# Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Cylindrical Roller Bearings From Italy

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## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Notice
- **Published:** November 4, 1999
- **Citation:** 64 FR 60291

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-475-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Cylindrical Roller
Bearings From Italy

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: cylindrical
roller bearings from Italy.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order
on cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'') from Italy (64 FR 15727)
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the
Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate
substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and
inadequate response from respondent interested parties, the Department
determined to conduct an expedited review. As a result of this review,
the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty order
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the
levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351(1998) in
general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3-- Policies Regarding the Conduct of
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by this order are CRBs and parts thereof from
Italy. For a detailed description of the products covered by this
order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations,
refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on
antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently
with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')
determination on CRBs from Italy on May 3, 1989.1 In this
determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping
margin of 212.45 percent for SKF Industrie S.p.A. (``SKF''). The
Department also published an all others rate of 212.45 percent. Since
that time, the Department has conducted nine administrative
reviews.2 This sunset

[[Page 60292]]

review covers imports from all Italian producers and/or exporters of
CRBs, excluding those imports from SKF.3 We note that, to
date, we have made no duty absorption findings with regards to CRBs
from Italy.4
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\1\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of
Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and
Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This
determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy
and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).
\2\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 56 FR 31751 (July 11, 1991);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand,
and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14, 1992);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in
Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 58 FR 53914 (October 19, 1993); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France and Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 58 FR 65576 (December 15, 1993);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Germany, Italy, and Sweden; Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 38369 (July 16,
1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From Italy; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 70100 (December 18, 1998);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR
10959 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany and Italy; Amended
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 60 FR
31142 (June 13, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Italy; Amended Final Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 33791 (June 29,
1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative
Reviews, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom: Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 3003 (January 21,
1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and
the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Singapore; Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, (March 26, 1997);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore,
Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy, Romania,
and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 40878 (July 31, 1998).
\3\ The order was revoked with respect to SKF. See Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
Italy; Final Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in
Part of Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).
\4\ The Department has issued duty absorption findings for two
producers and/or exporters of ball bearings from Italy in the 1995-
1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews. However, no duty
absorption findings have been issued with respect to CRBs from
Italy. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64
FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the
antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy (64 FR 15727), pursuant to
section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to
Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and
MPB Corp. (``MPB''), and on behalf of the Roller Bearing Company of
America (``RBC''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB''), and
Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within
the deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset
Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from the
domestic interested parties on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day deadline
specified in the Sunset Regulations under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). We
did not receive a complete substantive response from Link-Belt.
Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status
under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of CRBs. In addition,
Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original
investigation and has participated actively in all administrative
reviews of this order. MPB stated that it participated in the
Commission's injury investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they had
not previously participated in any segment of this proceeding before
the Department.
The Department also received a complete substantive response from
FAG Italia S.p.A and FAG Bearings Corporation (collectively, ``FAG'')
on May 3, 1999. FAG stated that it participated in the original
investigation and each subsequent administrative review of the
Department's proceeding on CRBs from Italy.
Based on the information submitted by FAG concerning the volume and
value of its exports and volume of imports as reported in U.S. Census
Bureau IM146 Reports, the Department determined that FAG's exports of
subject merchandise to the United States accounted for less than 50
percent of the total volume of subject merchandise to the United States
over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of this sunset
review.5 Therefore, respondent interested parties provided
inadequate response to the notice of initiation and, pursuant to 19 CFR
351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an
expedited, 120-day, review of this order.6
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\5\ FAG stated that it has not sold any CRBs in the United
States over the past five years.
\6\ On May 24, 1999, the Department informed the Commission
that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested
parties, it was conducting an expedited sunset review of this order
consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.
May, Director, Office of Policy.)
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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy is
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28,
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.7
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\7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the
margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning continuation or
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB also submitted
comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted. In its
submission, it asserts that most of the domestic interested parties
that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation of the
Department's various

[[Page 60293]]

antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings. NHBB also offered new
argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the
statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46
(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the
weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of
the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department
indicated that it will normally determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de
minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given
that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order,
the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further
that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because dumping
continued.
Arguing that the Department's import statistics do not permit a
comparison of pre- and post-order import volumes of CRBs, Torrington
and MPB suggest that the Department examine data regarding the import
value of all roller bearings, the narrowest category of products for
which a consistent set of data is available regarding pre- and post-
order imports. Torrington and MPB suggest that these data are
conservative because declines in import volumes could be obscured by
increases in import values and inclusion of non-covered products. They
argue that the data will demonstrate that total import value of CRBs
dropped dramatically following the order, from more than $6 million in
1988 to less than $1 million in 1993 and import values were below 1988
totals in every year until (and including) 1995.8 This data,
they argue, provides strong additional support for a determination that
dumping is likely to continue or recur were the order revoked. In
conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to
consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production.
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\8\ Torrington and MPB note that imports of CRBs from Italy
increased sharply after 1995, coincident with the revocation of the
order on CRBs exported by SKF. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than
Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results
of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty
Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).
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NHBB assert that revocation of the order is not likely to result in
continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its assertion on the
fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure,
thus causing injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a
part.
FAG asserts that the dumping margin likely to prevail if the order
were to be revoked would be 0.00 percent, the dumping margin it has
maintained since the 1993-1994 administrative review. With respect to
whether import volumes ceased following the imposition of the order,
FAG states that it has not shipped subject merchandise to the United
States over the past five years. In addition, FAG indicates that total
exports of the subject merchandise from Italy have continued throughout
the life of the order (see May 3, 1999, substantive response of FAG,
Appendix 2).
Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, state that the
cessation of imports from FAG strongly supports an affirmative
determination of likelihood of dumping in this case. Further,
Torrington and MPB note that the Department's sunset determinations are
made on an order-wide basis.
In addition, Torrington and MPB assert that the Department should
take into account the submitter's affiliation in its consideration of
comments of various parties filing as domestic producers. Further,
citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Thailand; Final Results
of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Review and Revocation of
Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 (May 8, 1996), they argue
that the Department has recognized that domestic producers who are
affiliated with subject foreign producers and exporters do not have a
common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the maintenance of the order.
Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that other parties' comments
addressing issues other than margins and import volumes should not be
considered unless such parties establish ``good cause'' to consider
such additional factors, which, in these reviews, they have not done.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of
an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping,
the Department considers the margins determined in the

[[Page 60294]]

investigation and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of
imports. Therefore, the arguments of NHBB with respect to the effect
revocation would have on the U.S. market, even if correct, do not rebut
the fact that dumping continues and has continued over the life of the
order.
In the instant proceeding, dumping margins above de minimis
continue to exist for at least one known producer and/or exporter.
Therefore, given that dumping has continued over the life of the order,
the Department determines that dumping is likely to continue if the
order were revoked. Because we have based this determination on the
fact that dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not
addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to
``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other interested
parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will
normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in
the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for
companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not
begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department
normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from
the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated
margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption
determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy
Bulletin.)
The Department, in its LTFV investigation of CRBs from Italy,
published a weighted-average dumping margin of 212.45 percent for SKF.
In addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping
margin of 212.45 percent on all other imports of the subject
merchandise from Italy.9 As noted above, the Department has
not issued any duty absorption findings with respect to CRBs from
Italy.
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\9\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of
Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and
Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This
determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy
and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).
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In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the
margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original
investigation. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that the dumping
margins found for each company in the original investigation (as
opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative
reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail, including margins
based on best information available, except where the most current
margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption determination,
exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore, RBC states that
the margins from the original investigation are most probative of the
rates likely to prevail as they are the only calculated rates that
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order
in place.
NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order
were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that
the Department should not report margins from the original
investigation. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA
provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on
a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance
is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, dumping margins have
declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or
increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the
methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins introduced by
the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to
the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994.
As noted above, FAG argues that the dumping margin likely to
prevail if the order were revoked is its current dumping margin of 0.00
percent. FAG states that it has remained at a 0.00 percent dumping
level since the 1993-1994 administrative review period. FAG states
further that this is due principally to the absence of any imports of
Italian CRBs by FAG Bearings Company. Lastly, FAG states that, were the
dumping order revoked, there would be no change in FAG's current
sourcing and resale patterns of Italian CRBs.
Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, stated that FAG's
reliance on its current rate ignores the fact that current rates do not
reflect the behavior of producers and/or exporters without the
discipline of the antidumping duty order. As such, they contend, the
Department should not rely on this current rate.
Additionally, in their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue
that other parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies
regarding the selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the
Department's duty absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are
clear--normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the
only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the
discipline of the order and rejection of margins from administrative
reviews in which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and
MPB argue that there is no authority which would authorize or justify
the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the particular
methodology used at the time of the investigation. Additionally, with
respect to claims that more recent margins should be used based on
declining margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports,
Torrington and MPB argue that it is the responsibility of such
claimants to provide information regarding companies' relative market
share. Since no such information was provided, they contend the
Department should not accept these assertions since imports of CRBs
from Italy have actually declined since the imposition of the order.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty absorption determinations.
With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best
reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the
original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there
is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of
subsequent changes in methodology since such changes do not invalidate
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which
reflect the behavior of exporters without the

[[Page 60295]]

discipline of the order, regardless of the methodology used to
calculate that margin or the use of best information available (see
section 752(c)(3) of the Act).
With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence
to support these claims and nothing submitted in the course of this
sunset proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or
increased. In fact, FAG submitted information claiming that it ceased
exporting subject merchandise, indicating that import volumes may have
decreased. Furthermore, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB
indicate that post-order import volumes (1989-1998) are lower than pre-
order volumes (1989) in each year.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent
the discipline of an order, we normally will consider the company's
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share.
With respect to FAG's arguments concerning the dumping margin
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. FAG participated in and
had shipments during both the 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 administrative
reviews. The SAA at 890 and the House Report at 63-64 state that the
cessation of imports after the order is highly probative of the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. Furthermore, if
imports ceased after the order is issued, it is reasonable to assume
that exporters could not sell in the United States without dumping and
that, to reenter the U.S. market, they would have to resume dumping. As
such, we find that the 0.00 percent dumping margin we calculated for
FAG for the 1993-1994 administrative review is not probative of the
dumping margin likely to prevail if the order were to be revoked. The
cessation of imports by FAG following the establishment of this margin
strongly suggests to the Department that FAG cannot sell subject
merchandise in the United States without dumping. Consequently, we find
that the dumping margins calculated in the original investigation are
the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters
without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in the
Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of
Italian producers and exporters of CRBs if the order were revoked.
Therefore, we will report to the Commission the ``all others'' rate
from the original investigation contained in the Final Results of
Review section of this notice.10
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\10\ The Department calculated only one company-specific rate in
the original investigation. The order was subsequently revoked with
respect to this one company, SKF (see Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final
Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of
Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995). Because of
this, the Department will report to the Commission only the ``all
others'' rate from the original investigation.
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Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer/ Exporter Margin (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SKF........................................ Revoked
All Other Producers/Exporters.............. 212.45
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.
This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28773 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-28773. Public record. Not legal advice.