# Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-14439 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** July 17, 2026 - **Citation:** 91 FR 44976 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 8 CFR Parts 214, 248, and 274a [DHS Docket No. ICEB-2025-0001] RIN 1653-AA95 Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media AGENCY: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is amending its regulations to change the admission period in the F, J, and I classifications from duration of status to an admission for a fixed time period, and additional changes to admission and extension requirements. This final rule will provide additional protections and oversight of these nonimmigrant categories and will allow DHS to better evaluate whether these nonimmigrants are maintaining status while temporarily in the United States. This final rule provides amendments to the proposed rule covering this topic that was published in the Federal Register on August 28, 2025. DATES: This rule has been classified as a major rule subject to congressional review. The effective date is September 15, 2026. However, at the conclusion of the congressional review, if the effective date has been changed, DHS will publish a document in the Federal Register to establish the actual effective date or to terminate the rule. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, 500 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20536-5901. Telephone 202-732-6960 (not a toll-free number). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Acronyms and Abbreviations ACGME Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education ADIS Arrival and Departure Information System ARO Alternative Responsible Officer AUD Admit Until Date CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection CFR Code of Federal Regulations CPT Curricular Practical Training DOJ U.S. Department of Justice DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security D/S Duration of Status DoS U.S. Department of State DSO Designated School Official EAD Employment Authorization Document ECFMG Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates ED U.S. Department of Education ELT English language training EOS Extension of Stay ESL English as a second language FY Fiscal year GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 INA Immigration and Nationality Act INS U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking NIH National Institutes of Health OPT Optional Practical Training PDSO Principal Designated School Officials POE Port of Entry PRC People's Republic of China RFE Request for Evidence RO Responsible Officer SAR Special Administrative Region SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System SEVP Student and Exchange Visitor Program SSR Special Student Relief STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights USA PATRIOT Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services II. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action Studying and participating in exchange visitor and academic programs in the United States offers aliens access to world-renowned, individualized instructional and educational programs. Similarly, the United States allows foreign news and media members access to the United States as part of their foreign employment. Millions of aliens have come to the United States on a temporary basis in the F (academic student), 1 J (exchange visitor), 2 and I (representatives of foreign information media) 3 nonimmigrant classifications. 4 1 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 101(a)(15)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F). 2 See INA 101(a)(15)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J). 3 See INA 101(a)(15)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(I). 4 See Office of Homeland Security Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics-Yearbook 2023, Table 25, Nonimmigrant Admissions by Class of Admission: Fiscal Years 2014 to 2023 (last updated July 31, 2025), https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/yearbook-immigration-statistics/yearbook-2023. Unlike aliens in most nonimmigrant classifications who are admitted until a specific departure date, F, J, and I (except for some I nonimmigrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC)) nonimmigrants are admitted into the United States for an unspecified period of time to engage in activities authorized under their respective nonimmigrant classifications. This unspecified period of time is referred to as “duration of status” (D/S). D/S for F academic students is generally the time during which a student is pursuing a full course of study at an educational institution approved by DHS, or engaging in authorized practical training following completion of studies, plus authorized time to depart the country. 5 D/S for J exchange visitors is the time during which an exchange visitor is participating in an authorized program, plus authorized time to depart the country. 6 D/S for I representatives of foreign information media is the duration of their foreign employment duties in the United States. 7 For dependents of principal F, J, or I nonimmigrants, D/S generally corresponds with the principal's period of admission so long as the dependents are also complying with the requirements of their particular classifications. 8 5 Statutory and regulatory requirements restrict the duration of study for an alien who is admitted in F-1 status to attend a public high school to an aggregate of 12 months of study at any public high school(s). See INA 214(m), 8 U.S.C. 1184(m); see also 8 CFR 214.2(f)(5)(i) (2025). 6 See 8 CFR 214.2(j)(1)(ii) (2025) (explaining the initial admission period) and 8 CFR 214.2(j)(1)(iv) (2025) (explaining that extensions of stay can be obtained with a new Form DS-2019). See also 22 CFR 62.43 (permitting responsible officers to extend J nonimmigrant's program beyond the original DS-2019 end date according to length permitted for the specific program category). 7 8 CFR 214.2(i) (2025). 8 See 8 CFR 214.2(f)(3) (2025), (f)(5)(vi)(D) (2025) (discussing F-2 period of authorized admission); 214.2(j)(1)(ii) (2025), (j)(1)(iv) (2025) (discussing J-2 authorized period of admission); INA 101(a)(15)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(I); 22 CFR 41.52(c). Since D/S was first introduced in 1978 for F nonimmigrants and in 1985 for J and I nonimmigrants, 9 the number of F, J, and I nonimmigrants admitted each year into the United States has significantly increased. 10 In fiscal year (FY)2024 alone, there were over 1.8 million admissions in F status, a dramatic rise from when the legacy U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first shifted to D/S admission in 1979 and more than an 11 percent increase since FY 2023. 11 For example, in the 1980-81 school year, there were approximately 260,000 admissions in F status. 12 Similar growth in the J nonimmigrant population has also occurred over the past decades. In FY 2024, there were over 500,000 admissions in J status, up over 300 percent from the 141,213 J admissions into the United States in 1985 and up over 7 percent since FY 2023. 13 Finally, there were 37,330 admissions for I nonimmigrant foreign media representatives in the United States in FY 2024, over double the 16,753 admissions into the U.S. in 1985 and a nearly 15 percent increase from the prior fiscal year. 14 9 See Admission of Nonimmigrant Students for Duration of Status, 43 FR 54618 (Nov. 22, 1978) and Nonimmigrant Classes; Admission Period and Extensions of Stay, 50 FR 42006 (Oct. 17, 1985). 10 In 1985, when D/S was introduced for I and J nonimmigrants, there were 16,753 admissions in I status, 141,213 admissions in J status, and 251,234 admissions in F status. DOJ, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Oct. 1999), https://ohss.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1997.pdf. 11 In FY 2024, there were 1,816,480 admissions in F-1 status and 63,510 in F-2 status. See DHS Off. of Homeland Sec. Stat., Legal Immig. and Adjustment of Status Report Fiscal Year 2024, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, https://ohss.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025_0624_ohss_legal-immigration-adjustment-of-status-fy-2024q4_0.xlsx. Compare this to FY 2023, when there were 1,625,740 admissions in F-1 status and 61,910 in F-2 status. See DHS Off. of Homeland Sec. Stat., Legal Immig. and Adjustment of Status Report Fiscal Year 2023, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, https://ohss.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/2024_0507_ohss_legal-immigration-adjustment-of-status-fy-2023q4.xlsx. 12 In the 1980-81 school year, 312,000 nonimmigrant students were admitted into the United States. Approximately 83 percent of the nonimmigrant students admitted into the United States during the 1980-81 school year were in F status. Therefore, approximately 258,960 nonimmigrant students in F status were admitted into the United States in the 1980-81 school year. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off (GAO)., Controls Over Foreign Students in U.S. Postsecondary Institutions Are Still Ineffective; Proposed Legislation and Regulations May Correct Problems (Mar. 10, 1983), https://www.gao.gov/assets/hrd-83-27.pdf. 13 See FY 2024, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11, sum of J-1 514,170 and J-2 68,010. See also DHS FY 2023, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11, sum of J-1 481,280 and J-2 62,000. 14 See FY 2024, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11. See also DHS FY 2023, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11, sum of I nonimmigrants 32,470. The significant increase in the volume of F academic students, J exchange visitors, and I representatives of information media under D/S poses a challenge to DHS's ability to monitor and oversee these nonimmigrants while they are in the United States. During the length of their stay for D/S, a period of admission without a specified end date, these nonimmigrants are not required to have direct interaction with DHS, except for a few limited instances, such as when applying for employment authorization for optional practical training (OPT), or for reinstatement if they have failed to maintain status. Admission for D/S, in general, does not afford immigration officers enough predetermined opportunities to directly verify that aliens granted such nonimmigrant statuses are engaging only in those activities their respective classifications authorize while they are in the United States. In turn, this has undermined DHS's ability to effectively enforce compliance with the statutory inadmissibility grounds related to unlawful presence and has created incentives for fraud and abuse. For F and J visa holders, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifically states that aliens must have a residence in a foreign country which they have no intention of abandoning and seek to enter the United States temporarily, 15 yet, DHS has many examples of students and exchange visitors staying for decades in their student or exchange visitor status. 16 15 See INA sec. 101(a)(15)(F) and (J); 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F) and (J). 16 DHS has identified over 2,100 aliens who first entered as F-1 students between 2000 and 2010 and remain in active F-1 status as of Apr. 6, 2025. See Student Exchange Visitor Program analysis of data in the Student Exchange Visitor Information System and valid as of Apr. 6, 2025. The events of 9/11 highlighted the potential for abuse of the student visa. In the wake of 9/11, a Homeland Security Presidential Directive titled, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies directed, among other things, that a program be developed to track the status of foreign students. It also mandated that the government develop guidelines that may include control mechanisms such as limited duration of student status. 17 The 9/11 Commission reiterated the need to track foreign students and place tighter controls on student visas. 18 From these mandates and the statutory authorities described below, the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) was created, and the electronic Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was implemented. SEVIS is a DHS computer system that stores and processes information about foreign students and exchange visitors in the U.S. 17 See Homeland Sec. Presidential Directive 2, Combating Terrorism Through Immig. Policies (Oct. 29, 2001) (HSPD-2), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/text/20011030-2.html. 18 Kean, T.H. & Hamilton, L.H., The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York: Norton, at 81, 187 (2004). SEVIS ensures government agencies have essential data related to nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors to preserve national security. SEVIS also implements Section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1372), which requires DHS to collect current information from nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors continually during their stay in the United States. In addition, section 416 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56 (amending IIRIRA sec. 641), mandated full implementation and expansion of SEVIS. Given these mandates and concerns, DHS believes that the admission of F, J, and I nonimmigrants for D/S is not appropriate. The final rule replaces the D/S framework for F, J, and I nonimmigrants with a return to an admission period with a specific date upon which an authorized stay ends. Nonimmigrants who would like to stay in the United States beyond their fixed period of admission will need to apply directly to DHS for an extension of stay (EOS) 19 or gain readmission by traveling abroad and re-entering the United States. DHS anticipates that many F, J, and I nonimmigrants will be able to complete their respective activities within their period of admission. However, those who are unable will generally be able to request an extension of their period of admission from an immigration officer. DHS believes that this process will help to mitigate risks posed by aliens who seek to exploit these programs and live in the United States on a non-temporary basis in contradiction with the underlying statutory language that applies to their nonimmigrant status. 19 See generally 8 CFR 214.1(c) (setting forth the general EOS requirements applicable to most other nonimmigrants). Replacing admissions for D/S with admissions for a fixed time period of authorized stay is consistent with most other nonimmigrant categories. 20 It will provide additional protections and oversight of these nonimmigrant categories and will allow DHS to better evaluate whether these nonimmigrants are maintaining status while temporarily in the United States. DHS does not believe such a requirement will place an undue burden on F, J, and I nonimmigrants. Rather, providing F, J, and I nonimmigrants a fixed time period of authorized stay that will require them to apply to extend their stay, change their nonimmigrant status, or otherwise obtain authorization to remain in the United States ( e.g., adjustment of status) by the end of this specific admission period is consistent with requirements applicable to most other nonimmigrant classifications and consistent with the practices for F-1 students prior to 1979. 21 20 For example, see 8 CFR 214.2(a)(1) (setting forth a period of admission for the A-3 nonimmigrant classification); (b)(1) (period of admission for aliens admitted under the B nonimmigrant classification); (c)(3) (period of admission for aliens in transit through the United States); (e)(19) (periods of admission for most E nonimmigrants); (g)(1) (period of admission for the G-5 nonimmigrant classification); (h)(5)(viii) (9)(iii) and (13) (various periods of admission and maximum periods of stay for the H-1B, H-2A, H-2B, and H-3 nonimmigrant classification); (k)(8) (period of admission for the K-3 and K-4 nonimmigrant classification); (l)(11)-(12) (periods of admission and maximum periods of stay for the L nonimmigrant classification); (m)(5), (10) (period of stay for the M nonimmigrant classification); (n)(3) (period of admission for certain parents and children eligible for admission as special immigrants under section 101(a)(27)(I) ); (o)(6)(iii) and (10) (period of admission for the O nonimmigrant classification); (p)(8)(iii) and (12) (period of admission for the P nonimmigrant classification); (q)(2) (period of admission for the Q nonimmigrant classification); (r)(6) (period of admission for the R nonimmigrant classification); (s)(1)(ii) (period of admission for the NATO-7 nonimmigrant classification); (t)(5)(ii) (period of admission for the S nonimmigrant classification); and (w)(13) and (16) (period of admission for the CW-1 nonimmigrant classification). 21 See Special Requirements for Admission, Extension, and Maintenance of Status, 38 FR 35425 (Dec. 28, 1973). These changes will ensure that DHS has an effective mechanism to periodically and directly assess whether these nonimmigrants are complying with the conditions of their classifications and U.S. immigration laws, and to obtain timely and accurate information about the activities these aliens have engaged in and plan to engage in during their temporary stay in the United States. If immigration officers discover a nonimmigrant in one of these classifications has overstayed or otherwise violated his or her status, the alien will accrue unlawful presence for purposes of unlawful presence-related statutory grounds of inadmissibility under the INA. Unlawful presence in the United States may result in an alien becoming inadmissible upon departing the United States. 22 As a result of this inadmissibility, the alien may become ineligible for a nonimmigrant or immigrant visa, admission to the United States, or benefits for which admissibility is required, such as adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. 23 This will encourage aliens to maintain lawful status and reduce instances in which F, J, and I nonimmigrants unlawfully remain in the United States after their program, practical training, or activities or assignments consistent with the I classification end. DHS believes this greater oversight will deter F, J, or I nonimmigrants from engaging in fraud and abuse and will strengthen the integrity of these nonimmigrant classifications while enhancing national security. 22 See INA 212(a); 8 U.S.C. 1182(a). 23 See INA 212(a), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a); INA 245(a); 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). DHS believes that the provisions of each new regulatory amendment function independently of other provisions. However, to protect DHS's goals for this rule, DHS added regulatory text stating that the provisions are severable so that, if necessary, the regulations may continue to function even if a provision is rendered inoperable. B. Public Participation—Overview of Comments On August 28, 2025, DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay (EOS) Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media (90 FR 42070). The public was given 32 days to comment on the proposed rule and 60 days to comment on the information collections described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of the NPRM. DHS received close to 22,000 public comments. To see comments go to https://www.regulations.gov and enter this rulemaking's eDocket number: DHS Docket No. ICEB-2025-0001 in the “Search” box. C. Summary of Changes Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS has made several changes to the regulatory text proposed in the NPRM. 24 However, most of the changes proposed in the NPRM have been adopted. A summary of the changes as compared to the NPRM is outlined in section V.A. below. As discussed in detail elsewhere in this preamble, the changes this final rule makes to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) include the following: 24 See Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media, 90 FR 42070 (Aug. 28, 2025). • Amend 8 CFR 214.1, Requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status, by: ○ Striking all references to D/S for F, J, and I nonimmigrants; ○ Describing requirements for F and J nonimmigrants seeking admission, including after travel abroad and those approved for OPT and academic training; ○ Updating the cross reference and clarifying the standards for admission in the automatic extension visa validity provisions that cover F and J nonimmigrants applying at a Port of Entry (POE) after an absence not exceeding 30 days solely in a contiguous territory or adjacent islands; ○ Outlining the process for EOS applications for F, J, and I nonimmigrants; ○ Providing a short-term reprieve from filing for EOS during the first 6 months after the rule takes effect if applying for employment authorization for either post-completion OPT or STEM OPT; ○ Specifying the effect of departure while an F, J, or I nonimmigrant's application for an EOS in F, J, or I nonimmigrant status and/or employment authorization (and an associated employment authorization document (EAD)) is pending; ○ Providing procedures specific to the transition from D/S to admission for a fixed time period of authorized stay for F, J, and I nonimmigrants; ○ Replacing references to specific form names and numbers with general language, to account for future changes to form names and numbers; and ○ Codifying that an F-1 student who has timely filed an EOS application, will be authorized to continue pursuing a full course of study after the expiration of the admission period until USCIS adjudicates the EOS application. • Amend 8 CFR 214.2, Special requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status, by: ○ Setting the authorized admission and extension periods for F and J nonimmigrants up to the program length, not to exceed a 4-year period; ○ For F-1 students changing educational objectives or transferring to an SEVP-certified school, requiring that the student complete his or her first academic year of a program of study at the school that initially issued his or her Form I-20 or successor form, unless an exception is authorized by SEVP; ○ Prohibiting F-1 students at the graduate education level or above from changing educational objectives at any point during a program of study; ○ Prohibiting F-1 students at the graduate education level or above from transferring at any point during their program of study, unless an exception is authorized by SEVP for extenuating circumstances; ○ Outlining procedures and requirements for F-1 nonimmigrants who change educational objectives while in F-1 status; ○ Requiring any nonimmigrant who has completed a program at one educational level to only be allowed to begin another program at a higher educational level as an F-1 student and prohibiting a change to the same or a lower educational level while an F-1 student; ○ Providing DHS the ability to delay implementation of the prohibition on changing schools, educational objectives, and levels if needed; ○ Clarifying the circumstances under which a continuing F-1 student may be granted an EOS; ○ Decreasing the period allowed for F-1 nonimmigrants to prepare to depart from the United States after completion of a course of study or an authorized period of post-completion practical training from 60 to 30 days; ○ Requiring that if an F-1 student ends study or training early, the student and eligible dependents must depart the U.S. or take action to maintain lawful status within 30 days of the end date; ○ Providing for collection of biometric information in conjunction with an EOS application for F, J, and I nonimmigrants as may be required by 8 CFR 103.16; ○ Limiting language training students to an aggregate 24-month period of stay, including breaks and an annual vacation; ○ Providing that a delay in completing one's program by the program end date specified on the Form I-20, which includes but is not limited to delays caused by academic probation or suspension or a student's repeated inability or unwillingness to complete his or her course of study, is generally an unacceptable reason for program extensions for F nonimmigrants; ○ Allowing F nonimmigrants whose timely filed EOS applications remain pending after their admission period has expired to receive an auto-extension of their current authorization for on-campus and off-campus employment based on severe economic hardship resulting from emergent circumstances under existing 8 CFR 214.2(f)(5)(v). The length of the auto-extension of employment authorization will be up to 240 days or the end date of the Federal Register notice announcing the suspension of certain regulatory requirements, whichever is earlier; ○ Replacing D/S for I nonimmigrants with admission for a fixed time period until they complete the activities or assignments consistent with the I classification, not to exceed 240 days (with the exception of some I nonimmigrants from the PRC), with an EOS available for I nonimmigrants who can meet specified EOS requirements; ○ Codifying the definition of a foreign media organization for I nonimmigrant status, consistent with long-standing U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State (DoS) practice; ○ Updating the evidence an alien must submit to demonstrate eligibility for the I nonimmigrant classification; ○ Clarifying that J-1 nonimmigrants who are employment authorized with a specific employer incident to status continue to be authorized for such employment for up to 240 days under the existing regulatory provision at 8 CFR 274a.12(b)(20) if their status expires while their timely filed EOS application is pending, whereas J-2 dependents, who must apply for employment authorization as evidenced by an EAD, do not have the benefit of continued work authorization once the EAD expires; ○ Providing a temporary reprieve for those J-1s whose D/S status expires shortly after the rule takes effect by allowing them to apply for EOS and continue to work for the duration of the time on their new Form DS-2019 regardless of how long the EOS application takes to adjudicate; ○ Requiring that if the program end date is shortened, the J-1 exchange visitor and any J-2 accompanying dependents must leave the United States within 30 days from the new program end date or otherwise seek to maintain lawful status in that 30-day period; ○ Providing the responsibilities of the responsible officer (RO) when submitting late requests for extension of current program end date for exchange visitors; ○ Clarifying that I nonimmigrants are authorized to continue working in the United States for their foreign employer, under 8 CFR 274a.12(b)(20), for up to 240 days (with the exception of I nonimmigrants from the PRC who may continue working for up to 90 days) while their timely filed EOS application is pending; ○ Striking all references to “duration of status” and/or “duration of employment” for the F, J, and I nonimmigrant classifications; and ○ Including a severability clause. In the event that any provision of this rule is not implemented for whatever reason, the remaining provisions can be implemented in accordance with the stated purposes of this rule. ○ Amending 8 CFR 214.2(f)(5)(ii)(E) to limit the ability to delay or suspend the implementation of 8 CFR 214.2(f)(5)(ii)(A) through (C) for a period of two years from the effective date of the rule since this provision is not needed indefinitely. • Amend 8 CFR 248.1, Eligibility, by: ○ Establishing requirements to determine the period of stay for F or J nonimmigrants whose change of status application was approved before the final rule's effective date and who depart the United States, then seek admission after the final rule's effective date; and ○ Codifying the long-standing policy under which DHS deems abandoned an application to change to another nonimmigrant status, including F or J status, if the alien who timely filed the application departs the United States while the application is pending. • Amend 8 CFR 274a.12, Classes of aliens authorized to accept employment, by updating the employment authorization provisions to incorporate the revisions in 8 CFR 214.2. D. Summary of the Costs and Benefits Currently, aliens in the F (academic student), J (exchange visitor), and most I (representatives of foreign information media) nonimmigrant classifications are admitted to the United States under the D/S framework. However, this framework poses a challenge to DHS's ability to efficiently monitor and oversee these nonimmigrants to assess whether these nonimmigrants are complying with the terms and conditions of their status and whether they present national security concerns. To address these vulnerabilities, DHS is replacing D/S with an admission for a fixed time period for F, J, and I nonimmigrants. Admitting aliens in the F, J, and I classifications for a fixed period of time will require all F, J, and I nonimmigrants who wish to remain in the United States beyond their specific authorized admission period to apply for authorization to extend their stay with USCIS if in the United States, thus requiring periodic assessments by DHS in order for the alien to remain in the United States for a longer period. This change will impose incremental costs on F, J, and I nonimmigrants as well as schools and exchange visitor program sponsors but will in turn protect the integrity of the F, J, and I programs by having immigration officers evaluate and assess the appropriate length of stay for these nonimmigrants. The period of analysis for the rule covered 10 years and assumed the rule would go into effect in 2026. Therefore, the analysis period goes from 2027 through 2036. This analysis estimates the annualized value of future costs using two discount rates: 3 percent and 7 percent. In Circular A-4, OMB recommends that a three percent discount rate be used when a regulation affects private consumption, and a seven percent discount rate be used in evaluating a regulation that will mainly displace or alter the use of capital in the private sector. The discount rate accounts for how benefits or costs that occur sooner are more valuable. The rule will have an annualized cost ranging from $443.1 million to $448.6 million (with 3 and 7 percent discount rates, respectively). When considering U.S. parties only, annual costs range from $119.9 million to $125.1 million (with 3- and 7-percent discount rates, respectively). III. Background and Purpose A. Legal Authority The authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary) to implement the regulatory amendments in this rule can be found in various provisions of the immigration laws. Section 102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) (Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135), 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103(a)(1) and (3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103 (a)(1), (3), charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States. Section 214(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1184(a), gives the Secretary the authority to prescribe, by regulation, the time and conditions of admission of any alien as a nonimmigrant, including F, J, and I nonimmigrant aliens. See also 6 U.S.C. 271(a)(3), (b) (describing certain USCIS functions and authorities, including USCIS's authority to establish national immigration services policies and priorities and adjudicate benefits applications) and 6 U.S.C. 252(a)(4) (describing the authority of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to collect information relating to foreign students and exchange program participants and to use such information to carry out its enforcement functions). Section 248 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1258, permits DHS to allow certain nonimmigrants to change their status from one nonimmigrant status to another nonimmigrant status, with certain exceptions, as long as they continue to maintain their current nonimmigrant status and are not inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Similar to extensions of stay, change of status adjudications are discretionary determinations. 25 Also, section 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, governs the employment of aliens who are authorized to be employed in the United States by statute or in the discretion of the Secretary. 25 See INA 248(a), 8 U.S.C. 1258(a); 8 CFR 248.1(a). Finally, the INA establishes who may be admitted as F, J, or I nonimmigrants. Specifically, section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), established the F nonimmigrant classification for, among others, bona fide students qualified to pursue a full course of study who wish to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing a full course of study at an academic or language training school certified by the SEVP, as well as for the spouse and unmarried children under the age of 21 of such aliens. See also INA 214(m), 8 U.S.C. 1184(m) (limiting the admission of nonimmigrants for certain aliens who intend to study at public elementary and secondary schools). Section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J), established the J nonimmigrant classification for aliens who wish to come to the United States temporarily and have no intention of abandoning their residence in a foreign country, to participate in exchange visitor programs designated by the DoS, as well as for the spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21 of such aliens in certain J-1 categories. Section 101(a)(15)(I) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(I), established, upon a basis of reciprocity, the I nonimmigrant classification for bona fide representatives of foreign information media (such as press, radio, film, print) seeking to enter the United States to engage in such vocation, as well as for the spouses and children of such aliens. Within DHS, SEVP is administered by ICE. SEVP is authorized to administer the program to collect information related to nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors under various statutory authorities. Section 641 of IIRIRA authorizes the creation of a program to collect current and ongoing information provided by schools and exchange visitor programs regarding F and J nonimmigrants during the course of their stays in the United States, using electronic reporting technology where practicable. Consistent with this statutory authority, DHS manages these programs pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2), Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies (Oct. 29, 2001), as amended, ( https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-110HPRT39618/pdf/CPRT-110HPRT39618.pdf ), and section 502 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-173, 116 Stat. 543, 563 (May 14, 2002) (EBSVERA). HSPD-2 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct periodic, ongoing reviews of institutions certified to accept F nonimmigrants, and to include checks for compliance with recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Section 502 of EBSVERA directs the Secretary to review the compliance with recordkeeping and reporting requirements under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F) and 1372 of all schools approved for attendance by F students within 2 years of enactment, and every 2 years thereafter. B. Background 1. F Classification Section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), permits aliens who are bona fide students to temporarily be admitted to the United States solely for the purpose for pursuing a full course of study at an established college, university, seminary, conservatory, academic high school, elementary school, or other academic language training program. Principal applicants are categorized as F-1 nonimmigrants and their spouses and children who may accompany or follow to join as F-2 dependents. 26 26 INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i)-(ii); 8 CFR 214.2(f)(3). DHS notes the terms “F-1 nonimmigrant” and “F-1 student” are used throughout this final rule and the regulatory text. These terms are synonymous. From 1973 to 1979, F students were admitted for one year and could be granted an EOS in increments of up to 12 months if they established that they were maintaining status. 27 However, on July 26, 1978, given the large number of nonimmigrant students in the United States at the time and the need to continually process their EOS applications, legacy INS proposed amending the regulations to permit F-1 students to be admitted for the duration of their status as students. 28 Legacy INS explained the changes would facilitate the admission of nonimmigrant students, provide dollar and manpower savings to the Government, and permit more efficient use of resources. 29 On November 22, 1978, a final rule was published to amend the regulations at 8 CFR 214 to allow the legacy INS to admit F-1 students for a D/S period. 30 That rule became effective on January 1, 1979. 27 See 38 FR 35425 (Dec. 28, 1973) (The period of admission of a nonimmigrant student shall not exceed one year.). 28 See Admission of Nonimmigrant Students for Duration of Status, 43 FR 32306 (July 26, 1978). 29 Id. at 32306-07. 30 See 43 FR 54618 (Nov. 22, 1978) (The period of admission of a nonimmigrant student shall be for the duration of status in the United States as a student if the information on his/her Form I-20 indicates that he/she will remain in the United States as a student for more than 1 year. If the information on Form I-20 indicates the student will remain in the United States for 1 year or less, he/she shall be admitted for the time necessary to complete his/her period of study). Subsequently, between January 23, 1981, and October 29, 1991, the INS amended the regulations addressing admission periods for F-1 students four more times. 31 On January 23, 1981, a rule changed admission for F-1 nonimmigrants to a fixed period of admission, i.e., the time necessary to complete the course of study, with the opportunity for an EOS on a case-by-case basis. 32 Legacy INS explained this was necessary because admitting nonimmigrants students for D/S resulted in questionable control over foreign students and contributed to problems in record keeping. 33 31 See Nonimmigrant Classes; Revised Requirements for Nonimmigrant “F-1” Students, 46 FR 7267 (Jan. 23, 1981), Nonimmigrant Classes; Change of Nonimmigrant Classification; Revisions in Regulations Pertaining to Nonimmigrant Students and the Schools Approved for Their Attendance, 48 FR 14575 (Apr. 5, 1983); Nonimmigrant Classes; F-1 Academic Students, 52 FR 13223 (Apr. 22, 1987); Nonimmigrant Classes; Students F and M Classifications, 56 FR 55608 (Oct. 29, 1991). 32 See 46 FR 7267 (Jan. 23, 1981). 33 Id. On April 5, 1983, D/S was reinstituted with, among other changes, the implementation of new notification procedures for transfers between schools, improved reporting requirements for Designated School Officials (DSOs), 34 a limit for enrollment in one educational level, and a requirement for F-1 students to apply for an EOS and, if applicable, a school transfer to pursue another educational program at the same level of educational attainment. 35 34 A DSO means a regularly employed member of the school administration whose office is located at the school and whose compensation does not come from commissions for recruitment of foreign students See 8 CFR 214.3(l). 35 See 48 FR 14575 (Apr. 5, 1983). On April 22, 1987, a final rule outlined medical and academic reasons that would allow F-1 students to drop below a full-time course of study while remaining in D/S status and clarified when an EOS or reinstatement must be requested. 36 36 See 52 FR 13223 (Apr. 22, 1987). Finally, in 1991, the regulations were revised to implement Section 221(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Public Law 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, which established a three-year off-campus program for F-1 students, 37 and clarified the procedures for F-1 students seeking EOS and employment authorization utilizing the Form I-20. 38 The rule also gave DSOs the authority to grant program extensions (essentially an EOS) for F-1 students with a compelling academic or medical reason that prevented them from completing their educational program by a program end date and then to notify INS of the extension. 39 Since then, and pursuant to the 1991 final rule, the DHS has relied on DSOs to report on student status, issue program extensions, and transfer students between programs and schools. Information from these nonimmigrant students is now tracked in SEVIS to ensure government agencies have essential data related to nonimmigrant students to preserve national security. This is consistent with the requirements in IIRIRA, the USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56, and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. Changes to D/S were proposed for F students in 2020, but the proposal was withdrawn in 2021. 40 37 See 56 FR 55608 (Oct. 29, 1991). 38 Form I-20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status, is the document used by DHS that provides supporting information for the issuance of a student visa. Applicants (including dependents) must have a Form I-20 to apply for a student visa, to enter the United States, and to apply for an EAD to engage in OPT. See SEVP's web page, Form I-20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status, https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/I-20_Intial.pdf (last updated Mar. 31, 2018). 39 See 56 FR 55608 (Oct. 29, 1991). 40 See Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media, 85 FR 60526 (Sept. 25, 2020) and Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media, 86 FR 35410 (July 6, 2021). 2. J Classification The J nonimmigrant classification was created in 1961 by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, Public Law 87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (22 U.S.C. 2451, et seq. ), to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchanges. It authorizes aliens to participate in a variety of exchange visitor programs in the United States. The Exchange Visitor Program regulations cover the following program categories: professors and research scholars, short-term scholars, trainees and interns, college and university students, teachers, secondary school students, specialists, alien physicians, international visitors, government visitors, camp counselors, au pairs, and summer work travel. 41 41 See INA 101(a)(15)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J); 22 CFR 62.20-62.32. Prior to 1985, J exchange visitors were granted an initial admission for the period of their program up to one year. 42 In 1985, the regulations were amended to allow J exchange visitors to be admitted for the duration of their program plus 30 days. 43 This change from being admitted for a fixed period to D/S was implemented as part of a continuing effort to reduce reporting requirements for the public as well as the paperwork burden on the agency associated with processing extension requests. 44 Changes to D/S were proposed for J exchange visitors in 2020, but the proposal was withdrawn in 2021. 45 42 See 8 CFR 214.2(j)(1)(ii) (1985). 43 See 50 FR 42006 (Oct. 17, 1985). 44 Id. 45 See 85 FR 60526 (Sept. 25, 2020) and 86 FR 35410 (July 6, 2021). A prospective exchange visitor must be sponsored by a DoS-designated program sponsor to be admitted to the United States in the J nonimmigrant classification and participate in an exchange visitor program. The DoS designated sponsor will issue a prospective J exchange visitor a Form DS-2019, Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor (J-1) Status. The DS-2019 permits a prospective exchange visitor to apply for a J-1 nonimmigrant visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad or seek admission as a J-1 nonimmigrant at a POE. A J-1 exchange visitor is admitted into the United States for D/S, which is the length of his or her exchange visitor program. 46 46 Form DS-2019, Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor (J-1) Status, is the document required to support an application for an exchange visitor visa (J-1). It is a 2-page document that can only be produced through SEVIS. SEVIS is the DHS database developed to collect information on F, M, and J nonimmigrants (see 8 U.S.C. 1372 and 6 U.S.C. 252(a)(4)). The potential exchange visitor's signature on page one of the form is required. Page 2 of the current Form DS-2019 consists of instructions and certification language relating to participation. No blank Forms DS-2019 exist. Each Form DS-2019 is printed with a unique identifier known as a “SEVIS ID number” in the top right-hand corner, which consists of an “alpha” character (N) and 10 numerical characters ( e.g., N0002123457). The DoS' Office of Private Sector Exchange Designation in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA/EC/D) designates U.S. organizations to conduct exchange visitor programs. These organizations are known as program sponsors. When designated, the organization is authorized access to SEVIS and is then able to produce Form DS-2019 from SEVIS. The program sponsor signs the completed Forms DS-2019 in blue ink and transmits them to the potential exchange visitor and his or her spouse and unmarried children under the age of 21. J visa applicants must present a signed Form DS-2019 at the time of their visa interview. Once the visa is issued, however, the biographic information on the SEVIS record cannot be updated until the participant's program is validated (“Active” in SEVIS). The sponsor is required to update the SEVIS record upon the exchange visitor's entry, and no corrections to the record can be made until that time. In addition, in the event a visa is needed, sponsors may issue a Form DS-2019 for a dependent spouse or child; the system will not permit a new Form DS-2019 to be created as long as the primary's SEVIS record is validated in initial or active status. See 9 FAM 402.5-6(D)(1)(U), The Basic Form, https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040205.html (last updated Aug. 15, 2024). While applicants must still present a paper Form DS-2019 to DoS in order to qualify for a visa, the SEVIS record is the definitive record of student or exchange visitor status and visa eligibility. See 9 FAM 402.5-4(B)(U), Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) Record is Definitive Record, https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040205.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2024). Extensions of J exchange visitor programs are governed by DoS regulations. 47 If there is authority to extend a program, the exchange visitor program sponsor's RO, 48 similar to the DSO in the F-1 student context, is authorized to extend a J exchange visitor's program by issuing a duly executed Form DS-2019. 49 Requests for extensions beyond the maximum program duration provided in the regulations must be approved by DoS, which adjudicates these extensions. USCIS does not adjudicate these program extensions; however, USCIS does adjudicate requests to change into J status from another nonimmigrant status. As outlined above, consistent with the requirements in IIRIRA and the USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56, J exchange visitor programs are also monitored using SEVIS. 47 See 22 CFR part 62. These programs vary in length. For example, professors and research scholars are generally authorized to participate in the Exchange Visitor Program for the length of time necessary to complete the program, provided such time does not exceed five years. See 22 CFR 62.20(i)(1). Alien physicians are also generally limited to 7 years. See 22 CFR 62.27(e)(2). 48 An RO is an employee or officer of a sponsor who has been nominated by the sponsor, and approved by DoS, to carry out the duties outlined in 22 CFR 62.11. 49 See 22 CFR 62.43. An RO must be a citizen of the United States or a lawful permanent resident of the United States. See 22 CFR 62.2. 3. I Classification Section 101(a)(15)(I) of the INA defines the I classification as, upon a basis of reciprocity, an alien who is a bona fide representative of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media who seeks to enter the United States solely to engage in such vocation, and the spouse and children of such a representative, if accompanying or following to join him or her. Most nonimmigrant representatives of information media (with the exception of those presenting a passport issued by the PRC) are currently admitted for the duration of their employment. They are not permitted to change their information medium or employer until they obtain permission from USCIS. 50 50 See 8 CFR 214.2(i). From 1973 to 1985, aliens admitted to the United States in I nonimmigrant status were admitted for a period of 1 year with the possibility of extensions. 51 In 1985, legacy INS amended the regulations to allow nonimmigrant representatives of information media to be admitted for the duration of their employment. 52 This change from a set time period of admission to admission for duration of employment for I nonimmigrants was implemented as part of a continuing effort to reduce reporting requirements for the public, as well as the paperwork burden associated with processing extension requests on the agency. 53 Through its administration of the regulations authorizing I nonimmigrants admission for duration of employment, DHS currently admits all I nonimmigrants for D/S, with the exception of those presenting a passport issued by the PRC (other than a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) passport or a Macau SAR passport). 54 Changes to D/S were proposed for I foreign media representatives in 2020, but the proposal was withdrawn in 2021. 55 51 See 38 FR 35425 (Dec. 28, 1973). See also 50 FR 42006 (Oct. 17, 1985) (indicating that, prior to the publication of this rule, I nonimmigrants were admitted for one year). 52 See 8 CFR 214.2(i); 50 FR 42006 (Oct. 17, 1985). 53 Id. 54 See Period of Admission and Extensions of Stay for Representatives of Foreign Information Media Seeking to Enter the United States, 87 FR 61959 (Oct. 13, 2022) and Period of Admission and Extensions of Stay for Representatives of Foreign Information Media Seeking to Enter the United States, 85 FR 27645 (May 11, 2020). 55 See 85 FR 60526 (Sept. 25, 2020) and 86 FR 35410 (July 6, 2021). C. Need for Rulemaking 1. Risks to the Integrity of the F, J, and I Nonimmigrant Classifications DHS welcomes F academic students, J exchange visitors, and I representatives of foreign information media, but it also acknowledges that the sheer size of the population complicates oversight and vetting functions. Since 1980, the number of F nonimmigrant students admitted into the United States has more than sextupled. 56 Similarly, since D/S was introduced for J and I nonimmigrants in 1985, the number of exchange visitors admitted into the United States has more than quadrupled while the number of representatives of foreign information media has more than doubled. 57 56 For example, approximately 260,000 F-1 students were admitted into the United States during the 1980-81 school year. See GAO, Controls Over Foreign Students in U.S. Postsecondary Institutions Are Still Ineffective, supra note 12, pg. ii. In fiscal year (FY) 2024, 1,816,480 F-1 students were admitted into the United States. See DHS FY 2024, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11. 57 In 1985, 110,942 exchange visitors and 16,753 representatives of the foreign information media were admitted into the United States. See 1997 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Oct. 1999), Tbl. 39, 118-19, supra note 10. In FY 2024, 514,170 exchange visitors and 37,330 representatives of the foreign information media were admitted into the United States. See DHS FY 2024, Quarter 4, tbl.4B, supra note 11. DHS uses SEVIS, a web-based system, to maintain information regarding: SEVP-certified schools; F-1 students studying in the United States (and their F-2 dependents); M-1 students enrolled in vocational programs in the United States (and their M-2 dependents); DoS-designated Exchange Visitor Program sponsors; and J-1 Exchange Visitor Program participants (and their J-2 dependents). SEVIS is necessary for national security and is consistent with the requirements in IIRIRA, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the 9/11 Commission Report. Employees of educational institutions and program sponsors, specifically DSOs and ROs, play a large role in SEVIS. They are responsible for monitoring students and exchange visitors, accurately entering information about the students' and exchange visitors' activities into SEVIS, and properly determining whether the student or exchange visitor's SEVIS record should remain in active status or change to reflect a change in circumstances. 58 Under this framework, an academic student or exchange visitor generally maintains lawful status by complying with the conditions of the program, as certified by the DSO or RO. However, a program extension and an extension of an alien's nonimmigrant stay are different. DHS believes it is appropriate for the DSO to recommend an extension of an academic program and an RO to recommend an extension of an exchange visitor program; however, an EOS involves an adjudication of whether an alien is legally eligible to extend his or her stay in the United States in a given nonimmigrant status and has been complying with the terms and conditions of his or her admission. 59 DHS believes that the determinations of program extension and EOS should be separated, with the DSO's and RO's recommendation being one factor an immigration officer reviews while adjudicating an application for EOS. Changing to a fixed period of admission will give immigration officers a mechanism to make this evaluation at reasonably frequent intervals. 58 See 8 CFR 214.3(g)(1), (g)(2) (detailing a DSO's reporting requirements); 214.4(a)(2) (stating that failure to comply with reporting requirements may result in loss of SEVP certification). 59 See 8 CFR 214.1(a)(3). Additionally, DHS expects this change will deter and prevent fraud, as a requirement to check in directly with an immigration officer is inherently likely to deter exploitation of perceived vulnerabilities in the F and J nonimmigrant classifications. The same benefits of direct evaluation, better recordkeeping, and fraud prevention will also apply to the I population. 2. Risks Within the F Classification DHS is aware that the F-1 program is subject to fraud, exploitation, and abuse. Since 2008, multiple school owners and others have been criminally prosecuted for “pay-to-stay” fraud, in which school officials, in return for cash payments, falsely report that F-1 students who do not attend school are maintaining their student status. 60 In some cases, convicted school owners operated multiple schools and transferred students among them to conceal the fraud. 61 DHS is also concerned that DSOs at these schools were complicit in these abuses; some DSOs intentionally recorded a student's status inaccurately. 62 Further, DSOs have issued program extensions to students who did not have compelling medical or academic reasons for failing to complete their program by its end date and DHS continues to observe F-1 students enrolling in schools for extended periods of time. For example, DHS previously identified in the NPRM a nonimmigrant who was an F-1 student at a dance school from 1991-2021. Although the reported normal length of the dance program is 5 years, the school issued 17 program extensions between 2003 (when the use of SEVIS was mandated) and 2020, claiming that the student needed more time despite nearly 30 years of enrollment. The student subsequently transferred to an English language training program at another school with a program start date in November 2022, despite more than 30 years in the United States as an F-1 student. She remained enrolled there until December 2025, when she transferred to another school to commence additional language training with a program start date of January 19, 2026, and a program end date of January 19, 2029. She has been an F-1 student for approximately 35 years. If she remains at the school through the current program end date, she will have spent nearly 38 years in the United States in F-1 status. 63 In another case, DHS also identified a nonimmigrant who has been in F-1 student status for more than 18 years since he enrolled in an English language training program that began on April 21, 2008. He has enrolled in four language training programs, four bachelor's programs, and is currently enrolled in a master's in theology/theological studies program with a program end date in August 2027. 64 Another student who was enrolled at the same school from 2009 to 2020 and had been an F-1 student since 2005, was granted 14 program extensions. DHS also identified three F-1 students in doctoral programs that have taken over 20 years to complete their programs, and 5 F-1 students at community colleges have been enrolled in associate degree programs for periods in excess of 5 years—some for as long as a decade. 65 There are also examples where some DSOs permitted students who failed to maintain status to transfer to another school rather than apply for reinstatement. 66 Beyond cases publicly identified by DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS is concerned about cases where DSOs were not aware of status violations by students. 60 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Operator of English language schools charged in massive student visa fraud scheme (Apr. 9, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2008/038.html; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Owner/Operator and employee of Miami-based school sentenced for immigration-related fraud (Aug. 30, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/fls/PressReleases/2010/100830-02.html; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Pastor sentenced to 1 year for visa fraud, ordered to forfeit building housing former religious school (June 13, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/pastor-sentenced-1-year-visa-fraud-ordered-forfeit-building-housing-former-religious; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, School Official Admits Visa Fraud (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/pae/News/2012/Mar/tkhir_release.htm; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Owner of Georgia English language school sentenced for immigration fraud (May 7, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/owner-georgia-english-language-school-sentenced-immigration-fraud; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, 3 Senior Executives of For-profit Schools Plead Guilty to Student Visa, Financial Aid Fraud (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/3-senior-executives-profit-schools-plead-guilty-student-visa-financial-aid-fraud; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Owner of Schools That Illegally Allowed Foreign Nationals to Remain in U.S. as “Students” Sentenced to 15 Months in Federal Prison (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/owner-schools-illegally-allowed-foreign-nationals-remain-us-students-sentenced-15 . 61 Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, 3 Senior Executives of For-profit s Schools Plead Guilty to Student Visa, Financial Aid Fraud, supra note 60. 62 Goff Wilson, Former DSO Official Found Guilty of Visa Fraud (May 20, 2019), https://www.goffwilson.com/Blawg-entries/2019/former-DSO-Official-Guilty-of-Visa-Fraud.aspx; ImmigrationReform.com, U.S. Removes 4,600 Fraudulent OPT Participants from the Program (July 14, 2020), https://www.immigrationreform.com/2020/7/2014/OPT-fraud-dhs-crackdown-immigrationreform-com; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Operator of English Language Schools Charged in Massive Student Visa Fraud Scheme, supra note 60; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Owner/Operator and Employee of Miami-based School Sentenced for Immigration-related Fraud, supra note 60 ; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Pastor Sentenced to 1 Year for Visa Fraud, Ordered to Forfeit Building Housing Former Religious School, supra note 60; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, School Official Admits Visa Fraud, supra note 60; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Owner of Georgia English Language School Sentenced for Immigration Fraud, supra note 60; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, 3 Senior Executives of For-profit Schools Plead Guilty to Student Visa, F inancial Aid Fraud, supra note 60; Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Owner of Schools that Illegally Allowed Foreign Nationals to Remain in U.S. as “Students” Sentenced to 15 Months in Federal Prison, supra note 60. 63 DHS analysis of data in SEVIS and valid as of June 2, 2026. 64 Id. 65 DHS analysis of data in SEVIS and valid as of May 7, 2025. 66 Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, 3 Senior Executives of For-profit Schools Plead Guilty to Student Visa, Financial Aid Fraud, supra note 60. Apart from concerns about DSOs and school owners involved in fraudulent schemes, DHS also has concerns about the actions of the aliens themselves. Some aliens have used the F classification to reside in the United States for decades by continuously enrolling in or transferring between schools, a practice facilitated by the D/S framework. 67 DHS identified over 2,100 aliens who first entered as F-1 students between 2000 and 2010 and remain in active F-1 status as of April 6, 2025. 68 To extend their stay, these aliens enrolled in consecutive educational programs, repeatedly transferred to new schools, or DSOs repeatedly extended their program end dates. This practice is not limited to any one particular type of school; students at community or junior colleges, universities, and language training schools have maintained F-1 status for lengthy periods. DHS is concerned that such instances of extended stays may violate the underlying statutory intent given that student status is meant to be temporary, with the alien having no intention of abandoning their residence in a foreign country, and for the primary purpose of studying, not as a way to remain in the United States indefinitely. 69 67 Monitoring F-1 students on post-completion OPT can be even more complicated because the students are no longer attending classes. See GAO, GAO-14-356, Student and Exchange Visitor Program, DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students with Employment Authorization (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-356.pdf. 68 DHS analysis of data in SEVIS identifying the number of F-1 active students who began studying between 2000 and 2010, valid as of Apr. 6, 2025. 69 See INA section 101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). The use of the F classification to remain in the United States for decades raises doubts that the alien's intention was to stay in the United States temporarily, as required by the INA. 70 It also raises concerns as to whether those aliens are bona fide nonimmigrant students who are maintaining valid lawful status by complying with the terms of their admission, which include solely pursuing a full course of study and progressing to completing a course of study. Likewise, it raises concerns as to whether these aliens truly have the financial resources to cover tuition and living expenses without engaging in unauthorized employment. 70 See INA section 101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). Even when employment is authorized under programs such as the Optional Practical Training (OPT), DHS has found fraud that enabled students to stay in the U.S. without actually having legitimate jobs. ICE Acting Director Todd Lyons told reporters at a press conference on May 12, 2026, that ICE had identified more than 10,000 cases of potential fraud associated with the OPT program. The cases were identified after site visits and other investigative techniques showed that some employers were just shell companies helping recent graduates stay in the U.S. without actual work at a legitimate U.S. company or working for supposedly U.S. based companies managed from abroad, which violates the law requiring U.S. training and direction. 71 71 Bazail-Eimil, E., Politico, ICE: More than 10,000 Potential Fraud Cases Related to Student Job Program (May 12, 2026) https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/12/ice-optional-practical-training-fraud-00916797?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQKNjYyODU2ODM3OQABHu-ImKwboqhNMO80GLrZjBo_qILfwUY-Z6JPDnwwm6kP5wOJevFE6OQSF-t__aem_6dBAnJ-5UnboRuB5hQnZAQ Further, while some school owners and school executives have faced legal consequences for their violation of the law, nonimmigrants admitted for D/S generally do not accrue unlawful presence for purposes of the 3- and 10-year bars described in INA 212(a)(9)(B) and (C), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) and (C), unless an immigration officer finds they have violated their status in the context of adjudicating an immigration benefit request, or an immigration judge orders them excluded, deported, or removed. 72 Because F-1 students are admitted for D/S, they generally do not file applications or petitions, such as EOS applications, with USCIS, and therefore, immigration officers do not generally have an opportunity to determine whether the students are engaging in F-1 nonimmigrant activities in the United States and maintaining their F-1 nonimmigrant status. 72 See USCIS, Interoffice Memorandum: Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act (May 6, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF . The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on DHS's concerns about DSOs and nonimmigrant students. In 2019, GAO and ICE published a report identifying fraud risks to SEVP related to managing school recertification and program training. The report included vulnerabilities associated with involving school owners and DSOs in overseeing the maintenance of status of F-1 students. 73 In the report, GAO identified fraud vulnerabilities on the part of both students and schools. Examples include students claiming to maintain status when they are not, such as failing to attend class or working without appropriate authorization, or school owners not requiring enrolled students to attend classes or creating fraudulent documentation for students who are ineligible for the academic program. GAO recommended that ICE develop a fraud risk profile and use data analytics to identify potential fraud indicators in schools petitioning for certification, develop and implement fraud training for DSOs, and strengthen background checks for DSOs. 74 73 In a 2019 report, GAO was asked to review potential vulnerabilities to fraud in the SEVP. GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which ICE (1) implemented controls to address fraud risks in the school certification and recertification processes and (2) implemented fraud risk controls related to DSO training. See GAO, GAO-19-297, DHS Can Take Additional Steps to Manage Fraud Risks Related to School Recertification and Program Oversigh t (Mar 2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-297.pdf; GAO, GAO-11-411, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would Have Costs (Apr. 15, 2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317762.pdf; and GAO, GAO-12-572, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight Functions (June 18, 2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591668.pdf. 74 Since publishing its 2019 report, GAO has updated its website to include comments to the Recommendations for Executive Action included therein. ICE has taken steps to implement the report's recommendations, including making a public announcement regarding changing the timeline for the recertification notification process for schools. See GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Can Take Additional Steps to Manage Fraud Risks Related to School Recertification and Program Oversight, Recommendations (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-297?mobile_opt_out=1#summary_recommend (last visited Jun. 9, 2026). DHS believes it can mitigate fraud risks in this rule in part through setting the authorized admission and extension periods for F nonimmigrants as the length of the F nonimmigrant's specific program, not to exceed a 4-year period. The rule will establish a mechanism for immigration officers to assess these nonimmigrants at defined periods (such as when applying for an EOS in the United States beyond a 4-year admission period) and determine whether they are complying with the conditions of their classification. Immigration officers receive background checks, clearances, and training before DHS authorizes them to implement the nation's immigration laws, which includes as part of adjudicating the application whether nonimmigrants meet the requirements to extend their stay, whether a student has violated his or her nonimmigrant status without the DSO's awareness or whether DSOs are engaging in fraud by not requiring students to attend classes or by falsifying documents. Immigration officers are further trained to assess applications for fraud indicators and conduct reviews and vetting that may assist in the detection of fraud or abuse. This will provide further opportunities for DHS to identify and hold accountable aliens who violate their F-1 status, as well as their educational institutions. DHS currently employs out-of-cycle reviews and recertification of SEVP-certified schools outlined in 8 CFR 214.3(h) to ensure the school's compliance with regulatory recordkeeping and reporting requirements. DHS may also conduct on-site reviews of schools at any time, which may lead to withdrawal of SEVP certification upon findings of noncompliance or regulatory violations. Under the current D/S framework, DHS might not detect an individual F-1 status violation for an extended period if the student stays enrolled in a school, does not seek readmission to the United States, and does not apply for additional immigration benefits. If DHS makes periodic assessments to verify that F-1 students are maintaining their student status, DHS could better detect and mitigate against these violations as well as violations by their school. 75 The rule creates opportunities for this scrutiny if these nonimmigrants wish to remain beyond their fixed period of admission. This may also have the effect of deterring individuals who would otherwise seek to come to the United States and engage in some of the behaviors discussed above, believing they would be able to do so undetected for long periods of time. DHS believes this is a more appropriate way to maintain the integrity of the U.S. immigration system. Additionally, DHS believes the changes will allow immigration officers to directly verify, among other things, that students applying for an EOS: have the funds needed to live and study in the United States without engaging in unauthorized work; are maintaining a residence abroad to which they intend to return; have pursued and are pursuing a full course of study; and are completing their studies within the 4-year generally applicable timeframe relating to their post-secondary education programs in the United States or are able to provide a permissible explanation for taking a longer period of time to complete the program. 75 For example, SEVP may withdraw a school's certification or deny a school's recertification if a DSO willfully issues a false statement, including wrongful certification of a statement by signature, in connection with a student's school transfer or application for employment or practical training. See 8 CFR 214.4(a)(2)(v). Finally, because the D/S framework reduces opportunities for direct vetting of foreign academic students by immigration officers, it creates opportunities for foreign adversaries to exploit the F-1 program and undermine U.S. national security. Under the D/S framework, DHS has identified national security threats within the F-1 program. For example, on March 24, 2023, a Russian man was charged with acting as an agent of a foreign power, visa fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and other charges stemming from his illegal activities in the United States functioning as an “illegal” agent for a Russian Intelligence Service. He obtained an F-1 visa in 2018 under an assumed Brazilian identity, which he used to enter the United States and enroll in a U.S. university from 2018 to 2020. 76 In recent years, multiple F-1 students have been arrested in connection with illegal activities pertaining to U.S. military bases. 77 On January 18, 2024 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a student from China for prohibited operation of an unmanned aircraft system, violation of national defense airspace, and photography of defense installations after an investigation revealed the student utilized a commercial drone to take photographs of U.S. naval bases in the Norfolk, Virginia area. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's Newport News Division convicted him for use of an aircraft for the unlawful photographing of designated installation without authorization on October 2, 2024, and he was removed from the United States on May 7, 2025. 78 In June 2020, three Chinese nationals were sentenced to federal prison for illegal photography of a U.S. naval installation in Key West, Florida. Two of those arrested were F-1 students, and one was a J-1 exchange visitor. 79 In October 2024, five Chinese students were charged with conspiracy, making false statements and destroying records in connection with a federal investigation after they were observed with cameras at Camp Grayling in Michigan during a training exercise in August 2023 where thousands of military officials, including some from Taiwan, were participating. 80 Each of these examples was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. 76 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Russian National “Illegal” Charged with Acting as Agent of a Russian Intelligence Service in the United States (March 24, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/russian-national-illegal-charged-acting-agent-russian-intelligence-service-united-states. See also DHS analysis of data in SEVIS and valid as of June 2, 2026. 77 See Lubold, G., Stobel, W.P., and Viswanatha, A., The Wall Street Journal, Chinese Gate-Crashers at U.S. Bases Spark Espionage Concerns (last updated Sept. 4, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/chinese-gate-crashers-at-u-s-bases-spark-espionage-concerns-cdef8187. 78 Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, ICE removes Chinese national convicted of photographing military installations (May 14, 2025), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-removes-chinese-national-convicted-photographing-military-installations. 79 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Three Chinese Nationals Sentenced to Prison for Illegal Photography of U.S. Naval Installation in Key West, Florida (June 5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/three-chinese-nationals-sentenced-prison-illegal-photography-us-naval-installation-key. 80 Blake, J., Inside Higher Ed, Chinese U of Michigan Grads Charged in Countersurveillance Probe (Oct. 4, 2024), https://insidehighered.com/news/quick-takes/2024/10/04/five-chinese-u-m-students-charged-countersurveillance-probe. In addition to creating risks to national security, some F-1 students pose risks to public safety and have been charged with criminal acts. DHS has identified multiple F-1 students arrested since 2024 for their roles in sophisticated financial scams targeting vulnerable and elderly victims in the United States. Some of these schemes resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars in losses to victims. In some instances, multiple F-1 students were arrested for their involvement in the same schemes. 81 81 See Iowa Insurance Division, Press Release, Chicago Man Arrested for Conspiracy Related to Gold Bar Scam (Oct. 16, 2025), https://iid.iowa.gov/press-release/2025-10-16/chicago-man-arrested-conspiracy-related-gold-bar-scam; Sebastian, C., El Paso County Sheriff, Suspect Arrested in Multi-State Government Impersonation Scam (Oct. 16, 2025), https://epcsheriffsoffice.com/suspect-arrested-in-multi-state-government-impersonation-scam/; Bensen, J., NBC 4 Washington, DC Police Arrest Suspects in Elaborate Gold Bar Scam (Aug. 6, 2025), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/dc-police-arrest-suspects-in-elaborate-gold-bar-scam/3971831/; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Massachusetts Man Charged and Detained in Ongoing Elder Fraud Investigation (Nov. 24, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/pr/massachusetts-man-charged-and-detained-ongoing-elder-fraud-investigation; and U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Three Nigerian Citizens Indicted for Wire Fraud and Money Laundering (Jan. 25, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edwi/pr/three-nigerian-citizens-indicted-wire-fraud-and-money-laundering . This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. An open education environment in the United States offers benefits, but it also places research universities and the nation at risk for economic, academic, or military espionage by foreign students. Foreign adversaries are using progressively sophisticated and resourceful methods to exploit the U.S. educational environment, including well-documented cases of espionage through the student program. 82 Detecting and deterring emerging threats to U.S. national security posed by adversaries exploiting the F-1 program requires additional oversight. In 2022, in response to a Congressional inquiry, GAO investigated and made recommendations that ICE modify the SEVIS system to include factors that potentially indicate which foreign students or scholars may pose more risk of transferring technology at U.S. universities. 83 82 In January of 2023, Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese national who came to the United States to study electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology in 2013, was sentenced to eight years for spying for the Chinese government. See CNN Politics, Chinese Engineer Sentenced to 8 years in U.S. Prison for Spying (Jan. 25, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/25/politics/chinese-engineer-sentence-spying-intl-hnk/index.html. In December 2019, Weiyun (Kelly) Huang, the owner of Findream and Sinocontech, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit visa fraud in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago. In return for payments, Findream listed aliens as OPT workers, providing them with what appeared to be legal status. The FBI charged one of those aliens with spying. See NBC Bay Area, Kelly Huang Criminal Compliant (Mar. 28, 2019), https://media.nbcbayarea.com/2019/09/KellyHuangCriminalComplaint.pdf. Huang was sentenced to 37 months in federal prison for conspiracy to commit visa fraud. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Chinese Business Woman Sentenced to 37 Months in Federal Prison for Conspiracy to Commit Visa Fraud (June 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/chinese-businesswoman-sentenced-37-months-federal-prison-conspiracy-commit-visa-fraud. This vulnerability presented in the nonimmigrant student classification has been highlighted by the FBI. In a 2018 hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the FBI Director testified about the threat from China, noting “that the use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting, whether it's professors, scientists, students, we see in almost every field office that the FBI has around the country. It's not just in major cities. It's in small ones as well. It's across basically every discipline. I think the level of naiveté on the part of the academic sector about this creates its own issues. They're exploiting the very open research and development environment that we have, which we all revere, but they're taking advantage of it. So, one of the things we're trying to do is view the China threat as not just a whole of government threat, but a whole of society threat on their end. I think it's going to take a whole of society response by us. So, it's not just the intelligence community, but it's raising awareness within our academic sector, within our private sector, as part of the defense.” See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing, Worldwide Threats (Feb. 13, 2018), transcript available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/02/08/hearings-open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0/; see also Senate Finance Committee, Foreign Threats to Taxpayer—Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions: Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee (June 5, 2019) (Statement of Louis A. Rodi III), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf. DSOs are not trained immigration officers nor are they in a position to make such determinations. 83 See GAO, GAO 23-106114, China, Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data (Nov. 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106114.pdf. DHS believes that replacing admissions for D/S for F-1 students with admission for a fixed time period will help mitigate these national security risks by ensuring an immigration official directly and periodically vets applicants for extensions of stay and, in so doing, confirms they are engaged only in activities consistent with their student status. F-1 nonimmigrants applying for EOS will also be required to establish they are admissible, and failure to do so will result in denial of the EOS. Admissibility grounds are complex and are properly assessed by a trained DHS officer. Such an assessment is not currently made when F-1 nonimmigrants apply for an extension of their program with their institution. 84 Significantly, under the changes to the period of admission of F nonimmigrants and the applicable EOS process, DHS may collect biometrics and other information (such as evidence of financial resources to cover expenses and evidence of any criminal activity) from F nonimmigrant students more frequently, thereby enhancing the Government's oversight and monitoring of these aliens. 84 In addition, DSOs may be unaware of a student's failure to maintain status, including by engaging in criminal activity, nor do they have the authority or ability to acquire such information. Admitting F-1 nonimmigrants for a fixed period of admission would provide trained immigration officers with the opportunity to vet these individuals. 3. Risks Within the J Classification DHS believes that the national security risks posed by D/S admissions for individuals admitted under the J classification are similar to those posed by the F classification. 85 According to a December 2018 report by a panel of experts commissioned by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to study foreign influence on federally-funded scientific research, “Small numbers of scientists have committed serious violations of NIH policies and systems by not disclosing foreign support ( i.e., grants), laboratories, or funded faculty positions in other countries.” 86 As with F nonimmigrants, setting the length of the J nonimmigrant's specific program to not exceed a 4-year period will establish a mechanism for immigration officers to assess these nonimmigrants at defined periods (such as when applying for an EOS in the United States beyond a 4-year admission period) and determine whether they are complying with the conditions of their classification. This will increase vetting of the J nonimmigrant population, which can help to prevent and deter nefarious actors. 85 In its 2019 Report to Congress, the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the Commission described the United States Government's efforts to curb China's extensive influence and espionage activities in academic and commercial settings. The Commission noted that these efforts took the form of visa restrictions for Chinese nationals, greater scrutiny of federal funding awarded to universities, legal action against those suspected of theft or espionage, and new legislation. See U.S. Commission on China, U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission, 2019 Annual Report to Congress (Nov. 2019), https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2019-annual-report. 86 See U.S. National Institutes of Health Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD), ACD Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity (Dec. 2018) (discussing measures to address concerns about foreign influences related to graduate students and post-doctoral fellows, as well as foreign employees). There are multiple examples of ongoing national security threats posed by J nonimmigrants under the D/S framework, thereby supporting the need for increased oversight within the program. For example, in 2009, an Iranian national was issued a J-1 visa to be a visiting professor in computer science at a U.S. university from September 2009 to August 2010. On November 8, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated him as a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012, “Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran.” 87 He was reportedly attempting to acquire equipment related to the monitoring of Short Message Service (SMS) traffic from abroad as of February 2009 and, as of early July 2012, was actively assisting the Government of Iran's internet censorship activities. 88 On November 5, 2025, three J-1 research scholars from China were charged with conspiracy to smuggle biological materials into the United States and for making false statements to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. 89 In June 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that two Chinese national J-1 exchange visitors were charged with conspiracy and smuggling a dangerous biological pathogen into the U.S. for their work at a U.S. university laboratory. 90 On November 5, 2025, one of the J-1 exchange visitors pleaded guilty to charges of smuggling a biological pathogen into the U.S. and then lying to FBI agents about it. 91 87 Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Designation of Four (4) Individuals and Five (5) Entities Pursuant to Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012, 77 FR 68820 (Nov. 16, 2012). This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. 88 United Against Nuclear Iran, Sanctioned Persons—Jalili, Rasool, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sanctioned-person/jalili-rasool (last visited Jun 2, 2026). See also Rezaei, R., Iranwire, Who is Rasoul Jalili, the So-Called “Father of Filtering” of the Islamic Republic? (Apr. 19, 2026), https://iranwire.com/en/features/151390-who-is-rasoul-jalili-the-so-called-father-of-filtering-of-the-islamic-republic/. This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. 89 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Three Chinese National Scholars from University of Michigan Laboratory Charged for Conspiring to Smuggle Biological Materials into the U.S. (Nov. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-chinese-national-scholars-university-michigan-laboratory-charged-conspiring-smuggle. This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. 90 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Chinese Nationals Charged with Conspiracy and Smuggling a Dangerous Biological Pathogen into the U.S. for their Work at a University of Michigan Laboratory (June 3, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-conspiracy-and-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen-us. This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. 91 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Chinese National Pleads Guilty and is Sentenced for Smuggling a Dangerous Biological Pathogen into the U.S. While Working at a University of Michigan Laboratory ( Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-and-sentenced-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen . This was part of DHS's analysis of SEVIS data on June 2, 2026. In another example, in September 2019, a stark illustration of state-sponsored efforts to illegally obtain United States technology emerged when the FBI charged Chinese government official Zhongsan Liu with conspiracy to fraudulently procure United States research scholar visas for Chinese officials whose actual purpose was to recruit United States scientists for high technology development programs within China. 92 Liu was convicted of participating in conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraudulently obtain U.S. visas. 93 92 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Chinese Government Employee Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Participating in Conspiracy to Fraudulently Obtain U.S. Visas (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/chinese-government-employee-charged-manhattan-federal-court-participating-conspiracy. 93 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Chinese Government Employee Convicted of Participating in Conspiracy to Defraud the United States and Fraudulently Obtain U.S. Visas (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/chinese-government-employee-convicted-participating-conspiracy-defraud-united-states . Additionally, in December 2019, Zaosong Zheng, a 29-year-old graduate student in J-1 status participating in an exchange visitor program at Harvard University, was stopped at Boston Logan International Airport. Federal agents determined he was a “high risk for possibly exporting undeclared biological material” after finding 21 vials of brown liquid wrapped in a plastic bag inside a sock in his checked luggage; typed and handwritten notes indicated “that [the exchange visitor] . . . was knowingly gathering and collecting intellectual property. . . possibly on behalf of the Chinese government.” 94 Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. 94 See Boston Herald, China May be Behind Theft of Bio Samples by Harvard-Sponsored Chinese Student, Fed Says (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/12/30/peoples-republic-of-china-may-be-behind-theft-of-bio-samples-by-harvard-sponsored-chinese-student-feds-say/; see also The Daily Beast, China Might Be Behind Harvard Student's Theft of Cancer Research, Feds Claim (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/china-might-be-behind-harvard-student-zaosong-zhengs-theft-of-cancer-research-feds-claim; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related . In January 2020, Yanqing Ye was charged with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy after Ye falsely identified herself on her J-1 visa application as a “student” and lied about her ongoing military service at a top military academy directed by the Chinese Communist Party. It was further alleged that while studying at Boston University's Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering, Ye continued to work as a People's Liberation Army Lieutenant completing numerous assignments from People's Liberation Army officers such as conducting research, assessing United States military websites and sending United States documents and information to China. 95 95 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases, supra note 94. In June 2020, a Chinese national who entered the United States on a J-1 visa to conduct research at the University of California, San Francisco was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport while attempting to return to China and charged with visa fraud. According to court documents, he allegedly is an officer with the PRC People's Liberation Army and provided fraudulent information about his military service in his visa application. He allegedly was instructed by his military lab supervisor to bring information back to China about the lab at University of California, San Francisco. 96 96 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Officer of China's People's Liberation Army Arrested at Los Angeles International Airport (June 11, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/officer-china-s-people-s-liberation-army-arrested-los-angeles-international-airport . In 2025, a J-1 Chinese research scholar at the University of Michigan was charged in a criminal complaint for conspiracy, smuggling goods into the United States, false statements, and visa fraud. The FBI arrested the exchange visitor for allegedly smuggling a noxious fungus which is responsible for billions of dollars in economic losses worldwide each year and causes health problems for both humans and livestock. The J-1 allegedly received Chinese government funding for her work on this pathogen and is a loyal member of the Chinese Communist Party. 97 97 See Chinese Nationals Charged with Conspiracy and Smuggling a Dangerous Biological Pathogen into the U.S. for their Work at a University of Michigan Laboratory, supra note 90. As with F nonimmigrants, DHS believes that replacing admissions for D/S for J-1s with admission for a fixed time period will help mitigate the national security concerns described above. Exchange visitor program categories include college and university students, which share similarities with the F-1 nonimmigrant classification. Students enrolled in such programs are pursuing post-secondary studies alongside F-1 nonimmigrants. J-1 college and university students in a degree program may be authorized to participate in the exchange visitor program so long as they meet the requirements for duration of participation, including pursuing a full course of study, echoing the full course of study requirements for F-1 nonimmigrants. A J-1 exchange visitor's program may also be extended by the ROs, subject to regulation and/or approval by DoS, without an application to DHS. These similarities give rise to the same concerns about national security related to F-1s, as described above, and about fraud and abuse by J-1s and their ROs. By requiring the same fixed period of admission for F-1s and J-1s, J-1 college and university students in exchange visitor programs will be unable to circumvent the intent of this rule, 98 which is to protect the integrity of these programs and provide additional protections and mechanisms for oversight. Because J exchange visitors are also tracked in SEVIS, DHS believes it will be more effective for an immigration officer to periodically confirm that an alien has properly maintained status, rather than relying on the checks of an RO that the J-1 is pursuing the activities permitted by the exchange visitor program. As noted above, DHS believes it is more appropriate for immigration officers, with their background checks, clearances, and training from the U.S. government, to adjudicate maintenance of nonimmigrant status and whether an alien is eligible for an additional admission period. Switching from D/S to a fixed period of admission will permit immigration officers the opportunity to determine whether an alien is eligible for an additional period of time. If an officer finds a violation of status while adjudicating the alien's request, the consequences could be immediate. Applicants for EOS must also establish that they are admissible, and failure to do so will result in denial of the EOS. 99 Admissibility grounds are complex and are properly assessed by a trained DHS officer. Such an assessment is not currently made when J exchange visitors apply for an extension of their program with their RO. 100 Thus, admitting J exchange visitors for a fixed period, instead of for D/S, will give DHS more frequent opportunities to directly vet these foreign visitors and ensure they are bona fide exchange visitors, and it will prevent and deter nefarious actors within the J exchange visitor population. Under the changes to the period of admission of J exchange visitors and the applicable EOS process, DHS may more frequently collect biometrics and other information from J exchange visitors, enhancing the Government's oversight and monitoring of these aliens. 98 References to “this proposed rule” and “this proposed rulemaking” throughout this document refer to the rulemaking being proposed within this NPRM. 99 See 8 CFR 214.1(a)(3). 100 ROs may be unaware of a student's failure to maintain status, including by engaging in criminal activity. Admitting J-1s for a fixed period of admission would provide trained DHS officers with the opportunity to vet these individuals. 4. Risks Within the I Classification Admitting most I nonimmigrants for D/S affords them different treatment from most other nonimmigrants, who are admitted for a specified period of time. DHS believes admitting aliens temporarily to the United States for a fixed period will strengthen vetting and information collection and help immigration officers ensure that the I nonimmigrants are, and will be, engaged in activities that are permissible under INA 101(a)(15)(I). In addition, this rulemaking requires individuals who wish to remain in I nonimmigrant status beyond the end date of their authorized stay to apply for an EOS with USCIS, at which point immigration officers can review their activities in the United States. It also clarifies what DHS will require these individuals to present as evidence supporting their EOS request. 101 101 These proposed changes, including additional evidence relating to foreign media organizations and activities the alien intends to engage in while in I status, would also apply to a nonimmigrant in the United States who requests to change his or her nonimmigrant status to that of an I nonimmigrant. IV. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule A. Support for the Proposed Rule 1. General Endorsement Comments: Commenters expressed support for the proposed rule, stating that the rule would curtail fraud and abuse associated with these nonimmigrant classifications, enhance national security through periodic vetting, promote compliance and fair competition, and generally have a positive impact on the economy, schools, and students. Multiple commenters supported the rule by remarking that it strengthens competitiveness and the ability of the United States to attract the world's brightest students while ensuring that only law-abiding students remain in the system. Some commenters added that the rule balances the interests of foreign nonimmigrants with the need to protect national interests and safeguard opportunities for American students and workers. Several commenters expressed support for the fixed term and believed that the requirements to reapply for an extension would not be an issue for the foreign students. In support of the rule, several commenters also mentioned that the F, J, and I classifications should be aligned with other visa classifications for consistency. Some commenters stated that individuals in these visa classifications should focus on their course of study and not on employment. Additionally, while showing support, some commenters indicated that the rule does not go far enough and called for more restrictions. Additionally, some commenters expressed support for the proposed rule, while also acknowledging that many nonimmigrant students provide value to the United States. Some stated that the rule is well within the federal government's lawful authority and plenary power over immigration, follows the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, and does not implicate constitutional rights, as visas confer a privilege and not an entitlement. Response: DHS appreciates the support and in-depth understanding of these issues. DHS agrees with commenters assessment about the impacts of this rule and agrees the rule is well within its lawful authority. As noted above, DHS believes the rule will give DHS the ability to monitor and oversee these nonimmigrants while they are in the United States, curtailing fraud and abuse associated with these nonimmigrant classifications. 2. Positive Impacts on Immigration System a. Fraud and Abuse, Overstays, and National Security Comments: Commenters expressed support for the proposed time limits and elimination of D/S, noting that such measures would help address instances of abuse and fraud where the foreign student has no intent to study and remains in the United States indefinitely. Commenters stated that the fixed admission period for F, J, and I nonimmigrants creates consistency across other nonimmigrant categories, as most nonimmigrant categories have fixed admission terms, and creates fairness and clarity to the system. Specifically, commenters provided examples of fraud and abuse, such as in the indefinite language training programs, visa mills, criminal enterprises, “pay-to-stay” fraud—where school officials falsely report that F-1 students who do not attend school are maintaining their student status in return for cash payments, schools with classes that require minimum in-person presence, issues with “Day-1 CPT”—where Curricular Practical Training (CPT) allows certain foreign graduate students to start working in the United States immediately upon admission, and foreign nationals abusing and misusing resources provided by the university as well as by the local community. For example, one commenter remarked that, as an American, the commenter lost his job due to coordinated visa fraud. Another commenter remarked that fraudulent IT consultancies train students and secure jobs for them using fake resumes. Another commenter remarked that online forums contain evidence of students with immigrant intent, crafting their interview answers to get approved. One commenter remarked that there is no attendance requirement or verification that F-1 students are attending class and that students can drop classes with no verification that they are slowing down the completion of their program to stay and work in the United States longer. Another commenter noted that fraud by certain schools and multiple large-scale “sham school operations” exacerbate inequities, and referenced Tri-Valley University, which was noncompliant and closed operations. 102 The commenter also mentioned the University of Northern New Jersey, stating it involved an ICE undercover sting that revealed more than 1,000 foreign nationals enrolled through recruiters at a fake university to maintain status, and Farmington University (sic), stating it involved an ICE sting that exposed over 600 foreign students paying to remain in the United States with no real classes. 103 The commenter noted that these schemes not only defraud the education system but also exploit students financially and can result in unauthorized work arrangements akin to trafficking conditions. 102 The commenter did not provide citations or references to support this assertion, but see, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, CEO and President of East Bay University Sentenced to 198 Months for Fraud Scheme (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/ceo-and-president-east-bay-university-sentenced-198-months-fraud-scheme . 103 The commenter did not provide citations or references to support this assertion, but see, e.g., Manning, W., Nat'l L. Rev., The “University of Northern New Jersey” Visa Fraud Sting Operation Shutdown After Arrest of 21 (Apr. 12, 2016), https://natlawreview.com/article/university-northern-new-jersey-visa-fraud-sting-operation-shutdown-after-arrest-21 and Immig. & Customs Enf't, Press Release, Final Defendant Sentenced in ICE HSI University of Farmington Investigation, (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/final-defendant-sentenced-ice-hsi-university-farmington-investigation . Relatedly, a research organization pointed out that there are many documented cases of visa abuse or fraud across U.S. visa categories, 104 and that eliminating D/S will support the integrity of the immigration system by allowing DHS to more easily uncover fraud and abuse in the F, J, and I nonimmigrant visa programs. The research organization cited a USCIS report stating that in some of these cases, school owners operate multiple schools and transfer students between these schools to help conceal the fraud. 105 104 The commenter referenced Vaughan, J., Statement for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Restoring Integrity and Security to the Visa Process (June 25, 2025); GAO, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks (Sept. 19, 2022); and North, D., Center for Immigration Studies, The Dregs of Higher Education Damage Our Immigration System (Sept. 11, 2017). 105 The commenter referenced North, D., Center for Immigration Studies, Higher Education Fraud Comes in Two Different Packages, Part 1 (Jan. 8, 2018). A few commenters also noted what they view as fraud and abuse of the J-1 program. A commenter remarked that healthcare systems are abusing these visas to train foreign doctors in very competitive fields. The commenter noted that there are hundreds of competent American physicians and medical students who are overlooked by healthcare systems to hire J-1 medical residents/fellows. Another commenter stated that J students are susceptible to abuse from employers more than other visas. The commenter asserted that the GAO and the DoS Inspector General had recommended that DoS should not be operating the J program and reported that the visa results in American workers being denied jobs. The commenter also highlighted articles regarding J-1 nonimmigrants, though no specific citations were provided: that J visa `Summer Work Travel Program' refers to the summer of the guestworkers and that it can be used to avoid hiring Americans year-round (“Visa program encourages seasonal hiring of foreign students while U.S. youths go jobless” Denver Post); that the J-1 program has become a `money machine,' with over $100 million received every year in fees (“J-1 Visas: Cheap Labor as Cultural Exchange,” Center for Immigration Studies); that there are efforts to recruit foreign youth to the program and into U.S. jobs to help employers calculate how much money they can save by not hiring American youth (Panel Transcript: Summer Work Travel Program, Center for Immigration Studies); and that there is a strong lobby to expand the Summer Work Travel program but no lobby for American youth. Another commenter also wrote in support of the proposed rule, and with respect to J-1, the commenter stated that if a nonimmigrant Ph.D. student is making legitimate progress in their program of study, the new extension process should not present an issue to the nonimmigrant student. Commenters expressed support for a fixed period of admission, reasoning that it promotes accountability and compliance, and decreases overstays. A commenter stated that the current D/S policy allows over 1 million nonimmigrants to remain in the United States without defined end dates, increasing the risk of overstays and weakening oversight. The commenter further stated that the implementation of a fixed admission period would improve compliance tracking and help address the reported overstay rate, which is currently estimated to be around 2-to-3-percent. Many commenters addressed the rates of overstays among students admitted for D/S, stating that a fixed admission period ensures tracking of nonimmigrant visa holders' stays, thereby reducing the risk of overstays. One organization stated that terminating D/S would address visa overstays. The organization noted that in 1978, DOJ proposed a rule allowing nonimmigrants to be admitted “for the duration of their status as students.” 106 The organization reported that these changes were proposed despite a 1975 General Accounting Office document, which reported high numbers of foreign student overstays and found that among the 222,000 foreign students in the United States in December 1974, 42 percent were in illegal status resulting from overstaying their visas. 107 The organization also stated that individuals on student visas are more likely to be authorized to work today than in 1979, due to the creation and subsequent expansion of the OPT program and the addition of an extension for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) OPT. The organization concluded that the potential for employment increases enforcement challenges, given that work authorization increases the risks of overstays and other violations. In support of the rule, another commenter asserted that visa overstay for student or exchange visitors is among the highest of all nonimmigrant groups at 3.67 percent. 106 43 FR 32306 (July 26, 1978). 107 The commenter referenced GAO, Better Controls Needed to Prevent Foreign Students from Violating the Conditions of Their Entry and Stay While in the United States (Feb. 4, 1975). A few commenters discussed support for the rule with respect to protecting national security. Commenters remarked that adversary countries use foreign students to steal intellectual property, sabotage agriculture, and engage in espionage. One commenter expressed that there are foreign students who use U.S. resources while engaging in activities that do not reflect positively on the United States, including sharing content that is critical of the country on social media. The commenter requested greater attention to how such resources are allocated, to ensure they are used constructively and in support of the broader goals of the nation. In support of the rule, a commenter noted that in extreme cases, there have been reports of foreign students intimidating others from their home countries who hold differing political views, creating a chilling effect within communities. Commenters expressed concern that the current D/S framework weakens DHS's ability to enforce immigration laws, further stating that the newly proposed rule will foster national security by implementing periodic reviews of nonimmigrant statuses, as a method for DHS to routinely assess and mitigate risks. Some commenters referenced the September 11, 2001, attacks, noting that some of the perpetrators had entered the United States on student visas. The commenters further stated that the proposed rule aligned with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations of increasing information sharing between federal agencies by supporting visa compliance through better tracking systems of lawful status. Similarly, commenters raised concerns about general national security risks posed by foreign students, particularly those from China and India, citing examples of espionage, intellectual property theft, hazardous material transportation, and technology transfer. Commenters pointed to espionage concerns, such as referencing the case of Ji Chaoqun, who was sentenced to eight years in prison for spying while in F-1 status. The commenters also raised concerns regarding countries that may exploit student and exchange programs to place individuals in sensitive academic fields, potentially for espionage or intellectual property theft. Another commenter pointed out that a 2023 National Intelligence Council report showed a 30 percent rise in espionage cases linked to foreign students since 2019. Commenters stated that this rule would facilitate periodic vetting, reduce administrative burdens on DSOs, and ensure that individuals in sensitive programs are closely monitored, reducing risks to national security. Another commenter stated that there are documented cases of foreign students smuggling dangerous biological materials across the United States, and of foreign nationals stealing cutting-edge American research, directly threatening national security and intellectual property. 108 One comment raised concerns on the current immigration system being incompatible with the financial interests of universities and employers that maximize foreign enrollment and employment, even when the FBI is reporting that a new China-related counterintelligence case is opened approximately every 10 hours, and where global air travel is increasingly accessible, allowing foreign nationals to take advantage of United States' university systems and immigration policies. 109 108 The commenter did not provide citations or references to support this assertion, but see, e.g., Three Chinese National Scholars from University of Michigan Laboratory Charged for Conspiring to Smuggle Biological Materials into the U.S., supra note 89; ET Online, The Economic Times Students or Spies? How China Infiltrated U.S. Universities (May 29, 2025), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/students-or-spies-how-china-infiltrated-us-universities/articleshow/121492092.cms; Winter, T., NBC News, Chinese Couple Charged with Smuggling a Biological Pathogen into the U.S. (Jun. 3, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/chinese-couple-charged-smuggling-biological-pathogen-us-rcna208658. 109 The commenter did not provide citations or references to support this assertion, but see, e.g., China's Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions, Remarks by FBI Director Christopher Wray, Hudson Institute Video Event, Washington, DC (July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches-and-testimony/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states (Director Wray advised the FBI was opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours). See also e.g., Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside the U.S., Remarks by FBI Director Chrisopher Way, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA (Jan. 31, 2022), (Director Wray advised that roughly every 12 hours the FBI opens new cases to counter the CCP's intelligence operations). Response: DHS appreciates the commenters' support on this rule and agrees that this rule will strengthen the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, specifically relating to F, J, and I nonimmigrants, and enhance national security. DHS acknowledges that the D/S framework is vulnerable to fraud, abuse (including overstays), and national security threats. While the commenter did not provide any specific evidence supporting their claims of theft of American research or threats to intellectual property or national security, DHS has provided examples of national security threats and intellectual property theft in transferring sensitive research back to China. 110 In another recent example, in 2024, an F-1 student visa overstay and an alien released after illegally crossing the border and being issued a Notice to Appear, posed as Amazon drivers and attempted to breach a Marine Corps Base in what experts believe may have been a dry run for a terrorist attack. 111 DHS agrees that this rule will reduce status violations ( e.g., overstays), strengthen oversight, and yield additional benefits to enhance the U.S. immigration system. DHS believes that this rule establishes an effective mechanism to periodically and directly assess whether nonimmigrants in F, J, and I status are complying with the conditions of their nonimmigrant classifications and U.S. immigration laws, and to obtain timely and accurate information about the activities these aliens have engaged in and plan to engage in during their temporary stay in the United States. It will allow DHS to vet and screen aliens in these nonimmigrant classifications for fraud, abuse, and security threats, and identify aliens subject to inadmissibility and removability grounds. DHS believes that this rule will encourage aliens to maintain lawful status and reduce instances in which F, J, and I visa holders unlawfully remain in the United States after their program, practical training, or activities or assignments end. Furthermore, admitting individuals in the F, J, and I visa classifications for a fixed period of time will require those F, J, and I nonimmigrants who wish to remain in the United States beyond their specifically authorized admission period to apply for an EOS directly with USCIS. The other option of departing the country and then applying for admission with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at a POE has always been available to all nonimmigrants whether on a fixed admission period or on D/S. Requiring nonimmigrants who wish to stay in the United States longer than their initial authorization without leaving the country to apply to USCIS for an EOS will provide DHS with an additional mechanism to exercise the oversight necessary to enforce our nation's immigration laws, protect the integrity of these nonimmigrant programs, and promptly detect national security concerns. 110 Students or Spies? How China Infiltrated US Universities, supra note 108; Winter, T., Chinese Couple Charged With Smuggling a Biological Pathogen Into the U.S., supra note 108. 111 Ruiz, M., Jordanian Quantico Breach Suspect Freed Under Biden Arrested Again by ICE: Report (Mar. 4, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/us/jordanian-quantico-breach-suspect-freed-under-biden-arrested-again-ice-report. b. Impacts on Schools, Higher Education, and Exchange Programs Comments: In support of the rule, commenters stated the rule will address inequities that American students and American workers face resulting from abuses in these visa classifications and employer incentives to hire foreign students. Multiple commenters remarked that universities should give preference to American students and expressed concern that foreign students are taking spots from more qualified American students. A commenter remarked that extended stays by foreign students artificially increase demand at universities. Commenters stated that the rule will reduce tuition costs, open job markets for Americans, open degree and course options for American students, by reducing foreign student demand at universities and job-markets. Some commenters view that the rule will al [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-14439. Public record. Not legal advice.