended openings (paragraph (g)(8)). Current provisions addressing physical barriers are located at § 73.51(d)(1). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current requirements. Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to develop and identify target sets and document the analyses and methodologies used to determine and group the target set equipment or elements. The DOE would also be required to implement a program for the oversight of certain facility equipment and systems documented as part of the DOE protective strategy. Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to establish an access control program for personnel, vehicles, and material. The paragraph would establish the features required for the access control program, including access control points, emergency conditions, vehicles, access control devices, visitors, and escorts. Current provisions addressing access control are found at § 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(7), and 73.51(d)(9). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current requirements. Paragraph (j) would establish the requirements for search programs for individuals, packages, and vehicles. This paragraph would expand and strengthen the current requirements located in § 73.51(d)(9). Paragraph (k) would establish the requirements for the detection and assessment systems. The DOE would be required to establish and maintain an intrusion detection and assessment system that must provide the capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized persons and activities. This proposed requirement would not mandate specific intrusion detection equipment for any specific area, but rather would require that the system provide detection and assessment capabilities that meet Commission requirements. The current requirements addressing detection and assessment systems are located at § 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(2), 73.51(d)(3), 73.51(d)(4), and 73.51(d)(11). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current requirements. Paragraph (l) would require the DOE to establish and maintain continuous communication capability with onsite and offsite resources to ensure effective command and control during both normal and emergency situations. The chosen communication method would be available and operating any time it would be needed to communicate information. The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current requirements located at § 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(6), and 73.51(d)(8). Paragraph (m) would establish the response requirements for personnel and equipment and armed responders. The DOE would be required to establish and maintain the minimum number of properly trained and equipped personnel required to intercept, challenge, delay and/or neutralize any security related events. Paragraph (n) would require the DOE to implement a cyber-security program that provides high assurance that computer systems, which if compromised could adversely impact safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are protected from cyber attacks. Paragraph (o) would establish the requirements for security program reviews and audits. The DOE would be required to review the physical protection program at intervals not to exceed 12 months or as necessary based upon assessments or other performance indicators with each element being reviewed at least every 24 months. The DOE would also be required to conduct quarterly drills and annual exercises in accordance with Section III of Appendix C of 10 CFR part 73 and the DOE performance evaluation program. The proposed requirements expand on the current requirement for a physical protection program review every 24 months that is in § 73.51(d)(12). Paragraph (p) would require the DOE to implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to ensure that security programs and equipment are tested for operability and performance at predetermined intervals, are maintained in operable condition, and are capable of performing their intended function when needed. Paragraph (q) would require the DOE to identify measures and criteria needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance of personnel, equipment systems, and components that are required to meet the requirements. Paragraph (r) would authorize the DOE to suspend implementation of affected requirements of § 73.53 in an emergency when action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and during severe weather when the suspension is needed to protect personnel from a life threatening situation. In both cases, a designated senior site manager would need to approve the suspension before taking the action. Paragraph (s) would require the DOE to maintain all records required to be kept until the Commission terminates the license and to maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years after the record is superseded. Paragraph (t) would require the DOE to develop and implement a process to inform and coordinate safety and security activities to ensure that these requirements do not adversely affect the capabilities of the security organization to satisfy the security requirements or overall GROA safety. Paragraph (u) would provide a mechanism for the DOE to receive approval for use of alternative measures to those required by § 73.53. Current provisions for alternative measures are covered by § 73.51(d). Paragraph (v) would contain additional performance capabilities that must be met if the DOE were to possess formula quantities of strategic SNM, unless otherwise approved by the Commission. These additional measures include requirements on the security organization; physical barrier subsystem; access control subsystem and procedures; search programs; detection, surveillance, and alarm subsystems and procedures; and response requirements. Section 73.56a Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for a Geologic Repository Operations Area This section would be added to address the requirements for the personnel access authorization program for a GROA. The current regulations require the DOE to grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; however, there are no specific requirements for the access authorization program. The proposed program addresses the integration of the access authorization requirements and security program requirements. The proposed performance objective is to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the common defense and security, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion. The proposed rule would establish requirements for the background investigation (paragraph (d)), psychological assessments (paragraph (e)), behavioral observation (paragraph (f)), arrest reporting (paragraph (g)), granting unescorted access authorization (paragraph (h)), maintaining access authorization (paragraph (i)), access to vital areas (paragraph (j)), trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and authorization program personnel (paragraph (k)), review procedures (paragraph (l)), protection of information (paragraph (m)), audits and corrective action (paragraph (n)), and records (paragraph (o)). The proposed requirements are nearly identical as those proposed for power reactors (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006). Section 73.57 Requirements for Criminal History Checks of Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or the Protected Area of a Geologic Repository Operations Area, or Access to Safeguards Information by Power Reactor Licensees This section would be retitled to include the protected area of a GROA. New paragraph (a)(4) would be added to require the DOE to comply with the requirements for criminal history checks contained in this section upon receipt of Commission authorization to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) would be added to expand the requirements for criminal history checks to anyone granted unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA. Paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(4)(i), (b)(5), (b)(8), (c)(1), (d)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(5) would be revised to expand the requirements to individuals granted unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA. Section 73.70 Records The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference to § 73.53. Paragraph (c)(1) would be added to include a reference to § 73.53(i)(7). A new paragraph (c)(1) is being proposed because changes to paragraph (c) have been proposed in the power security rule and it could cause confusion to stakeholders to propose additional changes to the same section. This section would establish the requirements for record retention. Record retention requirements are currently located in § 73.51(c), 73.51(d)(10), and 73.51(d)(13). The record retention period remains 3 years or termination of the license, depending on the record type. Section 73.71a Reporting of Safeguards Events for a GROA Section 73.71a would be created to contain the safeguards reporting events that are specific to a GROA. A new section is being proposed because significant changes to this section have been proposed in the power reactor security rule and it could cause significant confusion to stakeholders to propose additional changes to the same section. A new reporting requirement is proposed that would require the DOE to promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent threat. Four-hour notification is being proposed for suspicious events and tampering events not otherwise covered under Appendix G. The provision for one-hour notifications for certain safeguards events (e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM, significant physical damage to any facility, entry of an unauthorized person into protected areas.) would be retained, with some modifications to include attempted actions and to broaden the scope of the language used for specified areas. The provisions for events to be recorded in the safeguards log would be retained with minor revisions. Requirements for making the required telephonic and written notifications are also proposed. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73—General Criteria for Security Personnel A new Section VII, “Geologic Repository Operations Area Training and Qualification Plan,” would contain the training and qualification requirements for security personnel. These new requirements would include additional physical requirements for unarmed security personnel to assure the personnel performing these functions meet physical requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new requirements also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and program requirements for on-the-job training. Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73—Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans A new Section III, “Geologic repository operations area safeguards contingency plans,” would establish the requirements that govern the development of the safeguards contingency plan for a GROA. Proposed requirements include specific references to personnel who function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the GROA security force and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates the DOE's ability to execute the protective strategy as described in the site security plans. Additionally drills and exercises must be performed properly to assure they do not negatively impact personnel or facility safety. Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference to §§ 73.71a and 73.53 to address the reporting provisions that would apply specifically to a GROA. The reporting requirements would be revised to support the revised reporting requirements from proposed § 73.71a. Paragraph V would be added to require prompt reporting (not later than 15 minutes of discovery) after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the facility. Paragraph VI would contain the reports to be reported within one (1) hour. Paragraph VII would contain the events to be reported with four (4) hours. Paragraph VIII would contain the events to be recorded in the safeguards log. Section 74.1 Purpose Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to §§ 60.21 and 63.21 to cover submittal of a license application for a GROA. Section 74.2 Scope Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to the proposed Subpart F. Section 74.4 Definitions This section would be revised to add definitions for accounting, custodian, high-level radioactive waste, item control area, item control program, and material balance area. Section 74.13 Material Status Reports Paragraph (a) would be revised to require the submittal of Material Status Reports within 60 calendar days of the GROA physical inventory. This requirement was previously covered by § 72.76. Section 74.17 Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary Report Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary Reports for the GROA. Section 74.19 Recordkeeping Paragraphs (a) and (c) would be revised to exempt a GROA from the recordkeeping requirements because the recordkeeping requirements for a GROA would be specified in a new Subpart F. Subpart F—Geologic Repository Operations Area This new subpart would contain the MC&A requirements that are specific for a GROA. The new Subpart would contain requirements that are both risk informed and performance based. Section 74.71 Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for a Geologic Repository Operations Area (GROA) This new section would contain the MC&A general performance objectives (paragraph (a)), the systems capabilities (paragraph (b)), and the implementation dates (paragraph (c)) for a GROA. Required systems capabilities and features would be commensurate with the kind, amount, and specifications of the SNM proposed to be possessed at a GROA. Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved MC&A program that meets the following performance objectives: (1) Maintain accurate, current, and reliable information on, and confirm the quantities and locations of, SNM; (2) detect, respond to, and resolve any anomalies indicating a possible loss of SNM; (3) permit rapid determination of whether an actual loss of a significant amount of SNM has occurred: (4) generate and provide, as requested, information to aid in the investigation and recovery of missing SNM; and (5) control access to MC&A information that might assist adversaries in possible attempts to carry out a theft or diversion, or to help target HLW for radiological sabotage. Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to include the capabilities and features specified in Section 74.73 in the MC&A program. Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to submit an MC&A plan that describes how the performance objectives would be achieved and the system capabilities would be met. The plan would be submitted no later than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA. Paragraph (c) would also require the DOE to implement the Commission-approved MC&A plan upon issuance of a license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or by a date specified in a license condition. Section 74.73 Internal Controls, Inventory, and Records This new section would establish the internal controls (paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h)), inventory requirements (paragraph (i)), additional provisions for receipt of strategic SNM (paragraph (j)), and the recordkeeping requirements (paragraph (k)) for the MC&A program. Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish and maintain the internal control, inventory, and recordkeeping capabilities that would be required by paragraphs (b) through (k). Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to establish, document, and maintain a management structure that assures clear overall responsibility for the MC&A program, would be independent of other operations, and would provide for separation of key responsibilities. The DOE would also be required to provide for the adequate review, approval, and use of written procedures. Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to assure that personnel that work in key positions are trained to maintain a high-level of safeguards awareness and are qualified to perform their duties. Paragraph (d) would require the DOE to perform and document independent reviews and assessments of the total MC&A program at intervals not to exceed 24 months. Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to establish, document, implement, and maintain an item control program that: (1) Provides current knowledge of all HLW items with respect to unique identity, element and isotope content, and location from receipt to underground emplacement and possible retrieval and alternate storage; (2) assures that the integrity of items is maintained such that the unauthorized removal of SNM would be readily apparent; (3) maintains and follows procedures for any tamper-safing program that is to be used for assuring the validity of prior measurements; and (4) stipulates the use of the 2-person rule for sealing operations, affixing tamper-indicating devices, handling of bare fuel assemblies, performing physical inventories, and internal transfers. Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and maintain an anomaly, detection, and response program that incorporates checks and balances sufficient to thwart attempts to divert SNM and to detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal the theft or diversion of SNM. The program would also be required to detect and respond to a potential loss or misuse of SNM, including the theft or diversion of SNM by an internal threat using collusion, stealth, and deceit. The overall design of the detection and response program would need to include an analysis of conceivable ways and means through which clandestine attempts of theft, diversion, or other misuse might occur. Paragraph (g) would require the DOE to establish, document, implement, and maintain a program to reasonably assure the validity of assigned SNM quantities, including a measurement system and a measurement control program that maintains a level of effectiveness sufficient to satisfy the capabilities required for resolving anomalies, as needed. Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to provide information to the NRC or other agencies deemed necessary for conducting an investigation of actual (or highly suspected) events pertaining to missing SNM and information relevant to recovery of the SNM. Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to perform a facility-wide physical inventory of all possessed SNM to close material balances at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months. The paragraph would further require the DOE to provide written instructions for conducting the physical inventories. Within 60 days after the start of the inventory, the DOE would be required to reconcile and adjust the book record, as appropriate, to the results of the physical inventory and to investigate and resolve, or report any unresolved inventory difference or discrepancy to the NRC. Paragraph (j) would require the DOE to establish additional measures, if the DOE were to receive formula quantities of strategic SNM that are in a form other than irradiated reactor fuel or high-level radioactive waste. These additional measures include: (1) Item-monitoring features as specified in § 74.55; (2) alarm resolution as specified in § 74.57; (3) quality assurance and accounting capabilities as specified in § 74.59; (4) establishment of controlled areas for strategic SNM; and (5) semi-annual physical inventories of all strategic SNM. Paragraph (k) would require the DOE to establish records that demonstrate that the requirements have been met, to maintain the records in duplicate in an auditable form, and to retain the records until the Commission terminates the GROA license. The paragraph also requires the DOE to retain procedures until the Commission terminates the license, with superceded portions of a procedure to be retained for 3 years after the portion is superceded. The DOE would also be required to maintain adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss of records. The DOE must also satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 60.71 or 63.71 for records on the receipt, handling, and disposition of radioactive waste at a GROA. IV. Criminal Penalties For the purpose of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73, and 74 under one or more of Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 73, are discussed in § 73.81. The new §§ 73.53, 73.56a, and 73.71a are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not included in § 73.81(b). Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 74, are discussed in § 74.84. The new §§ 74.71 and 74.73 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not included in § 74.84(b). Willful violations of the rule would be subject to criminal enforcement. V. Agreement State Compatibility Under the “Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs” approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR 46517), this rule is classified as Compatibility Category “NRC.” Compatibility is not required for Category “NRC” regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. VI. Plain Language The Presidential Memorandum, “Plain Language in Government Writing,” published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC requests comments on this proposed rule specifically with respect to the clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent to the address listed under the ADDRESSES heading. VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC would establish security and MC&A requirements for a GROA. This action does not constitute the establishment of a standard that establishes generally applicable requirements. VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact Pursuant to Section 121(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, this proposed rule does not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement under Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 or any environmental review under subparagraph (E) or (F) of Section 102(2) of such act. IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement The information collection requirements contained in this proposed rule of limited applicability affect one respondent, which is a federal entity. Therefore, Office of Management and Budget approval is not required pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ). X. Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. XI. Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading. The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule would not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing of one entity, the DOE, which does not fall within the scope of the definition of “small entities” set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). XIII. Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule (§§ 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, or 76.76) does not apply to this proposed rule because this amendment would not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required. List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 60 Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and disposal. 10 CFR Part 63 Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and disposal. 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation, Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. 10 CFR Part 74 Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552; the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73, and 74: PART 60—DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES 1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). 2. In § 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read as follows: § 60.21 Content of application. (b) * * * (3) A description of the security measures for physical protection of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in accordance with § 73.53 of this chapter. This description must include a description of the design for physical protection, the safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The description must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. (4) A description of the material control and accounting program to meet the requirements of §§ 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71, and 74.73 of this chapter. 3. In § 60.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows: § 60.24 Updating of application and environmental impact statement. (d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the submittal of the following plans: (1) Physical Security Plan; (2) Training and Qualification Plan; (3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and (4) Material Control and Accounting Plan. 4. Section 60.78 is revised to read as follows: § 60.78 Criticality reporting. (a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center 3 within one hour of discovery of any case of accidental criticality. 3 Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (301) 816-5100. (b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour. PART 63—DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA 5. The authority citation for part 63 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2238, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). 6. In § 63.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read as follows: § 63.21 Content of application. (b) * * * (3) A description of the security measures for physical protection of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in accordance with § 73.53 of this chapter. This description must include the description of the design for physical protection, the safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The description must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. (4) A description of the material control and accounting program to meet the requirements of §§ 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71, and 74.73 of this chapter. 7. In § 63.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows: § 63.24 Updating of application and environmental impact statement. (d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the submittal of the following plans: (1) Physical Security Plan; (2) Training and Qualification Plan; (3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and (4) Material Control and Accounting Plan. 8. Section 63.78 is revised to read as follows: § 63.78 Criticality reporting. (a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center 3 within one hour of discovery of any case of accidental criticality. 3 Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (301) 816-5100 (b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour. 9. Section 63.161 is revised to read as follows: § 63.161 Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations area through permanent closure. DOE shall develop and be prepared to implement a plan to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the geologic repository operations area, at any time before permanent closure and decontamination or decontamination and dismantlement of surface facilities. The emergency plan must be based on the criteria of § 72.32(b) of this chapter. PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 10. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169) and under sec. 652, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 810 (42 U.S.C. 2169). 11. In § 73.2, definitions for “ high-level radioactive waste ” and “target set for a geologic repository operations area ” are added in alphabetical order to read as follows: § 73.2 Definitions. High-level radioactive waste or HLW means: (1) The highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations; (2) Irradiated reactor fuel; and (3) Other highly radioactive material that the Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent isolation. Target set for a geologic repository operations area means the combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant operational disruption or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action by site operators. For a geological repository operations area (GROA), a target set means quantities and form of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative measures to protect against potential large scale releases of fission products from malevolent actions. 12. In § 73.50, the introductory paragraph is revised to read as follows: § 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities. Each licensee who is not subject to §§ 73.51 or 73.53, but who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surfaces without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall comply with the following: 13. In § 73.51, the heading is revised and paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows: § 73.51 Requirements for physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. (a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section. This includes spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of this chapter: (1) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or (2) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation. 14. Section 73.53 is added to read as follows: § 73.53 Requirements for physical protection of a geologic repository operations area. (a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to DOE for its activities at the geologic repository operations area (GROA) pursuant to a license issued under Part 60 or 63 of this chapter. (b) Submittal and implementation dates. (1) DOE shall submit a Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan that delineate how the requirements of this section will be met. The security plans must be submitted no later than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA. The Commission-approved security plans must be implemented upon the Commission's issuance of a license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or by the date specified in a license condition. (2) DOE is exempt from the requirements of this section after permanent closure of the GROA. (c) Performance objectives —(1) General. DOE shall establish, implement, and maintain an onsite physical protection program and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. (2) Radioactive waste containing strategic special nuclear material. For formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize security-related events specified for theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological sabotage as stated in § 73.1(a). (3) Radioactive waste not containing strategic special nuclear material. (i) For radioactive material that could result in a significant radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the controlled area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less, could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize security-related events specified for radiological sabotage as stated in § 73.1(a)(1). (ii) For radioactive material that could result in a moderate radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the controlled area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less, could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.05 Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize, impede, or mitigate security-related events specified for radiological sabotage. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle bomb to the proximity of vital areas. (iii) For all other radioactive material containing special nuclear material, DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and prevent the removal of special nuclear material from the protected area for security-related events specified for theft or diversion. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle bomb to the proximity of vital areas. (iv) For other solidified radioactive material and Appendix P to part 110—Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Material, DOE shall establish and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system designed to: (A) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized access to the radioactive material; (B) Prevent or impede the removal of the radioactive material from the controlled area; (C) Facilitate the location and prompt recovery of lost, stolen, or missing radioactive material; and (D) Mitigate potential consequences of such security-related events. (d) General requirements. DOE shall: (1) Design and implement the physical protection program to satisfy the performance requirements of this section and ensure that no single act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to prevent the theft of strategic special nuclear material and significant radiological sabotage. The physical protection program must include diverse and redundant equipment, systems, technology, programs, supporting processes, and implementing procedures; (2) Establish and maintain a written performance evaluation program in accordance with Appendix B and Appendix C to this part, to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of armed responders and armed security officers to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities to protect target sets described in paragraph (h) of this section and Appendix C to this part, through implementation of the DOE protective strategy. Except, the requirement for annual force-on-force exercises only applies to formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets; (3) Establish, maintain, and follow an access authorization program for protected and vital areas that meets the requirements of § 73.56a and § 73.57; (4) Develop, implement, and maintain an insider mitigation program. The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, DOE capability to prevent theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage of high-level radioactive waste; and (5) Ensure that its corrective action program assures that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective equipment, and nonconformances in security program components, functions, or personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures shall ensure that the cause of any of these conditions is determined and that corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. (e) Security plans. DOE shall: (1) Develop security plans that implement Commission requirements and that identify: (i) How the physical protection program will prevent the theft or diversion and radiological sabotage of special nuclear and byproduct materials through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, and the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies; and (ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of Commission requirements. (2) Protect the security plans and other related safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of § 73.21 or Executive Order 12958, as appropriate. (3) Establish, implement, and maintain written procedures that document the structure of the security organization, detail the specific duties and responsibilities of each position, and implement Commission requirements through the approved security plans. Implementing procedures must detail the specific actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each position of the security organization to implement the approved security plans. (4) Develop, implement, and maintain a process for DOE's written approval of implementing procedures and revisions to those procedures. The process shall ensure that implementing procedures and revisions to the procedures do not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans. (5) Revise approved security plans as necessary to ensure the effective implementation of Commission regulations and DOE's protective strategy. Commission approval of revisions made pursuant to this paragraph is not required, provided that the revisions make no change that would decrease the effectiveness of any security plan prepared pursuant to this section. DOE shall submit a report containing a description of each change within six months after the change is made. DOE shall submit any change that decreases the effectiveness of any security plan for NRC approval pursuant to §§ 60.45 or 63.45 of this chapter. (6) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved physical security plan that identifies how the performance objective and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented. The physical security plan must describe the facility location and layout; the security organization and structure; duties and responsibilities of personnel; and defense-in-depth implementation that describes components, equipment, and technology used. The physical security plan must include an assessment of radiological sabotage security events against the radiological dose criteria to determine the appropriate protective strategy for identified target sets described in paragraph (h) of this section. (7) Establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training and qualification plan that identifies how the criteria set forth in Appendix B, “General Criteria for Security Personnel,” Section VII, to this part will be implemented. The training and qualification plan must describe the process by which armed and unarmed security personnel, watch persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, qualified, and requalified to ensure that these individuals possess and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities effectively. (8) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan that describes how the criteria set forth in Appendix C, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,” Section III, to this part will be implemented. The safeguards contingency plan must describe predetermined actions, plans, and strategies designed to respond to security related events. (f) Security organization. DOE: (1) Shall establish and maintain a security organization designed, staffed, trained, and equipped to provide early detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized activities within any area of the facility. The security organization must include: (i) A management system that provides oversight of the onsite physical protection program; and (ii) At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the approved security plans and licensee's protective strategy. (2) Shall not permit any individual to act as a member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B, Section VII, to this part and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. (3) Shall not assign an individual to any position involving detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless that individual has satisfied the requirements of § 73.56a. (4) Shall ensure that any written agreement with any contractor used to implement the onsite physical protection program must be retained as a record for the duration of the contract, and the agreement must clearly state the following conditions: (i) DOE is responsible to the Commission for maintaining the physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders, Commission regulations, and the approved security plans; (ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and documents are kept by DOE or the contractor; (iii) An individual may not be assigned to any position involving detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless that individual has satisfied the requirements of § 73.56a; (iv) An individual may not be assigned duties and responsibilities required to implement the approved security plans or DOE protective strategy unless that individual has been properly trained, equipped, and qualified to perform his or her assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with Appendix B, Section VII, to this part and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan; and (v) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the ability to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities effectively. (g) Physical barriers. DOE shall establish and maintain physical barriers in the controlled area to deter, delay, or prevent unauthorized access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities; and control approach routes to the facility. Based upon DOE's protective strategy, analyses, and site conditions that affect the use and placement of physical barriers, DOE shall install and maintain physical barriers that are designed and constructed as necessary to deter, delay, and prevent the introduction of unauthorized personnel, vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be controlled or restricted. (1) DOE shall describe in the approved security plans, the design, construction, and function of physical barriers and barrier systems used and shall ensure that each barrier and barrier system is designed and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier and barrier system. (2) DOE shall retain in accordance with § 73.70, all analyses, comparisons, and descriptions of the physical barriers and barrier systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and shall protect these records as safeguards information in accordance with the requirements of § 73.21. (3) Physical barriers must: (i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of the area(s) for which the physical barrier provides protection or a function, such as protected and vital area boundaries and standoff distance; (ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against security-related events as specified by the Commission, commensurate to the required function of each barrier and in support of the DOE's protective strategy; (iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and support access control measures; and (iv) Support effective implementation of DOE's protective strategy. (4) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation zone must be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeter barrier. The isolation zone shall be: (A) Designed and of sufficient size, typically 6.1 m (20 feet) wide, to permit unobstructed observation and assessment of activities on either side of the protected area barrier; and (B) Equipped with intrusion detection equipment capable of detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier. (ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-time and play-back/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely evaluation of any detected unauthorized activities before and after each alarm annunciation. (iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the DOE's capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (g)(5)(i)(A) and (g)(5)(i)(B) must be located outside of the isolation zone. (5) Protected area. (i) The protected area perimeter must be protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet Commission requirements, and all penetrations through this barrier must be secured in a manner that prevents or delays and detects the exploitation of any penetration. (ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security plan. (iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by locking devices that allow exit only and are alarmed. (iv) The central alarm station and the location, within which the last access control function for access to the protected area is performed, must be bullet-resisting. (v) All exterior areas within the protected area must be periodically checked to detect and deter unauthorized activities, personnel, vehicles, and materials. (6) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment must be located only within vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers designed and constructed to perform the required function, except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this section. (ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area. (iii) Secondary power supply systems for intrusion detection and assessment equipment, nonportable communications equipment, and the alarm stations, must be provided protection equivalent to vital equipment located within a vital area. (iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with paragraph (t) of this section, and adjustments must be made to the site protective strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as necessary. (v) DOE shall protect all vital areas, vital area access portals, and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be designed to permit exit only. (vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked. (7) Vehicle barrier system. DOE must: (i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area from which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance objectives and requirements described in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, as appropriate; (ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes; (iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include passive and active barriers, at a standoff distance adequate to protect personnel, equipment, and systems against security-related events as specified by Commission requirements; (iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized access beyond a vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to a protected area or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the protected area perimeter; (v) Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual operation, in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position within the time line required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance; and (vi) Provide surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and barrier systems to detect unauthorized activities and to ensure the integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system. (8) Unattended openings. Unattended openings in any barrier established to meet the requirements of this section that are 620 cm 2 (96.1 in 2 ) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension of 15 cm (5.9 in) or greater, must be secured and monitored at a frequency that would prevent exploitation of the opening consistent with the intended function of each barrier. (h) Target sets. DOE shall: (1) Document in site procedures the process used to develop and identify target sets, to include analyses and methodologies used to determine and group the target set equipment or elements. (2) Consider the effects that cyber attacks may have upon individual equipment or elements of each target set or grouping. (3) Explicitly identify in the approved security plans any target set equipment or elements that are not contained within a protected or vital area. Protective measures for such equipment or elements must be addressed by DOE's protective strategy in accordance with Appendix C to this part. (4) Implement a program for the oversight of plant equipment and systems documented as part of DOE's protective strategy to ensure that changes to the configuration of the identified equipment and systems do not compromise DOE's capability to prevent or mitigate radiological sabotage. (i) Access control. DOE shall establish an access control program with the features described in paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(8) of this section. (1) General. DOE shall: (i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access into any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system, established to meet the requirements of this section; (ii) Control all points of personnel and vehicle access into vital areas in accordance with access authorization lists; (iii) During nonemergency conditions, limit unescorted access to the protected area and vital areas to only those individuals who require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and responsibilities; (iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of access control systems; (v) Provide supervision and control over the badging process to prevent unauthorized bypass of control equipment located at or outside of the protected area; (vi) Isolate the individual responsible for the last control function (controlling admission to the protected area) within a bullet-resisting structure to assure the ability to respond or to summon assistance in response to unauthorized activities; and (vii) In response to a specific threat and security information, implement a two (2) person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in vital areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to vital areas. Under these conditions, DOE shall implement measures to verify that the two-person rule has been met when a vital area is accessed. (2) Confirmation, verification, and search. In accordance with the approved security plans and before granting unescorted access through an access control point, DOE shall: (i) Confirm the identity of individuals; (ii) Verify the authorization for access of individuals, vehicles, and materials; and (iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials in accordance with paragraph (j) of this section. (3) Access control points. Access control points must be: (i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, and monitoring, observation, and surveillance equipment, as appropriate; and (ii) Located outside or concurrent with, the physical barrier system through which it controls access. (4) Emergency conditions. DOE shall: (i) Design the access control system to accommodate the potential need for rapid ingress or egress of authorized individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions; (ii) Under emergency conditions, implement procedures to ensure that: (A) Authorized emergency personnel are provided prompt access to affected areas and equipment; (B) Attempted or actual unauthorized entry to vital equipment is detected; and (C) The capability to prevent or mitigate radiological sabotage is maintained. (iii) Ensure that restrictions for site access and egress during emergency conditions are coordinated with responses by emergency support organizations identified in the emergency plans required by § 60.21(c)(9) or § 63.161 of this chapter. (5) Vehicles. (i) DOE shall exercise control over all vehicles while inside the protected area and vital areas to ensure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes. (ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or vital areas must be operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the area, or must be escorted by an individual trained, qualified, and equipped to perform vehicle escort duties, while inside the area. (iii) Vehicles inside the protected area must be limited to facility functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in use. (iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected area must be escorted by an armed member of the security organization. (6) Access control devices —(i) Identification badges. DOE shall implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system for all individuals authorized unescorted access to the protected area and vital areas. (A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area only when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing unescorted access to the protected area. (B) Except where operational safety concerns require otherwise, identification badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area and vital areas. (C) DOE shall maintain a record, to include the name and areas to which unescorted access is granted, of all individuals to whom photo identification badge/key-cards have been issued. (ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks, combinations, passwords, and related access control devices used to co [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3AE7-24346. Public record. Not legal advice.