# Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-14539 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** July 20, 2026 - **Citation:** 91 FR 45324 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 8 CFR Parts 103 and 212 [CIS No. 2857-26; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0304] RIN 1615-AD06 Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: DHS is rescinding the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations (“2022 Final Rule”). The 2022 Final Rule was not the best implementation of the statute. It was inconsistent with congressional intent, unduly restrictive, and hampered DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations of whether certain aliens are likely at any time to become a public charge. Rescission restores broader discretion for DHS officers to evaluate all pertinent facts and aligns with long-standing policy that aliens in the United States should be self-reliant and government benefits should not incentivize immigration. This rule also revises the breach and cancellation of public charge bonds regulations. DATES: The final rule is effective on September 18, 2026. This rule applies to applications for admission made on or after September 18, 2026 or applications for adjustment of status postmarked or electronically submitted on or after September 18, 2026. Receipt of means-tested public benefits before September 18, 2026 will be considered consistently with the 2022 Final Rule. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), DHS, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, MD 20746; telephone (240) 721-3000 (not a toll-free call). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action B. Legal Authority C. Summary of the Proposed Rule D. Implementation E. Costs and Benefits II. Background A. Legal Authority B. Grounds of Inadmissibility Generally C. Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility III. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule A. Summary of Public Comments B. Comments Expressing General Support for the Proposed Rule C. Comments Expressing General Opposition to the Proposed Rule D. Comments Regarding Legal Authority and Statutory Provisions 1. Statutory Authority 2. Congressional Intent and Historical Application 3. Administrative Law Concerns 4. Constitutional Concerns 5. Prospective Application of the Final Rule and Retroactivity Concerns E. Negative Impacts on DHS and Immigration Policy Objectives 1. Concerns About Immigration Officer Discretion 2. Lack of Replacement Language or Framework 3. Immigration System Impacts, Operational Burdens, and Processing Delays 4. Misalignment With Longstanding Immigration Policies or U.S. Values F. Negative Impacts on Applicants, Petitioners, Beneficiaries, and Support Systems 1. Chilling Effects on Benefit Usage 2. Concerns About Clarity and Discrimination G. Negative Impacts on U.S. Economy, Businesses, and Communities 1. Workforce Impacts 2. Impacts of Reduced Consumer Spending 3. Concerns About U.S. Demographics 4. Impacts on Housing 5. Impacts to Innovation 6. Other Economic Effects 7. Impacts on the Military and Veterans H. DHS's Rationale and Justification for the Rule 1. Insufficient Evidence or Reasoned Justification To Change Policy 2. Insufficient Connection Between Receipt and Dependency on the Government 3. Would Not Accomplish Stated Goal To Reduce Public Expenditures 4. Agreement With Stated Need for Proposed Rule I. Amendments to Cancellation and Breach of Public Charge Bond Provisions J. Removal of 8 CFR 212.20, “Applicability of Public Charge Inadmissibility” K. Removal of the Public Charge Regulatory Definitions 1. General Comments 2. Definition of “Likely at Any Time To Become a Public Charge” 3. Definition of “Public Benefits” 4. Definition of “Receipt (of Public Benefits)” 5. Definitions of “Government” and “Household” L. Removal of the Public Charge Inadmissibility Determination Framework 1. Minimum Factors 2. Consideration of the Affidavit of Support 3. Consideration of Current and/or Past Receipt of Public Benefits 4. Disability Alone Is Not Sufficient 5. Totality of the Circumstances 6. Written Denial Requirement 7. Receipt of Public Benefits While an Alien Is in an Immigration Category Exempt From the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, or of Benefits Available to Refugees M. Elimination of List of Exemptions and Waivers (8 CFR 212.23) 1. General Opposition to Removal 2. General Support for Removal 3. Certain Cubans and Haitians 4. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands N. Comments Unrelated to Specific Regulatory Sections 1. General Comments 2. Comments on the Development of Future Public Charge Inadmissibility Policy Interpretive Tool 3. Privacy and Personal Data Concerns 4. Recommendations for Public Charge Inadmissibility Regulations or Subregulatory Guidance 5. Recommendations for Implementation 6. Severability 7. Other Comments O. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements 1. Costs, Benefits, and Transfer Payments 2. Regulatory Flexibility Act 3. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) 4. Other Statutory and Regulatory Requirements P. Out-of-Scope 1. Support for Immigration and Opposition to Restrictive Immigration Policies 2. Opposition to Immigration Generally 3. Miscellaneous IV. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation) 1. Summary of Changes From the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the Final Rule 2. Summary of the Regulatory Changes 3. Background and Purpose 4. Population 5. Cost-Benefit Analysis B. Regulatory Flexibility Act C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 D. Small Business Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional Review Act) E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform) G. Family Assessment H. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments) I. National Environmental Policy Act J. Paperwork Reduction Act Table of Abbreviations APA—Administrative Procedure Act ASC—Application Support Center BIA—Board of Immigration Appeals CCBG—Child Care and Development Block Grant CBO—Congressional Budget Office CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection CFR—Code of Federal Regulations CHIP—Children's Health Insurance Program CMS—Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services CNMI—Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands COVID-19—Coronavirus Disease 2019 CPI-U—Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers CPS—Current Population Survey CTC—Child Tax Credit DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security DOJ—Department of Justice DOS—U.S. Department of State EAD—Employment Authorization Document eFMAP—Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage EITC—Earned Income Tax Credit E.O.—Executive Order FAM—Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual FAS—Freely Associated States FFP—Federal Financial Participation FMAP—Federal Medical Assistance Percentage FOIA—Freedom of Information Act FR—Federal Register FY—Fiscal Year GW—George Washington University HCV—Housing Choice Voucher HHS—U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HSA—Homeland Security Act HUD—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ICE—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICR—Information Collection Request IIRIRA—Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 IMF—International Monetary Fund INA—Immigration and Nationality Act INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service IRCA—Immigration Reform and Control Act KFF—Kaiser Family Foundation LPR—Lawful Permanent Resident NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act NEPA—National Environmental Policy Act NHTSA—U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NOID—Notice of Intent to Deny NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking NTA—Notice to Appear NTMVS Act—National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 OBBBA—One Big Beautiful Bill Act OHP—Oregon Health Plan OMB—Office of Management and Budget PII—Personally Identifiable Information PRA—Paperwork Reduction Act PRWORA—Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 RFE—Request for Evidence RIA—Regulatory Impact Analysis SNAP—Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program SSA—Social Security Administration SSI—Supplemental Security Income TANF—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families TPS—Temporary Protected Status UBI—Universal Basic Income UMRA—Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 U.S.C.—United States Code USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services USDA—U.S. Department of Agriculture VAWA—Violence Against Women Act WIC—Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action The purpose of this rule is to remove from the Code of Federal Regulations the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility final rule (2022 Final Rule), 1 as these provisions straitjacket DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). See Public Law 104-193, section 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were directed to consider seven factors (five of those required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances. 2 1 87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022). 2 The Fourth Circuit emphasized the provision indicates the executive has extensive and ultimate discretion over the relevant determination, especially since Congress embedded discretion into the statutory scheme such as by identifying minimum, but not exclusive, factors for consideration. See CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 243-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (request for rehearing en banc granted on December 3, 2020, but the appeal was later dismissed). DHS believes this rescission is more consistent with congressional intent as it restores ultimate discretion for officers to consider not just the minimum statutory factors but also any other information the officer deems relevant to a public charge inadmissibility determination. DHS is moving away from a bright line primary dependence standard. By removing most 3 of the regulatory provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, DHS can implement policy and interpretive tools guiding officers in making individualized, fact-specific public charge inadmissibility determinations, based on a totality of the alien's circumstances, consistent with the statute, congressional intent, and precedent. 4 These tools will guide public charge inadmissibility determinations while empowering officers to consider: (1) the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B); (2) the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits; (3) any other individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case; and (4) any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency. Using good judgment and discretion, officers will more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, in the totality of the circumstances, as Congress intended. 3 Except certain public charge bond provisions, which this final rule amends. 4 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (“The elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied. They are not defined by statute, but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting. ”) (emphasis added); Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974) (“Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner.”). DHS reviewed and considered the feedback and recommendations submitted in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). B. Legal Authority The authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) for the rescissions and regulatory amendments is found in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), (public charge inadmissibility determinations); section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, (applicants for admission); and section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, (eligibility criteria for applications for adjustment of status). In addition, section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), authorizes the Secretary to establish such regulations as deemed necessary for carrying out the Secretary's authority under the INA. C. Summary of the Proposed Rule On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). In the NPRM, DHS proposed the following changes: • Amend 8 CFR 103.6(c), Cancellation and breach—Clarifying that receipt of any means-tested public benefit, or being otherwise noncompliant with any condition of the public charge bond, results in a breach of that bond and eliminating language stating that “USCIS may cancel a public charge bond at any time after determining that the alien is not likely at any time to become a public charge.” • Remove 8 CFR 212.20, Applicability of public charge inadmissibility—Removal in its entirety of the language defining the categories of aliens subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. • Remove 8 CFR 212.21, Definitions—Removal of the definitions, including the definitions of “likely at any time to become a public charge,” “receipt (of public benefits),” “public cash assistance for income maintenance,” and “long-term institutionalization at government expense.” • Remove 8 CFR 212.22, Public charge inadmissibility determination—Removal of the overly restrictive language relating to an alien's current and/or past receipt of means-tested public benefits, the totality of the circumstances analysis, and receipt of public benefits by an alien in an exempt category. • Remove 8 CFR 212.23, Exemptions and waivers for public charge ground of inadmissibility—Removal of the language listing exemptions and waivers to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. DHS received 8,846 5 comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The preamble to this final rule includes summaries of significant issues raised by the comments and includes responsive explanations for policy changes. 5 DHS received 5,882 comments during the 30-day comment period applicable to the rule, and 2,964 during the overlapping 60-day comment period applicable to the associated information collection. D. Implementation DHS will begin implementing this final rule on its effective date. This final rule will apply to applications for adjustment of status that are postmarked or electronically submitted on or after the effective date and applications for admission made on or after the effective date. On or before the effective date, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance to inform, but not prescribe, the outcome of USCIS officers' public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the totality of the circumstances. In addition, DHS will only consider the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government expense before the effective date of this final rule and will consider the receipt of any means tested public benefits on or after that date. E. Costs and Benefits DHS is removing most of the 2022 Final Rule provisions to allow DHS to better implement the public charge ground of inadmissibility. The final rule is expected to impose new benefits and transfers. To assess the impacts of the rule, DHS considers the potential impacts of the rule relative to a no-action baseline, which reflects the current state of the world absent this regulatory action. The primary source of unquantified benefits of this rule is the removal of overly restrictive provisions promulgated in the 2022 Final Rule that hinder officers in making public charge inadmissibility determinations. By removing rigid regulatory definitions and standards, this rule ensures that officers can make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances. This approach will prevent the application of overly restrictive criteria that straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations. The rule will also result in a reduction in transfer payments from Federal and State governments to individuals who may choose to disenroll from or forgo enrollment in a public benefits program. Individuals who might choose to disenroll from or forgo future enrollment in a public benefits program include aliens as well as U.S. citizens who are members of mixed-status households. DHS estimates that the total reduction in transfer payments from the Federal and State governments could be approximately $13.05 billion annually due to disenrollment or forgone enrollment in public benefits programs by members of households that include aliens who may be receiving public benefits. DHS estimates that the 10-year discounted Federal and State transfer payments reduction of this rule could be approximately $111.28 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $91.62 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. This total includes DHS's estimate that Federal transfer payments could decrease by approximately $65.76 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $54.14 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. Using the average Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), DHS further estimates that State transfer payments could decrease by approximately $45.52 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and approximately $37.48 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. DHS notes there may be additional reductions in transfer payments that we are unable to quantify. DHS also recognizes that the estimated reductions in transfer payments are approximations and could be influenced by external factors unrelated to this rule. For example, the recent changes to Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) included in H.R. 1 are expected to impact enrollment rates, adding complexity to quantification efforts. 6 DHS anticipates that disenrollment or forgone enrollment rates may fluctuate independently of this rule, potentially affecting the transfer payment estimates presented. However, those external factors are separate and independent of this rule. 6 See H.R. 1 Reconciliation Bill, e.g., secs. 10108 (SNAP Eligibility); 71109 (Alien Medicaid Eligibility); Public Law 119-21 (July 4, 2025). 7 For a complete list of regulatory changes in this rule, please see section V. “List of Subjects and Regulatory Amendments.” Finally, DHS recognizes that reductions in Federal and State transfers under Federal benefits programs may have downstream and upstream impacts on State and local economies, large and small businesses, and individuals. For example, the rule might result in reduced revenues for healthcare providers, such as hospitals and nonprofits, participating in Medicaid, companies that manufacture medical supplies or pharmaceuticals, grocery retailers participating in SNAP, agricultural producers who grow foods that are eligible for purchase using SNAP benefits. Landlords participating in federally funded housing programs may also experience financial strain, such as increased tenant turnover and higher administrative costs. Table I.1 provides a detailed summary of the regulatory changes and the estimated costs, benefits, and transfers associated with the expected impacts. 7 BILLING CODE 9111-97-P ER20JY26.000 ER20JY26.001 ER20JY26.002 BILLING CODE 9111-97-C II. Background A. Legal Authority The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA). 8 Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Section 101 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 111, establishes that part of DHS's primary mission is to ensure that efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland do not diminish either the overall economic security of the United States or the civil rights and civil liberties of persons. 8 See Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (Nov. 25, 2002). In addition to establishing the Secretary's general authority for the administration and enforcement of immigration laws, section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, enumerates various related authorities, including the Secretary's authority to establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, issue such instructions, and perform such other acts as the Secretary deems necessary for carrying out such authority. Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), provides that any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if he or she is likely at any time to become a public charge. In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible based only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary. Under section 213A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, certain aliens are required to submit a sufficient Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA (Form I-864) executed by a sponsor who agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line 9 during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable. The Form I-864 is intended to ensure that an intending immigrant has adequate means of financial support and is not likely to rely on the U.S. Government for financial support. 9 Sponsors on active duty (other than active duty for training) in the Armed Forces of the United States who are petitioning for the admission of their spouse or child only need to demonstrate the means to maintain an annual income equal to at least 100 percent of the Federal poverty line. Section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, addresses the inspection of applicants for admission, including inadmissibility determinations of such aliens. Section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, generally establishes eligibility criteria for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR). B. Grounds of Inadmissibility Generally The United States has a long history of permitting aliens to enter the United States, whether permanently or on a temporary basis. At the same time, Congress has excluded aliens who pose a threat to the safety or general welfare of the country or who seek to violate immigration laws. 10 10 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 787 (1977) (The Supreme Court has “long recognized [that] the power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control”). Congress has exercised this authority in part by establishing the concepts of admission 11 and inadmissibility in the INA. 12 Aliens are inadmissible due to a range of acts, conditions, and conduct. 13 If an alien is inadmissible that alien is ineligible to be admitted to the United States and ineligible to receive a visa, unless he or she applies for and receives a waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief. Congress extended the applicability of the inadmissibility grounds beyond the context of applications for admission and visas by making admissibility an eligibility requirement for certain immigration benefits, including adjustment of status to that of an LPR. 14 If an alien is inadmissible, that alien is also ineligible for those benefits unless the alien is eligible to apply for and received waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief, where available and appropriate. 15 11 Admission is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See INA sec. 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A). 12 See INA sec. 212(a), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a). 13 Id. 14 See INA sec. 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2). 15 See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v); INA sec. 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h); INA sec. 212(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(i); INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii); see also USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 9, Waivers and Other Forms of Relief, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-9 (last updated Feb. 3, 2026). DHS has the discretion to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility as designated by Congress. Where an alien is seeking an immigration benefit that is subject to a ground of inadmissibility, DHS cannot approve the immigration benefit being sought if a waiver of that ground is unavailable under the INA, the alien does not meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for the waiver, or the alien does not warrant the waiver in any authorized exercise of discretion. C. Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), states any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if in the opinion of the consular officer or immigration officer, as applicable, the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. The public charge ground of inadmissibility, therefore, applies to aliens applying for a visa to come to the United States temporarily or permanently, for admission at or between ports of entry, 16 and for adjustment of status to that of an LPR. 17 Under the statute, some categories of aliens are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility, while others, if found inadmissible under the public charge ground, may apply for a waiver of the public charge ground of inadmissibility or may be invited to submit a public charge bond. 18 16 DHS notes that due to differences in the information collected from aliens and operational limitations at and between the ports of entry, the information and evidence considered in the totality of the circumstances by USCIS may be different from that which is considered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 17 See INA sec. 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Three different agencies are responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility, each in a different context or contexts. DHS primarily applies the public charge ground of inadmissibility to applicants for admission at or between ports of entry and when adjudicating certain applications for adjustment of status. DOS consular officers are responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility as part of the visa application process and for determining whether a visa applicant is ineligible for a visa on public charge grounds at the time of application for a visa. This rule does not revise DOS standards or processes. DOJ is responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility with respect to aliens in Immigration Court. Immigration Judges adjudicate matters in removal proceedings, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and, in some cases, the Attorney General, adjudicate appeals arising from such proceedings. This rule does not revise DOJ standards or processes. 18 See INA secs. 212(d)(3)(A), 213, 245(d)(2)(B), and 245(j), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A), 1183, 1255(d)(2)(B), and 1255(j), and 8 CFR 213.1 and 8 CFR 245.11. The INA does not define the terms “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” However, it does specify that when determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, consular officers and immigration officers must, at a minimum, consider the alien's age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Section 212(a)(4)(B)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii), permits consular officers or immigration officers to consider any Form I-864 submitted on the alien's behalf, when determining whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. 19 In fact, with very limited exceptions, most aliens seeking family-based immigrant visas and adjustment of status, and certain aliens seeking employment-based immigrant visas or adjustment of status, must submit a sufficient Form I-864 in order to avoid being found inadmissible as likely at any time to become a public charge. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(C) and (D), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C) and (D). 19 See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii). When required, the applicant must submit an Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA (Form I-864 or Form I-864EZ). In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary. See INA sec. 213, 8 U.S.C. 1183. D. Current Rulemaking On November 19, 2025, DHS published the NPRM, Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). The public comment period on the NPRM closed on December 19, 2025, and the public comment period on the associated information collection closed on January 20, 2026. 20 Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The following section of the preamble includes a detailed summary and analysis of public comments received. Comments received may be reviewed at the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) at https://www.regulations.gov, docket number USCIS-2025-0304. 20 DHS received 5,882 comments during the first comment period, and 2,964 during the second comment period. Comments on the NPRM were to be submitted during the first comment period. Comments on the information collection described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section could be submitted during both comment periods. For a detailed description of the history of the public charge ground of inadmissibility, public benefits under PRWORA, and prior public charge rulemakings, please refer to the NPRM. E. Severability DHS intends the changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) to be severable from the full rescission of regulatory provisions in 8 CFR part 212. To the extent a court finds this final rule rescinding the public charge inadmissibility regulations in 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23 is invalid or unenforceable, DHS intends that certain changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) nevertheless be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to those provision(s) permitted by law, unless they are also held to be wholly invalid and unenforceable. Specifically, DHS intends to continue to give effect to the removal of the ground for cancellation 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1) stating that DHS can cancel a public charge bond at any time if it determines “that the alien is not likely at any time to become a public charge” because, as discussed in the NPRM, the rationale for the proposed removal of that ground of cancellation is based on the practical infeasibility of applying it rather than the broader justification for rescinding 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Similarly, if not separately invalidated or deemed unenforceable, DHS intends to keep the revised restructuring of 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1), separating the cancelation and breach provisions into paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) for clarity. III. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule A. Summary of Public Comments On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS received 8,846 comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Most of the comment submissions were from individual or anonymous commenters, including attorneys and academic researchers. Other commenters included healthcare providers, legal service providers, research and religious organizations, advocacy groups, social and community organizations, professional associations, State and local government agencies and elected officials, trade and business organizations, unions, schools and universities, and a foreign government entity. B. Comments Expressing General Support for the Proposed Rule Comment: Several commenters were generally in favor of the proposed rule. Some of the commenters who supported the proposal stated that public benefit programs are intended for Americans and that the government should put America first. Many commenters who supported the rule expressed concern about the burden of benefit use by immigrants on available resources, stating the government should not allow immigrants to burden the benefit systems for Americans. Several commenters stated that the United States should eliminate the potential for aliens to be incentivized to immigrate for public benefits, with some commenters referencing aliens' fraud and abuse of public benefit programs, taking advantage of the United States, draining resources, or disproportionately benefiting from assistance at taxpayer expense. One commenter stated that resources for new immigrants should be limited, with another stating that when conditions for U.S. citizens in America improve immigrants can be helped. One commenter expressed their belief that supplemental programs are meant to be a temporary aid but that there are insufficient regulations to prevent such aid from becoming a lifestyle. Other commenters expressed support for the rule, remarking that immigrants should demonstrate advanced education, personal savings, and value provided to the United States upon admission. Response: DHS agrees that aliens applying for admission and adjustment of status who are subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility should be self-sufficient and should not depend on the government to meet their needs. DHS also agrees that the availability of public benefits should not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States, as Congress indicated in PRWORA. 21 This rulemaking seeks to align public charge inadmissibility determinations with those concepts. DHS firmly believes that this was Congress's intent in enacting section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). 21 See Public Law 104-193, sec. 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). This rulemaking will empower officers to consider not only the mandatory statutory factors and an alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, but also all relevant evidence and information in the record specific to the alien as the officers determine whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. This will restore a public charge inadmissibility determination that relies on DHS officers' good judgment and sound discretion as envisioned by Congress. DHS emphasizes neither the public charge ground of inadmissibility nor this final rule govern eligibility for means-tested public benefits; rather they govern which aliens are inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for admission and adjustment of status. This final rule does not address the government's responsibility to care for aliens or which aliens are, or should be, eligible to receive means-tested public benefits. C. Comments Expressing General Opposition to the Proposed Rule Comment: Many commenters expressed general opposition to the rule. Some stated that the rule is unfair, cruel and inhumane or barbaric, that previous poverty is not a reason to penalize a person today, and that every human deserves to be cared for and treated respectfully. Some disagreed with the basis of the rule, commenting that the rule is not right for the country. One commenter called the rule pointless, with another stating the rule is unnecessary and would negatively impact children. Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the rule is pointless, unnecessary, or unfair. The purpose of this rule is to remove the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the 2022 Final Rule, 87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022), as these provisions straitjacketed DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA. 22 The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination, preventing officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. See 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Rescission of the 2022 Final Rule allows officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge using good judgment and discretion, consider the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B), the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, all individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case, and any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency. 22 See Public Law 104-193, section 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). Comment: A commenter wrote that the proposed rule is not practical and instead driven by a desire to resurrect a punitive approach that was widely rejected by public health experts, State and local governments, and advocates. Response: DHS rejects the suggestion that it is resurrecting the public charge ground of inadmissibility approach found in the 2019 Final Rule, 84 FR 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019). As it made clear in the NPRM, previous regulations relating to the public charge ground of inadmissibility were overly restrictive. 23 By removing (not replacing or amending) the rigid definitions and factors, this final rule will allow officers to consider all case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination, in the totality of the circumstances. This in turn enables officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. DHS is not implementing the provisions of the 2019 Final Rule in this final rule. 23 90 FR 52180-52181 (Nov. 19, 2025). D. Comments Regarding Legal Authority and Statutory Provisions 1. Statutory Authority Comment: One commenter stated that this rule is intended to reduce immigration to the United States, which only Congress can do via statute. Response: While it is possible this rule may decrease the number of aliens who will be admitted into or granted adjustment of status in the United States, as explained elsewhere in this final rule, DHS is unable to quantify those impacts due to the nature of the individualized case-by-case determination required by statute. DHS strongly disagrees that it is aiming to reduce immigration in excess of its statutory authority. While Congress established annual numerical limitations for certain immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications, Congress has not mandated, nor would it be practical to mandate, that these limits be fully utilized given specific eligibility criteria and other congressionally imposed restrictions, such as specific grounds of inadmissibility. See e.g., INA secs. 202, 203, 212 and 214; 8 U.S.C. 1152, 1153, 1182, and 1184. In fact, Congress provided for the rollover or reallocation of immigrant visas in certain circumstances. See e.g., INA sec. 201, 203, and 206, 8 U.S.C. 1151, 1153, and 1156. The very purpose of the public charge ground of inadmissibility is to prevent the admission and adjustment of status of aliens who are determined by an officer to be likely at any time to become a public charge. Indeed, since 1882, Congress has clearly decided to limit the admission of such aliens. 24 To the extent the commenter does not like that this ground of inadmissibility prevents the admission and adjustment of status of certain aliens, the complaint is for Congress, not DHS. More than 70 years ago Congress recognized that setting the parameters for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge is best left to the judgment and interpretation of the executive branch and the courts because the elements constituting public charge are so varied. 25 If Congress wanted to conclusively define what it means to be “likely at any time to become a public charge” it would have done so when enacting immigration statutes in 1882, 26 1891, 27 1903, 28 1907, 29 1917, 30 1952, 31 1990, 32 or 1996. 33 However, Congress, at no point during the history of the public charge inadmissibility ground, limited the manner in which the executive branch made public charge inadmissibility determinations save providing a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be considered, in 1996. 24 Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882). 25 See The 1950 Omnibus Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 349 (1950). 26 Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882). 27 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (Mar. 3, 1891). 28 Immigration Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 825 (Feb. 13, 1903). 29 Immigration Act of 1907, 36 Stat 264 (Feb. 20, 1907). 30 Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (Feb. 5, 1917). 31 INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (June 27, 1952). 32 603 See Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101-649, section 601, 110 Stat. 4978, 5072 (Nov. 29, 1990). 33 IIRIRA, See, e.g., Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emp. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2018) (explaining that, if Congress had wanted to deprive State courts of jurisdiction over certain class actions, it could have easily done so by inserting a provision). As referenced in the NPRM and this final rule, with the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule DHS is eliminating a rigid regulatory framework and restoring broader officer discretion, which ensures that aliens whom DHS has determined are likely at any time to become a public charge are not admitted or granted adjustment of status, as Congress intended. Comment: Several commenters said this rulemaking overreached the powers granted in the statute by Congress. Another said removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful. Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful or goes beyond the powers granted to DHS by Congress. The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the HSA. Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Indeed, this rulemaking is within DHS's express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, section 103(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). For these reasons as well as those discussed previously, the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule does not exceed the Secretary's authority. The removal of the 2022 Final Rule in favor of a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis is a permissible implementation of the public charge inadmissibility statute enacted by Congress. See INA sec. 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). DHS believes that the express language of sections 212(a)(4)(A) and (B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B), the longstanding national policy on immigration and welfare, and the precedent decisions that have guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guidance for DHS officers to make public charge inadmissibility determinations. Comment: Some commenters stated that section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), does not authorize DHS to consider the past or present receipt of non-cash public benefits, and added that such consideration would constitute an impermissible expansion of the statutory criteria and undermine the intent of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Another commenter similarly stated that the expansion of the public charge definition to include non-cash benefits lacks a clear basis in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), or precedent decisions. Response: DHS is neither promulgating definitions for the terms “public charge” or “public benefits” through this rulemaking. As proposed in the NPRM, DHS believes that retaining regulations that disregard receipt of certain means-tested public benefits, when such receipt is relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood of becoming a public charge, is not the best reading of the statute. DHS is therefore removing the rigid provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, including limitations on what public benefits may be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination, which prevented officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the clear self-sufficiency goals articulated by Congress in PRWORA. Consideration of non-cash public benefits in a public charge inadmissibility determination is neither precluded by section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), nor inconsistent with precedent decisions. 34 34 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (considering receipt of cash benefits and other public funds as part of a public charge inadmissibility determination); Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 131, 131 (BIA 1944) (considering alien's receipt of public aid as part of public charge inadmissibility determination). In fact, when passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress added a list of minimum, but not exclusive, factors to consider in public charge inadmissibility determinations but did not preclude consideration of any other factors including the alien's receipt of non-cash public benefits. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Moreover, DHS disagrees that Congress intended to exclude consideration of non-cash benefits when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Congress does not mention public benefits at all in section 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), leaving it to the agencies administering the public charge ground of inadmissibility 35 to specify how public benefits should be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination. However, Congress did prohibit consideration of any public benefits under 8 U.S.C. 1641(c) for certain battered aliens, without reference to cash versus non-cash benefits, which strongly suggests Congress understood and accepted DHS's consideration of past receipt of any public benefits—cash and non-cash alike—in all other circumstances. INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s). DHS further disagrees that precedent decisions preclude consideration of non-cash benefits. On the contrary, as concluded in past precedent decisions that have informed public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades, receipt of public support of any kind is an appropriate consideration in a public charge inadmissibility determination. 36 35 DHS, DOJ, and DOS all administer this ground of inadmissibility. 36 See, e.g., Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131 (Reg'l Comm's 1977) (consideration of past public benefits in determining the likelihood of becoming a public charge in the future); Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 589 (Reg'l Comm'r 1974) (“Congress intends that an applicant for a visa be excluded who is without sufficient funds to support himself, who has no one under any obligation to support him and who, being older, has an increasing chance of becoming dependent, disabled and sick.”) (emphasis added). Comment: A commenter stated removal of 2022 Final Rule contradicts DHS's statutory obligation to administer immigration laws fairly, equitably, and without discrimination. Response: DHS disagrees. As noted above, DHS has the authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility and to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out that authority. INA sec. 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). By removing regulations that the Secretary determined are rigid, overly-restrictive, and not the best implementation of the statute, DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis, consistent with Congress's express national policy on immigration and welfare and in line with the spirit of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). With this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard which permits DHS officers to consider any and all factors, in the totality of the circumstances, relevant to each individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. 37 As discussed in other comment responses, DHS disagrees any changes in this final rule risk inviting discriminatory decision-making. 37 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (“The elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied. They are not defined by statute, but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.” ) (emphasis added); Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974) (“Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner.”). Comment: One commenter, citing Loper Bright v. Raimondo , 38 stated that “legal interpretation” of statutes—even statutes Congress expressly authorized agencies to implement, like section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)—is a judicial function driven by “traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” not the “policy preferences” of the Executive, adding the statute has a fixed, single best meaning which courts (and not the Supreme Court alone) must interpret and agencies must implement. The commenter said DHS mistakenly treats statutory meaning merely as a regulatory choice and mischaracterizes “primary dependence on the government for subsistence” as a “bright-line . . . standard” rather than acknowledging it is the statute's single best meaning. Another commenter indicated the rule suffers from the same defects which led courts to enjoin the 2019 Final Rule under the more deferential Chevron 39 framework, adding that Loper Bright requires agencies to adopt a statute's best reading and asserted the existing regulatory framework reflects a better, if not the best reading. Another cited to Loper Bright, stating the Administration is not entitled to any deference when interpreting a statute in a way that is contrary to its plain meaning, history, and tradition. Another commenter said DHS does not have unchecked power, authority, or flexibility in defining the term public charge contrary to congressional intent. 38 603 U.S. 369 (2024). 39 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Response: The Supreme Court in Loper Bright held that courts are no longer required to defer to an agency's “reasonable” interpretations of ambiguous statutes. DHS strongly disagrees with the commenters' suggestion that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is simply a policy decision. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the Secretary's determination that the 2022 Final Rule is not the best reading of the statute, as well as congressional intent on immigration and welfare. As noted in the NPRM, DHS is removing the 2022 Final Rule to restore the longstanding case-by-case and inherently discretionary nature of public charge inadmissibility determinations expressly intended by Congress when mandating officers make these determinations in their opinion considering certain enumerated non-exhaustive factors at a minimum. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). The Secretary determined rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is appropriate to ensure officers are making public charge inadmissibility determinations in line with the statute and relevant precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52186-87 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS believes relevant precedent decisions that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades and, where applicable, recent circuit case law will provide officers with sufficient guidance to conduct individualized determinations based on the specific facts and circumstances of each alien's case. DHS believes this approach falls within the explicit discretionary authority Congress delegated to the Secretary. 40 Therefore, DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, and subsequent administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility consistent with the statute and applicable precedent, is well within the Secretary's authority. It is also consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA. See 8 U.S.C. 1601. Therefore, this final rule does not reflect an exercise of unchecked power or unauthorized flexibility contrary to congressional intent. 40 See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394-395 (2024) (explaining that in some cases, a statute may authorize an agency to exercise discretion, such as by expressly delegating authority to define a particular statutory term, by empowering an agency to prescribe rules to fill up the details of a statutory scheme, or by authorizing an agency to regulate, subject to certain limits). Finally, DHS disagrees that it is interpreting the term “public charge” in this final rule, or that any such interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning, history, or tradition. As proposed and discussed previously, this final rule is putting forth no definition of the term “public charge.” As discussed in the NPRM, there is no single settled meaning of the term and courts have differed in their positions regarding what the term encompasses, as well as what DHS can consider when making public charge inadmissibility determinations. 41 DHS does not dispute that the Supreme Court has tasked courts with ascertaining the best meaning of ambiguous statutes or that a number of federal courts found different meanings for the term. DHS, in operating the national immigration system, is not precluded from eliminating regulatory definitions and rigid frameworks that have not been definitively or uniformly endorsed as reflecting the best meaning of statutory terms, particularly where Congress delegated broad discretion to DHS over immigration and the public charge ground of inadmissibility. DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to decades of agency practice, consistent with statute and binding precedent. 41 The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits opined on the plain language of the statute as well as the historical/traditional meaning of the term public charge but did not reach mutually consistent decisions. The Fourth Circuit, for example, disagreed that the primarily dependent standard is embedded into the text of the statute, as well as that the term has a fixed historical meaning and emphasized that instead the statute grants the executive extensive and ultimate discretion over inadmissibility determinations, including the consideration of a non-finite list of factors. See, CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 242-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (rehearing en banc granted but the case was subsequently voluntarily dismissed). Other circuits focused on identifying limitations on the meaning of the term, and ensuring that the term public charge is not defined in such a way that would deem someone receiving a small amount of supplemental benefits for a short period of time inadmissible under the ground. See, e.g., New York v. DHS, 969 F.3d 42, 78 (2nd Cir. 2020); City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 981 F.3d 742, 759 (9th Cir. 2020); Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 229, 246 (7th Cir. 2020). The Seventh Circuit held that the term “public charge” has a “floor inherent in the words,” which requires a degree of dependence that goes beyond temporary receipt of supplemental in-kind benefits from any type of public agency. Id. Comment: A commenter stated that the “extraordinary breadth” of authority DHS exerts with the proposed rule, coupled with the economic significance of the action, also opens the proposed rule to major questions doctrine concerns under West Virginia v. EPA. 42 The commenter warned that courts would be skeptical to conclude Congress meant to confer this level of political and economic authority to DHS, writing that “reliance on Executive Orders to enact policy unmoored from statutory text and agency discretion has given rise to claims during this Administration that agency action is preordained.” 42 597 U.S. 697 (2022). Response: DHS disagrees that this final rule implicates the major questions doctrine as articulated in West Virgina v. EPA. The major questions doctrine is triggered when the agency claims regulatory authority of vast economic and political significance, and the asserted authority lacks clear congressional authorization. 43 43 Id. at 724. First, DHS has clear congressional authorization for this final rule. As discussed throughout this preamble, the INA provides that an alien is inadmissible if, “in the opinion of the consular officer or the Attorney General” (now the Secretary of Homeland Security), the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A). The statutory text does not define public charge or likely at any time to become a public charge and only requires officers to consider a non-exhaustive list of specified minimum factors. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches possess plenary authority over admission of aliens. 44 And the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) repeatedly recognized the inherently discretionary nature of the public charge inadmissibility determinations. 45 This statutory structure reflects an express delegation from Congress to the Secretary, explicit discretionary language (“in the opinion of”), and mandatory but non-exhaustive factors. Unlike the statutes at issue in West Virgina v. EPA, or Biden v. Nebraska , 46 Congress did not assign a narrow, technical function that DHS has transformed into sweeping economic regulation. Congress instead gave DHS broad discretion in an immigration inadmissibility context. Unlike cases where agencies argued for an expansion of authority or claimed transformative new regulatory powers, in this final rule DHS is doing the opposite: it is rescinding rigid regulatory definitions adopted in 2022; restoring individualized, discretionary adjudications that track the plain language of the statute; and returning to long-standing totality of the circumstances analysis. This administrative calibration is within the precise domain Congress delegated: immigration admissibility. 44 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 45 See, e.g., Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583 (Reg'l Comm'r 1974); Matter of Martinez-Lopez, 10 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964); Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131 (BIA 1977). 46 600 U.S. 477 (2023). Furthermore, the economic impact of this final rule does not alone trigger the major questions doctrine. The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) estimates potential transfer effects related to public benefits disenrollment, which is an indirect impact of the final rule. But the Supreme Court has made clear economic impact alone does not trigger the doctrine. In West Virginia v. EPA, the Court emphasized the doctrine applies when agencies claim the power to make decisions of “vast economic and political significance” in a manner inconsistent with their statutory design. 47 Admissibility determinations, which could impact aliens' decisions to disenroll from public benefits programs, are squarely within DHS's statutory domain. Importantly, this final rule does not purport to regulate public benefit eligibility; rather, public benefits eligibility remains governed by PRWORA and other statutes. Any economic effects are incidental to admissibility determinations Congress explicitly authorized DHS to make. Finally, immigration is an area of heightened executive authority given that the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the political branches' broad authority over admission and exclusion. 48 This final rule pertains to admission eligibility and adjustment of status, but it does not more broadly regulate aliens' or citizens' conduct or restructure domestic industries. 47 West Virginia, 597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022). 48 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). Finally, this final rule does not reflect a transformative expansion of agency power, it simply implicates existing delegated authority that DHS is tailoring to more closely reflect the plain language of the statute, national policy on self-sufficiency of aliens, and longstanding agency practice. Comment: Citing section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), a commenter remarked DHS's choice to rescind the public charge regulations without promulgating a replacement regulation is inconsistent with the INA, which explicitly provides that the Secretary “shall establish such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.” Response: DHS disagrees that it is required to promulgate a regulation to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule and notes this rulemaking is a permissible change in the manner in which DHS makes public charge inadmissibility determinations given prior interpretations of the statute were not the best interpretation. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). On the contrary, while the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates the process agencies must follow when issuing, amending, and rescinding regulations, it does not require agencies to replace a rescinded regulation. 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Indeed, an agency may change or rescind regulations as long as it provides a reasoned justification, 49 but it is not required to replace a rescinded regulation unless required by law. There is nothing in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), requiring DHS to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule with a new rule. Further, DHS notes there were no regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations from 1882 until the 2019 Final Rule. 49 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009). Although this is a change from the frameworks established since 1999, DHS emphasizes that it provided a reasoned justification for the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM and throughout this final rule, as well as an explanation as to why prior frameworks were lacking. 50 This position aligns with the plain language of section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), which the commenter cites—which by incorporating the phrase “as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority” grants the Secretary both authority and discretion over issuing regulations. In this case, the Secretary has determined that issuing replacement regulations is not necessary for carrying out his authority. Therefore, DHS will not issue a replacement rule. 50 Id. Comment: Some commenters said DHS's emphasis on the subjective nature of the public charge inadmissibility determination contradicts the INA, which vests discretionary authority with the Attorney General, not DHS. Specifically, the commenter suggests that it is only the opinion of the Attorney General, not the opinion of an individual DHS officer, that is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations. Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' interpretations of DHS' statutory authority. On March 1, 2003, functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to DHS. 51 Although several provisions of the INA discussed in this final rule refer exclusively to the “Attorney General,” such provisions are now read as referring to the Secretary by operation of the HSA. 52 DHS rejects the suggestion that only the Attorney General's (now, the Secretary's) opinion is relevant in the context of a public charge inadmissibility determination when an alien applies for admission or adjustment of status. Congress understood that the Attorney General and Secretary delegate authorities throughout the INA to officials serving under them. 53 DHS notes that no ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), contains language referencing DHS or DOJ officers; throughout the section, Congress referred to consular officers, the Attorney General, or the Secretary. DHS also notes that section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), states that the status of an alien “may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion” to that of an LPR. Congress knew that the Attorney General would not personally make millions of admissibility, adjustment of status, admission, and deportation decisions annually. 51 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, sections 402(3), 441, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178, 2192. 52 See 6 U.S.C. 202(3), 251, 271(b), 542 note, 557; 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), (g), 1551 note; Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2 (2019). 53 Specifically, section 102(b) of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112(b), states that the Secretary “. . . may delegate any of the Secretary's functions to any officer, employee, or organization unit of the Department.” In addition, section 103(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(4), states that “[the Secretary] may authorize any employee of the Service or the Department of Justice to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter. . .” See also, DHS Delegation No. 0150.1 (Jun. 5, 2003); DHS Delegation 07010.3 Rev. 03.2 (May 11, 2005). Comment: One commenter suggested that the rule is unjustified because DHS does not identify relevant post-1999 or post-2022 laws, data, or experience not already considered by INS, USCIS, or any other component or predecessor of DHS that would justify this change. The commenter requested that DHS identify and describe the legal authorities and other information, apart from those that predated the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the 2022 Final Rule, that DHS relied on in developing a new framework. Response: DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule and return to a broader exercise of case-by-case discretion is based on the same statutes, authorities, and other resources that served as the basis and justification for the 2022 Final Rule. DHS rejects this commenter's suggestion that DHS cannot rely on previously considered authorities. On the contrary, DHS may rely on the same authorities underlying the now rescinded 2022 Final Rule so long as DHS provides a reasoned explanation for coming to a different conclusion, which it has, and as long as the new approach is consistent with the plain language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). 54 DHS explained the change and why DHS believes it to be a better reading of the statute. As explained in other comment responses, DHS has the express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, and finds support for this rule in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), the national statements of immigration policy and welfare in PRWORA, and the sources listed in the NPRM. See 90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025). 54 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009) (holding that an agency “need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”). Comment: Commenters stated that DHS's reliance on section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), to support its argument that Congress intended consideration of past benefit receipt in all contexts outside of certain battered aliens is flawed. One commenter said the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provisions speak broadly about benefits but do not support DHS's contention that Congress intended DHS to consider receipt of benefits beyond those considered in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. Another commenter said the language in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is not an express command to consider all means-tested public benefits, calling the proposal “particularly dubious” because Congress repeatedly expanded public benefit programs for certain aliens. Response: DHS disagrees that section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), does not support considering the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefit in public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule. Section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), 55 prohibits considering the receipt of benefits by certain victims of violence and trafficking in applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status and was codified to ensure they could access the full range of support services necessary for recovery and cooperation with law enforcement, including healthcare, housing, food assistance, and other non-cash benefits. 56 The fact that Congress expressly precluded the consideration of receipt of benefits by this population strongly suggests that, absent such an exception, Congress intended DHS to consider the receipt of benefits when other aliens applied for immigrant visas and adjustment of status. “`Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ” 57 Similarly, when Congress creates a specific exception to a general rule, it is presumed that Congress intended the general rule to apply in all other circumstances. 58 Accordingly, section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), reflects that Congress understood that unless expressly exempted, an alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits would be considered in all other applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status. 55 This provision was enacted by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Public Law 106-386 sec. 1505(f) (2000). 56 See, e.g., Public Law 106-386 sec. 107(b) (2000). 57 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 58 See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“ `Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.' ”) (internal citations omitted). As noted in the NPRM, the term benefits in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is properly interpreted as including both cash means-tested public benefits and non-cash means-tested public benefits since Congress did not limit benefits to cash assistance for income maintenance as the commenters suggest; it used the broad term “benefits.” 90 FR 52168, 52187 (Nov. 19, 2025). Additionally, Congress cross-referenced 8 U.S.C. 1641(c), which defines Federal public benefits as “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and . . . any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States,” clearly including both cash and non-cash benefits. 8 U.S.C. 1611 and 1641(c). The absence of limiting language, combined with Congress's intent to provide comprehensive support to victims, demonstrates that the exemption applies to all forms of public assistance, not just cash benefits. As Congress's prohibition on consideration of benefits for these victims is properly interpreted to include both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits, DHS believes that it is proper to consider the receipt of both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits for all other cases as part of the public charge inadmissibility determination under this final rule. Comment: A commenter expressed concern that DHS is relying on a series of decades-old immigration statutes originating from the 1882 Immigration Act to justify stricter policies, stating that this represents an unjustifiable regression that conflicts with Congress's tailored framework in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Response: DHS disagrees that it is impermissibly relying on decades-old immigration statutes to justify this final rule. DHS notes that the public charge ground of inadmissibility as it exists today has deep roots in the earliest immigration laws, as explained in detail in the NPRM. 90 FR 52168, 52174-52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS's interpretation and application of the public charge inadmissibility ground in this rulemaking is properly guided by the more than centuries-old history of this provision, the current statutory language at section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), relevant case law, and Congress's express statements of national policy with respect to immigration and welfare. Where Congress has not materially altered the statutory framework, DHS is tasked with implementing the statute as written. Reliance on the historical and current statutory framework for the public charge ground of inadmissibility is legally appropriate. 2. Congressional Intent and Historical Application Comment: Commenters expressed support for the proposed rule, stating that the rule better reflects congressional intent. In particular, one commenter stated that the definitions in the 2022 Final Rule were too rigid, artificially narrowed categories of public benefits considered, and frustrated Congress's intent that immigration policy discourage dependence on public resources. Another commenter stated that the rule returns the decision-making process to a more balanced, common-sense approach where the totality of the circumstances, not just one or two factors, may be considered. Response: DHS notes that the 2022 Final Rule emphasized seven factors that must be considered, not one or two factors as the commenter indicated. However, DHS agrees otherwise with these commenters; this final rule better reflects congressional intent. First, the commenter is correct that the 2022 Final Rule unduly limited DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA. See 8 U.S.C. 1601. Second, DHS agrees that the 2022 Final Rule prevented DHS officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were limited to considering seven factors (five required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances. 59 As a result, DHS agrees that it is essential to remove these limiting regulations in order to follow congressional intent. 60 59 For example, when considering the challenge to the 2019 Final Rule, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the language in the provision indicates that the executive has extensive and ultimate discretion over the relevant determination, especially since Congress embedded discretion into the statutory scheme such as by identifying minimum, but not exclusive, factors for consideration. See CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 242-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (request for rehearing en banc granted on December 3, 2020, but the appeal was later dismissed). DHS believes that this rescission will be more consistent with congressional intent as it would restore ultimate discretion for officers to consider not just the minimum statutory factors but also any other information the officer deems relevant to a public charge inadmissibility determination. 60 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (“The elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied. They are not defined by statute, but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting. ”) (emphasis added); Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974) (“Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner.”). DHS also agrees that while Congress identified five minimum factors officers must consider, Congress intended, and the courts have endorsed, that the totality of an individual alien's circumstances, not a rigid number of regulatory factors, should be taken into consideration when determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. Although the statute does not expressly include a totality of the circumstances test, this test “has been developed in several Service, BIA, and Attorney General decisions and has been codified in the Service regulations implementing the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.” 61 Federal courts have also endorsed this “totality of the circumstances” test. 62 As a result, officers had made public charge inadmissibility determinations considering all facts and circumstances in the totality prior to the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule. DHS will continue to do so, consistent with past precedent decisions, under this final rule. 63 61 See 64 FR 28689, 28690 (May 26, 1999) (citing Zambrano v. INS, 972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992), judgment vacated on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993)). 62 See, e.g., Zambrano v. INS, 972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992), judgment vacated on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993). 63 Matter of A-, 19 I&N Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1988) (“The traditional test applied by the Service to determine whether an alien is likely to become a public charge is “a prediction based on the totality of the alien's circumstances” as presented in the individual case.”); Matter of Perez, 15 I&N Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1974) (“The determination of whether an alien is likely to become a public charge under section 212(a)(15) is a prediction based upon the totality of the alien's circumstances at the time he or she applies for an immigrant visa or admission to the United States.”); Matter of Martinez-Lopez, 10 I&N Dec. 409, 421-22 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964) (in determining whether a person is likely to become a public charge, factors to consider include age, health, and physical condition, physical or mental defects which might affect earning capacity, vocation, past record of employment, current employment, offer of employment, number of dependents, existing conditions in the United States, sufficient funds or assurances of support by relatives or friends in the United States, bond or undertaking, or any specific circumstances reasonably tending to show that the burden of supporting the alien is likely to be cast on the public.). Comment: One commenter said that the proposed rule ignores decades of practice and contradicts congressional intent. Another wrote that Congress did not intend for the public charge ground of inadmissibility to punish people for using temporary or supplemental assistance while others opined that Congress did not intend for officers to consider an infinite set of factors. One asserts that Congress's silence as to whether additional factors can or should be considered was not intended to permit consideration of infinite factors and that Congress did not intend the statute to include a “catch-all” provision. In their view, the language “at a minimum” in the statute does not imply contemplation of factors not listed because the must-consider factors are complemented by one additional item that may be considered—the Form I-864. Response: DHS disagrees that this rule ignores or contradicts congressional intent. In fact, Congress made clear in PRWORA that aliens within the nation's borders should be self-sufficient and not dependent on public resources to meet their needs. As set forth in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge are inadmissible to the United States unless a statutory exception applies. While DHS agrees that the broader discretionary approach to public charge inadmissibility determinations resulting from this rule is a departure from the 1999, 2019, and 2022 public charge efforts, it notes Congress authorized the Secretary to determine how to implement this provision. The Secretary determined, as he is authorized to do, that DHS needs to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that reflect Congress's intent when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA. Indeed, with this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard permitting officers to consider any and all factors relevant to an individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, consistent with precedent. 64 64 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (“The elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied. They are not defined by statute, but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.” ) (emphasis added); Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974) (“Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner.”). Additionally, DHS agrees Congress made clear that officers must consider certain factors; however, we disagree that those factors are a limited, structured framework with defined parameters. The statute lists the five factors DHS officers must consider “at a minimum,” language that clearly does not preclude the consideration of other factors. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Congress created the broad, non-exhaustive, and discretionary framework DHS will follow upon rescission of the unduly rigid 2022 Final Rule. As discussed thoroughly in the NPRM, the Secretary determined the 2022 Final Rule is overly restrictive and prevents DHS officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations that align with the longstanding national policy set by Congress. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also disagrees that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will lead to potential consideration of infinite factors, as DHS will limit consideration to only relevant factors; i.e., factors bearing on an alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting, consistent with precedent decisions. 65 65 See Matter of Vindman, 16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977). 3. Administrative Law Concerns a. Request To Extend the Comment Period Comment: Several commenters requested an extended comment period on the proposed rule, noting the 30-day comment period overlapping with a significant Federal holiday and arguing that that is not consistent with Federal law and the APA in particular, and stating the time provided was insufficient to respond to a rule of significant scope, lack of clarity, and potential impacts. A commenter remarked that the apparently rushed approach, combined with the lack of a replacement framework, suggests the rulemaking is driven by predetermined policy preferences not careful consideration of statutory requirements and practical implementation, while another asserted the compressed timeframe was an effort to curtail negative comments. Commenters referenced longer public comment periods in DHS's past rulemaking efforts, including past public charge rules, as support for an extension and various comments requested between an additional 120 and 150 days (some for a total of 180 days) to enable sufficient time for all stakeholders, discussion and consideration of the data, and to provide comment on the potential impacts of the proposed rule. One commenter cited caselaw to support the insufficiency of a 30-day comment period, stating the purposes of “notice and comment requirements are `(1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.' ” 66 66 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); see also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The purpose of the comment period is to allow interested members of the public to communicate information, concerns, and criticisms to the agency during the rule-making process.”) Response: DHS believes the 30-day comment period provided an adequate opportunity for public input and declines to extend the comment period. DHS agrees with commenters regarding the purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking in that the APA is silent regarding the duration of public comment periods, and neither it nor relevant caselaw establish a minimum duration applicable in all cases. 5 U.S.C. 553. Often, agencies, including DHS in the past, provide a 60-day comment period consistent with the recommendation in Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, particularly when the rulemaking is broad, includes new policies not previously considered by the regulated public or has significant impacts on the regulated public. DHS emphasizes this final rule is not broad but narrow in scope since it only covers a single ground of inadmissibility. Further, it does not include new policies not previously considered by the regulated public since DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the approach that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades before the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. While a 30-day comment period was shorter than the 60 days recommended in E.O. 12866, DHS believes in this instance 30 days was sufficient for the public to review, consider, and comment on the proposed rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS notes that it received 5,882 public comments during the 30-day comment period, 67 including substantive, high-quality comments from attorneys, Federal, State, and local elected officials, and advocacy organizations who provided detailed information and, in some instances, raised significant issues to which DHS is responding in this final rule. As such, an extension of the comment period would not have been helpful or necessary. 67 As discussed elsewhere in this final rule, an additional 2,964 public comments were received during the second part of the comment period applicable only to the associated information collections. As stated in the NPRM, DHS believes it is in the best interest of the United States and its citizens to ensure public benefits do not create an incentive for immigration contrary to the INA and PRWORA. In acting expeditiously to remove regulations requiring officers to ignore the receipt of a large swath of public benefits when making public charge inadmissibility determinations, DHS is returning the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the congressional intent underlying the INA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA. Finally, DHS strongly disagrees it provided a shorter comment period to curtail negative public comments or failed to adequately consider practical impacts of the rulemaking in favor of predetermined policy preferences. As discussed in this preamble, during the comment period, DHS received a number of comments opposing the proposed rule. In addition to carefully explaining and addressing the anticipated impacts of the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM, DHS has carefully considered and here responds to public comments in this final rule. DHS agrees with commenters, however, that every agency rulemaking reflects the policy objectives of the administration which initiated the rulemaking and reflects the will of the American people who elected the public officials heading a particular administration. So too, in this case, this rulemaking reflects current policy objectives. DHS published a proposed rule, carefully considered the public comments received, and provided substantive responses, in full compliance with the APA. b. Future Guidance and Compliance With the APA Comment: Several commenters requested DHS commit to developing future public charge inadmissibility standards through transparent notice-and-comment rulemaking, not solely through subregulatory policy tools. Several commenters stated, if DHS decides to develop an alternative rule, it must be open to full public notice and comment along with any guidance or tools created to direct officers' decisions. Multiple commenters said asking for open-ended feedback and recommendations on what to include in such tools is not a substitute for notice and comment. Response: As indicated in the NPRM and other comment responses, DHS is not issuing regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS is removing regulatory provisions that unduly hampered officers when making inadmissibility determinations. USCIS will issue nonbinding subregulatory guidance that will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule. This guidance will be a general statement of policy that will not have the force and effect of law and will thus be exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. USCIS plans to include the new guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual, which is available on the USCIS website, is transparent to the public, and will replace the existing guidance reflecting the 2022 Final Rule. If regulations are needed or would be helpful to the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility in the future, DHS will comply with the APA requirements in issuing any such regulations. Comment: Several commenters objected to eliminating regulatory standards in favor of undefined policy and interpretive tools without notice-and-comment rulemaking, arguing it denies the public a meaningful opportunity to review the adjudication standards and likely violates the APA. The commenters cited Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association 68 and Mendoza v. Perez 69 to warn subregulatory guidance cannot create new substantive standards, alter statutory requirements, or expand adjudicator discretion in ways that affect rights. They stated that public charge inadmissibility determinations require clear, publicly vetted regulations, not internal guidance, and warned relying on future guidance would invite inconsistent, arbitrary USCIS decisions across offices, leave families uncertain which programs are safe to use, and chill participation in health, nutrition, and housing supports. Commenters urged DHS to withdraw the rulemaking or clarify its intentions, develop the rule internally, and reissue a more detailed proposed rule or a new NPRM if substantive changes are intended, noting that bypassing the APA would allow continual policy shifts without public input and create ongoing uncertainty. 68 575 U.S. 92 (2015). 69 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Response: DHS disagrees that this rule will lead to arbitrary outcomes and that any future guidance will alter statutory requirements or conflict with the APA and related case law. DHS will not withdraw the NPRM, and is issuing this final rule to conclude the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS also disagrees that any clarification of its intentions is needed. The NPRM was explicit about rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and freeing officers from arbitrary and undue limitations on the exercise of congressionally-authorized discretion. DHS is committed to following the law, including the APA, and does not intend to issue regulations or promulgate substantive rules through subregulatory guidance without notice and comment rulemaking. As discussed in other comment responses, the subregulatory guidance USCIS publishes in the USCIS Policy Manual will guide, but not prescribe, public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the context of adjustment of status applications. This guidance will explain how officers will be able to consider the receipt of any means-tested public benefits by the alien and will ensure officers fully consider this and any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances, as Congress intended. Comment: Commenters supported the creation of appropriate interpretive tools, but said these should supplement, not supplant, Federal regulations, requesting regulations not be removed until after such tools are developed and any timeline appropriately reflect a period for soliciting and incorporating public input on these tools before they are finalized. Another commenter said instead of including details of the policies or interpretative tools in the NPRM, DHS elected to issue a “vague” NPRM and issue the tools later, which likely violates the APA at 5 U.S.C. 533 because the public is entitled to notice and comment rulemaking on impactful matters, especially those implicating the potential use of public benefits. Commenters asserted DHS should withdraw the NPRM because it cannot radically expand the definition of “public charge” without explicitly proposing a new public charge rule subject to notice and comment. Commenters stated that interpretive tools must undergo the full notice-and- comment process, citing Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA 70 and General Electric Co. v. EPA, 71 noting soliciting feedback is not a substitute for notice and comment. They claimed that without clearer guidance, it would be very difficult to advise clients on the potential public charge implications of certain public benefits. 70 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 71 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Other commenters said the 2025 NPRM explicitly seeks a return to policies similar to the 2019 Final Rule, while attempting an end-run around the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, noting to justify a new substantive public charge rule, DHS must go through the full APA-mandated process, as the first Trump Administration did in 2018-2019 and the Biden Administration did in 2022. The commenters warned simply rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and replacing it with “appropriate policy and interpretive tools” ( i.e., not a “legislative rule” under the APA) would be a clear violation of statute with no purpose other than haste and avoidance of public comment. A few commenters requested DHS use the full notice-and-comment process for any policy or tools in public charge determinations, clearly reaffirm any changes would apply only prospectively (in acknowledgement of the reliance interests) and not penalize individuals who relied in good faith on prior rules. Response: As indicated in the responses above, DHS disagrees with these commenters because the NPRM was not vague; rather, it clearly explained the changes DHS was considering and the reasoning behind them. DHS will not issue substantive rules without notice and comment rulemaking. Further, DHS is not making an “end run” around the APA's notice and comment requirements. As explained in the NPRM and elsewhere in this final rule, there are some substantive differences between the 2019 Final Rule and this final rule. For example, the 2019 Final Rule limited officer discretion. Specifically, the 2019 final rule included strict definitions, such as the term “likely at any time to become a public charge.” This definition included a new dependence threshold. The 2019 Final Rule also included regular and heavily weighted factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, and specific exclusions from consideration of certain public benefits (when such benefits were received by certain populations). DHS now finds this limited discretion is not aligned with Congressional intent. USCIS will issue guidance for officers to consider when making individualized public charge inadmissibility determinations, consistent with the INA and established precedent. The APA's notice and comment requirements apply to legislative rules but not to interpretative rules or general statements of policy. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). The Supreme Court has long recognized the distinction. 72 Interpretive rules or general statements of policy are lawful so long as they do not impose new rights or obligations or bind agency decisionmakers. 73 DHS disagrees that the guidance and interpretive tools it plans to issue would fail under Appalachian Power or General Electric because in those cases the guidance used mandatory language, left no room for agency discretion, imposed concrete regulatory obligations, the regulated parties reasonably believed that noncompliance would trigger enforcement, and they had no realistic alternative but compliance. 74 72 See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015 (“Interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.”); Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (interpretive rules may be issued without notice and comment). 73 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Mining Association v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 74 See, generally, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002). DHS has determined regulations are unnecessary for the effective implementation of the public charge ground of inadmissibility and will not issue replacement regulations at this time. DHS believes the statute and applicable precedent decisions that guided the public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guideposts for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. DHS also disagrees that it would be possible or appropriate to delay the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule pending the issuance of new agency guidance because absent a rescission of existing regulations, USCIS would be bound by the prior administration's policies reflected in that regulatory framework when issuing subregulatory guidance to officers. By removing the 2022 Final Rule, DHS is reestablishing officer discretion within the existing statutory and precedential framework. Any guidance that USCIS issues will not amount to a binding rule but rather guide USCIS officer discretion in the context of adjustment of status applications without limiting it or prescribing adjudicatory outcomes. Comment: A commenter warned DHS cannot lawfully rescind binding regulations and substitute undisclosed subregulatory guidance to effect substantive policy changes while avoiding public participation and judicial review, noting that a November 6, 2025, Department of State (DOS) cable to consular posts broadened the public charge factors and evidence for visa adjudications. The commenter said the cable reportedly directs officers to deny visas unless applicants affirmatively show they will never become a public charge; treats non-cash benefits, charitable aid, and other lawful support as potential evidence of inadmissibility; and deepens financial scrutiny (previewing Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) updates) forcing applicants to produce extensive financial documentation and imposing disproportionate burdens on low-income, credit-thin, intermittently employed, or unstably housed individuals, an outcome the commenter contended plainly violates the APA. Response: DHS refers commenters to DOS on the issue of the DOS cable and the FAM. With respect to the evidentiary burden applicable to aliens seeking adjustment of status with USCIS after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS has proposed changes to the Form I-485 and disclosed the relevant paperwork burden estimate on which the public was invited to comment in conjunction with this rulemaking during the applicable 60-day comment period consistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) and implementing regulations. 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., 5 CFR part 1320. As with all other adjudications, should USCIS officers require more evidence or clarification of information or evidence included with the Form I-485, USCIS may issue Requests for Evidence (RFEs) or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs). c. Good Cause To Forgo Notice and Comment Rulemaking Comment: One commenter stated if DHS invoked the APA's good-cause exception to bypass notice-and-comment or the 30-day delayed effective date, it is improper for a rule of this scope absent a genuine, immediate emergency, since courts construe good cause narrowly; administrative convenience or policy urgency does not suffice. Response: When issuing this final rule, DHS did not invoke the good cause exception to the APA's notice and comment requirements but rather published a proposed rule with a 30-day comment period, and is publishing this final rule with a 60-day effective date, as required by the Congressional Review Act and in compliance with the APA which requires a minimum of 30 days. See 5 U.S.C. 553 and 5 U.S.C. 801-808. d. Rule Is Arbitrary and Capricious i. Lack of Reasoned Justification Comment: Multiple commenters asserted the NPRM should be struck down under 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because the APA requires a reasoned explanation for rescinding or changing an existing rule beyond just a new administration. Some commenters asserted the rule is arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of a sufficient justification for DHS's changed position, the likelihood of inconsistent agency interpretations, and the failure to consider reliance interests stemming from prior rules and guidance. Citing to the litigation on the 2019 Final Rule, the commenters added the rule would also be inconsistent with the INA and it departs from the well-settled meaning of public charge. Another commenter stated, under basic principles of administrative law, “reasoned decision making” requires agencies to rely on expertise and coherent standards, not unguided intuition. Response: DHS disagrees with commenters that the NPRM or this final rule is arbitrary and capricious. Importantly, DHS is not providing a definition for public charge in this final rule. Moreover, there is no single well-settled meaning of the term public charge that definitively includes the consideration of some public benefits but not others, notwithstanding the caselaw commenters cite. 75 As discussed in the NPRM, the INA does not define “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” Instead, Congress provided a framework of non-exhaustive minimum factors for consideration (age, health, family status, assets, resources, and financial status, and education and skills and left it to the agency's discretion to determine whether an alien is inadmissible under the ground. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A) and (B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B); 90 FR 52168, 52186, 52187-88, 52175 (Nov. 19, 2025). 75 DHS acknowledges that there is a general understanding as reflected in certain dictionary definitions that public charge is generally a person in economic distress who is dependent on the government for his or her support. However, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have defined the term in statute or through case law. While there had been early 20th century Supreme Court precedent which found an alien inadmissible under the totality of the circumstances approach focusing on the labor market where the alien was headed and which seemed to consider the term narrowly to mean something akin to a pauper ( i.e., someone destitute and unable to work), the case was overridden by Congress. See CASA de Maryland v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020) (“In all events, there is considerable doubt as to Gegiow's [v. Uhl's, 239 U.S. 3 (1915)] continued relevance, as Congress amended the Immigration Act two years later to nullify Gegiow's restrictive interpretation of the statute.”) (internal citations omitted). Administrative and judicial precedent decisions have consistently recognized the public charge inadmissibility determination is inherently subjective and discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the alien's circumstances. DHS notes these precedent decisions predate both the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the regulatory definitions promulgated in 2019 and 2022. As indicated in Matter of Harutunian, the elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied; they are not defined by statute but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting. 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974). Similarly, as stated in Matter of Martinez-Lopez, the statute “requires more than a showing of a possibility that the alien will require public support. Some specific circumstance . . . must be present.” 10 I&N Dec. 409, 421-22 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964). Finally, as stated in Matter of A-, the “traditional test . . . is `a prediction based on the totality of the alien's circumstances' as presented in the individual case.” 19 I&N Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1988) (citation omitted). As DHS noted in the NPRM, there has never been a single, uniform, or “well settled” definition of public charge. 90 FR 52168, 52174 (Nov. 19, 2025). Instead, the meaning evolved over time and has been subject to varying administrative interpretations. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950 noted: “[s]ince the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination . . . rests within the discretion of the consular officers or [INS].” 90 FR 52168, 52181 (Nov. 19, 2025). Certain circuit courts recognized the statute grants the executive “extensive and ultimate discretion” and the term “public charge” does not have a fixed historical meaning. 76 Finally, as stated in the NPRM, past agency guidance and practice in place before the 2019 Final Rule, including the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and prior administrative decisions, have always emphasized a flexible, fact-specific approach, not a rigid or narrow definition. Congress, in enacting PRWORA and IIRIRA, did not codify a specific definition but instead reinforced the officer's discretion to consider all relevant evidence. 90 FR 52168, 52182-83, 52188-89 (Nov. 19, 2025). For these reasons, rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and restoring broader officer discretion is not arbitrary and capricious; it is not contrary to a well-settled meaning of public charge, because no such settled meaning exists. 76 See, e.g., CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 242-44 (4th Cir. 2020). In addition, DHS disagrees this rule is arbitrary and capricious because it lacks justification or a reasoned explanation. DHS agrees that, under FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), a change in agency regulations requires a reasoned explanation: the agency must acknowledge the change, provide good reasons for it, and indicate why it believes the new position is better. DHS satisfied these requirements in the NPRM and in this final rule. DHS explicitly acknowledged it was proposing to rescind the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations established by the 2022 Final Rule and consistently provided good reasons for the proposed rescission. 77 DHS provided detailed, reasoned explanations for the change, including explaining the 2022 Final Rule is not the best implementation of the statute, is inconsistent with congressional intent, is unduly restrictive, and hampers DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). While rescinding the 2022 Final Rule is a departure—in varying degrees—from the three prior efforts over the last 27 years related to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS is not required to retain any of the prior regulations and policy guidance the Secretary determined, upon a review of guidance and public-facing information dating back to 1946, are not the best way to implement the expansive, fact-specific, totality of the circumstances, and discretionary public charge inadmissibility determination Congress put into place. See 90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025). 77 See 90 FR 52168, 52169-52170 (Nov. 19, 2025) (“DHS proposes to rescind the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations . . . Rescission would restore broader discretion to evaluate all pertinent facts and align with long-standing policy . . .”). The NPRM further stated the 2022 Final Rule straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA by limiting what public benefits DHS can consider in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven factors outlined in the regulations. 90 FR 52168, 52169-52170 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also explained that both the 2019 and 2022 rules provided a finite list of factors officers are required to consider without providing officers the authority to consider other factors relevant in any individual case, which is inconsistent with the discretionary and case-specific framework Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-52181 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also explained why it believes that public charge inadmissibility determinations after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will be more consistent with congressional intent. Specifically, DHS noted that officers will be able to use good judgment and discretion to make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances, rather than being limited by rigid regulatory definitions and standards. 90 FR 52168, 52194 (Nov. 19, 2025). Crucially, DHS explained that the 2022 Final Rule's approach including the primary dependence standard may have resulted in USCIS finding aliens eligible for adjustment of status even when their past receipt of means-tested public benefits may have demonstrated they lacked self-sufficiency and were likely at any time to become a public charge, due to officers' inability to consider all benefits the alien depended on and any other relevant case-specific factor that has bearing on the inadmissibility determination. 90 FR 52168, 52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). In fact, DHS provided multiple reasons to support the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81, 52186 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also discussed the underlying reasons for past policies, including their limitations in the NPRM. Specifically, DHS noted that both the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule attempted to provide clarity and predictability by specifying a finite list of factors and benefits to be considered in public charge determinations, however in so doing these rules “severely and unduly limited the factors that DHS could consider in making a public charge inadmissibility determination,” which is inconsistent with the broad, discretionary standard Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also discussed the 2019 Final Rule in various parts of the NPRM and determined that it was not a truly viable alternative, because, while closer to congressional intent behind section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA, that rule also prescribed a rigid and complex regulatory scheme that unnecessarily constrained officer discretion. Furthermore, in proposing the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS also provided a thorough review of statutory history, prior administrative practice, and case law, and explained the new approach is grounded in the agency's expertise and longstanding precedent. 78 Finally, DHS acknowledged the existence of reliance interests and specifically requested comments on what aspects of the 2022 Final Rule might have engendered such reliance interests, and how DHS should best address such reliance interests given its stated policy objectives. 90 FR 52168, 52193 (Nov. 19, 2025). In this final rule, DHS is responding to public comments raising specific reliance interests and has made clarifications in this final rule to further address those interests. 78 See, e.g., 90 FR 52168, 52182-52187 (Nov. 19, 2025) (discussing the totality of the circumstances test and relevant BIA/Attorney General decisions). For all of these reasons, DHS has established why the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is reasonable given the broad congressional delegation, and the fact that there is no settled meaning of public charge. DHS has provided a detailed, reasoned explanation for the change, identified the deficiencies in the prior rules, explained why the new approach is preferable, and addressed reliance interests and the need for coherent, expertise-driven discretionary determinations. Comment: Some commenters stated expanding the public charge inadmissibility framework so broadly—to potentially encompass working U.S. citizens with income—lacks historical or rational support and would be arbitrary and capricious. Citing the Supreme Court's requirement in FCC v. Fox Television that agencies justify disregarding prior facts and reliance interests, commenters noted the proposal offers no evidence the 2022 Rule is unworkable or inconsistent with the INA, identifies no enforcement problems or data, and fails to account for the chilling effects on immigrants, domestic violence- survivors, and nonprofit service providers. One commenter stated the Supreme Court addressed the very issue of rescinding automobile safety standards without promulgating new regulations in the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (“ State Farm ”), finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. Several commenters warned DHS has not provided the necessary justification for abandoning longstanding interpretations or for why the codified provisions of the 2022 Final Rule could not instead be modified in response to H.R.1. Response: DHS disagrees that the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious or lacks a reasonable basis or sufficient explanation. As detailed above, DHS provided an ample reasonable basis for removing the 2022 Final Rule, explained removing the rule restores officer discretion, and aligns the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility closer to the congressional intent. Neither State Farm 79 nor FCC v. Fox Television 80 requires DHS to establish the 2022 Final Rule is unworkable or that it is inconsistent with the INA. The Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television held an agency does not need to show its prior policy or interpretation is unworkable to justify a change, explaining an agency may change its policy as long as it provides a reasoned explanation for the change, acknowledges the shift, and addresses any reliance interests. 81 The Court specifically rejected the requirement for heightened justification, stating an agency “need not demonstrate. . .that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” 82 Instead, the agency must simply explain the new policy and why it believes it is preferable. 83 This principle allows agencies flexibility to adapt and revise policies without being constrained by the workability or enforceability of previous approaches. 84 All of this being said, DHS believes it established in the NPRM the 2022 Final Rule was not the best interpretation of th [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-14539. Public record. Not legal advice.