# Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf-Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-15953 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Proposed Rule - **Published:** August 6, 2026 - **Citation:** 91 FR 50998 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 30 CFR Part 250 and 254 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 30 CFR Part 550 [Docket ID: BSEE-2026-0133 EEEE500000-256E1700D2-ET1SF0000.EAQ000] RIN 1082-AA05 Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf AGENCY: Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE); Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Interior. ACTION: Proposed rule. SUMMARY: The Department of the Interior (DOI or Department), acting through BSEE and BOEM (collectively, “the Bureaus”), is proposing to revise its existing regulations for exploratory drilling and related operations on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), to reduce unnecessary burdens on stakeholders while ensuring that energy exploration on the Arctic OCS is safe and environmentally responsible. 1 This proposed rule would revise certain requirements promulgated through the rule entitled, Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (“2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule”) ( see 81 FR 46478). This proposed rule would modify existing Arctic OCS blowout preventer (BOP) real-time monitoring requirements and add new provisions to BSEE's regulations pertaining to requirements for crane operations on artificial islands, suspensions of operations (SOO), and suspensions of production (SOP). This proposed rule would also revise certain parts of the Exploration Plan (EP) and Development and Production Plan (DPP) regulations implemented by BOEM. 1 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, sec. 3, 43 U.S.C. 1332. DATES: Submit comments on this proposed rule to BSEE on or before October 5, 2026. The Bureaus may not fully consider comments received after this date. You may submit comments to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the information collection burden in this proposed rule by September 8, 2026. The deadline for comments on the information collection burden does not affect the deadline for the public to comment to the Bureaus on the proposed regulations. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the proposed rule by any of the following methods. Please use the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 1082-AA05 as an identifier in your message. See also Public Availability of Comments under Procedural Matters. • Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. In the entry entitled, “Enter Keyword or ID,” enter BSEE-2026-0133, then click search. Follow the instructions to submit public comments and view supporting and related materials available for this rulemaking, including a plain language summary of the proposed rule as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4). The Bureaus may post all submitted comments. • Mail or hand-carry comments to the DOI, BSEE and BOEM: Attention: Regulations and Standards Branch, 45600 Woodland Road, VAE-ORP, Sterling VA 20166. Please reference RIN 1082-AA05, “Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf,” in your comments, and include your name and return address. • Email: regs@bsee.gov . • Send comments on the information collection in this rule to: Interior Desk Officer 1082-AA01, Office of Management and Budget; 202-395-5806 (fax); or via the online portal at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. From this main web page, you can find and submit comments on this particular information collection by proceeding to the boldface heading “Currently under Review,” selecting “Department of the Interior” in the “Select Agency” pull down menu, clicking “Submit,” then, checking the box “Only Show ICR for Public Comment” on the next web page, scrolling to this proposed rule, and clicking the “Comment” button at the right margin. Alternatively, you may use the search function on the main web page. Please also send a copy to the Bureaus by one of the means previously described, and reference “ OMB Control Number 1014-[TBD] (Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf) for BSEE-related comments or OMB Control Number 1010-[TBD] (Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf) for BOEM-related comments, as applicable, in the subject line of your comments. • Public Availability of Comments: Please be aware that BOEM's and BSEE's practice is to make comments, including the names and addresses of individuals, available for public inspection. Before including your address, phone number, email address, and any personally identifiable information in your comment, please be advised that your entire comment, including your personally identifiable information, may be made publicly available at any time. For the Bureaus to consider withholding from disclosure your personally identifiable information, you must identify, in a cover letter, any information contained in your comments that, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of your personal privacy. You must also briefly describe any possible harmful consequences of the disclosure of information, such as embarrassment, injury, or other harm. Even if the Bureaus withhold your information in the context of this proposed rule, your submission is subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). If your submission is requested under the FOIA, your information will only be withheld if BOEM or BSEE determines that one of the FOIA exemptions to disclosure applies. Such a determination will be made in accordance with the Department's FOIA regulations and applicable law. The Bureaus will make available for public inspection all comments, in their entirety, submitted by organizations and businesses (except as provided material marked and exempted as proprietary information) or by individuals identifying themselves as representatives of organizations or businesses. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions related to regulatory changes BSEE is proposing in Part 250, contact Bobby Kurtz, BSEE, Acting Alaska OCS Regional Director, Bobby.Kurtz@bsee.gov, 805-384-6359. For technical questions related to regulatory changes BOEM is proposing in Part 550, contact Joel Immaraj, BOEM, Alaska Regional Office, joel.immaraj@boem.gov, (907) 334-5238. For procedural questions contact Bryce Barlan, BSEE, Regulations and Standards Branch, regs@bsee.gov, (703) 787-1126. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Executive Summary Executive Orders (E.O.) and Secretary's Orders (S.O.) issued in 2017 directed Federal agencies to review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately begin processes to potentially suspend, revise, or rescind those regulations that are determined to unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources, beyond the degree necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply with the law. E.O. 13795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy ( see 82 FR 20815), which specifically called for a review of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, and S.O. 3350, America-First Offshore Energy Strategy , are discussed in more detail below in Section I. Background, Subsection B. Executive and Secretary's Orders . 2 2 These Orders do not dictate outcomes; rather, they directed a review in accordance with applicable law. In response to these orders, the Bureaus undertook a review of the regulations promulgated through the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule and, on December 9, 2020, the Bureaus issued a proposed rule titled Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (“2020 Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule”) ( see 85 FR 79266). However, on June 29, 2021, the Bureaus withdrew the 2020 Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule ( see 86 FR 34172) due to a change in administration and policy. Subsequently, in January 2025, the President signed E.O. 14153, Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential ( see 90 FR 8347) and E.O. 14154, Unleashing American Energy ( see 90 FR 8353), which aimed to expand natural resource development throughout the Nation and in Alaska to promote American energy independence. These E.O.s. also call upon the heads of Federal Agencies, including the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions, and rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from those that limit energy development on Federal lands and waters. In response to these E.O.s, the Secretary issued S.O. 3422, Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential, and S.O. 3418, Unleashing American Energy, both of which were intended to implement the policies in E.O. 14153 and E.O. 14154. This proposed rule responds to the 2025 E.O.s and S.O.s and is also consistent with the efforts the Bureaus previously undertook through the 2020 Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule. It would create more flexible and less costly compliance options in BSEE's and BOEM's regulations and is designed to ensure the safe, effective, and responsible exploration of Arctic OCS oil and gas resources, while protecting the marine, coastal, and human environments, and preserving Alaska Natives' cultural traditions and their access to subsistence resources. In particular, this proposed rule would revise certain provisions in 30 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 250, Subparts C, D, and G, 30 CFR part 254, subparts A and E, and 30 CFR part 550, subpart B, that were promulgated through the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule and pertain to: 1. Definition of the “Arctic OCS”; 2 Pollution prevention; 3. Arctic OCS Source Control and Containment Equipment (SCCE); 4. BOP real-time monitoring requirements for the Arctic OCS; 5. Relief rig capabilities for the Arctic OCS; 6. Mudline cellars; 7. Oil spill response plan-holder reviews; 8. Timing and submission requirements related to Integrated Operations Plans (IOP) for proposed Arctic exploratory drilling; 9. What must be included in the IOP; and 10. What data and information must accompany the EP and DPP. This proposed rule would also revise certain provisions in 30 CFR part 250, subpart A, that are not addressed by the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, but are relevant to the Arctic OCS or the Alaska OCS region and, therefore, are appropriate to address as part of this proposed rulemaking. These provisions pertain to: 1. The factors that the BSEE Regional Supervisor may evaluate in assessing whether to grant an SOO or grant or direct an SOP to address unique and specific conditions relevant only to exploration and development activities in the Alaska OCS region; and 2. Cranes used for operations on artificial islands. Table of Contents: I. Background A. BSEE and BOEM Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities B. Executive and Secretary's Orders C. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking D. Procedures for Incorporation by Reference and Availability of Incorporated Documents for Public Viewing II. Section-by-Section Discussion of Proposed Changes A. Key Revisions Proposed by BSEE Title 30, Chapter II, Subchapter B, Part 250 Subpart A—General • Definitions (§ 250.105) • What requirements must I follow for cranes and other material-handling equipment? (§ 250.108) • What requirements must I follow for cranes and other material-handling equipment? (§  250.108) • How long does a suspension last? (§ 250.170) • How do I request a suspension? (§ 250.171) • When may the Regional Supervisor grant or direct an SOP? (§ 250.174) • When may the Regional Supervisor grant an SOO? (§ 250.175) • Documents Incorporated by Reference. (§ 250.198) Subpart C—Pollution Prevention and Control • Pollution Prevention. (§ 250.300) Subpart D—Oil and Gas Drilling Operations • What are the real-time monitoring requirements for Arctic OCS exploratory drilling operations? (§ 250.452) • What additional information must I submit with my APD for Arctic OCS exploratory drilling operations? (§ 250.470) • What are the requirements for Arctic OCS source control and containment? (§ 250.471) • What are the additional well control equipment or relief rig requirements for the Arctic OCS? (§ 250.472) Subpart G—Well Operations and Equipment • When and how must I secure a well? (§ 250.720) • What are the real-time monitoring requirements? (§ 250.724) Title 30, Chapter II, Subchapter B, Part 254 Subpart A—General • Definitions. (§ 254.6) Subpart E—Oil-Spill Response Requirements for Facilities Located on the Arctic OCS • What are the additional requirements for facilities conducting exploratory drilling from a MODU on the Arctic OCS? (§ 254.70) B. Key Revisions Proposed by BOEM Title 30, Chapter V, Subchapter B, Part 550 Subpart B—Plans and Information • Definitions. (§ 550.105) • Removal of § 550.204, When must I submit my IOP for proposed Arctic exploratory drilling operations and what must the IOP include? • How do I submit the EP, DPP, or DOCD? (§ 550.206) • What must the EP include? (§ 550.211) • If I propose activities in the Arctic OCS Region, what planning information must accompany the EP? (§ 550.220) III. Additional Comments Solicited IV. Procedural Matters A. Regulatory Planning and Review (E.O. 12866 and 13563) B. Reducing Regulatory Burdens (E.O. 14192) C. Unleashing American Energy and Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential (E.O.s 14153 and 14154) D. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) F. Takings Implication Assessment G. Federalism (E.O. 13132) H. Civil Justice Reform (E.O. 12988) I. Consultation with Indian Tribes (E.O. 13175) J. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) K. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) L. Data Quality Act M Effects on the Nation's Energy Supply (E.O. 13211) N. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) O. Clarity of Regulations P. Severability List of Acronyms and References 60-Day Report Report to the Secretary of the Interior, Review of Shell's 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Program 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf-Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, see 81 FR 46478, July 15, 2016 (available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/07/15/2016-15699/oil-and-gas-and-sulfur-operations-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-requirements-for-exploratory ) 2020 Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf-Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, see 85 FR 79266, December 9, 2020 (available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/09/2020-25818/oil-and-gas-and-sulfur-operations-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-revisions-to-the-requirements-for#h-63 ) ABS American Bureau of Shipping ACP Alternative Compliance Program ANCSA Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act APD Application for Permit to Drill API American Petroleum Institute Arctic OCS OCS oil and gas planning areas that include any portion of their geographic extent located north of 66°33′ N latitude ASME The American Society of Mechanical Engineers AWKS Alternative Well Kill System BOEM Bureau of Ocean Energy Management BOP Blowout Preventer Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 Suitability of Source Control and Containment Equipment versus Same Season Relief Well in the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Region, October 2018 BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement CFR Code of Federal Regulations CWA Clean Water Act Department Department of the Interior DNV GL Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd DOCD Development Operations Coordination Document DOI Department of the Interior DPP Development and Production Plan EA Environmental Assessment EIA Environmental Impact Analysis E.O. Executive Order EP Exploration Plan EPA Environmental Protection Agency FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act G&G Geological and geophysical IC Information Collection IOP Integrated Operations Plan RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis LMRP Lower Marine Riser Package MASP Maximum Anticipated Surface Pressures MMS Minerals Management Service MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit NAICS North American Industry Classification System NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 NPC National Petroleum Council NPC 2015 Report Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources NPC 2019 Report Supplemental Assessment to the 2015 Report on Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System NTL Notice to Lessees and Operators OCS Outer Continental Shelf OCSLA Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ODCE Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluations OFR Office of the Federal Register OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs OMB Office of Management and Budget OSRP Oil Spill Response Plan OSPD Oil Spill Preparedness Division PRA Paperwork Reduction Act RIN Regulation Identifier Number ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle ROT Remotely Operated Tool RP Recommended Practice SCCE Source Control and Containment Equipment Secretary Secretary of the Interior S.O. Secretary's Orders SEMS Safety and Environmental Management Systems SSID Subsea Isolation Device SSRW Same Season Relief Well SOO Suspensions of Operations SOP Suspensions of Production UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 U.S. United States USCG U.S. Coast Guard WCR Well Control Rule WCD Worst Case Discharge I. Background A. BSEE and BOEM Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities The OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., was first enacted in 1953 and substantially amended in 1978. In amending OCSLA, Congress established a national policy of making the OCS “available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs.” (43 U.S.C. 1332(3)). OCSLA authorizes the Secretary to lease the OCS for mineral development and to regulate oil and gas exploration, development, and production operations on the OCS. As described in case law, “OCSLA allows the Secretary of the Interior to regulate oil and gas leasing on the OCS. Id. § 1334(a). He delegated this power to two subordinate agencies, including [BOEM and BSEE]. Dep't of Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3299 (May 19, 2010). Under OCSLA, the Secretary `may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the [OCS].' 43 U.S.C. 1334(a). The statute specifies that `[t]he regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to' [the prompt and efficient exploration and development of a lease area] . . . .” Id. § 1334(a)(1)-(8).” Gulf v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. , 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60712, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2026). BOEM's mission is to manage the development of the OCS energy and mineral resources in an environmentally and economically responsible way. BOEM's functions include: leasing; EP administration; DPP and DOCD administration; permitting of G&G activities; environmental analyses in compliance with federal law and regulation; resource evaluation; oil spill WCD determination; economic analysis and fair market value bid/lease evaluations; management of the OCS renewable energy and marine mineral programs; coordination with other entities at the local ( e.g., North Slope Borough, Native Villages), State, and Federal levels ( e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries, USCG), as well as consultation with federally recognized ANCSA Tribes and Corporations related to activities within BOEM's activities and areas of responsibility. BSEE is responsible for safety and environmental enforcement functions, including, but not limited to, permitting activities, inspections, investigations, summoning witnesses and ordering the production of evidence; levying penalties; canceling or suspending activities; 3 compliance with federal environmental laws and regulations; coordination with other entities at the local ( e.g., North Slope Borough, Native Villages), State, and Federal levels ( e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries, USCG), as well as consultation with federally recognized ANCSA Tribes and Corporations; and overseeing safety, oil spill response, and removal preparedness. BSEE's mission is to promote safety, protect the environment, and conserve resources through vigorous regulatory oversight and enforcement. BSEE's functions include evaluating permit applications for post-lease oil and natural gas exploration and development activities on the OCS and conducting inspections to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, lease terms, and approved plans and permits. 3 Based on the plain language of OCSLA section 5, Congress required the Department to issue regulations concerning suspensions. “The [OCSLA] regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to, provisions . . . for the suspension or temporary prohibition of any operation or activity, including production, pursuant to any lease or permit (A) at the request of a lessee, in the national interest, to facilitate proper development of a lease or to allow for the construction or negotiation for use of transportation facilities, or (B) if there is a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral deposits (in areas leased or not leased), or to the marine, coastal, or human environment . . . .” 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(1). See also, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 (E.D. La. 2010). “OCSLA permits suspension of `any operation or activity . . . pursuant to any lease or permit.' ” (Quoting, 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(1)). BOEM evaluates EPs, and BSEE, thereafter, evaluates APDs and other permits and applications, to determine whether the operator's proposed activities meet OCSLA's standards and each Bureau's regulations governing OCS exploration. Based on the Bureaus' evaluations, they will respectively either approve the operator's EP and APD, require the operator to modify its submissions, or disapprove the EP or APD (§ 250.410, How do I obtain approval to drill a well? ). The review and approval of these activities is outlined below in the following section. 1. BOEM Approval of the EP As promulgated through the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, § 550.204, When must I submit my IOP for proposed Arctic exploratory drilling operations and what must the IOP include?, requires that a lessee submit an IOP at least 90 days before filing an EP with BOEM, if that EP would involve exploration for oil and gas on the Arctic OCS. While the IOP is not subject to approval, the submission is intended to facilitate the prompt sharing of information among the relevant Federal agencies that may be involved in overseeing exploratory drilling operations conducted from MODUs. The operator may then submit an EP to BOEM for approval. An EP must include information, such as a schedule of anticipated exploration activities, equipment to be used, the general location of each well to be drilled, and any other information deemed pertinent by BOEM (§§ 550.211 through 550.228). 2. BSEE Approval of the APD Approval of an EP does not, by itself, permit the operator to proceed with exploratory drilling. After BOEM approves the EP, the operator must submit an APD to BSEE. BSEE then determines whether it will approve the APD. The operator must receive an approval from BSEE before it may drill a well (43 U.S.C. 1340(d); § 250.410). Among other things, the APD must be consistent with the approved EP and include information on the well location, the drilling design and procedures, casing and cementing programs, the diverter and BOP systems, MODU (if one is to be used), and any additional information requested by the BSEE Regional Supervisor. B. Executive and Secretary's Orders On April 28, 2017, the President issued E.O. 13795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy ( see 82 FR 20815), which directed the Secretary to “take all steps necessary to review” the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule and, “if appropriate, [to,] as soon as practicable and consistent with law, publish for notice and comment a proposed rule suspending, revising, or rescinding this rule.” The policy underlying E.O. 13795 is “to encourage energy exploration and production, including on the OCS, in order to maintain the Nation's position as a global energy leader and foster energy security and resilience for the benefit of the American people, while ensuring that any such activity is safe and environmentally responsible.” To further implement E.O. 13795, on May 1, 2017, the Secretary issued S.O. 3350, America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, directing the Bureaus to review the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule “for consistency with the policy set forth in section 2 of E.O. 13795” and to prepare a report “summarizing the review and providing recommendations on whether to suspend, revise, or rescind the rule.” Consistent with E.O. 13795 and S.O. 3350, the Bureaus reviewed the regulations promulgated through the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule and, on December 9, 2020, issued the 2020 Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule to reduce unnecessary burdens on industry while maintaining safety and environmental protection. On June 29, 2021, the Bureaus withdrew the proposed rule ( see 86 FR 34172) due to a change in administration and policy, and in response to E.O. 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis ( see 86 FR 7037), which revoked E.O. 13795. In January 2025, the President signed E.O. 14153, Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential ( see 90 FR 8347) and E.O. 14154, Unleashing American Energy ( see 90 FR 8353). E.O. 14153 established new policy for the U.S. to fully avail itself of Alaska's vast lands and resources for the benefit of the Nation and the American citizens who call Alaska home. The E.O. called upon the heads of all executive departments and agencies to rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy set forth in the E.O. In February 2025, the Secretary issued S.O. 3422, Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential, and S.O. 3418, Unleashing American Energy, to implement the policies set forth in E.O. 14153 and E.O. 14154. E.O. 14154 outlines a broad federal energy policy aimed at expanding domestic energy production and reducing regulatory constraints. The E.O. supports energy exploration and production on Federal lands and waters, including on the OCS, in order to meet the needs of our citizens and solidify the U.S. as a global energy leader long into the future. To that end, it directs all Federal agencies to review all agency actions, including existing regulations, to identify those agency actions that impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources, with particular attention to, among other resources, oil and natural gas, or that are otherwise inconsistent with the policies set forth in the E.O. The Bureaus are proposing the revisions contained in this rulemaking in response to these recent E.O.s and S.O.s. C. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking Since publication of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, the Bureaus have become aware of additional information informing and warranting the bureaus' reconsideration of certain regulatory provisions promulgated through that rule. BSEE commissioned a Technology Assessment Program study (Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018) that entailed a historical statistical analysis of a 5-year period on Alaska's Arctic OCS drilling seasons (between 2012 and 2016), in which meteorology and physical oceanographic (“metocean”) and operational conditions would support the safe deployment of SCCE, the drilling of a relief well, or both. The study included a comprehensive review and gap analysis of U.S. and international regulations, standards, RPs, specifications, technical reports, and common industry methods regarding the safe deployment of SCCE, as compared to the effectiveness of drilling a relief well in Arctic conditions. The Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study determined that metocean conditions prevalent in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea ( i.e., rough sea states and sea ice conditions, primarily) are key factors that limit the ability to safely deploy SCCE throughout the Arctic OCS. The study determined that, when operating in the presence of sea ice in the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea, there is a greater probability for safe relief well deployment versus SCCE deployment. When operating in open water conditions ( i.e., those prone to rough sea states) in the Chukchi Sea, there is also a greater probability for safe deployment of a relief rig versus SCCE. In the Beaufort Sea, the probability for safely deploying relief rigs and SCCE is the same. This is because the Beaufort Sea has fewer ice-free days than the Chukchi Sea and ice helps maintain calm sea state conditions. The study also determined that water depth in the Arctic OCS is an additional factor limiting the safe deployment of SCCE. Safe deployment of SCCE is likely to be impaired in water depths shallower than 984 feet because the equipment could potentially encounter a gas boil at the surface caused by a subsea blowing well (Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 at 143). Water depths in the majority of both the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea where exploration has historically occurred are relatively shallow—167 feet or less ( id. at 7 to 9). This water depth range limits the capabilities of support vessels that could be used for the safe deployment of SCCE. The NPC 4 also published its NPC 2019 Report as a supplemental assessment to the NPC 2015 Report. The NPC prepared the NPC 2019 Report in response to an April 2018 request from the Secretary of Energy to provide recommendations for enhancing the Nation's regulatory environment by improving reliability, safety, efficiency, and environmental stewardship of oil and gas activities on the OCS. That report specifically addressed the regulatory burdens associated with Arctic OCS development. 4 The NPC is a FACA-chartered advisory committee established to provide advice, information, and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the entire Executive Branch on matters related to oil and natural gas or the oil and gas industries. The council's membership encompasses all segments of the oil and gas industries, including both large and small companies. Additionally, the NPC includes members whose interests extend beyond oil and gas operations, such as representatives from academic, financial, and research institutions, Native American groups, and public interest organizations. Key findings from the NPC's 2019 supplemental assessment include that the requirement to drill a SSRW to mitigate the risk of a late season well control event continuing over the winter season is “outdated.” The NPC also concluded that SSID and capping stacks are superior solutions that could stop the flow of oil and allow intervention through the original borehole before a relief well could be completed (NPC 2019Report at 19). Details in the report regarding Russia's 2014 drilling operation that included the use of an SSID in the South Kara Sea also informs this proposed rule. The Kara Sea is a useful model for technical and operational challenges faced in the U.S. Arctic OCS. Both areas have similar cold climates, seasonal sea ice, and are located in isolated geographical regions with limited emergency response capabilities. Equipment used in the Kara Sea—like SSIDs with full well shut-in and winter isolation capabilities—could be applied similarly to proposed operations in the Arctic OCS, given the similar environmental and operational conditions between the two areas. In this proposed rule, the Bureaus also address other issues in addition to those addressed in the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, including seasonal weather-related constraints in the Arctic that severely impact an operator's ability to safely perform leaseholding operations or operations to initiate production for a significant portion of the term on a lease. BSEE is also addressing the use of cranes for operations on artificial islands in the Arctic OCS. BSEE's existing crane-related regulations expressly address fixed platforms installed on open waters, which are not the same types of cranes used on artificial islands. Cranes used on artificial islands are similar to those used on land, i.e., mobile cranes, which are not fixed in place (such as on an offshore facility) and may have wheels or tracks so as to lift and transport materials on location. While these issues are in addition to those addressed by the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, they are unique to the Alaska OCS region and, therefore, are appropriate to address as part of this proposed rulemaking. This proposed rule would leave most of the regulations promulgated by the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule unaltered, except for certain proposed changes to accommodate technological innovation and encourage energy exploration on the Arctic OCS. Based on the information gathered from the Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study, and global practical experience gained over the years, as described in the NPC Reports, the Bureaus believe that these proposed revisions reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens on stakeholders and increase the ability to review and apply advancing technological innovations, while ensuring safety and environmental protection. The following paragraphs briefly summarize the key elements of this proposed rule, which are more fully explained in Section II. Section-by-Section Discussion of Proposed Changes of this preamble: 1. Definition of the “Arctic OCS”—The Bureaus propose to modify the definition of the “Arctic OCS” to include all OCS oil and gas planning areas that include any portion of their geographic extent located north of 66°33′ N latitude. Although the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act extends the U.S. Arctic boundary to the Aleutian chain, this proposed rule only applies to planning areas north of 66°33′ N that are subject to and distinguished by persistent Arctic oceanographic and meteorological conditions. This would mean that, in addition to the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea planning areas, the new High Arctic Planning Area and existing Hope Basin Planning Area would also be part of the Arctic OCS. In April 2025, as part of its efforts to establish the 11th National OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, BOEM revised the OCS planning areas used for agency planning and administrative purposes for oil and gas activities to reflect jurisdictional changes since they were last updated. This included the establishment of a new High Arctic Planning Area. 2. Pollution Prevention (Water-Based Mud and Cuttings)—BSEE proposes to eliminate references to the Regional Supervisor's discretionary authority to require the capture of water-based muds and cuttings in those cases where subsistence values might be impacted by such discharges. While not intended, BSEE understands that this reference has created some uncertainty for the regulated industry, because it appeared to overlap with regulation by the EPA and, if implemented, might result in BSEE issuing requirements that contradict EPA's requirements. 3. Arctic OCS SCCE—BSEE would preserve the requirement for the operator to have access to its SCCE, which includes the capping stack, cap and flow system, and containment dome, when drilling below or working below the surface casing. However, with respect to the capping stack, BSEE proposes to modify the equipment's positioning requirement by providing an opportunity to the operator to adjust the point in time during operations when it must position its capping stack so that it is available to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control. If the operator is able to demonstrate to BSEE, based on documentation it submits as part of its APD, that the operations it plans to conduct below the surface casing would not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geological hazards before reaching the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities, then BSEE will allow the operator to delay its positioning of the capping stack until reaching that casing point. BSEE's proposal to delay the positioning of the capping stack would be based on the documentation that the operator provides as well as any relevant data and information. The existing regulations also impose a positioning requirement on the cap and flow system, and the containment dome when drilling below or working below the surface casing—slightly different from the capping stack. The cap and flow system and the containment dome must be “positioned to ensure that it will arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control.” BSEE proposes to eliminate the requirement for the operator to ensure that the containment dome and cap and flow system are positioned so as to arrive at the well location within seven days after a loss of well control. The Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study evaluated industry methods and standards for deploying SCCE in Arctic OCS conditions, and determined that meteorological conditions ( e.g., rough sea state and sea ice conditions) prevalent in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea are the key factors limiting the time periods when SCCE may be safely deployed throughout the Arctic OCS. This is discussed in further detail below in Section II. Section-by-Section Discussion of Proposed Changes, under the subheading What are the requirements for Arctic OCS source control and containment? (§ 250.471). It is not practical for the BSEE-administered regulations to prescribe that certain SCCE (containment dome and cap and flow system, in particular) be positioned within proximity to a well location when the conditions for safely deploying this equipment in the Arctic OCS are limiting. BSEE would, however, retain other existing containment dome and cap and flow system requirements in § 250.471, which provide that the operator must: (i) Demonstrate that it has access to a containment dome and cap and flow system; (ii) Provide a containment dome and cap and flow system that meets BSEE's operating standards; (iii) Conduct tests or exercises for all SCCE; and (iv) Maintain records pertaining to the testing, inspection, maintenance, and use of the SCCE and make these available to BSEE upon request. These changes would preserve the regulations' requirement that operators have redundant protective measures that are appropriate for Arctic OCS conditions because there is no guarantee that a single measure could control or contain a WCD. 4. BOP Real-time Monitoring Requirements for the Arctic OCS—The Arctic OCS's BOP real-time monitoring requirements are currently inconsistent with the general BOP real-time monitoring requirements that apply throughout the OCS. When the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule was developed, BSEE was still working to establish overarching real-time monitoring requirements in 30 CFR 250 subpart G. Since 2016, these requirements have been revised and fully implemented, making it unnecessary to maintain separate, duplicative requirements for the Arctic. As a result, BSEE proposes to align the Arctic's BOP real-time monitoring with the real-time monitoring requirements applicable in other parts of the OCS. 5. Relief Rig Capabilities for the Arctic OCS—BSEE proposes to revise the relief rig and SSRW requirements by providing the operator with the option of using an SSID or having access to a relief rig as an additional means to secure the well in the event of a loss of well control, if the operator will be conducting exploratory drilling operations from a MODU. In addition, BSEE proposes to provide an opportunity to the operator to adjust the point in time during operations when it must stage its relief rig (if the operator elects to have access to a relief rig) when conducting Arctic OCS exploratory drilling operations. An operator would be able to delay the staging of its relief rig until its operations have reached the “last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities,” rather than below the “surface casing.” If the operator is able to demonstrate to BSEE, based on documentation it submits as part of its APD, that the operations it plans to conduct below the surface casing would not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geological hazards before reaching the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities, then BSEE will allow the operator to delay its staging of the relief rig until reaching that casing point. BSEE's proposal to permit the delay of the staging of the relief rig will be based on the documentation that operator provides, as well as any other available data and information. In the relief rig and SSRW regulation, BSEE would also eliminate the reference to expected seasonal ice encroachment because the relevant timeframes for operations should be based on the capabilities of the operator's rig and equipment to operate in the applicable ice conditions, rather than an absolute date. 6. Mudline Cellars—BSEE proposes to clarify the requirement that an operator, in areas of ice scour, must use a mudline cellar when drilling that is designed to minimize the risk of damage to the well head and wellbore. The existing regulation could be read to require the operator to use a mudline cellar in all cases, except when the operator can prove that the mudline cellar would present an operational risk, and that was not BSEE's intent. This proposed change would make it clear that the operator has more flexibility to propose to employ alternate procedures or equipment instead of the mudline cellar under appropriate circumstances, as provided by the longstanding provisions of § 250.141, May I ever use alternate procedures or equipment?; not just when a mudline cellar would present an operational risk and if the operator is able to demonstrate that the alternate procedure or equipment would provide a level of safety and environmental protection that equals or surpasses the mudline cellar requirement. 7. IOP—BOEM proposes to eliminate the requirement that the operator submit an IOP because it requires submission of information that overlaps with that required in the EP and the IOP's early information sharing is unnecessary in light of BOEM's practice for reviewing and coordinating review of the EP. Consequently, the operator is already aware that it must plan for how it will reduce operational risks and address the challenges associated with operations on the Arctic OCS through its EP. BOEM is proposing to move certain requirements for the IOP to the information required for EPs and delete the remaining requirements that were for the IOP only. 8. Seasonal Conditions SOO—The unique seasonal conditions in the Alaska OCS region make it difficult or physically impossible for operators to explore their leases for a significant portion of each year. To facilitate the proper development of Arctic leases in accordance with OCSLA section 5, 5 BSEE proposes to add a new provision to its regulations that would provide those operators that are conducting drilling operations, but are prevented from completing those leaseholding operations due to seasonal constraints unique to Alaska, with the opportunity to obtain an SOO. If granted, this type of SOO would suspend the running of the lease term and effectively extend the term of the affected lease by a period equivalent to the period of such suspension. This would provide operators that are otherwise ready and able to conduct drilling operations with additional time to diligently explore their leases, without facing lease expiration due to interference by seasonal constraints unique to Alaska. 5 OCSLA sec. 5 (as amended) provides in pertinent part: “The regulations prescribed by the Secretary . . . shall include . . . provisions . . . for the suspension . . . of any operation or activity . . . at the request of a lessee, in the national interest, [or] to facilitate proper development of a lease . . . and for the extension of any permit or lease affected by [such] suspension . . . by a period equivalent to the period of such suspension . . . .” 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(1). 9. Initial and Continuing Development Obligations Lease Suspensions—In addition to the proposed SOO, BSEE proposes to add provisions to suspend unitized Alaska OCS leases greater than five years in length when it would allow the lessee the time needed to diligently complete their initial development obligations, or one or more continuing development obligations approved by the BSEE Regional Supervisor. These lease suspensions would exempt unitized Alaska OCS leases from the requirement to provide a commitment to production when requesting a suspension. The maximum 10-year term issued for Alaska OCS leases is inadequate to sufficiently explore and develop the resources on a lease and reach sustained production without the need for one or more lease suspensions. The isolated nature of the region and the tough seasonal conditions of the Alaska OCS make data collection, pre-development planning efforts, and decision-making for the operator difficult to achieve in a timely manner, and if an operator is able to progress to the exploratory drilling stage, they face the challenge of acquiring the drilling rigs or vessels suitable for the area's harsh conditions. These lease suspensions would provide those operators that can demonstrate they are working to diligently complete one or more continuing development obligations the time needed to properly develop and establish production on their unitized Alaska OCS leases. 10. Cranes Used for Operations on Artificial Islands—As discussed in the next section, BSEE proposes to incorporate by reference into the regulations the ASME B30.5-2021, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes, which addresses the construction, inspection, testing, maintenance, and operation of mobile and locomotive cranes. BSEE's existing crane regulations apply to fixed platforms installed on open waters, which are not the same types of cranes used on artificial islands. Cranes used on artificial islands are like those used on land, i.e., mobile cranes, which are not fixed in place (such as on an offshore facility) and may have wheels or tracks to lift and transport materials on location. Incorporating this technical document into BSEE's regulations would ensure that consistent, industry-based safety requirements for cranes used on artificial islands are established. D. Procedures for Incorporation by Reference and Availability of Incorporated Documents for Public Viewing BSEE frequently uses standards ( e.g., codes, specifications, and RPs) and other documents developed by standard development organizations as a means of establishing requirements for activities on the OCS. This practice, known as “incorporation by reference,” allows the Department to incorporate the standards from technical documents into the regulations so that the regulations reflect well accepted industry standards without increasing the volume of the CFRs. The legal effect of incorporation by reference is that the incorporated standards become regulatory requirements. This incorporated material, like any other regulation, has the force and effect of law. Operators, lessees, and other regulated parties must comply with the documents incorporated by reference in the regulations. The OFR regulations at 1 CFR part 51 govern how BSEE and other Federal agencies may incorporate documents by reference. Agencies may incorporate a document by reference by publishing in the Federal Register the document title, edition, date, author, publisher, identification number, and other specified information. The preamble of the proposed rule must also discuss the ways that the incorporated materials are reasonably available to interested parties and how those materials can be obtained by interested parties. The Director of the Federal Register will approve each incorporation of a publication by reference in a final rule that meets the criteria of 1 CFR part 51. Incorporation by reference of a document or publication is limited to the edition of the document or publication cited in the regulations. This means that newer editions, amendments, or revisions to documents already incorporated by reference in regulations are not part of BSEE-administered regulations until they are incorporated by reference. A standard that is proposed for incorporation by reference is frequently referred to as a “1st tier document.” When a 1st tier document references another document, the referenced document is referred to as a “2nd tier document”; these references are either considered “normative” or “informative.” Each has their own definitions of “normative” and “informative.” Generally speaking, compliance with normative references is obligatory to fulfill the provisions of the standard that cites it, while informative references provide additional information that supports the 1st tier document. For example, the API considers compliance with normative references to be necessary for the fulfillment of the provisions of the primary reference. Particularly, the API Document Format and Style Manual (January 2009) and all API standards include the following statement clarifying the importance of normative references: “The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document.” The ASME also considers compliance with normative references as necessary for complying with the primary reference. Standards incorporated from the ASME contain a statement that normative references are indispensable for the application of the primary standard. When a copyrighted publication is incorporated by reference into BSEE's regulations, the bureau is obligated to observe and protect that copyright. BSEE provides members of the public with website addresses where these standards may be accessed for viewing—sometimes for free and sometimes for a fee. Standards development organizations decide whether to charge a fee. The regulations governing incorporation by reference under 1 CFR part 51 provide that publications are eligible for incorporation by reference if they are “reasonably available to and usable by the class of persons affected.” (See 1 CFR 51.7(a)(3)). BSEE is proposing to incorporate by reference for the first time into the regulations the requirements found in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers B30.5-2021, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes—Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings; 2021 Edition, December 17, 2021. This standard contains provisions that address the construction, installation, operation, inspection, testing, maintenance, and use of cranes and other lifting and material-movement-related equipment. It applies to crawler cranes, locomotive cranes, wheel-mounted cranes, and any variations thereof that retain the same fundamental characteristics, and are basically powered by internal combustion engines or electric motors. However, side-boom tractors and cranes designed for railway and automobile wreck clearance, digger derricks, cranes manufactured specifically for, or when used for, energized electrical line service, knuckle boom, trolley boom cranes, and cranes having a maximum rated capacity of 1 ton or less are outside the scope of this standard. ASME standards can be accessed at http://www.asme.org or by phone: 1-800-843-2763. However, for the convenience of members of the viewing public who may not wish to purchase copies or view the ASME technical document online, the document may be inspected by appointment at BSEE's offices at 45600 Woodland Road, Sterling, Virginia 20166, or 1919 Smith Street, Suite 14042, Houston, Texas 77002. To make an appointment to inspect the material proposed for incorporation at the Houston BSEE office, call 1-844-259-4779. An appointment is required to ensure personnel are available to accommodate the request and to account for competing agency obligations or concerns, including those related to public health and natural disasters. BSEE is also proposing to add an express reference to API Recommended Practice (RP) 17H, Remotely Operated Tools and Interfaces on Subsea Production Systems, Second Edition, June 2013; Errata, January 2014, in proposed § 250.472. This RP provides recommendations for the development and design of remotely operated subsea tools and interfaces on subsea production systems in order to maximize the potential of standardizing equipment and design principles. This document does not cover manned intervention, internal wellbore intervention, internal flowline inspection, tree running, and tree running equipment. However, all the related subsea ROV/ROT interfaces are covered by this standard. It is applicable to the selection, design, and operation of ROTs and ROVs, including ROV tooling. BSEE has reviewed the requirements in ASME B30.5-2021 and API RP 17H, and proposes to incorporate ASME B30.5-2021 by reference into the regulations for the first time, and add an express reference to API RP 17H in proposed § 250.472 to ensure that industry uses the best available safety technologies on the OCS. II. Section-by-Section Discussion of Proposed Changes This section provides explanations of and justifications for each of the specific regulatory changes proposed in this notice. Since this is a joint BSEE and BOEM proposed rulemaking, this Section-by-Section discussion is organized according to the order in which the relevant provisions would appear in the CFR. The BSEE-administered and BOEM-administered regulations are found in the CFR at Title 30—Mineral Resources, Volume 2; BSEE-administered regulations are in Chapter II, and BOEM-administered regulations are in Chapter V. A. Revisions Proposed by BSEE Title 30, Chapter II, Subchapter B, Part 250 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf Subpart A—General Definitions. (§ 250.105) BSEE proposes to modify the definition of “Arctic OCS” to mean all OCS oil and gas planning areas that include any portion of their geographic extent located north of 66°33′ N latitude. This proposed change would make the new High Arctic Planning Area and existing Hope Basin Planning Area parts of the Arctic OCS, thus, subjecting them to the requirements promulgated by the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule and the changes proposed in this rulemaking, thereby aligning the regulation of exploration activities in those areas with the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea planning areas. The proposed designation of “Arctic OCS” as north of 66°33′ N is merely for functional purposes, to identify the OCS oil and gas planning areas that define the scope of where the requirements of this rulemaking and the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule would apply. The High Arctic and Hope Basin planning areas experience the same type of Arctic weather conditions, i.e., extreme cold, freezing spray, snow, and sea ice, as the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea planning areas. Therefore, BSEE proposes to expand the definition of the “Arctic OCS” to make the development requirements for all four planning areas consistent. As BOEM has acknowledged throughout the planning process for the 11th National OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program, BOEM estimates the High Arctic to have negligible resource quantities and Hope Basin to have measured resource potential but negligible development value. BSEE also proposes to make a modification to the definition of “Arctic OCS conditions.” In the definition, BSEE proposes to replace “on the Arctic OCS” at the end of the first sentence with “throughout the Alaska OCS region.” BSEE would also replace “characteristic of the Arctic region” at the end of the last sentence with “characteristics present throughout the Alaska OCS region.” These proposed changes recognize that extreme cold, freezing spray, snow, extended periods of low light, strong winds, dense fog, sea ice, strong currents, and dangerous sea-state conditions are not only experienced in Arctic waters. They may also occur throughout the Alaska OCS region. Finally, BSEE proposes to revise the definition of capping stack by deleting the phrase “including one that is pre-positioned” from the definition. BSEE included this phrase as part of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule in response to a suggestion that the definition in the 2015 Arctic Proposed Rule should be expanded to allow pre-positioned capping stacks to be used below subsea BOPs when deemed technically and operationally appropriate. Recognizing that the comment was helpful, BSEE agreed with the suggestion and added the phrase “including one that is pre-positioned” to the capping stack definition ( see 81 FR 46492). As a practical matter, pre-positioned capping stacks are similar, but not the same, as SSIDs. Accordingly, this modification that was included in the 2016 final rule effectively allows the operator to install an SSID below a subsea BOP and would be in compliance with the capping stack requirement in the existing § 250.471, What are the requirements for Arctic OCS source control and containment? Section 250.471(a)(1) specifically requires the operator, when drilling below or working below the surface casing, to have access to a capping stack that is positioned to ensure that it will be able to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control. Typically, an operator would comply with this requirement by having one or more support vessels capable of handling and deploying the capping stack down to the subsea wellhead, when needed. Installing an SSID below the subsea BOP allows the operator to comply with § 250.471(a)(1) and forgo the need to provide support vessels and a capping stack on standby at the surface. However, BSEE is proposing to eliminate this language because a pre-positioned capping stack is a piece of equipment that is similar to and aligns closely with an SSID. Given that BSEE is currently proposing distinct SSID requirements under § 250.472, What are the additional well control equipment or relief rig requirements for the Arctic OCS?, the proposed revision to the capping stack definition would provide clarity concerning the capping stack requirements under § 250.471. More specifically, installation of an SSID under § 250.472 does not constitute compliance with the capping stack requirements under § 250.471. For purposes of BSEE's proposed regulations, an SSID is not considered to be the same as, or to satisfy the requirement to have, a capping stack. What requirements must I follow for cranes and other material-handling equipment? (§ 250.108) Section 250.108 currently requires operators and lessees to comply with crane-specific provisions to ensure the safe design, construction, and testing of all cranes mounted on any fixed platform installed on the OCS. These requirements include, but are not limited to, compliance with the API RP 2D, Operation and Maintenance of Offshore Cranes and API RP 2C, Specification for Offshore Pedestal Mounted Cranes, which requires cranes to be equipped with a functional anti-two block device, and the management of records related to the operations of those cranes. BSEE proposes adding a new paragraph (g) to § 250.108 that would require all cranes positioned on artificial islands on the Alaska OCS to meet the requirements of ASME B30.5-2021. BSEE also proposes to modify: (1) paragraph (b) to apply the requirement for cranes to be equipped with a functional anti-two block device to “OCS artificial islands;” and (2) paragraph (e) to make the requirement to retain all design and construction records for the life of the crane, all inspection, testing, and maintenance records for at least 4 years, and the qualification records of the crane operator and all rigger personnel for at least 4 years applicable to cranes used on “OCS artificial islands.” BSEE is proposing these modifications since the regulations currently do not address cranes used on artificial islands on the OCS. In more recent years, exploration activities on the Arctic OCS have focused primarily on development from these man-made features. These proposed changes would ensure the safe design, construction, and testing of all cranes positioned on OCS artificial islands is being applied consistently, based on best available technologies. How long does a suspension last? (§ 250.170) Section 250.170 specifies the length of time BSEE may issue a suspension, which is 5 years per suspension, and describes the effect of a suspension once it is granted, ends, or is terminated. BSEE proposes to add a new provision in a new paragraph (f) to § 250.170 that provides the Alaska OCS Regional Supervisor with the authority to determine the length of an SOP for unitized leases in the Alaska OCS and would not subject these leases to the 5-year suspension timeframe currently described in this section. The length of the suspension would be the amount of time the Regional Supervisor agrees is needed to complete initial development obligations or continuing development obligations justified by the lessee to ensure the maximum economic recovery of unitized OCS lease resources to BSEE's satisfaction. BSEE's determination would be based on the information the operator submits as part of its suspension request, as well as any information about other relevant associated development activities in proximity to the leases covered under the suspension request. “Continuing development obligations” means a program of development activities or operations an operator conducts that, after the operator completes the initial development obligations defined in a unit agreement or otherwise agreed to by the Regional Supervisor: (1) meets or exceeds the rate of development activities or operations in the vicinity of the unit; and (2) represents an investment proportionate to the size of the area covered by the unit agreement. Initial development obligations are a planned program of exploration activities that, when completed, would allow the operator to estimate the size and shape of the reservoir within the unit area and understand the geologic conditions existing within the reservoir and unit area. Initial development obligations are completed before continuing development obligations. For example, an initial development obligation could include: (i) the number of wells to be drilled that an operator anticipates will be necessary to assess the reservoir adequately; (ii) the primary target for each well, a schedule for starting and completing drilling operations for each well; and (iii) the time between starting operations on a well to the start of operations on the next well. Continuing development obligations are activities that would be performed after the operator completes its initial development obligations, which, for example, could include: (i) drilling, testing, or completing additional wells to the primary target or other unit formations; (ii) drilling or completing additional wells that establish production of oil and gas; (iii) recompleting wells or other operations that establish new unit production; or (iv) drilling existing wells to a deeper target. As previously mentioned, the isolated nature and tough seasonal conditions of the Alaska OCS region present multiple challenges that make it difficult to initiate production within the current 10-year timeframe of a lease. This proposed provision would allow the Regional Supervisor to determine the appropriate length of a suspension that would be necessary to complete proper development and initiate production on a unitized Alaska OCS lease without having to rely on the limits of the 5-year timeframe specified in this section, which may be more applicable to other OCS regions. How do I request a suspension? (§ 250.171) This section specifies the information that must be included in a suspension request, which includes a commitment to production for SOP requests. BSEE proposes adding a provision for unitized Alaska OCS leases that requires the operator to include a commitment to complete the initial development obligations identified in its unit agreement or otherwise approved by the Regional Supervisor. The commitment must include, at minimum, drilling the producible well, as required by 250.171(c), and any additional initial development activities or operations that the Regional Supervisor agrees are necessary to sufficiently explore the lease and justify the lease earning the benefits of unitization. In the case of continuing development obligations, BSEE would require the operator to include a commitment to complete one or more continuing development obligations that the Regional Supervisor agrees are necessary to properly develop the lease. BSEE would also modify existing paragraph (d) to clarify that the commitment to production referenced in this paragraph applies to SOPs for leases that are not unitized Alaska OCS leases. This provision would allow the operator to request a suspension for their unitized Alaska OCS leases if it is able to provide a commitment to complete its initial development obligations or one or more of its continuing development obligations. BSEE has existing guidance on what constitutes such a commitment, as outlined in NTL 2019-G01. Based on guidance from this NTL, examples of commitment may include: (1) a final investment decision by the operator, (2) evidence that the venture will be economically viable, (3) a written agreement or contract with any third parties (such as pipeline companies or minority lessees) whose resources are required for production to occur, and (4) geologic or reservoir information that BSEE would need for evaluating the economic viability. After the promulgation of this rule, the NTL would be updated to include information relevant to phased development as established under the proposed SOP. BSEE would consider granting a suspension if the operator is able to demonstrate a commitment to continued diligent development to ensure the maximum economic recovery of unitized OCS lease resources, which may be longer than 5 years. This provision could provide the certainty operators may need to commit their resources in an area with extremely high investment risks for success. When may the Regional Supervisor grant or direct an SOP? (§ 250.174) This section lists the criteria under which BSEE may grant or direct an SOP when the suspension is in the National interest. BSEE proposes adding a new criterion under proposed paragraph (e) for units on the Alaska OCS whereby the Regional Supervisor may grant a suspension if it allows the operator time to complete its initial development obligations, or one or more continuing development obligations. When an SOP is granted under proposed paragraph (e), only the requirement to produce the undeveloped or underdeveloped lease(s) would be suspended. As proposed, the lessee may continue to produce from the properly developed unitized lease(s) as long as production complies with 250.172(b) and production activities prevent waste, conserve natural resources, and protect correlative rights, including Federal royalty interests, of a reasonably delineated and productive reservoir. When may the Regional Supervisor grant an SOO? (§ 250.175) BSEE proposes to revise § 250.175 by adding a new paragraph (d), which would allow an operator to request an SOO under certain situations that may be present in leases or units throughout the Alaska OCS Region. This proposed revision is consistent with OCSLA's requirement that the Secretary promulgate suspensions regulations that “facilitate proper development of a lease . . . .” 6 The proposed regulation would list the factors upon which BSEE may rely when determining whether to grant an SOO and include when an operator: 6 OCSLA sec. 5, 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(1). (1) has conducted operations on the lease during the drilling season immediately preceding the period for which the operator is seeking a suspension; (2) is drilling from: (i) a MODU, (ii) an artificial gravel island or a gravity-based structure, or (iii) an artificial ice island; and (3) is not able to safely continue its operations due to the presence of seasonal ice, temporary seasonal drilling restrictions in its approved OSRP, or seasonal temperature changes (respectively, for each facility type). Currently, BOEM issues Alaska OCS leases with the maximum 10-year primary lease term allowed under OCSLA. 7 However, operators may be precluded from properly developing leases because it is not possible to conduct leaseholding operations for significant portions of those 10-year terms. Offshore drilling locations in the Alaska OCS can be inaccessible for a significant portion of each year, due to seasonal changes that make operating conditions unsafe or otherwise preclude operations. While BOEM cannot award leases with more than the maximum 10-year primary lease term allowed under OCSLA, the Secretary's statutorily delegated authority referenced above at 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(1) allows for suspensions in certain circumstances that have the effect of extending the lease term by a period equivalent to the period of such suspension. This authority has been redelegated to BSEE, to administer suspensions that can address and mitigate, as appropriate, the effects of Arctic working conditions when they may limit the operator's ability to perform leaseholding activities for much of the year. See also 30 CFR 556.601(f) (How may I maintain my oil and gas lease beyond the primary term?). Paragraph (f) of 30 CFR 556.601 references BSEE-administered suspension regulations at 30 CFR 250.168 through 250.180, in which § 250.169(a) clarifies that a suspension may extend the term of a lease and that the extension is equal to the length of time the suspension is in effect, with respect to operator-requested suspensions. This proposed rule clarifies the factors that can be considered when issuing such suspensions. 7 OCSLA sec. 8, as amended, states in part: “An oil and gas lease issued pursuant [OCSLA] shall . . . be for an initial period of (A) five years; or (B) not to exceed ten years where the Secretary finds that such longer period is necessary to encourage exploration and development in areas because of unusually deep water or other unusually adverse conditions . . . .” 43 U.S.C. 1337(b). The primary term commences on the effective date of the lease (rather than on a calendar year basis). 30 CFR 556.521. The lease may be maintained beyond the primary term in accordance with 30 CFR 556.601. MODUs —Drilling operations performed from a MODU may occur only during the open-water drilling season (generally late June to early November), when sea ice is non-existent or minimal. This practical limitation, without considering other logistical problems unique to the Alaska OCS, could mean that during a consecutive 10-year period, a lease may be unavailable for operations for up to 70 percent of the time. Artificial Gravel Islands or Gravity-based Structures —Drilling from artificial gravel islands and gravity-based structures is prohibited during the spring/summer ice break-up and the fall/early winter freeze-up periods due to potential interferences that weather and ice conditions may have on potential oil spill response and cleanup efforts. In particular, response and cleanup techniques for a large spill are not as effective when sea ice is broken and unconsolidated around the drilling location. By contrast, response and cleanup efforts for a large oil spill from an artificial gravel island or a gravity-based structure could be executed effectively during the summer ( i.e., in open-water conditions) using existing oil spill response technologies. During the winter ( i.e., under solid ice conditions), the ice, and any snow on the ice, could provide an effective platform for oil spill response and cleanup efforts, and help absorb the spill and contain it to an area relatively close to the gravel island or gravity-based structure. Land-based equipment could then be used to collect and transport the oil-covered ice out of the location. For context, a gravity-based structure would include a concrete island drilling structure and one or more steel drilling caissons. Artificial Ice Islands —A similar issue would be encountered if drilling were to take place from a man-made ice island. In those cases, the drilling location would be accessible only during the winter season when temperatures are very low, and the area is completely covered by ice stable enough to safely support a drilling rig and associated equipment. As temperatures rise during the spring and summer seasons, the ice breaks or melts away, making the drilling location inaccessible until the next winter season. The new paragraph (d) of § 250.175 would facilitate the proper development of a lease by addressing those seasonal conditions that limit leaseholding operations and providing an operator ready and able to complete its operations with the opportunity to obtain an SOO. If granted, this SOO would suspend the running of the lease term and effectively extend the term of the affected lease by a period equivalent to the period of such suspension. The SOO would allow a diligent operator to use the full 10 years in a 10-year lease term to explore for hydrocarbons, without the concern for a lease expiring because Arctic seasonal constraints prevented operations. BSEE is contemplating the option of limiting the period for when the suspension would remain in effect to assure commencement of appropriate lease holding activities. The suspension would remain in effect during the period between one drilling season and the next when the operator is prevented from continuing its drilling or other leaseholding activities due to seasonal conditions. This option would still provide operators more time to effectively explore their leases without fear of an expiring lease. It could also provide BSEE with a better means of tracking an operator's diligence efforts. This option, however, could result in additional unnecessary burdens, since an operator would have to “reapply” for a new suspension if the operator is unable to return to the location during the next open-water season. BSEE is seeking comment on this regulatory option for the SOO or any other option that could avoid or minimize additional burden, but still assure appropriate operations occur for lease exploration and development. Documents Incorporated by Reference. (§ 250.198) BSEE proposes to incorporate by reference ASME B30.5-2021, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes—Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings; 2021 Edition, December 17, 2021, for the first time into the regulations as a new paragraph (f)(4) to §  250.198. ASME B30.5-2021 is an industry standard that addresses the construction, installation, operation, inspection, testing, maintenance, and use of cranes and other lifting and material-movement-related equipment operating on artificial islands on the Arctic OCS. In connection with this new incorporation by reference, BSEE would specify in the new paragraph (f)(4) that ASME B30.5-2021 is expressly referenced in proposed § 250.108(g) (“What requirements must I follow for cranes and other material-handling equipment?”). BSEE also proposes to add, in existing paragraph (e)(2)(i)(HH) of § 250.198, a reference to proposed § 250.472(a). One of the features in BSEE's proposed revisions to the existing relief rig and SSRW requirements in § 250.472, which is discussed in detail later below in the What are the relief rig or additional well control equipment or relief rig requirements for the Arctic OCS? (§ 250.472) section-by-section discussion, is a requirement for the SSID to include ROV intervention equipment that has the capabilities to function as the SSID. Under proposed § 250.472(a)(3)(ii), specifically, BSEE would require the ROV to have panels that are compliant with API RP 17H to ensure that the operator's ROV capabilities for the SSID follow BSEE's existing ROV panel requirements for BOP systems. Adding a reference to § 250.472(a) in § 250.198(e)(2)(i)(HH) makes clear as to where API RP 17H would be codified in the BSEE-administered regulations. Subpart C—Pollution Prevention and Control Pollution Prevention. (§ 250.300) BSEE proposes to revise paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of § 250.300 by eliminating the existing language that states the Regional Supervisor may require the capture of all water-based mud, and associated cuttings, from operations after completion of the hole for the conductor casing to prevent its discharge into the marine environment. While this proposed rule would eliminate the language regarding the Regional Supervisor's discretionary authority to require the capture of water-based muds and cuttings, it would maintain the existing requirement in § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2) that operators capture all petroleum-based mud and associated cuttings while operating on the Arctic OCS. Existing § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2) state that the BSEE Regional Supervisor may exercise his or her discretionary authority to restrict discharges of water-based muds and associated cuttings from Arctic OCS exploratory drilling based on various factors, such as: proximity of drilling operations to subsistence hunting and fishing locations; the extent to which discharged water-based mud or cuttings may cause marine mammals to alter their migratory patterns in a manner that impedes subsistence users' access to or use of those resources, or increases the risk of injury to subsistence users; or the extent to which discharged mud or cuttings may adversely affect marine mammals, fish, or their habitat. BSEE promulgated the existing provisions in response to concerns raised by Alaska Native Tribes during preparation of the 2015 Arctic Proposed Rule. These concerns included how water-based muds or cuttings could adversely affect marine species ( e.g., whales and fish) and their habitats and compromise the effectiveness of subsistence hunting activities. BSEE re-examined the language in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section in light of EPA's authority to address water-based muds and cuttings discharges. The CWA (Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)) provides EPA with the authority to issue NPDES general permits, which authorize certain discharges, including certain restricted discharges of water-based muds and cuttings, from oil and gas exploratory facilities on the OCS in the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea. Those general permits additionally prohibit the discharge of oil-based and non-aqueous based muds and cuttings. The EPA must issue an NPDES general permit before an operator may seek coverage under that general permit. Compliance with the CWA, including gaining coverage under an applicable NPDES general permit, is necessary before an operator may discharge pollutants from its exploratory drilling operations. Before issuing an NPDES permit, EPA must make specific determinations to ensure that issuance of a permit will not lead to unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. EPA's determination is guided by an ODCE. The ODCE requires the agency to consider multiple environmental factors, such as potential impacts on human health through direct and indirect pathways, and the importance of the receiving water area to the surrounding biological community. The most relevant NPDES permits issued for offshore oil and gas exploration activities conducted from a MODU on the Arctic OCS are two 2012 general permits that covered oil and gas exploration facilities conducting operations in Federal waters of the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea. When considering the multiple environmental factors under the ODCE for the 2012 general permits ( i.e., potential impacts on human health through direct and indirect pathways, and the importance of the receiving water area to the surrounding biological community), EPA considered how discharges could impact subsistence activities, marine resources, and coastal areas. The Beaufort Sea permit 8 does not allow the discharge of water-based muds and cuttings during the fall bowhead whale hunt. However, the Chukchi Sea permit 9 did not include a similar restriction. According to the ODCE for the Chukchi Sea permit, the restriction was not necessary because the migration of bowhead whales would be over before discharge-related activities would begin. 10 8 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/r10-npdes-beaufort-oil-gas-gp-akg282100-final-permit-2012.pdf. 9 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/r10-npdes-chukchi-oil-gas-gp-akg288100-final-permit-2012.pdf. 10 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/r10-npdes-chukchi-oil-gas-gp-akg288100-odce-2012.pdf. pp. 6-14 to 6-17. Under this proposed rule, BSEE would preserve the requirements in § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2) that the operator capture all petroleum-based mud and associated cuttings. This requirement is consistent with a longstanding, OCS-wide regulatory authority that existed prior to the promulgation of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule. BSEE must preserve the petroleum-based muds and cuttings requirement since it is not unusual for petroleum-based muds to contain constituents that are toxic and harmful to the environment. Although water-based muds may not be a feasible option for all drilling operations, such as when drilling through hydrophobic geologic formations that could be damaged by water-based muds, its use is a more environmentally benign approach in comparison to the use of petroleum-based muds. However, BSEE's proposed revisions reflect the Bureau's understanding that the express statements regarding the Regional Supervisor's discretionary authority to require the capture of water-based muds and cuttings in existing § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2) are not necessary. In particular, the EPA already addresses the goals of protecting water quality through the NPDES program, protecting marine species and their habitats, as well as the effectiveness of subsistence hunting activities, through the exercise of that agency's authorities. Thus, BSEE does not expect the Regional Supervisor to need to exercise the discretionary authority under existing § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2) in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, BSEE understands, and did so even while it was preparing the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling rule, that the references to the BSEE Regional Supervisor's authority in existing paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) created some uncertainty for the regulated industry because it appeared to overlap with EPA's jurisdiction and, if implemented, might result in BSEE issuing duplicative or conflicting requirements. BSEE addressed this concern by explaining that the amendments were meant to clarify the Regional Supervisor's authority to impose operational measures that complement EPA's discharge limitations by considering potential impacts to specific components of the Arctic environment, such as subsistence activities, marine resources, and coastal areas ( see 81 FR 46505). Given the policy in E.O. 14153 for all Federal agencies to fully avail itself of Alaska's vast lands and resources for the benefit of the Nation and the American citizens who call Alaska home, and the E.O.'s direction to rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy set forth in the E.O., it is appropriate to propose eliminating the water-based mud, and associated cuttings, provisions in § 250.300(b)(1) and (b)(2). This proposed regulatory change does not suggest any change in BSEE's recognition that it has a regulatory responsibility to ensure that operators conduct oil and gas exploration and production activities on the OCS in a safe and environmentally responsible manner pursuant to OCSLA. Therefore, the proposed rule would not alter the longstanding regulation at § 250.300(b)(1), under which the District Manager (or Regional Supervisor) retains the ability to restrict the rate of drilling fluid discharges or prescribe alternative discharge methods where warranted. Pursuant to § 250.300(b)(1), BSEE would be able to determine whether there is a need to require operators to capture of water-based muds and cuttings on a case-by-case basis, if the EPA has not done so. In particular, the District Manager would consider and determine whether such a requirement would be appropriate for any facility. The District Manager would make this determination on a case-by-case basis, in conjunction with the EP and APD approval process. This process includes coordinating with BOEM, particularly at the EP stage, when BOEM conducts an environmental review to identify the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental effects that may be expected as a result of implementing the EP. That environmental review also incorporates input about potential environmental effects that may be obtained through consultations and review by interested parties, Federal agencies ( e.g., EPA), State or local agencies, Tribes, or the public. Nothing would change BSEE's position from the 2016 rule to communicate with other agencies responsible for oversight of discharges related to oil and gas exploration drilling in the Arctic. This communication will help ensure that conflicts do not arise ( see 81 FR 46504). BSEE expects that such input from EPA would address whether that agency has issued or plans to issue a permit for the same exploratory drilling facilities, and whether that agency believes that capture of water-based muds in a specific case is warranted. Through BSEE's longstanding authority under § 250.300(b)(1), the District Manager could require an operator to restrict the rate of drilling fluid discharges or prescribe alternative discharge methods. Such a restriction on the discharge of water-based muds and cuttings might be appropriate if identified in the EP environmental review process. In addition to the proposed revisions just described, BSEE proposes a minor modification to the second sentence in existing paragraph (b)(2), which requires the operator to capture all cuttings from operations that “utilize” petroleum-based mud to prevent their discharge into the marine environment. BSEE proposes to replace the word “utilize” with “use” to improve the readability of the regulation. Subpart D—Oil and Gas Drilling Operations What are the real-time monitoring requirements for Arctic OCS exploratory drilling operations? (§ 250.452) BSEE proposes to remove all provisions in § 250.452 and require operators to simply follow the BOP real-time monitoring requirements in § 250.724, which contains the real-time monitoring requirements for subsea BOPs and surface BOPs used in other parts of the OCS. In conjunction with this proposed change, BSEE also proposes to modify paragraph (a) of § 250.724 by adding “all Arctic OCS drilling operations” to the list of environments/cases where BOP real-time monitoring requirements would apply. The Arctic OCS's BOP real-time monitoring requirements were initially established as part of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule. The provisions in § 250.452 were tailored to be consistent with the real-time monitoring requirements established by the BOP Systems and WCR promulgated that same year ( see 81 FR 25888). However, since 2016, the WCR's real-time monitoring requirements in § 250.724 have been updated, but without a consistency-update to the Arctic OCS's BOP real-time monitoring requirements. It is not necessary to have two separate real-time monitoring requirements for BOPs used on the OCS. Therefore, BSEE proposes to update BOP real-time monitoring requirements for the Arctic OCS to be consistent with the Bureau's overall BOP real-time monitoring requirements in § 250.724. What additional information must I submit with my APD for Arctic OCS exploratory drilling operations? (§ 250.470) BSEE proposes to revise paragraph (b) of § 250.470 by adding paragraph (13) to include “Recover the subsea isolation device (SSID), where applicable.” This revision is necessary to address the SSID alternative proposed in § 250.472, and to ensure the operator's permit addresses how it would recover the SSID, if one is used. For operations relying on an SSID, the SSID is a critical piece of equipment. Therefore, BSEE must understand how the operator will handle it, prior to and after drilling operations. We also propose minor, non-substantive edits to paragraphs (b)(11) and (12) to accommodate this addition. BSEE also proposes to revise paragraph (f)(3) by replacing the “below the surface casing” language in this paragraph with the phrase “below the surface casing, or before the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities, as approved by the Regional Supervisor.” This change would make the requirement in paragraph (f)(3) consistent with the substantive changes BSEE is proposing to § 250.471, which establishes the substance of the Arctic OCS SCCE requirements. Paragraph (f)(3) of § 250.470 complements § 250.471, by requiring the operator, in cases where it obtains SCCE capabilities through contracting, to provide proof of contracts or membership agreements with cooperatives, service providers, or other contractors. This includes information demonstrating the availability of the personnel and/or equipment on a 24-hour per day basis during operations “below the surface casing.” The proposed changes to § 250.471 are discussed in further detail below. Finally, BSEE proposes to add a new paragraph (h) to complement the proposed revisions to § 250.472, which would provide the operator with the option to use an SSID or have access to a relief rig, as an additional means to secure the well in the event of a loss of well control, if the operator will be conducting exploratory drilling operations from a MODU (that change is discussed in further detail in connection with that provision). Under proposed paragraph (h), if the operator elects to use an SSID, BSEE would require the operator to provide a certification, signed by a registered professional engineer, confirming that its SSID and well design (including casing and cementing program) meet the design requirements in proposed § 250.472(a), and the design is appropriate for the purpose for which it is intended under expected wellbore conditions. BSEE is proposing this new provision to be consistent with existing requirements under existing § 250.420 (a)(7)(i), which require the operator to include with the APD a certification signed by a registered professional engineer that the casing and cementing design is appropriate for the purpose for which it is intended under expected wellbore conditions. What are the requirements for Arctic OCS source control and containment? (§ 250.471) Section 250.471(a) currently requires the operator to have access to the SCCE described in subparagraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3), which must be capable of stopping or capturing the flow of an out-of-control well if the operator will be using a MODU when drilling below or working below the surface casing. Subparagraph (a)(1) specifically requires the capping stack to be positioned to ensure that it will be able to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control. Subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) require the cap and flow system and the containment dome to be positioned to ensure that they will be able to arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control. BSEE proposes to revise § 250.471 by: (i) Adding a new provision to paragraph (a) that would allow the operator to, subject to BSEE's determination, delay access to its SCCE until operations have reached the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities provided that the operator submits adequate documentation (such as, but not limited to, risk modeling data, off-set well data, analog data, seismic data), with its APD, demonstrating that they will not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geologic hazards. This provision would make clear that BSEE will base its determination on any documentation the operator provides, as well as any other available data and information. (ii) Replacing the language in paragraph (a) stating “capable of stopping or capturing the flow of an out-of-control well” with “capable of controlling or containing the flow from an out-of-control well when drilling below or working below the surface casing;” and (iii) Removing the phrase “positioned to ensure that it will arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control” from subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3), which apply to the cap and flow system and containment dome, respectively. The changes described in item (i) in the previous paragraph could allow the operator to adjust the point in time during operations when it must position its capping stack—from “when drilling or working below the surface casing” to “when drilling or working below the last casing point prior to the zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities”—if the operator is able to demonstrate that it will not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geological hazards before that casing point. However, unless otherwise approved by BSEE, the operator must have access to their SCCE as described in subparagraph (a)(1) and proposed subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3), when drilling or working below the surface casing. While BSEE does not propose changes to the capping stack provision in subparagraph (a)(1), changes to paragraph (a) would have a practical effect on the existing capping stack requirements. Changes to the capping stack requirements are discussed in the next subsection, entitled, Revisions to the Capping Stack Requirements. BSEE's proposed modifications described in item (ii) above are administrative in nature. BSEE proposes this change so that the language is consistent with the source “control” and “containment” description of this equipment, as well as the title of this section of the regulations ( i.e., § 250.471 What are the requirements for Arctic OCS source control and containment? ). It would not change the performance standard that the operator's SCCE must meet. BSEE's proposed changes described in item (iii) above to remove the phrase “positioned to ensure that it will arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control” from subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) would still require the operator to ensure it has access to a cap and flow system or a containment dome. However, the operator would no longer be required to ensure the equipment is positioned to be able to arrive at the well location within 7 days after the loss of well control. The distinction between the positioning requirement and the requirement to have access to the equipment is that “having access” refers to ensuring the operator has identified the equipment that would meet the performance requirements in this section and in other existing BSEE regulations ( i.e., § 250.462, What are the source control, containment, and collocated equipment requirements? ), and is able to deploy the equipment as directed by the Regional Supervisor. Additional information regarding BSEE's proposed revisions to §§ 250.471(a)(2) and 250.471(a)(3) are discussed in the subsection below, entitled, Revisions to the Cap and Flow System, and Containment Dome Requirements. • Revisions to the Capping Stack Requirements BSEE's proposed revisions to the capping stack requirements in paragraph (a) would provide an opportunity to the operator to adjust the point in time during operations when it must position its capping stack, so that it will be available to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control. If the operator is able to demonstrate to BSEE that the operations it plans to conduct below the surface casing would not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geologic hazards before reaching the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities, then BSEE would allow the operator delay its positioning of the capping stack until that point. The existing capping stack requirements in paragraphs (a) and (a)(1) are intended to ensure that a capping stack is readily available to stop or capture the flow of hydrocarbons in case of a loss of well control when drilling below or working below the surface casing. While BSEE does not propose to eliminate the requirement in paragraph (a)(1) to ensure that the capping stack will be able to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control, the existing requirement in paragraph (a) to ensure the equipment is accessible when drilling below the surface casing does not fully take into consideration the known geology of an area. The formations below the surface casing, based on the known geology of the area, may have minimal or no potential to flow hydrocarbons in measurable quantities during drilling operations. This obviates the need for ensuring capping stack availability during operations in those zones. Prior to submitting an APD, operators assess the formations they will potentially encounter during drilling operations, including the potential for hydrocarbon flow. Operators base this assessment on existing G&G data that they include in the APD. In many cases, flowable hydrocarbons are not anticipated or encountered in measurable quantities until the target productive formation is reached. For example, a surface casing shoe setting depth for an Arctic OCS exploration well could be only 1,500 feet, but the hydrocarbon bearing formation may be thousands of feet below that point. The existing regulations require the operator to have access to an available capping stack when drilling or working below the surface casing, even though geologic and engineering risk analyses the operator must submit as part of their APD may show that there is little or no potential for hydrocarbons to escape the formation and flow into the well prior to reaching the targeted productive formation. In such circumstances, the operator could safely drill for thousands of feet below the surface casing, without any identifiable need for a capping stack. This proposed change would, when appropriate, eliminate an unnecessary burden for the operator to maintain a positioned capping stack while drilling into low risk, non-productive sections of the well below the surface casing. An extensive amount of geophysical data already exists for certain areas of both the Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Planning Areas, and there has been extensive drilling in certain areas of the Beaufort Sea Planning Area. In the known geologic conditions of the U.S. Arctic, operators have a good understanding of the locations of reservoirs that they will encounter, which can be relatively shallow and normally pressured above certain geologic depths. Therefore, it may not be necessary to have access to a capping stack when drilling through zones below the surface casing that do not have abnormally high formation pressures or contain other geological hazards, and do not have the potential to flow hydrocarbons in measurable quantities, as they are penetrated. However, because geologic conditions are not uniformly normally pressured throughout the Arctic OCS, BSEE is maintaining the existing requirement to have the capping stack positioned, when drilling or working below the surface casing, at a location within proximity to the drilling location so as to be able to arrive within 24 hours of a blowout. At the same time, BSEE does not discount the possibility that future projects would not need to have SCCE ( i.e., the capping stack) positioned until reaching the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons. The criteria BSEE proposes to rely on to determine whether to grant an exception ( i.e., operator demonstrates to BSEE that it will not encounter “abnormally high-pressured zones or other geologic hazards”) accounts for those downhole risks that could lead to a blowout and may require the use of a capping stack. With respect to abnormally high-pressured zones, BSEE is concerned that there could be a case where a kick (an influx, or flow, of formation fluid from the high-pressured zone entering into the wellbore) is not controlled and could lead to a blowout. While there are means of mitigating the risk of a kick, ( i.e., overbalanced drilling), the capping stack needs to be readily available if heavier weight drilling muds, the BOP, and SSID, if applicable, fail to control the well. There could be other geologic hazards, such as fractured or high permeability zones, that may also pose a risk, particularly if those zones contain hydrocarbons. It is possible that normally pressured zones may be highly permeable or contain fractures, in which lost circulation may occur. This could cause a dynamic effect where drilling mud flows into the permeable formation causing the circulating pressure to decrease below the zone's pore pressure resulting in formation fluids flowing into the well bore, i.e., loss of well control. The capping stack must be readily available if heavier weight drilling muds, the BOP, and SSID, if applicable, fail to control the well. However, if the operator is able to demonstrate that a highly permeable or fractured zone is predicted to only contain water, BSEE would consider allowing the operator to delay positioning of the capping stack. Under this scenario, the operator would be able to use the diverter system in conjunction with the BOP system to maintain safety and environmental protection because it would be unlikely for hydrocarbons to be released into the environment. The diverter system consists of a mechanical device similar to a BOP annular preventer. The diverter system is used to divert gases, fluids, and other materials flowing from the well, away from facilities and personnel. Also, an operator would pump fluid loss materials into the well to bridge the formation to reduce its permeability and allow drilling muds to isolate the formation from the well. To permanently address the incident, the operator could also install a liner or set a new casing point at the interval where that highly permeable or fractured zone is located. BSEE would like to know whether there are more appropriate criteria, other than “abnormally high-pressured zones or other geologic hazards,” that the Bureau should use to determine whether to allow the operator to delay positioning of the capping stack. BSEE's proposed regulatory language describing the types of documentation it would consider adequate to demonstrate that abnormally high-pressured zones or other geological hazards would not be encountered before reaching the last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities—“such as, but not limited to, risk modeling data, off-set well data, analog data, seismic data”—is not meant to be an exhaustive list. BSEE would accept any other types of documentation the operator may provide that will help its demonstration. BSEE does not anticipate this submission requirement would lead to a significant information collection burden on the operator because it is normal practice for operators to gather these types of information to develop and design an offshore exploration drilling project on the Arctic OCS. BSEE is requesting comment on what other types of information could be used to demonstrate the absence of abnormally pressured zones or other geologic hazards, and how burden on the operator could change—increase or decrease—if BSEE were to require its submission. At the APD stage, BSEE would evaluate the operator's documentation along with other accompanying geologic and engineering information/analyses that must be submitted as part of its APD. BSEE would also consider any other available G&G information, such as information gathered from prior drilling operations in the area ( e.g., well log and pressure testing information), and any other applicable geophysical ( e.g., seismic data) information. BSEE makes clear in its proposed regulatory language that the Regional Supervisor will base the determination on whether to allow the operator to delay positioning of the capping stack on the documentation that the operator submits, as well as any other available data and information. • Revisions to the Cap and Flow System, and Containment Dome Requirements As described at the beginning of this section-by-section discussion, § 250.471, BSEE is also proposing to revise paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) to remove the requirement to have a cap and flow system or a containment dome positioned to ensure the equipment will be available to arrive at the well location within 7 days after the loss of well control, but still preserving the existing requirement to deploy those pieces of equipment as directed by BSEE. BSEE proposes to allow the operator to adjust the point in time during operations when it must position its capping stack under paragraph (a), from “when drilling or working below the surface casing” to “when drilling below or working below last casing point prior to penetrating a zone capable of flowing hydrocarbons in measurable quantities” if the operator is able to demonstrate that it will not encounter any abnormally high-pressured zones or other geologic hazards before that casing point. Only the 7-day arrival timing related to the “flow” part of the cap and flow system would be altered as a result of BSEE's proposed modification to paragraph (a)(2) of § 250.471. 11 11 Existing § 250.105 defines Cap and flow system and Capping stack. The changes proposed in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) to remove the requirement for the cap and flow system and the containment dome to arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control would not change other existing requirements throughout § 250.471 for the operator to ensure: (i) access to a containment dome and cap and flow system; (ii) that the cap and flow system is designed to capture at least the amount of hydrocarbons equivalent to the calculated WCD rate referenced in the operator's BOEM-approved EP; (iii) that the containment dome has the capacity to pump fluids without relying on buoyancy; (iv) that tests or exercises are conducted for the SCCE, as directed by the Regional Supervisor; (v) that records pertaining to the testing, inspection, maintenance, and use of the SCCE are maintained and made available to BSEE upon request; (vi) that all SCCE identified in § 250.471 are transported to the well upon a loss of well control; and (vii) that SCCE is deployed as directed by the Regional Supervisor. Since the promulgation of the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule, the cap and flow system and containment dome have not been needed to respond to a loss of well control event in the Arctic OCS. If Arctic OCS exploration/production activities do increase at the rates described in the RIA, there is potential for an increase in the risk of longer duration oil spills if an event were to occur and this equipment may be needed. Thus, the cost savings and forgone benefits should be considered in that context. BSEE proposes to remove the cap and flow system and containment dome 7-day arrival timing requirements based on the Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study, which determined that the time periods when SCCE may be safely deployed throughout the Arctic OCS is limited based on typical Arctic conditions. In the Chukchi Sea, safe SCCE deployment could only occur between August and October in the historically active exploration area. Moving north from the historically active exploration area of the Chukchi Sea, the ability to safely deploy SCCE diminishes significantly ( id. at 100). The study mentions there are more opportunities for safe deployment of SCCE in other portions of the Chukchi Sea (June through December). However, it is only in the southwestern extent of the Chukchi Sea Planning Area; outside of the historically active exploration area. In the Beaufort Sea, the study noted that sea ice concentrations tend to be greater year-round as compared to the Chukchi Sea ( id. at 75). Accordingly, safe SCCE deployment could occur from ice capable vessels between early August and October in the historically active exploration area of the Beaufort Sea ( i.e., the southern portion of the Beaufort Sea Planning Area). However, moving north beyond the historically active exploration area, time windows for safe SCCE deployment decrease significantly ( id. at 104). In the case of open water operations in both the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, the study points out that sea state is an important limiting factor for safe SCCE deployment. Rough sea states—high waves and longer wave periods—can affect the safety and operating limits of SCCE deployment. The vessel carrying the SCCE can become very unstable in rough sea states and the heave action on the deck can therefore increase significantly beyond the vessel's tolerance levels for conducting operations, which may negatively affect the ability to safely deploy the SCCE. Rough sea states are most likely to occur when there is less sea ice coverage and larger open water areas to generate large waves, which is more of an issue in the Chukchi Sea, where there are larger open water areas throughout the open water season ( id. at 11). When operating in open water conditions, sea states generally dictate that safe SCCE deployment could occur only between late September and October in the historically active exploration area of the Chukchi Sea, and that window diminishes significantly moving north of the historically active exploration area. In the Beaufort Sea, where there is less open water throughout the operating season, sea states would generally permit safe deployment of SCCE between late-August and early- to mid‐October in the historically active exploration area. Beyond that, the probability for safe SCCE deployment decreases rapidly in the historically active exploration area and in the other areas of the Beaufort Sea. ( id. at 98,102) Water depth is also an important factor to consider for the safe deployment of SCCE. Deployment is likely to be impaired in water depths shallower than 984 feet because the equipment would potentially be subject to a gas boil at the surface from a subsea blowing well ( id. at 143). A gas boil is a forceful release of hazardous gases which can present human‐health hazards to workers, fire hazards, and potential stability problems for support vessels and the vessel deploying the SCCE directly above the blowing well. Water depths in the majority of the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea where exploration has historically occurred are relatively shallow—167 feet or less (Table 1-1 and Table 1-2, id. at 7 to 9). In April of 2020, the only leases with potential projects that would be subject to the Arctic OCS's SCCE requirements were relinquished. 12 These leases were located in the Beaufort Sea in water depths less than approximately 170 feet deep. This water depth range limits the capabilities of support vessels that can be used for the safe deployment of SCCE. A possible solution that could enable SCCE deployment in the presence of a gas boil is the use of offset‐deployment technology to remotely position SCCE over the blowing well in shallow water ( id. at A-35). 12 There are other leases in the Beaufort Sea located nearer to the shore in shallow waters where exploration and development projects are being pursued (primarily through man-made gravel islands). When BSEE proposed its original Arctic OCS SCCE requirements in 2015, the Bureau explained that there is limited ability in the Arctic region to summon additional source control and containment resources. Accordingly, the Bureau required operators to plan for response redundancies and planning complexities not required elsewhere ( see 80 FR 9938). BSEE determined that the provisions finalized in 2016 provided for the necessary redundancy and sequencing of the responses, based on the time necessary to deploy, and therefore provided sufficient safety and environmental protection to allow for exploratory drilling on the Arctic OCS. At that time, BSEE believed that the technologies identified in its SCCE requirements represented the optimal approach to well control capabilities available for the Arctic OCS ( see 81 FR 46520). Since publication of the 2016 rule, however, BSEE has sought to better understand the ability to safely deploy SCCE (and relief rigs) in Arctic OCS conditions, through the study it commissioned to Bratslavsky Consulting Engineers, Inc., and SolstenXP, Inc. According to the Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study, the time periods when SCCE may be safely deployed throughout the Arctic OCS is limited in comparison to relief-well drilling operations, based on typical Arctic conditions. BSEE did not have the benefit of having the Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study when finalizing the 2016 Arctic Exploratory Drilling Rule. BSEE's proposed changes to §  250.471(a)(2) and (a)(3) for the containment dome and cap and flow system responds to the information it has gathered from the study. BSEE recognizes that Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study data are now over a decade old. Since then, there may have been changes in U.S. and international regulations, standards, recommended practices, specifications, technical reports and common industry methods regarding the safe deployment of SCCE versus a relief well in Arctic conditions. Furthermore, data of the Arctic OCS's 2012 to 2016 drilling seasons in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and the resulting operating scenarios, could be updated to provide additional insight to the forecast for the RIA. BSEE will continue to review the Bratslavsky and SolstenXP 2018 study to ensure it remains relevant to the proposed provisions of this rulemaking. In light of these findings, BSEE proposes the revisions under § 250.471 to the containment dome and cap and flow system deployment requirements in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) because it is not reasonable to impose such universal, prescriptive requirements for equipment that may not be safely deployed (moved to the location, equipment put into place, and activated) and effectively used under certain Arctic OCS conditions. The deployment and arrival schedules of the cap and flow system and the containment dome will be directed by the BSEE Regional Supervisor on a case-by-case basis. However, as previously described, BSEE proposes only to adjust, rather than eliminate, the reference to the point in time during operations when the operator must have access to a capping stack that is positioned to be able to arrive at the well location within 24 hours after a loss of well control. In comparison to the containment dome, the capping stack has proven to be a more effective technology when successfully deployed and has a different function compared to a containment dome. The capping stack latches on to a connector or pipe stub located on or in the well to achieve a pressure tight seal to capture or stop all fluids flowing out of the well. A containment dome, which removes oil and gas from the water column, will likely capture only a portion of the hydrocarbon flow due to the non-sealing design. In addition, the use of a containment dome may be constrained by the drilling unit itself. Certain drilling rigs, such as jackups and submersible drilling vessels, are unlikely to provide adequate structural clearance for deployment of a containment dome without moving the rig off the drill site. ( id. at 33). Furthermore, containment domes have limited field application to prove their capabilities while, in contrast, capping stacks have been field tested and successfully deployed in multiple practice drills ( id. at 32 and 34). 13 13 For example, the capping stack technology was used to shut-in the Macondo well during the Deepwater Horizon incident. With respect to the cap and flow system, the flow portion of the system would require additional vessel support activities on the surface ( e.g., support vessels for oil and gas processing, and hydrocarbon storage/transfer) to keep the system working in comparison to what would be needed to deploy a capping stack ( e.g., a single vessel that would load the capping stack and deploy to the well when needed). The support activities and the vessel on which the flow system is loaded would be subject to the same challenging metocean conditions previously described, thus limiting their ability to be safely deployed throughout the Arctic drilling season. The capping stack would generally have a better opportunity for deployment because once the capping stack is lowered under the water and attached to the wellhead, weather becomes less of a factor. BSEE believes it is critical to ensure that operators have redundant protective measures in place, as there is no guarantee that a single measure could control or contain a worst-case discharge ( see 81 FR 46487). Because the chances of successfully deploying a capping stack under Arctic OCS conditions may be greater in comparison to the containment dome and cap and flow system, BSEE is revising, and not eliminating, the capping stack positioning requirement. BSEE invites comments on any technological upgrades or methods that exist for SCCE that would meet the objective of being a redundant system that could control or contain a WCD. Although BSEE is proposing to remove the requirement in existing paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) to ensure that the cap and flow system and containment dome will be available to arrive at the well location within 7 days after a loss of well control, BSEE would maintain the provisions under the same paragraphs that require that the operator identify and have access to a containment dom [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-15953. Public record. Not legal advice.