# Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed no Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A98-10332

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Notice
- **Published:** April 20, 1998
- **Citation:** 63 FR 19532

## Text

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-423]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed no
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-49 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) for
operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, located in New
London County, Connecticut. The proposed change to Technical
Specification (TS) 3/4.4.4, Relief Valves, would ensure that the Power-
Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) will be capable of automatic cycling as
well as manual cycling when in the TS 3/4.4.4 action statements that
allow indefinite continued operation. The proposed amendment also makes
an editorial change, adds PORV surveillance requirements, and modifies
the associated Bases section. The proposed changes provide added
assurance that the pressurizer safety relief valves will not be damaged
due to water relief during an inadvertent safety injection event.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:

NNECO has reviewed the proposed revision in accordance with
10CFR50.92 and has concluded that the revision does not involve a
significant hazards consideration (SHC). The basis for this
conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not
satisfied. The proposed revision does not involve [an] SHC because
the revision would not:
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
Currently, timely operator action is required to prevent the
pressurizer from filling and potentially challenging the pressurizer
safety valves under water relief. The proposed TS changes provide
added assurance that the safety valves will not be challenged by
requiring the PORVs to be available for automatic pressure control.
The changes to the Surveillance Requirements add the appropriate
requirements to provide assurance that the automatic capability of
the PORVs is OPERABLE. The quarterly analog channel operational test
for the PORV high pressurizer pressure channels will not include
valve operation. However, it does involve changing the opening logic
from 2/4 to 1/3 and, thus, performing the surveillance increases the
probability of the PORVs opening inadvertently. If the automatic
capability of one PORV is INOPERABLE for more than 72 hours,
shutdown is required. If the automatic capability of both PORVs is
INOPERABLE for more than one hour, shutdown is required. If the
block valves have been closed but the automatic capability of the
PORVs is OPERABLE, an EOP [emergency operating procedure] change has
been made to assure that the PORV block valve would be opened within
ten minutes of an Inadvertent ECCS [emergency core cooling system]
actuation at power. The new analysis shows that this is sufficient
to assure that the PORVs would control RCS [reactor coolant system]
pressure if water relief is experienced and the safety valves would
not be challenged. Thus, it is concluded that the change provides
added assurance that the safety valves would not fail due to water
discharge.
Evaluations and analysis have been performed to demonstrate that
the PORVs and the associated piping are qualified for water relief
from an Inadvertent ECCS Actuation at Power Operation for one hour
from event initiation. This provides significant margin for operator
action to terminate the event.
The PORV control logic has been upgraded to be safety grade and
single failure proof. A 2/4 logic is used for opening and 3/4 logic
is used for subsequent closure. With the upgrade of the PORV control
logic, there is added assurance that the PORV will be capable of
providing automatic pressure control and preventing challenges to
the safety valves, particularly under water solid conditions.
However, there is a small impact on the probability of inadvertent
opening of both PORVs resulting from multiple channel failures. With
the new safety grade PORV control logic, two failed high pressurizer
pressure channels will result in inadvertent opening of both PORVs.
With the current logic, a single failed high pressurizer pressure
channel would result in opening a PORV. However, the 2/4 closure
logic will re-close the PORV when pressurizer pressure drops below
2200 psia. With the current logic three failed high pressurizer
pressure channels are required for the PORVs to inadvertently open
and remain open. Thus it is concluded that there is an increase in
the probability that the PORVs will inadvertently open and remain
open.
However, multiple channels failing high are required for the
PORVs to inadvertently open and remain open. For failure modes such
as loss of power for the transmitter or a failure of the instrument
tubing, the channel will fail low. Failure modes that can result in
the channel failing high are highly unlikely. Further, the new logic
will require energization in order to open the PORVs, further
minimizing the potential for inadvertent opening. These failures,
which result in the PORVs automatically opening and remaining open,
do not disable the ability of the operators to close the PORVs by
taking their control switch to the close position. Thus, it is
concluded that the increase in risk is negligible. The consequences
of inadvertent opening of both PORVs is bounded by the analysis
provided in Chapter 15.6.1 Inadvertent Opening of Pressurizer Safety
or Relief Valve.
In the event of an inoperable pressurizer pressure channel, the
channel will be placed in the tripped condition. This will change
the opening logic from 2/4 to 1/3 and the subsequent closure logic
from 3/4 to 3/3.

[[Page 19533]]

This means that, when a pressurizer pressure channel is inoperable,
a single failure of a pressurizer pressure channel high will cause
both PORVs to open and remain open. Thus it is concluded that the
Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) change which addresses specific
surveillance controls, also results in an increase in the
probability that the PORVs will inadvertently open and remain open.
However, procedural controls will be implemented and controlled in
the TRM that will require a plant shutdown if the channel is
inoperable for more than thirty days.
The setpoint for the PORV opening logic has been selected to
assure that the PORVs will open prior to the safety valves, taking
into account instrument uncertainties. The setpoint will be
specified and controlled in the Technical Requirements Manual. This
minimizes the potential challenges to the pressurizer safety valves
under steam as well as water solid conditions. The PORV closure
logic will be 3/4 that actuates when pressurizer pressure drops 20
psi below the opening setpoint. Since the stroke time for the PORV
is very short, the closing pressure is adequate to assure that the
valve will cycle as designed.
An EOP [Emergency Operating Procedure] change will direct the
operator to open the PORV block valve if it has been closed due to
excessive seat leakage. The EOP change will not result in the
opening of the PORV block valve when the power has been removed when
required to prevent a small break LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident].
This includes leakage from the PORV such that there is no assurance
that the PORV would re-close as required to control RCS pressure.
Thus, the PORV block valve would be opened only when there is
assurance that the PORV will open and re-close as required. Thus,
the EOP change does not impact the probability of a failed open
PORV.
Credit is now being taken for the PORVs to prevent challenges to
pressurizer safety valves under water relief. If the PORVs were to
fail to control RCS pressure, it is possible for water relief
through the safety valves to occur. This also can result if both of
the PORV block valves cannot be opened. Since the safety valves and
the associated piping are not qualified for water relief, the valves
may be damaged and may not reseat, resulting in an unisolable RCS
leak. However, this would require multiple failures since the PORVs
are redundant. The accident analysis has shown that DNB [departure
from nucleate boiling] is not a concern and thus, there would be no
failed fuel associated with this event. In addition, any RCS leakage
would be inside containment. The analysis provided in FSAR [Final
Safety Analysis Report] Section 15.6.1 for an Inadvertent Opening of
a Pressurizer Safety or Relief Valve bounds the opening of both
PORVs since the capacity of two PORVs is equivalent to one
pressurizer safety valve.
Thus it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequence of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The changes provide added assurance that an Inadvertent ECCS
Actuation at Power Operation will be mitigated and meet the
requirement that a moderate frequency event will not lead to a more
serious event without additional failures. The PORVs and associated
piping have been qualified for water relief. In addition the PORVs
are QA [Quality Assurance] equipment and are single failure proof.
The TS changes provide assurance that the PORV automatic function
will be OPERABLE or the plant will be shutdown. By crediting the
PORVs, there is added assurance that the operators will terminate
the event and prevent water relief from the safety valves for which
they are not qualified. Since all criteria are met for this event,
this does not represent the possibility of an accident of a
different type.
Because of the change in the PORV automatic actuation circuitry
and the changes in the channel operability and surveillance
requirements, the change does increase the probability of an
Inadvertent Opening of both PORVs but the consequences are bounded
by the analysis provided in FSAR Section 15.6.1 for Inadvertent
Opening of a Safety or Relief Valve. Thus, this does not represent
an accident of a different type.
Credit is being taken for the operator to open a PORV block
valve if it has been closed due to excessive PORV seat leakage. The
PORV block valve will be opened following a Safety Injection
actuation only after it has been determined that RCS pressure is
above the HPSI [high pressure safety injection] shut off head. This
means that charging is sufficient to maintain RCS pressure well
above the RCS pressure predicted for the limiting LOCA analysis.
Further, the PORV block valve would not be opened when power has
been removed because of the potential for operation of the PORV to
result in a small break LOCA. Further, the potential for opening the
PORV block valve when the PORV is needed for accident mitigation is
already addressed in the TS and is part of the licensing basis.
Thus, this does not create the possibility of an accident of a
different type.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
With the proposed changes, all criteria for the Inadvertent ECCS
actuation at Power Operation are met. The changes provide added
assurance that a moderate frequency event would not result in a more
serious event without additional failures. The TS changes and EOP
change provide added assurance that the PORVs would be available to
mitigate this event. Opening the block valve when the PORV can be
used to mitigate an accident without the potential for a small break
LOCA is already addressed in the TS and is part of the licensing
basis. Inadvertent Opening of both PORVs is bounded by the Chapter
15 accident analysis. Thus, it is concluded that the changes have no
impact on the margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is
determined that the proposed revision does not involve an SHC.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By May 20, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should

[[Page 19534]]

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at
the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical
College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the
Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford,
Connecticut. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to
intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the
Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on
the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an
appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior
Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270,
Hartford, Connecticut, 06141-0270, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated April 14, 1998, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stephen Dembek,
Project Manager, Special Projects Office--Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-10332 Filed 4-17-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A98-10332. Public record. Not legal advice.