# Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Antifriction Bearings From Sweden

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-28771

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Notice
- **Published:** November 4, 1999
- **Citation:** 64 FR 60282

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-401-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Antifriction Bearings
From Sweden

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review:
antifriction bearings from Sweden.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders
on ball bearings (``BBs'') and cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'')
(collectively, antifriction bearings) from Sweden (64 FR 15727)
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the
Act'').1 On the basis of a notice of intent to participate
and adequate substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic
interested parties and inadequate response (in these cases, no
response) from respondent interested parties, the Department determined
to conduct expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these reviews, the
Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on
antifriction bearings from Sweden would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the
Final Results of Review section of this notice.

\1\ The orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden include CRBs
and BBs. The Department has no antidumping duty order on spherical
plain bearings from Sweden.
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For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998)
in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--``Policies Regarding the Conduct of
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these orders are CRBs and BBs and parts
thereof from Sweden. For a detailed description of the products covered
by these orders, including a compilation of all pertinent scope
determinations, refer to the notice of final results of expedited
sunset review on antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804),
publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')
determination of antifriction bearings from Sweden on May 3,
1989.2 In this determination, the Department published a
weighted-average dumping margin of 105.92 percent for BBs for SKF
Sverige AB (``SKF'') and 105.92 percent for all other producers and/or
exporters of Swedish BBs. The Department also published a weighted-
average dumping margin of 13.69 percent for CRBs for SKF and 13.69
percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish CRBs. Since
that time, the Department has conducted eight administrative
reviews.3 These sunset reviews cover

[[Page 60283]]

imports from all Swedish producers and/or exporters of antifriction
bearings. With respect to duty absorption, the Department issued a
duty-absorption finding for SKF for BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996
administrative review. In addition, the Department determined that SKF
was absorbing duties with respect to BBs and CRBs in the 1997-1998
administrative review.4
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\2\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical
Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair
Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and
Parts Thereof, From Sweden, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); Notice of
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy
and Sweden, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993).
\3\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical
Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair
Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and
Parts Thereof, From Sweden, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); Notice of
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy
and Sweden, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Sweden;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 31762
(July 11, 1991); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755
(June 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24,
1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,
Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR
32969 (July 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14,
1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23,
1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and
Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July
26, 1993); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany, Italy, and Sweden; Amended
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR
38369 (July 16, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial
Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of
Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR
66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043
(October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18,
1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64
FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
\4\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997), and Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews,
64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the
antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden (64 FR
15727), pursuant to section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received
Notices of Intent to Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company
(``Torrington''), MPB Corp. (``MPB''), the Roller Bearing Company of
America (``RBC''), the NSK Corp. (``NSK''), New Hampshire Ball
Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB''), and Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-
Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section
351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations. We received complete
substantive responses from Torrington, MPB, RBC and NHBB on May 3,
1999, within the 30-day deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations
under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). The Department also received the
complete substantive response from NSK on April 30, 1999. The
Department did not receive a complete substantive response from Link-
Belt.5
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\5\ All participants, except Link-Belt and NSK, filed
substantive responses on both CRBs and BBs from Sweden. Link-Belt
did not file a substantive response to the notice of initiation for
either of these sunset reviews. NSK filed a substantive response on
only BBs from Sweden.
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Torrington, MPB, RBC and NHBB claimed interested-party status under
19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of bearings. NSK claimed
interested-party status under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9). In addition,
Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original
investigations and has participated actively in all administrative
reviews of these orders. MPB stated that it had participated in the
International Trade Commission's (``the Commission'') injury
investigations. RBC and NHBB stated that they have not participated
previously in any segment of these proceedings before the Department.
On May 3, 1999, the Department received a waiver of participation
on behalf of SKF. We did not receive a response from any other
respondent interested party to these proceedings. As a result, pursuant
to 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct
expedited, 120-day, reviews of these orders.6
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\6\ On May 24, 1999, we informed the Commission that, on the
basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we
were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders consistent
with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.
May, Director, Office of Policy.)
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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). On August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the sunset
reviews of the antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from
Sweden are extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for
completion of the final results of these reviews until not later than
October 28, 1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the
Act.7
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\7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order, and shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin
of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning continuation or
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our
determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK also submitted
comments on whether expedited sunsets review were warranted. In their
submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic interested
parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation
of the orders. These parties also offered new arguments regarding the
likely effect of revocation of the orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic
industry

[[Page 60284]]

support during the course of a sunset review (other than the statutory
provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46
(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the
weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of
the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall
determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its
participation in the sunset review. In the instant reviews, the
Department received a waiver of participation on behalf of SKF and did
not receive a response from any other respondent interested party.
Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations, this
constitutes a waiver of participation.
In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at above de minimis
levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that, given
that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the
orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to
continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert
further that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because
dumping continued.
Torrington and MPB contend, however, that should the Department
decide to consider import volumes, Torrington and MPB assert that the
data will demonstrate that 1998 import volumes are significantly below
the 1988 pre-order volumes. Moreover, according to Torrington and MPB,
post-order import volumes are lower than pre-order volumes in every
year since the imposition of the orders. Using pre-and post-order
statistics for complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert
is the only category for which statistics are available on a consistent
basis, they argue that post-order declines in import volumes provide
strong additional support for a determination that dumping is likely to
continue or recur were the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington
and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors,
such as sales below the cost of production.
NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the orders is not likely to
result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its
assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic
price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which
foreign owners are a part. NSK appears to support its assertion on the
basis that the margin of dumping has fallen during the life of the
order.
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,
they have not done.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an
order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the
Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever
relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible
disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market
might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has
continued over the life of the order.
In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis
continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given
that dumping has continued over the life of the orders and respondent
interested parties have waived their right to participate in this
review before the Department, we determine that dumping is likely to
continue if the orders were revoked. Because we have based this
determination on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de
minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and
MPB with respect to ``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments
of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will
normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in
the final determination in the original

[[Page 60285]]

investigation. Further, for companies not specifically investigated or
for companies that did not begin shipping until after the order was
issued, the Department normally will provide a margin based on the
``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the
Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a
more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty-absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the
Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
The Department, in its LTFV determinations, published a weighted-
average dumping margin of 105.92 percent for BBs for SKF and 105.92
percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish BBs. The
Department also published a weighted-average dumping margin of 13.69
percent for CRBs for SKF and 13.69 percent for all other producers and/
or exporters of Swedish CRBs. As noted above, the Department issued
duty-absorption findings for SKF for BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996
administrative review and for BBs and CRBs in the 1997-1998
administrative review.8
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\8\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64
FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that the
margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original
investigations. They also note that the Department issued a duty-
absorption finding with respect to BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996
administrative review and should consider this in determining the
margin likely to prevail. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that
the dumping margins found for each company in the original
investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual
administrative reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail,
including margins based on best information available, except where the
most current margin, increased by the Department's duty-absorption
determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. RBC states
that the margins from the original investigations are most probative of
the rates likely to prevail as they are the only calculated rates that
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the orders
in place.
NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the
orders were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it
would be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings
investments to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB
argues that the Department should not report margins from the original
investigation. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA
provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on
a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance
is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, dumping margins have
declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or
increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the
methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins introduced by
the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to
the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994.
Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail would be
de minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in
existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average
methodology used in an investigation, as opposed to the transaction-to-
average methodology common to administrative reviews, to measure the
extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK states that it believes any
margin found would be below the 2.0 percent de minimis level applicable
in investigations. NSK argues further that the Department's unorthodox
approach during the original investigation, plus the liberal use of
best information available, skewed the results of the original
investigation seriously, rendering those results inappropriate
indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail were the
orders revoked. Finally, NSK also argues that dumping margins have
declined over time with respect to BBs while, at the same time, imports
have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support,
NSK cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-
334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's
duty-absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin,
Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--
normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only
margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline
of the order and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in
which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue
that the two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset
reviews. Further, they contend that there is no authority which would
authorize or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the
basis of the particular methodology used at the time of the
investigation. Additionally, with respect to claims that more recent
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the
responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding
companies' relative market share. Since no such information was
provided, they contend, the Department should not accept these
assertions. In fact, they assert, imports of BBs have actually declined
since the imposition of the orders.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide the Commission with a margin from the original investigation
because that is the rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent
the discipline of the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy
include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where
appropriate, and consideration of duty-absorption determinations.
With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best
reflected by the dumping margins calculated in the original
investigations. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no
basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation due to
subsequent changes in methodology because such changes do not
invalidate margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore,
the dumping margins from the original investigations are the only rates
which reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the
orders, regardless of the methodology used to calculate those margins
or the use of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the
Act).
With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that
dumping margins have declined over the lives of

[[Page 60286]]

the orders and imports have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB
provided no evidence to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the
course of these sunset proceedings indicates that imports have remained
steady or increased. In fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB
indicate that post-order import volumes (1989-1998) are lower than pre-
order volumes (1989) in each year. Furthermore, the Department finds no
consistent downward trend in dumping margins over the lives of the
orders with respect to either BBs or CRBs from Sweden. Regardless of
the level of imports, dumping margins above de minimis levels continue
as do imports of the subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent
the discipline of an order, we normally will consider the company's
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we
expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past
sunset reviews where market-share information was not available, we
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic arguments
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share. In these reviews, we did not
receive any such company-specific arguments.
In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department
should report to the Commission the higher of the margin from the
original investigation or the margin from a more recent final results
of administrative review, adjusted to reflect the finding of duty
absorption. In the instant cases, the Department agrees. As noted
above, the Department determined in the final results of the 1995-96
administrative review of BBs that SKF was absorbing duties.9
Furthermore, the Department determined in the final results of the
1997-1998 administrative review of BBs and CRBs that SKF was absorbing
duties.10 Therefore, consistent with the statute and the
Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of
its findings regarding duty absorption when conducting a sunset review.
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\9\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997).
\10\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885
and the House Report at 60 and provides that, where the Department has
found duty absorption, the Department normally will provide to the
Commission the higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would
have reported or the most recent margin for that company, adjusted to
account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. In the case
of BBs from Sweden in both the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative
reviews, the margins adjusted to account for duty-absorption findings
are less than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.
In the case of CRBs from Sweden in the 1997-1998 administrative review,
SKF's margins adjusted to account for duty-absorption findings are
higher than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.
Therefore, the Department agrees with the domestic interested
parties concerning the margins likely to prevail. We find that the
dumping margin calculated in the original investigation for BBs is the
only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters without
the discipline of the order. With respect to CRBs produced and/or
exported by SKF, the Department finds that the margin adjusted for the
Department's duty-absorption findings from the 1997-1998 administrative
review is the most appropriate to report to the Commission. Consistent
with the Sunset Policy Bulletin, we will report to the Commission the
company-specific and ``all others'' rates for BBs from the original
investigation and the adjusted margin from the 1997-1998 administrative
review for CRBs produced and/or exported by SKF. These margins are
contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation
of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For BBs:
SKF.................................................... 105.92
All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 105.92
For CRBs:
SKF.................................................... 27.38
All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 13.69
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable
violation.

[[Page 60287]]

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28771 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A99-28771. Public record. Not legal advice.