# Power Brake Regulations; Proposed Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

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## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Uncategorized Document
- **Published:** September 16, 1994

## Text

SUMMARY: FRA proposes revisions to regulations governing train and
locomotive power braking systems. The proposed revisions are designed
to achieve safety by better adapting the regulations to the needs of
contemporary railroad operations and better facilitating the
introduction and use of advanced technologies. These proposed revisions
are being issued in order to comply with recently enacted legislation,
to respond to petitions for rulemaking, and to address areas of concern
derived from experience in the application of existing standards.

DATES: Written Comments: Written comments must be received by December
31, 1994. Comments received after that date will be considered to the
extent possible without incurring additional expenses or delay.
Public Hearings: A series of public hearings will be held on the
dates and at the locations listed below to provide interested parties
the opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions contained in the
NPRM.
The dates of the public hearings are as follows:

Monday, October 24 and Tuesday, October 25, 1994 at 9 a.m. in
Washington, DC.
Tuesday, November 1 and Wednesday, November 2, 1994 at 9 a.m. in
Chicago, Illinois.
Friday, November 4, 1994 at 9 a.m. in Newark, New Jersey.
Wednesday, November 9, 1994 at 9 a.m. in Sacramento, California.

Any person wishing to participate in a public hearing should notify
the Docket Clerk at the address provided below at least five working
days prior to the date of the hearing. This notification should
identify the hearing in which the person wishes to participate, the
party the person represents, and the particular subject matter(s) the
person plans to address. The notification should also provide the
Docket Clerk with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the
right to limit participation in the hearings of persons who fail to
provide such notification.

ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Address comments to the Docket Clerk,
Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-30, Federal Railroad Administration, 400
Seventh Street SW., Room 8201, Washington, DC 20590. Comments should
identify the docket and notice number, and five copies should be
submitted. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their
comments should include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The Docket
Clerk will indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were
received and will return the card to the addressee. The dockets are
housed in Room 8201 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20590. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours
of 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
(2) Public Hearings: Hearings to discuss particular issues will be
held at these locations:
Washington, DC: Nassif Building, Conference Room 2230, 400 Seventh
Street SW., Washington, DC.
Topics: Issues relevant to all operations.
Chicago: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12th Floor Conference Room,
111 North Canal Street, Chicago, Illinois
Topics: Issues relevant specifically to freight operations.
Newark: Peter W. Rodino Federal Building, Conference Room 204-205,
970 Broadway, Newark, New Jersey
Topics: Issues relevant specifically to passenger and commuter
operations.
Sacramento: Clarion Hotel, 700 16th Street, Sacramento, California
Tel: (800) 443-0880
Topics: Issues relevant to all operations.
Persons desiring to participate in any of the hearings should
notify the Docket Clerk by writing to: Docket Clerk, Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Chief, Motive
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA,
400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-366-4094 or
202-366-9186), or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief
Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone
202-366-0628).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

INTRODUCTION

Background

49 U.S.C. Sec. 20141 (formerly contained in Section 7 of the Rail
Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No. 102-365
(September 3, 1992), amending Section 202 of the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et
seq.), by adding a new subsection related to power brake safety which
states:
(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a review
of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to railroad
power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall revise such
rules based on such safety data as may be presented during that review.
(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment.
(3)(A) The Secretary shall require 2-way end of train devices (or
devices able to perform the same function) on road trains other than
locals, road switchers, or work trains to enable the initiation of
emergency braking from the rear of the train. The Secretary shall
promulgate rules as soon as possible, but not later than December 31,
1993, requiring such 2-way end of train devices. Such rules shall at a
minimum--
(i) set standards for such devices based on performance;
(ii) prohibit any railroad, on or after the date that is one year
after promulgation of such rules, from acquiring any end of train
device for use on trains which is not a 2-way device meeting the
standards set under clause (i);
(iii) require that such trains be equipped with 2-way end of train
devices meeting such standards not later than 4 years after
promulgation of such rules; and
(iv) provide that any 2-way end of train device acquired for use on
trains before such promulgation shall be deemed to meet such standards.
(B) The Secretary may consider petitions to amend the rules
promulgated under subparagraph (A) to allow the use of alternative
technologies which meet the same basic performance requirements
established by such rules.
(C) In developing the rules required by subparagraph (A), the
Secretary shall consider data presented under paragraph (1).
(4) The Secretary may exclude from the rules required by paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3) any category of trains or rail operations if the
Secretary determines that such an exclusion is in the public interest
and is consistent with railroad safety. The Secretary shall make public
the reasons for granting any such exclusion. The Secretary shall at a
minimum exclude from the requirements of paragraph (3)--
(A) trains that have manned cabooses;
(B) passenger trains with emergency brakes;
(C) trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of
the general railroad system;
(D) trains that do not exceed 30 miles per hour and do not operate
on heavy grades, except for any categories of such trains specifically
designated by the Secretary; and
(E) trains that operate in a push mode. Pub. L. No. 102-365,
Sec. 7; 45 U.S.C. 431(r).
On December 31, 1992, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the possible revision of the power brake
regulations (57 FR 62546). The ANPRM provided background information
and presented questions on various subjects including: the use and
design of end-of-train (EOT) telemetry devices; the air flow method of
train brake testing; the additional testing of train air brakes during
extremely cold weather; the training of employees to perform train
brake tests and inspections; computer-assisted braking systems; the
operation of dynamic brakes on locomotives; and other miscellaneous
subjects relating to conventional brake systems as well as information
regarding high speed passenger train brakes. The questions presented in
the ANPRM on the various topics were intended as fact-finding tools and
were intended to elicit the views of those persons outside FRA charged
with ensuring compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-
day basis.
Following publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted four days of
technical workshops in early 1993 to elicit information and views.
Workshops were conducted in Kansas City, Missouri on February 17; in
Chicago, Illinois on March 2 and 3; and in Newark, New Jersey on March
9. These workshops were attended by at least seventeen railroads, three
organizations representing railroads, four labor organizations and
various individual members of the organizations, four manufacturers of
train brake-related equipment, and several governmental agencies.
Written comments were received from most of these parties or their
individual members. In addition to the written comments received from
the parties that attended the workshops, written comments were also
received from one other railroad, one state public utilities
commission, one state transit authority, and one private citizen.
FRA has carefully considered all of the oral and written comments
offered by the various parties. The resulting Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) is based on these comments as well as FRA's
experience with enforcing the current power brake regulations.

Prologue

FRA's institutional experience in locomotive and train braking
safety extends backwards in time to creation of the Department of
Transportation in 1967 (at which time the Bureau of Railroad Safety and
its functions were transferred from the Interstate Commerce
Commission), to the passage of the Power or Train Brakes Safety
Appliance Act of 1958, and ultimately to the passage of the original
Safety Appliance Act 100 years ago. Current FRA personnel have, during
prior years, served in a variety of capacities on every major railroad.
Each of them has been exposed--in their combined Federal and private
sector careers--to a vastly richer panorama of American railroading
than most railroad employees will enjoy in a lifetime. These railroad
safety inspectors, supervisors, and managers contribute daily to the
rulemaking judgments ultimately expressed by the Federal Railroad
Administrator, and the agency has made a special effort in this
proceeding to tap the knowledge that these individuals possess to
ascertain the means by which public and employee safety may be secured.
The experience of the agency yields the following broad findings.
These finding are based upon hundreds of accident investigations, tens
of thousands of days of inspection activity, and hundreds of thousands
of contacts with railroad employees, supervisors, and managers, as well
as the comments to this docket:
In general, locomotive and train brake safety is good.
Investments in improved technology offer the possibility of further
progress in the future.
However, exceptions to this rule are numerous and
persistent.
Exceptions often derive from railroads' attempts to speed
the provision of efficient transportation services.
The current structure of the regulations tends to impede
efficient provision of transportation services, while creating
incentives to evade the regulations and imposing certain requirements
that are not effective in practice.
Accordingly, continuation of the current regulatory
structure--which with every passing year becomes less well adapted to
the current realities of the industry--is likely to erode safety over
time.

Train Brake Inspections

The principal problems addressed in this notice concern the safety
of conventional freight trains. In particular, the current regulations
focus great attention on intensive and often repetitive train brake
inspections conducted at departure from major terminals and at fixed
intervals en route. Under these circumstances, tremendous incentives
exist to ``overlook'' or fail to inspect rigorously for what may be
viewed as minor defects on individual cars. In some cases, personnel
have been instructed to disregard defective conditions in order to move
trains, after which FRA has often been required to resolve (or attempt
to resolve) disputed claims of responsibility in the context of
enforcement actions.
This system encourages railroads to assign inspection duties to
train crews who--while notably competent and alert in their normal
duties--have often received little training in inspection of
increasingly diverse power brake arrangements and other safety-critical
components of freight equipment. As a result of this and other
factors,1 the number of qualified mechanical personnel employed by
the railroads and the number of locations at which such personnel are
deployed have declined rapidly. In a system that ensures minimum
economies of scale, repair trucks equipped with an increasing array of
equipment are then used to provide spot-repair capability at outlying
points in cases where cars cannot be moved safely prior to repair (or
where, as in the case of the statutory power brake requirements,
movement is prohibited by law). Although this process of consolidation
and adaptation may have been both necessary and healthy in its earlier
stages, it now threatens to leave the railroads short of qualified
mechanical forces and excessively dependent on contract repair
facilities.
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\1\FRA is intimately familiar with other factors that complicate
this analysis. In particular, the competitive environment fostered
by deregulation of the motor carrier and railroad industries has led
to intensive cost cutting through rationalization of plant, more
effective utilization of equipment, substitution of automated
information systems for manual systems, and reduction of payrolls
through reductions in force and contracting out of work previously
performed by railroad employees. For the railroads, reducing
employment has become an imperative that threatens to drive itself
out of control. For instance, the Railroad Retirement System depends
upon employer contributions on behalf of less than 275,000 employees
to support over 372,000 retirees. With every employee removed from
the rolls, the likelihood increases that further increases in
Railroad Retirement Taxes will be required--creating further
perceived incentives to reduce employment.
A long-term shift in car ownership has also affected railroad
employment decisions. Approximately 40 percent of the freight car
fleet is now privately owned, including virtually all tank cars used
in revenue service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Adequate deployment of mechanical employees will remain necessary
for the foreseeable future, both to foster power brake safety and to
ensure that other components of locomotives and cars are adequately
inspected and maintained. Federal regulations should encourage this
process through reasonably structured incentives while avoiding any
attempt at micromanagement of business decisions. This notice embodies
a strategy to achieve safety in the short term--train by train--while
encouraging adequate deployment of mechanical personnel to provide the
eyes, hands and minds necessary for effective maintenance of railroad
rolling stock.

General Revision of Standards for Freight and Passenger Service

Commenters in this proceeding have noted, and FRA agrees, that the
current regulations fail to adequately delineate between requirements
for conventional freight braking systems and the more diverse systems
for various categories of passenger service. FRA also agrees that the
regulations should be updated to recognize contemporary electronic
systems that are used to control elements of power brake systems.
Finally, FRA has learned over years since passage of the Power or Train
Brakes Safety Appliance Act of 1958, which required adoption of the
Association of American Railroads' (AAR) recommended practices as
regulatory text, that improvements in clarity are badly needed.
Accordingly, FRA proposes a comprehensive revision of the
regulations that preserves useful elements of the current system in the
framework of an entirely new document.
The resulting proposed changes balance the concerns of rail labor
and management and would increase the effectiveness of the regulations.
The NPRM includes significant incentives to the railroads to encourage
the use of qualified mechanical forces to conduct train brake system
tests at major terminals where long-haul trains originate. The NPRM
also proposes requirements to check abuses in the single car test
program. The overall regulatory proposal focuses on safety performance
rather than micromanagement of the railroads.
In developing this proposal FRA engaged in a systems approach to
the power brake regulations. FRA considered all aspects of a railroad
operation and the effects that the entire operation has on the train
and locomotive power braking systems. Therefore, these proposed
requirements not only address specific brake equipment and inspection
requirements, but also attempt to encompass other aspects of a
railroad's operation which directly affect the quality and performance
of the braking system, such as: personnel qualifications; maintenance
requirements; written procedures governing operation, maintenance, and
inspection; record keeping requirements; and the development and
integration of new technologies. Consequently, FRA views this proposal
as an organic whole, with any one of its individual requirements being
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the others.
As an additional aspect of this systems approach, FRA considered
the role that shortline railroads have in today's freight industry. FRA
believes that the current marketplace requires Class I railroads and
shortline railroads to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's
shortlines rely on Class I railroads for the training of their
employees and the maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many
shortline railroads and Class I railroads interchange and operate each
others equipment. Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is
impossible, from a regulatory standpoint, to separate shortline
railroads from Class I railroads. Therefore, in order to ensure the
safety and quality of train and locomotive power braking systems
throughout the entire freight industry, this proposal generally imposes
a consistent set of requirements on shortline and Class I railroads as
a group. Although FRA recognizes that many of the operational benefits
created by this proposal are not available to most shortline
operations, FRA feels that the integrated nature of the freight
industry requires that universally consistent requirements be imposed
on both shortline and Class I railroads.
The proposed rule is justified on the basis of operating cost
savings to the industry as a whole. Cost savings due to accident/
incident prevention were quantified to some extent but were not
included in the cost impact analysis. See 49 CFR Sec. 225.5. Although
significant accident/incident reduction will occur due to the proposed
rule, the benefits were not fully quantified because of the need to
proceed with satisfaction of the statutory mandate, the already
positive benefit to cost ratio, and the difficulty associated with
quantifying the effectiveness of some of the proposals prior to further
public comment. A detailed discussion regarding the quantifying of
benefits derived from accident/incident reduction is provided in the
Regulatory Impact section of the preamble and in the Appendix to the
Regulatory Analysis.
FRA recognizes that some of the provisions contained in this
proposal may affect other FRA regulations currently in existence. For
example, the provisions regarding Special Notices for Repair for
freight cars and locomotives contained at Part 216 of this chapter do
not address nonconformity with the requirements proposed in this part.
Other FRA regulations that may be affected by these proposed
requirements are the Freight Car Safety Standards, the signal
inspection standards, and the Locomotive Engineer Qualification
Standards contained at Parts 215, 236, and 240 of this chapter
respectively. Consequently, after issuance of a final rule, FRA will
make whatever conforming or clarifying changes to FRA's other
regulations that are deemed necessary.

Discussion of Comments and General FRA Conclusions

For purposes of discussion, the comments may be grouped in four
categories by origin: (1) Railroad labor organizations and their
individual members, (2) railroad management representatives, (3)
manufacturers of train brake equipment, and (4) other commenters. FRA
noted both the common themes expressed by members of these groups and
the many variations on, and exceptions to, those themes. Discussions
follow with respect to the primary issues addressed by the commenters.

I. EOT Telemetry Devices

Since the advent of EOT devices, technological advances have been
made to incorporate ``two-way communication'' into the system. The two-
way EOT device, in addition to the features of the one-way EOT device,
has the ability of transmitting from the controlling locomotive an
emergency brake application that begins at the rear of the train. This
is a desirable feature in event of a blockage in the brake pipe that
would prevent the pneumatic transmission of the emergency brake
application throughout the entire train. In 1986, FRA concluded that
mandating the installation of two-way EOT devices was not warranted.
However, at that time FRA made a public commitment to monitor
developments in EOT device technology and to review the subject
periodically. 51 FR 17300, 17301 (May 9, 1986).
Since 1986, significant advances have been made in the development
of two-way EOT devices, and they are now commercially available in the
market place from two manufacturers. In addition, FRA has received
recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
and petitions from the United Transportation Union, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, the Oregon Public Utilities Commission, the
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and the Montana
Public Service Commission to require two-way EOT devices on all
cabooseless trains operating in certain territories. Furthermore, 49
U.S.C. Sec. 20141, formerly contained at Section 7 of the RSERA, which
amends the FRSA by adding a new subsection dealing with power brakes,
mandates that the Secretary of Transportation promulgate rules
requiring two-way EOT devices. Section 20141, formerly Section 7 of the
RSERA, sets out various minimum requirements that any promulgated rule
must contain. Consequently, based upon the advances in technology, the
recommendations and petitions received, and the statutory mandate, FRA
requested comments from interested parties regarding the exception of
certain operations from any two-way EOT device requirements, the
operational characteristics of the devices, the en route failure of the
devices, and the costs associated with equipping trains with the
devices. 57 FR 62546, 62550-62551 (Dec. 31, 1992).
A. Exceptions and Definitions
The AAR and several individual railroads recommended that remote
control operations and operations with helper locomotives located near
the end of the train be excepted from any two-way EOT device
requirements. The commenters contended that in these types of
operations the purpose of the two-way EOT device, to initiate an
emergency brake application commencing at the rear of the train,
disappears since either a crew has control of the brakes or the
locomotive placed near the end of the train is able to initiate a brake
application from other than the head end of the train. Union Pacific
Railroad Company also recommended an exception for all empty trains,
loaded trains used in short turnaround service of sixty miles where
grade is not a factor, and trains with less than 4,000 trailing tons.
One commenter also sought an exception for trains equipped with
secondary, fully independent brake systems that would require the
development of a unique EOT device to initiate an emergency application
from the rear of the train. One railroad suggested that no exception
should be given to any trains currently using one-way devices and that
all trains except those operating with an occupied caboose should be
equipped with two-way EOT devices.
In defining ``mountain grade'' The American Short Line Railroad
Association (ASLRA) and other commenters recommended that the
definition should be based on a variety of factors including tonnage,
length of grade, speed, percent of grade, and grade distance. The ASLRA
felt that a definition based on these factors would be consistent with
the intent of Congress not to require every small railroad to fall
under the legislation. Several other railroad representatives
recommended that the definition of mountain grade be based on both the
gradient and distance. Many of the railroad commenters proposed
definitions of 1.5-2 percent grades for a distance of five miles. Two
commenters addressed the definition of ``heavy tonnage,'' stating that
it should be defined as any train weighing over 100 tons per operative
brake.
Railroad representatives suggested that the effective date of any
regulation requiring the use of two-way devices should be extended for
the full four years permitted under the Act. The commenters felt that
the later the effective date, the fewer the number of one-way devices
that would have to be discarded and the longer the time for railroads
to spread out the costs of the new two-way devices. Railroad commenters
also recommended a grandfather clause for any two-way equipment
purchased prior to the issuance of a final rule.
Labor representatives recommended that two-way devices should be
required on all cabooseless trains that are not specifically excepted
in the RSERA. However, these commenters also admitted that grade
situations are probably the area where the devices are most useful. Two
labor representatives suggested requiring the use of the devices on
grades of one percent or greater. The Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers (BLE) wanted ``mountain grades'' defined as areas with one
percent grades for two miles. One individual conductor felt that two-
way devices should be mandatory on all trains in which the rear is
unoccupied, with a weight in excess of 2,000 tons, and a length of
greater than 3,000 feet.
FRA Conclusions. Based on consideration of Congress' purpose in
enacting Sec. 7 of the RSERA and after review of the comments received
and the accidents relied on for support of the use of two-way EOT
devices, FRA feels that the devices should be required on trains that
operate at speeds in excess of 30 mph and on trains that operate in
mountain grade territories. However, FRA believes that certain
operations, other than those specifically listed in Sec. 7 of the
RSERA, should also be excepted from the requirements regarding two-way
EOT devices. FRA recognizes that the safety concerns for requiring two-
way EOT devices are less prevalent in operations (i) of trains having
the ability to initiate a brake application from other than the front
end and (ii) of trains equipped with fully independent secondary
braking systems. FRA further agrees with several of the commenters that
the definition of ``mountain grade'' must be based on some formula that
takes into account not only the percent of grade but also the length of
grade and the speed of the train. FRA thinks that a definition based on
these factors would sufficiently limit the number of areas covered by
the definition, so as not to be overly burdensome to the industry, and
yet would include those areas that would most benefit from the added
safety provided by the two-way devices. Furthermore, in order to
provide the industry time to acquire a sufficient number of two-way EOT
devices and to ease the economic impact of acquiring the devices, FRA
proposes to mandate compliance with any final regulation requiring the
use of two-way EOT devices as of January 1, 1997. Requiring earlier
compliance is not warranted by the marginal safety benefits, and later
compliance would not be consistent with the spirit of the RSERA (even
if, as is possible, FRA is unable to issue a final rule by December 31,
1993).
B. Operational Characteristics
Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) reported that it has used two-way
EOT devices for seven years and has had no reports of an emergency
being initiated from the front end. Although BN experienced some
problems with undesired emergencies in the beginning, they were due to
start-up problems. CP Rail Systems reported that it has about 700 two-
way devices in service since 1989 and has had no undesired emergencies
due to faulty operation of the equipment, nor has it had occasion to
use the devices.
Several railroads that currently use either one-way or two-way EOT
devices stated that they have experienced effective communication
between the head and rear units in trains as long as 1.5 and 2 miles.
However, these railroads also reported that they have experienced
communication problems in several circumstances, such as the following:
when trains are split by an overpass or viaduct; when trains operate in
some mountain or tunnel locations; and when trains are in a major yard
where bridges, power lines, towers, and industrial structures are more
prevalent.
Other railroads that have some experience with the devices stated
that the current two-way EOT devices have many optional features to
provide information from the rear to the front units, such as the
distance from front to rear units, monitoring of end- car brake-pipe
pressure, motion status, marker light status, battery status, loss-of-
communication alarm, automatic and manual communication test, and rear-
of-train emergency braking. The AAR as well as seven of its railroad
members commented that these additional features should not be
required, but that each individual railroad should be allowed to
determine which options are best suited for its particular operations.
These parties also stated that the statute merely requires that the
rear end of a train be able to initiate an emergency brake application
when activated from the front and that there is no evidence available
to support the need of requiring the transmission of other information.
Several railroads expressed concern over requiring these additional
features noting that such features reduce the battery life of the
device, create additional enroute failure problems, add to the cost of
the device, and may be eliminated or relocated as technology advances.
One railroad recommended that failure of any optional feature, other
than the ability to initiate an emergency brake application, should not
be treated as an enroute failure. This same railroad also recommended
that FRA consider replacing the ``flashing lights on EOT devices'' with
retro-reflectorized material such as that used in Canada. The railroad
suggested that such a change could significantly alter the cost of two-
way devices, reduce battery requirements, and reduce failure rates. One
railroad commented on the battery life of current two-way devices,
indicating that it is about 80 percent that of one-way devices. This
party also indicated that inspection of the battery must be made at
initial terminal brake inspections. The AAR commented that the
telemetry battery life of EOT devices operating in conditions from 40
degrees below zero to 150 degrees above zero is about 100 hours for
one-way devices and 80 hours for two-way devices. The AAR also stated
that the light flasher battery life is about 50 hours.
Several railroad representatives commented that two-way EOT devices
need to be ``secured system'' types, which means that an emergency
application should be obtainable only by someone in the cab of the
locomotive on that train. These commenters stated that current devices
are designed so that the front and rear units can be linked together by
use of a specific code which prevents outside tampering. Once the two
units are linked, no other front unit will communicate with the rear
unit. One commenter stated that it would require 38 hours of constant
contact to get the proper code needed to obtain access to the device.
Individual members of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen (BRC)
commented that the current one-way devices are unreliable and are not
receiving proper maintenance. These individuals stated that the gauges
used to calibrate the devices need to be tested. Several carmen
commented that transmissions from current one-way devices have been
affected by high tension wires, bridges, and foggy conditions. Labor
representatives as well as individual members stated that they would
like to see as many of the additional features now available with two-
way devices required. These commenters felt that any additional
information that could be made available to train crews regarding the
condition of the train would be beneficial. One individual conductor
suggested that the batteries on EOT devices should be checked at all
brake tests and at all crew change points. This individual also felt it
should be required that batteries have at least a 75-percent charge
before the train departs a terminal and that the devices be operational
at all crew change points.
A conductor for BN provided information on a new safety device
invention that would address the problem of trainline blockage and
turned angle cocks and would be used in connection with EOT devices.
The device is coupled to the end of the brake pipe and would
continuously exhaust air at a predetermined rate, which would be
compensated for by the locomotive air source. Thus, if the trainline is
blocked, the locomotive air source will not replenish the depleted air,
and a brake application will take place. The engineer will be warned of
the loss in pressure at the rear of the train by the EOT device and
will be able to take corrective action. One manufacturer of EOT devices
commented that the EOT devices are limited to two watts of power by the
Federal Communications Commission and that depending on the site, such
as when a train is half in a tunnel and half out of a tunnel, trains
may experience brownouts or complete blackouts. The manufacturer stated
that many of these problems can be eliminated with installation of a
repeater feature that continuously repeats the transmitted message
every few seconds. In addition, the manufacturer noted that when an
emergency application is requested the transmission signal is increased
to 8 watts, which probably will overcome any site interference. Another
manufacturer of the devices commented that it did not know of any
interference due to power lines, but stated that it has received
comments about losing transmissions in mountainous areas.
FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizes the benefits provided to the train
crew by the additional features currently available on two-way EOT
devices and highly recommends that railroads obtain as many of these
optional features as they can when purchasing the devices. However, as
long as the devices meet the minimum operating standards required to
initiate an emergency brake application from the rear of the train, FRA
believes that each individual railroad is in the best position to
determine the type of optional features that are best suited for their
operations. In addition, FRA does not want to prevent any technological
advancements which might improve or modify many of the optional
features currently available.
Several parties commented on the loss of transmission between the
front and rear units at various locations. Based on the comments and
information provided by the manufacturers of the devices, FRA believes
that railroads should be required to automatically check the
communication status between the two units on a periodic basis in order
to alert train crews of any transmission problem. FRA suggests that
those railroads that experience transmission problems consider the
installation of a repeater feature recommended by the manufacturers,
which continuously repeats the transmitted message every few seconds.
FRA also notes, as one manufacturer commented, that the transmission
signal requesting an emergency brake application is sent at a higher
wattage than normal transmissions and should be sufficient to overcome
any site interference. Furthermore, in order to prevent vandalism and
avoid the possibility of a train accidentally being placed in emergency
by an outside transmission, FRA believes that the front and rear units
should be linked together so that the rear unit will only respond to an
emergency command from its associated front unit.
FRA elects not to comment, at this time, on one railroad's
suggestion that reflectorized material be allowed to be used in place
of the flashing lights on EOT devices, since this issue would be more
appropriately addressed under a revision of 49 CFR Part 221 regarding
rear end markers.2 FRA also finds that the use of the safety
device, introduced by an individual conductor for Burlington Northern,
designed to detect blocked trainlines is not feasible at this time
based on current operating and train handling procedures; however, FRA
encourages continued testing and development of the device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\Retroreflective panels do not satisfy performance criteria
for rear end marking devices because of track curvature's effect on
the projection of the light source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. En route Failures
The AAR and several of its member railroads commented that a train
that experiences enroute failure of its two-way EOT device should be
allowed to continue without delay and without imposition of a speed
limit. These parties base this position on the fact that little data
exists that shows the preventive effect of the devices and no railroads
currently using the devices have reported an incident where the device
was used. Some railroad commenters suggested that trains that
experience en route failure should be allowed to continue to
destination, whereas other railroads suggested that the trains be
allowed to continue to the next forward point for repairs or
replacement, just as any other enroute failure. Several railroads also
contended that if a speed limit were imposed on trains with en route
failures the cost to the industry would be devastating and would hurt
the industry's competitiveness due to multiple train delays, missed
deliveries, and loss of business. Several commenters also suggested
that imposing speed limits for en route failures would actually
increase safety risks due to undesirable speed differentials with
trailing trains and because these slower trains would have to take to
sidings to let faster trains pass and, thus, the likelihood of
vandalism is increased. CP Rail Systems noted that Canada requires
speed to be reduced to 30 mph when failure of the devices occurs en
route. This commenter also noted that two-way devices have a low
failure rate, only about 1 in every 400 crew starts. One railroad
suggested that a 30 mph speed limit be applied only to trains departing
from an initial terminal with inoperative device.
FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that, if a train equipped with a two-
way EOT device has an en route failure that causes the train to lose
the ability to initiate an emergency brake application from the rear of
the train, the speed of that train should be limited. FRA recognizes
the railroads' concerns that a speed limitation may cause train delays,
missed deliveries, and a possible increase in safety risks; however,
FRA believes that the railroads are overstating these problems. The
railroads themselves conceded that the EOT devices are very reliable
and can operate for two to three years without a problem. In fact, two
railroads commented on the low failure rate of the devices, indicating
a failure rate of less than one percent. One railroad also mentioned
that Canada requires speed to be reduced to 30 mph on trains which
experience enroute failure of the two-way device; however, this
commenter did not contend that Canada's requirement has produced the
problems cited by the railroads. Thus, FRA feels the concerns raised by
the railroads regarding a speed limitation for en route failures of the
devices are not justified. Furthermore, allowing trains to continue
with inoperative two-way EOT devices, at speeds that FRA feels require
the added safety benefits provided by the devices, would expose both
railroad employees and the public to potential harm that might be
averted if this relatively new technology is available to the train
crews. FRA also believes that attaching a material operational
limitation to a failure of the device will materially increase the
likelihood that such failures will be prevented through improved design
and maintenance.
D. Costs and Maintenance
Both railroad and labor organizations agreed that the cost of new
two-way EOT devices will be approximately $7,000 per unit, which
includes both the front and rear units. The AAR and several railroads
also stated that the cost of current one-way units is approximately
$3,700 per unit. The AAR estimates that the total cost to the industry
to replace currently used one-way devices with devices that have two-
way capabilities will be approximately $150 million. Railroad
representatives stated that existing rear units of one-way devices
could not be upgraded to two-way capabilities, and although the front
units of the one-way devices could be upgraded it was not cost
effective. However, one railroad did state that it could retrofit its
1,500 existing front-end radio units at a cost of $740 each, for a
total cost of $1.1 million, but stated that retrofitting the rear units
was not feasible. Various railroad commenters provided approximate
figures for equipping their fleets with two-way devices: Union Pacific
estimated initial costs at $21 million and $2.4 million per year for
replacement units; BN estimated the cost to replace its 1,400 one-way
devices at $15 million; CSX Transportation estimated a cost of $17
million to acquire approximately 1,867 rear units and 2,687 front end
receivers; Conrail estimated the cost to replace its 1,100 existing
one-way devices at $10 million; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe estimated
the cost to upgrade front units and replace 650 rear one-way units at
$5.6 million; and Norfolk Southern estimated its cost to convert to
two-way devices at $2.7 million.
The AAR estimated the maintenance costs of two-way devices to be
twice the costs of maintenance on current one-way devices. Based on
figures presented by one railroad, the AAR stated that in 1989
maintenance costs of one-way devices were approximately $2,000 annually
per device; thus, expected maintenance costs for two-way devices will
be about $4,000 per year per device. The AAR as well as seven railroads
commented that current regulations regarding one-way EOT devices are
adequate except that the current calibration period of 92 days is based
on outdated technology. All of these commenters stated that they have
used the devices for years and have had little if any problems with
them. One commenter stated that the most frequent cause of failure of
these devices is battery failure during periods of extreme cold, which
could be cured by replacing the batteries at initial terminals. The
commenters stated that they have rarely, if ever, found one of the
devices out of calibration within the 92-day period and believe that an
annual calibration requirement would be more realistic, with all
related tests being performed at that time. Several railroads also
commented that based on the performance of current one-way devices
there is no reason to require calibration of the two-way devices every
92 days. These commenters believed that the 92-day calibration
requirement for one-way devices was based on the fact that there was
little experience with their operation at the time. Since that time,
experience with the devices has shown that a calibration period of one
year is more than adequate. One railroad stated that its current one-
way devices operate for two to three years without a problem, and that
in 1992 it replaced only about 20 of its 1,400 units.
Several members of the BRC commented on the need to have
interchangeable battery packs for all the different types of two-way
devices currently available because at present some railroads are
unable to charge the devices that come onto their lines from other
railroads. Various carmen also presented written comments reiterating
their concerns that the current one-way devices are unreliable, that
maintenance is not being performed, and that the gauges used to
calibrate them need to be tested.
FRA Conclusions. FRA generally agrees with the cost figures
presented by the commenters. FRA also believes that the 92-day
calibration period currently imposed on one-way EOT devices is
outdated. FRA agrees with several of the commenters that the 92-day
requirement was established at a time when there was little experience
with these types of devices. Since that time, FRA has received no
evidence indicating that calibration of the devices is difficult to
maintain. Furthermore, several railroads attested to the reliability of
the one-way and two-way devices stating that they rarely find the
devices out of calibration after 92 days and that the failure rates of
the devices are very low. Consequently, FRA believes that the
calibration period for all EOT devices could be extended to one year.
FRA further believes that one of the major factors affecting the
reliability of two-way EOT devices is the failure of the batteries on
the devices while a train is enroute. As several commenters stated,
battery failure is often the result of a failure to inspect the battery
charge prior to departure or the inability of one railroad to charge
the batteries of the devices belonging to another railroad which are
used on its line. Consequently, in order to ensure that the batteries
on a two-way EOT device are sufficiently charged to operate the device
throughout a train's movement and to encourage the development and use
of interchangeable batteries or battery chargers, FRA proposes to
prohibit a train equipped with a two-way EOT device from departing from
a point of origin with the batteries of such device charged to less
than 75 percent of watt-hour capacity.

II. Air Flow Method

The air flow method (AFM) of train air brake testing monitors the
rate of air flow through the automatic brake valve to the brake pipe by
the means of a brake pipe flow indicator. The AFM of brake testing is a
more comprehensive test than the present leakage test. The leakage
method only measures the amount of leakage from the brake and branch
pipes, whereas the AFM tests the entire brake system including the
reservoirs and control valves. In addition, the leakage method does not
test the capability of the pressure-maintaining feature of the 26L
brake equipment. The AFM, on the other hand, tests the brake system
just as it is operated, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in.
The AFM of qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in
Canada as an alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition,
several railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since
1989 when the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance was granted
allowing the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. In order to
determine if the AFM of train air brake testing should be included as
an alternative to the leakage test, FRA in the ANPRM (57 FR 62552)
requested comments from interested parties regarding the operating
history of the AFM.
The AAR and several railroads commented on the operating experience
of using the AFM. These commenters reported that the AFM is an
effective and reliable method of qualifying train brakes and that the
greatest benefit of the method is the information it provides to the
train crew. CP Rail reported that testing on the AFM started in Canada
in 1975 and became an alternate method of qualifying train brakes in
1984. CP Rail as well as several other railroads stated that they have
experienced no problems with the method. Conrail commented that,
although it initially experienced problems with sticking pointers,
defective check valves, and protruding screws on the air flow meters,
these problems have been eliminated. Conrail also stated that use of
the AFM has indicated a slight reduction in undesired emergencies.
Several railroads commented that the AFM provides information to the
train crew regarding the brake pipe that is not provided by the leakage
test. Two railroads responded that in all the years they have used the
AFM they have experienced no instance where a train had to stop because
the air flow could not be maintained. The AAR maintained that the
failure rate of the air flow indicators is less than 1 percent. In
fact, Conrail stated that it performed 9,000 air flow indicator
calibrations in 1992 and found only 90 defective indicators. Several
railroads commented that they currently calibrate the air flow meters
on a 60-day to 92-day basis and have no problem with current
calibration procedures. Two railroads noted that they initially had
problems calibrating the devices due to orifice sizes but have since
cured this problem. One railroad mentioned that it had problems
calibrating the devices in extremely cold weather until it applied
condition eight of FRA's waiver to the calibration of the gauge on the
locomotive as well as the test orifices. (``The air flow indicator
calibration test orifice shall be calibrated at temperatures of not
more than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.'')
Railroad representatives unanimously opposed any requirement that
would make using the AFM mandatory or the sole method of qualifying
brake systems. All railroad commenters supported the adoption of the
AFM as an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying braking
systems. Most of these commenters suggested that the use of either
method is an economical or operational decision that should be made by
each individual railroad. One railroad recommended that trains
qualified under the AFM should be requalified with the leakage test if
the air flow indicator fails enroute. The cost figures presented by the
AAR and several railroads for equipping locomotives with air flow
meters range from $350 to $1,450 per unit.
Amtrak and two other passenger and commuter railroads commented
that due to the short length of passenger trains the AFM is not a
beneficial means of qualifying the braking systems. They felt that the
flow rate of 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM) was inappropriate for
passenger trains because it would allow these shorter trains to operate
with excessive brake pipe leakage since the AFM measures the ability to
maintain pressure, not brake pipe leakage. However, these commenters
did support the use of the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test
for freight operations.
Both the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) and the BRC
as well as several individual carmen opposed the adoption of the AFM as
an alternative method of qualifying brake systems. The parties felt
that the leakage test is the only reliable method for determining the
integrity of the air brake system and for identifying leaks. These
commenters stated that the AFM only determines whether the brake pipe
is compensating for existing leaks and does not identify the severity
of the leak, and thus, trains would be allowed to operate with leaks
over 5-psi, which is dangerous especially in cold weather and could
result in an emergency application or derailment.
Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) responded stating that both
the leakage test and the AFM combined with the 15-psi gradient
restriction are effective and acceptable methods of qualifying braking
systems. WABCO commented that the 60-CFM limit required by the AFM and
the 5-psi limit required by the leakage test are both conservative
figures in view of today's braking system capabilities, and that the 5-
psi limit was derived long before today's pressure maintaining feature
which is an integral part of all locomotive brake valves. WABCO stated
that front-to-rear gradient is the most important element of braking
performance and that long trains with a 15-psi gradient can be operated
with no problem. This commenter also mentioned that the 60-CFM limit of
the AFM would allow higher leakage on shorter trains but nothing that
would cause a problem in brake operations if the 15-psi gradient is
maintained.
FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that if a train contains a locomotive
equipped with 26L freight locomotive brake equipment and the train is
equipped with an EOT device, that train should be allowed to be
qualified using the AFM. FRA also agrees with several commenters that
the AFM should not be permitted as a means of qualifying braking
systems on commuter and passenger trains. Due to the shorter length of
these types of trains the use of the AFM to qualify their brake systems
might allow these trains to operate with excessive brake pipe leakage.
The AFM would be an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying
properly equipped freight train brake systems. FRA recognizes the
concerns of several labor organization commenters opposing the adoption
of the AFM; however, FRA believes these commenters' apprehension is
based on their unfamiliarity with the method. As FRA pointed out in the
ANPRM (57 FR 62551) and as several commenters confirmed, the AFM is a
much more comprehensive test than the leakage test. The AFM tests the
entire brake system just as it is used, with the pressure-maintaining
feature cut in. The method has been allowed in Canada since 1984
without any problems. Based on the comments from several railroads and
information obtained during the method's testing from 1981 to 1988, FRA
feels the AFM is an effective and reliable alternative method of
qualifying train brakes. Although FRA is not mandating the use of the
AFM, FRA does encourage railroads to use the method on all trains, not
necessarily for qualifying the brake systems, but as a means of
providing additional information regarding the brake system to the
train crew. FRA further believes that calibration of the air flow
indicators should be performed at least every 92 days, based on the
fact that it is the calibration period required by the current FRA
waiver granted to the AAR and because most railroads stated that they
already calibrate the air flow indicators every 60 to 92 days and gave
no indication that the period should be altered. See 54 FR 5195 (Feb.
1, 1989).

III. Testing in Cold Weather and on Steep Grades

FRA has received a recommendation from the NTSB and petitions from
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the United Transportation
Union, and the Montana Joint Rail Labor Legislative Council to require
additional train air brake system testing in extremely cold weather and
mountain grade territory. These parties cite concerns regarding
existing practices of some railroads in these areas and the general
problem of assuring sufficient brake pipe pressure during train
operations in extremely cold weather and on steep, descending grades.
In the ANPRM (57 FR 62553), FRA sought comments from interested parties
regarding the need for additional testing of train air brakes in these
circumstances and the type of additional testing required.
The AAR and a variety of other railroads opposed the mandating of
additional testing in cold weather or in mountain grade territory. They
stated that the accidents that have occurred in cold weather and on
heavy grades are due to failure of individuals to comply with existing
procedures and not due to inadequate testing, procedures, or equipment.
These commenters felt that current brake tests and operating procedures
are sufficient as long as they are followed and performed properly.
Several railroads commented that they have installed air dryers on
their locomotives in order to eliminate the use of alcohol in cold
weather, which is very detrimental to the rubber components of the
braking system. In addition, several railroads contended that improved
equipment, such as welded fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses, have
negated the effects of cold weather on leakage and braking. Several
railroads also suggested that running tests should not be required in
mountain grade territory since the performance of such tests only
results in the depletion of the reserve air supply, and thus,
jeopardizes the effectiveness of the brake system by requiring a train
to approach a grade with less than a fully charged brake system.
In addressing the issues of ``feed valve braking'' and use of the
``Passenger'' position of the 26C brake valve in freight service, the
AAR stated that the individual railroads have operating rules that
address these forms of braking and since no safety issue has arisen
regarding their use there is no justification for removing the
railroad's discretion in establishing rules appropriate for their
operations. At least four railroads stated that use of the
``Passenger'' position in freight service can be performed safely and
may be needed and wanted in certain circumstances, and that there
should be no regulation prohibiting its use. Although several railroads
stated that they do not allow or recommend ``feed valve braking,'' they
all believed that the current operating rules of the individual
railroads sufficiently address the issue.
Two labor organizations and several of their members commented that
additional tests are not required but that good initial and
intermediate terminal brake tests are needed. Counsel for the TCU
suggested that the railroads should consider placing a carman on each
train. The BRC and several of its carmen commented on the widespread
use of alcohol and methanol in the trainline during cold weather and
mentioned the degenerative effect it has on the rubber components of
the brake system. These commenters felt that the use of these materials
in the trainline should be addressed by FRA. The Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (BLE) suggested that the allowable front-to-rear
gradient be reduced in cold weather from 15-psi to 10-psi. One
organization recommended a regulation requiring locomotive engineers to
test the brake pipe pressure prior to passing the summit on a mountain
grade. The BLE stated that the burden of establishing the safety of
``feed valve braking'' and the use of the ``Passenger'' position of the
brake valve should be borne by the railroads rather than using BLE
members as test pilots. However, one individual engineer felt that both
methods should continue to be allowed in limited circumstances to
address unusual conditions that arise from either undesired emergencies
or faulty maintaining features of the 26C or 30A-CDW brake valves.
Two brake equipment manufacturers commented that no additional
testing requirements are needed. They stated that the industry has
taken dramatic steps to reduce leakage in cold weather by installing
and using welded pipe fittings, wide lip hose couplings, and ferrule
clamps. These commenters felt that if brake equipment is properly
maintained and good terminal brake tests are performed, there is no
need for additional regulations.
The NTSB commented that cold weather operations impose additional
problems regarding brake system leakage due to shrinkage of the brake
components in extreme cold. This commenter stated that it would like to
see some type of additional testing to assure that excessive leakage is
not occurring. The Board acknowledged that, since the original
recommendation, the railroads have added equipment that performs better
in cold weather conditions.
FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizes that few, if any, of the commenters
supported the mandating of additional testing in cold weather or in
mountain grade territory. FRA agrees that the development and use of
welded pipe fittings, wide lip hose couplings, and ferrule clamps has
greatly reduced the effects of cold weather on the air brake system.
However, FRA believes that there are several extreme operating
conditions that involve added safety risks and that need to be further
addressed by the railroads. These include cold weather and mountain
territory operations as well as the operation of long and heavy trains.
FRA feels that each railroad needs to develop detailed operating
procedures for these types of operations, tailored to the equipment and
territory of each railroad. Furthermore, FRA believes that the use of
chemicals in the trainline must be eliminated in order to prevent
untimely damage and wear to the brake system components. Therefore, FRA
feels that most trains operating in cold weather should be equipped
with air dryers. Several railroads commented that they have already
equipped their locomotives with these devices in order to curb the use
of alcohol and other foreign substances in the trainlines.

IV. Training of Test and Inspection Personnel

Currently, the regulations require that the initial terminal test
and inspection be performed by a qualified employee but does not
provide any guidance as to what type of knowledge these individuals
should possess. See 49 CFR Sec. 232.12(a)(1). An increasing number of
train brake tests and inspections are being conducted by train crews
and FRA has concerns whether or not all personnel performing these
duties are truly qualified. Consequently, FRA sought comments and
information from interested parties regarding the type of training that
is currently provided to individuals charged with inspecting and
testing train brake systems, and suggestions on the type of training
these individuals should receive. See 57 FR 62553.
The AAR and several railroads commented that employees performing
air brake tests and inspections are adequately trained to perform these
tasks. However, many of the railroads admitted that they could do a
better job of training their employees. Several railroads presented
information regarding their individual training programs. The training
provided by these commenters ranged from several days to several weeks,
a portion of which is dedicated to air brake tests and inspections.
Most of the major railroads stated that their training includes annual
testing of the employees upon completion of the formal training classes
and that employees must pass these tests with scores of 85-90 percent.
Several railroads also mentioned that their training involves a certain
amount of on-the-job training in addition to the formal classroom
training and that unannounced site checks are conducted by their
supervisory personnel. The ASLRA commented that most shortline
railroads engage in cross-training of their employees so they can
perform all functions of the operations and that these railroads rely
heavily on the Class I railroads' training facilities and video tapes.
Several railroads stated that some type of list of those employees that
are considered qualified to perform tests and inspections is maintained
either in the form of a formal list or a list of employees who have
received the necessary training.
The AAR and all the other railroads providing comments believed
that there is no need for FRA to impose training or certification
requirements. These commenters felt that training is the responsibility
of the carriers and that carriers are in best position to determine the
type of training needed for their operation. The AAR contended that the
decline in train accidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over
the last ten years is a testament to the adequacy of current training
provided by the railroads. The AAR and several railroads also insisted
that there is no reason to require those employees performing air brake
tests and inspections to be as highly trained as a carman and that
something more reasonable is sufficient. These parties also felt that
merely being a member of a particular craft should not automatically
make a person qualified, and the AAR added that any reference contained
in the regulations designating a particular craft to perform the
inspections should be eliminated. Many of these commenters also stated
that there is no need for FRA to certify qualified persons and that
such a scheme would merely increase the costs to railroads without
improving the performance of those individuals conducting the tests and
inspections.
Several labor organizations commented that the current training
provided by the railroads to the individuals performing the air brake
tests and inspections is insufficient. The BLE and various members of
the United Transportation Union (UTU) stated that the training they
have received is inadequate to prepare them for making the air brake
tests and inspections they are currently required to perform.
Representatives of the BRC and several of its individual members stated
that train crews lacked the experience and training necessary to
perform inspections and tests of the air brakes. These individuals also
contended that only carmen are qualified by training and experience to
perform these tasks based on the fact that they have completed two- to
three-year apprenticeships and have completed numerous written exams.
These commenters stated that elimination of various tests and
inspections, such as the elimination of cleaning, oiling, testing, and
stencilling (COT&S) requirements and run-through inspections, and the
increase of permissible piston travel have placed primary importance on
the initial terminal inspection, which is not being performed properly
because train crews are not qualified to perform the tasks. Several
members of the BRC recommended that carriers be required to have carmen
perform all initial and intermediate inspections and any other tests or
inspections required by the FRA.
Every commenting labor organization and several of their individual
members recommended that FRA designate qualified inspectors by
specifying the experience and training that are required for these
individuals rather than leaving these matters in the railroad's
discretion. Most of these commenters also suggested that FRA certify
those employees that are deemed to be qualified to perform these tests
and inspections. Two labor organizations also suggested that FRA
require railroads to maintain a list of those individuals deemed
qualified in order to assure compliance with the regulations.
FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that the current training provided to
the individuals charged with performing the required brake tests and
inspections should be improved in order to ensure that these tests and
inspections are performed properly. Several labor organizations and
their individual members explicitly commented that they are not
sufficiently trained to perform the inspections and tests required of
them. In addition, several railroads affirmed that the training they
currently provide could be improved. Increasing reliance on train crews
to conduct train air brake tests, as a result of the consolidation of
mechanical forces, means that it is more important than ever before
that each person responsible for power brake safety be thoroughly
trained in the functions which that person is called upon to perform.
FRA recognizes that many railroads are attempting to improve their
training programs; however, FRA thinks that minimum training and
experience guidelines need to be established to assure that brake
inspections and tests are being properly performed in order to protect
both the public and railroad employees from the operation of equipment
not meeting FRA requirements. Although there has been a decline in the
number of train accidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over
the last ten years, FRA believes that the number of these incidents
will be further reduced if inspections and tests of the brake system
are performed by individuals who have been instructed in accordance
with these minimum training and experience guidelines.
Consequently, FRA proposes broad performance-based qualification
requirements for individuals that perform brake system inspections and
tests; individuals that inspect, test, and maintain the electronic and
mechanical parts of the brake system; and individuals that supervise
the work of the aforementioned personnel. FRA will supplement these
performance-based qualification standards by issuing minimum training
and experience guidelines that will aid the railroads in developing
training programs sufficient to ensure that individuals are capable of
meeting the performance-based qualification standards. FRA believes
that each railroad should be allowed to develop and implement a program
to train, qualify, and issue credentials to these individuals in
accordance with these minimum requirements based on each railroad's own
unique operating conditions and equipment. Furthermore, in order to
insure that quality inspections, tests, and maintenance are continually
being performed, FRA believes that periodic spot checks of inspections
and maintenance should be performed by qualified supervisory personnel.

V. Electronic Brake Systems

Railroad power brake systems are moving into the computer age, and
recently, several innovative electronic brake systems have been adopted
into train service. These electronic brake systems include blended
brakes, locomotive speed limiters, and microprocessor-controlled
brakes. Although these braking systems meet present Federal
regulations, the regulations may be silent in certain areas that need
to be addressed in order to ensure that braking systems which
incorporate versions of this new technology maintain the same level of
safety as conventional power brakes. In order to determine the type of
regulation that might be needed to assure the ``fail-safe'' nature of
these types of braking systems FRA requested comments from experienced
parties regarding the operation of electronic braking systems, the
sensors utilized by the systems, and the maintenance requirements of
such systems. See 57 FR 62554.
A number of passenger and commuter railroads, one State transit
authority, and several freight carriers commented that technology for
electronic braking systems is advancing quickly and that performance
standards need to be developed to address these types of systems.
Several commenters stated that a power failure in these electronic
braking types of systems will result in a full service brake
application being applied through the entire train, with the emergency
brake valve available to initiate an emergency application at any time.
The AAR and several railroads discussed the sensors that are, or
may be, used with these types of systems. Amtrak felt that the
reliability of the sensors is a key issue for these systems because
nothing is gained if they fail as often as the equipment being
monitored. These parties stated that sensors currently manufactured are
fairly reliable, with advertised reliability rates of 14.6 years or
failure rates of once every 35-38 million miles of operation. One
commenter stated that sensors have not yet been developed that would
indicate when disc brake pads are worn to condemning limits. Commenters
also contended that sensors that could be used to assist in brake tests
to determine proper piston travel or whether brakes are applied would
be very expensive at this time and difficult to install and maintain.
One commenter suggested that the only way to monitor whether brakes are
applied would be to install a sensor on every brake head, which would
be very impractical.
Several commenters stated that the computer software used with
these systems is designed to continually self-test not only the
software controlling the brake system but also the hardware every time
it is used. Therefore, the parties contend that there is no need to
require daily testing since the system will identify any defects or
reduction in performance each time it is used. These commenters also
suggested that the need for time based COT&S with these systems is
unnecessary since the computer will indicate when attention is needed.
Two railroads stated that complete air brake tests should be performed
when a system component is replaced, whereas other railroads
recommended following the manufacturer's recommended practice or at a
minimum running a normal system check to verify the repair.
Two manufacturers of brake equipment suggested that whatever
regulations are developed they need to allow for technological
development. They stated that systems are being developed that will be
able to monitor all sorts of things and will eliminate the need for
time-based maintenance and cleaning of brake equipment. These parties
believed that in the next five years systems will be available that can
be self-diagnostic and able to report on their operational
capabilities. Expected future capabilities are: advanced train control
system (ATCS) compatibility, distributed power, simplicity of design,
maintainability, accuracy of pressure control, and adaptability to
complete electronic or radio control throughout freight train
operation.
FRA Conclusions. In order to allow for and encourage the
development of new technology, FRA proposes to provide guidelines
regarding the tests and procedures required for introducing new brake
system technology. These guidelines would require the submission of
design and test plans as well as subsequent operational plans for the
introduction of new technology. Parties would also be allowed to
petition the FRA to convert some of the brake system design and
maintenance requirements into performance-based standards to
accommodate the use of electronic braking systems.

VI. Dynamic Brakes

As the result of the Southern Pacific Transportation Company
accident at San Bernardino, California on May 25, 1989, the NTSB made
the following two recommendations to FRA concerning dynamic brakes:
1. Study, in conjunction with the AAR, the feasibility of
developing a positive method to indicate to the operating engineer in
the cab of the controlling locomotive unit the condition of the dynamic
brakes on all units in the train.
2. Revise regulations to require that if a locomotive unit is
equipped with dynamic brakes that the dynamic brakes function.
Dynamic brakes were developed as a ``free'' by-product of the
diesel-electric drive train. By engaging the dynamic brake, the
normally powered traction motors on each axle are changed to
generators, and the power generated is dissipated through resistance
grids. The effect is similar to that of shifting an automobile to a
lower gear when descending a steep grade. The additional hardware
needed to outfit a locomotive with dynamic brakes includes the grids
and the controls and switches.
The primary selling point of dynamic brakes has been to save on
freight car brake shoe wear. The dynamic brake is also useful in
controlling train slack in lieu of using the locomotive independent
brake. Furthermore, use of the dynamic brake in controlling train speed
in lieu of power braking, where the train brake is applied with the
locomotive under power, is a major factor in fuel savings. Due to these
benefits, railroads currently emphasize and encourage the use of
dynamic brakes. In order to determine the types of requirements or
standards that should be developed regarding the design and use of
dynamic brakes, FRA requested comments from interested parties
regarding the reliability, testing, and cost of dynamic brakes as well
as the types of information that are or could be provided to the
engineer regarding the availability and operation of the devices. See
57 FR 62555.
The AAR and a number of railroads commented that dynamic brakes are
not safety devices but are economical devices and their operation
should be governed by the railroads' operating rules and not federal
regulations. Every railroad commenting on dynamic brakes stated that
they are not the primary brake and are not used to stop a train. The
parties considered the devices optional features used to save fuel and
reduce wear and tear on brake equipment. Therefore, the commenters felt
that any decision to equip a locomotive with dynamic brakes and any
specific handling instructions as to their use should be left to each
individual railroad since their installation and use must be based on
an individual economic analysis. Several commuter and passenger
railroads commented that they operate with blended brakes on MU cars
and, thus, feel that any regulations regarding dynamic brakes need to
separate these types of operations from conventional freight service.
Several commenters also stated that dynamic brakes do not have a
fail-safe feature and can fail at any time. The most common failures
reported by these parties occur in brake resistors, traction motors,
grid systems, blowers, and control modules and contactors. However, the
railroads reported that dynamic brakes are relatively dependable and
trouble free. Two railroads stated that they had failure rates of less
than three percent.
Several commenters stated that the reliability of dynamic brakes is
influenced by the degree of maintenance they receive. Several railroads
reported that they perform routine preventive maintenance every 92
days. One railroad stated that their routine maintenance includes
visual inspection of equipment, inspection of grid blower brushes,
verification of trainline continuity, check of MU jumper cable wiring,
check of main generator voltage regulation, and verification of
previous dynamic brake operation via recording system playback. This
railroad and one other carrier also stated that at major servicing
facilities set up of the dynamic brakes is verified. In addition, these
railroads commented that dynamic brakes are part of the daily
inspection and that if enroute failure of dynamic brakes occurs the
train crew is to complete a form, contained in the locomotive,
detailing the problem. With regard to pre-departure testing of the
dynamic brakes, the AAR and several railroads stated that, due to the
operating efficiency of dynamic brakes, a standing test of the devices
would merely let the engineer know if the dynamic brakes set up, but
would not inform him as to whether they will work, and that in order to
completely test the devices the train must be moving. However, these
commenters also discouraged the use of running tests since such a test
would require at least a 10-mph speed, whereas most facilities have 5
mph speed limits and because creation of slack in a train is
inadvisable at some locations.
The AAR and a number of railroads commented that there is no
equipment available today to monitor the dynamic brakes on trailing
locomotives. These parties also stated that the monitoring of trailing
units is really rather useless due to the fact that dynamic brakes can
fail at any time. One railroad commented that a prototype device
capable of monitoring the dynamic brakes on trailing locomotives has
been developed but no production model is available and the cost of the
device would be $10,000-$15,000 per locomotive. The AAR also provided
an approximate figure of $100,000 as the cost to retrofit an individual
locomotive with dynamic brakes.
The RLEA recommended that dynamic brakes be employed on all trains,
be in working order, and be tested before all departures and that
training be provided on their usage. The RLEA would also like mandatory
installation of a device that would monitor the dynamic effort on
trailing locomotives. The BLE and BRC did not think that dynamic brakes
could be monitored and felt that even if they could, it would probably
not be that effective since dynamic brakes tend to fail while in use.
The BLE did recommend that railroads be required to maintain the
equipment. In addition, the BRC and BLE recommended that if dynamic
brakes are present a running test should be required, even if performed
at less than 10 mph since such a test would at least indicate whether
the dynamic brakes are functioning.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) commented that the
railroads are improperly describing dynamic brakes as a luxury. The
NTSB stated that railroads preach and encourage the use of the dynamic
brake and, thus, should ensure at least from the initial terminal that
the system will work.
FRA Conclusion. The RSERA requires FRA to issue standards for
locomotive dynamic brakes, ``where applicable.'' It is clear from this
qualification and the history of the legislation that it imposes no
requirement that locomotives be equipped with dynamic brakes. Nor do we
understand the RSERA to supersede the Act of March 2, 1893, which
forbids a railroad to ``run any train * * * that has not a sufficient
number of cars in it * * * equipped with power or train brakes that the
engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed
without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that
purpose.'' This provision clearly requires that the train brake system
(which, after 100 years is still pneumatically operated in the case of
conventional freight equipment) bear the burden of providing a sound
and serviceable first-order safety system capable of controlling train
speed and arresting the movement when required.
It is pertinent to ask why, against this background, FRA is now
required to address the issue of locomotive dynamic brakes. The mandate
for dynamic brake safety standards emanated from the investigation, by
the National Transportation Safety Board, of an accident in which
normal precautions for use of the primary train air brake system were
cast to the wind. In brief, excessive tonnage and excessive speed
cresting the grade led to a train out of control. This, together with
the disastrous consequences, resulted in examination by the Board of
whether the availability of fully operational dynamic braking, as a
secondary safety system, might have saved the day. Report No. RAR-90-02
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1990).
It is conceded by most serious observers that locomotive dynamic
brakes do not offer the technical capability to serve as a primary
train braking system, since--
(a) they provide braking force only on powered locomotive axles and
are incapable of controlling in-train forces in the same manner as the
automatic braking system;
(b) they are effective only within a narrow speed range and have no
capability to actually stop a train;
(c) they can fail without prior warning; and
(d) their failure mode is characterized by loss of braking force
(as opposed to the automatic brake, which, properly employed, initiates
an emergency brake application upon loss of system integrity).
FRA thus views as unfortunate, and potentially reckless, the
increasing number of train handling and power brake instructions issued
by freight railroads that emphasize use of dynamic brakes without
including prominent warnings that such systems may not be relied upon
to provide the margin of safety necessary to stop short of obstructions
and control points or to avoid overspeed operation. Such instructions,
while not yet affirmatively misleading to seasoned locomotive
engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgment of safety critics and
regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon these systems.
While FRA is not persuaded that dynamic brakes warrant emphasis as
the primary safety system, the agency recognizes that the statute
communicates a valid safety concern, properly construed. That is, to
the extent significant emphasis is placed on dynamic brakes--either by
the railroads as a legitimate means of limiting fuel consumption,
undesired emergency brake applications, and wear to freight car
components, or by safety critics who do not foresee that hazard of
reliance on such systems--engineers may in fact be encouraged to make
errors in judgment that take them beyond prudent safety margins. At
such a critical point, proper functioning of any secondary safety
system--however subject to failure--is greatly to be wished. Further,
dynamic brakes offer a redundant safety feature should the engineer
make a mistake in judgment leading to excessive speed under the
prevailing conditions of grade, tonnage, and weather.
FRA believes that dynamic brakes have become, de facto, a second-
order safety system where employed. While from the point of view of
logical priorities, dynamic brakes ``back up'' the automatic train
brake system, in sequence of operational procedures the priority is
reversed. Stated differently, either the proper functioning of these
systems, or the provision of reliable information concerning degraded
functioning of these systems, should prevent locomotive engineers from
operating trains in a manner that might make recovery through use of
the automatic brake impossible. As between these two alternatives,
proper functioning is marginally preferred, since communication,
perception, and comprehension of information is not a uniformly
successful enterprise.
To summarize, although FRA will not require that locomotives be
equipped with dynamic brakes, FRA does believe that Congress, in
Sec. 20141 (formerly Sec. 7 of the RSERA), intended for FRA to develop
meaningful and enforceable standards regarding the safe use and
operation of dynamic brakes. Furthermore, FRA believes that if the
devices are available, they should be maintained, and engineers should
be informed on their safe and proper use and be provided with
information regarding the amount of dynamic braking effort that they
have available. Further, FRA believes that railroads operating braking
systems that include dynamic brakes should have written operating
rules, tailored to the specific equipment and territory of each
railroad, governing the safe handling procedures for the use of dynamic
brakes under all operating conditions, including procedures covering
the loss of dynamic brakes. FRA also proposes to require railroads to
inform engineers of the total dynamic brake retarding force available
on all outbound trains equipped with dynamic brakes. As several
commenters stated, in order to completely test dynamic brakes the train
must be moving. Thus, FRA believes that running tests of the dynamic
brake should be performed whenever the motive power or engine crew is
changed so that the availability, or lack of availability, of the
device can be rechecked.
Currently, the operating rules of most railroads contain limits on
the amount of dynamic braking force that may safely be used depending
on the dimensions of the train involved. Most railroad operating rules
express these limits in terms of the number of axles that engine
consists are permitted to use in dynamic braking. Railroads generally
will cut out the dynamic brakes on trailing locomotives, when the train
is made up, in order to avoid the possibility of excessive dynamic
braking force being applied, which could result in the buckling of the
train. However, some operating rules also express dynamic braking
limits for operating through turnouts, crossovers, and curves in terms
of dynamic brake amperes, yet, there is currently no way for engineers
to know the amount of dynamic brake amperage on their train or the
amperage they are using. Furthermore, although running tests of dynamic
brakes, as proposed by FRA, provide information to the locomotive
engineer regarding the availability of dynamic brakes, such tests are
limited to the specific moment they are performed. Thus, running tests
do not provide continuous information on the current status of the
dynamic brakes to the locomotive engineer. Because dynamic brakes could
fail at any time, FRA feels there should be some way for engineers to
continuously monitor the operation of their available dynamic brakes.
Consequently, based on Congress' mandate contained in Sec. 20141
(formerly Sec. 7 of the RSERA), requiring meaningful standards to
address the safe use of dynamic brakes, FRA believes that locomotives
built after January 1, 1996, and equipped with dynamic brakes, should
be able to (i) test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at
rest and (ii) display the total train dynamic brake retarding force, at
certain speed increments, in the cab of the controlling locomotive.
In the ANPRM (57 FR 62555), FRA requested comments from the
industry on possible methods of providing information regarding the
status of dynamic brakes to the engineer in the cab of the controlling
locomotive. The only workable option presented to FRA in the comments
received was the equipping of locomotives with a dynamic brake display.
Although FRA recognizes that the technology for dynamic brake displays
with the ability to provide the type of information sought by FRA is
not readily available today, several commenters suggested that it is
currently being developed. FRA believes that the benefits of such an
indicator would be to alert engineers that they have diminished or
excessive dynamic capabilities, thus permitting the engineer to control
the braking of their train in the safest possible manner. However, in
order to fully evaluate the viability of this proposal, FRA seeks
comments from all interested parties regarding the following specific
issues:
(1) What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake
indicators capable of providing the information required by this
proposal?
(2) Are FRA's cost estimates regarding this proposal accurate?
(3) What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety
benefits can be derived from the use of these devices?
(4) What alternative methods are available for providing the same
information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a
locomotive engineer?

VII. Miscellaneous Issues

A. Brake Pipe Reduction

Present regulations require brake-pipe reductions of either 15
pounds, 20 pounds, or full service depending on which of the required
train air brake test is being performed. 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13. In the
ANPRM (57 FR 62556), FRA sought comments from interested parties to
determine if it is feasible and beneficial for FRA to establish one
standard brake-pipe reduction for all required train air brake tests.
The AAR and several railroads recommended that some type of
performance standard be established so that each railroad could
determine the amount of reduction that best suits its operation. The
AAR also suggested that if the reduction amounts were left in the
discretion of the individual railroads, it would be receptive to a
requirement that the railroad indicate what reduction rates it would
use at different locations. Several railroads commented that one
standard reduction should be required for all tests and inspections and
that the standard should not require an increase to a full service
reduction because such a practice could cause undesired releases. These
commenters also noted that one standardized reduction for all tests
would simplify air brake tests and make it easier for the railroads to
train and instruct their employees. Most of the commenting railroads
suggested a 20-psi reduction if a specific amount were established. Two
commuter railroads stated that they are unable to comply with 49 CFR
232.12 as currently written because they are unable to make a service
rate reduction on some of their equipment.
Two labor organizations recommended that one standard reduction be
established by FRA rather than allowing each individual railroad to
determine their own reductions. This recommendation was based on the
commenters' concern that varying reduction standards among the
railroads would cause confusion for train crews since many railroads
swap trains and operate crews over each other's lines. These commenters
also felt that one standardized reduction would make training easier.
FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees with many of the commenters that a
standardized brake pipe reduction of 20 psi is sufficient for the
performance of all required brake inspections and tests. FRA believes
that the adoption of one standard reduction will simplify both the
performance of the required inspections and the training of employees
charged with performing these inspections. Under the proposal FRA would
no longer require full service reductions for any of required
inspections in order to avoid the possibility of undesired releases.
FRA feels that the suggestion of several commenters to allow each
railroad to determine its own brake pipe reduction is not viable. It is
not uncommon to find train crews operating in several different
locations or to find the train crew of one railroad operating the
equipment belonging to another railroad or operating over the lines of
another railroad. Thus, if various reductions were established by
different railroads or by one railroad in different locations, it would
merely cause further confusion in both the performance of the
inspections and the training of personnel.

B. Performance of Brake Inspections

To determine whether regulations should be developed specifying how
certain brake inspections should be performed and whether certain
currently required inspections are necessary, FRA requested comments
from interested parties regarding the current methods of performing the
various required brake inspections and sought comments on how current
inspections could be improved or eliminated. See 57 FR 62556.
The AAR and a number of railroads recommended that the specific
method of performing the various required inspections should be left to
the discretion of each railroad since the type of inspection required
depends on the equipment involved and the operating conditions existing
at various locations. Many of these commenters stated that experience
has shown that vehicle inspections do not detract from inspections and
that such inspections are adequate depending on the location performed.
These parties also stated that their employees are instructed to get
off their vehicle if they are unable to see the brake equipment from
the vehicle. Several commenters also endorsed the use of roll-by
inspections at least to determine release of the brakes. Most of the
commenters also recommended that inspection of five-pack equipment
(articulated cars) needs to be looked at since this equipment utilizes
several different types of braking systems, many of which cannot be
viewed from one side of the car. Several railroads stated that they
were in the process of developing specific training for the inspection
of five-pack equipment. One commenter suggested that if the brakes fail
to apply on one of the sets of brake equipment contained on multi-
platform cars with multiple brake systems, the car should be considered
operable and permitted to continue to the first terminal where repairs
could be made.
Amtrak commented that the use of package, or unit, brake actuators
on most modern passenger trains requires an inspection of both sides of
the train. This commenter also stated that the enshrouding of brake
actuators, the existence of high-level platforms, and the presence of
wayside electric power systems make inspection of brake systems on
passenger trains dangerous. Amtrak recommended an alternative to the
initial terminal inspection that would allow passenger trains making
multiple turns in a 24-hour interval to perform a set and release after
a leakage test is performed at all subsequent departures after a
complete initial terminal brake inspection if the train remains charged
and the consist is not broken. The AAR and one railroad stated that the
use of carside indicators is a reliable method for determining the
condition of brakes when brake equipment is enshrouded or mounted in-
board or when a train is next to a high-level platform or other
obstruction. Two other passenger railroads suggested that FRA develop a
list of parameters that each initial terminal test must address and
then allow each passenger railroad to submit its test procedures, based
on its individual operations, to FRA for approval. A number of
passenger and commuter railroads also commented that many of the
current inspection requirements contained in the regulations are not
applicable to multiple unit (MU) cars, specifically noting the leakage
test requirement, the piston travel regulations, and the requirement to
keep equipment charged when adding cars. These parties recommended that
provisions regarding MU cars be separated from provisions on freight
locomotives and cars.
The AAR and a number of railroads provided comments on specific
inspections currently required and on specific elements of various
inspections. Several of these commenters suggested that the inbound
brake equipment inspection contained at Sec. 232.14 be eliminated.
These commenters stated that this inspection requires the ``bottling of
air'' (the angle cock to be closed following a 20-psi reduction), which
is contrary to most railroads' operating rule requiring the brake pipe
to be left open on standing cars. The parties felt that the current
requirement could result in the train being put in emergency, which
wastes time because then the train must be recharged, and is
potentially dangerous because it could cause a train to roll away due
to a brake release.
Several parties also mentioned that current piston travel
requirements are no longer necessary due to the use of automatic slack
adjusters, which are designed to keep piston travel within certain
tolerances. Some commenters felt that if slack adjusters were required,
noting that most cars operating today are already equipped with them,
the need to constantly measure piston travel would be eliminated.
Several commenters also suggested that railroads have the option of
performing a thorough inbound inspection together with a set-and-
release departure inspection in lieu of performing an initial terminal
inspection, since initial terminal inspections can be an obstacle to
moving goods quickly because the removal of bad ordered cars once the
train is assembled can cost considerable time. These parties also
recommended that cars found with sticking brakes during the departure
inspection be cut out and tagged and allowed to continue to destination
as long as the tonnage per operable brakes did not exceed a specified
amount. One railroad also requested revision Sec. 232.12(i) to allow
the yard test device to be placed at any location in the train, rather
than at the end of the train nearest the hauling road locomotive, since
the results of such a test are not affected by location of the device.
The AAR and several railroads also suggested that the 85 percent
requirement contained at Sec. 232.1 should be changed to a performance
standard based on tonnage per operative brakes. These parties stated
that it is almost impossible to remake a train while enroute to
disassociate those cars with inoperative brakes from the rest of the
train. However, none of these commenters had any major problem with the
85 percent requirement, and all of them stated that retaining the
standard is acceptable.
One air brake manufacturer agreed with the railroads that the
problem of excessive piston travel has been addressed by the
development of slack adjusters. This commenter stated that slack
adjusters automatically adjust piston travel to prevent excessive
travel and that if slack adjusters are reliable there is no need to
measure for piston travel. The commenter suggested that new technology
is being developed to monitor the brake cylinder and that any new
regulation needs to allow for technology that may do away with
measuring piston travel.
Labor organization representatives and several individual members
believed that FRA should specify how inspections are to be performed.
Several members of the BRC commented that the only proper inspection is
a walking inspection on both sides of the train with a set and release.
However, these commenters suggested that if a walking inspection is
performed on both sides of a train during a set, then a roll-by
inspection for the release would be acceptable. Several commenters
stated that on some cars an adequate inspection could be made from one
side of the train but that on other cars such as multilevel stack cars
only 50 percent of the brake equipment can be observed from any one
side of the cars. Members of both the BRC and the UTU strenuously
recommended that inspection of five-pack cars not be performed from
moving vehicles because it is very difficult to observe the brake
equipment on these cars. A BRC representative also stated that if slack
adjusters have eliminated the need to measure piston travel then the
railroads should have no problem complying with a seven-to nine-inch
piston travel limit. This commenter also stated that unless there are
regulations governing the proper setting and operation of slack
adjusters, piston travel must continue to be monitored and measured.
Several labor organizations and their individual members stated
that train crews are not qualified to perform initial terminal
inspections. Various individual carmen commented that many of the
initial terminal inspections that are currently being performed are
inadequate because the employees performing the inspections are not
adequately trained. The BRC maintained that the initial terminal
inspection could not be separated from the pre-departure inspection
required under Part 215 and both must be performed by carmen. The BRC
also mentioned that because the initial terminal inspections are not
being performed by qualified individuals trains are departing without
100 percent operable brakes, and thus, believes that the 85 percent
rule contained at 232.1 should be increased to 90 or 100 percent. This
party also supported an increase in the 85 percent requirement based on
the fact that heavier and longer trains are being run today, and
therefore, better braking is needed. The BLE commented that they do not
see a problem on today's railroads regarding inoperative brakes and
felt that unless there was some technical evidence that the requirement
should be reduced, the 85 percent requirement should remain.
FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees with several of the railroad commenters
that it would be practically impossible and far too intrusive for FRA
to mandate the specific methods for performing various inspections on
various equipment. FRA feels that each individual railroad is in the
best position to determine the best method for performing the various
required inspections based on their operating conditions and equipment.
However, the method of inspection that is chosen by a railroad should
ensure that all required equipment is properly inspected and is
functioning as required by the regulations. FRA will continue to allow
the use of roll-by inspections of the brake release if train speed does
not exceed 10 mph. FRA feels that roll-by inspections made at greater
speeds would not permit sufficient visual inspection of the brake
equipment.
FRA recognizes the unique characteristics of some commuter and
passenger trains that repeat the same trip several times a day without
breaking up the consist. Because the trains in these types of
operations are not broken up and remain connected to an air supply
continuously, it is unlikely that their air brake equipment would
deteriorate beyond federal requirements in one day if they were in
proper working order at the beginning of the day. Thus, FRA believes
that trains that repeat the same trip more than once a day need only be
required to have an initial terminal brake test, performed by a
qualified individual, prior to the first departure for that train each
calendar day.
FRA also agrees with several commenters that the MU equipment,
currently used by many commuter operations, is unable to conform to
many of the standards established for freight operations. Consequently,
FRA believes that commuter railroads operating MU equipment should
develop and enforce written inspection, maintenance, and test
procedures for this equipment to ensure the systems will operate as
intended.
FRA further recognizes that the inbound inspection required
pursuant to Sec. 232.14, which requires the bottling of air, is
contrary to most railroads' operating procedures requiring the brake
pipe to be left open on standing cars. FRA feels that this requirement
is unnecessary in present-day operations and could actually cause a
train to roll away due to a brake release.
Although several parties commented that piston travel requirements
are no longer necessary due to the development and use of automatic
slack adjusters, FRA believes that piston travel still is an important
component that must be kept within certain operating limits. If
automatic slack adjusters function properly, then the railroads should
have no problem maintaining piston travel within the required limits.
Currently, the only way to ensure that a slack adjuster is working
correctly is to measure the component it is adjusting. If a device is
developed that can reliably monitor the brake cylinder, as one
manufacturer indicated, then parties can petition the FRA for a change
in the standards at that time.
FRA will continue to require 100-percent functional train brake
systems at initial terminals. As there were no major objections raised,
FRA proposes to retain the ``85-percent'' requirement previously
contained at Sec. 232.1. The BRC was the only party which requested
that the percentage be increased, based on their contention that
initial terminal inspections were not being performed by qualified
individuals. However, FRA believes that the qualification standards
proposed below, adequately address this party's concern. Furthermore,
as previously stated, FRA does not feel railroads are currently
performing initial terminal inspections as well as they should be and,
thus, we do not believe it would be appropriate, at this time, to allow
alternatives to the initial terminal inspections as requested by
several commentators.

C. COT&S Requirements

Prior to January 1, 1992, railroads and car owners were required to
maintain freight brake equipment in accordance with a periodic clean,
oil, test, and stencil (COT&S) schedule. This schedule varied from 10
to 16 years, depending on type of brake control valve. At the
conclusion of the equipment changeout, a single car test was performed
to verify the integrity of the entire brake system.
Prior to 1982, this same single car test was required on each car
when on a shop or repair track and the date of test so stencilled on
the car. This was known as an ``In Date Test'' or IDT. Cars which had
been last tested in less than 90 days were excluded from the test
requirement. In 1982 the IDT was abolished, and only a simple
application and release test of the brakes was required when on the
shop or repair track. Certain brake (sticking, inoperative, etc.) and
wheel defects (overheated, built-up tread, etc.) did require the single
car test.
In 1990, several improvements were made in test procedures to
reduce the incidence of undesired emergency brake applications and
leakage which could cause wheel damage. These improvements were
incorporated into the full single car test and in a new abbreviated
test, identified as a ``Repair Track Air Brake Test.'' At that time the
repair track test was required each time a car was on a shop or repair
track. The full single car test is required when the brake control
valves are replaced. As these comprehensive tests were phased in, the
COT&S requirements were abolished. The effectiveness of these new tests
was evident by the increased replacement of brake components which were
determined to be defective. Leakage at angle cocks and cutout cocks was
the primary source of problems. In order to determine whether there is
a need for time-based COT&S requirements, FRA sought comments, in the
ANPRM (57 FR 62556), from interested parties regarding the problems
associated with the elimination of the COT&S requirements for freight
equipment and whether COT&S requirements are necessary for passenger
equipment or are alternatives available.
The AAR and several of its member railroads contended that the new
single car test is much better than the old time-based COT&S and turns
up many more defects due to the increase in air pressure to 90 pounds.
The AAR stated that their studies show that a car is on the repair
track 1.7 times a year and, thus, on average every car will receive a
single car or repair track test at least one to two times a year. The
AAR also stated that in 1992 1.1 to 1.4 million single car or repair
track tests were performed by the railroads and that three times as
many brake valves were changed out in 1992 as compared to 1991. In
addition, the AAR reported that the railroads spent in excess of $7.5
million to upgrade their equipment to perform the enhanced single car
test. Several railroads provided figures on the number of cars in their
fleets receiving single car and repair track tests, and provided data
comparing the number of brake components that were changed out in 1992
with the number of components changed out in 1991 under the old COT&S
requirements. In all cases the data showed an increase in the number of
components changed out, which the railroads attributed to the
improvement of the single car test and were presented as support for
their contention that the improved single car and repair track tests
are more effective than the old, time-based COT&S requirements. Several
railroads also commented that there is no need for FRA to establish
brake maintenance requirements separate from those established by the
AAR. These commenters stated that significant improvements in brake
maintenance have been made by the AAR without increased regulation.
These parties also noted that the AAR has its own engineering staff and
laboratories and has expertise of all the railroads and, thus, is in
the best position to determine the best practices for maintaining the
brake systems.
Amtrak and two other passenger and commuter railroads provided
comments regarding COT&S requirements for passenger cars. These
commenters felt that the brake equipment on passenger cars can be
maintained by criteria other than time-based COT&S. The parties
proposed the possibility of requiring that a single car test be
performed each time a car is on the repair track or each time the car
comes in for preventive maintenance, about every 120 days. These
parties would prefer to conduct periodic testing rather than changing
out valves on a periodic basis. These commenters felt that the current
three-year COT&S requirement on 26C-based systems is too restrictive.
Amtrak also commented that the six-year COT&S requirement it employs
for freight-type brake valves on its passenger cars should be
considered an internal Amtrak policy.
The BRC and several of its individual members admitted that the new
single car test may be very valuable, but contended that the railroads
are circumventing its use. These commenters stated that railroads are
eliminating repair tracks all over the nation in order to avoid
performing these single car tests. Several individuals presented
examples of how the single car test and repair track test are being
circumvented, such as making repairs in the field or moving cars to
expediter tracks for repairs rather than to repair tracks. Therefore,
the BRC recommended that some type of in-date testing or attention must
be reinstated, preferably somewhere in the seven- to eight-year range.
The RLEA also recommended that periodic attention be reinstated,
contending that acceptance of AAR's unilateral change in the
maintenance requirements allows the AAR to establish regulations
without public comment. The BRC and several of its members also
commented on the three-year COT&S requirement for passenger cars,
contending that the requirement should be maintained due to
condensation building up in the trainlines and the fact that
compressors are not being maintained. The BRC also recommended that any
change made by the AAR in their recommended maintenance practices
should be approved by FRA.
One manufacturer strongly endorsed the new single car test and
repair track test as the most comprehensive tests ever performed. This
commenter felt that these tests will ensure more effective brake
maintenance than the previous application-and-release test and the 16-
year COT&S requirement.
FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that the new single car test, which has
been used industry-wide since January of 1992, is a much better and
more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating defective brake
equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S requirements.
FRA believes that performance of the single car test will significantly
reduce the number of defective components currently found and will
dramatically increase the reliability of brake equipment. Thus, use of
the single car test will greatly improve the safety of both railroad
employees and the general public since brake equipment will be in
better and safer condition. However, in order to fully benefit from the
advantages of the single car test, cars must receive the test. Several
labor commenters admitted that the new test was very valuable, but
stated that the test is being circumvented by the railroads. These
commenters provided various examples of how the tests are being
avoided. Therefore, in order to ensure that all cars receive the new
single car test, FRA proposes to require the performance of the test on
a timely basis.
FRA feels that the single car test should be conducted on any car
that is on a repair or shop track for various wheel or brake equipment
defects and that at a minimum freight service equipment should receive
the test every one or two years depending on whether the equipment is
high-utilization or non-high-utilization equipment, as defined below,
and that commuter and passenger service equipment should receive the
test at least every six months. Freight railroad representatives
reported that on average a car is currently on the repair track 1.7
times a year and, thus, receives a full single car or repair track test
at that time. Commuter and passenger railroad representatives reported
that their cars are on a shop or repair track every 120 days.
Therefore, FRA does not feel that requiring the single car test to be
performed at the proposed time periods would be overly burdensome on
the industry since, by its own admission, most cars will be on a repair
or shop track within these time limits. Furthermore, parties would be
allowed to request a change in the time interval for performing the
single car test by monitoring their single car tests and conducting a
statistical analysis of the results. The procedure for requesting a
change in the time interval is further discussed in the section-by-
section analysis.
In order to ensure that the single car tests are properly
performed, FRA believes that only qualified brake system inspectors
should conduct the tests and that the single car testing devices should
be tested at least once a day and receive maintenance at least every 92
days. Furthermore, in order to ensure proper maintenance of brake
equipment, FRA believes that each railroad should develop and enforce
written maintenance procedures for all types of brake systems it
operates which meet or exceed current industry standards and all
federal train brake system safety requirements. The maintenance
required by these procedures should only be performed by individuals
qualified as mechanical or electronic brake system inspectors. Spot
checks of both the single car tests and the maintenance procedures
should be conducted by qualified supervisory personnel to make sure the
procedures are being followed and the tests are properly performed.

D. Charging of Air Brake System.

Present regulations for air brake testing basically require that
cars that have previously been tested in accordance with the
regulations either ``be kept charged until road motive power is
attached'' or be retested. 49 CFR 232.12(i). Based on longstanding
administrative interpretation and practice, FRA presumes that a brake
system is no longer adequately charged if disconnected from the
charging device (supply of pressurized air) for more than two hours
before coupling of locomotives; otherwise, retesting is required. In
the ANPRM (57 FR 62556), FRA requested comments from interested parties
regarding the viability of this interpretation and sought information
for developing alternative procedures that would not jeopardize safety.
The AAR and several railroads stated that there is no reason to
assume that once a train is charged and tested and then left standing
without being provided with a source of compressed air that the brake
system would become defective. These parties suggested that leakage on
standing trains has been greatly reduced through the use of welded
brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. These
commenters felt that FRA's interpretation of allowing trains to sit
without air for only two hours is from an era when this new equipment
was not used. They also stated that FRA's current interpretation costs
the industry money, fuel, and time and creates pollution because trains
must be either reinspected or left with a locomotive attached and
idling in order to avoid performing a full initial terminal test.
Several railroads suggested that trains could be off air indefinitely
if the consist is not altered, or at least as long as 24 hours, and
remain in the same condition. Several commenters recommended that if a
set of cars is off air for an extended period, all that should be
required is a set-and-release test to assure the continuity of the
brake pipe. CP Rail Services mentioned that there is no such two-hour
rule in Canada and stated that in Canada if cars are off air for any
length of time a set-and-release continuity test is required. Every
commenting railroad felt the current two-hour interpretation is onerous
and unrealistic.
The BLE, BRC, and several individual carmen felt that the current
interpretation is reasonable. Most of these commenters expressed
concern for the integrity of the brake system if a consist were left
standing for longer than two hours. These concerns were aimed at the
effect that climate might have on the equipment and the increased
possibility of vandalism to the equipment if consists sat without air
for longer periods. One conductor recommended returning to a four-hour
limit as a minimum.
FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that our longstanding administrative
interpretation, that requires the retesting of cars disconnected from a
charging device for longer than two hours, was established prior to the
development of new equipment that has greatly reduced leakage problems,
such as welded brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses.
However, contrary to several railroads' assertions FRA does not believe
that cars should be allowed to be off air for extended periods of time
without being retested. FRA believes that the longer cars sit without
air attached the greater the chances are that the integrity of the
brake system will be compromised. The longer cars sit the more
susceptible they may be to weather conditions or even vandalism, as
some commenters suggested. Consequently, based on today's equipment,
operating practices, and overriding safety concerns, FRA feels that
cars should not be disconnected from a supply of pressurized air for
longer than four hours without being retested.

E. Specifications for Power Brake Systems for Freight Service

Currently, Appendix B of Part 232, entitled ``Specifications and
Requirements for Power Brakes and Appliances for Operating Power-Brake
Systems for Freight Service'', contains the specifications for AB
valves, as were adopted in the early 1930's, and has not been modified
since, although several deviations have been permitted. No improvements
or new features, as reflected in present-day control valves, have been
added to the appendix. Consequently, FRA sought comments from
interested parties as to how the specificatio

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A94-22222. Public record. Not legal advice.