# Airport Security > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A97-19698 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Proposed Rule - **Published:** August 1, 1997 - **Citation:** 62 FR 41760 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Parts 107 and 139 [Docket No. 28979; Notice No. 97-13] RIN 2120-AD-46 Airport Security AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This notice proposes to amend the existing airport security rules. It would revise certain applicability provisions, definitions, and terms; reorganize these rules into subparts containing related requirements; and incorporate some requirements already implemented in airport security programs. This proposed revision also would incorporate certain new measures that would provide for better security. Specifically, this proposal would more clearly define the areas of the airport in which security interests are the most critical and where security measures should be the most stringent. It would modify access control requirements by allowing secondary access media, modify escort procedures for individuals without access authority, and expand the requirement for an identification system to include a challenge system. Further, it would clarify the following: training requirements for airport security personnel; the role of the airport security coordinator; procedures for airport operators to comply with Federal Aviation Administration security directives; procedures for responding to and evaluating threats; and the need to review and test security contingency plans. The intent of this proposal is to enhance security for the traveling public, air carriers, and persons employed by or conducting business at public airports by increasing awareness of and compliance with civil aviation security measures. DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before December 1, 1997. ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or delivered, in triplicate, to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-10), Room 915-G, Docket No. 28979, 800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591. Comments may also be sent electronically to the following internet address: [email protected]. Comments may be examined in Room 915- G between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, Civil Aviation Security Division (ACP-100), Penny Anderson, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3418. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this document are also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and should be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket (see ADDRESSES). All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. All comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable. The proposals contained in this document may be changed in light of comments received. Comments received on this proposal will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Dockets for examination by interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security has determined that the airport security programs required by part 107 contain sensitive security information. As such, the availability of information pertaining to airport security programs is governed by 14 CFR Part 191 (Withholding Security Information from Disclosure under the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974). Comments wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comment must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. 28979.'' The postcard will be date-stamped and mailed to the commenter. Availability of NPRM Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677. Communications must identify the notice number of this NPRM. An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321- 3339) or the Office of the Federal Register's electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 202-512-1661). Internet users may reach the FAA's webpage at http://www.faa.gov or the Office of the Federal Register's webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su__docs for access to recently published rulemaking documents. Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes the application procedure. Background This proposed rule was written before the tragic crash of TWA 800 on July 17, 1996. That accident raised concerns about the safety and security of civil aviation, leading the President to create the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, headed by the Vice President. The Commission issued an initial report on September 9, 1996, with 20 specific recommendations for improving security. On February 12, 1997, the Commission issued its Final Report with 57 recommendations, 31 of which deal with improving security for travelers. In addition, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-264) was signed on October 9, 1996, and directs the FAA to amend rules to upgrade civil aviation security. The FAA is working to respond to the recommendations of the Commission and to carry out the legislation, and has issued several proposals. On March 11, 1997, an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the certification of screening companies was issued (62 FR 12724, March 17, 1997), and on March 14, 1997, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on employment history; verification and criminal records checks (62 FR 13262, March 19, 1997). The rules proposed in this notice were not written in response to the Commission or the Reauthorization Act. [[Page 41761]] However, this notice, which proposes to update the overall regulatory structure for airport and air carrier security, is the result of a multi-year effort involving the FAA, airports and air carriers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. The extensive proposed revisions are considered to be consistent with the intentions of the mandates, contain proposals that industry has identified as necessary or appropriate, and outline a new organization for the regulations that would assist in developing future changes to the rules. For these reasons, the FAA is publishing this proposed rule for comment. The FAA anticipates that any final rule based on this proposal will incorporate responses to these mandates. Terrorist Incidents In response to a rise of hijacking incidents, and to ensure the security of airports serving scheduled air carriers, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 107 on March 18, 1972. The rule required each airport operator to implement prescribed security measures by developing and observing an airport-specific security program. Part 107 has been amended on several occasions, but the rule has never undergone a comprehensive update. Since the inception of part 107, the primary threat to civil aviation has expanded beyond hijacking to bombing of aircraft and murderous attacks within airports. The following incidents are indicative of this evolution. December 27, 1985: Simultaneous attacks at two European airports against the general public in open terminal areas. At least 13 people were killed and approximately 80 wounded at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci International Airport; 4 persons were killed and approximately 45 wounded at Vienna's Schwechat International Airport. September 5, 1986: Terrorist assault on Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 73. Four terrorists assaulted Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited to take off. The four terrorists were dressed similarly to airport security personnel and drove a van resembling an airport security vehicle alongside the aircraft. The terrorists stormed the aircraft and after 17 hours or negotiations, the aircraft's auxiliary power unit failed. Anticipating an attack by security forces, the terrorists opened fire on the massed passengers, killing 22 persons and injuring 125 others before security forces could intervene. September 14, 1986: The bombing of an international terminal building. A device detonated in a trash can located in front of the international terminal building of the Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, South Korea. Five persons were killed and 29 were injured. November 11, 1987: Explosives detonated in a passenger terminal. Explosives in baggage detonated, possibly prematurely, in the passenger terminal of the Beirut International Airport, Beirut, Lebanon. Six persons were killed and 73 were injured. No person(s) claimed responsibility; however, the person carrying the bag was killed. December 21, 1988: The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. All 243 passengers and 16 crew on board, plus 11 persons on the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland, were killed. Subsequent inspection of the reconstructed aircraft determined that a device consisting of plastic explosives inside a tape cassette player was responsible for the destruction of Flight 103. The device had been concealed in checked luggage. Individuals working for the Government of Libya are responsible for the bombing. One conspirator was the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Malta and retained full access to the airport. Using this access privilege and other knowledge gained as representatives of LAA, the conspirators bypassed security checks at Valletta's Luqa Airport and inserted the suitcase containing the bomb into baggage of an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt. August 26, 1992: Explosive device placed in an international terminal. A 20-pound explosive device was placed in the international terminal in the Houari Boumedienne International Airport, Algiers, Algeria. Twelve persons were killed and 126 were injured. Members of the Islamic Salvation Front were arrested. Their intent was to disrupt foreign involvement in Algeria. November 3, 1994: Armed individuals seized the airport. Armed militant Muslim activist seized the Saidu Sharif Airport in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and barricaded the runway. Pakistani paramilitary forces attacked several days later. Five persons were killed and at least 17 were injured. December 24, 1994: Hijacking and possible intention to destroy Air France flight 8969. While on the ground at Houari Boumedienne International Airport, Algeria, Air France Flight 8969 was commandeered by four terrorists armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and explosives. The four gunmen wore what appeared to be Air Algerie uniforms and displayed airport identification. The hijackers killed three people. French counterterrorism forces stormed the aircraft at Marignane Airport in Marseille, France; all four hijackers were killed. Explosive were found on the aircraft, leading to speculation that the hijackers intended to blow up the aircraft over Paris. July 22, 1996: A bomb detonated in a public area of a terminal building. Six persons were killed and an estimated 60 others were injured when a bomb exploded in the concourse outside of the departure/arrival lounges at the Lahore International Airport, Lahore, Pakistan. The device, containing approximately 3 kilograms of explosives, reportedly had been left in a briefcase and placed beneath a bench near the domestic lounge. The explosion occurred moments before the departure of PIA flight 715 for Karachi. There were no immediate claims for the bombing. Fifty-nine attacks have been recorded at airports throughout the world during the past 5 years. These attacks have included 24 bombings; 15 attempted bombings; and 20 shootings, shellings (such as mortar attacks), arsons, and similar incidents. At least 41 persons have been killed and more than 250 injured in attacks at airports between 1992 and 1996.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1996, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Civil Aviation Security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Terrorism has been, for the most part, a phenomenon afflicting U.S. interests overseas, and the threat to U.S. civil aviation is assessed to be higher abroad than it is domestically. The World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, however, indicates that terrorism is also a very real threat in the United States, and may be on the rise. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has been convicted for the bombing of Philippines Airline flight 434 (December 11, 1994) and for conspiring to bomb U.S.-flag aircraft. Authorities believe that Yousef and his co- conspirators acted on their own volition, in opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and that they were assisted by local radical sympathizers in the Philippines and the United States. The conspiracies are indicative of an emerging trend in terrorism, characterized by terrorist elements operating without traditional organizational structure or state sponsorship. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes such terrorists as seeking a ``common political, social, economic, or personal objective which transcends nation-state boundaries.'' The U.S. Department of State, commenting on global terrorism trends [[Page 41762]] notes that ``terrorism by extremist individuals or groups claiming to act for religious motives'' continue to dominate international terrorism.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ For further analysis of the terrorist threat, please refer to the following public documents: Terrorism in the United States: 1994, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, U.S. Department of State, April 1996. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The number of international terrorist attacks against U.S. interests fell between 1995 and 1996, although incidents involving American targets still represented more than 24%of the total attacks worldwide in 1996. Domestically, the FBI asserts that the U.S. is not immune to international terrorism, describing the terrorist threat as ``real and potentially lethal.'' The FAA views these developments as cause for concern.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, U.S. Department of State, April 1997. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, individual acts of revenge or criminality must be considered since the consequences of such acts can be just as deadly. Following are three examples: December 7, 1987: Destruction of Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight 1771. Flight 1771 crashed when a recently terminated airline employee boarded the Los Angeles San Francisco flight with a handgun, shot one passenger (his former supervisor), the flightcrew, flight attendant, and presumably himself. As a result, all 38 passengers and five crew on board were killed. The fired employee retained his airline identification after his dismissal and used to bypass the passenger screening checkpoint. August 14, 1990: Gunman gained unauthorized access at Washington National Airport. A man armed with a .38 caliber revolver entered the Ogden Allied Services garage at Washington, DC's National Airport, and held several employees at gunpoint. He was a former employee at Ogden and had voluntarily left his job. He commandeered a fuel truck, forced an Ogden employee to drive onto the air operations area and fired several shots at a second Ogden fuel truck, wounding two persons. He was in possession of 30 to 40 rounds of ammunition when he was arrested. A molotov cocktail was recovered from the commandeered fuel truck, and several others were found in the gunman's vehicle. May 7, 1995: Gunman exchanged fire with police at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. A man armed with a 7.62 mm Norinco SK5 assault rifle attempted to enter a secured area through a door in the baggage claim area. Unable to gain access, the gunman fired several rounds, shattering panes of plate glass, and then proceeded through the terminal firing his weapon. The gunman then exited the terminal to a public driveway, changed fire with responding police officers and was shot three times before being apprehended. Three persons were injured by flying debris, but non seriously. The weapon used appeared to have been altered to fire automatically and the gunman was in possess of 90 rounds of ammunition. The gunman never gained access to the sterile or secured areas of the airport. October 13, 1995: A low-level explosive device destroyed an automated facility serving La Guardia International Airport. The facility, a Low Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS), is locate din a remote area near Flushing Airport, formerly a general aviation field. The LLWAS is housed in a metal box on a utility pole and is surrounded by a perimeter fence that was cut to gain entry. Even through the LLWAS was not fully functional for several days, air traffic to La Guardia was not jeopardized. An arrest was made in this matter. Despite an anti-government leaflet found at the scene, no connection was found between the person arrested and right-wing terrorist organizations. Response to Terrorist Incidents The incidents discussed above have led to concerted efforts to strengthen aviation security around the world and particularly security at U.S. airports. The FAA responded by issuing emergency amendments to airport security programs, using part 107 authority. The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 resulted in numerous changes to civil aviation security. The Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was critical of the domestic U.S. civil aviation security system for failing to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public and urged major reforms. Specifically, the commission recommended that the ``FAA initiate immediately the planning and analysis necessary to phase additional security measures into the domestic system over time.\4\ The Commission's report prompted the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-604), enacted November 16, 1990. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, Report to the President, May 15, 1990. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The new law mandated many changes to airport and air carrier security programs, as well as Federal staffing and reporting procedures. Several rulemakings were initiated to impose hiring standards for air crew and security personnel, and training standards and criminal history checks for certain airport and air carrier personnel. The act also required the FAA to coordinate with the FBI to assess the domestic air transport system, develop security guidelines for airport design and construction, and expand the security technology research and development program. The proposed revisions to part 107 also respond to two other Federal reports. In September 1993, the Office of the Inspector General (IG) of the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a report critical of certain aspects of the FAA's oversight of airport security systems.\5\ In January 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report suggesting further actions the FAA could take to improve civil aviation security.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ DOT Office of Inspector General, Audit of Airport Security, Federal Aviation Administration, Report No. RP-FA-3-105, September 20, 1993. \6\ United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Changes, January 1994. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The IG report found significant deficiencies in the effectiveness of access control and challenge procedures at five U.S. airports. The report recommended that airport and air carrier implementation of procedures for access control and challenge be strengthened, stressing that the FAA must take steps to increase airport and air carrier employees' awareness and responsibility for those procedures. In January of 1994, the FAA responded to the report by meeting with representatives of airports, air carriers and other airport tenants, and employee groups/unions to discuss the IG's findings and to emphasize the need for improved employee security awareness. Simultaneously, the FAA began focused inspections at U.S. airports with the highest volume and most complex security operations. Slated to continue on a routine basis, these special inspections targeted the security measures that the IG found to be a universal weakness--access control and challenge procedures. The response has been an industry-wide commitment to address the identified weaknesses and improve compliance. In particular, many airports and air carriers have improved their training programs and instituted programs to provide individual incentives for compliance and escalating disciplinary action for instances of non-compliance. Compliance at airports which have [[Page 41763]] instituted such programs has improved markedly. The FAA proposes to implement similar measures at other part 107 airports by clarifying and modifying access control, identification display, and challenge requirements. Separately, the GAO issued a report entitled ``Aviation Security-- Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges,'' in response to a Congressional inquiry on FAA's efforts to implement the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. GAO found that the FAA has taken important steps in response to the act and cited additional actions that should be taken to enhance the FAA's security programs and initiatives. These actions include--(1) pilot-testing new procedures before implementation, (2) strengthening human factors research and its application, (3) making systematic analytical use of information that the FAA collects during air carrier and airport security inspections, and (4) providing airport security coordinators with security clearances, so that they can be given classified information regarding threats to civil aviation. Similar to the IG report, the GAO report highlighted the need for the FAA to increase industry employees' overall awareness of security measures. The report concluded that the FA must refine security training and procedures to increase personnel sensitivity to security requirements. The FAA agrees that complacency must be combated, and as previously noted, considers improved employee training and increased accountability to be an essential part of the solution. Specific responses to issues raised in the IG and GAO reports are discussed below in the ``Section by Section Analysis.'' The Role of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee The Department of Transportation and the FAA are convinced that the aviation industry and general public should have input into the development of future aviation security measures and issues. On April 3, 1989, the Secretary of Transportation announced the formation of a national aviation security advisory committee under the provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Title 5 U.S. Code, Appendix II). The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was formed to examine all areas of civil aviation security and to ensure a higher degree of safety for the traveling public by recommending improvement of aviation security equipment and procedures. The ASAC is chaired by the FAA's Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and makes recommendations to the FAA Administrator. Committee membership represents a balance of Federal government, aviation industry, and consumer advocacy groups, including: 1. Air Courier Conference of America 2. Air Line Pilots Association International 3. Air Transport Association of America 4. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 5. Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network 6. Airports Council International, Inc. 7. Allied Pilots Association 8. American Association of Airport Executives 9. Association of Flight Attendants 10. Aviation Consumer Action Project 11. Aviation Security Contractors Association 12. Cargo Airline Association 13. Families of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie 14. International Airline Passengers Association 15. National Air Carrier Association, Inc. 16. National Air Transportation Association 17. Regional Airline Association 18. U.S. Department of Defense (Policy Board on Federal Aviation) 19. U.S. Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 20. U.S. Department of State 21. U.S. Department of Transportation (Office of Intelligence and Security and Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center) 22. U.S. Department of the Treasury (Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Secret Service) 23. U.S. Postal Service 24. Victims of PanAm Flight 103 All ASAC meetings are open to the public and are announced in the Federal Register. Meetings are typically held three times a year. Members of the public are permitted to attend and appear before the committee, subject to reasonable limitations of space and time. The FAA invited the ASAC to comment on the underlying issues and potential solutions associated with the revision of parts 107 and 108. In December 1993, the FAA sought the ASAC's input on a ``discussion paper'' that presented a broad scope of security issues and concerns. A copy of this paper is filed in the FAA public docket for this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). To address the issues raised in the discussion paper, the ASAC formed two subcommittees to develop recommendations on airport and air carrier security issues, respectively, and provided the FAA formal recommendations on March 15, 1994. Individual ASAC members also provided comments on issues when their respective organizations differed from the position taken by the committee. The views of the ASAC and of individual committee members were then forwarded to the FAA with an overall recommendation that security regulations should remain flexible and contain only general security performance standards. Specific recommendations are addressed individually in the ``Section- by-Section Analysis.'' Discussion of the Proposed Rule This proposed revision of part 107 would comprehensively update airport security regulations to more efficiently and effectively address terrorist and other criminal threats to civil aviation. This proposed action would incorporate both procedures currently in airport security programs and new security procedures, in a manner that is intended to allow regulated entities and individuals to understand their responsibilities more readily. When a final rule has been adopted, the FAA will update relevant advisory circulars and prepare a standard airport security program that will contain specific security measures that are considered sensitive under part 191 and therefore cannot be included in the proposed revision. Lastly, the proposed revision would incorporate certain new measures that would provide for better security. For example, the proposed revisions make individuals directly accountable to the FAA for violating certain regulations and would require airports to include in their security programs specific disciplinary action and penalties to be taken with employees or tenants that do not comply with security requirements. Through these changes, the FAA hopes to create a more effective mixture of individual and corporate responsibility for complying with security regulations, particularly those relating to access controls and challenge procedures. Air carrier security programs required by part 108 also have been amended extensively since 1985. The FAA proposes to revise part 108, which governs aircraft operator security, concurrently with this part. The rulemakings will proceed in tandem. All references to proposed part 108 in this preamble are intended to refer to the concurrently proposed revision of part 108. Further, this proposal would modify the airport emergency plan [[Page 41764]] required under 14 CFR part 139, the certification and operations rules for land airports, to indicate that the evaluation of threats would be handled under airport security programs. The proposed revisions of part 107 and part 108 represent a comprehensive approach toward upgrading the security requirements of the civil aviation system. The intent of these proposed revisions is to foster consistency and standardization throughout the national civil aviation security program. Where possible, the revisions of part 107 and part 108 propose nearly identical language to enhance, clarify, or propose security measures for implementation by both airport operators and air carriers. Changes to definitions in proposed Sec. 107.3 and Sec. 108.3 are intended to promote a common understanding within the aviation community when used in these respective regulations. Moreover, the proposed definitions for both parts 107 and 108 take into account the need to clarify the division of responsibility between air carriers and airport operators for the implementation of aviation security measures. Proposed Sec. 107.7 and Sec. 108.5 would clarify the authority of the Administrator to conduct inspections or tests to determine air carrier compliance with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, and the regulations, and the airport operator's and air carrier's obligation to provide FAA Special Agents the necessary access and identification medium to conduct inspections. Both proposals include language, in proposed Sec. 107.9 and Sec. 108.7, that would prohibit persons from knowingly making false statements or entries on security-related documentation. Proposed Sec. 107.11 and Sec. 108.9 contain language that would prohibit persons from interfering with or compromising required security methods or procedures. Further, new language proposed in Sec. 107.103(a) and Sec. 108.103 would require the inclusion of a security compliance program within an airport operator's and air carrier's security program. Proposed Sec. 107.105 and Sec. 108.105 reflect similar procedural language for the approval and amendment of security programs. Proposed Sec. 107.209 and Sec. 108.223 would require the airport operators and air carriers to establish accountability standards for identification media. Finally, language is proposed in both notices to expand training requirements to include personnel performing security-related duties (proposed Sec. 107.211 and Sec. 108.227), to incorporate similar sections for the implementation of contingency plans (proposed Sec. 107.301 and Sec. 108.307), and to require compliance with Security Directives (proposed Sec. 107.303 and Sec. 108.305). Section-by-Section Analysis In this notice, the FAA proposes to revise existing Secs. 107.1 through 107.31. The FAA further proposes to add several new sections, some of which address the security responsibilities of persons and the requirements for personnel identification systems. Individual airport security programs which implement the requirements of part 107 would be subject to revision as a consequence of this rulemaking (see the section below entitled ``Implementation Schedule''). Historically, part 107 has been amended in increments with each amendment being added to the regulation at the end of the part. The FAA proposes to reorganize the regulation into specific subparts identified by subject matter. To do so would require a change in the current numbering scheme. For example, all sections that specify security program content and approval process would be listed in proposed subpart B, entitled ``Security Program.'' All sections which describe the operational aspects of systems or procedures required in the approved security program would be listed in proposed subpart C, ``Operations,'' and so on. This arrangement of the sections by subpart is intended to make part 107 ``user friendly'' by allowing the reader to locate a particular section easily and to identify all requirements relevant to a specific subject readily. Arranging the regulation by subparts also would allow the FAA to keep similar sections together rather than to add serially to the body of the regulation. Throughout the proposed rule, references are made to 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII. This statute is the recodification of FAA's authority to prescribe aviation security regulations previously found in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App. 1301 et seq. Subpart A--General Section 107.1 Applicability This notice proposes to extend the applicability of existing Sec. 107.1. This proposal would extend the applicability to employees, contractors, and other individuals who have significant security responsibilities at an airport and whose actions could diminish the effectiveness of those systems, methods, or procedures required by this part, by acts such as subverting an access control system, divulging security-sensitive information, or falsifying records. Further, the FAA proposes to extend airport security requirements beyond airports serving scheduled passenger operations. Instead, the proposed requirements would apply to an airport regularly serving any air carrier required to have a security program under parts 108 and 129. This is not intended, however, to imply that an airport which only serves an occasional single air carrier flight is necessarily required to implement an airport security program. Title 49 U.S.C. 44903 specifies that the FAA shall impose certain security requirements on airports ``regularly serving'' air carrier operations. This notice also proposes to move existing Sec. 107.1(a)(3), which applies the requirements of this part to persons entering a sterile area, to part 108. This change would consolidate most security requirements applicable to the sterile area in part 108, since the responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the sterile area rests mainly with air carriers. Part 107 currently refers to the ``Director of Civil Aviation Security'' as the official who oversees civil aviation security operations and approves airport security programs. Under internal FAA reorganization, the current title of this position is Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security; however, 49 U.S.C. 44932 refers to this official as the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. Therefore, paragraph (b) of this section would use the title ``Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security.'' The FAA intends to resolve this inconsistency before issuance of the final rule. In addition, paragraph (b) would clarify that the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, or any individual formally designated could act in the capacity of the Assistant Administrator and the duties of this position could be further delegated. Section 107.3 Definitions This proposed section would replace existing Sec. 107.3, Security program. The provisions of existing Sec. 107.3 would be incorporated under proposed Subpart B, Airport Security Program. This proposed section also would revise the definitions contained under current Sec. 107.1, Applicability and definitions. The introductory text of this proposed section would make the definitions in proposed part 108 apply to this part. The term ``air operations area'' in existing Sec. 107.1 would be replaced by the term ``restricted operations area'' and its definition modified. The definition ``exclusive area'' in existing Sec. 107.1 would be revised and grouped [[Page 41765]] with a newly defined ``exclusive area agreement.'' This new definition would ensure clarity of standards pertaining to security agreements between the airports and air carriers or foreign air carriers, and expand the applicability of exclusive area agreements to include not only air carrier leaseloads but individual access points as well. The definitions ``escort'' and ``sterile area'' would remain essentially unchanged from existing Sec. 107.1 The definition ``escort'' would be revised to include reference to the proposed critical security area and restricted operations area; the definition ``sterile area'' would be revised to clarify the responsibility to conduct inspections of persons and property. The following definitions would be added: Airport security program, Airport tenant, Airport tenant security program, Assistant Administrator, Critical security area, Exclusive area agreement, Restricted operations area, and Unescorted access authority. The definitions ``airport tenant'' and ``airport tenant security program'' would be added to this section to clarify proposed Sec. 107.113 and to eliminate confusion between airport tenant security programs (which do not apply to air carriers and foreign air carriers that have security programs) and exclusive area agreements (which only apply to air carriers and foreign air carriers that have security programs). This notice proposes two new security area definitions. The definition of ``critical security area'' is introduced for the purposes of proposed Sec. 107.201, Security of the Critical Security Area. The term ``critical security area'' would be added to replace the term ``secured area'' found in existing Sec. 107.14. The definition ``restricted operations area'' would be added to replace the term ``air operations area'' found in existing Secs. 107.1 and 107.13. This definition would be added for the purposes of proposed Sec. 107.203, Security of the Restricted Operations Area. (See below for further discussion of these particular sections). The description of the intended parameters of ``critical security area'' and ``restricted operations areas'' would be purposely limited. Due to the different physical layouts and tenant activities, it is impossible to define with specificity in this proposed rule the boundaries of the proposed critical security area and restricted operations area. As such, the proposed definitions give only general descriptions for critical security area and a restricted operations area. The term ``unescorted access authority'' would be defined in this section to support access and identification requirements of the newly proposed critical security area and restricted operations area. It would be included to ensure a clear distinction between individuals that are authorized access and those who are not. Section 107.5 Airport Security Coordinator Under this proposal, existing Sec. 107.5 entitled ``Approval of security program'' would be incorporated into proposed $107.105 entitled ``Approval and amendments,'' under proposed Subpart B, Airport Security Program. Existing Sec. 107.29 entitled ``Airport Security Coordinator'' would be revised and renumbered as new Sec. 107.5 under new Subpart A, General. As part of the employment standards rulemaking [56 FR 41412; August 20, 1991] adopted in response to the Aviation Security Improvement Act, the FAA Administrator requires airport operators to designate an official at each airport as the airport security coordinator (ASC), to serve as the point of contact with the FAA on security matters and to provide oversight to the airport's security system. The ASC serves as the counterpart of the air carrier's ground security coordinator required under part 108. To promote standardization, this proposed section would further define the functions and responsibilities of the ASC, including the designation of alternate ASCs. Specifically, the ASC would be responsible for immediately initiating corrective action for each instance of noncompliance and for reviewing all security-related functions for compliance and effectiveness. The proposal also would clarify that an individual serving as an ASC may perform other duties in addition to those required by the FAA, and need not serve full-time as the ASC. Existing language specifies that the ASC is the airport operator's primary FAA contact, charged with reviewing all security-related functions for compliance with this part and the airport security program. Nevertheless, the ASAC commented that the FAA has not applied this requirement as written, as the ASC is not treated as the FAA's primary contact. Proposed language is intended to clarify the relationship between the FAA and the ASC. The FAA also proposes to require training for the ASC every 2 years. This training is intended to ensure that ASCs and their alternates remain updated on both airport and air carrier security regulatory and operational requirements. The ASAC opposed inclusion in the rule of any ASC training requirements as well as a description of the ASC's job duties and responsibilities. The committee did note, however, that, if training is required, credit should be given for the ASC's previous experience. The FAA therefore requests comments on methods airport operators would use to meet this training requirement. For example, should the FAA require in security programs specific training as it does for air carrier ground security coordinators? Should the training be performed once or should it be recurrent? Should the FAA develop specific guidance or a curriculum for such a training program? How should experience be factored into the training requirement? Should existing ASCs be ``grandfathered'' under the training requirement? The FAA also proposes moving to this section certain provisions of existing Sec. 107.31 recently effective [60 FR 51854; October 3, 1995] regarding the ASC responsibility to review and control results of access investigations and to serve as the contact for individuals appealing their results. This change is intended to ensure that all ASC responsibilities are located in the same section of the rule. Section 107.7 Inspection Authority Under this proposal, existing Sec. 107.7 entitled ``Changed conditions affecting security'' would be moved to proposed Subpart, B Sec. 107.107. Existing Sec. 107.27 entitled ``Evidence of compliance'' would be given a new title, ``Inspection authority,'' and revised and renumbered as new Sec. 107.7 under new Subpart A, General. This proposed section would combine the evidence of compliance requirements of existing Sec. 107.27 with the FAA's statutory authority to conduct inspections, investigations, and tests. Paragraph (a) proposes to state the Administrator's authority to conduct inspections and investigations necessary to determine compliance with part 107 and the security program. The authority for the FAA to conduct inspections necessary to gauge compliance with Federally-mandated security requirements has, on occasion, been challenged by airport operators. The new language would resolve any misunderstanding regarding the FAA's authority to conduct such inspections under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII. Proposed paragraph (b) would restate the language of existing Sec. 107.27. Proposed paragraph (c) would clarify the airport operator's obligation to provide FAA Special Agents the necessary access and identification media to conduct inspections. This proposed requirement would not be [[Page 41766]] extended in the rule to any FAA employee other than Special Agents. Special Agents are those FAA employees who are authorized to conduct inspections of airport and air carrier security operations and who must possess and present valid FAA-issued credentials. There are some inspections and investigations that a Special Agent can accomplish only with unescorted access to the critical security area and restricted operations area, and it is essential that they be able to accomplish these tasks. The FAA will provide criteria for ascertaining the validity of Special Agents' credentials in non-regulatory guidance materials. The inclusion of paragraph (c) is intended to facilitate FAA Special Agents conducting inspections, investigations, tests, and other duties without being hampered. It is not intended to allow FAA Special Agents to have access to the entire airport, only to those portions necessary to conduct their duties. Nor is the FAA proposing to require airport operators to give access and identification media to all FAA inspectors. However, as mentioned in the discussion of Sec. 107.209 (d) below, airports may be required to accept FAA form 8000-39 as a valid identification media. Section 107.9 Falsification Under this proposal, existing Sec. 107.9 entitled ``Amendment of security program by airport operator'' would be moved to proposed Subpart B under Sec. 107.105 and retitled ``Approval and amendments.'' Proposed Sec. 107.9 would be new, retitled ``Falsification,'' and would be included under proposed Subpart A, General. This section is the same as the current Sec. 107.2 adopted on November 17, 1996 (61 FR 64242 (December 3, 1996). Section 107.11 Security Responsibilities of Persons Under this proposal, existing Sec. 107.11 entitled ``Amendment of security program by FAA'' would be moved to proposed Subpart B under Sec. 107.105 ``Approval and amendments.'' Proposed Sec. 107.11, retitled ``Security responsibilities of persons,'' would be included under Subpart A, General, and would be completely new. The FAA believes that the contribution of individuals to the success of the civil aviation system cannot be overestimated and that the regulations must address the responsibility of individuals who work within the security system. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to prohibit persons from tampering, compromising, or modifying any security system, or carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, or destructive substance into sterile areas, critical security areas, or restricted operations areas. Although the airport operator is primarily responsible for carrying out statutory and regulatory security responsibilities under this part, the FAA believes that it is critical that persons employed directly by the airport operator understand the importance of their responsibilities to ensure that security measures within the civil aviation system are properly implemented. It is also important that other persons who may have an impact on aviation security understand their responsibilities. This section proposes specific requirements to make persons accountable for complying with regulatory prohibitions against interfering with or compromising security methods or procedures required under this part. Moreover, by including these prohibitions in the regulation, this proposed section would permit the use of civil penalty action as a means to gain compliance under this part by persons who are employed by the airport operator and other persons not under the direct authority of the airport operator (such as trespassers). While there are some instances in which enforcement action against persons may be taken by the FAA, in many cases enforcement action would not be appropriate or necessary. The FAA intends, in proposed Sec. 107.103, to require the airport operator to include in its security program procedures to ensure that persons with unescorted access to critical security areas or restricted operations areas will comply with the requirements of this section. Many airports already have such programs in place and have established penalties, such as monetary fines and revocation of access authorization. The airport operator would remain the primary party responsible for violations, including those committed by their employees and contractors. However, in appropriate cases, persons who fail to comply would be subject to FAA enforcement action, such as a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per violation of these rules. The term ``person,'' used throughout this new section and the proposed rule, is used as defined in 14 CFR Part 1, under Sec. 1.1, General Definitions, which defines person to mean an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or governmental entity, and includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or similar representative of any of them. Proposed paragraph (a) of this new section would prohibit tampering or interfering with an airport's security system, including circumventing access control systems and misusing identification media. This proposed paragraph is intended to provide a deterrent which, in turn, would promote the effectiveness of the security control measures required by this part. For instance, many airports have invested in personnel identification systems as a means of satisfying the requirement to control movement under existing Sec. 107.13 (proposed Sec. 107.203). This proposal would require the use of personnel identification systems in both critical security areas and restricted operations areas and would set forth minimum standards for personnel identification systems. Establishing sanctions for not complying with personnel identification media display requirements would significantly promote the effectiveness of personnel identification systems. Further, this section would prohibit persons from compromising, or rendering less effective, any system implemented in response to the various requirements of this part. This prohibition includes similar language found in existing Sec. 107.25(f) that prohibits the use of an airport-approved identification by any person unless it is issued to that person. However, the proposed language would expand the prohibition to encompass any type of intentional misuse, such as tampering, compromise, or modification, of security systems or the unauthorized circumvention of these systems. Such acts would include writing on walls or doors combination lock numbers that provide access to critical security areas or restricted operations areas, temporarily or permanently disabling electronic access systems, and loaning of access or identification media which would provide access to, or movement within, security-sensitive areas of an airport without authorization. Under part 108, the responsibility rests with the air carrier for ensuring that unauthorized items which may be harmful to civil aviation or to the traveling public do not get into the sterile area. The FAA, accordingly, believes that the current prohibition found in existing Sec. 107.21(a) against the introduction of a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary into sterile areas is more appropriately located in part 108. The FAA proposes transferring the existing prohibition found in Sec. 107.21(a) to proposed part 108. The risk to the traveling public presented by the presence of a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary, or destructive substance [[Page 41767]] should not be underestimated. Paragraph (b) of this section, as proposed, has been drafted to prohibit the unauthorized possession of such weapons or other dangerous items in sterile areas, critical security areas, and restricted operations areas. The current rules refer to the carriage of ``explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapons'' in various places, including existing Sec. 107.21 and Sec. 108.9. The statute, however, refers to searching persons and property for the presence of a ``dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance.'' (See 49 U.S.C. 44902) In order to make more clear what items the air carriers search for and what items are controlled in various areas secured for the purposes of part 107, the FAA proposes to refer throughout the revised part to ``deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive substance.'' This change is proposed in paragraph (b) of this section as well as proposed Sec. 107.101(a)(1), Sec. 107.219(c)(1), and Sec. 107.219(c)(4)(ii). The FAA also will provide guidance on destructive substances. This section is also intended to prohibit persons from conducting unauthorized ``tests'' of airport security systems by compromising or circumventing any element of the system. However, proposed paragraph (c), would allow for individuals authorized by the Federal government, airport operator, and air carrier to conduct tests and inspections of security systems. Provisions regarding the carriage of firearms by law enforcement officers and other authorized personnel found in existing Sec. 107.21(b) would be included in proposed paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) proposes that provisions of this section that apply to firearms and weapons would not be applicable to law enforcement personnel, Federal Air Marshals, and certain individuals authorized in an airport security program to carry a weapon. This paragraph would further exempt persons properly transporting declared firearms under proposed Sec. 108.213 or hazardous materials under 49 CFR part 175 from firearms and weapons prohibitions. Proposed paragraph (d)(7) also would exclude from these prohibitions weapons and firearms legally carried aboard non-air- carrier aircraft, such as general aviation pilots operating personal aircraft and transporting firearms in compliance with state and local laws. The concept of requiring persons to be responsible for complying with security measures was generally supported by the ASAC, particularly the airport operator representatives. Two ASAC members, the Air Line Pilots Association and the National Air Transport Association, however, expressed reservations about the feasibility of enforcing such a requirement and suggested that security resources could be better used elsewhere to achieve the same results. By promoting awareness of security responsibilities, this proposal also would address the concerns raised by the DOT Inspector General about employee awareness of, and compliance with, access control and challenge procedures. Further, this proposed section parallels efforts to require that persons be accountable for their actions related to the dissemination of sensitive security information [Sensitive Security Information, final rule published 62 FR 13736, March 21, 1997]. Other federal regulations and statutes may also contain applicable security and safety responsibilities of persons, including the following: proposed Sec. 107.207, Access investigation; proposed Sec. 108.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of cargo; proposed Sec. 108.213 of this part, Carriage of weapons; Part 191 of this chapter, Protection of Sensitive Security Information; 49 CFR part 175, Transportation of hazardous materials; 49 U.S.C. 46302, regarding false information involving aircraft piracy, interference with flight crew members, carrying a weapon, and other criminal laws; and 49 U.S.C. 46303, regarding carriage of a weapon. Subpart B--Airport Security Program Section 107.101 Requirements While part 107 is a public document and sets forth broad airport security requirements, the security-sensitive details of how an airport meets these requirements are contained separately in the airport's FAA- approved, non-public security program. The FAA intends to continue to use this method and proposes a new security program requirements section, Sec. 107.101. This proposed section would be included under proposed Subpart B which would incorporate all sections relating to airport security programs. The provisions of existing Sec. 107.3(a) would be stated in this proposed section. The FAA believes that this minor change will help the reader comprehend the overall purpose and format of an airport security program. This new section would incorporate similar provisions of the existing regulation that require the airport security program to be in writing, and that a copy be kept at the airport operations office. The program's objective has been modified to include protection against the introduction of a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive substances onto aircraft. Also, the reference to the Director of Civil Aviation Security would be updated to Assistant Administrator and reference to part 191 prohibitions on the distribution and disclosure of sensitive security information would be included. The FAA is developing a Standard Airport Security Program (SASP) to aid airport operators in developing and revising their security programs. Drafting of the model program is being coordinated with the revision of part 107 and it is scheduled to be available shortly after the publication of the final rule of part 107. Additionally, the FAA is revising security advisory circulars to ensure that they reflect any changes to part 107 resulting from this rulemaking; the circulars are intended to be available references for the development and revision of airport security programs. Section 107.103 Content This proposed section would be new and would be added to proposed Subpart B, Airport Security Program. It would describe the required content of airport security programs. Basically, it would revise the provisions of existing Sec. 107.3. Existing Sec. 107.3 defines the type of air carrier operation that requires a specific airport security program. Currently, the type of security program an airport operator must implement is expressed in terms of the type of aircraft operations. The proposed revision would express the applicability in terms of aircraft operations regulated under proposed Sec. 108.101. Proposed Sec. 108.101, Security program: Adoption and Implementation, requires each air carrier to adopt and carry out a security program as it applies to the type of operations conducted. This change is intended to promote consistency and interdependency between parts 107 and 108. The FAA designs security regulations to provide varying levels of protection based upon the size, type, and frequency of aircraft operations. Security provisions, therefore, are more demanding at airports where air carriers utilize large transport airplanes with 60 seats or more, and have scheduled departures and arrivals. The number and nature of crimes against civil aviation since 1972 validates the connection between the requirement for an airport security program and the type of aircraft serving a given airport. [[Page 41768]] Experience shows that airport served only by smaller aircraft need not comply with all requirements appropriate for airports served by larger aircraft. This approach currently allows smaller airports to implement security measures in a more economical manner. The FAA believes that this has provided an acceptable level of security at such facilities and proposes to continue this approach to airport operator security programs. The proposed rule continues to specify three different security programs varying in complexity, but the proposed part 108 would modify the type of passenger operations that would determine the program required. The most comprehensive security program would continue to be applicable to airports serviced by scheduled passenger operations with aircraft of more than 60 seats. The type of passenger operations that trigger the two remaining types of airport security programs have been expanded somewhat, as the result of proposed changes to part 108, to ensure complete protection of the sterile area and to ensure security of all passengers, even those enplaned by private charters and on helicopters (discussed below). As proposed, airports that serve scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations with aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of more than 60 seats would continue to have in their security program descriptions of the following: 1. Areas to be secured and those adjacent to the airport that would affect security; 2. Procedures to control access to areas to be secured; 3. Exclusive areas and the procedures each air carrier must use to notify the airport operator when that air carrier cannot adequately control access; 4. Law enforcement support and training; 5. System for maintaining records; and 6. Alternate security procedures to be used in emergencies and other unusual conditions. Proposed Sec. 107.103(a) also would add new requirements to require such airports to include in their security program a description of the following: 1. Airport security coordinator's duties, means of contact, training and identification; 2. Security compliance program; 3. Critical security area boundaries, activities, entities and signs, as well as procedures, facilities, and equipment used to perform the control functions; 4. Restricted operations area boundaries, activities, entities and signs, as well as procedures, facilities, and equipment used to perform the control functions; 5. Sterile area boundaries and procedures, facilities and equipment used to control access, other than the passenger screening checkpoint; 6. Personnel background check procedures; 7. Personnel and vehicle identification systems; 8. Escort and challenge procedures; 9. Employee and tenant training programs; 10. Schedule for submitting records; 11. Procedures, facilities, and equipment supporting air carrier passenger screening operations, including law enforcement support; 12. Procedures, facilities, and equipment supporting the contingency plan; 13. Procedures for handling Security Directives, Information Circulars, and classified information, as appropriate; 14. Procedures for public advisories; 15. Incident management procedures; and 16. Each airport tenant security agreement, including a description of the area and procedures, facilities, and equipment used to perform the control functions, and methods by which the airport operator will monitor and audit the tenant. A second level of standards, contained in proposed Sec. 107.103(b), would be required for airport operators serving air carrier operations described in proposed Sec. 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3) and existing Sec. 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3). Existing Sec. 107.3(g) requires an airport operator to have a security program if served by scheduled passenger or public charter operations where passengers are enplaned from, or deplaned into, a sterile area. Proposed Sec. 107.103(b) would still require an airport serving these type of air carrier operations to have an airport security program but, by referencing proposed Sec. 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3), these operations would be expanded to also cover public charter operations using aircraft with less than 61 seats and any private charter operations when passengers are enplaned from, or deplaned into, a sterile area. For such airports, the minimum law enforcement standards would remain essentially the same; however, requirements for an airport security coordinator, as well as the establishment of contingency plans and incident response procedures, are proposed. As these additions typically are procedural in nature, the FAA believes that the inclusion of such requirements would not unduly burden airports with such limited operations. Instead, this enhancement would promote better compliance and emergency preparedness by ensuring better coordination and dissemination of security-related information, and response to threats to civil aviation. Specifically, this notice proposes that an airport operator serving air carrier operations specified in proposed Sec. 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3) and existing Sec. 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3) would continue to have in their security program the descriptions of law enforcement support and training, the descriptions of a system for maintaining records, and also the identity and means to contact the airport security coordinator. Proposed Sec. 107.103(b) also would require such airports to include in their security program a description of the following: 1. Airport security coordinator duties and training; 2. Schedule for submitting records; 3. Procedures, facilities, and equipment supporting the contingency plan; 4. Procedures for handling Security Directives, Information Circulars, and classified information, as appropriate; 5. Procedures for public advisories; and 6. Incident management procedures. The third and final level in proposed Sec. 107.103(c) is intended for airports served by air carriers required to have a security program under proposed Sec. 108.101(a)(4) and existing Sec. 129.25(b)(4). Similar to existing Sec. 107.3(f), an airport security program would be required if the airport is served by air carriers that have scheduled passenger operations in an aircraft with a passenger seating configuration of more than 30 but less than 61 seats. Proposed Sec. 108.101(a)(4), however, would expand the applicability to public charter operations as well as private charter operations using aircraft with more than 30 seats and any type of international operation using an aircraft of less than 61 seats to and from the United States. Such air carriers would not be required to implement all security measures at all times. They would implement portions of their security program only when directed by the Administrator to do so. Similar to the second level of airport security program requirements, the FAA proposes to expand program requirements for this third category of airports to include establishing procedures for incident response and public advisories. Again, the FAA views these additions as procedural and not unduly burdensome, and believes they [[Page 41769]] would promote a higher level of emergency preparedness. Specifically, this notice proposes that an airport operator serving air carrier operations specified in proposed Sec. 108.101(a)(4) and existing Sec. 129.25(b)(4) would continue to have in their security program the descriptions of law enforcement support availability and training, the descriptions of a system for maintaining records, and also the identity and means to contact the airport security coordinator. Proposed Sec. 107.103(c) also would require such airports to include in their security program a description of the following: 1. Airport security coordinator duties and training; 2. A schedule for submitting records; 3. Procedures for handling Security Directives, Information Circulars, and classified information, as appropriate; 4. Procedures for public advisories; 5. Incident management procedures. The following chart compares security program requirements between airports served by different levels of air carrier operations: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Airport served by ----------------------------------------- Other schd. Scheduled operations Any Proposed requirement operations and public/ operations and public private not required charter > 60 charter to screen Access to Secured Areas at Airports (1988). Security Directives (1989). Explosives Detection Systems (1989). X-Ray Systems (1990). Employment Standards (1990). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In reviewing the five security-related rules, the costs were updated from their respective base-year dollars to 1994 dollars using the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic Product. The present value of the costs and benefits was recalculated using the current discount rate of 7 percent. The FAA has developed new data that has improved components of past analyses. The estimated update discounted costs total $498 million. The FAA has developed three cost-benefit comparisons. Comparing benefits of $1.871 billion, which are based on the historical record of incidents, to the combined estimated costs of the proposed amendments to parts 107 and 108, $217.4 million, suggests that expected benefits exceed estimated costs. Using the Poisson distribution, the FAA estimated the probability of occurrence of potential benefits. From this information, the agency has been able to determine the probability of obtaining occurrences where potential benefits would exceed costs. Each of the criminal and terrorists incidents, explosions, hijackings, and sabotage, has a range of expected occurrences (based on the current assumed level of threat) with an associated probability for each discrete number of events. The FAA calculated the probability and associated benefits of each possible combination of occurrences. The results of this analysis indicate that the probability exceeds 95% that obtaining combinations of occurrences where the benefits of avoiding any of these combinations of occurrences will exceed the estimated costs of these proposed rules. When the estimated cost of these two proposed rules are added to the cost of the five security rules ($727 million, undiscounted) already issued, the combined cost is $944 million, undiscounted. The probability of obtaining a combination of occurrences yielding benefits equal to or greater than $944 million is over 68%. The FAA, therefore, has determined that the benefits of these two proposed rules exceed their costs, even when the costs of these two rules are added to the cost of the previously issued rules. International Trade Impact Statement In accordance with the Office of Management and Budget memorandum dated March 1983, federal agencies engaged in rulemaking activities are required to assess the effects of regulatory changes on international trade. This proposed rule would affect all airport owners that have an FAA-approved security program in accord with part 107. Unlike domestic air carriers that compete with foreign air carriers, domestic airports are not in competition with foreign airports. For this reason, a trade impact assessment would not be applicable. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily burdened by government regulations. The RFA requires agencies to review rules that may have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.'' The FAA's criterion for a ``substantial number'' is a number that is not less than 11 and that is more than one third of the small entities subject to the rule. The FAA's small entity size standards criterion define a small airport as one owned by a county, city, town or other jurisdiction having a population of [[Page 41783]] 49,999 or less. If two or more towns, cities, or counties operate an airport jointly, the population size of each are totaled to determine whether that airport is a small entity. The threshold annualized cost levels in December 1983 dollars is $5,400 for airports; adjusting to 1994 values, this threshold cost becomes $7,800. The FAA examined all primary airports \8\ to determine the number of airports classified as small entities. After reviewing population data, the FAA determined that 108 of the primary non-military airports are owned by jurisdictions with populations less than 50,000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ A primary airport is one which enplanes 10,000 or more passengers annually (as per 49 U.S.C. 47102 (11)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some airports are already in compliance with portions of the proposed rule and the total costs estimated in the regulatory evaluation were adjusted accordingly. However, this regulatory flexibility determination, in looking for the maximum cost that could be incurred by a small entity airport, assumed that the typical airport was not in compliance. Annually, the proposed part 107 would cost the average Type A (<2) airport no more than $28,299, save the typical Type B airport $3,327, and cost the typical Type C airport no more than $2,869. The cost of the proposed part 107 to Types B and C are less than the threshold figure of $7,800, but the costs of Type A (<2) airports exceed this threshold. As noted above, there are 21 Type A (<2) airports in the 108 airports that qualify as small entities. At 19% of the number of small entities, this is less than the definition of a ``substantial number''. Therefore, the FAA finds that this proposed rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A ``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development of regulatory proposals. This proposed rule does not contain any Federal intergovernmental mandates or private sector mandates. Federalism Implications The regulations proposed herein will not have substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposed regulation will not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment. Conclusion For the reasons discussed in the preamble, and based on the findings in the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination and the International Trade Impact Analysis, the FAA has determined that this proposed regulation is significant under Executive Order 12866. In addition, it is certified that this proposal, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. This proposal is considered significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). List of Subjects 14 CFR Part 107 Airports, Arms and munitions, Law enforcement officers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. 14 CFR Part 139 Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety. The Proposed Amendment In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend parts 107 and 139 of 14 CFR as follows: 1. Part 107 is revised to read as follows: PART 107--AIRPORT SECURITY Sec. Subpart A--General 107.1 Applicability. 107.3 Definitions. 107.5 Airport security coordinator. 107.7 Inspection authority. 107.9 Falsification. 107.11 Security responsibilities of persons. Subpart B--Airport Security Program 107.101 General requirements. 107.103 Content. 107.015 Approval and amendments. 107.107 Changed conditions affecting security. 107.109 Alternate means of compliance. 107.111 Exclusive area agreements. 107.113 Airport tenant security programs. Subpart C--Operations 107.201 Security of the critical security area. 107.203 Security of the restricted operations area. 107.205 Access control systems. 107.207 Employment history, verification, and criminal history records checks. 107.209 Identification systems. 107.211 Training. 107.213 Law enforcement support. 107.215 Law enforcement personnel. 107.217 Supplementing law enforcement personnel. 107.219 Records. Subpart D--Contingency Measures 107.301 Contingency plan. 107.303 Security directives and information circulars. 107.305 Public advisories. 107.307 Incident management. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 44706, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105. Subpart A--General Sec. 107.1 Applicability. (a) This part describes aviation security rules governing: (1) The operation of each airport regularly serving an air carrier required to have a security program under part 108 of this chapter. (2) The operation of each airport regularly serving a foreign air carrier required to have a security program under Sec. 129.25 of this chapter. (3) Each person who is in, or entering, a critical security area, restricted operations area, or sterile area described in this part and part 108 of this chapter. [[Page 41784]] (4) Each person who files an application or makes entries into any record or report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance under this part, or to exercise any privileges under this part. (b) Except as provided in Sec. 107.105 of this part, the authority of the Administrator under this part is also exercised by the Assistant Administrator of Civil Aviation Security and the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, and any individual formally designated to act in their capacity. The authority of the Assistant Administrator, including matters under Sec. 107.105 of this part, may be further delegated. Sec. 107.3 Definitions. Terms defined in part 108 of this chapter apply to this part. For purposes of this part, part 108 of this chapter, and security programs under these parts, the following definitions also apply: Airport operator means a person who operates an airport serving an air carrier or a foreign air carrier required to have a security program under part 108 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter. Airport security program means an airport operator's security program required under Sec. 107.101 of this part and approved by the Administrator. Air tenant means any person, other than an air carrier or foreign air carrier that has a security program under part 108 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter, that has an agreement with the airport operator to conduct business on airport property. Airport tenant security program means the agreement between the airport operator and an airport tenant that specifies the measures by which the tenant will perform security functions under Sec. 107.113 of this part. Assistant Administrator means the FAA Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security as described in 49 U.S.C. 44932. Critical security area means a portion of an airport specified in the airport security program in which security measures specified in this part are carried out. In general, this area is where air carriers and foreign air carriers enplane and deplane passengers, and sort and load baggage, and any adjacent areas that are not separated by security controls or physical barriers. Escort means to accompany or supervise an individual who does not have unescorted access authority to a critical security area or a restricted operations area, in a manner sufficient to take action should the individual engage in activities other than those for which the escorted access is granted. Exclusive area means any portion of a critical security area or restricted operations area, including individual access points, for which an air carrier or foreign air carrier that has a security program under part 108 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter has assumed responsibility under Sec. 107.111 of this part. Exclusive area agreement means an agreement between the airport operator and an individual air carrier or foreign air carrier that has a security program under part 108 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter that permits such an air carrier or foreign air carrier to assume responsibility for specified security measures in accordance with Sec. 107.111 of this part. Restricted operations area means a portion of an airport specified in the airport security program in which security measures specified in this part are carried out. In general, this area is where air carrier and foreign air carrier aircraft take off, land, taxi, park, and otherwise maneuver (other than critical security areas), and any adjacent areas that are not separated by security controls or physical barriers. Unescorted access authority means the authority granted to individuals by an airport operator, air carrier, foreign air carrier, or airport tenant authorized under this part, or parts 108 or 129 of this chapter, to gain access to, and be without an escort in, critical security areas and restricted operations areas. Sec. 107.5 Airport security coordinator. (a) Each airport operator shall designate an Airport Security Coordinator (ASC), and any alternate ASC as necessary, in the airport security program to serve as the airport operator's primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and communications with the FAA. Any individual designated as an ASC may perform other work duties in addition to those described in paragraph (b) of this section. (b) The ASC, or alternate ASC, shall-- (1) Serve as the airport operator's primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and communications with the FAA; (2) Be available to the FAA on a 24-hour basis; (3) Review with sufficient frequency all security-related functions to ensure that all are effective and in compliance with this part, including the airport security program, airport tenant activities, and applicable security directives; (4) Immediately initiate corrective action for any instance of non- compliance with this part, the airport security program, and applicable security directives; (5) Review and control the results of access investigations required under Sec. 107.207 of this part; (6) Serve as the contact to receive notification from individuals applying for unescorted access of their intent to seek correction of their criminal history record with the FBI; and (7) Perform any other duties deemed necessary by the Administrator as set forth in the airport security program or in a Security Directive. (c) Effective [insert 180 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register], each airport operator shall ensure and document that the individual designated as the ASC, and each designated alternate ASC, has been trained within the preceding 24 calendar months to carry out the responsibilities described in paragraph (b) of this section, as specified in the airport security program. The airport operator shall maintain ASC training documentation in its principal operations office until 180 days after the termination of each individual serving as an ASC. (D) With respect to training required under this section, whenever a person completes recurrent training in the calendar month before or the calendar month after the calendar month in which that training is required, that person is considered to have completed the training in the calendar month in which it was required. Sec. 107.7 Inspection authority. (a) Each airport operator shall allow the Administrator, including FAA Special Agents, at any time or place, to make any inspections or tests to determine compliance of the airport operator, air carrier, foreign air carrier, and other airport tentants with-- (1) The airport security program; (2) This part; (3) 49 CFR part 175, which relates to the carriage of hazardous materials by aircraft; and (4) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended. (b) At the request of the Administrator, each airport operator shall provide evidence of compliance with this part and its airport security program. (c) On request of any FAA Special Agent, and presentation of valid FAA-issued credentials, each airport operator shall issue to that agent access and identification media to provide the special agent with unescorted access to, and movement within, critical security areas and restricted operations areas. [[Page 41785]] Sec. 107.9 Falsification. No person may make, or cause to be made, any of the following: (a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any application for any security program, access medium, or identification medium, or any amendment thereto, under this part. (b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with this part, or exercise any privileges under this part. (c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, of any report, record, security program, access medium, or identification medium issued under this part. Sec. 107.11 Security responsibilities of persons. (a) No person may: (1) Tamper or interfere with, compromise, modify, attempt to circumvent, or cause a person to tamper or interfere with, compromise, modify, or circumvent, any security system, method, or procedure implemented under this part. (2) Enter, or be present within, a critical security area or restricted operations area without complying with the systems, methods, or procedures being applied to control access to, or presence in such areas. (3) Use, allow to be used, or cause to be use, any airport-approved access medium or identification medium that authorizes the access or presence of persons and vehicles in critical security areas or restricted operations areas in any other manner than that for which it was issued by the appropriate authority under this part, part 108, or part 129 of this chapter. (b) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C. subtile VII, and paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, no individual may have any deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive substance on or about the individual's person or accessible property when entering, or within a critical security area or restricted operations area of an airport governed by this part, or a sterile area governed under Sec. 108.201 of this chapter. (c) The provisions of this section with regard to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not to apply to persons authorized by the Federal Government, airport operator, air carrier, or foreign air carrier to conduct inspections for compliance with this part, part 108, or part 129 of this chapter, or 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, while they are conducting an inspection. (d) The provisions of this section with respect to firearms and weapons do not apply to the following: (1) Law enforcement personnel required to carry a firearm or other weapon while in the performance of their duties at the airport. (2) Persons authorized to carry a firearm under Sec. 108.213, Sec. 108.215, or Sec. 129.27 of this chapter. (3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area, critical security area, or restricted operations area under this part, an approved airport security program, an approved air carrier security program, or security program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25 of this chapter. (4) Properly declared firearms in checked baggage for transport under Sec. 108.213 of this chapter. (5) Transportation of hazardous materials under 49 CFR part 175. (6) Federal Air Marshals. (7) Aircraft operators not subject to part 108 or part 129 of this chapter carrying firearms in accordance with state and local law. Subpart B--Airport Security Program Sec. 107.101 General requirements. (a) No person may operate an airport subject to this part unless it adopts and carries out an airport security program that-- (1) Provides for the safety and security of persons and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against an act of criminal violence, aircraft piracy, and the introduction of deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive substance onto an aircraft; (2) Is in writing and is signed by the airport operator or any person to whom the airport operator has delegated authority in this matter; (3) Includes the items listed in Sec. 107.103 of this part; (4) Is organized in the same sequence as Sec. 107.103 of this part to the extent practicable; and (5) Has been approved by the Administrator. (b) The airport operator shall maintain one complete copy of the security program in its principal operations office, and make it available for inspection upon the request of the Administrator. (c) Each airport operator shall-- (1) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of sensitive security information, as defined in part 191 of this chapter, to persons with a need to know, and (2) Refer all requests for sensitive security information by other persons to the Administrator. Sec. 107.103 Content. (a) Except as otherwise approved by the Administrator, each airport regularly serving an air carrier, required to conduct screening under Sec. 108.101(a)(1) or Sec. 129.25(b)(1) of this chapter, shall include in the security program a description of the following-- (1) Name, means of contract, duties, and training requirements of the airport security coordinator, and designated alternates, required under Sec. 107.5 of this part. (2) Security compliance program that specifies procedures the airport operator will implement to ensure persons with authorized unescorted access to critical security areas and restricted operations areas comply with Sec. 107.9 and Sec. 107.11 (a) and (b) of this part, including revocation of unescorted access authority of persons that fail to comply with security requirements. (3) Critical security areas, including-- (i) Dimensions and a map detailing boundaries and pertinent features; (ii) Each activity or entity on, or adjacent to, a critical security area that affects security; (iii) Procedures, facilities, and equipment used to perform the access control functions required under Sec. 107.201(b)(1) of this part; and (iv) Notification signs required under Sec. 107.201(b)(7) of this part. (4) Restricted operations areas, including-- (i) Dimensions and a map detailing boundaries, and pertinent features; (ii) Each activity or entity on, or adjacent to, a restricted operations area that affects security; (iii) Procedures, facilities, and equipment used to perform the access control functions required under Sec. 107.203(b)(1) of this part, and (iv) Notification signs required under Sec. 107.203(b)(7) of this part. (5) Sterile areas, including-- (i) Dimensions and a map detailing boundaries and pertinent features; (ii) Activities and tenants located within the sterile area; (iii) Access controls to be used when the passenger-screening checkpoint is non-operational and the entity responsible for that access control; and (iv) Procedures, facilities, and equipment used to control access as specified in Sec. 107.205 of this part. (6) Access investigation procedures used to comply with Sec. 107.207 of this part. (7) Personnel and vehicle identification systems as described in Sec. 107.209 of this part. [[Page 41786]] (8) Escort procedures in accordance with Sec. 107.205(d) of this part. (9) Challenge procedures in accordance with Sec. 107.209(f) of this part. (10) Training programs required under Sec. 107.211 and Sec. 107.215 of this part. (11) Law enforcement support used to comply with Sec. 107.213(a) of this part. (12) System for maintaining records and schedule for reporting records, as described in Sec. 107.219 of this part. (13) Procedures, facilities, and equipment used to support air carrier or foreign air carrier screening functions of Sec. 108.211 of this chapter. (14) Procedures, facilities, and equipment incorporated in the contingency plan required under Sec. 107.301 of this part. (15) Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of Security Directives, Information Circulars, and, as appropriate, classified information, as specified in Sec. 107.303 of this part. (16) Procedures for public advisories as specified in Sec. 107.305 of this part. (17) Incident management procedures used to comply with Sec. 107.307 of this part. (18) Alternate security procedures, if any, that the airport operator intends to use in the event of natural disasters and other emergencies or unusual conditions. (19) Each exclusive area required under Sec. 107.111 of this part. (20) Each airport tenant security program as specified in Sec. 107.113 of this part. (b) Except as otherwise approved by the Administrator, each airport regularly serving an air carrier or foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under Sec. 108.101(a)(2) or (a)(2) or (a)(3), and Sec. 129.25(b)(2) or (b)(3) of this chapter shall include in the security program a description of the following-- (1) Name, means of contact, duties, and training requirements of the airport security coordinator, and designated alternates, as required under Sec. 107.5 of this part; (2) Law enforcement support used to comply with Sec. 107.213(a) of this part; (3) Training program for law enforcement personnel required under Sec. 107.215 of this part; (4) System for maintaining records and schedule for reporting records, as described in Sec. 107.219 of this part; (5) Procedures, facilities, and equipment incorporated in the contingency plan required under Sec. 107.301 of this part; (6) Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of Security Directives, Information Circulars, and, as appropriate, classified information, as specified in Sec. 107.303 of this part; (7) Procedures for public advisories as specified in Sec. 107.305 of this part; and (8) Incident management procedures used to comply with Sec. 107.307 of this part. (c) Except as otherwise approved by the Administrator, each airport regularly serving an air carrier or foreign air carrier required to have a security program under Sec. 108.101(a)(4) or Sec. 129.25(b)(4) of this chapter, shall include in the security program a description of the following-- (1) Name, means of contact, duties, and training requirements of the airport security coordinator, and designated alternates, required under Sec. 107.5 of this part; (2) Law enforcement support used to comply with Sec. 107.213(b) of this part; (3) Training programs for law enforcement personnel required under Sec. 107.215 of this part; (4) System for maintaining records and schedule for reporting records, as described in Sec. 107.219 of this part; (5) Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of Security Directives, Information Circulars, and, as appropriate, classified information as specified in Sec. 107.303 of this part; (6) Procedures for public advisories as specified in Sec. 107.305 of this part; and (7) Incident management procedures used to comply with Sec. 107.307 of this part. (d) The airport operator may comply with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section by including in the security program, as an appendix, any document that contains the information required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). Such an appendix shall be referenced in the corresponding section(s) of the security program. Sec. 107.105 Approval and amendments. (a) Approval of security program. Unless otherwise authorized by the Assistant Administrator, each airport operator required to have an airport security program under this part shall submit its proposed airport security program to the Assistant Administrator for approval at least 90 days before any air carrier or foreign air carrier, required to have a security program under Sec. 108.101 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter, is expected to begin operations. Such requests shall be processed as follows: (1) Within 30 days after receiving the proposed airport security program, the Assistant Administrator will either approve the program or give the airport operator written notice to modify the program to comply with the applicable requirements of this part. (2) Within 30 days of receiving a notice to modify, the airport operator may either submit a modified security program to the Assistant Administrator for approval, or petition the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify. A petition for reconsideration must be filed with the Assistant Administrator. Except in the case of an emergency requiring immediate action in the interest of safety, the filing of the petition stays the notice pending a decision by the Administrator. (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant Administrator either amends or withdraws the notice, or transmits the petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to withdraw or amend the notice to modify, or by affirming the notice to modify. (b) Amendment Requested by an Airport Operator. Except as provided in Sec. 107.107(c) of this part, an airport operator may submit a request to the Assistant Administrator to amend its airport security program, as follows: (1) The application must be filed with the Assistant Administrator at least 45 days before the date it proposes for the amendment to become effective, unless a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant Administrator. However, in accordance with the procedures in this paragraph, it may take longer than 45 days for a final decision by the Administrator. (2) Within 30 days after receiving a proposed amendment, the Assistant Administrator, in writing, either approves or denies the request to amend. (3) An amendment to an airport security program may be approved if the Assistant Administrator determines that safety and the public interest will allow it, and the proposed amendment provides the level of security required under this part. (4) Within 30 days after receiving a denial, the airport operator may petition the Administrator to reconsider the denial. (5) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant Administrator either approves the request to amend or transmits the petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to approve the amendment or affirm the denial. [[Page 41787]] (c) Amendment by the FAA. If safety and the public interest require an amendment, the Assistant Administrator may amend an airport security program as follows: (1) The Assistant Administrator sends to the airport operator a notice, in writing, of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less than 30 days within which the airport operator may submit written information, views, and arguments on the amendment. (2) After considering all relevant material, the Assistant Administrator notifies the airport operator of any amendment adopted or rescinds the notice. If the amendment is adopted, it becomes effective not less than 30 days after the airport operator receives the notice of amendment, unless the airport operator petitions the Administrator to reconsider no later than 15 days before the effective date of the amendment. The airport operator shall send the petition for reconsideration to the Assistant Administrator. A timely petition for reconsideration stays the effective date of the amendment. (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant Administrator either amends or withdraws the notice, or transmits the petition, together with any pertinent information to the Administrator for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to withdraw or amend the amendment, or by affirming the amendment. (d) Emergency Amendments. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section, if the Assistant Administrator finds that there is an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air transportation or in air commerce that makes procedures in this section contrary to the public interest, the Assistant Administrator may issue an amendment, effective without stay, on the date the airport operator receives notice of it. In such a case, the Assistant Administrator shall incorporate in the notice a brief statement of the reasons and findings for the amendment to be adopted. The airport may file a petition for reconsideration under paragraph (c) of this section, however, this does not stay the effectiveness of the emergency amendment. Sec. 107.107 Changed conditions affecting security. (a) After approval of the airport security program, each airport operator shall notify the Administrator when changes have occurred to the-- (1) Procedures, methods, system, facilities, training, equipment, area descriptions, staffing, or any other description or requirement prescribed by the airport security program; (2) Nature of air carrier or foreign air carrier operations, including changes to level of service, aircraft, and leasehold; or (3) Layout or physical structure of any area under the control of the airport operator, air carrier, or foreign air carrier used to support the screening, access, or movement control functions required under parts 107, 108, or 129 of this chapter. (b) Whenever a changed condition described in paragraph (a) of this section occurs, each airport operator shall notify the Administrator within 2 hours, or within the time specified in its security program, of discovery of the changed condition and each interim measure being taken to maintain adequate security until an appropriate amendment to the security program is approved. Each interim measure(s) must be acceptable to the Administrator. (c) For changed conditions under 60 days duration, each airport operator shall forward the information required in paragraph (b) of this section in writing to the Administrator within 72 hours of the original notification of the change condition(s). The Administrator will notify the airport operator of the disposition of the notification in writing. If approved by the Administrator, this written notification will become a part of the airport security program for the duration of the changed condition(s). (d) For changed conditions over 60 days duration, each airport operator shall forward the information required in paragraph (b) of this section in the form of a proposed amendment to the airport operator's security program, as required under Sec. 0107.105 of this part. The request for an amendment shall be made within 30 days of the discovery of the changed condition(s). The Administrator will respond to the request in accordance with Sec. 107.105 of this part. Sec. 107.109 Alternate means of compliance. If the safety and security of the airport, and air carrier passengers and operations, are not diminished, the Administrator may approve an airport security program that permits the use of alternate means of compliance with the requirements of this part. Such an amendment may be considered for an airport operator of an airport that is served seasonally or infrequently by an air carrier or foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under Sec. 108.101(a)(1) or Sec. 129.25(b)(1) of this chapter. Sec. 107.111 Exclusive area agreements. (a) The Administrator may approve an amendment to an airport security program in accordance with this section that permits an air carrier or foreign air carrier that has an approved security program under part 108 or part 129 to assume responsibility for specified security measures for all or portions of the critical security areas or restricted operations areas. The assumption of responsibility must be exclusive to one air carrier or foreign air carrier, and shared responsibility among air carriers or foreign air carriers is not permitted. (b) An exclusive area agreement shall be in writing and maintained in the airport security program. This agreement shall contain descriptions of the following: (1) Dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features of each area, or individual access points, over which the air carrier or foreign air carrier will exercise exclusive security responsibility. (2) Procedures and a description of the facilities and equipment used to perform the control functions described in Sec. 107.201 or Sec. 107.203 of this part, as appropriate. (3) Procedures by which the air carrier or foreign air carrier will immediately notify the airport operator and provide for alternative security measures when the procedures, facilities, and equipment required by the agreement are not adequate to perform the control functions in accordance with Sec. 107.201 or Sec. 107.203 of this part, as appropriate. (4) Methods by which the airport operator will monitor and audit the air carrier's or foreign air carrier's compliance with the exclusive area agreement. (5) Circumstances under which the airport operator will terminate the exclusive area agreement for cause and resume responsibility for security measures covered by the exclusive area agreement. Sec. 107.113 Airport tenant security programs. (a) The Administrator may approve an airport tenant security program that permits an airport tenant having access to a critical security area or restricted operations area to accept responsibility for all or part of the specified security measures of Secs. 107.201 or 107.203 of this part within the tenant's leased areas or areas designated for the tenant's exclusive use under an agreement with the airport operator. This airport tenant [[Page 41788]] security program shall be included in the airport security program. (b) The airport tenant security program shall include the following: (1) Dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features of each area covered by the airport tenant security program. (2) Measures by which the tenant will carry out within its designated areas the security requirements imposed by the Administrator on the airport operator. (3) Methods by which the airport operator will monitor and audit the tenant's compliance with the security requirements. (4) Terms of the agreement, including monetary and other penalties, to which the tenant may be subject if it fails to carry out any security requirements it agreed to perform. (5) Circumstances under which the airport operator will terminate the airport tenant security program for cause. (c) The airport operator may not be found to be in violation of a requirement of this part in any case in which the airport operator demonstrates that: (1) The tenant, or an employee, permittee, or invitee of the tenant, is responsible for such violation; and (2) The airport operator has complied with all measures in its airport security program to ensure the tenant has complied with the airport tenant security program. (d) The Administrator may amend or terminate an airport tenant security program in accordance with Sec. 107.105 of this part. Subpart C--Operations Sec. 107.201 Security of the critical security area. (a) Each airport operator required to have an airport security program under Sec. 107.103(a) of this part shall establish at least one critical security area and describe each critical security area in its security program. (b) Each airport operator required to establish a critical security area shall do the following: (1) Prevent the entry of unauthorized individuals and ground vehicles by establishing and carrying out a system, method, or procedure for controlling access to critical security areas of the airport in accordance with Sec. 107.205 of this part. (2) Establish and carry out a personnel and vehicle identification system described under Sec. 107.209 of this part to control the presence and movement of persons and ground vehicles within the critical security area. (3) Establish and use escort procedures in accordance with Sec. 107.205(d) of this part. (4) Establish and use challenge procedures required under Sec. 107.209(f) of this part. (5) Subject each individual to a personnel background check as described in Sec. 107.207 of this part before authorizing unescorted access to a critical security area. (6) Train each individual before granting unescorted access to the critical security area, as required in Sec. 107.211(b) of this part. (7) Post signs at critical security area access points and on the perimeter that provide warning of the prohibition against unauthorized access. Such warning signs shall be posted by each airport operator not later than 2 years after [the effective date of this rule]. Sec. 107.203 Security of the restricted operations area. (a) For those portions of the airport where air carrier and foreign air carrier aircraft take off, land, taxi, park and otherwise maneuver but are not delineated as a critical security area, each airport operator required to have an airport security program under Sec. 107.103(a) of this part shall establish and describe in its security program a restricted operations area. (b) Each airport operator required to establish a restricted operations area shall do the following: (1) Use a system, method, or procedure for controlling access to restricted operations areas of the airport in accordance with Sec. 107.205(b) of this part. (2) Subject each individual to a 5-year employment history verification before authorizing unescorted access to the restricted operations area. (3) Establish and use a personnel and vehicle identification system described under Sec. 107.209 of this part to control the presence and movement of individuals and ground vehicles within the restricted operations area. (4) Establish and use escort procedures in accordance with Sec. 107.205(d) of this part. (5) Establish and use challenge procedures required under Sec. 107.209(f) of this part. (6) Provide security information as described in Sec. 107.211(c) of this part to each individual with unescorted access to the restricted operations area. (7) Post signs on restricted operations area access points and perimeters that provide warning of the prohibition against unauthorized access. Signs shall be implemented by each airport operator not later than 2 years after [the effective date of this rule]. Sec. 107.205 Access control systems. (a) Critical Security Area. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, the system, method, or procedure for controlling access to the critical security area required under Sec. 107.201(b)(1) of this part shall-- (1) Ensure that only those individuals authorized to have unescorted access to the critical security area are able to obtain that access; (2) Ensure that an individual is immediately denied access to a critical security area when that person's authority for that area is withdrawn; (3) Provide a means to differentiate between individuals authorized to have access to an entire critical security area an individuals authorized access to only a particular portion of a critical security area; and (4) Be capable of limiting an individual's access to a critical area by time and date, as specified in the airport contingency plan required under Sec. 107.301 of this part. (b) Restricted Operations Area. Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) of this section, the system, method, or procedure for controlling access to the restricted operations area required under Sec. 107.203(b)(1) of this part shall-- (1) Prevent the entry of unauthorized individuals and ground vehicles; (2) Provide for detection of and response to each unauthorized presence in or access or attempted access to, the restricted operations area by an individual whose entry is not authorized in accordance with the airport security program; (3) Be locally controlled; and (4) Incorporate accountability procedures to maintain the integrity of that system, method, or procedure. (c) Secondary access media. An airport operator may issue a second access medium to individuals authorized access to critical security areas and restricted operations areas, if the airport operator follows methods and procedures in the airport security program that-- (1) Verify the access authorization of the individuals granted unescorted access to critical security areas and restricted operations areas but are not in possession of their original access medium; (2) Limit time of access with second access medium; (3) Retrieve the second access medium when expired; and (4) Deactivate or invalidate temporarily the original access medium until the time that the individual returns the second access medium. (d) Escorting. Each airport operator shall establish and implement [[Page 41789]] procedures for escorting individuals who do not have unescorted access authority to a critical security area or a restricted operations area that-- (1) Ensure that only individuals with unescorted access authority are permitted to escort; (2) Ensure that the escorted individuals are continuously accompanied or supervised in a manner sufficient to take action should escorted individuals engage in activities other than those for which escorted access was granted; (3) Identify what action is to be taken by the escort, or other authorized individual, should individuals under escort engage in activities other than those for which access was granted; (4) Prescribe law enforcement support of escort activities; and (5) Ensure that individuals escorted to a sterile area without being screened under Sec. 108.201 of this chapter remain under escort in accordance with this section, or submit to screening pursuant to Sec. 108.201 of this part. (3) Group validation. An airport operator may submit for approval by the Administrator procedures in its airport security program for group validation without each individual validating access authority at individual access points. (f) Sterile areas. With the exception of access points leading from a critical security area, each airport operator shall ensure that all points that provide access to the sterile area from nonpublic areas meet the requirements of this section. (g) Alternative systems. The Administrator may approve an amendment to an airport security program that provides an alternative system, method, or procedure that provides an overall level of security equal to that which would be provided by the system, method, or procedure described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. Sec. 107.207 Employment history, verification, and criminal history records checks--[Reserved] [Note: The is a separate rulemaking action that will result in new text for this section. To avoid confusion, the section is not repeated here. See the preamble for further explanation.] Sec. 107.209 Identification systems. (a) Personnel identification system. The personnel identification system under Secs. 107.201(b)(2) or 107.203(b)(3) of this part shall include the following: (1) Personnel identification media that-- (i) Convey accurate identification of the individual to whom the identification medium is issued; (ii) Indicate clearly the scope of the individual's access and movement privileges; (iii) Indicate clearly an expiration date; and (iv) Are of sufficient size and appearance as to be readily observable for challenge purposes. (2) Procedures to ensure that each individual continuously displays the identification medium issued to that individual. (3) Procedures to ensure accountability through the following-- (i) Retrieving expired identification media; (ii) Reporting lost or stolen identification media; (iii) Securing unissued identification media stock and supplies; (iv) Auditing the system at a minimum of once a year or sooner as necessary to ensure the integrity and accountability of all identification media; (v) As specified in the airport security program, revalidate the identification system or reissue identification media if a portion of all issued identification media become unaccounted for, including identification media that is combined with access media; and (vi) Ensure that only one identification medium is issued to an individual at a time. A replacement identification medium may only be issued if an individual declares in writing that the medium has been lost or stolen. (b) Vehicle identification system. The identification system required under Sec. 107.201(b)(2) and Sec. 107.203(b)(3) of this part shall include the following: (1) Vehicle identification media that-- (i) Indicate clearly the scope of the vehicle's access and movement; (ii) Indicate clearly an expiration date; and (iii) Are of sufficient size and appearance as to be readily visible when affixed to the vehicle. (2) Procedures to ensure accountability through-- (i) Retrieving expired vehicle identification media; (ii) Reporting lost or stolen vehicle media; (iii) Securing unissued vehicle identification media stock and supplies; (iv) Auditing the system at a minimum of once a year or sooner as necessary to ensure accountability of all vehicle identification media; (v) As specified in the airport security program, revalidate, or reissue vehicle identification media, if a portion of all issued vehicle identification media become unaccounted for; and (vi) Ensure that only one identification medium is issued to a vehicle at a time. A replacement identification medium may only be issued if the owner of the vehicle, or designee, declares in writing that the medium has been lost or stolen. (c) Part 139, Ground vehicle system. If approved by the Administrator, a vehicle access control and operations system may be used to meet the requirements of both Sec. 139.329, Ground Vehicles and this section. (d) Temporary identification media. Each airport operator shall issue personnel and vehicle identification media to persons whose duties are expected to be temporary. Temporary identification media system shall include procedures and methods to-- (1) Retrieve temporary identification media; (2) Authorize the use of a temporary media for a limited time only; and (3) Ensure that temporary media are distinct and clearly display an expiration date. (e) Airport-approved identification media. The Administrator may approve the use of identification media meeting the criteria of this section that are issued by entities other than the airport operator, as described in the airport security program. (f) Challenge program. Each airport operator shall establish and carry out a challenge program that requires each individual authorized unescorted access to critical security areas and restricted operations areas to ascertain the authority of any individual not displaying an authorized identification media to be present in such areas. A challenge program shall include procedures to verbally challenge or report individuals not visibly displaying authorized identification media that-- (1) Apply uniformly in both critical security areas and restricted operations areas, including exclusive areas; (2) Identify how to challe [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A97-19698. Public record. Not legal advice.