# Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction Scheduled for March 21, 2000

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-31239

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Notice
- **Published:** December 2, 1999
- **Citation:** 64 FR 67569

## Text

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-99-28-A (Auction No. 28); DA 99-2594]

Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction Scheduled for March 21,
2000

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

[[Page 67570]]

ACTION: Notice; seeking comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Public Notice announces the auction of certain AM, FM,
LPTV and TV broadcast construction permits to commence March 21, 2000.
All spectrum to be auctioned is the subject of pending, mutually
exclusive applications for referenced broadcast services for which the
Commission has not approved settlement agreements obviating the need
for an auction. This Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction shall
dispose of the remaining broadcast applications not included in earlier
Auctions. In addition, included in the Supplemental Closed Broadcast
Auction are certain mutually exclusive LPTV and TV translator
displacement relief applications. Pursuant to the Broadcast First
Report and Order, participation in the auction will be limited to those
applicants identified in this Public Notice and applicants will be
eligible to bid only on those construction permits for which they
previously filed long form applications (FCC Forms 301 or 349).

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 6, 1999 and reply
comments are due on or before December 16, 1999.

ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties must submit an original and four
copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20554. In
addition, parties must submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions
and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Room No. 4-
A760, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shaun Maher, Video Services Division,
Mass Media Bureau at (202) 418-1600, Lisa Scanlan, Audio Services
Division, Mass Media Bureau at (202) 418-2700 or Bob Reagle, Auctions
and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, at
(717) 338-2807.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of a Public Notice
released November 19, 1999. The complete text of the public notice is
available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in
the FCC Reference Center (Room CY-A257), 445 12th Street, SW,
Washington, DC. It may also be purchased from the Commission's copy
contractor, International Transcription Services, Inc., (ITS, Inc.)
1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20035, (202) 857-3800. It is also
available on the Commission's website at http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/
auctions.
1. Construction permits will be auctioned for each of the mutually
exclusive applicant groups (``MX Groups''). In some, but not all, of
the MX Groups listed on Attachment A, a ``daisy chain'' of mutual
exclusivity exists whereby applications are directly mutually exclusive
with certain applications in the MX Group but not others (``Daisy Chain
MX Groups''). A ``daisy chain'' occurs when two or more non-table,
site-based applications propose service areas that do not directly
overlap, but are linked together into a chain by the overlapping
proposal(s) of other(s). In such cases, the potential exists to grant
more than one application and issue more than one construction permit
per MX Group and remain consistent with the Commission's separation
requirements relating to site-based services. The identification of
``daisy chains'' on Attachment A is provisional in nature, since the
final configuration of groups cannot be ascertained until after the
filing of short-form (FCC Form 175) applications, at which point mutual
exclusivity for auction purposes arises. At that time, a final
identification and enumeration of ``daisy chain'' MX Groups will be
made and a public notice will be released providing this information
(``Status PN''). It is possible that some MX Groups provisionally
identified here as constituting a daisy chain may, after the short
form-filing deadline, become directly mutually exclusive. In such
case(s), the proposal in this notice pertaining to applications that
are directly mutually exclusive with each other (``Direct MX Groups'')
become applicable.
2. The MX Groups are categorized on a service-by-service basis,
accompanied by the respective reserve prices/minimum opening bids and
upfront payments. The groups involving provisional daisy chain
situations are noted. All MX Groups identified in (Attachment A) have
been subject to competition through the opening and closing of the
period for filing competing applications through the two-step cut-off
list procedures, or through an application filing window. Pursuant to
the Broadcast First Report and Order, 63 FR 48615 (September 11, 1998)
in those specific situations where both non-commercial and commercial
applicants for full power stations filed mutually exclusive long form
applications for non-reserved band channels, auctions shall not be
conducted at this time and these applications are not included on
Attachment A.
3. The total number of long form applications being disposed of in
this proceeding is 60. These long form applications are grouped
together in a total of 14 MX groups, 8 of which are provisional daisy
chain groups.

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

4. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (section 30002(a), Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Public Law 105-33, 111 Stat. 251) calls upon the
Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price
will be required or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses
or construction permits are subject to auction (i.e., because the
applications are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines
that a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the public interest.
Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureaus,
Part One Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770 (January 7, 1998) to seek
comment on the use of minimum opening bids and/or reserve prices prior
to the start of each broadcast auction. This is consistent with policy
applied in earlier spectrum auctions, including the recently completed
Closed Broadcast Auctions. These auctions (Nos. 25 and 27) concluded
October 8, 1999, after 35 rounds and 15 rounds, respectively. The
Commission has concluded that either or both of these mechanisms may be
employed for auctions and has delegated the requisite authority to make
determinations regarding the appropriateness of employing either or
both.
5. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below,
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum-opening bid, on the other
hand, is the minimum acceptable bid price set at the beginning of a
multiple round auction. It too constitutes a minimum amount below which
no bids are accepted and is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario,
the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount later
in the auction.
6. In anticipation of these auctions and in light of the Balanced
Budget Act, the Bureaus propose to establish minimum opening bids for
Direct MX Groups and reserve prices for the Daisy Chain MX Groups. The
Bureaus believe that use of minimum opening bids, which have been
utilized in other simultaneous, multiple round auctions, is an
effective practice for conducting the auction of the Direct MX Groups,
since the competitive bidding design the Commission proposes for those
groups features simultaneous, multiple rounds.

[[Page 67571]]

For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, on the other hand, where a single round
format is proposed, the Commission will utilize published reserve
prices, which will function in a single round context much like the
minimum opening bids in the multiple round format.
7. Minimum opening bids for the Direct MX Groups will help to
regulate the pace of the auction. The proposed minimum opening bids
were determined by taking into account various factors related to the
efficiency of the auction and the potential value of the spectrum. For
the television construction permits, the Commission has based the
proposed minimum opening bids upon the type of service that will be
offered, market size, industry cash flow data and recent broadcast
transactions. For the radio construction permits, the Commission has
based the proposed minimum opening bids upon the service and class of
facility that will be offered, the population covered by the proposed
facilities for which parties intend to bid and recent broadcast
transactions.
8. Comment is sought on this proposal. If commenters believe the
reserve prices and minimum opening bids proposed will result in a
substantial number of unsold construction permits, or, in particular
instances, do not constitute reasonable amounts, they should explain
why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative
approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims with specific
valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid
levels or formulas. Commenters should detail any alternative method
they propose for valuing given spectrum, providing examples and
citations for each part of their formula. Alternatively, comment is
sought on whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act; the public
interest would be served by having no minimum opening bids or reserve
prices.

II. Other Auction Procedural Issues

9. The Balanced Budget Act, at section 3002(a)(E)(I), requires the
Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive
bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * *
before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on
proposed auction procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the provisions of
the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have
adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific provisions
that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission
directed the Bureaus, under their existing delegated authority, to seek
comment on a variety of auction-specific issues prior to the start of
each auction. Pursuant to our delegated authority as contained in the
Broadcast First Report and Order, the Commission seeks comment on the
following issues.

a. Auction Sequence, License Groupings and Auction Design

10. The Commission proposes two separate auction designs to award
these construction permits, one for the Daisy Chain MX Groups and one
for Direct MX Groups. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission
will employ an electronic single round auction to determine the
winner(s). The Commission has concluded that the disposition of these
construction permits in this manner is most appropriate because of the
complexity of the overlapping nature of the permits in these groups.
11. For Direct MX Groups, the Commission will employ an electronic
simultaneous multiple round auction format. The Commission has
concluded that the disposition of these construction permits in this
manner is the most administratively appropriate and allows bidders to
utilize the same competitive bidding design option successfully
employed in the recently concluded Closed Broadcast Auction.
12. The Commission believes that the use of these designs furthers
the public interest by enhancing efficient spectrum usage and seeks
comment on these proposals.

b. Structure of Bidding Rounds

13. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission proposes that
there will be a single round in which each bidder must place a bid that
meets or exceeds the established reserve price. Bidders will enter
their bids in whole dollar amounts. The determination of the winning
bidder in each of the Daisy Chain MX Groups shall be made by finding
the set of bids on non-overlapping coverage areas that accrue to the
greatest amount. For example, consider the case of an MX Group
consisting of a ``daisy chain'' of three potential bidders (Bidders 1,
2 and 3) interested in three construction permits in the MX Group
(respectively Construction Permits A, B and C) such that A is MX'ed
with B and B is MX'ed with C. This means that either A and C can both
be assigned or B can be assigned, but not A and B, B and C or A, B and
C. In order for Bidder 2 to win construction permit B, its bid would
have to exceed the combined bids of Bidders 1 and 3 on construction
permits A and C, respectively. All bids will be time-stamped and in the
case of tie bids, the first complete combination of bids placed first
in time shall be considered the winning bid combination.
14. For the Direct MX Groups, the Commission proposes a single
stage, simultaneous multiple round auction. In order to ensure that the
auction closes within a reasonable period, an activity rule requires
bidders to bid actively on a percentage of their maximum bidding
eligibility during each round of the auction rather than waiting until
the end to participate. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity
rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or use an
activity rule waiver. The Commission proposes that, in each round of
the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is
required to be active on construction permits encompassing one hundred
(100) percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain
the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity
rule waiver is used, see Section e.). The Commission seeks comments on
these proposals.

c. Reserve Prices and Minimum Accepted Bids

15. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, each bidder must place a bid
that meets or exceeds the established reserve price. Bidders will enter
their bids in whole dollar amounts.
16. For the Direct MX Groups, the bid level will begin at the
established minimum opening bid. Once there is a standing, high bid on
a construction permit, a bid increment will be applied to that
construction permit to establish a minimum acceptable bid for the
following round. The Commission proposes to set a minimum 10%
increment. This means that a new bid placed by a bidder must be at
least 10% greater than the previous bid received on that construction
permit. The Bureaus retain the discretion to change the methodology for
determining the minimum bid increment if they determine the
circumstances so dictate. Bidders will enter their bids as multiples of
the bid increment (i.e., with a 10% bid increment, a bid of 1 increment
will place a bid 10% above the previous high bid, a bid of 2 increments
will place a bid 20% above the previous high bid). The Commission seeks
comment on these proposals.

d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder

17. Bidders will be required to submit an upfront payment for each
construction permit for which they are

[[Page 67572]]

qualified and interested in placing a bid. The Bureaus have delegated
authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront payment
for each construction permit being auctioned, taking into account such
factors as efficiency of the auction process and the potential value of
the spectrum. Eligibility for participation depends on whether an
applicant has timely tendered its upfront payment and has otherwise
complied with all of the Commission's rules relating to participation.
Bidders will be required to submit an upfront payment for each
construction permit for which they are qualified and interested in
placing a bid. With these guidelines in mind, the Commission proposes
the schedule of upfront payments. The Commission seeks comment on this
proposal.

e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

18. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, because of the single round
format, activity rule waivers and reducing eligibility are not
applicable.
19. For the Direct MX Groups, use of an activity rule waiver
preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's
activity in the current round being below the required minimum level.
An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and not
to a particular construction permit. Activity waivers are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
20. The automated auction system assumes that bidders with
insufficient activity at the close of a round would prefer to use an
activity rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding
eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply a waiver
(known as an ``automatic waiver'') at the end of any bidding round
where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless:
(1) there are no more activity rule waivers available; or (2) the
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility thereby meeting the minimum requirements.
21. The Commission proposes that a bidder with insufficient
activity that wants to reduce its bidding eligibility rather than use
an activity rule waiver, must affirmatively override the automatic
waiver mechanism during the bidding period by using the reduce
eligibility function in the software. In this case, the bidder's
eligibility would be permanently reduced to bring the bidder into
compliance with the activity rules as described above. Once eligibility
has been reduced, a bidder would not be permitted to regain its lost
bidding eligibility.
22. The Commission proposes that a bidder may proactively use an
activity rule waiver as a means to keep the auction open without
placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive waiver (using the
proactive waiver function in the bidding software) during a bidding
period in which no bids are submitted, the auction will remain open and
the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked
in a round in which there are no new valid bids will not keep the
auction open, under the simultaneous stopping rule. The submission of a
proactive waiver cannot occur after a bid has been submitted in a round
and will preclude a bidder from placing any bids later in that round.
23. The Commission proposes that each bidder be provided with five
activity rule waivers that may be used in any round during the course
of the simultaneous multi-round auction. The Commission seeks comment
on these proposals.

f. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal

24. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission proposes the
following bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close
of the bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids
placed. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder may
effectively ``unsubmit'' any of its bids placed in the single round
auction. A bidder removing a bid is not subject to withdrawal payments.
Bid withdrawals after the close of the bidding round are not applicable
to the single round auction. The Commission seeks comment on this
proposal.
25. For the Direct MX Groups, the Commission proposes the following
bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a
bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids placed in
that round. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder
may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal
payments.
26. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
However, in the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids. A
high bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round
is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions (see 47 CFR
1.2104(g); 1.2109). The Commission seeks comment on these bid removal
and bid withdrawal procedures.
27. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission explained
that allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of
licenses and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information
becomes available during the course of an auction. The Commission
noted, however, that in some instances bidders might seek to withdraw
bids for improper reasons, including delaying the close of the auction
for strategic purposes. The WTB, therefore, has discretion, in managing
the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent strategic
delay of the close of the auction or other abuses. The Commission
stated that the WTB should assertively exercise its discretion,
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market it finds
that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.
28. Applying this reasoning, the Commission proposes to limit each
bidder in the auction to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during
the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more
than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of
withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The two rounds in
which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's discretion;
withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission's
rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high bids that may
be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized.
Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment
provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Commission seeks
comment on these proposals.

g. Stopping Rule and Waivers

29. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Bureaus propose to conduct a
single round of bidding and declare the auction over at the conclusion
of this bidding period. The Bureaus propose a single, two-hour bidding
period. The Bureaus retain the discretion to increase or decrease this
time limit by announcement before the auction if circumstances so
dictate. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal, and,
specifically, whether a bidding period of greater or less than two
hours should be employed.
30. For the Direct MX Groups, the Bureaus propose to employ a
simultaneous stopping approach. The Bureaus have discretion to
establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in
order to terminate the

[[Page 67573]]

auction within a reasonable time (see 47 CFR 1.2104(e) and 73.5001(b)).
A simultaneous stopping rule means that all construction permits remain
open until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive
waivers or withdrawals are received. After the first such round,
bidding closes simultaneously on all construction permits. Thus, unless
circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all
construction permits until bidding stops on every construction permit.
31. The Bureaus seek comment on a modified version of the
simultaneous stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the
auction for all construction permits after the first round in which no
bidder submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any
constructions on which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent
any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a
construction permit for which it is the standing high bidder would not
keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureaus
further seek comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
utilized.
32. The Commission proposes that the Bureaus retain the discretion
to keep an auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive
waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a
proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and
a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding
eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.
33. Finally, the Commission proposes that the Bureaus reserve the
right to declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureaus invoke
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s)
only for construction permits on which the high bid increased in at
least one of the preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureaus
propose to exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as,
for example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is
minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction
will not close within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising
this option, the Bureaus are likely to attempt to increase the pace of
the auction by, for example, increasing the number of bidding rounds
per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid increments for
the limited number of construction permits where there is still a high
level of bidding activity. The Commission seeks comment on these
proposals.

h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

34. The Commission proposes that, by Public Notice or by
announcement during the auction, the Bureaus may delay, suspend or
cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason
that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding
(see 47 CFR 1.2104(i)). In such cases, the Bureaus, in their sole
discretion, may elect to: resume the auction starting from the
beginning of the current bidding period; resume the auction starting
from some previous bidding period; or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureaus to delay or
suspend the auction. The Commission emphasizes that exercise of this
authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureaus, and its use
is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may
wish to apply their activity rule waivers. The Commission seeks comment
on this proposal.

Federal Communications Commission.
Louis Sigalos,
Deputy Chief, Auctions & Industry Analysis Division.

Attachment A.--Video Service Construction Permit: Minimum Opening Bids/Reserve Prices and Upfront Payments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum
Channel/ Bidding Upfront opening bid/ Daisy Case file
MX group Location FX units payment reserve Applicants chain numbers
price
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PST1 El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 $100,000.00 $100,000.00 Agape Church, Inc................... No BPCT-960628K
F
El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 KB Communications, Inc.............. No BPCT-960710K
W
El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 Sioux Falls 64, LLC................. No BPCT-960930K
R
El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 KM Communications, Inc.............. No BPCT-960930K
V
El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 United Television, Inc.............. No BPCT-961001L
E
El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 Cardinal Broadcasting Corp.......... No BPCT-961001X
N
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST1 Glide, Oregon.................. 49 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc.. No BPTTL-JG0601
ZX
Roseburg, Oregon............... 49 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ No BPTT-980601V
D
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST2 Knoxville, Tennessee........... 46 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ Yes BPTT-JG0601P
J
Knoxville, Tennessee........... 46 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Dwight R. Magnuson.................. Yes BPTTL-980601
RL
Knoxville, Tennessee........... 45 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Dwight R. Magnuson.................. Yes BPTTL-980601
TJ
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST3 Yorktown, Virginia............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 JBS, Inc............................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060
1MN

[[Page 67574]]

Virginia Beach, Virginia....... 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 B.N. Viswanath...................... Yes BPTTL-JG0601
XW
Hampton, Virginia.............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Lockwood Broadcasting, Inc.......... Yes BPTTL-JG0601
ZI
Hampton, Virginia.............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 LWWI Broadcasting, Inc.............. Yes BPTTL-980601
UH
Suffolk, Virginia.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 LWWI Broadcasting, Inc.............. Yes BMPTTL-98060
1UI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST4 Rochester, New York............ 35 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Tony J. Fant........................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060
1AG
Buffalo, New York.............. 36 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Tony J. Fant........................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060
1AH
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rochester, New York............ 36 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Metro TV, Inc....................... Yes BPTTL-980601
QQ
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST5 Wichita Falls, Texas........... 46 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Barbara Sharfstein.................. Yes BPTTL-940415
L4
Wichita Falls, Texas........... 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 James W. Satterfield................ Yes BPTTL-JD0415
BJ
Ardmore, Oklahoma.............. 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Buddy L. Watson..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415
NZ
Seminole, Oklahoma............. 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Bryan Westbrook..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415
SE
Wichita Falls, Texas........... 61 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Terri Harris........................ Yes BPTTL-JE0415
FB
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST6 Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Christian TV System........ Yes BPTTL-820616
TQ
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Minerva Rodriguez Frias............. Yes BPTTL-EO0307
PJ
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jose Armando Tamez.................. Yes BPTTL-GC0308
XV
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Lidia Rodriguez..................... Yes BPTTL-GD0308
XI
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 51 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308
PJ
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 49 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308
PK
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 50 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jo Ann's Balloon Boutique, Inc...... Yes BPTTL-GQ0308
TT
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 50 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Raul Francisco Rivas................ Yes BPTTL-GU0308
RK
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST7 Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GE0308
NW
Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evarista Romero..................... Yes BPTTL-GG0308
LQ
Uvalde, Texas.................. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GJ0308
ME
Uvalde, Texas.................. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evarista Romero..................... Yes BPTTL-GJ0308
VE
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308
PL
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308
PM
Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GK0308
RC
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jo Ann's Boutique, Inc.............. Yes BPTTL-GU0308
SG
Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Raul Francisco Rivas................ Yes BPTTL-HD0308
RT
Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evangelina Garcia Garza............. Yes BPTTL-HO0308
VN
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SST8 Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 28 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Marcie Hillyard..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415
EA

[[Page 67575]]

Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 44 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Marcie Hillyard..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415
EB
Twin Falls/Jerome, Idaho....... 29 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Idaho Independent Television, Inc... Yes BPTTL-JD0415
CW
Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 29 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Kevin Hillyard...................... Yes BPTTL-JE0415
MC
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SST9 Summerville, S. Carolina....... 26 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Towers, Inc......................... No BMPTTL-JG060
1EV
Charleston, S. Carolina........ 26 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Charles S. Namey.................... No BMPTTL-98060
1JR
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SST10 Bakersfield, California........ 20 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 3 Angles Broadcasting Network, Inc.. No BPTTL-980601
VG
Bakersfield, California........ 19 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ No BPTT-980601Z
L
Bakersfield, California........ 19 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Valley Public Television, Inc....... No BPTT-9JG0601
TQ
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[FR Doc. 99-31239 Filed 12-1-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-31239. Public record. Not legal advice.