# Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps To Account for CAD and MXN Interest Rate Benchmark Transitions

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-18212

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Rule
- **Published:** September 8, 2026
- **Citation:** 91 FR 57063

## Text

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 50
RIN 3038-AF69
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps To Account for CAD and MXN Interest Rate Benchmark Transitions

AGENCY:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC) is amending its interest rate swap clearing requirement regulations under applicable provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to address the transition from the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR) to the Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (CORRA), and the transition from the Mexican Interbank Equilibrium Interest Rate (la Tasa de Interés Interbancaria de Equilibrio, or TIIE by its Spanish acronym) to the TIIE Funding Rate (TIIE de Fondeo or F-TIIE), as benchmark reference rates for interest rate swaps denominated, respectively, in Canadian dollars (CAD) and Mexican pesos (MXN). These transitions are part of an ongoing global effort by market participants, benchmark administrators, regulators, and others to shift away from reliance on certain interbank offered rates (IBORs) that have become unavailable as benchmark reference rates and adopt alternative reference rates, which are predominantly overnight, nearly risk-free reference rates (RFRs). These amendments revise the set of interest rate swaps that are required to be submitted for clearing, pursuant to the CEA and the Commission's regulations, to a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) that is registered under the CEA (registered DCO) or a DCO that has been exempted from such registration (exempt DCO). The amendments modify the Commission's interest rate swap clearing requirement to reflect the market transitions from swaps referencing CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE to swaps referencing, respectively, CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE.

DATES:

The amended rules are effective October 8, 2026.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sarah E. Josephson, Deputy Director, at 202-418-5684 or
sjosephson@cftc.gov;
Daniel O'Connell, Special Counsel, at 202-418-5583 or
doconnell@cftc.gov;
or Philip Tumminio, Special Counsel, at 202-418-5910 or
ptumminio@cftc.gov,
Division of Clearing and Risk at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background

A. Commission's Swap Clearing Requirement

B. Global Progress on Benchmark Reform

C. CAD and MXN Interest Rate Benchmark Transitions

II. Domestic and International Coordination Efforts

A. Domestic Coordination Efforts

B. International Coordination Efforts

C. Clearing Requirements in Other Jurisdictions

III. Overview of Comment Letters Received

IV. Final Amendments to Regulation § 50.4(a)

V. Determination Analysis for RFR OIS

A. General Description of Information Considered

B. Consistency With DCO Core Principles Under Section 2(h) of the CEA

C. Conclusions Regarding Consideration of Section 2(h)'s Five Statutory Factors

VI. Implementation Schedule

VII. Cost Benefit Considerations

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

B. Overview of Swap Clearing

C. Consideration of the Costs and Benefits of the Commission's Action

D. Costs and Benefits of the Amendments as Compared to Alternatives

E. Section 15(a) Factors

VIII. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

C. Antitrust Laws

D. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192

E. Congressional Review Act

I. Background

A. Commission's Swap Clearing Requirement

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) established a comprehensive new regulatory framework for swaps.
1

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act (Title VII) amended the CEA to require, among other things, that a swap be cleared through a registered DCO or an exempt DCO if the Commission has determined that the swap, or group, category, type, or class of swaps, is required to be cleared, unless an exception to the clearing requirement applies.
2

The CEA, as amended by Title VII, provides that the Commission may issue a clearing requirement determination based either on a Commission-initiated review of a swap
3

or a swap submission from a DCO.
4

1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

2
Section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(1)(A).

3
Section 2(h)(2)(A) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(A). Section 2(h)(2)(A) provides for a Commission-initiated review process whereby the Commission, on an ongoing basis, must review swaps, or a group, category, type, or class of swaps, to determine whether a swap, or a group, category, type, or class of swaps, should be required to be cleared.

4
Section 2(h)(2)(B) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(B). Section 2(h)(2)(B)(i) requires that each DCO submit to the Commission each swap, or group, category, type, or class of swaps, that it plans to accept for clearing. The swaps subject to this determination were submitted by DCOs pursuant to CEA section 2(h)(2)(B)(i) and regulation 39.5(b), 17 CFR 39.5(b). Pursuant to section 2(h)(2)(B)-(C) of the CEA, the Commission must review swap submissions from DCOs to determine whether the swaps should be subject to required clearing. Regulation § 39.5(b) implements the procedural elements of section 2(h)(2)(B)-(C) by establishing the process by which a DCO must submit the swaps it offers for clearing to the Commission for purposes of considering a clearing requirement determination.

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the following five factors when making a clearing requirement determination: (I) the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data; (II) the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is traded; (III) the effect on the mitigation

of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market for such contract and the resources of the DCOs available to clear the contract; (IV) the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing; and (V) the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property.
5

5
7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(D)(ii).

The Commission adopted its first clearing requirement determination (First Determination) in 2012.
6

The First Determination was implemented between March 2013 and October 2013 based on the schedule described in regulation § 50.25 and the preamble to the First Determination.
7

The First Determination applied to interest rate swaps in four classes: fixed-to-floating swaps, basis swaps, forward rate agreements (FRAs), and overnight index swaps (OIS).
8

6
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 FR 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (First Determination).

7
17 CFR 50.25; First Determination, 77 FR at 74319-74321.

8

See generally
First Determination. By way of background, an interest rate swap is generally an agreement by counterparties to exchange payments based on a series of cash flows over a specified period of time, typically calculated using two different rates. Fixed-to-floating swaps are interest rate swaps in which the payment(s) owed on one leg of the swap is calculated using a fixed rate, and the payment(s) owed on the other leg is calculated using a floating rate. Basis swaps are interest rate swaps for which the payments for both legs are calculated using floating rates. FRAs are interest rate swaps in which payments are exchanged on a predetermined date for a single period and one leg of the swap is calculated using a fixed rate while the other leg is calculated using a floating rate set on a predetermined date. OIS are interest rate swaps for which one leg of the swap is calculated using a fixed rate and the other leg is calculated using a floating rate based on a daily overnight rate.

In making its initial interest rate swap clearing determination, the Commission focused on the size of the interest rate swap market relative to the swap market overall, as well as the fact that these swaps were already widely being cleared on a voluntary basis.
9

As set forth in regulation § 50.4(a), the Commission required clearing for four classes of interest rate swaps satisfying six specifications related to (i) the currency in which the notional and payment amounts are specified; (ii) the floating rate index referenced in the swap; (iii) the stated termination date; (iv) optionality; (v) dual currencies; and (vi) conditional notional amounts.
10

9

Id.
at 74287, 74307.

10
17 CFR 50.4(a).

The Commission, in the First Determination, limited the interest rate swaps required to be cleared to those denominated in four currencies (U.S. dollar (USD), Euro (EUR), British pound (GBP), and Japanese yen (JPY)). The Commission noted that interest rate swaps denominated in these currencies comprised an outsized portion of the interest rate swap market in terms of notional amounts outstanding and trading volumes compared to interest rate swaps denominated in other currencies.
11

11
First Determination, 77 FR at 74308.

The First Determination covered a number of interest rate swaps that reference interbank offered rates (IBORs), including fixed-to-floating swaps, basis swaps, and FRAs denominated in USD, GBP, JPY, and EUR, referencing the then existing USD London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), GBP LIBOR, JPY LIBOR, and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), respectively. The First Determination also included OIS denominated in EUR referencing the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA), as well as OIS denominated in USD referencing FedFunds and GBP referencing the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA). The Commission observed that interest rate swaps referencing those rates had significant outstanding notional amounts and trading liquidity.
12

The First Determination was implemented throughout 2013 by type of market participant pursuant to regulation § 50.25, in subpart B of part 50 of the Commission's regulations.

12

Id.
at 74309.

The Commission adopted its second clearing requirement determination for interest rate swaps (Second Determination) in 2016.
13

The Second Determination covered interest rate swaps in nine additional currencies: Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Hong Kong dollar (HKD), Mexican peso (MXN), Norwegian krone (NOK), Polish zloty (PLN), Singapore dollar (SGD), Swedish krona (SEK), and Swiss franc (CHF), and was implemented between December 2016 and October 2018 in part based on the effective dates of analogous clearing mandates adopted by authorities in non-U.S. jurisdictions.
14

The Commission adopted the Second Determination largely in order to further harmonize its interest rate swap clearing requirement with those of other jurisdictions that had already issued, or were in the process of issuing, interest rate swap clearing mandates.
15

The Second Determination also covered swaps that reference additional IBORs, including fixed-to-floating swaps denominated in SGD referencing the Singapore Swap Offer Rate (SOR-VWAP) and fixed-to-floating swaps denominated in CHF referencing CHF LIBOR.
16

13
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 FR 71202 (Oct. 14, 2016) (Second Determination).

14
17 CFR 50.26; Second Determination, 81 FR at 71202-71228.

15
Second Determination, 81 FR at 71203-71205. The Commission explained that such harmonization serves an important anti-evasion goal: if a non-U.S. jurisdiction issued a clearing requirement, and a swap dealer located in the United States were not subject to an analogous a clearing requirement under U.S. law, then market participants potentially could avoid the non-U.S. jurisdiction's clearing requirement by entering into a swap with a swap dealer located in the United States.
Id.
at 71203.

16

Id.
at 71205.

The Commission adopted its third clearing requirement determination (Third Determination) in 2022.
17

The Commission adopted the Third Determination largely to address the global transition from IBORs to RFRs in the context of the existing interest rate swap clearing requirement without any expansion of the underlying requirement. Specifically, the Commission adopted the Third Determination to account for the transition from LIBOR to RFRs covering five currencies, along with the transition from SGD Singapore Dollar Swap Offer Rate—Volume-Weighted Average Price (SOR-VWAP) (which relied on USD LIBOR as an input) and EUR EONIA (which ceased publication on January 3, 2022) to corresponding RFRs.
18

17
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps To Account for the Transition From LIBOR and Other IBORs to Alternative Reference Rates, 87 FR 52182 (Aug. 24, 2022) (Third Determination).

18

Id.
at 52183-52185; European Money Markets Institute, EONIA, available at
https://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/benchmarks/eonia/.
LIBOR was produced in five currencies: USD, GBP, EUR, CHF, and JPY. LIBOR, ICE, available at
https://www.ice.com/iba/libor.

LIBOR was one of the world's most frequently referenced interest rate benchmarks and served as a reference rate for a wide variety of swaps and other financial products. More than a decade ago, a decline in the volume of interbank lending transactions that LIBOR was intended to measure, as well as government investigations concerning LIBOR, gave rise to concerns regarding the integrity and reliability of LIBOR and other IBORs.

Although LIBOR was subject to significant reform efforts, regulators and global standard-setting bodies did not view these reforms as a long-term solution. The transition away from LIBOR, which is described in detail in the Commission's Third Determination, was a multiyear, coordinated process

involving the orderly cessation of LIBOR settings, market adoption of corresponding RFRs, and supporting steps by market participants, regulators, and others, including conversions of LIBOR swaps to RFR OIS at DCOs.
19

The transition was largely complete in June 2023 with the cessation or permanent loss of representativeness of the underlying markets of USD LIBOR and SGD SOR-VWAP.
20

19

See
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps to Account for CAD and MXN Interest Rate Benchmark Transitions, 91 FR 25812, 25814-25816 (May 12, 2026) (NPRM); Third Determination, 87 FR at 52183-52186.

20
Settings for GBP LIBOR, CHF LIBOR, and JPY LIBOR ceased or became unrepresentative prior to June 2023, as did settings for EUR LIBOR. The Commission did not adopt a clearing requirement for swaps referencing EUR LIBOR.

In the Third Determination, 30 days after the rule went into effect, the Commission (i) removed the requirement to clear swaps referencing GBP LIBOR, CHF LIBOR, and JPY LIBOR, and EUR EONIA, in each of the fixed-to-floating swap, basis swap, FRA, and OIS classes, as applicable; (ii) added a requirement to clear OIS referencing CHF Swiss Average Rate Overnight (SARON) (with a stated termination date range of seven days to 30 years), JPY Tokyo Overnight Average Rate (TONA) (seven days to 30 years), and EUR Euro Short-Term Rate (€STR) (seven days to three years); and (iii) extended the stated termination date range for GBP SONIA OIS required to be cleared to include seven days to 50 years. Shortly thereafter, on October 31, 2022, the Commission added a requirement to clear OIS referencing USD SOFR (seven days to 50 years) and SGD Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA) (seven days to 10 years).
21

Lastly, when USD LIBOR and SGD SOR-VWAP ceased publication, the Commission removed the clearing requirement applicable to swaps in the fixed-to-floating swap, basis swap, and FRA classes referencing those two rates.

21
This implementation date aligned with the timing for the Bank of England's implementation of its USD SOFR interest rate swap clearing requirement; the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) supported such timing, and no commenters opposed the implementation date. Third Determination, 87 FR at 52190-52191, 52204-52205.

In addition, regulators in other jurisdictions, including the UK, European Union, Australia, Japan, and Switzerland, updated their own interest rate swap clearing requirements to reflect the transition from LIBOR and other IBORs to corresponding RFRs.
22

22
Bank of England, Public Register for the Clearing Obligation, Dec. 30, 2025, available at
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/eu-withdrawal/clearing-obligation-public-register.pdf;
European Securities and Markets Authority, Public Register for the Clearing Obligation under EMIR, June 4, 2024, available at
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/public_register_for_the_clearing_obligation_under_emir.pdf;
Australian Government,
Federal Register
of Legislation, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Derivative Transaction Rules (Clearing) 2026, Mar. 17, 2026, available at
https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2026L00262/latest/text;
Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (JSCC), List of Clearing Products, available at
https://www.jpx.co.jp/jscc/en/cash/irs/product.html
(the Japan Financial Services Agency requires the clearing of products cleared at the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation); Swiss Federal Authorities, FINMA Financial Market Infrastructure Ordinance, FinMIO-FINMA, Feb. 1, 2023, available at
https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2015/855/en.

B. Global Progress on Benchmark Reform

While global benchmark reform efforts have focused on LIBOR, certain other IBORs continue to be published, and swaps referencing those rates remain subject to the Commission's interest rate swap clearing requirement, as well as clearing requirements in other jurisdictions. In adopting the Third Determination, the Commission noted that it may consider further modifications to the interest rate swap clearing requirement in regulation § 50.4 to address the cessation of additional IBORs and market adoption of corresponding RFRs.
23

23
Third Determination, 87 FR at 52192 n. 94.

Since the Commission adopted the Third Determination, benchmarks for certain CAD- and MXN-denominated swaps subject to the Commission's interest rate swap clearing requirement became unavailable: CAD CDOR, which ceased publication on June 28, 2024;
24

and 28-day MXN TIIE, which Banco de México prohibited as a reference rate for new contracts entered into by the financial entities it regulates beginning on January 1, 2025, subject to a waiver period that allowed for the trading of new swaps referencing 28-day MXN TIIE until December 31, 2025, provided such swaps did not mature after that date.
25

24

See
Canadian Alternative Reference Rate Working Group, CDOR Transition FAQs, July 10, 2024, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/cdor-transition-faqs.pdf
(CDOR Transition FAQs).

25
Banco de México, “Transition from TIIE with tenors greater than one business day (28, 91 and 182 days) to the Overnight TIIE Funding Rate (TIIE de Fondeo),” Dec. 20, 2022, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B2D6F5896-CF86-3F28-0C02-98D17B7542B9%7D.pdf
(discussing the transition from MXN TIIE to MXN F-TIIE); Banco de México, 10th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Dec. 6, 2023, at 10, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B8AAAB86C-BAD5-AD0F-513C-B465BAFDE75E%7D.pdf
(discussing the waiver period). As discussed below, Banco de México prohibited the use of 91- and 182-day MXN TIIE as reference rates for new contracts entered by financial entities regulated by Banco de México as of January 1, 2024.

C. CAD and MXN Interest Rate Benchmark Transitions

With respect to both the CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE transitions, as was the case with the transition away from LIBOR, benchmark administrators and working groups established a transition plan, with DCOs and market participants playing an important role in the adoption of corresponding RFRs.

1. Transition From CAD CDOR to CAD CORRA

Prior to its cessation, CAD CDOR was the primary wholesale interest rate benchmark in Canada.
26

CAD CDOR was developed in the 1980s as a survey-based benchmark to determine the interest rate for bankers' acceptance (BA)-related credit facilities.
27

It measured the average rate at which Canadian banks were willing to lend to corporate borrowers with existing committed BA credit facilities.
28

Refinitiv Benchmark Services (UK) Limited (RBSL) administered CAD CDOR from December 31, 2014 until CAD CDOR's cessation.
29

Immediately prior to its cessation, RBSL calculated CAD CDOR based on submissions from

six banks and published CAD CDOR for one-month, two-month, and three-month tenors.
30

26
As of 2021, CAD CDOR was referenced in over $20 trillion of gross notional exposure, ninety-seven percent of which was related to derivatives; namely, cleared interest rate swaps. Canadian Alternative Reference Rate Working Group, CARR's Review of CDOR: Analysis and Recommendations, Dec. 18, 2021, at 8, 10, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/CARR-Review-CDOR-Analysis-Recommendations.pdf
(CDOR White Paper).

27

Id.
A banker's acceptance is an instrument by which a bank promises to make a requested future payment.

28
In this manner, CAD CDOR was distinct from LIBOR, which measured the rate at which banks were able to
borrow.

29
CDOR White Paper at 9. Thomson Reuters was appointed as administrator of CAD CDOR (for which it was already calculation agent and distributor) as well as of CAD CORRA following a tender process announced by the Canadian Bankers Association and the Investment Industry Association of Canada. Thomson Reuters, “Thomson Reuters to administer two of Canada's fundamental financial benchmarks,” Jan. 6, 2015, available at
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2015/january/thomson-reuters-to-administer-two-of-canadas-fundamental-financial-benchmarks.html;
Investment Industry Association of Canada, CDOR/CORRA Administrator Tender Notice, June 2, 2014, available at
https://iiac-accvm.ca/wp-content/uploads/CDOR-CORRA-Tender-Notice.pdf.
Thomson Reuters sold Refinitiv, its financial and risk business which administered CAD CDOR, to the London Stock Exchange Group in 2021. Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Announces Closing of Sale of Refinitiv to London Stock Exchange Group, Jan. 29, 2021, available at
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2021/january/thomson-reuters-announces-closing-of-sale-of-refinitiv-to-london-stock-exchange-group.html.

30
CDOR White Paper at 9-10.

CAD CORRA, the interest rate benchmark that superseded CAD CDOR, measures the cost of overnight general collateral funding in CAD using Canadian treasury bills and bonds as collateral for repurchase (repo) transactions.
31

CAD CORRA is calculated based on overnight repo transactions between unaffiliated counterparties that are collateralized by Canadian treasury securities.
32

The underlying volume of daily transactions on which CAD CORRA is based has generally been in the range of $15 billion to $20 billion.
33

31
Bank of Canada, Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/interest-rates/corra/.

32
CDOR White Paper at 7.

33
CDOR Transition FAQs.

The Bank of Canada first published CAD CORRA in 1997.
34

RBSL was appointed as administrator of CAD CORRA in 2014.
35

The Bank of Canada assumed the role of CAD CORRA's administrator from RBSL in June 2020 and has published the benchmark under an enhanced methodology since that time.
36

34
Bank of Canada, “Bank of Canada to begin publishing Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average in June,” Feb. 18, 2020, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/02/bank-canada-begin-publishing-canadian-overnight-repo-rate-average-june/.

35
Thomson Reuters, “Thomson Reuters to administer two of Canada's fundamental financial benchmarks,” Jan. 6, 2015, available at
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2015/january/thomson-reuters-to-administer-two-of-canadas-fundamental-financial-benchmarks.html.

36

Id.;
CDOR White Paper at 6-7. While CAD CDOR is a forward-looking rate (
i.e.,
the three-month CAD CDOR rate is the interest rate that will apply for the next three months), CAD CORRA is an overnight rate that reflects market activity on the previous day. To derive a CAD CORRA rate that spans a tenor period, which would make the rate easier to use in loans and floating rate notes, since April 2021, the Bank of Canada has published a CAD CORRA Compounded Index that compounds CAD CORRA settings over the relevant interest period.
Id.
at 8; Bank of Canada, Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/interest-rates/corra/.
In September 2023, Candeal Benchmark Solutions and TMX Datalinx launched one-month and three-month term CAD CORRA rates for use in certain loans and derivatives used to hedge them. Bank of Canada, “Term CORRA to be launched on September 5, 2023,” Aug. 10, 2023, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2023/08/term-corra-to-be-launched-on-september-5-2023/;
Canadian Alternative Reference Rate Working Group, “CARR's allowable use cases for Term CORRA—Finalized,” Aug. 29, 2023, available at
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/carr-approved-use-cases-term-corra.pdf.

In 2018, the Canadian Fixed-Income Forum (CFIF), a committee established by the Bank of Canada to discuss developments, practices, and policy issues in fixed-income markets, established the Canadian Alternative Reference Rate Working Group (CARR) to help guide benchmark reform efforts in Canada.
37

In December 2021, CARR, in response to a request from CFIF in consultation with the CAD CDOR contributor banks,
38

published a white paper analyzing the effectiveness of CAD CDOR as a benchmark in Canada.
39

CARR's findings included that the determination of CAD CDOR was based predominantly on expert judgment and that the BA lending model on which CAD CDOR was premised was no longer viewed as an effective way for banks to provide credit to corporate clients.
40

CARR also noted the departure of contributor banks could further imperil CAD CDOR's robustness.
41

These observations echoed concerns raised about LIBOR.
42

37
CDOR White Paper at 5.

38

Id.

39

See generally
CDOR White Paper.

40

Id.
at 22-25.

41

Id.
at 25.

42

See
Third Determination, 87 FR at 52219-52220.

CARR recommended that CAD CDOR should cease publication after June 30, 2024, and that markets should transition to CAD CORRA,
43

in a two-stage process: (1) by June 30, 2023, a transition of all new derivatives and securities exposures to CAD CORRA, with no new exposures subject to limited exceptions;
44

and (2) by June 30, 2024, CAD CDOR would no longer be published, there would be no new use of CAD CDOR, and applicable CAD CDOR fallbacks would come into effect for any remaining CAD CDOR exposures.
45

43
CDOR White Paper at 28.

44

Id.

45

Id.
at 3, 28. A fallback rate is the rate provided for use in a contract if the benchmark that the contract uses becomes unavailable. ISDA, Understanding IBOR Benchmark Fallbacks, June 2, 2020, available at
https://www.isda.org/a/YZQTE/Understanding%20Benchmarks-Factsheet.pdf.
Under the ISDA 2020 IBOR Fallbacks Protocol, the fallback rate for CAD CDOR is a spread-adjusted version of CAD CORRA.
See
ISDA, ISDA 2020 IBOR Fallbacks Protocol, Oct. 23, 2020, at 41-42, available at
https://assets.isda.org/media/3062e7b4/08268161-pdf/.
CARR intended this phased approach to provide firms with additional time to transition loan agreements and manage potential issues related to the repapering of legacy securities. CDOR White Paper at 28.

Following a public consultation and announcement, among other steps, RBSL ceased calculation and publication of CAD CDOR after the June 28, 2024 publication.
46

DCOs supported the transition from CAD CDOR to CAD CORRA, as they did in the transition from LIBOR to corresponding RFRs. Prior to the cessation of CAD CDOR, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. (CME) and LCH Limited (LCH) cleared CAD CDOR fixed-to-floating swaps with maximum termination dates of, respectively, 31 years and 41 years.
47

LCH also cleared CAD CDOR-CAD CDOR and CAD CDOR-CAD CORRA basis swaps, both with a maximum termination date of 41 years.
48

CME and LCH currently clear CAD CORRA OIS with maximum termination dates, respectively, of 31 years and 41 years.
49

CME and LCH converted CAD CDOR swaps to CAD CORRA OIS ahead of the CAD CDOR cessation
50

and, post-conversion, neither DCO clears CAD CDOR swaps.
51

46
RBSL, Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR): Consultation on Potential Cessation of CDOR, Jan. 31, 2022, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/ftse-russell/en_us/documents/consultation/future-of-cdor-consultation.pdf;
RBSL, Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR) Announcement of Cessation of CDOR in June 2024, May 16, 2022, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/ftse-russell/en_us/documents/announcement/cdor-cessation-notice.pdf.

47
CME, Cleared OTC Interest Rate Swaps, Download Product Scope, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc.html;
LCH, LCH Limited Self-Certification: Tenor Extensions, Jan. 25, 2022, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/post-trade/en_us/documents/lch/proposed-rule-changes/lch-ltd/lch-self-ceort-hkd-nok-cad-extensions-20220125-final.pdf.

48
LCH, LCH Limited Self-Certification: Tenor Extensions, Jan. 25, 2022, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/post-trade/en_us/documents/lch/proposed-rule-changes/lch-ltd/lch-self-cert-hkd-nok-cad-extensions-20220125-final.pdf.

49
CME, Cleared OTC Interest Rate Swaps, Download Product Scope, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc.html;
LCH, Product Specific Contract Terms and Eligibility Criteria Manual, Nov. 2024, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/post-trade/en_us/documents/lch/rulebooks/lch-ltd/lch-product-specific-contract-terms-eligiblity-for-zar-zaronia-ois-compound-241104.pdf.

50
CME, Advisory Notice #24-136, CAD CDOR to CORRA Primary Swap Conversion—May 17, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/content/dam/cmegroup/notices/clearing/2024/05/Chadv24-136.pdf;
CME, CME Conversion for CAD CDOR Cleared Swaps, Jan. 2024, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/content/dam/cmegroup/trading/interest-rates/files/cme-conversion-for-cad-cdor-cleared-swaps.pdf
(CME CAD CDOR Conversion Presentation); London Stock Exchange Group, LCH SwapClear CAD CDOR Conversion Quick Guide, Feb. 21, 2024, available at
https://www.lch.com/system/files/?file=media_root/swapclear-cad-cdor-quickquide-021624-03.pdf
(LCH CAD CDOR Conversion Guide).

51
CME, Cleared OTC Interest Rate Swaps, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc.html
(noting, “Clearing support will be limited to spot and forward trades for swap products where an index cessation or modification effective date has occurred. Any IBOR indexed swaps submitted for clearing will be converted to a corresponding risk free rate (RFR) swap.”); LCH, What We Clear, available at
https://www.lseg.com/en/post-trade/clearing/lch-services/swapclear/what-we-clear.

2. Transition From MXN TIIE to MXN F-TIIE

Banco de México began administering and publishing MXN TIIE in 1995 as a more accurate reflection of the cost of funding in the Mexican banking market than the existing Average Interbank Interest Rate (la Tasa Interés Interbancaria Promedio, or TIIP by its Spanish acronym).
52

Historically, each bank business day, Banco de México published 28-, 91-, and 182-day MXN TIIE rates calculated based on quotations submitted by a panel of commercial banks.
53

52
Banco de México, Informe Anual, 1995, at 130, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-prensa/informes-anuales/%7B04840DAE-89CE-942C-ADC0-7F8D6DD0971D%7D.pdf.
MXN TIIP was first published in 1993 and ceased publication in 2001. Banco de México, Economic Information System, Securities Prices and Interest Rates, Interbank Interest Rates (CF111), n.3, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectoriointernetAction.do?accion=consultarCuadro&idCuadro=CF111&sector=18&locale=en.
While both MXN TIIP and MXN TIIE were designed to serve as survey-based indicators of the cost of funds in the Mexican banking market, MXN TIIE accounts for the supply and demand curve for such loans.
See generally
FSB, Progress in Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, July 9, 2015, at 15, available at
https://www.fsb.org/uploads/OSSG-interest-rate-benchmarks-progress-report-July-2015.pdf.

53
Banco de México, Economic Information System, Securities Prices and Interest Rates, Representative Interest Rates (CA51), n.3, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectoriointernetAction.do?sector=18&accion=consultarCuadroAnalitico&idCuadro=CA51&locale=en.
The 28-, 91-, and 182-day MXN TIIE rates refer to the tenor of the interbank transactions that MXN TIIE is intended to measure.

In order to foster the sound development of the financial system and abide by the recommendations of international standard-setting bodies with respect to benchmark methodology, in January 2020, Banco de México began administering and publishing MXN F-TIIE as an alternative to MXN TIIE.
54

MXN F-TIIE is calculated based on a volume-weighted median of daily observed MXN-denominated wholesale overnight repurchase agreement transactions settled by banks and brokerage firms and secured by debt instruments issued by the Mexican government, the Mexican Bank Savings Protection Institute (Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario, or IPAB by its Spanish acronym), Banco de México.
55

Banco de México also announced enhancements to governance, accountability, and quality requirements with respect to MXN TIIE rates with maturities of greater than overnight, and a Code of Conduct for institutions that participate in determining MXN TIIE rates.
56

54
Banco de México, “Publication of the overnight TIIE funding rate and improvement of TIIE rates with longer than overnight maturities,” Jan. 15, 2020, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/publications-and-press/other-announcements/%7BA3CFC638-5913-1C42-1843-360A95F89A92%7D.pdf.

55

Id.
Daily average turnover in the Mexican repo market is approximately MXN 2.4 trillion (approximately $117 billion). International Monetary Fund, Mexico: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on Systemic Liquidity Management, Nov. 10, 2022, at 8, available at
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/view/journals/002/2022/338/article-A001-en.pdf.

56

Id.
The enhancements are reflected in Banco de México Circular 3/2012, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/marco-normativo/normativa-emitida-por-el-banco-de-mexico/circular-3-2012/%7B4E0281A4-7AD8-1462-BC79-7F2925F3171D%7D.pdf.

In December 2022, after conducting an analysis supported by financial market participants in Mexico, Banco de México deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of MXN TIIE rates with tenors greater than one business day as reference rates for new contracts.
57

57
Banco de México, “Transition from TIIE with tenors greater than one business day (28, 91, and 182 days) to the Overnight TIIE Funding Rate (TIIE de Fondeo),” Dec. 20, 2022, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B2D6F5896-CF86-3F28-0C02-98D17B7542B9%7D.pdf.
Spanish-language versions of the consultation, draft provisions, comments, and comment summary are available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/ConsultaRegulacionWeb/
(see, under “Históricas,” “PROYECTO DE DISPOSICIONES PARA MODIFICAR LA CIRCULAR 3/2012, CON OBJETO DE ESTABLECER LAS FECHAS A PARTIR DE LAS CUALES SE RESTRINGIRÁ EL USO DE LAS TIIE A PLAZOS MAYORES A UN DÍA HÁBIL BANCARIO, ASÍ COMO MODIFICAR LA METODOLOGÍA PARA SU CÁLCULO”).
See also generally
Banco de México, 7th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Mar. 2023, at 6-8, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7BA0239E58-6DE1-A4BC-D0DE-88E94841D16F%7D.pdf
(summarizing comments on the consultation). Consistency with international efforts and best practices to move interest rate swap markets from survey-based IBORs to transaction-based RFRs was a significant consideration in Banco de México's decision. Banco de México, 4th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Nov. 30, 2021, at 8, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B53572077-823D-FEA5-6B89-5D4584C21981%7D.pdf. See also
Banco de México, 6th Meeting of the Working Subgroup on Derivative Instruments Referenced to the Funding TIIE of the GTTR, Oct. 30, 2023, at 3, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B77DD82E8-D6CC-D5B4-345B-CEDFE130EEC5%7D.pdf;
Banco de México, 10th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Dec. 6, 2023, at 3, 5, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B8AAAB86C-BAD5-AD0F-513C-B465BAFDE75E%7D.pdf;
Banco de México, 11th Meeting of the Working Subgroup on Derivative Instruments Referenced to the Funding TIIE of the GTTR, Feb. 1, 2024, at 5, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7BA5419A19-1C19-9ED4-F429-8518FF28516E%7D.pdf.

Accordingly, Banco de México determined the following: (1) use of 91- and 182-day tenor MXN TIIE as reference rates would be prohibited for new contracts entered into by financial entities regulated by Banco de México beginning on January 1, 2024; (2) use of the 28-day MXN TIIE rate as a reference rate for new contracts entered into by the financial entities regulated by Banco de México would be prohibited beginning January 1, 2025; and (3) Banco de México would modify the methodology for calculation of MXN TIIE with tenors greater than one business day so that contracts tied to MXN TIIE with tenors greater than one business day that are still active as of the transition dates would not require adjustment through legal amendment.
58

On December 6, 2023, to address feedback from market participants related to implementation concerns, particularly management of basis risk, Banco de México announced that it would grant a waiver to permit trading in new swaps referencing the legacy MXN TIIE 28-day rate until December 31, 2025, provided the maturity of the transaction did not extend beyond that date.
59

On June 7, 2024, Banco de México finalized amendments to its transition timeline to account for the waiver period.
60

58
Banco de México, “Transition from TIIE with tenors greater than one business day (28, 91, and 182 days) to the Overnight TIIE Funding Rate (TIIE de Fondeo),” Dec. 20, 2022, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B2D6F5896-CF86-3F28-0C02-98D17B7542B9%7D.pdf.
The new methodology was based on the overnight MXN TIIE rate on the day prior to the reference day being determined, compounded by the number of days of the corresponding term, with a fixed historical spread adjustment based on the historical median of the daily differences between MXN TIIE with tenors greater than one business day and MXN F-TIIE from November 2017 to October 2022, compounded by the number of days of the respective term.
Id.
The changes are reflected in Circular 3/2012 (new methodology for calculating MXN TIIE with tenors greater than one business day) and Circular 14/2007 (changes regarding restrictions on the use of MXN TIIE).

59
Banco de México, 10th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Dec. 6, 2023, at 10, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B8AAAB86C-BAD5-AD0F-513C-B465BAFDE75E%7D.pdf.

60
Banco de México, Circular 9/2024, June 7, 2024,
available at https://www.banxico.org.mx/marco-normativo/normativa-emitida-por-el-banco-de-mexico/circular-4-2012/%7B416701BC-FBE2-A422-6224-9D9E666ABA6A%7D.pdf.

Until the end of 2025, two registered DCOs cleared MXN TIIE swaps and MXN F-TIIE OIS. CME and LCH cleared fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps that reference 28-day MXN TIIE for a maximum stated termination date of,

respectively, 31 years and 21 years.
61

Additionally, Asigna, a Mexican clearinghouse that is currently neither a registered DCO nor an exempt DCO, cleared fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps that reference 28-day MXN TIIE for a maximum stated termination date of 30 years.

61
CME, Cleared OTC Interest Rate Swaps, Download Product Scope, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc.html;
LCH, Product Specific Contract Terms and Eligibility Criteria Manual, Nov. 2024, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/post-trade/en_us/documents/lch/rulebooks/lch-ltd/lch-product-specific-contract-terms-eligiblity-for-zar-zaronia-ois-compound-241104.pdf.

In November 2024, CME and LCH converted cleared MXN TIIE swaps into market standard MXN F-TIIE OIS, as did Asigna.
62

CME and LCH, and Asigna, no longer offer fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps that reference 28-day MXN TIIE for clearing. Now CME and LCH clear OIS that reference MXN F-TIIE for a maximum stated termination date of, respectively, 31 years and 21 years.
63

Asigna clears MXN F-TIIE OIS with a maximum stated termination date range of 30 years.
64

62
Asigna, “AVISO A SOCIOS LIQUIDADORES, PLATAFORMAS DE NEGOCIACIÓN, OPERADORES Y PÚBLICO EN GENERAL,” Dec. 20, 2024, available at
http://www.asigna.com.mx/wb3/wb/ASG/ASG_repositorio/_vtp/ASG/11a0_2024/_rid/124/_mto/3/20241220_Segunda_Conversion.pdf?repfop=view&reptp=11a0_2024&repfiddoc=21973&repinline=true; see also
Asigna, Funding TIIE Swap and Rate Conversion, available at
https://bmv.com.mx/docs-pub/ASSETS/TIIE_Fondeo_Ingles_V5.pdf;
Asigna, “AVISO A SOCIOS LIQUIDADORES, PLATAFORMAS DE NEGOCIACIÓN, OPERADORES Y PÚBLICO EN GENERAL,” Oct. 16, 2024, available at
http://www.asigna.com.mx/wb3/wb/ASG/ASG_repositorio/_vtp/ASG/2469_banners/_rid/124/_mto/3/TIIE_Fondeo_Espanol_difusion.pdf?repfop=view&reptp=2469_banners&repfiddoc=20752&repinline=true.
Post-conversion, Asigna clears only MXN TIIE swaps that will mature before the end of Banco de México's waiver period. Asigna, “AVISO A SOCIOS LIQUIDADORES, PLATAFORMAS DE NEGOCIACIÓN, OPERADORES Y PÚBLICO EN GENERAL,” Oct. 16, 2024, at 3, available at
http://www.asigna.com.mx/wb3/wb/ASG/ASG_repositorio/_vtp/ASG/2469_banners/_rid/124/_mto/3/TIIE_Fondeo_Espanol_difusion.pdf?repfop=view&reptp=2469_banners&repfiddoc=20752&repinline=true;
CME, Conversion Plan: CME Cleared MXN TIIE Interest Rate Swaps, Mar. 2024, at 2, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/articles/files/2024/proposal-for-cme-cleared-mxn-tiie-interest-rate-swaps-2024-03.pdf;
CME, Product Delisting Summary—MXN 28D TIIE Swap Clearing—Effective January 02, 2026, Jan. 2, 2026, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/notices/clearing/2026/01/26-001.html;
LCH, LCH Consultation on Conversion of Outstanding Cleared MXN 28D-TIIE Contracts, Dec. 20, 2023, available at
https://www.lch.com/membership/ltd-membership/ltd-member-updates/lch-consultation-conversion-outstanding-cleared-mxn-0;
LCH, MXN 28D-TIIE Conversion Update, Oct. 10, 2024, available at
https://www.lch.com/membership/ltd-membership/ltd-member-updates/mxn-28d-tiie-conversion-update.

63
CME, Cleared OTC Interest Rate Swaps, Download Product Scope, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc.html;
LCH, Product Specific Contract Terms and Eligibility Criteria Manual, Nov. 2024, available at
https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/post-trade/en_us/documents/lch/rulebooks/lch-ltd/lch-product-specific-contract-terms-eligiblity-for-zar-zaronia-ois-compound-241104.pdf.

64
MexDer, Terms and Conditions for the Nominal Fixed Interest Rates and Nominal Variable 28-Day Interbank Equilibrium Interest Rates (TIIE28) Swap Contract, available at
http://www.mexder.com.mx/wb3/wb/MEX/MEX_Repositorio/_vtp/MEX/2052_swaps_contracts/_rid/21/_mto/3/20241115ENGLISHCGCS_CONTRATO_SWAP_TIIE28.pdf?repfop=view&reptp=2052_swaps_contracts&repfiddoc=8723&repinline=true;
MexDer, Terms and Conditions for the Nominal Fixed Interest Rates and the Nominal Variable Interest Rates (TIIE de Fondeo) Swap Contract, available at
http://www.mexder.com.mx/wb3/wb/MEX/MEX_Repositorio/_vtp/MEX/2052_swaps_contracts/_rid/21/_mto/3/20241115CGCs_Swaps_de_TIIE_de_Fondeo_EN.pdf?repfop=view&reptp=2052_swaps_contracts&repfiddoc=8722&repinline=true.

II. Domestic and International Coordination Efforts

The transitions from CAD CDOR to CAD CORRA and from MXN TIIE to MXN F-TIIE are further steps in a continuing effort by international standard-setting bodies such as International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the FSB, regulators, cross-jurisdictional working groups, market infrastructure providers, market participants, and others, to move global swap markets toward reliance on more sustainable benchmarks. Due to the cross-border nature of this effort, and the size of the affected markets, it is a priority for the Commission to engage with domestic and international regulators as it considers changes to the clearing requirement.

A. Domestic Coordination Efforts

The Commission is committed to working with the FRB, the FRBNY, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other domestic authorities to ensure transparency in its efforts and, to the greatest extent possible, consistency in the transition from IBORs to RFRs. To this end, the Commission consulted with domestic authorities including the SEC, the FRB, and the FRBNY as part of this rulemaking process.

B. International Coordination Efforts

Section 752(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Commission to consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent international standards for the regulation of swaps.
65

The Commission accomplished this with respect to the Second Determination and Third Determination by considering the ways in which it could harmonize its clearing requirement with clearing requirements in other jurisdictions.
66

The Commission has long recognized the interconnectedness of the interest rate swap market, and the importance of consulting and coordinating with its counterparts in other jurisdictions in the adoption of clearing requirements in order to promote regulatory consistency and certainty, and to prevent the evasion of clearing requirements.
67

65
Section 752 is not codified in the CEA.

66
Second Determination, 81 FR at 71203; Third Determination, 87 FR at 52186-52189.

67

E.g.,
Third Determination, 87 FR at 52189 (discussing comments on the Commission's third proposed clearing requirement determination supporting the Commission's goal of harmonizing its clearing requirement with those of non-U.S. jurisdictions); Second Determination, 81 FR at 71223 (noting that “the interest rate swaps market is global and market participants are interconnected”); First Determination, 77 FR at 74287 (“The Commission is mindful of the benefits of harmonizing its regulatory framework with that of its counterparts in foreign countries. The Commission has therefore monitored global advisory, legislative, and regulatory proposals, and has consulted with foreign regulators in developing the final regulations.”).

As part of the rulemaking process, and consistent with the Third Determination, the Commission is working with its counterparts overseas to ensure a coordinated approach to required clearing of interest rate swaps during the move from use of swaps referencing IBORs to swaps referencing RFRs. As part of the ongoing regulatory dialogue among authorities, Commission staff consulted with counterparts, including those at Banco de México and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). This type of dialogue reflects an effort to ensure consistency in interest rate swap clearing requirements across jurisdictions.

C. Clearing Requirements in Other Jurisdictions

In developing this final rule, the Commission considered relevant changes to clearing requirements in other jurisdictions, ensuring that any changes are harmonized, to the greatest extent possible, with those adopted by international counterparts. This goal is consistent with the Commission's approach in prior actions.

1. Canada

The United States currently requires clearing of CAD-denominated, CAD CDOR-referenced fixed-to-floating swaps with a stated termination date range of 28 days to 30 years, and CAD-denominated, CAD CORRA-referenced OIS with a stated termination date range of 7 days to 2 years.
68

Canada required

the same set of CAD CDOR-referenced swaps to be cleared prior to, and for a period after, the cessation of CAD CDOR, but has updated its clearing requirement, as discussed below. No other jurisdiction has a CAD-denominated interest rate swap clearing requirement.

68
17 CFR 50.4(a); CSA, CSA Notice of Publication—Amendments to National Instrument 94-101 Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives and Changes to Companion Policy 94-

101 Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives, Jan. 27, 2022, available at
https://www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/2022-01/csa_20220127_94-101_mandatory-central-counterparty.pdf.

On September 25, 2025, the CSA published amendments to Canada's interest rate swap clearing requirement.
69

Considering the decrease (or cessation) of use of certain swaps referencing IBORs, and the adoption of RFRs and the corresponding increase in the liquidity of RFR swaps and in the systemic importance of RFRs, the CSA removed certain categories of swaps from Canada's interest rate swap clearing requirement, and added certain other categories of swaps. Specifically, the CSA removed its clearing requirement in each of the fixed-to-floating, basis swap, OIS, and FRA classes, as applicable, with respect to swaps referencing CAD CDOR, USD LIBOR, GBP LIBOR, and EUR EONIA. The CSA additionally added a clearing requirement for OIS referencing USD SOFR (7 days to 50 years) and EUR €STR (7 days to 3 years) and modified the clearing requirement for OIS referencing GBP SONIA to include maturities of 7 days to 50 years. The CSA also modified its requirement to clear CAD CORRA OIS to include CAD CORRA OIS to include maturities of 7 days to 30 years.

69
CSA, “CSA adopts amendments to mandatory central counterparty clearing of derivatives,” Sept. 25, 2025, available at
https://www.securities-administrators.ca/news/csa-adopts-amendments-to-mandatory-central-counterparty-clearing-of-derivatives/; see also
Ontario Securities Commission, National Instrument 94-101, available at
https://www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/2026-01/ni_20260119_94-101_unofficial-consolidation.pdf
(unofficial consolidation); CSA, B.6.1 CSA Notice of Consultation—Proposed Amendments to National Instrument 94-101 Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives, Sept. 19, 2024, available at
https://www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/2024-09/csa_20240919_notice-consultation-amendments-94-101.pdf.
The comment period for the consultation closed on December 19, 2024.

In modifying its interest rate swap clearing requirement, the CSA reviewed the suitability of adding certain swaps to its clearing requirement using a multifactor analysis,
70

analyzed data reported by market participants to designated or recognized trade repositories in accordance with applicable regulations, and held discussions with recognized central counterparties.
71

70
The CSA considered factors including: (i) the availability of the derivative to be cleared by a regulated clearing agency; (ii) the level of standardization of the derivative; (iii) the effect of central clearing of the derivative on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market for the derivative and the available resources of the regulated clearing agency to clear the derivative; (iv) whether mandating the derivative or class of derivatives to be cleared would bring undue risk to regulated clearing agencies; (v) the current liquidity in the market for the derivative or class of derivatives; (vi) the existence of capacity, operational expertise, and resources, with respect to a regulated clearing agency; and (vii) international harmonization. CSA, B.6.1 CSA Notice of Consultation—Proposed Amendments to National Instrument 94-101 Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives, Sept. 19, 2024, available at
https://www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/2024-09/csa_20240919_notice-consultation-amendments-94-101.pdf.

71
The CSA noted that as part of its analysis, for a review period of April 2023 to September 2023, and using data reported by market participants, the CSA analyzed monthly volume by assessing the number of transactions and the gross notional amount outstanding for certain OTC derivatives, including the gross notional by maturity, and the percentage of outstanding notional cleared each month of the reference period.
Id.

2. Mexico

Only the U.S. and Mexico required MXN TIIE swaps to be cleared. Regulation § 50.4 had required clearing of fixed-to-floating swaps denominated in MXN that reference TIIE-BANXICO, for a stated termination date range of 28 days to 21 years.
72

Following a consultation launched on June 2, 2023, Banco de México amended its rules for the execution of derivatives transactions to replace its requirement to clear MXN TIIE fixed-to-floating swaps with a stated termination date range of 56 days to 30 years with a requirement to clear MXN F-TIIE OIS with a stated termination date range of 28 days to 30 years, with the modifications effective on January 1, 2025.
73

Like the CSA, Banco de México amended its clearing requirement in consideration of a multifactor analysis.
74

72
17 CFR 50.4(a).

73
Spanish-language versions of the consultation, draft provisions, comments, and comment summary are available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/ConsultaRegulacionWeb/
(see, under “Históricas,” “PROYECTO DE DISPOSICIONES PARA MODIFICAR LA CIRCULAR 4/2012 DEL BANCO DE MÉXICO, CON OBJETO DE ESTABLECER LAS FECHAS A PARTIR DE LAS CUALES SE RESTRINGIRÁ EL USO DE LAS TIIE A PLAZOS MAYORES A UN DÍA HÁBIL BANCARIO COMO REFERENCIA PARA NUEVAS OPERACIONES”). The modifications are reflected in Banco de México Circular 7/2023, Sept. 8, 2023, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/marco-normativo/normativa-emitida-por-el-banco-de-mexico/circular-4-2012/%7B7D759428-892F-AD66-CF4F-B3D768ABD59A%7D.pdf
and in Banco de México Circular 4/2012, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/marco-normativo/normativa-emitida-por-el-banco-de-mexico/circular-4-2012/%7B97C62974-1C94-19AE-AB5A-D0D949A36247%7D.pdf. See also
Banco de México, 9th Meeting of the Working Group on Alternative Reference Rates in Mexico (GTTR), Aug. 15, 2023, at 4-6, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/markets/mexican-alternative-reference-rates-working-group/d/%7B0048779F-A14D-C07F-90F7-24E5E604E1D4%7D.pdf
(summarizing the consultation and results).

74
Banco de México considered (i) the degree of standardization of the terms and conditions of the derivatives transactions; (ii) the liquidity, depth, traded volume, and size of the derivatives transactions in the Mexican market; (iii) the number and type of entities that can trade and clear the derivatives transactions; (iv) the availability of pricing sources that are reasonable, reliable, and generally accepted; (v) the systemic risk associated with the execution of the derivatives transactions, and its impact on the stability of the Mexican financial system; (vi) the existence of companies that manage systems to facilitate trading of the products authorized by the National Banking and Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores or CNBV by its Spanish acronym), or foreign institutions that perform functions similar to those carried out by such companies that are recognized by the CNBV on which the derivatives transactions are traded; (vii) the existence of a clearinghouse or foreign institution that acts as a central counterparty, recognized by Banco de México, at which the derivatives transactions are cleared and settled; and (viii) the effect on competition, considering the fees associated with trading and clearing. Banco de México Circular 7/2023, Sept. 8, 2023, available at
https://www.banxico.org.mx/marco-normativo/normativa-emitida-por-el-banco-de-mexico/circular-4-2012/%7B7D759428-892F-AD66-CF4F-B3D768ABD59A%7D.pdf.

III. Overview of Comment Letters Received

On May 12, 2026, the Commission published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) seeking public input regarding how it should amend the interest rate swap clearing requirement to address the cessation or loss of representativeness of IBORs that have been used as benchmark reference rates in CAD- and MXN-denominated interest rate swaps and the market adoption of swaps that reference corresponding RFRs.

The proposal would amend regulation § 50.4(a) by: (1) removing from the clearing requirement interest rate swaps referencing CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE; (2) modifying the clearing requirement applicable to CAD-denominated OIS that reference CAD CORRA to include a maximum stated termination date of 30 years; and (3) adding a clearing requirement applicable to MXN-denominated OIS that reference MXN F-TIIE, with a maximum stated termination date of 21 years. The NPRM proposed an implementation date of 30 days after publication of final rules in the
Federal Register
.

The Commission received two comments on its NPRM: a comment from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and a comment from an individual commenter. Both comment letters are available at
www.regulations.gov.

ISDA's comment letter supported the NPRM and welcomed the Commission's alignment with other jurisdictions. However, ISDA recommended the Commission adopt an implementation period longer than the 30 days the Commission proposed.
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The individual commenter commented on several different aspects of the NPRM. The Commission addresses both comments below.

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ISDA Comment Letter. ISDA additionally requested the Commission consider an exemption from the clearing requirement for transactions arising from post-trade risk reduction exercises, such as multilateral compression, portfolio rebalancing, and optimization exercises. This matter is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

IV. Final Amendments to Regulation § 50.4(a)

The Commission is finalizing amendments to regulation § 50.4(a) in ways parallel to that of the proposal: (1) removing its CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE interest rate swap clearing requirements given that those swaps are no longer offered for clearing; (2) modifying its CAD CDOR OIS clearing requirement to account for the shift in the CAD interest rate swap market; and (3) adding a requirement to clear MXN F-TIIE OIS to account for the shift in MXN interest rate swap market.

The amendments update the existing clearing requirement, in effect replacing the requirement to clear certain IBOR swaps with a requirement to clear corresponding RFR OIS because the IBOR swaps have become unavailable and liquidity has shifted into RFR OIS. Accordingly, pursuant to this final rulemaking, the Commission will no longer require swaps denominated in CAD that reference CAD CDOR and swaps denominated in MXN that reference MXN TIIE, as floating rate indexes in the fixed-to-floating swap class, to be cleared. Indeed, neither CME nor LCH, nor any other clearinghouse, currently offer these swaps for clearing.

To account for the transition to RFRs, the Commission is amending the OIS class of interest rate swaps under regulation § 50.4(a) that are required to be cleared to include the following:

• Swaps denominated in CAD that reference CAD CORRA as a floating rate index with a stated termination date range of seven days to 30 years; and

• Swaps denominated in MXN that reference MXN F-TIIE as a floating rate index with a stated termination date range of 28 days to 21 years.
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The amendments to regulation § 50.4(a) will express the relevant index as “MXN-TIIE ON-OIS Compound,” as described in CME's and LCH's regulation 39.5(b) submissions, rather than as “F-TIIE.” For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission observes that “MXN-TIIE ON-OIS Compound” and “F-TIIE” refer to the same rate. This approach is consistent with the approach taken in designating the floating rate index with respect to the Commission's clearing requirement for MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating swaps in regulation § 50.4(a).
See
Second Determination, 81 FR 71226 & n.165.

These amendments are legally effective 30 days after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
and they will be implemented at that time. Further discussion of implementation appears below.
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77
Specific implementation timing is set forth in section VI.

V. Determination Analysis for RFR OIS

The Commission is amending its interest rate swap clearing requirement to include OIS referencing MXN F-TIIE and additional OIS referencing CAD CORRA by adopting a new clearing requirement determination. The Commission completed a review of the current CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS offered for clearing and considered the five specific statutory factors required to make a new clearing requirement determination.

A. General Description of Information Considered

CME and LCH provided the Commission with regulation § 39.5(b) submissions relating to CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS.
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In addition to the DCOs' submissions, the Commission looks to the ability of each DCO to clear MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS, DCO swap data, swap data repository (SDR) data, publicly available data, the rule frameworks and risk management policies of each DCO, and information provided through public comment.

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Regulation § 39.5(b) submissions from DCOs are available on the Commission's website,
www.cftc.gov,
under DCO Swaps Submissions.

This clearing requirement determination is similar to the Commission's Third Determination because it follows a consensus-driven market event that was announced in advance and features liquidity shifting to new benchmark rates from rates that have become unavailable. Notably, though, prior market adoption in Canada and Mexico and significant voluntary clearing in the United States means that this clearing requirement determination will have limited, if any, market effect.

B. Consistency With DCO Core Principles Under Section 2(h) of the CEA

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(i) of the CEA requires the Commission to determine whether a clearing requirement determination is consistent with core principles for DCOs set forth in section 5b(c)(2) of the CEA.
79

CME and LCH are registered DCOs that clear the RFR OIS subject to this rulemaking.
80

CME and LCH are required to comply with the DCO core principles and applicable Commission regulations, and these DCOs are subject to the Commission's examination and risk surveillance programs.

79
7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(D)(i). The core principles address numerous issues, including financial resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management, settlement procedures, default management, system safeguards, reporting, recordkeeping, public information, and legal risk, among other subjects. 7 U.S.C. 7a-1(c)(2). The Commission implemented the core principles through regulations that are applicable to registered DCOs. 17 CFR part 39.

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No exempt DCOs offer CAD CORRA or MXN F-TIIE OIS for clearing.

The Commission notes the importance of its ongoing examination and risk surveillance programs for all registered DCOs, as well as its ability to work with fellow authorities to ensure DCOs located outside the United States remain in compliance with the highest standards. In 2016, the Commission explained the rigor of the DCO registration and exemption processes, along with subsequent examination and risk surveillance scrutiny that DCOs receive. These processes remain in place and have been enhanced over the intervening years.
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Second Determination, 81 FR at 71207-08. In particular, Commission staff monitors the risks posed to and by DCOs, clearing members, and market participants, including market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and concentration risk with the objective (1) to identify positions in cleared products subject to the Commission's jurisdiction that pose significant financial risk; and (2) to confirm that these risks are being appropriately managed.

The Commission believes that CME and LCH will be able to maintain compliance with the DCO core principles and applicable Commission regulations following adoption of this clearing requirement determination. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission has determined that subjecting MXN F-TIIE OIS or additional CAD CORRA OIS to required clearing is unlikely to impair CME's or LCH's ability to comply with the DCO core principles, along with applicable Commission regulations.

Clearing the RFR OIS swaps subject to this determination does not pose financial or legal risks that are materially distinguishable from those posed by the IBOR interest rate swaps and OIS that the Commission required to be cleared in 2012 and 2016, or the OIS that the Commission required to be cleared in 2022. For additional information regarding the ability of DCOs to clear these swaps, see the

discussion of Factor II in the Commission's determination analysis below.

C. Conclusions Regarding Consideration of Section 2(h)'s Five Statutory Factors

Set forth below is the Commission's consideration of the five factors set forth in section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA as they relate to the specific OIS being added to the interest rate swap clearing requirement, which includes OIS (i) denominated in CAD and referencing CORRA (added as a function of modifying the maximum termination date range for CAD CORRA OIS required to be cleared) and (ii) denominated in MXN and referencing F-TIIE.
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The Commission is conducting this analysis only with respect to the swaps that are being added to the clearing requirement under this determination. As was the case in 2022, the decision to remove swaps that are no longer offered for clearing from Commission regulation § 50.4 is not considered in this analysis.

1. Factor (I)—Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity

Liquidity has shifted from swaps referencing CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE to, respectively swaps referencing CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE. The first of the five factors under section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider “the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data” related to “a submission made [by a DCO].”
83

In issuing past clearing requirement determinations, the Commission reviewed data from multiple sources, including data from SDRs and DCOs and other publicly available data, principally concerning notional exposures and counts of transactions in the relevant swaps.
84

For purposes of this rulemaking, the Commission similarly considered data from multiple such sources and principally considered notional exposures and trading liquidity based on the Commission's own collected data.

83
7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(D)(ii).

84

See
First Determination, 77 FR at 74306-74307; Second Determination, 81 FR at 71211-71216; Third Determination, 87 FR at 52195-52199.

a. Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity

The Commission reviewed data to determine whether there is an active market for the swap, including whether there is a measurable amount of notional exposure and whether the swap is traded regularly, as reflected by trade count. The data presented in the NPRM and below indicate that there is sufficient outstanding notional exposure and trading liquidity in RFR OIS to support a clearing requirement determination.
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85
Data considered includes all material presented in the NPRM along with updated additional information presented in this final rule.

Specifically, the data generally demonstrates that there is significant and steady activity in new CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, with little to no notional outstanding in CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE fixed-to-floating swaps. The Commission compiled the data used in tables 1-4 below from transaction data collected under part 45 of the Commission's regulations.
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This analysis also supports a DCO's ability to adequately risk manage the swap. In this final rulemaking, for tables 1-4 below, the Commission presents additional months of data beyond the January 2026 through March 2026 data presented in the NPRM.
87

The Commission believes this data demonstrates relatively consistent activity in the relevant OIS across six months. The additional three months of data also confirm there is effectively no activity in the case of CAD CDOR and only limited activity in MXN TIIE fixed-to-floating swaps.

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The data presented in these tables is the same as the data used to create the Commission's weekly swaps report. This data represents only those swaps that are reported to the CFTC's registered SDRs by swap market participants. The Commission's weekly swaps report currently incorporates data from three SDRs (CME Group SDR, DTCC Data Repository, and ICE Trade Vault). The raw SDR data has been filtered to represent, as accurately as possible, the market-facing trades that occur and excludes certain inter-affiliate transactions. For more information about the data components in the weekly swaps report, please visit the CFTC's web page available at:
https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/index.htm.

87
NPRM, 91 FR at 25824-25826.

In Table 1 below, the Commission provides estimates of notional transacted by month for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, and CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE fixed-to-floating swaps, for the period beginning January 1, 2026 and ending June 30, 2026.

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The data in Table 1 is based on the Commission's weekly swaps report data. In this table, a notional figure of $0 billion indicates that the notional transacted during a given time period was less than $1 billion.

Table 1—Estimated Notional Transacted

[USD billions]
88

Product

January
2026

February
2026

March
2026

April
2026

May
2026

June
2026

CAD CDOR Fixed-to-Floating Swaps
$0
$0
$0
0
0
0

CAD CORRA OIS
2,735
1,520
1,666
1,105
1,978
1,029

MXN TIIE Fixed-to-Floating Swaps
0
0
0
0
0
0

MXN F-TIIE OIS
428
620
1,004
605
578
607

Table 2 below provides estimates of trade counts for the same categories of RFR and IBOR swaps during the same six-month period. The data in Table 2 indicates that, with respect to CAD CORRA OIS, monthly trade count was relatively consistent between January 2026 and June 2026, while trade counts for CAD CDOR fixed-to-floating swaps stood at zero. With respect to MXN-denominated interest rate swaps, from January 2026 through June 2026, there was a significant number of transactions in MXN F-TIIE OIS alongside comparatively few transactions in MXN TIIE fixed-to-floating swaps.

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The data in Table 2 is based on the Commission's weekly swaps report data.

Table 2—Estimated Trade Count
89

Product

January
2026

February
2026

March
2026

April
2026

May
2026

June
2026

CAD CDOR Fixed-to-Floating Swaps
0
0
0
0
0
0

CAD CORRA OIS
8,745
5,584
8,879
6,005
5,914
6,658

MXN TIIE Fixed-to-Floating Swaps
3
14
5
6
18
10

MXN F-TIIE OIS
7,246
8,051
15,206
9,912
8,947
9,772

Table 3 below presents estimates of the percentage of notional cleared for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, based on notional transacted by month during the period beginning January 1, 2026 and ending June 30, 2026. The data in Table 3 illustrate that, with respect to CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, a majority of the notional traded month-to-month is already cleared voluntarily and, perhaps, due to changes in Canadian and Mexican law, as discussed in section II.C above.
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90
While, as the estimates below demonstrate, there are variations in the proportion of notional cleared month-to-month, these percentages are generally consistent with the clearing rates observed for the RFR swaps that were the subject of the Third Determination and are higher than the clearing rates observed for many of the swaps subject to the Second Determination.
See
Third Determination, 87 FR at 52196, table 4; Second Determination, 81 FR at 71234.

91
The data in Table 3 is based on the Commission's weekly swaps report data.

Table 3—Estimated Percentage of Notional Cleared

[Based on notional transacted by month]
91

OIS

Percentage
notional
cleared—
January 2026
(%)

Percentage
notional
cleared—
February 2026
(%)

Percentage
notional
cleared—
March 2026
(%)

Percentage
notional
cleared—
April 2026
(%)

Percentage
notional
cleared—
May 2026
(%)

Percentage
notional
cleared—
June 2026
(%)

CAD CORRA
99
96
98
97
97
99

MXN F-TIIE
87
90
90
87
86
85

Table 4 below presents a breakdown of notional transacted and trade count by tenor for the period beginning March 1, 2026 and ending March 31, 2026, which was presented in the NPRM. This chart also includes updated data by tenor for the period beginning June 1, 2026 and ending June 30, 2026, for cleared CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS. With respect to CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, Table 4 illustrates that these OIS are being cleared across a wide range of maturities, with most clearing activity by notional and trade count occurring in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS dated 15 years or shorter. Table 4 illustrates that there is a more limited amount of activity in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS dated longer than 15 years, with greater activity in CAD CORRA OIS dated longer than 15 years than in MXN F-TIIE OIS dated longer than 15 years.

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The data in Table 4 is based on the Commission's weekly swaps report data. Tenor length is approximate. In Table 4, a notional figure of $0 billion USD indicates that the notional transacted during a given time period was less than $1 billion.

Table 4—Estimated Cleared Notional and Trade Count by Tenor
92

OIS
Tenor
March 2026 transaction data

Notional cleared
(USD billions)

Trade count
June 2026 transaction data

Notional cleared
(USD billions)

Trade count

CAD CORRA
7 days-3 months
$922
510
$511
344

3-6 months
26
49
20
32

6 months-1 year
118
690
79
328

1-5 years
463
4,772
311
3,490

5-15 years
103
2,360
99
1,978

>15 years
12
494
10
486

MXN F-TIIE
7 days-3 months
205
571
161
237

3-6 months
148
793
48
250

6 months-1 year
332
3,094
180
1,736

1-5 years
294
8,262
196
5,948

5-15 years
26
2,475
22
1,592

>15 years
0
11
0
9

In addition to this transaction-level data, Table 5 below presents open swaps data illustrating outstanding notional in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS. The Commission notes that the data is consistent over the additional three-month period.

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The data in Table 6 represents swaps that have been cleared at CME and LCH and reported to the CFTC under part 39 of the Commission's regulations. The data includes payer/receiver values and outstanding notional associated with swaps generated from conversion processes.

Table 5—Outstanding Notional

[USD billions]
93

OIS

Outstanding notional
(as of April 24, 2026)

Outstanding notional
(as of July 14, 2026)

CAD CORRA
$24,824
$25,547

MXN F-TIIE
7,603
7,314

The Commission requested comment and any relevant market analysis regarding the sufficiency of outstanding notional exposures and trading liquidity in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, including for the proposed stated termination date ranges. The individual commenter made several observations about the sufficiency of the data and the Commission's conclusions based on it. The commenter suggested that the Commission take a more tailored approach to assessing the tenor distributions in establishing the scope of its clearing requirement. The commenter also noted that the Commission provided only three months of data in its NPRM.

The Commission offered the three-month data period to demonstrate the transition of open interest and trade count in both the CAD- and MXN- interest rate swap market from IBOR interest rate swaps to the new RFR interest rate swaps. Both the part 45 and the part 39 data discussed in this final rule reflect this market move and support the Commission's proposed rule change. Were the Commission to expand the existing interest rate swap clearing requirement or issue a new swap clearing requirement in another asset class, the commenter's points about insufficient data across tenors and a limited observation period might raise more substantive concerns. However, this rulemaking essentially reflects an update to existing regulatory requirements resulting from independent market moves in the CAD and MXN interest rate swap markets, updates that aim to better reflect current market realities. The data presented above reflects the CAD- and MXN-denominated swap markets following the transition to RFRs. That transition included the conversion of existing cleared IBOR swaps at DCOs to corresponding RFR OIS, the end of clearing support for CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE swaps, the conclusion of Banco de México's waiver period for continued MXN F-TIIE activity, and the movement of liquidity from IBOR swaps to RFR OIS.

b. Pricing Data

The Commission regularly reviews pricing data for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS subject to this determination and finds that these OIS are capable of being priced from deep and liquid markets. Commission staff regularly receives and reviews margin model information from DCOs that includes the procedures they follow to ensure market liquidity exists to close out a position in a stressed market, including the time required to determine prices for all or parts of the given position.
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Because of the stability of access to pricing data from these markets, the pricing data for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS is generally viewed as being reliable. Based on this information, the Commission determines that there is adequate pricing data to support required clearing of MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS.

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As discussed further below, Commission staff receives and reviews margin model information from the registered DCOs that clear these swaps, including information regarding how those DCOs would ensure that liquidity exists to exit a position in a stressed market. For purposes of the first statutory factor, the Commission considers possible periods of market stress, particularly when assessing whether there is sufficient liquidity and pricing data. Second Determination, 81 FR at 71210 (noting that the Commission considered “the effect a new clearing mandate will have on a DCO's ability to withstand stressed market conditions” as part of its analysis in connection with the Second Determination).

In addition, based on DCO regulation § 39.5(b) submissions, the Commission finds that there exists adequate pricing data to justify a clearing requirement determination, including information regarding transaction volumes and how the DCOs consider pricing information in determining eligibility of a swap for clearing.
95

No commenter presented any comment or market analysis regarding whether there is adequate pricing data for DCO risk and default management of the products subject to this rulemaking, including regarding the stated termination date ranges and during periods of stressed market conditions.

95
For instance, CME's § 39.5(b) submission addressed both cleared volumes and valuation curve methodologies for CAD CORRA OIS and MXN F-TIIE OIS. LCH's § 39.5(b) submissions related to CAD CORRA OIS how LCH considers pricing information in determining swap eligibility for clearing, and LCH's submission for MXN F-TIIE OIS noted that LCH has several brokers to serve as pricing sources for MXN F-TIIE OIS.

Based on the data presented and analyzed above, the Commission determines there are sufficient outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and pricing information for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS to support a clearing requirement determination.

2. Factor (II)—Availability Of Rule Framework, Capacity, Operational Expertise and Resources, and Credit Support Infrastructure

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(II) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the proposed classes of swaps on terms that are consistent with the conventions on which they are now traded. Based on their regulation § 39.5(b) submissions, as well as ongoing oversight, the Commission determines that CME and LCH have developed rule frameworks, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the interest rate swaps they currently clear, including CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, on terms that are consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which those swaps are being traded. The Commission subjects CME and LCH to ongoing review, risk surveillance, and examination to ensure compliance with the CEA's core principles and Commission regulations, including with respect to the submitted swaps.
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In order to be registered with the Commission, a DCO must comply with the DCO core principles under section 5b of the CEA and applicable Commission regulations. Once a DCO is registered with the Commission, Commission staff periodically examine each DCO to determine whether the DCO is maintaining compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations. In addition, Commission staff monitors the risks posed to and by DCOs, clearing members, and market participants, and conducts independent stress testing.

CME and LCH have procedures pursuant to which they regularly review their RFR OIS clearing in order to confirm or adjust margin and other risk management tools. When reviewing CME's and LCH's risk management tools, the Commission considers the ability of a DCO to manage risk during stressed market conditions to be one of the most significant considerations, considering the role central clearing

plays in reducing counterparty credit risk and in lowering the likelihood of defaults that could spread from one counterparty to others.
97

CME and LCH have developed detailed risk management practices, including a description of risk factors considered when establishing margin levels and other resource pools, like the default fund.
98

The Commission reviews and oversees CME's and LCH's risk management practices and development of margin models. Margin models are further refined by stress testing and daily back testing. The Commission also considers stress testing and back testing when assessing whether CME and LCH can clear swaps safely during stressed market conditions.

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See, e.g.,
ISDA, Evolution of OTC Derivatives Markets Since the Financial Crisis, at 13 (Jan. 2021), available at
https://www.isda.org/a/8jjTE/Evolution-of-OTC-Derivatives-Markets-Since-the-Financial-Crisis.pdf.

98

E.g.,
historical volatility, intraday volatility, seasonal volatility, liquidity, open interest, market concentration, and potential moves to default. For additional information, CME and LCH published documents outlining their respective compliance with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) published by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI; formerly, CPSS) and IOSCO. CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI), Apr. 16, 2012, available at
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm. See
CME, CME Clearing: Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures Disclosure, Dec. 12, 2025, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/files/cme-clearing-principles-for-financial-market-infrastructures-disclosure.pdf;
LCH Ltd., CPMI—IOSCO Self-Assessment 2024, Mar. 31, 2024, available at
https://www.lch.com/system/files/media_root/CPMI%20IOSCO%20Self%20Qualitative%20Assessment%20of%20LCH%20LTD_1.pdf.

CME and LCH design and conduct stress tests, and Commission staff monitors development of these stress tests. These stress tests, in part, are used to ensure that their default funds are sized appropriately and to ascertain whether any changes to their financial resources or margin models are necessary for continued robust risk management.
99

In addition, Commission staff monitors markets on both an end-of-day and real-time basis and performs stress tests against the DCOs' margin models. Depending on the result of this analysis, the Commission may recommend changes to a margin model. Finally, CME and LCH conduct daily back testing to ensure that the margin models capture market movements for member portfolios.
100

99
Reverse stress testing uses plausible market movements that could deplete guaranty funds and cause large losses for top clearing members. For example, CME and LCH may use scenarios for stress testing and reverse stress testing that capture, among other things, historical price volatilities, shifts in price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, and simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets.

100
Back testing tests margin models to determine whether they are performing as intended, and checks whether margin models produce margin coverage levels that meet the DCO's established standards. Back testing helps CME and LCH determine whether their clearing members satisfy the required margin coverage levels and liquidation timeframe.

Before offering a new product for clearing, each of the DCOs considers stress tests and back testing results in determining whether it has sufficient financial resources to offer new clearing services. The Commission also reviews initial margin models and default resources to ensure that the DCOs can risk-manage their portfolio of products offered for clearing. This combination of stress testing and back testing in anticipation of offering swaps for clearing provides CME and LCH with greater certainty that their offerings will be risk-managed appropriately. The process of stress testing and back testing also gives DCOs practice incorporating new swaps into their models. In addition to the Commission's surveillance and oversight, CME and LCH continue to monitor and test their margin models over time so that they can operate effectively in stressed and non-stressed market environments. Registered DCOs review and validate their margin models regularly.
101

101
For the avoidance of doubt, exempt DCOs are subject to oversight by their home country regulators, along with regulations regarding risk management.

Each DCO monitors and manages credit risk exposure by asset class, clearing member, account, or individual customer. They manage credit risk by establishing position and concentration limits based on product type or counterparty. These limits reduce potential market risks so that DCOs are better able to withstand stressed market conditions. Each of the DCOs monitors exposure concentrations and may require additional margin deposits for clearing members with weak credit scores, with large or concentrated positions, with positions that are illiquid or exhibit correlation with the member itself, and/or where the member has particularly large exposures under stress scenarios. DCOs also may call for additional margin, on top of collecting initial and variation margin, to meet unique risk exposures and protect against stressed market conditions.
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102
As a general matter, any DCO offering RFR OIS for clearing, including exempt DCOs, would follow this risk management approach when offering these swaps for clearing.

In support of its ability to clear CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, CME's regulation § 39.5(b) submissions cite to its rulebook to demonstrate the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear interest rate swap contracts on terms that are consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which the contracts are traded. LCH's submissions state that LCH's clearing model allows bilaterally traded interest rate swaps to be cleared on identical terms and that LCH has developed sophisticated operational models, controls, and risk algorithms to ensure that LCH can process trades rapidly, safely, and with an understanding of the risk to clearing members and customers. LCH's submissions provide, among other information, data regarding the portion of the interest rate swap market cleared by LCH, LCH's portfolio compression capacity, and daily clearing volumes.

The individual commenter stated that the NPRM failed to address “the fact that the number of active [futures commission merchants (FCMs)] has declined significantly over the past decade” and the issue of “whether smaller or occasional users may face onboarding delays or minimum fee hurdles.” In the commenter's view, this omission constitutes a direct gap in the analysis required under section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(II) (Factor II) of the CEA, which mandates that the Commission fully account for the availability of operational expertise, clearing capacity, resources, and downstream credit support infrastructure across all market participants. No other commenter raised this concern.

The question in the individual commenter's discussion relates to market participants and their clearing members. However, Factor II focuses on the clearinghouse and its swap offering, namely on the availability of frameworks, expertise, and resources to clear swaps on terms that are consistent with how the contract is traded. Thus, the individual commenter's statements about access to clearing by smaller market participants is distinguishable from this factor.

The Commission determines there are available rule frameworks, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructures, consistent with material terms and trading conventions, to support the required clearing of MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS. The application of DCO risk management practices to CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS should ensure the swaps subject to this rulemaking can be

cleared safely, even during times of market stress.
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103
For additional information related to this factor, please see the public disclosures made by CME and LCH. CME, CME Clearing: Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures Disclosure, Dec. 12, 2025, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/files/cme-clearing-principles-for-financial-market-infrastructures-disclosure.pdf;
LCH Ltd., CPMI—IOSCO Self-Assessment 2024, Mar. 31, 2024, available at
https://www.lch.com/system/files/media_root/CPMI%20IOSCO%20Self%20Qualitative%20Assessment%20of%20LCH%20LTD_1.pdf.

3. Factor (III)—Effect on the Mitigation of Systemic Risk

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(III) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the effect of the clearing requirement on the mitigation of systemic risk, considering the size of the market for such contract and the resources of the DCO available to clear the contract. As presented in the data and discussion above, the Commission has concluded that the mitigation of systemic risk through continued clearing in the market for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS is meaningful. Mitigating counterparty credit risk through clearing will likely reduce systemic risk in the interest rate swap market generally and, while not every individual RFR OIS market has large outstanding notional exposures, each such market is important, and continuity of clearing for RFR OIS serves to reduce systemic risk.

In its regulation § 39.5(b) submissions, CME explains the benefits of centralized clearing, including freer counterparty credit lines, enhanced risk management, operational efficiencies, and ease of offsetting risk exposures. LCH's submissions note that clearing avoids complex bilateral relationships that lead to systemic risk, and that requiring swaps to be cleared leads to a less disparate marketplace from a systemic risk perspective with respect to that swap.

Centrally clearing CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS through a DCO should reduce systemic risk by providing counterparties with daily mark-to-market valuations upon which to exchange variation margin pursuant to the DCO's risk management framework and requiring posting of initial margin to cover potential future exposures in the event of a default. In addition, swaps transacted through a DCO are secured by the DCO's guaranty fund and other available financial resources, which are intended to cover extraordinary losses that would not be covered by initial margin.

Central clearing was developed and designed to handle significant concentration of risk. CME and LCH have procedures for closing out and/or transferring a defaulting clearing member's positions and collateral.
104

Transferring customer positions to solvent clearing members in the event of a default is critical to reducing systemic risk. DCOs are designed to withstand defaulting positions and to prevent a defaulting clearing member's loss from spreading further and triggering additional defaults. To the extent updating a clearing requirement with respect to MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS increases the number of clearing members and market participants in the interest rate swap market, then DCOs may find it easier to transfer positions from defaulting clearing members if there is a larger pool of potential clearing members to receive the positions. However, the Commission recognizes that with the existing high rates of voluntary clearing of CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, the likelihood of adding additional clearing members and market participants in these markets is limited.

104
For further discussion of treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property in the event of the insolvency of a DCO or one or more of its clearing members, please see Factor (V)—Legal certainty in the event of insolvency below.

CME and LCH have experience risk managing interest rate swaps and, based on CME's and LCH's submissions and the Commission's ongoing supervision, CME and LCH should have the necessary financial resources available to clear MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS. Accordingly, the Commission finds that CME and LCH will be able to manage the risk posed by clearing MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS. In addition, the application of DCO risk management practices to CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS should ensure these swaps can continue to be cleared safely.

The CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS data presented in this rulemaking indicates varying levels of activity, measured by outstanding notional amounts and trade counts. The Commission acknowledges that the data comes from limited periods of time that do not explicitly include periods of market stress. However, the Commission concludes the data demonstrates sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding notional exposures in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS to provide the liquidity necessary for DCOs to successfully risk-manage these products and to support the adoption of a clearing requirement.

Accordingly, the Commission determines CME and LCH will be able to manage the risk posed by clearing MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS required to be cleared pursuant to this determination. In addition, the central clearing of the MXN F-TIIE and additional CAD CORRA OIS added under this rulemaking serves to mitigate counterparty credit risk, thereby potentially reducing systemic risk. No comments were submitted on this factor. Having considered the likely effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, the Commission is issuing this determination to add MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS to the clearing requirement.

4. Factor (IV)—Effect on Competition

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(IV) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing. Of particular concern to the Commission is whether this determination would harm competition by creating, enhancing, or entrenching market power in an affected product or service market, or facilitating the exercise of market power.
105

Market power is viewed as the ability to raise prices, including clearing fees and charges, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.
106

105
First Determination, 77 FR at 74313; Second Determination, 81 FR at 71220; Third Determination, 87 FR at 52201-52202.

106
First Determination, 77 FR at 74313 (discussing market power as described under U.S. Department of Justice guidelines).
See generally
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Horizontal Merger Guidelines) at section 4.1 (Dec. 18, 2023), available at
https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-12/2023%20Merger%20Guidelines.pdf
.

The Commission has identified one putative service market as potentially affected by this clearing determination: a DCO service market encompassing those clearinghouses that currently clear CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS.
107

This clearing requirement potentially could impact competition within the affected market. Of particular importance to whether any such impact is positive or negative, is: (1) whether the demand for these clearing services and swaps is sufficiently elastic that a small but significant price increase above competitive levels would prove unprofitable because users of the interest rate swap products and DCO

clearing services would substitute other clearing services coexisting in the same market(s); and (2) the potential for new entry into this market.
108

The availability of substitute clearing services to compete with those encompassed by this determination, and the likelihood of timely, sufficient new entry in the event prices do increase above competitive levels, each operate independently to constrain anti-competitive behavior.

107
First Determination, 77 FR at 74298; Second Determination, 81 FR at 71220. The DCO service market includes the registered and exempt DCOs that currently offer RFR OIS for clearing.

108

See
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, section 4.3.A.

Any competitive effect likely would stem from the fact that the determination and associated regulations would remove the alternative of not clearing for the CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS subject to this rulemaking. The determination does not specify who may or may not compete to provide clearing services for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, as well as those not required to be cleared.

Removing the choice to enter into a swap without submitting it for clearing under this rulemaking is not determinative of negative competitive impact. Other factors, including the availability of other substitutes within the market or potential for new entry into the market, may constrain market power. The Commission does not foresee that the determination constructs barriers that would deter or impede new entry into a clearing services market,
109

and the Commission anticipates this determination might foster an environment conducive to new entry. For example, the clearing determination may reinforce, if not encourage, growth in demand for clearing services. Demand growth, in turn, can enhance the sales opportunity, a condition hospitable to new entry.
110

Moreover, to the extent that there are high rates of voluntary clearing in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS already, a regulatory requirement to clear such swaps provides additional certainty that those high rates of clearing remain constant.

109
However, the Commission recognizes that (1) to the extent the clearing services market for the interest rate swaps identified in this rulemaking, after foreclosing uncleared swaps, would be limited to a concentrated few participants with highly aligned incentives, and (2) the clearing services market is insulated from new competitive entry through barriers (
e.g.,
high sunk capital cost requirements, high switching costs to transition from embedded incumbents, and access restrictions), the determination could have a negative competitive impact by increasing market concentration.

110

See, e.g.,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, section 2.4.A Evidence for reasonable probability of entry can include, for example, evidence that the firm has an incentive to enter or evidence that industry participants recognize the company as a potential entrant, in addition to evidence that the firm has sufficient size and resources to enter; evidence of any advantages that would make the firm well-situated to enter; or evidence that the firm has successfully expanded into similarly situated markets in the past or already participates in adjacent or related markets.
See id.

The individual commenter questions whether the Commission provided sufficient data to support its conclusions under Factor IV. In the commenter's view, empirical metrics are needed to support the finding that a mandate will have no adverse competitive impacts on venue-level clearing fees. In the commenter's view, the analytical standard intended by CEA section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(IV) (Factor IV) requires an explicit assessment of the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges. Both CME and LCH offer clearing services based on fees and charges that are well known to market participants.
111

Both clearinghouses maintain relationships with multiple FCM and non-FCM clearing members that offer their services to market participants in the United States and elsewhere in the global swaps markets. As noted above, one non-DCO clearinghouse, Asigna, offers clearing services for MXN F-TIIE OIS in Mexico. Other clearinghouses in both Canada and Mexico also may choose to enter the market for providing clearing services for the OIS subject to this rulemaking.

111

See
CME, Cleared OTC IRS Client Fee Schedules, available at
https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/cleared-swaps/cleared-otc-irs-client-fee-schedules.html;
LCH, SwapClear Client Clearing Fees, available at
https://www.lseg.com/en/post-trade/clearing/lch-services/swapclear/fees/client-clearing-fees.

No commenter provided any comment, or quantifiable data, on cost increases associated with clearing, particularly those fees and charges imposed by DCOs, and the effects of such increases on counterparties currently participating in the market. Similarly, no commenter submitted a comment regarding how the Commission's action would or could generate conditions that create, increase, or facilitate an exercise of: (1) clearing services market power in CME, LCH, and/or any other clearing service market participant, including conditions that would dampen competition for clearing services and/or increase the cost of clearing services, and/or (2) market power in any product markets for interest rate swaps, including conditions that would dampen competition for these product markets and/or increase the cost of CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS.

For these reasons, entry barriers currently do not exist with respect to a clearing services market for CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, and it is possible that this determination may encourage or facilitate new entry into the market. The Commission concludes that it has considered the effect of the updated clearing requirement on competition and found that, even in an unlikely case where competition is affected in these markets, anticompetitive behavior is likely to be constrained in size and breadth of effect. Demand for clearing services in this market is likely to remain unchanged. Accordingly, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion that competitiveness is sufficient to modify the existing interest rate swap clearing requirement to include MXN F-TIIE and additional CAD CORRA OIS.

5. Factor (V)—Legal Certainty in the Event of Insolvency

Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(V) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of its clearing members regarding the treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property. The Commission is issuing this clearing requirement determination based on its view that there is reasonable legal certainty regarding the treatment of customer and counterparty positions, funds, and property in connection with cleared swaps, including CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS, in the event of the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of the DCO's clearing members.

In the case of a clearing member insolvency at CME, where the clearing member is the subject of a proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 761-767) along with parts 22 and 190 of the Commission's regulations would govern the treatment of customer positions.
112

Pursuant to section 4d(f) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 4d(f), a clearing member accepting funds from a customer to margin a cleared swap must be a registered futures commission merchant (FCM). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 761-767 and part 190 of the Commission's regulations, the customer's interest rate swap positions, carried by an insolvent

FCM, would be deemed “commodity contracts.”
113

As a result, neither a clearing member's bankruptcy nor any order of a bankruptcy court could prevent CME from closing out/liquidating such positions. However, customers of clearing members would have priority over all other claimants with respect to customer funds that had been held by the defaulting clearing member to margin swaps, such as the CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS subject to this determination.
114

Thus, customer claims would have priority over proprietary claims and general creditor claims. Customer funds would be distributed to swap customers, including interest rate swap customers, in accordance with Commission regulations and section 766(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code and the Commission's rules thereunder (in particular 11 U.S.C. 764(b) and 17 CFR 190.07) permit the transfer of customer positions and collateral to solvent clearing members.

112
An FCM or DCO also may be subject to resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act to the extent it would qualify as a covered financial company (as defined in section 201(a)(8) of the Dodd-Frank Act). Under Title II, different rules would apply to the resolution of an FCM or DCO. Discussion in this section relating to what might occur in the event an FCM or DCO defaults or becomes insolvent describes procedures and powers that exist in the absence of a Title II receivership.

113
If an FCM is registered as a broker-dealer, certain issues related to its insolvency proceeding would be governed by the Securities Investor Protection Act, as well.

114
Claims seeking payment for the administration of customer property would share this priority.

Similarly, 11 U.S.C. 761-767 and part 190 would govern the bankruptcy of a DCO where the DCO is the subject of a proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with DCO rules providing for the termination of outstanding contracts and/or return of remaining clearing member and customer property to clearing members.

With regard to LCH, the Commission understands that in general the default of an LCH clearing member would be governed by LCH's rules, and LCH would be permitted to close out and/or transfer positions of a defaulting clearing member. Further, under applicable law, LCH's rules governing a clearing member default would supersede insolvency laws in the clearing member's jurisdiction. For an FCM based in the United States and clearing at LCH, the applicable law, as a general matter, would be the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and part 190 of the Commission's regulations. According to LCH's regulation § 39.5(b) submissions, the insolvency of LCH itself would be governed by English insolvency law, which protects the enforceability of the default-related provisions of LCH's rulebook, including in respect of compliance with applicable provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and part 190 of the Commission's regulations. LCH has obtained, and made available to the Commission, legal opinions that support the existence of such legal certainty in relation to the protection of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property in the event of the insolvency of one or more of its clearing members.
115

115
Letters of counsel on file with the Commission.

The individual commenter questioned whether there was sufficient explanation of U.K. insolvency proceedings' treatment of U.S. persons clearing swaps at LCH. This comment does not account for the discussion in the proposal or the fact that LCH has expanded its FCM clearing model in recent years.
116

Much of the commenter's request for additional information is available on the relevant clearinghouses' websites.

116

See
LCH, SwapClear, Resources, available at
https://www.lseg.com/en/post-trade/clearing/lch-services/swapclear/resources.

For the reasons described above, and despite the comment received, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion stated in the NPRM that reasonable legal certainty exists in the event of the insolvency of each of the relevant DCOs or one or more of their clearing members with regard to the treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property to modify the interest rate swap clearing requirement to include the CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS subject to this rulemaking.

VI. Implementation Schedule

With respect to its proposal to add a clearing requirement for MXN F-TIIE OIS and additional CAD CORRA OIS, the Commission proposed adopting one compliance date for all market participants and amending regulation § 50.26 to reflect that the compliance date would be 30 days after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
. The Commission is finalizing this implementation date as proposed for the reasons discussed below.

As a technical amendment, because the Commission is removing CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE swaps from regulation § 50.4, it is also removing those same swaps from regulation § 50.26. The Commission is making this change to eliminate any confusion that might arise if different swaps are included in 50.4 and 50.26. The Commission also will remove these swaps from regulation § 50.26, 30 days after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
.

CME and LCH have completed their conversion plans for all cleared CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE swaps into, respectively, CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS. Moreover, CME and LCH no longer offer CAD CDOR or MXN TIIE interest rate swaps for clearing. CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE have ceased publication or become otherwise generally unavailable for use by market participants. As the data above supports, swap liquidity associated with these benchmarks has shifted into, respectively, CAD CDOR and MXN F-TIIE OIS. Canada and Mexico have updated their clearing requirements to reflect the transitions in benchmark interest rates for interest rate swaps denominated in their respective currencies. There has been an overwhelming amount of voluntary clearing of CAD CDOR and MXN F-TIIE OIS, reflected in the volume of the outstanding notional for these OIS.

In its comment letter, ISDA disagrees with the NPRM's proposed effective date of 30 days after publication of the Final Rule in the
Federal Register
. In ISDA's view, the proposed effective date would not support efficient implementation.
117

ISDA states that establishing a framework that enables firms to comply with the amended scope of the clearing requirement requires additional market preparations, such as adapting systems, creating and running internal trainings, issuing client communications, developing and implementing control frameworks, addressing internal governance matters, and addressing unique jurisdictional requirements.
118

ISDA also notes that, to meet a shorter deadline, ISDA members may have to adopt tactical solutions and place an unnecessary strain on resources.
119

117
ISDA Comment Letter.

118

Id.

119

Id.

Additionally, the individual commenter recommended the Commission adopt a longer implementation timeline for its MXN F-TIIE OIS and modified CAD CORRA OIS clearing requirement. The commenter explains that the Commission should not treat the CAD and MXN transitions as if they are at the same stage of market maturity. In his view, the CAD CORRA IRS market is “fully established with deep liquidity, while MXN F-TIIE is still in an active transition period, with a waiver in place through the end of 2025 and uneven liquidity across tenors.”
120

The commenter's recommendation is the Commission should establish “a separate, phased implementation schedule that grants market participants a longer compliance runway for MXN F-TIIE products, rather than imposing a uniform effective date that ignores the stark

developmental delta between these two markets.”
121

120
Individual Commenter Letter.

121

Id.

The Commission is rejecting the positions advocated by both ISDA and the individual commenter. In commenting on the NPRM preceding the Third Determination, which proposed implementation of an RFR OIS clearing requirement 30 days after the date of publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
, ISDA similarly requested a compliance date be set a minimum of 90 days after the publication of the final rule.
122

Making virtually the same points, ISDA noted that compliance with new clearing requirements requires ISDA members to adapt systems, create and run internal training, issue client communications, and develop and implement control frameworks, address internal governance matters, and address jurisdictional requirements.
123

ISDA similarly contended that, to meet a shorter deadline, ISDA members may have to adopt tactical solutions and place an unnecessary strain on their resources.
124

122
ISDA Comment Letter, June 30, 2022, available at
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ReleasesWithComments.aspx.

123

Id.

124

Id.

Although the Commission modified the 30-day implementation period for the USD SOFR OIS clearing requirement to align with the UK's timing to implement its USD SOFR OIS clearing requirement, the Commission noted most commenters favored the Commission's proposed approach of implementing its RFR OIS clearing requirement 30 days after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
, and adopted that implementation date for the clearing requirement for nearly all the other RFR OIS subject to the Third Determination.
125

The Commission is not aware that there were any problems with the 30-day implementation period with respect to those products.

125
Third Determination, 87 FR at 52190. Commenters supported this approach, variously, because: (1) the market has already gravitated toward central clearing of RFR OIS (including USD SOFR OIS) to a significant degree, 30 days would provide market participants with sufficient time to comply with the new determination, and the new determination would not lead to a material change in operations for a majority of market participants (CCP12); (2) the proposed 30-day compliance date is appropriate because almost all USD SOFR OIS transactions were being cleared voluntarily (Citadel and the Managed Funds Association);
see also
comment letters from the Alternative Investment Management Association (suggesting the Commission should expedite its consideration of a final rule, consistent with the proposed rule, and update the clearing requirement as quickly as possible), and CME and JSCC (agreeing with the Commission's proposal to adopt a single compliance date that would be 30 days after the publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
).
Id.
The one exception was SGD SORA, which relied on USD LIBOR as a calculation input, and the implementation date for which was tied to USD LIBOR.

As discussed above and in the NPRM, the unavailability of CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE and recommended use of CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE as alternative benchmarks were announced well in advance of CAD CORRA and MXN TIIE becoming unavailable. The transitions occurred with support and input from regulators, clearinghouses, market participants, and others. Both CAD and MXN OIS transitions are now effectively complete, with Canada and Mexico having updated their respective clearing requirements to reflect the transition.

The data presented in the NPRM, and supplemented here with additional months of data, indicates liquidity has already moved from CAD CDOR to CAD CORRA and from MXN TIIE to MXN F-TIIE, with high rates of clearing in both OIS. The additional three months of data provided above demonstrates activity in CAD CORRA and MXN F-TIIE OIS was largely consistent with the data in the NPRM. There is no change that would be material to the Commission's conclusion. Accordingly, the points made by the two commenters are not persuasive. In response to the individual commenter, while the CAD and MXN interest rate swap markets may once have been at different stages of their respective transitions to RFRs, this is no longer the case. Likewise, in making its case, ISDA has not provided specific fact-based details or examples of the challenges market participants would face with respect to implementing this determination with the time proposed, that would be distinguishable from challenges faced during the transition away from LIBOR. This is even more so the case given that the transition for both markets is largely complete.

The Commission believes clearinghouses and swap markets, which have had experience clearing MXN TIIE swaps subject to the Commission's existing clearing requirement, and have transitioned to use of MXN F-TIIE OIS, which are cleared at high rates, are prepared to implement the clearing requirement applicable to MXN F-TIIE OIS, and the modified clearing requirement applicable to CAD CORRA OIS, within 30 days after the date of publication of this final rule in the
Federal Register
. If the clearing requirement compliance date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or U.S. federal public holiday, then the compliance date will be the next available business day. No compliance date will be set on a day when markets are not open in the United States.

In addition to adding MXN F-TIIE and additional CAD CORRA OIS to the clearing requirement, these amendments modify the existing clearing requirement to reflect the cessation or loss of representativeness of CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE. For purposes of this rulemaking, CAD CDOR and MXN TIIE, have ceased publication or become nonrepresentative.

As discussed above, DCOs no longer offer to clear swaps that reference these benchmarks. Throughout the transitions from IBORs to RFRs, regulators in the United States and other jurisdictions have called on market participants to transfer their swap positions from IBORs to RFRs, with corresponding liquidity shifting, and continuing to shift to the new RFR swap

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-18212. Public record. Not legal advice.
