# Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

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## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Proposed Rule
- **Published:** September 23, 1997
- **Citation:** 62 FR 49728

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 216, 223, 229, 231, 232, and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AA95

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule establishing comprehensive Federal
safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The proposed rule
contains requirements concerning equipment design and performance
criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in the event of a
passenger train accident; the inspection, testing, and maintenance of
passenger equipment; and the safe operation of passenger train service.
The proposed rule is designed to address the safety of passenger train
service in an environment where technology is advancing, and equipment
is being designed for operation at higher speeds. The rule would amend
existing regulations concerning special notice for repairs, safety
glazing, locomotive safety, safety appliances, and railroad power
brakes as applied to passenger equipment.
The proposed rule does not apply to tourist and historic railroad
operations. However, after consulting with the excursion railroad
associations to determine appropriate applicability in light of
financial, operational, or other factors unique to such operations, FRA
may prescribe requirements for these operations that are different from
those affecting other types of passenger operations.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or
before November 24, 1997. Comments received after that date will be
considered by FRA and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working
Group to the extent possible without incurring substantial additional
expense or delay. The docket will remain open until the Working Group
proceedings are concluded. Requests for formal extension of the comment
period must be made by November 7, 1997.
(2) Public hearing: FRA intends to hold a public hearing to allow
interested parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues
addressed in the NPRM. The date and location of the hearing will be set
forth in a forthcoming notice that will be published in the Federal
Register. Anyone who desires to make an oral statement at the hearing
must notify the Docket Clerk by telephone (202-632-3198), and must
submit three copies of the oral statement that he or she intends to
make at the hearing. The notification should also provide the Docket
Clerk with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the right to
limit participation in the hearings of persons who fail to provide such
notification. The date by which the Docket Clerk must be notified about
the oral statement and receive copies of it will be set forth in the
notice announcing the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should identify the docket number and must
be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified
that their comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped,
self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will
indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were received
and will return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be
available for examination, both before and after the closing date for
written comments, during regular business hours in Room 7051 of FRA
headquarters at 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Edward Pritchard, Acting Staff
Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail Stop 25,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3362); Daniel Alpert, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail
Stop 10, Washington, D.C. (telephone: 202-632-3186); or Thomas
Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-
3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

To enhance rail safety, the Secretary of Transportation convened a
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry in
September, 1994. As one of the initiatives arising from this Rail
Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing
safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period.
In November, 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for
implementing rail passenger equipment regulations and included it in
the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub.
L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Section
215 of the Act, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133, requires:

(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.--The Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers. Before
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall consider--
(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) Emergency response procedures and equipment; and
(5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect
safety not otherwise governed by regulations.

The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards
established under this subsection to cars existing at the time the
regulations are prescribed, as well as to new cars, and the
Secretary shall explain in the rulemaking document the basis for
making such standards applicable to existing cars.
(b) INITIAL AND FINAL REGULATIONS.--(1) The Secretary shall
prescribe initial regulations under subsection (a) within 3 years
after the date of enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1994. The initial regulations may exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroad
carriers to transport passengers.
(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final regulations under
subsection (a) within 5 years after such date of enactment.
(c) PERSONNEL.--The Secretary may establish within the
Department of Transportation 2 additional full-time equivalent
positions beyond the number permitted under existing law to assist
with the drafting, prescribing, and implementation of regulations
under this section.
(d) CONSULTATION.--In prescribing regulations, issuing orders,
and making amendments under this section, the Secretary may consult
with Amtrak, public authorities operating railroad passenger
service, other railroad carriers transporting passengers,
organizations of passengers, and organizations of employees. A
consultation is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), but minutes of the consultation shall be placed in the
public docket of the regulatory proceeding.

The Secretary of Transportation has delegated these rulemaking
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).
Consistent with the intent of Congress that FRA consult with the
railroad industry in prescribing these regulations, FRA invited various
organizations to participate in a working

[[Page 49729]]

group to focus on the issues related to railroad passenger equipment
safety and assist FRA in developing Federal safety standards. The
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group (or the ``Working
Group'') first met on June 7, 1995, \1\ and continues to meet in
support of this rulemaking. This proposed rule was developed by FRA in
consultation with the Working Group, and FRA will again convene the
Working Group to consider comments received in response to this Notice
and develop the final rule. Notice of any Working Group meetings will
be available through the FRA Docket Clerk.
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\1\ This date was incorrectly identified as June 6, 1995, in the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (61 FR 30672, June 17, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Working Group has evolved since its initial meeting, and its
membership currently includes representatives from the following
organizations:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners, Inc. (AAPRCO),
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO),
American Public Transit Association (APTA),
Association of American Railroads (AAR),
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE),
Brotherhood Railway Carmen (BRC),
FRA,
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of DOT,
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP),
Railway Progress Institute (RPI),
Safe Travel America (STA),
Transportation Workers Union of America (TWU), and
United Transportation Union (UTU).

The Working Group is chaired by FRA, and supported by FRA program,
legal, and research staff, including technical personnel from the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) of the Research
and Special Programs Administration of DOT. FRA has included vendor
representatives designated by RPI as associate members of the Working
Group. FRA has also included the AAPRCO as an associate Working Group
member. The National Transportation Safety Board has designated staff
members to advise the Working Group.
In developing proposed safety standards for passenger equipment
operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph, FRA
formed a subgroup (the ``Tier II Equipment Subgroup'') of Working Group
members representing interests associated with the provision of rail
passenger service at such high speeds. FRA invited representatives from
organizations including Amtrak, the BLE, BRC, RPI, and UTU to
participate in this effort.
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20133(d), the evolving positions of
the Working Group members--as reflected in the minutes of the group's
meetings and associated documentation, together with data provided by
the members during their deliberations-- have been placed in the public
docket of this rulemaking.
On June 17, 1996, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety
standards for railroad passenger equipment (61 FR 30672). The ANPRM
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various topics including: system safety programs and
plans; passenger equipment crashworthiness; inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements; training and qualification requirements for
mechanical personnel and train crews; excursion, tourist, and private
equipment; commuter equipment and operations; train make-up and
operating speed; tiered safety standards; fire safety; and operating
practices and procedures.
FRA's commitment to developing proposed regulations through the
Working Group necessarily influenced the role and purpose of the ANPRM.
FRA specifically asked that members of the Working Group not respond
formally to the ANPRM. The issues and ideas presented in the ANPRM had
already been placed before the Working Group, and the Working Group had
commented on drafts of the ANPRM. As a result, FRA solicited the
submission of written comments that might be of assistance in
developing a proposed rule from interested persons not involved in the
Working Group's deliberations.
FRA received 12 comments in response to the ANPRM, including a
request from a member of the Working Group to extend the ANPRM's
comment period. In addition, the United States Small Business
Administration (SBA) commented that the length of the comment period
was inadequate for the industry, especially small railways, to prepare
a thorough response to the ANPRM. FRA had closed the comment period on
July 9, 1996, so that all comments could be shared with the Working
Group before its meeting on July 10, 1996.
Although FRA did not formally extend the comment period, comments
received after the closing date of the comment period have been shared
with the Working Group at subsequent meetings. Such comments have been
considered (and identified in this Notice) to the extent possible
without incurring additional delay in preparing this Notice. Moreover,
the Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved in
the provision of intercity and commuter rail service nationwide, and
its members had the opportunity to comment on the issues raised in the
ANPRM before the document's publication, as noted above.

Need for Safety Standards

Effective Federal safety standards for freight equipment have long
been in place, but equivalent Federal standards for passenger equipment
do not currently exist. The AAR sets industry standards for the design
and maintenance of freight equipment that add materially to the safe
operation of this equipment. Industry standards for the safety of
railroad passenger equipment have been in place since the early part of
this century, as noted by the AAPRCO in comment on the ANPRM. However,
over the years, the AAR has discontinued the development and
maintenance of passenger equipment standards.
Passenger railroads do offer the traveling public one of the safest
forms of transportation available. In the five-year period 1991-1995,
there were 1.07 passenger fatalities for every billion miles a
passenger was transported by rail. However, accidents continue to
occur, often as a result of factors beyond the control of the passenger
railroad. Further, the rail passenger environment is rapidly changing.
Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing. Several
passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been proposed
for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general, these
trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that are
common practice for current North American equipment. FRA believes that
adherence to such standards by the nation's passenger railroads has in
large measure contributed to the high level of safety at which rail
passenger service is currently operated. However, these standards do
not have the force of regulation.
In general, the North American railroad operating environment
requires passenger equipment to operate commingled with very heavy and
long freight trains, often over track with frequent grade crossings
used by heavy highway equipment. European passenger operations are
intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North
America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose

[[Page 49730]]

lesser hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway
vehicle weight. European passenger equipment design standards may
therefore not be appropriate for the North American rail environment.
FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains
continue to be designed, built, and operated with a high level of
safety. A clear set of Federal safety and design standards for
passenger equipment tailored to the nation's operating environment is
needed to provide for the safety of future rail operations and to
facilitate sound planning for those operations.

Passenger Train Safety Hazards

Passenger trains are exposed to a variety of safety hazards. Some
of these hazards are endemic to the nation's rail passenger operating
environment, as noted above, and result from the operation of passenger
trains commingled with freight trains, often over track with frequent
grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment.
Collisions with a wide range of objects may occur at various speeds
under a number of different circumstances. In addition to freight
trains and highway vehicles, these objects include maintenance-of-way
equipment and other passenger trains. Although most of these collisions
occur only in the normal running direction of the train, impact into
the side of the train can occur, especially at the junction of rail
lines and at highway-rail grade crossings.
A passenger train collision with another train concerns FRA because
of the potential for significant harm demonstrated in actual accidents.
On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred
between Maryland Rail Commuter Service (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak
train 29 on track owned by CSX Transportation, Inc., (CSXT) at Silver
Spring, Maryland. The MARC train was operating with a cab car (a car
which provides passenger seating, as well as a location from which the
train is operated) as the lead car in the train, followed by two
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The collision
separated the left front corner of the cab car from the roof to its
sill plate, and tore off much of the forward left side of the car body.
Three crewmembers and eight passengers were fatally injured, and 13
other occupants of the MARC train sustained injuries. (FRA Accident
Investigation Report (Report) B-3-96.)
On February 9, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred
between New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., trains 1254 and 1107
on the borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two
crewmembers and one passenger were fatally injured, and 35 other people
sustained injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the nonfatal
injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was operating with
the cab car forward, followed by four passenger coaches and a
locomotive pushing the consist. (FRA Report B-2-96.)
On January 18, 1993, Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District (NICTD) trains 7 and 12 collided corner-to-
corner in Gary, Indiana. The left front corners and adjacent car body
sidewall structures were destroyed on both of the lead cars in each
train. Seven passengers died, and 95 people sustained injuries. (NTSB/
Railroad Accident Report (RAR)-93/03.)
The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with sharing
common rights-of-way with freight trains has been demonstrated in
recent accidents, and a past disastrous accident.
On February 15, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 58 mph
struck a shifted load of steel ``I'' beams extending from a Union
Pacific Railroad Company freight train stopped in a siding at Borah,
Idaho. The Amtrak train's six passenger coaches were raked with a steel
beam which penetrated the outer layer of the car bodies at various
points. Although no passengers were injured, the Amtrak train's two
locomotives were significantly damaged, and two crewmembers were
injured. (FRA Report C-14-95.)
On May 16, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed after striking
an intermodal trailer which had fallen or was falling from a CSXT
freight train travelling northbound on an adjacent track at Selma,
North Carolina. The lead locomotive of the Amtrak train rolled over,
and the assistant engineer was killed. The engineer sustained serious
injuries, and 120 other occupants of the Amtrak train reported
injuries. (NTSB/RAR-95/02.)
On January 4, 1987, an Amtrak train collided with the rear
of a Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) train near Chase,
Maryland, when it unexpectedly entered the track ahead of the Amtrak
train, which had been travelling between 120 and 125 mph only a few
seconds earlier. The Amtrak train's two locomotives and three front
passenger cars were destroyed in the collision. The engineer and 15
passengers aboard the Amtrak train were fatally injured, and 174 other
persons aboard the train were injured. (NTSB/RAR-88/01.)
The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with
operating over frequent highway-rail grade crossings, used by heavy
highway vehicles, has also been demonstrated in numerous accidents.
On January 16, 1996, a Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) train being operated by Amtrak struck a loaded
tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing in
Wakefield, Massachusetts. Twenty-two passengers were taken to hospitals
by ambulance or air. (FRA Report C-4-96.)
On October 3, 1995, a Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Company (Metro-North) train with a cab car in the lead struck a loaded
tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing near
Milford, Connecticut. Two crewmembers and 24 passengers were injured.
(FRA Report C-60-95.)
On September 21, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 81 mph
struck a loaded tractor-trailer at a highway-rail grade crossing near
Indiantown, Florida. The assistant engineer was killed, and five other
persons onboard the train were injured. (FRA Report C-56-95.)
On November 30, 1993, an Amtrak train derailed after
striking an 82-ton turbine being transported by a 184-foot long vehicle
which was fouling a grade crossing near Intercession City, Florida.
Fifty-eight of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.
(NTSB Highway Accident Report 95/01.)
In addition to collisions involving passenger trains striking
highway vehicles, highway vehicles may also strike passenger trains.
According to FRA's Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident
database, 13.8% of all highway-rail grade crossing collisions involving
passenger trains from 1986 through 1995 occurred when the highway
vehicle struck the passenger train. This accounts for 388 such
occurrences out of 2,820 highway-rail grade crossing collisions
involving passenger trains in this period. In commenting on the ANPRM,
the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) had asked
that FRA clarify the statement that 25 percent of all highway-rail
grade crossing accidents involve a highway vehicle striking the side of
a train. See 61 FR 30692. Though this higher figure does include
accidents involving both freight and passenger trains, the potential
for a highway vehicle to strike a passenger train is real.
The WSDOT also requested that FRA document how many ``heavy''
highway vehicles were involved in highway-rail grade crossing accidents
in which highway vehicles struck passenger trains. Over the same ten-
year period from 1986 through 1995, 52 of the 388 occurrences in which
a highway vehicle

[[Page 49731]]

struck a passenger train involved a heavy highway vehicle. For purposes
of this analysis, FRA considered the number of heavy highway vehicles
which struck passenger trains to consist of all those vehicles
identified as a ``Truck-Trailer'' (12) and one-half the number of those
vehicles identified as a ``Truck'' (79), as specified according to Form
FRA F 6180.57--Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Report.
Passenger trains are also vulnerable to accidents caused by
defective railroad track structure and vehicle interaction with the
rail structure.
On August 3, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed while
travelling at approximately 79 mph on Conrail trackage near Batavia,
New York, because of the dynamic interaction between a material
handling car and a flattened rail head. Five of the derailed passenger
cars descended a railroad embankment and came to rest on their sides.
One-hundred-and-eight passengers and ten crewmembers were injured.
(NTSB/RAR-96/02.)
On July 31, 1991, an Amtrak train derailed while
travelling at 80 mph over CSXT trackage in Lugoff, South Carolina, when
a switch point leading to a parallel auxiliary track unexpectedly
opened under the Amtrak train. The derailed passenger cars collided
with the first of nine hopper cars stored on the auxiliary track. The
collision caused the wheel set from the first hopper car to penetrate
the last passenger car. Eight passengers were fatally injured, and 12
passengers sustained serious injuries. (NTSB/RAR-93/02.)
Moreover, passenger trains are vulnerable to accidents caused by
vandalism and sabotage.
On October 9, 1995, an Amtrak train derailed near Hyder,
Arizona, while operating at 50 mph on Southern Pacific Transportation
Company trackage because the railroad track structure had been
sabotaged. The derailment killed an Amtrak employee who occupied a
passenger car which had rolled over onto its side. Seventy-eight
passengers were also injured. (FRA Report C-62-95.)
On May 21, 1993, an Amtrak train traveling at
approximately 45 mph derailed after striking two pieces of steel pipe
which had been lodged between the rails of a turnout near Opa-Locka,
Florida. Six of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.
(FRA Report C-34-93.)
On August 12, 1992, an Amtrak train traveling at 79 mph
derailed at Newport News, VA, after being unexpectedly diverted into a
railroad siding because of a vandalized track switch. Seventy of the
train's passengers and crewmembers were injured. (FRA Report C-52-92.)
Regardless of the cause of an accident, the occupants of a
passenger train may risk harm caused by the crushing of the occupant
compartment, in which the occupants themselves are crushed, and local
penetration into the occupant compartment, where an object intrudes
into the occupant compartment and directly strikes an occupant, as
demonstrated in the Amtrak accident in Lugoff, South Carolina.
Passenger train occupants are also vulnerable to harm from collisions
within the train's interior, including loose objects inside the train,
such as baggage. For example, the NTSB determined that at least two
passengers in a lounge car were injured when they were struck by
displaced pedestal seats as a result of the Intercession City, Florida,
grade crossing collision on November 30, 1993. The seat columns on four
pedestal seats had separated from their floor attachments, allowing
them to be projected forward.
A variety of threats to passengers are also posed by fire, broken
glazing, electrical shock, and submergence. These dangers may arise
following a train derailment or collision, with potentially
catastrophic results.
On September 22, 1993, an accident occurred when an Amtrak
train travelling at approximately 72 mph derailed after striking a
girder that had been displaced when a towboat, pushing six barges,
struck a railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. The train's three
locomotives, the baggage and dormitory cars, and two of its six
passenger cars fell into the water. Forty-two passengers and five
crewmembers were killed. All passengers died from asphyxia due to
drowning, and the train's three locomotive engineers died from asphyxia
and blunt force trauma while inside the lead locomotive that became
filled with mud. Two other employees died from smoke inhalation inside
the dormitory coach car which had caught on fire. (NTSB Railroad-Marine
Accident Report 94/01.)
Further, in the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland, train collision
between the MARC and Amtrak trains, fire erupted after the fuel tank of
one of the Amtrak locomotives was breached. Fuel oil spilled into the
MARC train's cab car through the openings in the torn car body. The
forward section of the cab car was incinerated.
Some dangers to passenger train occupants, such as fire and smoke,
may also arise independently without being associated with a train
collision or derailment.
On June 23, 1982, a fire started onboard an Amtrak
passenger train in a sleeping car travelling en route to Los Angeles,
California. As a result of the fire and smoke, two passengers died, two
passengers were seriously injured, and 59 other occupants of the train
were treated for smoke inhalation. (NTSB/RAR-83/03.)

Development of Passenger Train Safety Program

This rulemaking is part of several related and complementary
efforts by FRA that will contribute to rail passenger safety. FRA has
proposed regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency
response procedures for rail passenger service in a separate rulemaking
proceeding, designated as FRA No. PTEP-1. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24,
1997. In addition, FRA has formed a separate working group (the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group) to assist FRA in
the development of such regulations. This related proceeding is also
addressing some of the issues FRA identified in the ANPRM on passenger
equipment safety. Persons wishing to receive more information regarding
this other rulemaking should contact Mr. Edward R. English, Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202-632-3349), or David
H. Kasminoff, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3191).
Further, in response to the New Jersey Transit and MARC train
accidents in early 1996, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (Notice No.
1) on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately enhance
passenger train operating rules and emergency egress and to develop an
interim system safety plan addressing the safety of operations that
permit passengers to occupy the leading car in a train. 61 FR 6876,
Feb. 22, 1996. Both the New Jersey Transit and MARC train accidents
involved operations where a cab car occupied the lead position in a
passenger train. The Emergency Order explained that in collisions
involving the front of a passenger train, operating with a cab car in
the forward position or a multiple unit (MU) locomotive, i.e., a self-
propelled locomotive with passenger seating, presents an increased risk
of severe personal injury or death as compared with locomotive-hauled
service when the locomotive occupies the lead position in the train and
thereby acts as a buffer for the trailing passenger cars. This risk is
of particular

[[Page 49732]]

concern where operations are conducted at relatively higher speeds,
where there is a mix of various types of trains, and where there are
numerous highway-rail crossings over which large motor vehicles are
operated. Accordingly, the Emergency Order required in particular that
``railroads operating scheduled intercity or commuter rail service * *
* conduct an analysis of their operations and file with FRA an interim
safety plan indicating the manner in which risk of a collision
involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.
The Emergency Order also noted that there is a need to ensure that
emergency exits are clearly marked and in operable condition on all
passenger lines, regardless of the equipment or train control system
used. Although FRA Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require
that passenger cars have a minimum of four emergency window exits
``designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis
situation,'' the Silver Spring accident raised concerns that at least
some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to
exit through the windows. The Emergency Order requires ``that any
emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the
inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of
all such windows be examined to ensure operability.'' 61 FR 6880. On
February 29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order No. 20 to
refine three aspects of the original order, including providing more
detailed guidance on the emergency egress sampling provision. 61 FR
8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
In addition, FRA submitted a report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions on September 18, 1996, and
subsequently referred the issues raised in the report to the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). FRA established RSAC in March of
1996, to provide FRA with advice and recommendations on railroad safety
matters. See 61 FR 9740, Mar. 11, 1996. RSAC consists of 48 individual
representatives, drawn from 27 organizations representing various rail
industry perspectives, and two associate nonvoting representatives from
the agencies with railroad safety regulatory responsibility in Canada
and Mexico. RSAC will make recommendations as to the best way to
address the findings of the report to Congress, including voluntary
initiatives, and regulatory standards where appropriate. As a result,
FRA may initiate a separate rulemaking proposing equipment safety
requirements for both conventional freight and passenger locomotives.
In the context of improving railroad communications, RSAC has
established a working group to specifically address communication
facilities and procedures, with a strong emphasis on passenger train
emergency requirements. FRA expects that group will report
recommendations to RSAC early in 1997. FRA anticipates that those
recommendations will address the issue of whether there should be
redundant communications capability on all passenger trains.

Scope of the Proposed Rule

Through this Notice, FRA proposes to establish a comprehensive set
of necessary safety regulations for railroad passenger equipment. These
safety standards will improve the safety of rail passenger service.
In commenting on the ANPRM, the General Railway Signal Corporation
(GRS) expressed concern that FRA has focused on equipment
crashworthiness without sufficiently addressing crash avoidance. GRS
noted that the underlying systems which can provide crash avoidance and
the related systems safety elements involving a vitally integrated
crash avoidance control system include much more than the elements
onboard a train.
As explained in the ANPRM (61 FR 30683), and as is evident in
Emergency Order No. 20, FRA recognizes that rail passenger safety does
involve the safety of the railroad system as a whole, including the
track structure, signal and train control systems, operating
procedures, and station- and platform-to-train interface design--in
addition to passenger equipment safety. To that end, FRA has active
rulemaking and research projects in a variety of contexts that address
non-equipment aspects of passenger railroad safety, including signal
and train control systems. Nevertheless, this proposed rule is designed
to address the specific statutory mandate that minimum safety standards
be prescribed for the safety of cars used to transport railroad
passengers. Signal and train control systems are not the focus of this
rulemaking.
FRA received comments from the SBA and on behalf of the Minnesota
Transportation Museum, Inc., about this rulemaking's effect on tourist,
scenic, historic, and excursion railroads. The proposed rule does not
apply to these railroads. Instead, the proposed rule applies to
railroads that provide intercity passenger and commuter service. A
joint FRA/industry working group formed under RSAC is currently
developing recommendations regarding the applicability of FRA
regulations, including this one, to tourist, scenic, historic, and
excursion railroads. After appropriate consultation with the excursion
railroad associations takes place, passenger equipment safety
requirements for these operations may be proposed by FRA that are
different from those affecting other types of passenger train
operations. Any such requirements proposed by FRA will be part of a
separate rulemaking proceeding.

Approach

The proposed regulations are principally designed to apply to two
groups of equipment. The first group is identified as Tier I equipment
and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph. The second group is identified as Tier II equipment
and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds greater
than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph. FRA is not proposing a rule of
general applicability for railroad passenger equipment operated at
speeds exceeding 150 mph. FRA believes that the safety of such
passenger equipment must be addressed in a rule of a particular
applicability for an individual railroad.
The speed break points between Tier I and Tier II equipment have
been chosen because most of the nation's intercity passenger and
commuter rail equipment has demonstrated an ability to operate safely
at speeds up to 125 mph. Nevertheless, FRA recognizes that most of this
same equipment is currently operated only at speeds of 110 mph or less.
As a result, the proposed rule contains particular suspension system
safety requirements for passenger equipment operating at speeds above
110 mph but not exceeding 125 mph, near the transition range from Tier
I to Tier II requirements.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133(a), FRA may apply some or all of the
proposed standards to passenger cars existing at the time the
regulations are published, as well as to new cars, but FRA must explain
the basis for applying any such standards to existing cars. FRA
believes that passenger railroad equipment operating in permanent
service in the United States has established a good safety record,
proving its compatibility with the operating environment. Moreover, FRA
seeks to maximize the benefits resulting from the passenger railroad
industry's investment in any safety requirements which FRA may impose
through this rule. Accordingly, to be cost effective, most of the
proposed requirements would apply only to new or rebuilt equipment.

[[Page 49733]]

However, certain features routinely incorporated in existing designs
would be required at an earlier date than the more innovative features
proposed by this rule. Further, where appropriate, rebuilt equipment
would be required to comply with specific requirements.
FRA intends that the rules proposed in this NPRM lead to the
issuance of initial passenger equipment safety regulations, which are
required by statute to be issued by November 2, 1997. See 49 U.S.C.
20133(b)(1). FRA will propose additional rules for passenger equipment
in a second NPRM principally when the results of further research are
available. FRA intends that the second NPRM lead to the issuance of
final regulations by November 2, 1999, thereby completing the
rulemaking within the five-year period required by law. See 49 U.S.C.
20133(b)(2). To that end, FRA convened a meeting of the Working Group
on December 10-11, 1996, at the Volpe Center in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to determine and set priorities for the research
necessary to address unresolved safety issues identified in prior
Working Group meetings. Moreover, FRA hopes that the establishment of
final regulations in 1999 will be furthered by APTA's own initiative to
develop and maintain recommended industry standards for rail passenger
equipment. APTA's effort is being carried out through the Passenger
Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Task Force, and APTA has
invited FRA, FTA, the NTSB, equipment manufacturers, engineering and
consulting firms, rail labor, and others with an interest in rail
passenger equipment to work with it in developing and effectuating the
recommended standards. This represents a substantial and continuing
investment by member commuter authorities in the safety of rail
passenger service.

System Safety

FRA believes that passenger railroads should carefully evaluate
their operations with a view toward enhancing the safety of those
operations. The importance of formal safety planning has been
recognized in Emergency Order No. 20 and the proposed rule on passenger
train emergency preparedness. As noted, Emergency Order No. 20, Notice
No. 1, required that ``railroads operating scheduled intercity or
commuter rail service . . . conduct an analysis of their operations and
file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the manner in which
risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.
In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson,
President of Metro-North and Chairperson of APTA's Commuter Railroad
Committee, announced that commuter railroads are committed to seeking
additional opportunities to ensure the safety of their operations
beyond efforts such as those made to comply with the interim system
safety plan requirements of Emergency Order No. 20. Mr. Nelson
explained in particular that commuter railroads will examine and ensure
the safety of their operations by adopting a comprehensive system
safety plan that:
(a) Defines the overall safety effort, how it is to be implemented
and the staff required to maintain it;
(b) Establishes the safety interface within the railroad, as well
as with its key outside agencies;
(c) Clearly indicates Senior Management support for implementing
the safety plan and the railroad's overall commitment to safety;
(d) Establishes the safety philosophy of the organization and
provides the means for implementation;
(e) Defines the authority and responsibilities of the safety
organization and delineates the safety related authority and
responsibilities of other departments; and
(f) Incorporates safety goals and objectives into the overall
corporate strategic plan.

(APTA's Commuter Railroad Committee letter at pages 1 and 2.) Further,
the system safety plan is intended to be updated through periodic
safety reviews of all operations.
In a letter to FRA dated October 21, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson
submitted for FRA's review APTA's ``Manual for the Development of a
System Safety Plan for Commuter Railroads'' (APTA Manual). The APTA
Manual is intended to assist commuter railroads in adopting a
comprehensive system safety plan by September 1, 1997. In addition,
Amtrak recently began a corporate system safety program initiative to
make system safety formally an integral part of Amtrak's operations.
The value of the system safety process is rapidly being recognized and
accepted by the passenger railroad industry.
The System Safety Society (the ``Society''), which provided
detailed comments in response to the ANPRM, observed that the use of
the systems approach to safety is very actively followed in many other
industries. The Society noted that the implementation of system safety
plans has been observed to improve safety by reducing accidents and
incidents. Further, the Society explained that safety plans are usually
updated annually to maintain their utility because of technological
improvements and other changed circumstances, including changes in the
operating environment, rules and regulations.
The proposed rule contains system safety requirements to be applied
to all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment. Although FRA
initially considered addressing system safety requirements for Tier I
and Tier II equipment separately, FRA decided to propose system safety
requirements which can be applied generally to all types of passenger
equipment. Each individual railroad would be required to develop a
system safety plan and a system safety program tailored to its specific
operation, including train speed. The plan required by this part would
be developed as part of a comprehensive system safety process to which
commuter railroads are already committed.
Through the system safety process, each railroad would be required
to identify, evaluate, and seek to eliminate or reduce the hazards
associated with the use of passenger equipment over the railroad
system. In particular, the proposed rule would require that each
intercity passenger and commuter railroad prepare a system safety plan
addressing, at a minimum:
Fire protection;
Software safety;
Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance;
Employee training and qualifications; and
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing of equipment.

However, because FRA is also proposing a comprehensive set of
mandatory, equipment safety standards in this rule, FRA is generally
not proposing to enforce every element of a railroad's system safety
plan. The section-by-section analysis identifies those portions of the
system safety plan that will be enforced by FRA. Commenters are
requested to address whether FRA should mandate the contents of system
safety plans, whether the areas identified by FRA are appropriate,
whether additional areas should be added, and whether FRA should
enforce other portions of the system safety plans and, if so, which
portions. Should the proposed rule require that system safety plans be
comprehensive and address the entire railroad system in which the
equipment operates? Should the emergency preparedness planning
requirements contained in proposed 49 CFR part 239 (See the Passenger
Train Emergency Preparedness rulemaking,

[[Page 49734]]

designated as FRA No. PTEP-1 (62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997)) be expressly
integrated with the system safety planning requirements contained in
this proposed part (49 CFR part 238)?
APTA, citing to the fact that the commuter railroads have
voluntarily agreed to adopt system safety plans, has objected to FRA
issuing any regulations governing such plans. Commenters are requested
to address APTA's suggestion that the commuter railroads be allowed to
regulate themselves in this area. FRA understands that APTA's system
safety approach will be more comprehensive than what FRA is proposing
and address each commuter railroad's system more as an integrated
whole, not focused principally on rail equipment. FRA will carefully
consider the comments received in deciding what approach to take in the
final rule with respect to system safety plans.
Passenger railroads should seek to employ all means necessary to
reduce the risks associated with the use of passenger equipment over
their systems such as by improving the crashworthiness of their
equipment or by imposing operational limitations on its use. Further,
because many passenger railroads operate at least in part as a tenant
on the right-of-way of another railroad and may not in themselves be
able to control some of the major system hazards, as demonstrated when
an intermodal trailer from a CSXT freight train struck an Amtrak train
operating on an adjacent track in Selma, North Carolina, all railroads
are encouraged to exploit ways to reduce the risks associated with rail
travel to their employees, passengers, and the general public.

Emergency Egress and Access

During the NTSB's investigation of the February 16, 1996, collision
between the MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver Spring, Maryland, that
agency identified unsafe conditions on MARC's rail cars that had been
manufactured by Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe conditions
identified on these rail cars may exist on other commuter lines subject
to FRA oversight, on March 12, 1996, the NTSB recommended that FRA:

Inspect all commuter rail equipment to determine whether it has:
(1) easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanisms
adjacent to exterior passageway doors; (2) removable windows or kick
panels in interior and exterior passageway doors; and (3)
prominently displayed retroreflective signage marking all interior
and exterior emergency exits. If any commuter equipment lacks one or
more or these features, take appropriate emergency measures to
ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into
minimum passenger car safety standards. (Class I, Urgent Action) (R-
96-7)

(In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, the NTSB announced that it has
added ``Safety of Passengers in Railroad Passenger Cars'' to its list
of ``Most Wanted'' transportation safety improvements.)
In the discussion accompanying the safety recommendation, the NTSB
expressed concern that emergency quick-release mechanisms for the
exterior side doors on MARC's Sumitomo rail cars are located in a
secured cabinet some distance from the doors that they control, and the
emergency controls for each door are not readily accessible and
identifiable. Each cabinet door was secured by two fasteners, requiring
a screwdriver or coin to open. The NTSB believes that the emergency
quick-release mechanisms for exterior doors on MARC rail cars should be
well marked and relocated, so that they are immediately adjacent to the
door which they control and readily accessible for emergency escape.

Access to Emergency Door-Release for Power-0perated Doors

In response to the NTSB's recommendation, FRA inspected a total of
1,250 pieces of equipment in use on 16 commuter organizations. In
addition to MARC rail cars, FRA found that some commuter railroads
operate cars with power doors equipped with emergency door-release
levers located inside cabinets requiring special tools to enter. In
large part, these railroads have committed to the voluntary elimination
of latches requiring tools or other implements to access the emergency-
release levers on power-operated doors.
FRA convened a joint meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group and the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
Working Group on March 26, 1996, to discuss the NTSB's recommendations
and incorporate the Safety Board's findings, as appropriate, into each
working group's rulemaking. In accordance with the consensus of the
working groups, FRA is proposing in Secs. 238.237 and 238.441 of the
rule that train passengers and crewmembers be able to access door-
release mechanisms without the use of any tool or other implement.

Relocation of Emergency Door-Release

NTSB advisors to the Working Group clarified that the
recommendation to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms refers to
exterior side doors located in end vestibules partitioned from the
passenger compartment of the rail vehicle. If emergency door-release
mechanisms are located inside the passenger compartments of such
vehicles, exiting the vehicles in an emergency through side doors in
the vestibules may be complicated as passengers try to locate the
mechanisms and move between the vestibule and passenger compartment
areas.
In response to the NTSB's safety recommendation, passenger
railroads that operate rail equipment with end vestibules have agreed
to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms so that they are located
adjacent to the doors which they control. However, agreement could not
be reached on a time-table for retrofitting existing equipment. APTA
has proposed that the retrofit be required on all such passenger
equipment when it is overhauled in the course of each railroad's
equipment overhaul cycle. APTA anticipates that under this process
retrofitting the entire fleet of affected equipment will be
accomplished within 10 to 15 years.
FRA believes that the retrofit must be accomplished sooner to
ensure the safety of passenger train occupants. Consequently, FRA is
proposing in Sec. 238.237 that for equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph (Tier I equipment), within two years of the effective
date of the final rule each powered, exterior side door in a vestibule
that is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a passenger car
be equipped with a manual override that is: (1) capable of opening the
door without power from inside the car; (2) located adjacent to the
door which it controls; and (3) designed and maintained so that a
person may access the override device from inside the car without
requiring the use of any tool or other implement.
FRA expects that railroads will expedite this retrofit program and
believes that this retrofit can be completed well in advance of the 2-
year deadline. APTA maintains that the supply industry cannot provide
the necessary materials to complete the retrofit in such time without
unreasonable increases in costs, and believes that a 3 to 5 year time
frame is needed. (Commenters are requested to address whether a shorter
or longer time period should be established and, if so, provide the
rationale for the time period that the commenter recommends. Railroads
are requested to identify the number of cars that are not yet
retrofitted.) Further, before any equipment may be introduced for
service at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (Tier II

[[Page 49735]]

equipment), FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441 that each powered,
exterior side door on a passenger car be equipped with a manual
override meeting the above and additional requirements.
FRA believes that the cost of meeting the retrofit requirement will
be $3.7 million dollars, and recognizes that it is not clear whether
the occupants of the MARC train in the Silver Spring, Maryland,
accident could have opened the vestibule exterior side doors after the
collision, assuming that the emergency-release had been employed. The
NTSB did note that the left and right rear exterior side doors of the
first car and the front interior end door and the right front exterior
door of the second car on the MARC train were jammed. However, FRA
believes it must institute the retrofit requirement to decrease the
risk that passengers cannot rapidly exit a train in a life-threatening
situation.
FRA recognizes that passenger railroads have located door-release
mechanisms away from the doors which they control to discourage
passengers from exiting trains in non-emergency situations. When no
emergency is present, passengers exiting trains along the railroad
right-of-way unnecessarily risk exposure to oncoming trains, electrical
hazards, and other dangerous conditions. In consequence, the proposed
rule permits railroads to protect emergency door-release mechanisms
from casual or inadvertent use with a cover or a screen. However, the
cover or screen must be capable of removal by a 5th-percentile female
without the use of any tool or other implement. If the method of
removing the protective cover or screen entails breaking or shattering
it, the cover or screen shall be scored, perforated, or otherwise
weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can penetrate the cover or
screen with a single blow of her fist without injury to her hand.

Additional Egress Issues

The NTSB noted that none of the car doors on the MARC train
involved in the Silver Spring, Maryland, accident had removable windows
or pop-out emergency escape panels (``kick panels'') for use in an
emergency. In addition, the NTSB stated that several train passengers
were unaware of the locations of emergency exits, and none knew how to
operate them. The NTSB found that the interior emergency window decals
were not prominently displayed and that one car had no interior
emergency window decals. Also, the exterior emergency decals were often
faded or obliterated, and the information on them, when legible,
directed emergency responders to another sign at the end of the car for
instructions on how to open emergency exits.
Through the issuance of Emergency Order No. 20, FRA has addressed
on an interim basis the inspection of required emergency exits, and
emergency exit signage and marking. Further, FRA is proposing
requirements concerning the marking of emergency exits, as well as
instructions for their use, in the related rulemaking on passenger
train emergency preparedness. FRA shares the NTSB's concern about
passenger egress in an emergency; however, FRA believes that the NTSB's
suggestion to install kick panels is best limited to interior doors to
ensure passage through a train in an emergency--and not applied to
exterior doors.
To the best of FRA's knowledge, the concept of kick panels has not
been utilized in North American rail equipment. Installing kick panels
below the window levels in exterior doors was evaluated by FRA, with
concurrence from the joint working groups, as unacceptable for safety
reasons. Because passenger railroads have encountered recurring
situations in which passengers have inappropriately exited moving
trains, leading to death or serious injury, introducing kick panels in
exterior doors would create an unacceptable risk of inadvertent use,
particularly by children. Penetration of occupied areas by objects from
the outside is also a potential concern.
Use of kick panels to open passageways through a train has merit.
If panels can be made sufficiently large without decreasing the
functionality of doors in normal operation, such a feature may
facilitate evacuation through the length of the train if exterior side
doors are jammed. Evacuation throughout the length of the train is
often the safest route of egress in situations such as fires,
derailments in multiple track territory, and incidents in third-rail
powered commuter service. Accordingly, FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441
of the rule that Tier II passenger car end doors be equipped with a
kick-out panel, pop-out window or other similar means of egress in the
event the doors will not open.
Unlike a Tier II passenger train which should operate as a fixed
unit, the interchangeable use of some cab cars and MU locomotives as
leading and trailing units on a Tier I passenger train will complicate
analyzing the efficacy of installing such panels on Tier I equipment.
It would be unacceptable to have a removable panel at the point of a
train where objects or fluids might enter the vehicle as a result of a
highway-rail grade crossing accident or other collision. As a result,
FRA will further examine the concerns involving the use of kick panels
on Tier I equipment in the second phase of this rulemaking.
Additional emergency egress and access topics addressed in this
proposed rule are discussed below in the Emergency Systems section of
this preamble. Emergency egress and access topics are also addressed in
the related rulemaking on passenger train emergency preparedness. See
62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

Power Brake Inspection and Testing

In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. These
amendments specifically address the revision of the power brake
regulations and state in pertinent part:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
* * * * *
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
In response to the statutory mandate, various recommendations to
improve power brake safety, and due to its own determination that the
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an
ANPRM on December 31, 1992, concerning railroad power brake safety. See
57 FR 62546. The ANPRM provided background information and presented
questions on various subjects related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations, including: training of testing and
inspection personnel; electronic braking systems; cleaning, oiling,
testing, and stenciling (COT&S) requirements; performance of brake
inspections; and high speed passenger train brakes. Following
publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted a series of public workshops.
The ANPRM and the public workshops were intended as fact-finding tools
to elicit views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring
compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.
Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, the NTSB made the following
recommendation to FRA: ``Amend the power brake regulations, 49 Code of
Federal Regulations 232.12, to provide appropriate guidelines for
inspecting brake equipment on modern passenger

[[Page 49736]]

cars.'' (R-93-16). The recommendation arose out of the NTSB's
investigation of the December 17, 1991, derailment of an Amtrak
passenger train in Palatka, Florida. The derailed equipment struck two
homes and blocked a street north of the Palatka station. The derailment
resulted in eleven passengers sustaining serious injuries and 41 others
receiving minor injuries. In addition, five members of the operating
crew and four onboard service personnel received minor injuries. By
letter dated September 16, 1993, FRA told the NTSB that it was in the
process of reviewing and rewriting the power brake regulations and
would consider the NTSB's recommendation during the process.
Based on comments and information received, FRA published an NPRM
in 1994 regarding revision of the power brake regulations which
contained specific requirements related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations. These specific requirements included:
general design requirements; movement of defective equipment; employee
qualifications; inspection and testing requirements; single car testing
requirements and periodic maintenance; operating requirements; and
requirements for the introduction of new train brake system technology.
See 59 FR 47722-47753, September, 16, 1994.
Following publication of the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47676), FRA held a
series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties the
opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the 1994 NPRM.
Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois, on November 1-2; in
Newark, New Jersey, on November 4; in Sacramento, California, on
November 9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14, 1994. These
hearings were attended by numerous railroads; organizations
representing railroads; labor organizations; rail shippers; and State
governmental agencies. Due to the strong objections raised by a large
number of commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17,
1995, that it would defer action on the 1994 NPRM and permit the
submission of additional comments prior to making a determination as to
how it would proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375.
Based on these considerations and after review of all the comments
submitted, FRA determined that in order to limit the number of issues
to be examined and developed in any one proceeding it would proceed
with the revision of the power brake regulations via three separate
processes. In light of the testimony and comments received on the 1994
NPRM, emphasizing the differences between passenger and freight
operations and the brake equipment utilized by the two, FRA decided to
separate passenger equipment power brake standards from freight
equipment power brake standards. As passenger equipment power brake
standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment safety standards,
FRA requested the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group to
assist FRA in developing appropriate power brake standards for
passenger equipment and then decided that they would be included in
this NPRM. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, a second NPRM covering
freight equipment power brake standards would be developed with the
assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. See 61 FR
29164, June 7, 1996. Furthermore, in the interest of public safety and
due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that
it would separate the issues related to two-way end-of-train-telemetry
devices from both the passenger and freight issues. FRA convened a
public regulatory conference and published a final rule on the subject
on January 2, 1997. See 62 FR 278.
Beginning in December of 1995, the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group adopted the additional task of attempting to
develop power brake standards applicable to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations and equipment. The Working Group met on four
separate occasions in the last six months, which consisted of ten days
of meetings, with a good portion of these meetings being devoted to
discussion of power brake issues. From the outset, a majority of the
members, as well as FRA, believed that any requirements developed by
the group regarding the inspection and testing of the brake equipment
should not vary significantly from the current requirements and should
be consistent with current industry practice.
FRA's accident/incident data related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations support the assumption that the current
practices of these operations in the area of power brake inspection,
testing, and maintenance are for the most part sufficient to ensure the
safety of the public. Between January 1, 1990 and October 31, 1996,
there were only five brake related accidents involving commuter and
intercity passenger railroad equipment. No casualties resulted from any
of these accidents and the total damage to railroad equipment totaled
approximately $650,000, or $96,000 annually. In addition, between
January 1, 1995 and October 31, 1996, FRA inspected approximately
13,000 commuter and intercity passenger rail units for compliance with
49 CFR part 232. The defect ratio for these units during this period
was approximately 0.8 percent. Furthermore, during this same period FRA
inspected approximately 6,300 locomotives for compliance with 49 CFR
part 229. The brake defect ratio for these units was approximately 4.65
percent. Consequently, the defect ratio for brake related defects on
locomotives and other passenger equipment during this period was
approximately 2.08 percent.
The existing regulations covering the inspection and testing of the
braking systems on passenger trains are contained in 49 CFR part 232.
The current regulations do provide some requirements relevant to
passenger train operations, including: initial terminal inspection and
testing, intermediate inspections, running tests, and general
maintenance requirements. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13(a), 232.16, and
232.17. However, most of the existing regulations are written to
address freight train operations and do not sufficiently address the
unique operating environment of commuter and intercity passenger train
operations or the equipment currently being used in those operations.
Therefore, it has been necessary for FRA to provide interpretations of
some of the current regulations in order to address these unique
concerns.
Currently, all non-MU (multiple unit) commuter trains that do not
remain connected to a source of compressed air overnight and all MU
commuter trains equipped with RT-5 or similar brake systems must
receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system pursuant to
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) prior to the train's first departure on any given
calendar day. All non-MU commuter trains that remain connected to a
source of compressed air overnight are permitted to receive an initial
terminal inspection of the brake system sometime during each 24-hour
period in which they are used. Furthermore, all intercity passenger
trains must receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system
at the point where they are originally made up and must receive an
intermediate inspection in accordance with Sec. 232.12(b) every 1,000
miles.
As noted previously, most of the members of the Working Group
believed that any requirements developed by the group regarding the
inspection and testing of the brake equipment should not vary
significantly from the current requirements and should be consistent

[[Page 49737]]

with current industry practice. However, the Working Group was unable
to reach consensus on power brake standards, despite the positing of
multiple alternatives, use of a facilitator, and the foundation
provided by the 1994 NPRM. The Working Group identified and discussed
options with which the agency and labor can agree, and others with
which FRA and the railroads can agree. However, bridging the gap
between those various options proved elusive. Consequently, as the
Working Group could not reach any type of consensus on the inspection
and testing requirements, it was determined that FRA would address
these issues unilaterally, based on the information and discussions
provided by the Working Group and the information gathered from the
1994 NPRM. FRA is interested in receiving comments on the brake tests
that it has developed given the differences in the positions of the
various parties.
The Working Group discussed various options regarding the types of
brake inspections that should be required as well as when and how these
inspections should be performed. Labor representatives, particularly
the BRC, insisted that a comprehensive power brake inspection (i.e.,
something similar to the initial terminal brake inspections currently
required under Sec. 232.12(c)-(j)) must be performed prior to a train's
first run on a given calendar day. The BRC expressed concern that, as
equipment lays over between the evening commuter cycle and the first
trip of the morning, vandalism, weather changes, or other factors could
affect the integrity of the air brake system. The BRC also believes
that it is necessary for the first inspection of the day to determine
whether the brake shoes and the disc pads actually apply as intended.
The BRC further contends that in order to perform a comprehensive
inspection equivalent to an initial terminal inspection the train must
be walked or otherwise inspected on a car-to-car basis. In addition,
the BRC contends that these principal inspections should be performed
only by carmen or other qualified mechanical personnel as they are the
only employees sufficiently trained to perform these inspections.
Representatives of intercity passenger and commuter railroads
expressed the desire to have the flexibility to conduct a comprehensive
in-depth inspection of the train brake system sometime during the day
in which the equipment is utilized. These parties argued that safety
would be better served by allowing the railroads the flexibility to
conduct these inspections on a daily basis as it would allow the
railroads to conduct the inspections at locations that are more
conducive to permitting a full inspection of the equipment than many of
the outlying locations where trains are stationed overnight and where
the ability to observe all the equipment may be hampered. It is further
contended that, if trains are required to received the equivalent of an
initial terminal inspection at these outlying points, then many of
these inspections may be performed by individuals not as fully
qualified as a mechanical inspector. Whereas, if the railroads are
allowed some flexibility in conducting these type of inspections, then
the equipment can be moved to a location where a fully qualified
mechanical inspector can perform a detailed brake inspection under
optimum conditions, perhaps in conjunction with a daily mechanical
inspection.
Several parties also pointed out that, with proper maintenance,
``tread brake units'' and other friction brake components, commonly
used in commuter train operations, are highly reliable and that the
non-functioning of any individual unit would in no way compromise the
overall safety of the train. Furthermore, permitting the inspection of
these types of brake components in the middle of the day, rather than
at the beginning of the day, involves no greater safety risk to
passengers because friction brake systems and their components degrade
in performance based largely on use, and nothing short of a continuous
brake inspection can guarantee 100-percent performance at all times.
Railroad representatives suggested an inspection scheme that would
permit an in-depth, comprehensive brake inspection to be performed
sometime during the day in which the equipment is used with a brake
inspection being performed prior to the first run of the day verifying
the continuity of the trainline by performing a set and release on the
rear car of the train. In addition, one commuter railroad also
requested relief from performing Class I inspections on trains operated
in weekend service due to the shortage of mechanical inspectors
currently employed on those shifts.
Based on consideration of the discussions held in the Working Group
meetings, outlined above, as well as information obtained in relation
to the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposes to abandon the terminology related to
the power brake inspection and testing requirements contained in the
current regulations, which is generally based on the locations where
the inspections and tests are performed (i.e., initial terminal,
intermediate locations). In its stead, FRA proposes to identify various
classes of inspections based on the duties and type of inspection
required, such as: Class I; Class IA; and Class II. This is similar to
the approach taken by FRA in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47736-40. FRA
believes that this type of classification system will avoid confusion
with the power brake inspection and testing requirements applicable to
freight operations and will avoid the connotations historically
attached to the current terminology. FRA also believes this approach is
better suited for providing operational flexibility to commuter
operations while maintaining the safety provided by the current
inspection and testing requirements. Although FRA proposes a change in
the terminology used to describe the various power brake inspections
and tests, the requirements of these inspections and tests will closely
track the current requirements with some modifications made to address
the unique operating environment of, and equipment operated in,
commuter and intercity passenger train service. Members of the Working
Group appeared receptive to this kind of classification system and
discussed various options using some of this terminology. Consequently,
FRA proposes four different types of brake inspections to be performed
by commuter and intercity passenger railroads some time during the
operation of the equipment. FRA proposes the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class
IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``running brake test'' to identify the four
types of brake inspections required by this proposal.
FRA also proposes to divide passenger train operations into two
distinct types for purposes of brake inspections and testing. FRA
recognizes that there are major differences in the operations of
commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger trains tend to operate for fairly short distances
between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short
turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given
day. In contrast, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend to
operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning terminal
and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing multiple states
with relatively long distances between passenger stations.
Consequently, FRA proposes to use and define the terms ``commuter
train,'' ``short-distance intercity passenger train,'' and ``long-
distance intercity passenger train'' in order to identify the
inspection and

[[Page 49738]]

testing requirements associated with each. For the most part, commuter
and short-distance intercity passenger trains are treated similarly,
whereas, long-distance intercity passenger trains have slightly
different proposed inspection and testing requirements. In addition,
FRA proposes slightly different requirements with regard to the
movement of defective equipment in long-distance intercity passenger
trains (see the discussion below on the ``Movement of Equipment with
Defective Brakes'').
APTA, in its comments on a draft of the NPRM, expressed opposition
to the proposed Class IA brake test. APTA's position is that brake
tests prior to a train's first departure in any day should be limited
to a pre-departure set and release followed by a running test of the
brakes. APTA also expresses the belief that the proposed NPRM Class I
and Class II requirements go well beyond existing brake inspection
processes and that which is required for safety, and that these
requirements will increase costs dramatically.

A. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a
Class I Brake Test Sometime During a Day the Equipment Is Used

The proposed Class I brake test basically requires an inspection
similar to an initial terminal inspection as currently described at
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j), but is somewhat more extensive and specifically
aimed at the types of equipment being used in commuter and intercity
passenger train service. A Class I brake test would require an
inspection of the application and release of the friction brakes on
each side of each car as well as an inspection of the brake shoes,
pads, discs, rigging, angle cocks, piston travel, and brake indicators
if the equipment is so equipped. The Class I brake test would also
require testing of the communication signal system and the emergency
braking control devices. In addition, all supplemental braking systems
would be required to be inspected and be working. In recognition of the
advanced technology and various designs used in many of these
operations, which make observation of the piston travel virtually
impossible, FRA proposes to permit the inspection of the piston travel
to be conducted either through direct observation or by observation of
a brake actuator or the clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel.
Furthermore, FRA proposes to require a brake pipe leakage test only
when leakage will affect service performance.
Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test before
the first run in order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake
equipment. As FRA proposes that Class I brake tests be a comprehensive
inspection of the braking system, including the proper operation of
supplemental braking systems, FRA believes that commuter and short-
distance intercity passenger train operations must be permitted some
flexibility in conducting these inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes
to require that commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train
operations perform a Class I brake test sometime during the calendar
day in which the equipment is used. FRA believes that the flexibility
permitted by this proposed requirement will allow these railroads to
move equipment to locations that are most conducive to the inspection
of the brake equipment and would allow these railroads to combine the
daily mechanical inspections with this brake inspection for added
efficiency.
Furthermore, as FRA intends for these Class I brake inspections to
be in-depth inspections of the entire braking system which most likely
will be performed only one time in any given day in which the equipment
is used, FRA believes that these inspections must be performed by
individuals possessing not only the knowledge to identify and detect a
defective condition in all of the brake equipment required to be
inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational
workings of the equipment and the ability to ``troubleshoot'' and
repair the equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes that only qualified
mechanical inspectors be permitted to perform Class I brake tests.
Currently, initial terminal air brake inspections are conducted
prior to the first run of the day on 554 commuter train sets by
mechanical inspectors and on 168 commuter train sets by train crews or
other personnel who could not be fully qualified as mechanical
inspectors. Typically, commuter and short-distance intercity passenger
trains receive more than one initial terminal test each day, even if
this is not required due to the equipment being left ``off air.'' See
49 CFR 232.12(a). Often these additional tests are conducted sometime
during the middle of the day by train crews or mechanical employees.
Although most commuter and short-distance intercity operations
voluntarily perform an initial terminal brake inspection with
mechanical employees some time during the day, there is no requirement
to do so. In addition, there is a certain percentage of equipment where
the principal brake inspections are currently being performed strictly
by train crews rather than by mechanical employees. Consequently, FRA
believes that the proposed requirement incorporates the current best
practices of the industry and will, at a minimum, ensure that the
braking systems on all commuter and short-distance intercity equipment
will be inspected at least once each day by a fully qualified
mechanical inspector.
FRA has not proposed any special provisions for weekend operations
as suggested by some members of the Working Group. FRA recognizes this
is a difficult issue. Existing operations generally involve using
particular sets of equipment on only one day during the weekend to
avoid the need to refuel. On the one hand, there is no specific data
suggesting that existing weekend operations involving inspections
exclusively by train crew members have created a safety hazard. Yet,
the rationale for requiring daily attention by mechanical forces, a
proposition generally accepted by Working Group members, would appear
to apply equally to weekend periods. FRA believes that adjustments
might be made to weekend operations that might avoid significant new
expense while providing expert attention to inspection of the
equipment. Accordingly, FRA seeks additional information on the costs
and benefits of requiring that Class I brake inspections and daily
mechanical inspections be conducted by qualified mechanical inspectors,
as well as any suggestions for alternative means of addressing this
issue.

B. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require at
Least a Class IA Brake Test Prior to the Train's First Departure in Any
Given Day

Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake equipment in all
situations. However, contrary to the position espoused by APTA, FRA
believes that something more than just a determination that the brakes
on the rear car set and release is necessary.
Currently, the quality of initial terminal tests performed by train
crews is likely adequate to determine that

[[Page 49739]]

brakes apply on each car. However, most commuter equipment utilizes
``tread brake units'' in lieu of cylinders and brake rigging of the
kind prevalent on freight and some intercity passenger cars. It is
undoubtedly the case that train crew members do not verify application
of the brakes by tapping brake shoes while the brakes are applied, the
only effective means of determining that adequate force is being
applied. This is one reason why the subject railroads typically conduct
redundant initial terminal tests at other times during the day.
Further, train crews are not asked to inspect for wheel defects and
other unsafe conditions, nor should they be asked to do so, given the
conditions under which they are asked to inspect and the training they
receive.
FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a Class IA brake test be performed
prior to a commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train's first
departure on any given day. FRA believes that the proposed Class IA
brake is sufficiently detailed to ensure the proper functioning of the
brake system yet not so intensive that it requires individuals to
perform an inspection for which they are not qualified.
The proposed Class IA brake test is somewhat less comprehensive
than a Class I brake test but includes a detailed inspection of the
brake system to verify the continuity of the brake system and the
proper functioning of the brake valves on each car. A Class IA brake
test would be similar to the intermediate brake inspection currently
required for freight trains prescribed at Sec. 232.13(d)(1). A Class IA
brake test would generally require a walking inspection of the set and
release of the brakes on each car; however, the proposal would allow
brake indicators to be used to verify the set and release if the
railroad determines that operating conditions pose a safety hazard to
an inspector walking along the train. The Class IA brake test would
also require a leakage test if leakage affects service performance, as
well as an inspection of: angle cocks; piston travel, if determinable;
brake indicators; emergency brake control devices; and communication of
brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of train to the controlling
locomotive. FRA believes that a qualified mechanical inspector or a
properly trained and qualified train crew member could perform a Class
IA brake test.

C. Long-distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a Class I Brake
Test Prior to Departure From an Originating Terminal and Once Each
Calendar Day the Equipment Is Used or Every 1,500 Miles, Whichever
Occurs First

As noted above, FRA recognizes the differences between commuter or
short-distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity
passenger train operations. Long-distance intercity passenger trains do
not operate in shorter turn around service over the same sections of
track on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting passengers from
major centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend to operate for
extended periods of time, over long distances with greater distances
between passenger stations and terminals. Further, these trains may
operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24 hour period. Thus, the
opportunity for conducting inspections on these trains is somewhat
diminished. Therefore, FRA believes that a thorough inspection of the
braking system on these types of operations must be conducted prior to
the train's departure from an initial starting terminal. Consequently,
FRA will not permit the use of Class IA brake tests for these trains
and proposes to require that a Class I brake inspection be performed on
long-distance intercity passenger trains prior to departure from an
initial terminal. FRA does not believe there would be any significant
burden placed on these operations as the current regulations require
that an initial terminal inspection be performed at these locations.
Furthermore, virtually all of the initial terminal inspections
currently conducted on these types of trains are performed by
individuals who would be considered qualified mechanical employees
under this proposal.
FRA also recognizes that these long-distance intercity passenger
trains could conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if Class I inspections
were required only once every 24 hours the equipment is in service as
proposed for commuter and short-distance intercity passenger trains.
Thus, FRA believes that some outside mileage limit must be placed on
these trains between brake inspections. Currently, a passenger train is
permitted to travel no further than 1,000 miles from its initial
terminal, at which point it must receive an intermediate inspection of
brakes that includes application of the brakes and the inspection of
the brake rigging to ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR
232.12(b). However, in recognition of the improved technology used in
passenger train brake systems combined with the comprehensive nature of
the proposed Class I brake tests and mechanical safety inspections both
being performed by qualified mechanical inspectors, FRA proposes to
permit long-distance passenger trains to travel up to 1,500 miles
between Class I brake tests. Consequently, FRA proposes to eliminate
the 1,000-mile inspection for these trains and proposes to require that
the proposed Class I brake test be performed once every calendar day
that the equipment is used or every 1,500 miles, which every occurs
first.

D. The Brake Inspection and Testing Intervals for Long-distance
Intercity Passenger Trains Apply to All Tier II Equipment Regardless of
Whether the Equipment is Used in Short- or Long-distance Intercity
Trains

FRA also proposes to apply the brake inspection and testing
intervals proposed for long-distance passenger trains to all Tier II
equipment (i.e., equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but
not exceeding 150 mph) regardless of whether it is used in short- or
long-distance intercity trains. As FRA proposes to permit operators of
Tier II equipment to develop inspection and testing criteria and
procedures, these operations will be required to develop a brake test
that is equivalent to a Class I brake test for Tier II equipment. Due
to the speeds at which this equipment will be allowed to operate, FRA
believes it is a necessity that an equivalent Class I brake test be
performed on Tier II equipment before it departs from its initial
terminal. Likewise, FRA proposes to require that the equivalent Class I
brake test be performed every calendar day in which the equipment is
used or every 1,500 miles, whichever comes first.

E. Class II Brake Test Required Where Minor Changes to a Train Consist
Occur

In addition to the proposed Class I and Class IA brake tests, FRA
also proposes a Class II brake test. The proposed Class II brake test
is an inspection intended to verify the continuity of the train brake
system and is similar to the intermediate terminal inspection currently
prescribed at Sec. 232.13(a). A Class II brake test would basically
require a set and release of the brakes on the rear car. The proposed
Class II test would be required in those circumstances where minor
changes to a train consist occur. These include the change of a control
stand, the removal of cars from the consist, the addition of previously
tested cars, and the situations in which an operator first takes
control of the train.

[[Page 49740]]

F. Running Brake Tests

FRA also proposes to require a running brake test as soon as
conditions safely permit it to be conducted after a train receives a
Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test. FRA believes that this test
should be conducted in accordance with each railroad's operating rules.
The ``running brake test'' requirement is similar to the ``running
test'' requirements currently contained at Sec. 232.16.

Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes

The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:

(a) GENERAL.--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this
chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless
may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being
imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which
the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest
available place at which the repairs can be made--
(1) On the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) At the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).
Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order.
As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes makeup no more than
15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,
the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the
option of the receiving carrier, to a repair point that is no further
than the repoint on the delivering line.
The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective
or insecure brakes noted above can and do create safety hazards as well
as operational difficulties in the area of commuter and intercity
passenger railroad operations. As the provisions regarding the movement
of defective brake equipment were written almost a century ago, they do
not address the realities of these types of operations in today's
world. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of
causing major disruptions of service which result in the creation of
serious safety and security problems. For example, requiring repairs to
be made at the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made
could result in passengers being discharged between stations where
adequate facilities for their safety are not available or in the
overcrowding of station platforms and trailing trains due to
discharging passengers from a defective train at a location other than
the passenger's destination. In addition, strict application of the
statutory requirements could result in the moving of trains with
defective brake equipment against the current of traffic during busy
commuting hours. Irregular movements of this type increase the risk of
collisions on the railroad. Furthermore, many of today's commuter train
operations often utilize six cars or less in trains and in many
instances operate just two-car trains. Consequently, the necessity to
cut out the brakes on one car can easily result in noncompliance with
the 85-percent requirement for hauling the car for repairs, thus
prohibiting the train's movement and resulting in the same type of
safety problems noted above.
FRA has attempted to recognize the nature of commuter and intercity
passenger operations and the importance of addressing the safety of
passengers, as well as avoiding disruption of this service, when
applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with
defective brakes on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the
representatives of commuter and intercity passenger train operations
participating in this proceeding have requested that the regulations be
brought up to date, recognizing that brakes will have to be cut out en
route from time to time (e.g., because of damage from debris placed on
the track structure or because of sticking brakes) and that
contemporary braking systems and established stopping distances provide
a very considerable margin of safety. Furthermore, speed restrictions
can readily be used to compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority
of cars. FRA believes that affirmatively recognizing appropriate
movement restrictions would actually enhance safety, since compliance
with the existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.
Representatives from APTA proposed a method of updating the current
requirements regarding the movement of commuter passenger equipment
with defective brakes to bring them more in line with the realities of
today's operations. The Working Group discussed the proposal at length,
making various revisions. Although the Working Group did not reach
consensus on the issue, FRA believes that the proposed requirements are
within the scope of options discussed by the group. FRA believes that
the proposed restrictions are very conservative and effectively ensure
a high level of safety in light of the reliability of braking systems
currently used in commuter and intercity passenger train operations.
FRA recognizes that some of the proposed restrictions are not in
accord with the requirement contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) that cars
with defective or insecure brakes be moved to the ``nearest'' location
where the necessary repairs can be made. However, FRA does have
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled ``Exemption for technological
improvements,'' to establish the proposed restrictions. Section 20306
provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may exempt from the
requirements of this chapter railroad equipment or equipment that
will be operated on rails, when those requirements preclude the
development or implementation of more efficient railroad
transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under
existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as a part of the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act to authorize the use of
RoadRailer trailers as freight cars. See Pub. L. 96-

[[Page 49741]]

254 (May 30, 1980). Although it could be argued that the purpose of the
provision is too narrow to comprehend the instant application, FRA
believes that the use of the provision as contemplated in this proposal
is consistent with the authority granted the Secretary of
Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the statutory
requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective brake
equipment were written nearly a century ago and, in FRA's opinion, were
focused generally on the operation of freight equipment and did not
contemplate the types of commuter and intercity passenger train
operations currently prevalent throughout the nation. Since the
original enactment in 1910 of the provisions now codified at 49 U.S.C.
20303(a), there have been substantial changes both in the nature of the
operations of passenger trains as well as in the technology used in
those operations.
Contemporary passenger equipment incorporates various types of
advanced braking systems; in some cases these include electrical
activation of brakes on each car (with pneumatic application through
the train line available as a backup). Dynamic brakes are also
typically employed to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces and
to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the
brake valves and brake components used today are far more reliable than
was the case several decades ago. In addition to these technological
advances, the brake equipment used in commuter and intercity passenger
train operations incorporate advanced technologies not found with any
regularity in freight operations. These include:
The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the
brakes.
The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.
The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the
brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits
more flexibility and more forgiving train control.
The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those
brakes that are operable.
The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car
which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system,
thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a
total loss of air in the brake system.
The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main
reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the
brake pipe train line.
Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake
ratios of loaded freight cars.
Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for
several decades, most of the technologies were not in wide spread use
until after 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances
just started to be integrated into one efficient and reliable braking
system within the last decade. In addition to the technological
advances, commuter and intercity passenger train operations have
experienced considerable growth in the last 15 years necessitating the
need to provide more reliable and efficient service to the riding
public. Since 1980, the number of commuter operations providing rail
service has almost doubled and the number of daily passengers serviced
by passenger operations has more than doubled over the same time
period. Furthermore, commuter and intercity passenger train operations
conduct more frequent single car tests, COT&S, and maintenance of the
braking systems than is generally the practice in the freight industry.
Consequently, the technology incorporated into the brake equipment used
in today's commuter and intercity passenger train operations has
increased the reliability of the braking system and permits the safe
operation of the equipment for extended distances even though a portion
of the braking system may be inoperative or defective.
In the face of these technological advances, FRA believes it is
appropriate to utilize the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. 20306 and
exempt commuter and intercity passenger train operations from the
specific restriction contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the
movement of equipment with defective or insecure brakes to the nearest
location where the necessary repairs could be made and proposes various
restrictions on the movement of this type of equipment which FRA
believes are more conducive to safe operations.
In utilizing the authority granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the
Secretary is required to make ``findings based on evidence developed at
a hearing,'' unless there is ``an agreement between national railroad
labor representatives and the developer of the new equipment or
technology.'' FRA is confident that, after notice and opportunity for
public comment, oral and written, the record will support a finding
that the proposed provisions are ``in the public interest and
consistent with railroad safety,'' the basic test for waiving safety
requirements issued under other, general provisions of the code. See 49
U.S.C. 20103(d). It should be noted that the exemption granted to these
operations does not include an exemption from 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), which
contains the liability provisions attendant with the movement equipment
with defective or insecure safety appliances, including power brakes.
Consequently, the liability provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(c)
will be applicable to a railroad when hauling equipment with defective
or insecure power brakes pursuant to the requirements proposed by FRA
in this notice.
FRA also proposes to exempt commuter and intercity passenger train
operations from its longstanding interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 CFR 232.1 noted above, prohibiting the movement
of a train if more than 15 percent of the cars in the train have
defective, insecure, or inoperative brakes. As discussed previously,
such a limitation is overly burdensome and has the potential of
creating safety hazards due to the short length of the trains commonly
operated in commuter and intercity passenger service.
Based on the preceding discussions, FRA proposes various
restrictions on the movement of vehicles with defective brake equipment
which allow commuter and intercity passenger train operations to take
advantage of the efficiencies created due to the advanced braking
systems these operations employ as well as the improvements made in
brake equipment over the years, while ensuring if not enhancing the
safety of the traveling public. FRA proposes to permit trains to be
operated with up to 50 percent inoperative brakes to the next forward
passenger station or terminal based on the percentage of operative
brakes, which may result in movements past locations where the
necessary repairs could be made. However, to ensure the safety of these
trains with lower percentages of operative brakes, FRA also proposes
various speed restrictions and other operating restrictions, based on
the percentage of operative brakes. FRA believes that the proposed
speed restrictions are very conservative and ensure a high level of
safety. In fact, test data establish that with the proposed speed
restrictions the stopping distances of those trains with lower
percentages of operative brakes are shorter than if the trains were
operating at normal speed and had 100 percent operative brakes.
Consequently, FRA believes that the proposed approach to the movement
of

[[Page 49742]]

equipment with defective brakes not only enhances the overall safety of
train operations but benefits both the railroads, by providing
operational flexibility, and the traveling public, by permitting them
to get to their destinations in a more expedient and safe fashion. (The
proposed restrictions on the movement of equipment with defective
brakes are discussed in detail in the section-by-section analysis
below.)
Although FRA proposes to exempt all commuter and passenger
operations from the specific statutory requirement contained in 49
U.S.C. 20303(a), it should be noted that in reality the exemption being
proposed is fairly limited. In FRA's view, many of the proposed methods
for moving defective equipment are consistent, if not in accordance,
with the current statutory requirement. For example, FRA proposes to
permit a passenger train with 50-75 percent operative brakes to be
moved at reduced speed to the next forward passenger station. Although
the percentage of operative brakes is lower than currently permitted by
FRA's longstanding agency interpretation (which FRA believes is fully
compensated for by the proposed speed restrictions), FRA believes that
the movement of the defective equipment to the next passenger station
is in accordance with the statutory requirement as the safety of the
passengers must be considered in determining the nearest location where
necessary repairs can be made. In addition, permitting passenger trains
to continue to the next forward location where the necessary repairs
can be performed is also consistent with the statutory requirement as
such movement is necessary to ensure the safety of the traveling public
by protecting them from the hazards incident to performing movements
against the current of traffic. Furthermore, the proposed movement
provisions related to long-distance intercity passenger trains and
long-distance Tier II equipment are consistent with the current
statutory requirements as the proposal permits the movement of
defective brake equipment on these trains only to the next passenger
station or the next repair location, with various speed restrictions
depending on the percentage of operative brakes. Due to the unique
technologies used on the brake systems of these operations and the
unique operating environments, the facilities and personnel necessary
to conduct proper repairs on this equipment are somewhat specialized
and limited. Thus, FRA proposes to require the operators of these
trains to designate the locations where repairs will be made to the
equipment.
Some of the members of the Working Group, particularly those
representing labor organizations, expressed concern that any alteration
of the movement for repair provisions made in the context of commuter
and intercity passenger train operations may have a spillover effect
into the freight industry. FRA wishes to make clear that it has no
intention, at this time, of exempting freight operations from the
requirements relating to the movement of defective equipment contained
in 49 U.S.C. 20303. As noted above, many of the advanced brake system
technologies currently used in passenger service are not used in the
freight context. Furthermore, even if freight operations were to make
similar advances in the braking equipment they employ, this development
on the freight side may not create the efficiencies created in the
passenger train context since the operating environments of freight
trains and passenger trains differ significantly. Finally, the special
safety considerations relative to passengers are not present in freight
operations.

Structural Standards

To help ensure the survivability of a passenger train accident, FRA
is proposing comprehensive, minimum safety standards for the structural
design of rail passenger equipment. Under current regulations, MU
locomotives must comply with minimum structural design requirements,
see 49 CFR 229.141; however, no comparable set of Federal structural
design requirements apply to other forms of passenger equipment.
Moreover, FRA believes that existing structural design requirements for
MU locomotives should be revised, particularly those concerning MU
locomotives operating in trains having a total empty weight of less
than 600,000 pounds, see Sec. 229.141(b), because train operation has
significantly changed since these requirements were first promulgated.
The requirements contained in the proposed rule for the structural
design of Tier I and Tier II equipment are specified below in the
section-by-section analysis. These requirements include safety
standards for the following:
Anti-climbers--to prevent vehicles in a passenger train
from overriding or telescoping into one another;
Collision posts--to protect against the crushing of a
passenger vehicle's occupied areas in the event of a collision or
derailment;
Corner posts--to protect passenger vehicles in corner-to-
corner collisions and impacts with objects intruding upon the clearance
envelope;
Rollover strength--to prevent significant deformation of
the normally occupied spaces of a vehicle in the event it rolls onto
its side or roof;
Side impact strength--to resist penetration of a passenger
vehicle's side structure from a side collision with an object such as a
highway vehicle or a freight car; and
Truck to car body attachment--to prevent separation of
trucks from car bodies during collisions or derailments.

Corner Posts

Requirements concerning corner posts on rail passenger equipment
have been the subject of an NTSB safety recommendation. Following the
January 18, 1993, NICTD corner-to-corner train collision in Gary,
Indiana, the NTSB expressed concern about the adequacy of the corner
post structure in self-propelled passenger cars (MU locomotives) that
allows significant inward car body intrusion and subsequent serious
injuries and fatalities in a corner-to-corner collision. The NTSB noted
that, while MU locomotives must comply with Federal structural design
requirements which include providing for the protection of vulnerable
areas of the car body in a head-on collision, Federal regulations do
not address structural requirements for corner posts which protect the
car body in a corner-to-corner collision. Based on its investigation,
the NTSB recommended that FRA:

In cooperation with the Federal Transit Administration and the
American Public Transit Association, study the feasibility of
providing car body corner post structures on all self-propelled
passenger cars and control cab locomotives to afford occupant
protection during corner collisions. If feasible, amend the
locomotive safety standards accordingly. (Class II, Priority Action)
(R-93-24)

The Working Group has recommended that minimum corner post
structural design requirements be proposed for both locomotives and
rail cars designed to carry passengers, regardless whether the rail
cars are self-propelled or have control compartments. FRA is proposing
such a requirement in this rule and thereby extending the scope of the
NTSB's safety recommendation, which is expressly limited to self-
propelled rail cars. This action recognizes passenger exposure in
accidents such as the one in Lugoff, South Carolina, on July 31, 1991.
There, eight passengers were killed following incursion of a freight
car into

[[Page 49743]]

the side of two Amtrak coaches beginning at the corner of each car.
For cab cars, material improvements in actual end structure design
with respect to corner posts must await completion of further research.
Research completed to date indicates that improvements in strength
alone will not prevent casualties in accidents at higher closing speeds
such as those in the Silver Spring, Maryland, and Secaucus, New Jersey,
accidents.

Fuel Tank Standards

Locomotive fuel tanks are vulnerable to damage from collisions,
derailments, and debris on the roadbed due to their location on the
underframe and between the trucks of locomotives. Damage to the tank
frequently results in spilled fuel, creating the safety problem of an
increased risk of fire and the environmental problem of cleanup and
restoration of the spill site. Although 49 CFR 229.71 does require a
minimum clearance of 2.5 inches between the top of the rail and the
lowest point on a part or appliance of a locomotive, which includes
fuel tanks, FRA regulations do not address the safety of fuel tanks in
particular.
In 1992, the NTSB issued a report identifying concerns regarding
safety problems caused by diesel fuel spills from ruptured or punctured
locomotive fuel tanks. Entitled ``Locomotive Fuel Tank Integrity Safety
Study,'' the NTSB report cited in particular a collision involving an
Amtrak train and an MBTA commuter train on December 12, 1990, as both
trains were entering a station in Boston, Massachusetts. (NTSB Safety
Study-92/04.) Fuel spilled from a tank which had separated from an
Amtrak locomotive during the collision. The fuel ignited. Smoke and
fumes from the burning diesel fuel filled the tunnel, increasing the
hazard level in the post-crash phase of the accident, and hindering
emergency response activity. As a result of the safety study, the NTSB
made several safety recommendations to FRA, including in particular
that FRA:

Conduct, in conjunction with the Association of American
Railroads, General Electric, and the Electro-Motive Division of
General Motors, research to determine if the locomotive fuel tank
can be improved to withstand forces encountered in the more severe
locomotive derailment accidents or if fuel containment can be
improved to reduce the rate of fuel leakage and fuel ignition.
Consideration should be given to crash or simulated testing and
evaluation of recent and proposed design modifications to the
locomotive fuel tank, including increasing the structural strength
of end and side wall plates, raising the tank higher above the rail,
and using internal tank bladders and foam inserts. (Class II,
Priority Action) (R-92-10)
Establish, if warranted, minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks based on the research called for in
recommendation R-92-10. (Class III, Longer Term Action) (R-92-11)

The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation R-92-10 in a letter to FRA
dated August 28, 1997, conveying the NTSB's final safety
recommendations arising from the February 16, 1996, collision between a
MARC commuter train and an Amtrak passenger train. During the
collision, the fuel tank on the lead Amtrak locomotive ruptured
catastrophically. The fuel sprayed into the exposed interior of the
MARC cab control car and ignited, engulfing the car. (Letter at 12.)
As explained in FRA's report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions, FRA believes that fuel tank
design has a direct impact on safety. Minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks should be included in Federal safety regulations.
Accordingly, FRA is proposing that AAR Recommended Practice RP-506 be
incorporated into Sec. 238.223 of the proposed rule for external fuel
tanks on Tier I passenger locomotives. FRA believes that RP-506
represents a good interim safety standard for Tier I passenger
locomotives. Further, FRA is proposing more demanding fuel tank safety
standards for Tier II passenger equipment in Sec. 238.423 of the
proposed rule. Additionally, it is anticipated that RSAC will address
the safety of locomotive fuel tanks used on freight equipment, thereby
furthering the safety of rail passenger trains which operate commingled
with freight trains.
FRA invites comments whether the proposed rule should also require
that locomotive fuel tanks be compartmentalized. The Working Group
specifically discussed requiring whether the interior of fuel tanks be
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments so that a
penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment results in loss
of fuel only from that compartment. The Working Group recommended that
such a requirement be addressed in the second phase of the rulemaking,
to allow for additional research to remedy fuel feeding disruptions
that may result from the compartmentalization of fuel tanks. Commenters
are therefore requested to provide the results of specific research and
operating experience showing how compartmentalization can be
practically accomplished. Commenters are also asked to explain why the
issue of compartmentalization should or should not be addressed in the
final rule of this first phase of the rulemaking.

Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels

On January 13, 1994, a Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus
(Ringling Bros.) train operating on CSXT trackage derailed while
passing through Lakeland, Florida. Two circus employees were killed,
and 15 received minor injuries. The NTSB determined that the probable
cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of a thermally damaged
straight-plate wheel due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a stress
raiser associated with a stamped character on the wheel rim. (NTSB/RAR-
95/01.)
Noting that tread braking is a significant source of wheel
overheating and thermal damage; straight-plate wheels are vulnerable to
thermal damage; and rim stamping provides a stress concentration for
crack initiation, the NTSB recommends as a result of its investigation
that FRA ``[p]rohibit the replacement of wheels on any tread-braked
passenger railroad car with rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.'' (Class
II, Priority Action) (R-95-1).
FRA agrees that rim stamping of straight-plate wheels can lead to
wheel failure when subjected to heat from tread braking. Rim-stamping
was banned by the AAR in 1978, and FRA does not believe that rim-
stamped straight-plate wheels are in use on Amtrak or the nation's
commuter railroads. Nevertheless, in the event such wheels are in fact
in use, FRA proposes to prohibit the use of rim-stamped straight-plate
wheels on all equipment, whether tread-braked or not, used in intercity
passenger or commuter service as of January 1, 1998. In a letter to the
NTSB dated February 21, 1995, Ringling Bros. itself announced that it
has removed all rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on tread-braked
passenger cars from its circus trains. (Appendix D, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)
At this time, FRA is not proposing to prohibit the use of rim-
stamped straight-plate wheels on private passenger cars hauled in
intercity passenger or commuter trains. Private passenger cars are
generally not highly utilized in comparison to intercity passenger or
commuter equipment. According to a comment received from the AAPRCO,
the average private car, qualified to operate on Amtrak, probably
operates less than 4,000 miles per year, and a few may exceed 50,000
miles per year. Further, in a letter to the NTSB dated December 2,
1994, Amtrak stated that it only operates private cars that are
registered with Amtrak and are subject to a regular inspection by
Amtrak-approved inspectors. Amtrak observed that it ``has not
experienced any

[[Page 49744]]

problems on the private cars that operate on Amtrak trains with wheels
that are rim-stamped.'' (Appendix E, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)
However, FRA is requiring that rim-stamped straight-plate wheels
not be used as a replacement wheelset on a private car. As part of this
rulemaking, FRA may further address the use of rim-stamped straight-
plate wheels on private cars hauled in intercity passenger or commuter
trains.

Fire Safety

In 1984, FRA published guidelines recommending testing methods and
performance criteria for the flammability, smoke emission, and fire
endurance characteristics for categories and functions of materials to
be used in the construction of new or rebuilt rail passenger equipment.
See 49 FR 33076, Aug. 20, 1984; 49 FR 44582, Nov. 7, 1984. The
guidelines mirrored fire safety guidelines developed by the Urban Mass
Transit Administration (UMTA) of DOT (now the Federal Transit
Administration).
The intent of the guidelines is to prevent fire ignition and to
maximize the time available for passenger evacuation if fire does
occur. FRA later reissued the guidelines in 1989 to update the
recommended testing methods. See 54 FR 1837, Jan. 17, 1989. Testing
methods cited in the cur

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A97-24713. Public record. Not legal advice.