# Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings From Germany

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-28776

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Notice
- **Published:** November 4, 1999
- **Citation:** 64 FR 60309

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-428-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings
From Germany

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews:
antifriction bearings from Germany.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders
on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain
bearings (collectively, ``antifriction bearings'') from Germany
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the
Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an
adequate response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and an
inadequate response from respondent interested parties in each of these
reviews, the Department decided to conduct expedited reviews. As a
result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of
Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Mark D. Young or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
3207 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for conducting sunset reviews are
set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews
of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20,
1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1999) in general.
Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the
Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's
Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year
(``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders;
Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these reviews are antifriction bearings
(``AFBs'') from Germany, which include ball bearings (``BBs''),
cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and spherical plain bearings
(``SPBs'') and parts thereof. For a detailed description of the
products covered by these orders, including a compilation of all
pertinent scope determinations, refer to the notice of final results of
expedited sunset reviews on AFBs from Japan, published concurrently
with this notice.

History of the Orders

On May 3, 1989, the Department issued final determinations of sales
at less than fair value (``LTFV'') with respect to imports of AFBs from
Germany.1 The antidumping duty orders on AFBs were issued by
the Department on May 15, 1989, and the dumping margins that were found
in the final determinations of sales at LTFV were affirmed.2
Since the imposition of these orders, the Department has conducted nine
administrative reviews.3 The orders remain in effect for all
manufacturers and exporters of the subject merchandise. In the final
results of the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews of these
antidumping duty orders, the Department found that antidumping duties
were being absorbed by German producers of AFBs.4 This
review covers all producers and exporters of AFBs from Germany.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, May 3, 1989, 54 FR
18992.
\2\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic
of Germany; Antidumping Duty Order, May 15, 1989 54 FR 20900.
\3\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and
Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic
of Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999); 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); 62 FR 54043
(October 17, 1997); 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); 61 FR 66472
(December 17, 1996); 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995); 58 FR 39729
(July 26, 1993); 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); and 56 FR 31692 (July
11, 1991).
\4\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96); and Final Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 35590 (July
1, 1999) (1997-98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the
antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany, pursuant to section
751(c) of the Act. By April 16,1999, within the deadline specified in
section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices
of intent to participate from the following parties: Link-Belt Bearing
Division (``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington''); MPB
Corporation (``MPB''); Roller Bering Company of America (``RBC''); New
Hampshire Ball Bearing, Inc. (``NHBB''); and NSK Corporation (``NSK
Corporation''). Each of these parties claimed status as domestic
interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic producer,
manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products subject to
these orders.5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs,
and SPBs. Link-Belt and MPB filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. NSK
Corporation filed with respect to BBs only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested
parties with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, SKF USA and SKF
GmbH (collectively ``SKF'') notified the Department that they would not
file a substantive response in the sunset reviews of the AFBs orders.
Finally, we received a complete substantive response on behalf of FAG
Kugelfischer Georg Schafer AG and FAG Bearings Corporation
(collectively ``FAG''). FAG asserts that it is a foreign manufacturer
and exporter of BBs and CRBs and is, therefore, an interested party
within the meaning of section 771(9)(A) of the Act. We received
rebuttal comments from Torrington and MPB, RBC, NHBB, NSK Corporation,
and FAG on May 12, 1999, within the deadline. On May 21 and May 24,
1999, we informed the International Trade Commission (``Commission'')
that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested
parties, we were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders

[[Page 60310]]

consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letters to Lynn
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations, USITC, from Jeffrey
A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the
sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany are
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion
of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28,
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall
provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail
if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation
or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the
continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of Torrington and MPB supporting our
determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK Corporation
also submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were
warranted. In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the
domestic interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in
favor of revocation of the various orders on antifriction bearings.
These parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of
revocation of the orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the
statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the
purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the
Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the
facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute,
at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine
whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department
is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the
investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports
of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after
the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping when (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de
minimis levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that,
given that dumping margins continued to exist after the issuance of the
orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to
continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB also
assert that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because
dumping continued. Using pre- and post-order statistics for complete
unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only category for
which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they argue that
post-order declines in import volumes provide strong additional support
for a determination that dumping is likely to continue or recur were
the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no
``good cause'' exists to consider other factors. However, if the
Department were to consider other factors, they contend, it should
acknowledge that, in each review period, it has found that home market
sales by German producers were below the cost of production requiring
that such sales be disregarded for purposes of determining formal
market value or normal value.
NHBB and NSK Corporation assert that revocation of the orders is
not likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB
bases its assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S.
domestic price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of
which foreign owners are a part. NSK Corporation supports its assertion
on the basis that the margin of dumping would be de minimis. In
addition, the respondent interested party in these sunset reviews of
BBs and CRBs, FAG, asserts that revocation of the order would lead to a
continued decrease in dumping, as evidenced by the decline in the level
of dumping in recent years. FAG bases its conclusion

[[Page 60311]]

on the following factors: the decrease in value and volume of exports
of the subject merchandise; its significant reduction of its U.S.
resales of subject merchandise; its shift in production to its U.S.
facilities and its ability to source product from third countries that
are not covered by the antidumping duty orders; and decreasing dumping
margins.
Furthermore, the respondent argues that the range of subject
merchandise sold by FAG and other large bearing companies consists of
thousands of different models, sold in differing quantities and into
many different market sectors, tends to breed a certain percentage of
``random dumping.'' FAG uses charts to support its argument that the
analysis of the top ten sales for BBs and CRBs in the 1994-1995 and
1995-1996 reviews alone account for nearly 50 percent of the dumping
margins in each case.7 They argue that these sales were only
ten of tens of thousands of sales made during a full review period and
this would tend to negate any argument that there was chronic pattern
of dumping by FAG. Therefore, it asserts that these dumped sales were
extrapolated onto the wider selling and pricing patterns of the company
as a whole, which led to arbitrary and unfair results. FAG notes
further that the ``random dumping'' can explain the inevitable
percentage of dumping that recurs from year to year, as evidenced by
the fact that none of the large bearing manufacturers/exporters have
achieved a de minimis margin in the past nine reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of the Respondent at
Appendix 5 Chart 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the
maintenance of the orders. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,
they have not done.
Torrington and MPB argue further that FAG's admission that its
imports and sales have decreased strongly supports a determination that
FAG cannot resume selling at pre-order volumes without resorting to
dumping. Torrington and MPB also note that FAG's reliance on current
margins to predict likely post-revocation margins ignores the fact that
the investigation margins are the only margins which reflect the
exporter's behavior without the discipline of the orders. Finally,
Torrington and MPB note that if FAG's ``random dumping'' is in fact
``inevitable,'' then under FAG's own argument dumping will continue.
In its rebuttal comments, FAG concurs with the substantive response
of NSK Corporation which pointed out that the Department's methodology
for calculating dumping margins in an investigation has fundamentally
changed since the original LTFV investigation in AFBs ten years ago.
FAG argues further that Torrington, MPB, and RBC erred in their
reasoning to use the original investigation margins for purposes of
these sunset reviews. According to FAG, the analyses presented by these
domestic parties were not supported by empirical data, and that they
erroneously presumed that even if dumping continued at levels above de
minimis, and import volume decreased, there is a prima facie assumption
of continued dumping at investigation levels and a mandatory
requirement that these original margins be adopted.
FAG maintains that import levels for the subject merchandise
increased 40 percent between fiscal years 1993 and 1997, and that
dumping margins have decreased. Where margins have not declined over
time, FAG contends, an explanation exists insofar as the Department
changed its methodologies during the 1994-1995 administrative review.
In light of the above, FAG argues, the Department should calculate
projected dumping rates based on more recent reviews.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of
an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping,
the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation
and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports.
Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has
continued over the life of the orders.
In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis
continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given
that dumping has continued over the life of the orders, the Department
determines that dumping is likely to continue if the orders were
revoked. Because we have based this determination on the fact that
dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not addressed the
comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good cause''
and sales below the cost of production, nor have we addressed the
arguments of other interested parties regarding the condition of the
U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department will normally
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping
until after the order was issued, the Department will normally provide
a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See
section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this
policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where
appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (See
sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that
the margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are
the dumping margins found for each company in the original
investigations (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual
administrative reviews), including margins based on best information
available, except where the most current margin, increased by the
Department's duty absorption determination, exceeds the original
investigation margin. With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins
from the original investigation are the margins likely to prevail were
the order revoked.

[[Page 60312]]

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the
orders were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that
the Department should not report margins from the original
investigation, asserting that the SAA provides that, in certain
instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated
margin. NHBB also asserts that one such instance is where, as in the
AFBs cases, dumping margins have declined over the life of the orders
and imports have remained steady or increased. Additionally, NHBB
argues that, because the structure of the U.S. domestic industry that
exists today bears little resemblance to the industry when the
antidumping duty orders were imposed in 1989, the rates from the
original investigation are inappropriate as indicators of the rates
that would be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues that, in
light of changes in the methodology used to calculated antidumping duty
margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by
the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary
to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Similarly, NSK Corporation and FAG argue that the margins likely to
prevail are de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, were
the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the average-to-
average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to the
transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews to
measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation
states that it believes any margin found would be below the two-percent
de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues
further that the Department's unorthodox approach during the original
investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available,
skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering
those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin
likely to prevail were the orders revoked. Finally, NSK Corporation
also argues that dumping margins have declined over time with respect
to importations of BBs while, at the same time, importations have
remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support, it
cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at
14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
FAG points out that 751(a)(4) of the Act permits the Department to
conduct a duty absorption inquiry during any administrative review
initiated two years or four years after the publication of an
antidumping duty order. Notwithstanding this provision, FAG notes that
the Department conducted duty absorption inquiries in the 1995-1996 and
1997-1998 administrative reviews, and, therefore, its duty absorption
inquiry is unlawful and cannot be used.
In addition to the aforementioned argument, FAG challenges the
methodology chosen by the Department to calculate duty absorption
rates, stating that it was arbitrary and capricious, as well as
contrary to language found in 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(4). FAG asserts that
the Department has merely calculated the percentage of FAG's U.S.
affiliate's sales with dumping margins versus total sales and concluded
that this figure demonstrates duty absorption within the meaning of the
statute. FAG claims that there is no connection between the percentage
of sales of a U.S. importer with dumping margins and any alleged duty
absorption by the affiliated foreign producer or exporter.
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty
absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington
and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear `` normal
reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order
and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the
Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the
two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews.
Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize
or justify the rejection of the investigation rates on the basis of the
particular methodology used at the time of the investigations.
Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, it is the responsibility of such claimants to
provide information regarding companies' relative market share. Since
no such information was provided, the Department should not accept
these assertions since imports of certain BBs have actually declined
since the imposition of the order.
In its rebuttal comments, FAG notes that Torrington erred in
relying on the highest dumping margins calculated in each review period
rather than the average. Furthermore, FAG argues that Torrington relied
upon margins calculated using facts available. FAG asserts that, if the
Department assesses margin levels based on actual calculated dumping
rates, taken as averages for each review period, it will determine
that, but for changes in calculation methodologies, margins have
decreased over time.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty absorption determinations.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent
the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and
after the issuance of the

[[Page 60313]]

order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless
Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 8, 1998), and Final
Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron Construction Castings
From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of China, 64 FR 30310
(June 7, 1999).
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the orders while at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share.
FAG provided company-specific value and volume information
concerning its exports of BBs and CRBs, and it argued that exports of
the subject merchandise have generally decreased since the inception of
this case in 1987. The Department can confirm that current exports of
the subject merchandise are indeed lower than pre-order exports. FAG's
decrease in exports of the subject merchandise to the United States
over the life of the orders indicate that FAG is unable to sell subject
merchandise in the United States at pre-order volumes without dumping.
Therefore, absent such evidence, we find no reason to deviate from our
standard practice of using the margin we calculated in the original
investigation.
In the final results of the 1995/96 8 and 1997/98
administrative reviews of these orders, the Department found that
antidumping duties have been absorbed by foreign producers. With
respect to the 1997/98 administrative reviews we made the following
determinations 9:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96).
\9\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999) (1997-98).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball bearings Percent of sales
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SKF 3.17
FAG 10.31
INA 9.14
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
SKF 33.52
FAG 24.59
Torrington Nadellage 0.26
INA 9.24
Spherical Plain Bearings:
INA 3.53
SKF 20.31
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department will notify the Commission of its findings regarding such
duty absorption for the Commission to consider in conducting a sunset
review.
Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885
and the House Report at 60 and provides that, where the Department has
found duty absorption, the Department normally will provide to the
Commission the higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would
have reported or the most recent margin for that company, adjusted to
account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. In this case,
the margins adjusted to account for our duty absorption findings are
less than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.
Therefore, the Department agrees with Torrington, MPB, and RBC
concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be
revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original
investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior
of exporters without the discipline of the orders. Consistent with the
Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in
the original investigation are probative of the behavior of German
producers and exporters of BBs, CRBs, and SPBs if the order were
revoked. Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-
specific and ``all others'' rates from the original investigation
contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation
of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margins indicated below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball Bearings:
SKF.................................................... 132.25
FAG.................................................... 70.41
INA.................................................... 31.29
GMN.................................................... 35.43
All Others............................................. 68.89
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
SKF.................................................... 76.27
FAG.................................................... 52.43
INA.................................................... 52.43
All Others............................................. 55.65
Spherical Plain Bearings:
SKF.................................................... 118.98
FAG.................................................... 74.88
All Others............................................. 114.52
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.
These five-year (``sunset'') reviews and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28776 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-28776. Public record. Not legal advice.