# Anti-manipulation Rules Concerning Securities Offerings > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A97-1 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** January 3, 1997 - **Citation:** 62 FR 520 ## Text SUMMARY: The Commission is adopting new Regulation M governing the activities of underwriters, issuers, selling security holders, and others in connection with offerings of securities. Regulation M is intended to preclude manipulative conduct by persons with an interest in the outcome of an offering. Regulation M significantly eases regulatory burdens on offering participants by eliminating the trading restrictions for underwriters of actively-traded securities; reducing the scope of coverage for other securities; reducing restrictions on issuer plans; providing a more flexible framework for stabilizing transactions; and deregulating rights offerings. Consisting of five new rules, plus a new definitional rule, Regulation M replaces Rules 10b-6, 10b-6A, 10b-7, 10b-8, and 10b-21 (``trading practices rules'') under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act''), which are being rescinded. In addition, related amendments are being made to Items 502(d) and 508 of Regulations S-B and S-K, and to Rules 10b-18 and 17a- 2 under the Exchange Act. Conforming changes to various rules under the Securities Act of 1933 (``Securities Act'') and the Exchange Act are being made to reflect the repeal of the trading practices rules and the adoption of Regulation M. EFFECTIVE DATE: March 4, 1997. The requirement of Sec. 242.104(i) and the amendments to Sec. 240.17a-2 are effective on April 1, 1997. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Any of the following attorneys in the Office of Risk Management and Control, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Mail Stop 5-1, Washington, D.C. 20549, at 202-942-0772: Nancy J. Sanow, M. Blair Corkran, Carlene S. Kim, Heidi E. Pilpel, Barbara J. Endres, Irene A. Halpin, Marc J. Hertzberg, Denise M. Landers, Lauren C. Mullen, Mark R. Pacioni, Alan J. Reed, or Margaret A. Smith. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction and Summary of New Regulation M A fundamental goal of the federal securities laws is the prevention of manipulation. Manipulation impedes the securities markets from functioning as independent pricing mechanisms, and undermines the integrity and fairness of those markets. Congress granted the Commission broad rulemaking authority to combat manipulative abuses in whatever form they might take. In exercising its authority, the Commission has focused on the market activities of persons participating in a securities offering, and determined that securities offerings present special opportunities and incentives for manipulation that require specific regulatory attention. On April 11, 1996, the Commission published for comment a release (``Proposing Release'') proposing Regulation M, and Rules 100 through 105 thereunder, to govern the activities of issuers, underwriters, and other persons participating in a securities offering,1 and to replace Rules 10b-6, 10b-6A, 10b-7, 10b-8, and 10b-21 2 under the Exchange Act.3 The Commission received 39 comment letters from 36 commenters in response to the Proposing Release.4 The commenters generally expressed strong support for proposed Regulation M, although several expressed concerns with specific provisions, and some suggested alternative approaches for addressing particular issues. The Commission is adopting Regulation M substantially as proposed, but with some modifications to clarify provisions or to reflect commenters' views. The new regulation represents the most significant changes to the Commission's anti-manipulation regulation of securities offerings since the adoption of the trading practices rules over 40 years ago.5 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37094 (April 11, 1996), 61 FR 17108. \2\ 17 CFR 240.10b-6, 240.10b-6A, 240.10b-7, 240.10b-8, and 240.10b-21. \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. \4\ A summary of comments has been prepared by the staff of the Division of Market Regulation. The summary is included, along with the comment letters, in Public File No. S7-11-96, which is available for inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549. \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955), 20 FR 5075. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulation M is the culmination of a comprehensive review by the Commission of its anti-manipulation regulation of securities offerings.6 This review was prompted by ongoing developments and innovations in the securities industry, including: increasing institutionalization of the markets, advances in technology and communications media, enhanced surveillance capabilities, continuing globalization of the securities markets, and new offering techniques. These developments have outpaced the existing structure of anti- manipulation regulation of securities offerings and reduced the need for broad prophylactic restrictions. Moreover, the Commission was informed by market participants that the application of the trading practices rules had become needlessly complex and involved substantial compliance costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33924 (April 19, 1994), 59 FR 21681 (``Concept Release''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulation M exemplifies the Commission's efforts to relax restrictions in cases where either the risk of manipulation is small or the costs of the restrictions are disproportionate to the purposes they serve. The new regulation continues the anti-manipulation objectives of the trading practices rules, but reflects developments in the securities industry, allows greater flexibility for market participants to engage in activities that enhance competition in the marketplace, and incorporates the recommendations of the Commission's Task Force on Disclosure Simplification for a more streamlined approach to regulating manipulative conduct during offerings.7 Three of the principal elements that underlie the Commission's decision to provide greater flexibility for market activities during offerings are: securities market transparency, surveillance capabilities of the self-regulatory organizations (``SROs''), and continuing application of the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws, including Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and Sections 9(a), 10(b), and 15(c) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5 and 15c1-2 thereunder,8 to all activities in connection with an offering, whether or not the provisions of Regulation M apply.9 Like the former trading practices rules, Regulation M proscribes certain activities that offering participants could use to manipulate the price of an offered security. Although some [[Page 521]] commenters requested that the rules under Regulation M be formulated as non-exclusive safe harbors from the anti-manipulation provisions of the Exchange Act, the Commission continues to believe that a prophylactic approach to anti-manipulation regulation is the most effective means to protect the integrity of the offering process by precluding activities that could influence artificially the market for the offered security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, 77-79 (March 1996) (``Task Force Report''). \8\ 15 U.S.C. 77q(a); 15 U.S.C. 78i(a), 78j(b), and 78o(c); and 17 CFR 240.10b-5 and 240.15c1-2. \9\ See Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17109. Similarly, Regulation M and the interpretations thereof do not affect the application of the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act to offers and sales of securities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulation M contains six rules covering the following activities during a securities offering: (1) activities by underwriters or other persons who are participating in a distribution (i.e., distribution participants) and their affiliated purchasers; (2) activities by the issuer or selling security holder and their affiliated purchasers; (3) Nasdaq passive market making; (4) stabilization, transactions to cover syndicate short positions, and penalty bids; and (5) short selling in advance of a public offering.10 A separate rule under Regulation M, Rule 100, contains definitional provisions. Some of these definitions are new or revised; many are common to more than one rule. The Commission has endeavored to use straightforward and precise language in both the definitions and rule text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Regulation M is adopted under the Securities Act, particularly Sections 7, 17(a), and 19(a), 15 U.S.C. 77g, 77q(a), and 77s(a); the Exchange Act, particularly Sections 2, 3, 9(a), 10, 11A(c), 12, 13, 14, 15(c), 15(g), 17(a), 23(a), and 30, 15 U.S.C. 78b, 78c, 78i(a), 78j, 78k-1(c), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(c), 78o(g), 78q(a), 78w(a), and 78dd; and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (``Investment Company Act''), 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq., particularly Sections 23, 30, and 38, 15 U.S.C. 80a-23, 80a-29, and 80a-37. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The provisions of Regulation M that are analogous to Rule 10b-6 are contained in Rules 101 and 102, which cover distribution participants, and issuers and selling security holders, respectively. Rules 101 and 102 apply only during a ``restricted period'' that commences one or five business days before the day of the pricing of the offered security and continues until the distribution is over. The restricted periods are based on the trading volume value of the offered security and the public float value of the issuer, rather than the price per share and public float criteria used in Rule 10b-6, and generally are of a shorter duration than the cooling-off periods under Rule 10b-6. Furthermore, the restricted periods of Regulation M focus on the time of pricing. In contrast, Rule 10b-6 imposed restrictions during the entire distribution, which could extend over a lengthy period of time, but excepted certain trading activities prior to a two or nine business day ``cooling-off period.'' The applicable cooling-off period was keyed off the commencement of offers or sales. While Rule 10b-6 was designed to protect the pricing of an offering, certain distribution methods, particularly in connection with foreign offerings, could result in the cooling-off periods commencing after an offering had been priced. Rule 101 excludes from its coverage more actively-traded securities, nonconvertible and asset backed securities rated investment grade, and Rule 144A transactions. Restrictions on transactions in outstanding debt securities during a distribution of a debt security are narrowed substantially. Further, Rule 101 focuses on the security being distributed and does not cover bids for and purchases of related derivative securities. It permits, among other things, the routine dissemination of research reports, exercises of options and other securities, and transactions in baskets of securities involving the offered security. Also, bids for and purchases of rights during rights offerings are deregulated. Rule 101 deals with ``inadvertent'' violations during the restricted period by excusing de minimis transactions, provided that a distribution participant had in place written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the regulation. Moreover, the scope of persons subject to Rule 101 is narrowed by recognizing ``information barriers'' between the distribution participant and its affiliates. Rule 102 covers issuers, selling security holders, and related persons. The rule allows issuers and selling security holders to engage in market activities prior to the applicable restricted period. It also gives issuers greater flexibility in conducting their dividend reinvestment and stock purchase plans and odd-lot repurchase programs. During the restricted period, Rule 102 permits bids and purchases of odd-lots, transactions in connection with issuer plans, and exercises of options or convertible securities by the issuer's affiliated purchasers, and transactions in commodity pool or limited partnership interests during distributions of those securities. The rule contains a limited exception for actively-traded ``reference securities.'' Rule 103 replaces Rule 10b-6A and expands the scope of Nasdaq passive market making. The rule covers all Nasdaq securities and nearly all distributions, and permits more distribution participants to engage in passive market making. Rule 104, which replaces Rule 10b-7, regulates stabilizing and other activities related to a distribution. The rule provides a more flexible framework for stabilizing transactions than Rule 10b-7. Rule 104 allows underwriters to initiate and change stabilizing bids based on the current price in the principal market (whether U.S. or foreign), as long as the bid does not exceed the offering price. Also, by providing for greater disclosure and recordkeeping of transactions that can influence market prices immediately following an offering, Rule 104 addresses the fact that underwriters now engage in substantial syndicate-related market activity, and enforce penalty bids in order to reduce volatility in the market for the offered security. Rule 105 recodifies Rule 10b-21 governing short selling in connection with a public offering. To harmonize Rule 105 with the provisions of Rules 101 and 102, the period of Rule 105's coverage is narrowed to the five business day period before pricing, rather than the period extending from the time of filing of offering materials to the time when sales may be made. The Commission believes that separate regulation of rights offerings, as contained in Rule 10b-8, no longer is warranted. Many rights offerings, especially by foreign issuers, involve securities that fall within the exception for actively-traded securities contained in Rule 101. Even for less actively-traded securities, purchases of rights generally are not an efficient way for a distribution participant to facilitate an offering of the underlying security. Therefore, the Commission has decided to rescind Rule 10b-8. The new regulatory framework relieves market participants of unnecessary burdens and responds effectively to a changing marketplace, while maintaining essential investor protection. The following sections of this release describe the individual provisions of Regulation M and associated rule changes and discuss, where appropriate, how they differ from the rules as proposed and from the former trading practices rules, as well as reasons for these changes. II. Discussion of Regulation M and Related Amendments A. Rule 100--Definitions Rule 100 sets forth the definitions applicable to all of the rules under Regulation M. Most of the definitions are adopted as proposed; some definitions are revised to respond to commenters' suggestions or to add clarity to the rules. Many of these definitions are discussed later in this release in conjunction with the specific [[Page 522]] provisions of Regulation M to which they relate.11 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ In this release, terms defined in Rule 100 appear in italics when discussed for the first time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Rule 101--Activities by Distribution Participants 1. Generally Rule 101 governs the activities of persons participating in distributions of securities, other than issuers or selling security holders, and their affiliated purchasers. The distribution participants subject to Rule 101 will typically be financial intermediaries that routinely engage in market transactions for their own accounts or for customers as part of their businesses. In general, Rule 101 prohibits distribution participants and their affiliated purchasers from bidding for, purchasing, or attempting to induce any person to bid for or purchase, a covered security during a specified period (restricted period). As with Rule 10b-6(c)(5), a distribution of securities under Regulation M is distinguished from ordinary trading transactions by the ``magnitude of the offering'' and the presence of ``special selling efforts and selling methods.'' 12 The restricted period for a particular distribution commences one or five business days before the day of the pricing of the offered security and continues until the distribution is over.13 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Rule 100 defines distribution as ``an offering of securities, whether or not subject to registration under the Securities Act, that is distinguished from ordinary trading transactions by the magnitude of the offering and the presence of special selling efforts and selling methods.'' \13\ Many of the terms and concepts discussed with respect to Rule 101 also are relevant to Rule 102, which proscribes activities by issuers and selling security holders and their affiliated purchasers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even during the restricted period, Rule 101 permits distribution participants and their affiliated purchasers to engage in a variety of activities, including the following: the routine dissemination of research reports; exercises of options and other securities, including rights received in connection with a rights offering; transactions in baskets of securities involving an offered security; and certain transactions involving Rule 144A securities of foreign and domestic issuers. Rule 101 also excepts de minimis transactions that would otherwise violate the rule: bids that are not accepted, and one or more purchases that in the aggregate over the restricted period total less than 2% of the security's average daily trading volume, provided that the person making the unaccepted bids or purchases has maintained and enforced written policies and procedures designed to achieve compliance with the rule. 2. Persons Subject to Rule 101 a. Distribution Participant A distribution participant is defined in Rule 100 as an underwriter, prospective underwriter, broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate or is participating in a distribution. The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed. Several commenters expressed concern that a distribution participant affiliated with an issuer or selling security holder (e.g., an underwriter that is affiliated with an issuer) would be subject to the more restrictive provisions of Rule 102, rather than those of Rule 101, which they claimed could result in unwarranted adverse business and market consequences.14 They recommended that such distribution participants be permitted to rely on the provisions of Rule 101. Other commenters recommended that any financial services affiliate of an issuer or selling security holder, whether or not it is acting as a distribution participant in connection with the distribution, should have the benefit of the additional exceptions available under Rule 101. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ See infra Section II.C., discussing Rule 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After considering the commenters' views, the Commission has added a proviso to paragraph (a) of Rules 101 and 102, specifying that any affiliated purchaser of an issuer or selling security holder that also is acting as a distribution participant may comply with the provisions of Rule 101, rather than Rule 102, provided that such affiliated purchaser is not itself the issuer or selling security holder.15 Thus, during a distribution, an underwriter affiliated with the issuer will be able to comply with the provisions of Rule 101. The Commission is making this revision based upon its experience with Rule 10b-6, and the fact that underwriters affiliated with the issuer are often important market participants that are subject to SRO surveillance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ The exception for actively-traded securities is not available for securities that are issued by a distribution participant or an affiliate of the distribution participant. See infra Sections II.C.2. and II.C.5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Prospective Underwriter A prospective underwriter is defined as a person: who has submitted a bid to an issuer or selling security holder, and knows or is reasonably certain that such bid will be accepted, whether or not the terms and conditions of the underwriting have been agreed upon; or who has reached, or is reasonably certain to reach, an understanding with an issuer, selling security holder, or managing underwriter that such person will become an underwriter, whether or not the terms and conditions of the underwriting have been agreed upon.16 The definition differs from the proposal in that the phrase ``is reasonably certain'' replaces ``reasonably expects.'' Several commenters requested that the proposed definition provide greater certainty as to when a person becomes a prospective underwriter. They believed that, as a practical matter, it may be difficult or even impossible for a broker- dealer to know when it ``reasonably expects'' to have its bid accepted or to reach an understanding with an issuer. Although the definition as adopted does not provide a bright line test, the practical effect should be to reduce the circumstances in which a broker-dealer will be a prospective underwriter. The definition reflects the Commission's view that there is frequently some point prior to when a bid actually has been accepted, or a broker-dealer has been told that it will be an underwriter, when it is reasonably certain that such person will be an underwriter, and that the incentive to facilitate the distribution is present at that point. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ If a broker-dealer has entered into a continuing agreement with an issuer or selling security holder regarding takedowns of securities off a shelf, such agreement typically would make the broker-dealer reasonably certain that it would participate in a distribution off the shelf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Completion of Participation in the Distribution Under Regulation M, a person determines when its completion of participation in the distribution occurs based on the person's role in the distribution. An underwriter is deemed to have completed its participation in a distribution when its participation has been distributed, including all other securities of the same class that are acquired in connection with the distribution, and after any stabilization arrangements and trading restrictions in connection with the distribution have been terminated. The definition contains a proviso that an underwriter's participation is not deemed to be completed, however, if a syndicate overallotment option is exercised in an amount that exceeds the net syndicate short position at the time of such exercise.17 This proviso comports with a provision of Rule 10b-6 and is intended to assure that the underwriter's selling efforts in [[Page 523]] connection with the distribution have in fact ceased before trading prohibitions are lifted. Consistent with Rule 10b-6 interpretation, if an overallotment option is exercised for an amount of securities that exceeds the net syndicate short position (i.e., taking into account shares purchased in stabilizing or syndicate short covering transactions), the distribution will not be deemed completed and purchases made prior to the exercise of the option would constitute a violation of Regulation M.18 Any other distribution participant will have completed its participation when its allotment has been distributed.19 Several commenters asked the Commission to clarify that securities acquired for investment by persons participating in a distribution would be considered to be distributed. Consistent with an interpretation of Rule 10b-6, securities acquired in a distribution for investment purposes by anyone participating in the distribution, or any affiliated purchaser, are considered to be distributed.20 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ See Letter regarding Overallotment Options (November 27, 1996), 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 868. \18\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19565 (March 4, 1983), 48 FR 10628, 10640 (``Release 34-19565''). \19\ See infra Section II.C.2.a., discussing the definition of completion of participation in the distribution as it relates to issuers and selling security holders. \20\ The definition of completion of participation in the distribution codifies the approach taken by the staff in Letter regarding VLI Corporation, [1982-1983] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 77,625 (October 17, 1983) (``VLI Letter''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Affiliated Purchaser The Commission proposed to define affiliated purchaser for Rules 101 and 102 as: (1) a person acting in concert with a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder in connection with the acquisition or distribution of a covered security; (2) an affiliate who controls the purchase of such securities by a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder, or whose purchases are controlled by such persons, or whose purchases are under common control with those of such persons; or (3) an affiliate of a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder who regularly purchases securities for its own account or for the account of others, or who recommends or exercises investment discretion with respect to the purchase or sale of securities (``financial services affiliates''). The Commission proposed excluding a financial services affiliate of a distribution participant, but not that of an issuer or selling security holder, from the definition if: (1) the affiliate was a separate and distinct organizational entity from, having no officers or employees in common with, the distribution participant; (2) the affiliate's bids for, purchases of, and inducements to purchase securities in distribution were made in the ordinary course of its business; and (3) the distribution participant maintained and enforced written policies and procedures designed to segregate the flow of information between the distribution participant and its affiliates (``information barriers''), and obtained an annual independent assessment of the operation of its information barriers. Although commenters generally supported the Commission's efforts to revise the affiliated purchaser definition, several recommended that financial services affiliates of issuers and selling security holders also be excluded from this definition. Moreover, many commenters stated that precluding common officers and employees and requiring that the distribution participant and affiliate be separate and distinct organizational entities would prevent a large number of multi-service financial institutions from relying on this exception. Noting that large financial services providers frequently have at least some officers or employees with overlapping responsibilities, many commenters argued that the presence of common officers or employees should not preclude an affiliate from availing itself of the exclusion where the affiliate's purchases are made in the ordinary course of its business and the distribution participant has maintained and enforces appropriate information barriers. The Commission is adopting the first two prongs of the definition substantially as proposed.21 In response to several commenters' concerns, the Commission has determined to modify the third prong of the definition. As adopted, the exclusion is available to affiliates of distribution participants, issuers, and selling security holders. Moreover, the condition prohibiting common officers (or persons performing similar functions) or employees (other than clerical, ministerial, or support personnel) has been narrowed to preclude commonality only with respect to those officers or employees that direct, effect, or recommend transactions in securities.22 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ None of the commenters objected to the substance of the first two prongs of the proposed definition, although several commenters believed that these provisions would be sufficient to capture any affiliate with both the means and the incentive to manipulate. As adopted, the first prong of the definition remains unchanged, and the only modification to the second prong is the addition of language providing that an ``affiliate'' may be a separately identifiable department or division of a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder. \22\ The Commission believes that this modification will resolve substantially commenters' concerns that sharing one or more senior executives with a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder would preclude an affiliate from availing itself of the exclusion. For example, the requirement would not preclude common executives charged with risk management, compliance, or general oversight responsibilities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A number of commenters argued that information barriers would not deter manipulative activity because general information regarding a distribution is public. The Commission nevertheless is of the view that information barriers can serve to restrict the flow of non-public information that might inappropriately influence an affiliate's transactions in covered securities. For example, appropriate information barriers would prevent the communication of the details of pricing discussions with the issuer and prospective purchasers, or knowledge as to the demand for the offering. As adopted, the information barrier requirements specify that the distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder must maintain and enforce written policies and procedures to prevent the flow of information to or from the affiliate that might result in a violation of Rules 101, 102, or 104 of Regulation M,23 and obtain an annual, independent review of the operation of its information barriers. As noted in the Proposing Release, an internal audit group may perform the review if such group is independent of the distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder's corporate financing, trading, and advisory departments.24 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ The Commission notes that this provision does not require the affiliate to maintain and enforce such information barriers. \24\ Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17117. Several commenters requested that the proposed exclusion clarify that an internal audit group may perform the review. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission has determined to eliminate the requirement that the affiliate be a separate and distinct organizational entity from the distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder in the sense of requiring a separate legal entity, because such a condition could result in elevating form over substance. Moreover, in response to comments regarding the growth and complexity of multi-service financial institutions, language providing that an ``affiliate'' may be a separately identifiable department or division of a distribution participant, issuer, or selling security holder has been added to the second and third prongs of the definition. These changes broaden the scope of financial [[Page 524]] services affiliates that may be eligible for the exclusion. The Commission believes, however, that affiliates should be restricted from engaging in certain types of activities that present the greatest potential for manipulation during the course of a distribution. As adopted, the definition provides that any affiliate that, during the applicable restricted period, acts as a market maker (other than as a specialist in compliance with the rules of a national securities exchange), or engages, as a broker or a dealer, in solicited transactions or proprietary trading activities, in covered securities is an affiliated purchaser. An affiliate (whether an internal unit or a separate legal entity) engaged in these activities is not eligible for the exclusion to the affiliated purchaser definition.25 In contrast, an affiliate acting as an investment company or investment adviser, or in some other non-broker-dealer capacity, would be eligible for the exclusion.26 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ This means, for example, that a broker-dealer that does not make a market in a covered security, or that ceases market maker activity in covered securities during the applicable restricted period, would not fall within the definition of affiliated purchaser. Accordingly, an issuer affiliate that engages only in unsolicited brokerage transactions in covered securities would not fall within the definition. \26\ For example, a trustee or other pension plan administrator may avail itself of the exclusion, provided such entity satisfies the remaining conditions of the exclusion. A multi-service financial institution may engage in both investment advisory services and trading activities. To the extent that the institution's investment advisory services are performed by a separately identifiable department, with no officers or employees that direct, effect, or recommend transactions in securities in common with the trading department, then the investment advisory department may avail itself of the exclusion, provided the remaining conditions of the definition are satisfied. If the same individuals provide investment advisory services and engage in trading activities for the institution, however, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to attribute those functions to ``separately identifiable'' departments. Similarly, where the same individuals direct, effect, or recommend securities transactions for two separately organized affiliates, one providing investment advisory services and the other engaging in solicited activities, such persons could not avail themselves of the exclusion by simply attributing their solicited transactions to their investment advisory role. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission believes that these modifications to the definition of affiliated purchaser will resolve many of the commenters' concerns and avoid unnecessary burdens on multi-service financial organizations with affiliates engaged in financial advisory and other services.27 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ The variety and complexity of organizational structures means that Regulation M may apply to some affiliates that it may be appropriate to exclude. In such cases, the Commission, through the Division of Market Regulation, will entertain exemption requests. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Securities Subject to Rule 101 The Commission proposed applying the trading restrictions of Rule 101 to covered securities, which would include the security that is the subject of a distribution (subject security) and reference securities. The Commission is adopting the definition of covered security as proposed, but at the suggestion of some commenters has revised the definition of reference security to describe more specifically the situations when the term applies. The term reference security is defined as a security into which a subject security may be converted, exchanged, or exercised, or which, under the terms of the subject security, may in whole or in significant part determine the value of the subject security. Several commenters supported the proposed definitions. In general, these commenters believed that the proposed coverage of securities represented a significant improvement from the approach under Rule 10b- 6, which extended trading restrictions to any security of the ``same class and series'' as the security being distributed and any ``right to purchase'' such security.\28\ One commenter additionally noted that the elimination of the same class and series analysis would ease greatly the task of identifying securities that are subject to trading restrictions during debt offerings. Other commenters indicated uncertainty regarding the applicability of Regulation M to debt offerings and requested clarification on the coverage of debt securities that are ``identical in principal features.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ See Proposing Release, text accompanying notes 29 and 30, 61 FR 17114. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The elimination of the same class and series concept will reduce significantly the application of trading restrictions to nonconvertible debt securities that are not rated investment grade.\29\ Bids for and purchases of outstanding nonconvertible debt securities are not restricted unless the security being purchased is identical in all of its terms to the security being distributed. For example, Rule 101 does not apply to a security if there is a single basis point difference in coupon rates or a single day's difference in maturity dates, as compared to the security in distribution.\30\ In the rare situations in which Rule 101 will apply to outstanding debt, the restricted period will generally be five business days. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Nonconvertible debt and certain other securities that are rated investment grade are excluded from Rule 101. See infra Section II.B.6.b. \30\ In a distribution of equity securities, however, outstanding classes of securities that differ only in voting rights from the distributed security will be deemed to be the same security for purposes of Regulation M. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, derivative securities (i.e., those that derive all or part of their value from a security being distributed) are not subject to the trading prohibition of Rule 101. Thus, for example, bids for or purchases of options, warrants, rights, convertible securities, or equity-linked securities are not restricted during a distribution of the related common stock because, while they derive their value from the security being distributed, they do not by their terms affect the value of the security in distribution. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (``NASD'') expressed concern about permitting bids for and purchases of derivative securities in the case of a distribution of an underlying security, because trading in derivative securities can have a significant impact on the underlying security.\31\ The NASD recommended that the Commission consider limiting the exclusion to those derivative securities that are not likely to present manipulative risk, such as ``out-of-the-money'' options. The Commission recognizes that derivative securities, even those that are out-of-the-money, can be used to manipulate the price of an underlying security through inducing arbitrage and other transactions involving the underlying security. It is the Commission's intention, however, to focus trading restrictions on those securities that present the greatest manipulative potential. Moreover, any attempt to manipulate a security in distribution by transactions involving derivative securities will continue to be addressed by the general anti-manipulation provisions, including Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ See Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, President, NASD Regulation, Inc. and Alfred R. Berkeley, III, President, Nasdaq, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (July 23, 1996) (``NASD Comment Letter''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulation M does apply to reference securities, such as common stock underlying an exercisable, exchangeable, or convertible security that is being distributed. The Commission believes that transactions in reference securities can have a direct and substantial effect on the pricing and terms of the security in distribution. The definition of reference security also encompasses a security underlying an instrument, such as an equity-linked security, that does not give the holder the right to acquire the security, but whose value is or may be derived from such security.\32\ A security will be a [[Page 525]] reference security only when it, or an index of which it is a component, is referred to in the terms of a subject security. A security of the same or similar issuer will not be deemed a reference security merely because its price is used as a factor in determining the offering price of a security in distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ Rule 10b-6 by its terms did not apply to the underlying security in these circumstances. The Commission believes, however, that Regulation M should apply to a security whenever it has a price relationship to a subject security as a result of the terms of that security. In some cases, a reference security may have an extremely attenuated relationship to the security in distribution. While the Commission does not believe that a specific percentage test is a workable means to identify these cases, the staff will provide appropriate guidance in response to specific inquiries. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commenters sought clarification concerning whether an issuer or distribution participant would be permitted to write a put or maintain a ``short put'' position during a distribution of an underlying security.\33\ Transactions in derivative securities, including put options, are not subject to Rule 101 during an offering of the underlying security. In addition, maintaining a short put position is not deemed to be a continuing bid for the underlying security for purposes of Regulation M. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ Cf. Letter regarding The Chicago Board Options Exchange, [1990-1991] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 79,665 (February 22, 1991). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Restricted Periods of Rule 101 a. Duration. As discussed below, the Commission is adopting the exclusion from Rule 101 for actively-traded securities.\34\ This provision removes from Rule 101 securities with an ADTV value of at least $1 million where the issuer's common equity securities have a public float value of at least $150 million. For the remaining securities, Rule 101 restricts transactions by distribution participants in covered securities, unless an exception applies, for the following periods: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ See infra Section II.B.6.a., discussing the actively-traded securities exception, which excludes from Rule 101 securities having an ADTV value of at least $1 million and whose issuer's common equity securities have a public float value of at least $150 million. in a distribution of a security with an average daily trading volume (ADTV) value of at least $100,000, whose issuer has outstanding common equity securities having a public float value of at least $25 million, the restricted period begins on the later of one business day prior to the date on which the subject security's price is determined or the date on which the person becomes a distribution participant, and ends upon that person's completion of participation in the distribution; and in a distribution of any other security, the restricted period begins on the later of five business days prior to the date on which the subject security's price is determined or the date on which the person becomes a distribution participant, and ends upon that person's completion of participation in the distribution. The Commission proposed that the restricted periods for an offering would begin one or five business days prior to the pricing of the offering, depending upon the security's ADTV value alone.\35\ In addition, rather than using the date of commencement of offers or sales as a reference, the Commission proposed to determine the restricted period with reference to the date on which the offering is priced. Commenters generally supported shortening the restricted periods, and favored the one and five business days periods keyed off the offering's pricing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17113. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission believes that the ADTV standard is most relevant for determining which securities are more difficult to manipulate. Nevertheless, the use of a trading volume standard alone could skew the application of Rule 101 based on short-term, aberrational increases in trading volume. To prevent this result, the Commission has added a public float component to the test for determining the applicable restricted period.\36\ The public float component is intended to capture within Rule 101 those securities that experience unusual trading volume relative to their public float value. While the use of a two-part test requires distribution participants to make an additional calculation, the Commission believes that the combination of these components better identifies securities that are more likely to be resistant to manipulation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ The Commission has determined that using a public float value component alone would not differentiate securities sufficiently with respect to the likelihood of manipulation because of the wide variations in ADTV value for securities with similar public float value. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rule 10b-6 contained restrictions that principally applied during a two or nine day ``cooling-off period.'' Many securities that had a two day cooling-off period under Rule 10b-6 will now have a one day restricted period under Regulation M, or will be free from the restrictions of Rule 101 because they are actively-traded securities.\37\ Even some nine day securities under Rule 10b-6 will now have a one day restricted period under Regulation M.\38\ Approximately one-quarter of the securities that qualified for a two day cooling-off period under Rule 10b-6 are now subject to a five day restricted period because of the different criteria used in Regulation M and Rule 10b-6 for distinguishing securities. While the restricted periods under Regulation M are increased for some securities, other provisions of Regulation M, such as Rule 103 (permitting passive market making for all Nasdaq securities), will address liquidity concerns with respect to many of these securities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Based on 1995 volume and price data analyzed by the Commission's Office of Economic Analysis (``OEA''), the Commission estimates that 6,156 securities (out of a total of 7,822 securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (``NYSE''), the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (``Amex''), and (Nasdaq) were subject to a two day cooling-off period under Rule 10b-6. Under Regulation M, of those securities approximately 1,901, or 30.9%, are excluded from the rule; 2,693, or 43.7%, are subject to a one day restricted period; and 1,562, or 25.4%, are subject to a five day restricted period. \38\ Based on 1995 volume and price data analyzed by OEA, the Commission estimates that 1,666 securities (out of a total of 7,822 NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq-listed securities) were subject to a nine day cooling-off period under Rule 10b-6. Under Regulation M, of those securities, 11, or 0.7%, are excluded from the rule; 278, or 16.7%, are subject to a one day restricted period; and 1,377, or 82.6%, are subject to a five-day restricted period. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Calculation of ADTV and Public Float Value. The ADTV of a covered security is defined on the basis of reported worldwide average daily trading volume during a specified period prior to the filing of the registration statement or prior to the pricing of the offering, depending on the circumstances. Some commenters questioned whether ADTV can be measured uniformly across markets. The NYSE and the Amex requested that the Commission adopt different standards for determining trading volume on auction and dealer markets.\39\ These exchanges asserted that the Commission's reliance on reported trading volume to determine this exclusion's availability is discriminatory and anti-competitive, because such a standard allegedly favors dealer markets where dealer interpositioning increases volume as compared with auction markets. The Commission does not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to make distinctions based on the type of market on which the security is traded.\40\ The Commission proposed a three-month calendar period for calculating ADTV. The NASD recommended a rolling 60 day period, calculated as of a date within 10 business days prior to pricing, for determining ADTV.\41\ Commenters also requested guidance regarding what [[Page 526]] information sources may be used to calculate ADTV, and suggested that the Commission designate the types of information that are acceptable for determining ADTV. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Letter from James E. Buck, Senior Vice President and Secretary, NYSE, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (May 31, 1996); Letter from James F. Duffy, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Amex, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (June 25, 1996). \40\ See infra Section IV., discussing in greater detail the anti-competitive concerns raised by the NYSE and the Amex. \41\ See NASD Comment Letter, at p. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission believes that, with the addition of a test based on public float value that will tend to correct for volume aberrations, a 60 day rolling period provides a sufficient length of time to measure the trading volume of a security. Therefore, the rule permits distribution participants to use a two calendar month or a 60 day rolling period. The 60 day rolling period for calculating ADTV must end within 10 calendar days of the filing of a registration statement, or, if there is no registration statement or if the distribution is a shelf distribution, within 10 calendar days of the offering's pricing. The 10 day period will allow distribution participants in any type of distribution sufficient time to conform to the applicable restricted period. The Commission has decided not to designate acceptable information sources for determining ADTV; rather, a distribution participant should have flexibility in determining a security's ADTV value from information that is publicly available, if such participant has a reasonable basis for believing that the information is reliable.\42\ Furthermore, in calculating the dollar value of ADTV, any reasonable and verifiable method may be used. For example, it may be derived from multiplying the number of shares by the price in each trade, or from multiplying each day's total volume of shares by the closing price on that day. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27247 (September 14, 1989), 54 FR 39194, 39197-98 (discussing the standard under Rule 15c2-11 under the Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.15c2-11, for a broker- dealer to have a reasonable basis that certain information is true and accurate). For instance, a distribution participant may rely on trading volume as reported by an SRO or comparable entity, or any other source believed to be reliable. Electronic information systems that provide information regarding securities in markets around the world could provide an easy means to determine worldwide trading volume in a particular security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As for public float value, the Commission is adopting a definition that reflects its usage in Form 10-K (i.e., the aggregate amount of common equity securities held by non-affiliates).\43\ For example, for reporting issuers the public float value should be taken from the issuer's most recent Form 10-K or based upon more recent information made available by the issuer. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ 17 CFR 249.310. See also Securities Act Release No. 7326 (August 30, 1996), 61 FR 47706 (proposing the expansion of short- form registration to include companies with non-voting common equity). Form 20-F (17 CFR 249.220f), the annual report form used by foreign private issuers under the Exchange Act, does not require disclosure of public float information. Nonetheless, the public float value of such issuer should be determined in the same manner as provided in Form 10-K. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Offerings Subject to Rule 101 a. Generally. The provisions of Rule 101 apply in connection with a distribution of securities.\44\ The same types of offerings or other transactions that satisfied the distribution criteria under Rule 10b-6 (i.e., the magnitude of the offering/selling efforts test) also are subject to Rule 101. These include public offerings, private placements, shelf offerings, mergers and other acquisitions, exchange offers, forced conversions of securities, warrant solicitations, and at-the-market offerings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ See supra Section II.B.1., discussing the definition of distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Shelf Offerings. The Commission is modifying its approach to shelf-registered distributions by replacing the ``single distribution position'' taken under Rule 10b-6.\45\ Under Regulation M, each takedown off a shelf is to be individually examined to determine whether such offering constitutes a distribution (i.e., whether it satisfies the ``magnitude'' of the offering and ``special selling efforts and selling methods'' criteria of a distribution). Under prior Commission interpretation, if the aggregate amount of securities registered on a shelf constituted a Rule 10b-6 distribution, each takedown was deemed to be part of that single distribution for purposes of the rule, regardless of its individual magnitude.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ See Release 34-19565, 48 FR at 10631. \46\ See Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17115, and Release 34- 19565, 48 FR at 10631. See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23611 (September 11, 1986), 51 FR 33242, 33244 (``Release 34- 23611''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission's modified approach means that a broker-dealer participating in a takedown off a shelf must determine whether it is participating in a distribution.\47\ In those situations where a broker-dealer sells shares on behalf of an issuer or selling security holder in ordinary trading transactions into an independent market (i.e., without any special selling efforts) the offering will not be considered a distribution and the broker-dealer will not be subject to Rule 101.\48\ A broker-dealer likely would be subject to Rule 101, however, if it enters into a sales agency agreement that provides for unusual transaction-based compensation for the sales, even if the securities are sold in ordinary trading transactions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ An issuer's description in a shelf registration statement of a variety of potential selling methods will not cause, by itself, any sales off the shelf to be treated as a distribution, unless the broker-dealer in fact uses special selling efforts or selling methods in connection with particular sales off the shelf, and the sales are of a magnitude sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a distribution. Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18528 (March 3, 1982), 47 FR 11482, 11485. \48\ This approach assumes that the broker-dealer is disposing of shares in ordinary trading transactions into an independent market (i.e., one not dominated or controlled by the broker-dealer, and where the price is not manipulated by the broker-dealer or others acting in concert with the broker-dealer). Release 34-23611, 51 FR at 33247. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Exchange Offers. Many commenters questioned the application of Rule 101's restricted periods to mergers, acquisitions, and exchange offers. These commenters noted that during merger distributions subject to Rule 10b-6, trading restrictions were imposed during the applicable two or nine day period prior to the mailing of proxy solicitation materials and for the duration of the proxy solicitation.\49\ Similarly, the Commission also considered the commencement of any valuation period or any election period as the equivalent of the ``commencement of offers or sales,'' requiring bids and purchases to cease during the applicable two or nine day period and for the duration of the valuation or election period.\50\ Several commenters stated that by requiring the restricted period to commence one or five days prior to pricing, it is possible that the restricted period for a merger distribution could begin several months prior to the mailing of the proxy materials. These commenters noted that in such situations the restricted period could be much lengthier under Regulation M, as compared to the practice under Rule 10b-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ See Release 34-19565, 48 FR at 10638-39. \50\ Id. at 10639. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission believes that mergers, acquisitions, and exchange offers involve distributions in which interested persons have considerable incentive to manipulate. The Commission agrees with the commenters that the Regulation M restricted periods should reflect the characteristics of these types of distributions. Accordingly, as adopted the restrictions of Regulation M begin on the day when proxy solicitation or offering materials first are disseminated to security holders and end with the completion of the distribution (i.e., the time of the shareholder vote or the expiration of the exchange offer).\51\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ In addition, Rule 10b-13 under the Exchange Act continues to prohibit any purchases or arrangements to purchase securities that are the subject of an exchange offer, or a security immediately convertible into or exchangeable for those securities, from the time of public announcement until the expiration of the exchange offer. 17 CFR 240.10b-13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 527]] Consistent with an interpretation under Rule 10b-6, a restricted period also will apply during any period where the market price of the offered security will be a factor in determining the consideration to be paid pursuant to a merger, acquisition, or exchange offer. Thus, activity proscribed by Rules 101 and 102 must cease one or five business days before the commencement of any valuation period and for the duration of such period.\52\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ Release 34-19565, 48 FR at 10639. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. At-the-market Offerings. In an at-the-market offering, sales prices are established during the course of the offering based upon market conditions at the time of individual sales.\53\ Accordingly, the restricted period for such an offering would commence one or five business days before the pricing of each sale and continue until the person's participation in the distribution is completed. In practice, the application of Rule 101 will essentially be the same as in the case of a fixed price offering, where one price is established for the entire distribution, because the activities of distribution participants are restricted during the entire course of offers and sales, whether the securities are sold at fixed or varying prices. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \53\ The term at-the-market offering is defined as an offering of securities at other than a fixed price. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Securities Excepted from Rule 101 a. Exception for Actively-traded Securities. The Commission proposed excluding from Rule 101 all securities with a published ADTV value of at least $1 million, and requested comment on whether another test, such as a public float test, should be used to determine which securities should be excluded from the rule. Commenters supported an exclusion for actively-traded securities, with two commenters suggesting a lower threshold and one recommending a threshold of $10 million. The Commission is adopting an exception for those securities that have an ADTV value of at least $1 million that are issued by an issuer whose common equity securities have a public float value of at least $150 million. The Commission continues to believe that an exclusion for actively- traded securities is appropriate. The costs of manipulating such securities generally are high. In addition, because actively-traded securities are widely followed by the investment community, aberrations in price are more likely to be discovered and quickly corrected. Moreover, actively-traded securities are generally traded on exchanges or other organized markets with high levels of transparency and surveillance. The reasons for incorporating a dual ADTV value/public float value test for the restricted periods similarly apply to determining whether securities qualify for the actively-traded securities exception.\54\ The Commission selected $150 million for the public float value test because it believes that the securities of issuers with a public float value at or above this threshold, and that also have an ADTV value of at least $1 million, have a sufficient market presence to make them less likely to be manipulated. As discussed above, the $150 million public float value test is intended in part to exclude issuers from the actively-traded securities exception where a high trading volume level is an aberration. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ For example, the Commission considered using the $75 million public float value measure included in the eligibility criteria for Forms S-3 and F-3 under the Securities Act. However, the Commission adopted that threshold for different reasons, i.e., information regarding companies with a public float value of at least $75 million is efficiently assimilated by the market because they are likely to be followed by multiple analysts. See Securities Act Release No. 7053 (April 19, 1994), 59 FR 21644; Securities Act Release No. 7029 (November 3, 1993), 58 FR 60307. Therefore, it was appropriate to permit incorporation of Exchange Act filings in registration statements filed by such issuers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The combined minimums of $1 million ADTV value for the securities and $150 million public float value removes from Rule 101 the equity securities of approximately 1,900 domestic issuers, as well as those of a substantial number of foreign issuers.\55\ The Commission estimates that the addition of a public float test reduces by approximately 9% the number of domestic issuers whose common stock would be excepted from Rule 101 based solely on an ADTV test.\56\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ Based on transaction information for 1995 analyzed by OEA, approximately 1,106 securities listed on the NYSE, 770 securities quoted on Nasdaq, and 36 securities listed on the Amex would be excluded from Rule 101. The general increase in security prices and trading volume since year-end 1995 likely will increase the number of securities satisfying the ADTV minimum. \56\ Based on 1995 volume and price data analyzed by OEA, 2,103 securities have an ADTV value of at least $1 million; 1,912 securities have an ADTV value of at least $1 million and a market capitalization of at least $150 million. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Investment Grade Securities. The Commission is adopting an exception to Rule 101 for nonconvertible debt securities, nonconvertible preferred securities, and asset-backed securities, provided that the security being distributed is rated investment grade by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization.\57\ The Proposing Release recommended excepting investment grade nonconvertible debt and preferred securities and noted that the comparable Rule 10b-6 exception was based on the premise that these securities are traded on the basis of their yields and credit ratings, are largely fungible and, therefore, are less likely to be subject to manipulation. The Commission solicited comment on whether investment grade asset-backed securities have the same characteristics with respect to trading as nonconvertible investment grade debt of corporate issuers, and whether such securities should be excepted from the rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ The term nationally recognized statistical rating organization in paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 101 has the same meaning as that term is used in 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Several commenters stated that investment grade asset-backed securities should be excepted from Rule 101 because they are the functional equivalent of investment grade debt. One commenter suggested using the definition of asset-backed security contained in the Instruction to Form S-3 for purposes of Rule 101. Another commenter, although not proposing a definition of asset-backed security, recommended an exception for investment grade asset-backed securities backed by a fixed pool of receivables. Asset-backed securities are excluded from Rule 101 because such securities trade primarily on the basis of yield and credit rating. The principal focus of investors in the asset-backed securities market is on the structure of a class of securities and the nature of the assets pooled to serve as collateral for those securities, rather than the identity of a particular issuer. Investment grade asset-backed securities also are similar to investment grade nonconvertible debt and preferred securities. Therefore, Rule 101 excepts securities that are ``primarily serviced by the cashflows of a discrete pool of receivables or other financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to the security holders'' 58 and that are rated investment grade. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ This definition is identical to the definition of asset- backed security contained in General Instruction I.B.5. to Form S-3, 17 CFR 239.13(b). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A few commenters also proposed that an even broader exception for debt and preferred securities be adopted, suggesting that high-yield debt securities be excepted from Rule 101 when those securities satisfy certain criteria. One commenter proposed that all debt be excluded from coverage of [[Page 528]] Rule 101. The Commission believes that, as a practical matter, Rule 101 and Rule 102 will have very limited impact on debt securities, except for the rare situations where selling efforts continue over a period of time.59 In those circumstances, where the incentive to manipulate can escalate, the Commission believes that the application of Regulation M is appropriate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \59\ See supra Section II.B.3., discussing covered securities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Exempted Securities. The Commission is adopting the proposed exception to Rule 101 for ``exempted securities'' as defined in Section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act.60 Transactions in these securities are not restricted by Rule 101. This exception is similar to a provision contained in Rule 10b-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(12). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Face-amount Certificates or Securities Issued by an Open-end Management Investment Company or Unit Investment Trust. The exception to Rule 101 for face-amount certificates issued by a face-amount certificate company, or redeemable securities issued by an open-end management investment company or a unit investment trust, is adopted as proposed. Transactions in these securities are not covered by Rule 101. An identical provision existed in Rule 10b-6. 17. Activities Excepted from Rule 101 a. Exception 1--Research. The Commission is adopting exception 1 to Rule 101, which permits the publication or dissemination of any information, opinion, or recommendation relating to a covered security if the conditions of either Rule 138 or Rule 139 under the Securities Act are satisfied.\61\ This exception more closely aligns Rule 101 with the Securities Act rules governing permissible research activities by broker-dealers participating in offerings of securities.62 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \61\ 17 CFR 230.138, 230.139. \62\ Exception 1 differs from a previous staff position that certain research reports were not prohibited inducements to purchase if such research was issued by a broker-dealer in the ordinary course of business, and satisfied either Rule 138 or Rule 139(b), or satisfied Rule 139(a) and did not contain a recommendation or earnings forecast more favorable than that previously disseminated by the firm. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21332 (September 19, 1984), 49 FR 37569, 37572 n.25. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As proposed, the exception required the research to be published or disseminated ``in the ordinary course of business.'' Several commenters found this phrase to be confusing because Rule 138 requires that research be published or distributed in the ``regular course of business,'' 63 and Rule 139 requires that information, opinions, or recommendations be contained in a publication that is distributed with ``reasonable regularity in the normal course of business.'' 64 The Commission has deleted as redundant the phrase ``in the ordinary course of business'' from exception 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ 17 CFR 230.138 (a) and (b). \64\ 17 CFR 230.139(b)(1)(i). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commenters also were uncertain about the application of this exception to electronically disseminated research. The Commission believes that if a distribution participant, in the normal course of its business, provides research reports to independent research services that make such reports available to their subscribers electronically, whether or not the subscribers are customers of or have previously received research from the broker-dealer, such research is excepted from Rule 101. 65 Similarly, a distribution participant may update its mailing list (i.e., new persons may be added) where it is intended that they receive all future research sent to others on the list, and not just the research related to the security in distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ Also, a broker-dealer may deliver research reports to its customers via electronic means as a substitute for paper delivery. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37182 (May 9, 1996), 61 FR 24644. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some commenters inquired whether the exception would be available to unregistered offerings, because Rules 138 and 139 pertain to the dissemination of research during registered offerings. In the Commission's view, for purposes of Rule 101, exception 1 is available during distributions that are not registered under the Securities Act, as long as the conditions of either Rule 138 or Rule 139 are satisfied, other than those pertaining to the filing of a registration statement. A few commenters further recommended that research disseminated outside of the United States during a global offering be excepted from Rule 101's coverage, if such research is disseminated in conformity with local rule or custom. The Commission has determined that the conditions of Rules 138 and 139 (other than registration) define the appropriate parameters for research activities involving securities distributed in the United States because research activities outside the United States in connection with a distribution subject to the rule could be used to facilitate the distribution in the United States. The Commission notes, however, that many of the securities distributed in global offerings will be subject to the rule's actively-traded securities exception and, therefore, not subject to Rule 101's provisions. 66 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ Nevertheless, there may be other circumstances in which the dissemination of research that does not meet the conditions of Rules 138 or 139 outside the United States may be appropriate during a global offering. The staff will provide guidance on a case-by-case basis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Exception 2--Transactions Complying with Certain Other Sections. Exception 2, which allows passive market making transactions and stabilizing transactions complying with Rules 103 or 104, respectively, is adopted as proposed. c. Exception 3--Odd-Lot Transactions. Exception 3, permitting distribution participants to bid for or purchase odd-lots during the restricted period, is adopted as proposed. Accordingly, a distribution participant may purchase odd-lots during a distribution. Among other things, this exception permits distribution participants to engage in activities in connection with issuer odd-lot tender offers conducted pursuant to Rule 13e-4(h)(5) under the Exchange Act, including effecting purchases necessary to permit odd-lot holders to ``round-up'' their holdings to 100 shares. d. Exception 4--Exercises of Securities. Exception 4 permits distribution participants to exercise any option, warrant, right, or any conversion privileges set forth in the instrument governing a security. This exception does not distinguish call options acquired before the person became a distribution participant from those acquired afterwards. In addition, the exception covers exercises of non- standardized call options. Supporters of this exception noted that option exercises do not involve significant manipulative potential because of the unpredictability of the timing and the extent of purchases by persons writing call options. As noted earlier, the NASD expressed more general concerns about Regulation M's limited coverage of derivative securities.67 The Commission believes that exercises or conversions of derivative securities generally have an uncertain and attenuated manipulative potential and, for that reason, has adopted the exception as proposed.68 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \67\ See supra text accompanying note 31. \68\ The Commission cautions that in connection with exercises of non-standardized options and other securities that are privately negotiated between the parties, there may be circumstances when the exercise of a call option, for example, could be made for the purpose of requiring the other party to acquire the security. In such a case, the purchase by the party exercised against may be deemed to be a purchase by the exercising party. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In light of the treatment of derivative securities under Regulation M, the Commission is rescinding Rule 10b-8, [[Page 529]] which pertained to distributions through rights. This rule contained overly rigid and complex restrictions on purchases of rights and regulated sales of offered securities. Bids for and purchases of rights are not subject to Rules 101 and 102, although bids for and purchases of a security that is the subject of a rights distribution are restricted by these rules. e. Exception 5--Unsolicited Transactions. The Commission is adopting an exception to Rule 101 for unsolicited brokerage transactions, and for certain unsolicited purchases as principal. This exception incorporates the provision contained in exception (xi)(D) to Rule 10b-6 for unsolicited principal transactions, and, similar to exception (ii) to Rule 10b-6, permits unsolicited purchases that are not effected from or through a broker or dealer, on a securities exchange, or through an inter-dealer quotation system or electronic communications network (``ECN'') as defined in Rule 11Ac1-1(a)(8) under the Exchange Act.69 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ 17 CFR 240.11Ac1-1(a)(8). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37619A (September 6, 1996), 61 FR 48289 (``Release 34- 37619A''), for a discussion of ECNs. A purchase in response to an order or quote displayed on an ECN would not constitute an unsolicited transaction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This exception places no restrictions on distribution participants effecting unsolicited brokerage transactions during a distribution. 70 In addition, unsolicited purchases as principal are also unrestricted. Although the Commission did not propose an exception to Rule 101 for unsolicited principal purchases, many commenters asserted that exception (ii) to Rule 10b-6 pertaining to such purchases was, in fact, widely used. The Rule 101 exception for unsolicited purchases differs from the analogous Rule 10b-6 exception, however, because it does not require that purchases be of ``block'' size.\71\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \70\ This exception incorporates the provisions of Rule 10b- 6(a)(5)(B). In addition, consistent with an interpretation under Rule 10b-6, a broker-dealer who receives an unsolicited order to sell may solicit purchasers in executing the transaction as broker for the seller. \71\ Also, the exception as adopted does not incorporate the phrase ``privately negotiated'' because it is unnecessary in light of the other terms of the exception. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, the exception applies to purchases effected otherwise than through a broker-dealer, on a securities exchange, or through an inter-dealer quotation system or ECN, because those purchases are less likely to be used to influence the price of a security that is the subject of a distribution. This clause of the exception permits distribution participants and affiliated purchasers to purchase covered securities from persons, other than broker-dealers, who were not solicited by the distribution participant or its affiliated purchasers and precludes purchases through an exchange, Nasdaq, or alternative trading system. This exception reflects the view that unsolicited purchases, regardless of their size, generally do not raise the concerns at which Rule 101 is directed when those purchases are not effected through market mechanisms. In such circumstances, those purchases are less likely to affect the offered security's price. f. Exception 6--Basket Transactions. Exception 6 relates to purchases of covered securities made in connection with basket transactions. This exception permits transactions in covered securities when the aggregate dollar value of any bids for or purchases of a covered security constitutes 5% or less of the total dollar value of the basket being purchased, and the basket contains at least 20 stocks. The exception is available with respect to both index-related baskets and customized baskets. To qualify for the exception, the basket transaction must be a bona fide transaction effected in the ordinary course of business (i.e., the decision to include the security in distribution in the basket must be independent of the existence of the distribution).\72\ The exception also permits bids and purchases for the purpose of adjusting an existing basket position related to a standardized index when made in the ordinary course of business to the extent necessary to reflect a change in the composition of the index. For example, a basket could be adjusted to reflect substitutions of securities in a standardized index. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \72\ Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17118. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While supporting the flexibility of the basket transaction exception, some commenters suggested alternatives, including using either a single percentage test of 5% or 10%, or a 10%/10 stock or 10%/ 15 stock standard. The Commission believes that the majority of stocks contained in baskets will be excepted under the actively-traded securities exception and that the 5%/20 stock standard allows trading in most basket transactions while ensuring that such transactions are not easily used to influence the price of a security. The Commission is concerned that, given the possibility that a distribution participant could time its basket transactions for maximum price effect, a less rigorous standard could lead to abuse. Further, the inclusion of the 20 stock criterion provides an objective indication of the bona fide nature of the basket transaction. Commenters also stated that this exception should allow for rebalancing any customized basket covered by the exception, or for rebalancing in a covered security that is consistent with rebalancing activity in other stocks contained in the basket. In the Commission's view, allowing distribution participants to make adjustments in customized baskets may give a distribution participant the means to effect significant transactions in covered securities (e.g., by deciding to include a security in distribution in a basket without a reason independent of the distribution), thereby raising manipulative concerns. Accordingly, the Commission is not permitting adjustments to rebalance customized baskets, unless the adjustments themselves qualify under the 5%/20 stock test. g. Exception 7--De Minimis Transactions. The Commission is adopting exception 7 for de minimis transactions. As proposed, the exception applied to unaccepted bids and aggregate purchases of 1% of a security's ADTV. Several commenters stated that a 1% level was too limited to be useful. For this reason, a few commenters proposed raising the de minimis threshold to 5% of the security's ADTV. Commenters also requested clarification that the de minimis test could be applied to more than one transaction. In addition, some commenters suggested that any bid or purchase not exceeding a de minimis amount should be eligible for the exception. Because the Commission believes that an exception for small, inadvertent transactions lacking market impact is appropriate, it is adopting an exception for de minimis transactions. The purchasing level has been increased to 2% to give distribution participants greater margin for error, while retaining the exception's de minimis nature. Unaccepted bids, and purchases during the restricted period that in the aggregate do not exceed 2% of the ADTV of the security in distribution, are excepted from the rule, if the person has maintained and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the rule. Once inadvertent transaction(s) are discovered, subsequent transaction(s) would not be covered by this exception. Also, this de minimis exception does not apply to Nasdaq passive market making transactions. Commenters recommended that the exception be extended to include solicited brokerage transactions and [[Page 530]] bids that are accepted, but that do not result in a purchase because the trade is broken. The Commission clarifies that the exception is available to transactions resulting from solicited brokerage provided that the conditions of the exception are satisfied. However, any purchase, even if the trade subsequently is broken, must be considered a purchase for purposes of this exception. One commenter asserted that the proviso requiring written policies and procedures is unnecessary. This requirement is adopted as proposed, however, because the Commission believes that the presence of compliance procedures buttresses the inadvertent character of excepted de minimis transactions. The Commission notes that repeated reliance on the exception would raise questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of a firm's procedures. Therefore, upon the occurrence of any violation, a broker-dealer is expected to review its policies and procedures and modify them as appropriate. h. Exception 8--Transactions in Connection with a Distribution. The Commission is adopting the exception for transactions in connection with a distribution substantially as proposed. Exception 8 permits transactions among distribution participants in connection with the distribution and purchases from an issuer or selling security holder in connection with the distribution that are not effected on a securities exchange or through an inter-dealer quotation system, or through an ECN. Based on commenters' views, the portion of the proposed exception relating to offers to sell or the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being distributed or offered as principal is now contained in exception 9.\73\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \73\ A distribution participant relying on this exception must be prepared to sell the securities if the offer is accepted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- i. Exception 9--Offers to Sell or the Solicitation of Offers to Buy. The Commission is adopting the exception for offers to sell or the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being distributed (including securities acquired in stabilizing), or securities offered as principal by the person making such offer or solicitation. j. Exception 10--Transactions in Rule 144A Securities. The Commission is adopting the exception for transactions in securities eligible for resale under Rule 144A(d)(3) (``Rule 144A securities'') substantially as proposed.\74\ As adopted, the exception permits transactions in Rule 144A securities during a distribution of such securities, provided that sales of such securities within the United States are made solely to: qualified institutional buyers (``QIBs''), or persons reasonably believed to be QIBs, in transactions exempt from registration under the Securities Act (``Rule 144A distributions''); or persons not deemed to be ``U.S. persons'' for purposes of Rule 902(o)(2) or (o)(7) of Regulation S under the Securities Act, during a concurrent Rule 144A distribution to QIBs.\75\ The exception covers both the Rule 144A security being distributed and any reference security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ See 17 CFR 230.144A(d)(3). \75\ 17 CFR 230.902(o)(2) and (o)(7). This follows the position taken under Rule 10b-6 in Letter regarding Regulation S Transactions during Distributions of Foreign Securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers, [1993-1994] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 76,851 (February 22, 1994), as modified by Letter regarding Regulation S Transactions during Distributions of Foreign Securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers (March 9, 1995). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the Proposing Release, the Commission noted that an exception based on the categories of persons to whom the securities are distributed may be viewed as a departure from the anti-manipulation approach of Regulation M, because no class of investors, including large institutions, is immune to injury from securities fraud or manipulation.\76\ Nevertheless, the Commission considers it appropriate to reduce the scope of Rule 101's prophylactic protections in the case of QIBs, because QIBs have considerable ability to obtain, consider, and analyze market information, and the Commission is not aware of complaints of manipulation in this context.\77\ Moreover, in light of the characteristics of Rule 144A securities (e.g., eligible securities are not listed on a U.S. exchange or quoted on Nasdaq), the exception does not distinguish between Rule 144A distributions to QIBs of foreign and domestic securities.\78\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17119 n.61. \77\ The Commission wishes to emphasize that QIBs will continue to be protected by the general anti-manipulation and anti-fraud provisions, including Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and Sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. \78\ See Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17119. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Several commenters recommended broadening the proposed exception to include contemporaneous sales within the United States to certain institutional accredited investors. Some of these commenters suggested that the exception permit sales to institutional accredited investors where sales to QIBs exceeded a certain percentage of the total distribution.\79\ The Commission is not adopting these recommendations because institutional accredited investors encompass a much broader category of persons, a large segment of which do not have characteristics comparable to those of QIBs which underlie this exception. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \79\ The percentages recommended by commenters ranged from 50% to 80%. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. Exemptive Authority The Commission proposed to include within Rule 101 a provision permitting the Commission to exempt any transaction or transactions from the rule on a case-by-case basis. Two commenters recommended that the exemptive authority provision be expanded to permit exemptions for securities or classes of securities. To increase flexibility in the exemption process, the Commission is adopting this suggested addition. An exemption may be granted either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions.\80\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ The Commission is revising its Rules of Practice and Investigations to provide that exemptions may be granted by designated persons in the Division of Market Regulation pursuant to authority delegated by the Commission. See 17 CFR 200.30-3 of this chapter, as amended. Rules 102, 104, and 105 include similar provisions authorizing the Commission to grant exemptions from those rules, and this authority also will be delegated to designated persons in the Division of Market Regulation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Rule 102--Activities by Issuers and Selling Security Holders 1. Generally Rule 102 covers certain activities of issuers and selling security holders, and their affiliated purchasers, during a distribution of securities. Rule 102 is similar in format to Rule 101: issuers and selling security holders, and their affiliated purchasers, must refrain from bidding for, purchasing, or attempting to induce any person to bid for or purchase a covered security during the applicable restricted period, unless an exception permits the activity. Rule 102 contains fewer exceptions than Rule 101 because issuers and selling security holders have the greatest interest in an offering's outcome and generally do not have the same market access needs as underwriters. The exceptions in Rule 102 permit: transactions in nonconvertible investment grade securities and transactions during Rule 144A distributions; exercises of options and other securities, including rights; and odd-lot transactions and associated round-up transactions during an issuer odd-lot tender offer. Closed-end investment companies that engage in continuous offerings of securities also may conduct certain tender offers for those securities during such distributions. There is no general exception for actively-traded securities, although a limited exception is included [[Page 531]] for certain actively-traded reference securities. Furthermore, most transactions in connection with dividend reinvestment and stock purchase plans are excluded from Rule 102. Only plan distributions involving securities obtained directly from the issuer are subject to Rule 102. Several commenters asked that the Commission further explain the treatment of plans under Rule 102. This release provides guidance on the types of plan activities that may be engaged in without constituting special selling efforts and selling methods within the meaning of the definition of distribution, and clarifies that certain dividend reinvestment and stock purchase plans offered by bank-registered transfer agents and registered broker- dealers qualify for the plan exception. 2. Persons Subject to Rule 102 a. Generally. Rule 102 applies to issuers, selling security holders, and their affiliated purchasers. Several commenters sought clarification as to whether an issuer's transactions in a covered security would be restricted during a distribution effected solely by or on behalf of a selling security holder not affiliated with the issuer. The Commission does not intend to limit an issuer's activities during a distribution effected solely by or on behalf of a selling security holder if the issuer is not an affiliated purchaser of the selling security holder, and has modified paragraph (a) of Rule 102 accordingly.\81\ An issuer will be deemed to have completed its participation in a distribution when the entire distribution is completed.82 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ The interpretations contained in Release 34-23611 regarding shelf distributions by selling security holders will continue to have relevance. See infra Section II.C.4.b. \82\ Cf. supra Section II.B.2.c., discussing when distribution participants are considered to complete their participation in a distribution. See also the definition of ``completion of participation in a distribution.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Affiliated Purchaser. As discussed earlier, several commenters recommended excepting financial services affiliates of issuers and selling security holders from the definition of ``affiliated purchaser.'' 83 As adopted, the definition of affiliated purchaser excludes financial services affiliates of an issuer or selling security holder if the issuer or selling security holder maintains and enforces information barriers between itself and such affiliates. In addition, a proviso has been added to paragraph (a) of Rule 102 that provides that any affiliated purchaser of an issuer or selling security holder that is acting as a distribution participant may comply with Rule 101, rather than Rule 102.84 This accommodates the ordinary market activities of broker-dealers and other financial institutions participating in a distribution because they are subject to SRO surveillance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \83\ See supra Section II.B.2.d. \84\ The proviso to Rule 101 specifies that, where a distribution participant or an affiliated purchaser of a distribution participant is itself the issuer or selling security holder, Rule 102 applies. See supra Section II.B.2.a. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Securities Subject to Rule 102 The restrictions of Rule 102 apply to covered securities in the same manner as Rule 101.85 Thus, persons subject to Rule 102 are precluded during the restricted period from bidding for or purchasing the subject security or any reference security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \85\ See supra Section II.B.3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Offerings Subject to Rule 102 a. Generally. As with Rule 101, Rule 102 applies only when there is a distribution of securities.86 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ See supra Section II.B.5., discussing the types of offerings and other transactions that are subject to Rule 101. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Shelf Offerings. In the case of an offering of securities pursuant to a shelf registration statement, the Commission will apply Regulation M in a manner consistent with interpretations under Rule 10b-6 regarding the restrictions on issuers and selling security holders during shelf offerings.\87\ Thus, an issuer and all of its affiliated purchasers are subject to the applicable restricted period of Rule 102 when sales off a shelf by an issuer, or by any affiliated purchaser, constitute a distribution of securities. Similarly, when a selling security holder sells off the shelf and such sales constitute a distribution, all other shelf security holders who are affiliated purchasers of the selling security holder are subject to the applicable restricted period of Rule 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \87\ See Release 34-23611, 51 FR at 33242. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Securities Excepted from Rule 102 a. Actively-traded Reference Securities. Many commenters maintained that issuers, selling security holders, and their affiliated purchasers should have the benefit of an actively-traded securities exception similar to that in Rule 101. The Commission believes that persons subject to Rule 102 should not be able to trade in their securities, whether or not they are actively traded. The Commission's view is based on issuers' and selling security holders' stake in the proceeds of the offering, and their generally lesser need to engage in securities transactions. Certain commenters noted that, as proposed, Regulation M would have prevented an issuer of equity-linked securities, or its affiliated purchasers, from engaging in hedging activity in the associated reference security, even when that security was actively traded. According to these commenters, the ability to conduct such hedging activity immediately prior to the pricing of an equity-linked security is critical to the structure of such distributions. In response to these comments, the Commission has determined to provide a limited exception from Rule 102 for actively-traded reference securities that are not issued by the issuer of the security in distribution, or by any affiliate of the issuer. This exception permits the type of hedging activity that was not previously subject to Rule 10b-6. Thus, the issuer of an equity linked security, or a security holder selling an equity-linked security, can purchase in a hedging transaction an actively-traded reference security issued by an unaffiliated entity. However, the issuer or selling security holder of an equity-linked security is prohibited from purchasing any reference security for which it, or any of its affiliates, is the issuer. Of course, the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws are applicable to any transactions associated with distributions of equity-linked securities. b. Other Excepted Securities. The Commission is adopting as proposed the exceptions in Rule 102 for ``exempted securities'' as defined in Section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act, and face-amount certificates or securities issued by an open-end management investment company or unit investment trust. In addition, the Commission has determined to include in Rule 102 an exception for investment grade nonconvertible debt, nonconvertible preferred securities, and asset- backed securities, based on commenters' views and the rationales indicated above for an identical exception to Rule 101.88 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ See supra Section II.B.6.c. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Activities Excepted from Rule 102 a. Exception 1--Odd-Lot Transactions. Rule 102 contains an exception for odd-lot transactions, which permits issuer odd-lot tender offers. This exception, which is identical to exception 3 to Rule 101, will provide greater flexibility to issuers conducting odd-lot tender offers during a distribution.89 Moreover, as modified from the proposal, this exception permits an issuer conducting an odd-lot tender offer to engage in transactions [[Page 532]] necessary to enable shareholders to round-up their holdings to 100 shares.90 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \89\ See supra Section II.B.7.c. \90\ Today, the Commission also is adopting an amendment to Rule 13e-4(h)(5) to permit issuers to conduct odd-lot offers, including continuous, periodic, or extended odd-lot offers, for their equity securities without establishing a record date of ownership for shareholder eligibility to participate in the offer. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38068 (December 20, 1996). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Exception 2--Transactions by Closed-end Investment Companies. Exception 2, as it relates to transactions complying with Rule 23c-3 under the Investment Company Act,91 is adopted as proposed. Accordingly, repurchases by closed-end investment companies that are conducted in compliance with Rule 23c-3 will not violate Rule 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \91\ 17 CFR 270.23c-3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unlike so-called ``interval'' funds, which buy back their securities pursuant to Rule 23c-3, other closed-end funds are more circumscribed as to their repurchases.92 Many of these closed-end funds advise investors in their prospectuses that investments in the funds should be considered illiquid, particularly as the fund does not intend to seek a public trading market for its securities. To provide their investors with an opportunity to sell their securities, these funds often disclose that they may consider conducting periodic tender offers to repurchase all or a portion of their outstanding securities at the then current net asset value. A few commenters raised issues about the continuation of Rule 10b-6 exemptions granted to those closed-end funds that conduct periodic tender offers for their securities pursuant to Rule 13e-4 under the Exchange Act,93 when the funds are engaged in continuous offerings pursuant to Rule 415 under the Securities Act.94 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \92\ Cf. 15 U.S.C. 80a-23(c). \93\ 17 CFR 240.13e-4. \94\ 17 CFR 230.415. See, e.g., Letter regarding Brazilian Investment Fund, Inc., [1993] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 76,712 (August 6, 1993). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Exception 2 is available to a registered closed-end investment company that engages in a continuous offering of its securities pursuant to Rule 415 and repurchases, at net asset value, securities of the same class in a tender offer conducted pursuant to Rule 13e-4, provided that there is no widely available alternative transaction mechanism for its securities (i.e., the securities are not traded on a securities exchange or through an inter-dealer quotation system or ECN). This exception accommodates those closed-end funds that currently have Rule 10b-6 exemptions, and benefits additional closed-end funds with similar distribution and repurchase features, because they will not need to seek exemptive relief under Regulation M. c. Exception 3--Redemptions by Commodity Pools or Limited Partnerships. The Commission is incorporating exception 3 to permit redemptions by commodity pools or limited partnerships that are effected at a price based on the securities' net asset value in accordance with the terms and conditions of the governing instruments, as long as the securities are not traded on an exchange, or through an inter-dealer quotation system or ECN. This exception is being adopted in response to commenter concerns, and permits commodity pools and limited partnerships to effect redemptions of their securities without seeking exemptive relief under Regulation M. Redemptions of such securities pursuant to their governing instruments at a price based on net asset value are unlikely to raise manipulative concerns. d. Exception 4--Exercises of Securities. The Commission is adopting exception 4 relating to the exercises of call options and other securities as proposed. This exception is identical to exception 4 to Rule 101, and permits the exercise of rights in connection with convertible, exchangeable, or exercisable securities, including options received in connection with employee benefit plans. e. Exception 5--Transactions in Connection with the Distribution. Exception 5 is adopted as proposed. This exception permits offers to sell and the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being distributed, and enables an issuer or selling security holder to conduct an offering on its own behalf.95 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \95\ Regulation M does not preclude affiliates of an issuer (e.g., officers or directors) from purchasing securities in the offering. See also supra Section II.C.2.a., regarding a person's completion of participation in the distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- f. Exception 6--Unsolicited Purchases In the Proposing Release, the Commission solicited comment on an exception similar to that contained in Rule 10b-6 for unsolicited privately negotiated purchases. This exception from Rule 102 is identical to the unsolicited purchases exception from Rule 101.96 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \96\ See supra Section II.B.7.e., discussing exception 5 to Rule 101. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- g. Exception 7--Transactions in Rule 144A Securities Based on commenters' views and the basis discussed above for excepting transactions in Rule 144A securities from Rule 101, the Commission has determined to include an identical exception in Rule 102. 7. Plans a. Generally The Commission is adopting the dividend (or interest) reinvestment and stock purchase plan provisions of Rule 102 substantially as proposed.97 The treatment of plans under Regulation M reflects a continuation of the Commission's efforts to facilitate the use of plans as an alternative means for investors to purchase and sell securities, while maintaining essential investor protections.98 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \97\ The term plan is defined in Rule 100 as any bonus, profit- sharing, pension, retirement, thrift, savings, incentive, stock purchase, stock option, stock ownership, stock appreciation, dividend reinvestment, or similar plan; or any dividend or interest reinvestment plan or employee benefit plan as defined in 17 CFR 230.405. \98\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 35041 (December 1, 1994), 59 FR 63393 (``1994 STA Letter''), as modified by Letter regarding Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plans, [1995] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 77,110 (May 12, 1995); Letter regarding First Chicago Trust Company of New York, [1994] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 76,939 (December 1, 1994) (``First Chicago Letter''); Letter regarding Bank-Sponsored Investor Services Programs, [1995] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 77,122 (September 14, 1995) (``Bank Sponsored Programs Letter'') (collectively, ``Plan Letters''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Paragraph (c)(1) of Rule 102 excepts most distributions of securities pursuant to plans.99 The Commission has modified the introductory text of this paragraph to clarify that this exception includes plans operated by registered bank transfer agents or registered broker-dealers (``investor services plans''), as well as those plans operated by or on behalf of an issuer.100 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \99\ Of course, where an issuer plan does not involve a distribution (because there is insufficient magnitude, or because special selling efforts and selling methods are not used to sell the securities), Rules 101 and 102 do not apply. \100\ Although Regulation M supersedes the Plan Letters as they relate to Rule 10b-6, the staff positions taken in the Plan Letters on the application of other securities law provisions (i.e., Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77e, and Sections 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), 15(a), and 17A of, and Rule 10b-13 under, the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), and 17 CFR 240.10b-13, respectively) remain in effect. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rule divides plans into three categories: (1) plans that are available only to employees and shareholders (``employee-shareholder plans''); (2) plans, including investor services plans, that are available to persons other than, or in addition to, employees and shareholders, where securities for the plan are purchased from a source other than the issuer or an affiliated purchaser of the issuer (i.e., in the open market or in privately negotiated transactions) by an agent independent of the issuer (``open market plans''); and (3) plans that are available to persons other than, or in addition to, employees and shareholders where securities for the [[Page 533]] plan are purchased directly from the issuer or an affiliated purchaser of the issuer (``direct issuance plans''). b. Employee-shareholder Plans Rule 102(c)(1)(i) covers employee-shareholder plans, and excludes any distribution pursuant to a plan by or on behalf of an issuer or a subsidiary of an issuer, when the distribution is made solely to employees or shareholders of the issuer or its subsidiaries, or to a trustee or other person acquiring the securities for the accounts of such persons. This means that Rule 102 imposes no restrictions on transactions in the subject securities by the issuer or its affiliated purchasers during employee-shareholder plan distributions.101 The scope of eligible employees, and therefore the scope of the exception, is broader under this provision than under Rule 10b-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \101\ However, such activity may be subject to Rule 102 if the issuer is engaged in another distribution, and the transactions for the plan are attributable to the issuer. Rule 102 provides that plan transactions will not be attributable to the issuer if they are effected by an agent independent of the issuer. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Open Market Plans Rule 102(c)(1)(ii) excepts from the rule's coverage distributions involving open market plans, including investor services plans, where purchases for the plan are made by an agent independent of the issuer from sources other than the issuer or an affiliated purchaser of the issuer (i.e., in the open market or in privately negotiated transactions). Several commenters suggested revising the definition of agent independent of the issuer, including permitting the issuer to specify the broker or dealer who would make purchases for the plan and to change the source of securities for its plan more than once in any three month period. The Commission has determined not to make such changes at this time, because the definition has implications beyond Regulation M (i.e., it also relates to issuer repurchase programs conducted pursuant to Rule 10b-18 under the Exchange Act).102 Nevertheless, the Commission will examine this definition in connection with its anticipated review of Rule 10b-18, and will reconsider these comments in that process. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \102\ 17 CFR 240.10b-18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The definition of agent independent of the issuer specifies, among other things, that an issuer may not control, directly or indirectly, the timing of purchases by the agent. The Proposing Release stated that an agent would not be considered independent if the issuer directs the timing of purchases of securities by the agent, including a requirement that securities to fund the plan must be purchased on the plan's investment date. The release provided, however, that an issuer may establish general conditions for the operation of its plan, including, for example, requirements concerning the return of uninvested funds to plan participants, or requirements that optional cash payments be invested within 35 days of receipt.103 A number of commenters requested additional guidance on the timing element for plan purchases. The Commission notes that, although an issuer may not specify a particular time for such purchases, the issuer may specify a range of days for plan purchases based on a particular event (e.g., that plan purchases will be made within five days of the plan's investment date, or the stock's dividend date), or may specify that plan purchases will be made on or as soon as practicable after the plan's investment date, or the stock's dividend date. Moreover, the plan's agent could be deemed an agent independent of the issuer for purposes of Rule 102 if the plan's formula specifies the date, but not the times, of purchases pursuant to the plan, provided that the plan provisions regarding the purchase date are not changed more than once in any three-month period.104 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \103\ Proposing Release, 61 FR at 17121 n.71, citing 1994 STA Letter (modifying Letter regarding Lucky Stores, Inc., [1974-1975] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.79,903 (June 5, 1974)). \104\ Purchases by an independent agent for a plan can involve a certain magnitude, frequency, and duration that are known to the issuer. If an issuer schedules a non-plan distribution to coincide with such plan purchases, questions may be raised under the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Direct Issuance Plans Distributions pursuant to direct issuance plans (i.e., a plan that is available to persons other than, or in addition to, employees and shareholders where the issuer or affiliated purchaser of the issuer provides the shares for the plan) are not excepted from Rule 102. In the Commission's view, if the magnitude of securities offered through such plan, and the selling efforts and selling methods used to distribute such securities would constitute a distribution as defined in Rule 100, this type of offering raises the manipulative concerns underlying Regulation M.105 Because the issuer is receiving the proceeds of the offering, this kind of plan bears a close resemblance to a public offering. Consistent with prior interpretations concerning valuation periods for plans, Rule 102 applies during any valuation period for a direct issuance plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ Where a plan provides that securities for the plan may be purchased either in the open market or provided directly by the issuer, paragraph (c)(1)(ii) is only available when the plan securities are purchased in the open market. If the plan securities are obtained directly from the issuer, the plan must be treated as a direct issuance plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- To determine the magnitude of a direct issuance plan, only those persons to whom plan communications are directed at a particular time (rather than all current plan participants) should be considered. Moreover, the Commission will not deem special selling efforts and selling methods to be present in a direct issuance plan where only one or a combination of announcements, newspaper advertisements, circulars, notices, investor fairs, or Internet home pages are used to disseminate information about the availability of the plan to the public, or the issuer provides information about the plan to persons with whom the issuer has a pre-existing, continuing relationship involving the receipt of written communications by existing means of communication (e.g., a bill, annual report, or payroll stub).106 The information contained in such materials distributed by an issuer or its agent may include no more than the information allowed, nor less than that required, under Rule 134 under the Securities Act (i.e., ``tombstone advertisements''): 107 generally, the issuer's name, the issuer's type of business, the type of security being offered in the direct issuance plan (i.e., common or preferred stock), the price of the security or [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A97-1. Public record. Not legal advice.