# Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-06017

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Proposed Rule
- **Published:** March 27, 2026
- **Citation:** 91 FR 15454

## Text

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training Administration
20 CFR Parts 655 and 656
[DOL Docket No. ETA-2026-0001]
RIN 1205-AC30
Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States

AGENCY:

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor.

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY:

The Department of Labor (DOL or the Department) is issuing this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit comments and public input regarding its proposal to revise Employment and Training Administration (ETA) regulations governing the prevailing wages for employment opportunities that United States (U.S.) employers seek to fill with alien workers on a permanent or temporary basis through certain EB-2 and EB-3 employment-based immigrant visas via the Permanent Labor Certification (PERM) program or through H-1B, H-1B1, or E-3 nonimmigrant visas. Specifically, DOL is proposing to amend its regulations governing the PERM program and Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) to incorporate changes to the computation of wage levels under the Department's four-tiered prevailing wage structure based on the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) wage survey administered by the Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These proposed revisions aim to better align prevailing wage levels with the wages paid to U.S. workers who are similarly employed in the occupation and area of intended employment. The Department's proposed revisions also seek to strengthen program integrity by reducing the incentive for employers to use these programs to replace, rather than supplement, U.S. workers by employing lower-paid alien workers. In addition, the revision would enable the Department to more effectively ensure that the employment of immigrant and nonimmigrant workers admitted or otherwise provided one of the covered statuses does not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.

DATES:

Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on this proposed rule on or before May 26, 2026.

ADDRESSES:

You may submit comments electronically by the following method:

Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions on the website for submitting comments. A plain language summary of the proposed rule is also available on that website.

Instructions:
Comments should be confined to issues pertinent to the NPRM, identify the agency's name and public docket number ETA-2026-0001, explain the reasons for any recommended changes, and reference the specific section and wording being addressed, where possible.

Please be advised that the Department will post comments that relate to this NPRM to
https://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information provided. The
https://www.regulations.gov
website is the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal and all comments posted there are available and accessible to the public. Please do not submit comments containing trade secrets, confidential or proprietary commercial or financial information, personal health information, sensitive personally identifiable information (for example, social security numbers, driver's license or state identification numbers, passport numbers, or financial account numbers), or other information that you do not want to be made available to the public. Should the agency become aware of such information, the agency reserves the right to redact or refrain from posting such personally sensitive or other sensitive information, or comments that contain threatening language. Please note that depending on how information is submitted, the agency may not be able to redact the information and instead reserves the right to refrain from posting the information or comment in such situations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For further information, contact Brian Pasternak, Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Room N-5311, Washington, DC 20210, email:
OFLC.Regulations@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Legal Framework

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, assigns responsibilities to the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) relating to the entry and employment of certain categories of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
1

This NPRM concerns the calculation of the prevailing wage levels for job opportunities in the PERM,
2

E-3, H-1B, and H-1B1 programs for which employers seek labor certification from the Secretary.
3

The Department of Labor uses a unified four-tiered prevailing wage methodology based on data obtained from employers under the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) survey administered by the Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to determine wage levels for certain temporary (H-1B, H-1B1, E-3) and permanent (EB-2 and EB-3) labor certification processes.

1
There are two general categories of U.S. visas: immigrant and nonimmigrant. Immigrant visas are issued to foreign nationals who intend to live permanently in the United States. Nonimmigrant visas are for foreign nationals who enter the United States on a temporary basis—for tourism, medical treatment, business, temporary work, study, or other reasons.

2
PERM stands for Permanent Electronic Review Management.

3
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(E)(iii), (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(b1).

1. Overview of Labor Certification and Labor Condition Applications

Labor certifications and labor condition applications are requirements under the INA for certain alien workers seeking employment in the United States. To issue a labor certification, the Secretary of Labor must determine that there are not sufficient able, willing, and qualified workers available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the country and that the hiring of the alien worker will not adversely affect the wages or working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.
4

The Department's statutory obligations under the INA are specifically designed to ensure that the introduction of alien labor into the United States supplements, rather than displaces, U.S. workers and that the current prevailing wage structure protects U.S. labor market conditions.
5

4
INA § 212(a)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (labor certification requirement).

5
See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A)(ii); 20 CFR 656.1(a) (purpose of PERM regulations).

The labor condition application (LCA) is a requirement for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant visa classifications.
6

To be able to employ an alien as an H-1B, H-1B1, or E-3 nonimmigrant, the employer must have filed with the Secretary of Labor an application that makes a number of critical attestations surrounding wages and working conditions, including that

the employer is offering and will offer wages that are at least the actual wage paid by the employer to individuals with similar experience and qualifications or the prevailing wage as determined by the Department, whichever is greater, and will provide working conditions that will not adversely affect the working conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed.
7

6
8 U.S.C. 1182(n), 1182(t). Two subsections titled “(t)” have been enacted. Here, the Department cites to the first, titled “Nonimmigrant professionals; labor attestations.”

7
8 U.S.C. 1182(n), 1182(t).

The H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 programs are temporary nonimmigrant classifications that generally allow U.S. employers to hire alien workers in “specialty occupations,” generally defined as those jobs which require the theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge and at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent.
8

By contrast, the EB-2 and EB-3 programs are permanent immigrant visa categories that generally require labor certification before an employer can sponsor an alien worker for lawful permanent residence.
9

These programs, however, are intimately connected. Many alien workers initially enter the U.S. in a temporary H-1B status and later adjust their status to permanent residency through the EB-2 or EB-3 categories using the PERM process. In FY 2024, approximately 57.6 percent of PERM applications were filed on behalf of workers already employed in H-1B status, underscoring the overlap between temporary and permanent programs.

8
INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(iii), (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(b1), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(E)(iii), (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(b1); INA § 214(i), 8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(1)-(2) (definition of “specialty occupation” and degree requirement).

9
INA § 203(b)(2)-(3), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)-(3) (EB-2 and EB-3 classifications); INA § 212(a)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A) (labor certification requirement); 20 CFR part 656 (PERM regulations).

To ensure consistency and prevent wage-setting disparities across these interrelated programs, the Department applies a unified four-tier prevailing wage structure across all the programs based on the BLS OEWS survey. This structure, required by the INA, establishes wage levels which are commensurate with experience, education, and level of supervision and that are implemented through ETA regulations.
10

In FY 2024, the Department certified 502,374 H-1B applications, accounting for the vast majority of temporary labor certifications.
11

By comparison, H-1B1 applications totaled 3,368 and E-3 applications totaled 9,154.
12

For permanent employment, the Department certified 35,505 PERM applications during the same period.
13

These figures highlight the scale of the H-1B program relative to other visa classifications and underscore the importance of consistent wage protections across temporary and permanent programs.

10
INA § 212(p)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4) (requiring four wage levels commensurate with experience, education, and supervision);
see also
20 CFR 656.40(b)(2) and 655.731(a)(2)(ii) (prevailing wage methodology).

11
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, FY 2024 LCA data: available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance.

12
Id.

13
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, FY 2024 PERM data: available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance.

Among all LCAs certified in FY 2024, 19 percent were assigned to Wage Level I, 44 percent to Level II, 21 percent to Level III, and 16 percent to Level IV.
14

These levels reflect the Department's four-tier structure, which differentiates wages based on the education, experience, and level of supervision required for the position: Level I corresponds to entry-level roles, while Level IV represents the most experienced and highly skilled positions.
15

14
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, FY 2024 LCA data: available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance
.

15
See INA § 212(p)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4) (requiring four wage levels commensurate with experience, education, and supervision); 20 CFR 655.731(a)(2)(ii) and 656.40(b)(2) (prevailing wage methodology).

2. Permanent Labor Certification

The INA prohibits the admission of certain employment-based immigrants unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security that (1) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor; and (2) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.
16

16
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A). Although this provision references the Attorney General, the authority to adjudicate immigrant visa petitions was transferred to the Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (an agency within the Department of Homeland Security)—now known as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)—by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 451(b) (codified at 6 U.S.C. 271(b)). Under 6 U.S.C. 557, references in federal law to any agency or officer whose functions have been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security or other official or component to which the functions were transferred.

This “labor certification” requirement does not apply to all employment-based immigrants. The INA provides for five “preference” categories, or immigrant visa classes, only two of which—the second and third preference employment categories (commonly called the EB-2 and EB-3 immigrant visa classifications)—generally require a labor certification.
17

An employer seeking to sponsor an alien worker for an immigrant visa under the EB-2 or EB-3 preference categories generally must file a visa petition with the Department of Homeland Security on the worker's behalf, and the petition must include a labor certification from the Secretary of Labor.
18

Further, the Department of State (DOS) may not issue a visa unless the Secretary of Labor has issued a labor certification in conformity with the relevant provisions of the INA.
19

If the Secretary determines both that there are not sufficient able, willing, qualified, and available U.S. workers and that employment of the alien worker will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers, the Secretary so certifies to DHS and DOS by issuing a permanent labor certification. If the Secretary cannot make one or both of the above findings, the application for permanent employment certification is denied.

17

See
8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)-(3), 1182(a)(5)(D). Section 1153(b)(2) governs the EB-2 classification of immigrant visas granted to foreign workers who are either professionals holding advanced degrees (master's degree or above or foreign equivalent degree, or a bachelor degree or foreign equivalent degree plus five years of progressive experience in the specialty) or persons of “exceptional ability” in the sciences, arts, or business. To gain entry in this category, the foreign worker must have prearranged an offer of employment with a U.S. employer that meets the requirements of labor certification, unless the work he or she is seeking admission to perform is in the “national interest,” such as to qualify for a waiver of the job offer (and hence, the labor certification) requirement under 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(B). Section 1153(b)(3) governs the EB-3 classification of immigrant work visas granted to foreign workers who are either “skilled workers,” “professionals,” or “other” (unskilled) workers, as defined by the statute. To gain entry in this category, the foreign worker must have a prearranged offer of employment with a U.S. employer that meets the requirements of labor certification, without exception.

18
8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(F), 1182(a)(5)(A) and (D).

19
8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2), (b)(3)(C), 1201(g).

Under the INA, the EB-2 classification applies to aliens who are “members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States.”
20

DHS regulations, in turn, define an “advanced degree” as any United States academic or professional degree, or a foreign equivalent degree above that of a bachelor's degree. A United States bachelor's degree or a foreign equivalent

degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree.
21

If a doctoral degree customarily is required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree.
22

The regulations go on to define “exceptional ability” as “a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business.”
23

20
8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(A).

21
8 CFR 204.5(k)(2). Note that this equivalency is defined by DHS regulations for the purposes of EB-2 classification. The Department is not expressing a view on the substantive equivalence of these qualifications outside of that regulatory framework.

22

Id.

23

Id.

The EB-3 program consists of three discrete classifications: “skilled worker,” defined as aliens who are “capable . . . of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States;” “professional,” defined as “a qualified alien who holds at least a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and who is a member of the professions;” and “other worker,” defined as aliens who are “capable . . . of performing unskilled labor (requiring less than two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.”
24

24
8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3); 8 CFR 204.5(l)(2).

3. Labor Condition Application

The Secretary must certify an LCA filed by a U.S. employer before the employer may employ an alien worker under the E-3, H-1B, or H-1B1 programs.
25

LCAs apply only to temporary nonimmigrant visa classifications; permanent sponsorship is pursued through the PERM labor certification process under INA § 212(a)(5)(A). Because many H-1B workers later adjust to permanent residence under the EB-2 or EB-3 classification, this NPRM maintains a unified wage framework across temporary and permanent programs to ensure consistent protections, as described below.

25
See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(E)(iii), (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(b1); 8 CFR 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E); see also 8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); 8 U.S.C. 1182(n), (t); 20 CFR part 655, subpart H.

As noted above, the LCA is submitted by an employer to the Secretary of Labor and states, among other things, that the employer is offering and will offer wages that are at least the actual wage paid by the employer to individuals with similar experience and qualifications or the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment, whichever is greater, and will provide working conditions that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.
26

26
8 U.S.C. 1182(n), 1182(t).

Unlike the PERM program, the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 programs allow U.S. employers to employ alien workers temporarily in specialty occupations. “Specialty occupation” is defined as an occupation that requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of “highly specialized knowledge” and at least a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty, or its foreign equivalent, as a minimum requirement for entry into the U.S.-based occupation, meaning that the position must require at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty (or its equivalent) and the attainment of such a degree must be a standard minimum requirement for entry into the occupation.
27

The H-1B1 and E-3 nonimmigrant visa classifications also allow U.S. employers to temporarily employ alien workers in specialty occupations, except that these classifications specifically apply to the nationals of certain countries: The H-1B1 classification applies to alien workers in specialty occupations from Chile and Singapore,
28

while the E-3 visa classification applies to alien workers in specialty occupations from Australia.

27

See
8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(1)(A)-(B).

28
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b1), 1184(g)(8)(A).

B. Description of the Permanent Labor Certification Process

The Department's regulations at 20 CFR part 656 govern the PERM labor certification process and set forth the responsibilities of employers who desire to employ, on a permanent basis, alien workers covered by the INA's labor certification requirement.
29

The Department processes labor certification applications for employers seeking to sponsor alien workers for permanent employment under the EB-2 and EB-3 immigrant visa preference categories. Aliens seeking admission under, or adjustment of status to, the EB-2 or EB-3 preference categories are inadmissible “unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified . . . that—(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”
30

29
The current regulations were issued through a final rule implementing the streamlined permanent labor certification program through revisions to 20 CFR part 656. The final rule was published on December 27, 2004, and took effect on March 28, 2005.
See
Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Implementation of New System, 69 FR 77326-01 (Dec. 27, 2004). The Department published a final rule on May 17, 2007, to enhance program integrity and reduce the incentives and opportunities for fraud and abuse related to permanent labor certification, commonly known as “the fraud rule.”
Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Reducing the Incentives and Opportunities for Fraud and Abuse and Enhancing Program Integrity,
72 FR 27904-01 (May 17, 2007).

30
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A)(i).

The Secretary makes this determination in the PERM programs by, among other things, requiring the alien worker's sponsoring employer to recruit U.S. workers by offering a wage that equals or exceeds the prevailing wage and to further assure that the employer will pay the alien worker a wage equal to or exceeding the prevailing wage.
31

Prior to filing a labor certification application, the employer first must obtain a Prevailing Wage Determination (PWD) for its job opportunity from the Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC).
32

The standards and procedures governing the PWD process in connection with the permanent labor certification program are set forth in the Department's regulations at 20 CFR 656.40 and 656.41. If the job opportunity is covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was negotiated at arm's length between a union and the employer, the wage rate set forth in the CBA is considered the prevailing wage for labor certification purposes.
33

In the absence of a prevailing wage rate derived from an applicable CBA, the employer may elect to use an applicable wage determination under the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) or McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act (SCA), or provide a wage survey that complies with the Department's regulations.
34

In the absence of any of the above sources, the OFLC will use the BLS OEWS survey to determine the prevailing wage for the job opportunity based on the most

specific occupation and geographic area available.
35

After reviewing the employer's application, OFLC will determine the prevailing wage and specify the validity period, which may be no less than 90 days and no more than one year from the determination date.
36

31
20 CFR 656.10(c)(1). In addition to the prevailing wage requirement, employers must comply with other regulatory obligations under 20 CFR 656.10, including attesting that the job opportunity has been and is clearly open to U.S. workers, that all U.S. workers who applied were rejected only for lawful, job-related reasons, and that the employer has conducted the mandatory recruitment steps required by the PERM regulations.

32
20 CFR 656.15(b)(1), 656.40(a).

33

See
20 CFR 656.40(b)(1).

34
20 CFR 656.40(b), (g).

35
20 CFR 656.40(b)(2).

36
20 CFR 656.40(c).

Once the U.S. employer has received a PWD, the process for obtaining a permanent labor certification generally begins with the U.S. employer filing an
Application for Permanent Employment Certification,
Form ETA-9089, with OFLC.
37

As part of the standard application process, the employer must include, among other things, the labor or services to be performed and actual minimum job requirements contained on the valid PWD, the wage it is offering to pay for such labor or services the geographic location(s) where the work is expected to be performed, and the efforts it made to recruit qualified and available U.S. workers prior to filing the Form ETA-9089. Additionally, the employer must attest to certain labor condition statements on the Form ETA-9089, including that the “offered wage equals or exceeds the prevailing wage determined pursuant to 20 CFR 656.40 and 656.41, and the wage the employer will pay to the alien worker will equal or exceed the prevailing wage that is applicable at the time the alien begins work or from the time the alien is admitted to take up the certified employment.”
38

37
Applications for Schedule A occupations are eligible to receive pre-certification and bypass the standard applications review process. In those cases, employers file the appropriate documentation directly with DHS. 20 CFR 656.5, 656.15.

38
20 CFR 656.10(c)(1).

Through the requisite test of the labor market, the employer also attests, at the time of filing the Form ETA-9089, that the job opportunity has been, and is, clearly open to any U.S. worker, and that all U.S. workers who applied for the job opportunity were rejected for lawful, job-related reasons. OFLC performs a review of the Form ETA-9089 and may either grant or deny a permanent labor certification. When OFLC grants a permanent labor certification, the employer must submit proof of the certified Form ETA-9089 along with an
Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers
(Form I-140 petition) to DHS. A permanent labor certification is valid only for the job opportunity, employer, alien worker, and area of intended employment named on the Form ETA-9089 and must be filed in support of a Form I-140 petition within 180 calendar days of the date on which OFLC granted the certification.
39

39
20 CFR 656.30(b)(1).

C. Description of the Temporary Labor Condition Application Process

The Department's regulations at 20 CFR part 655, subpart H, govern the process for obtaining a certified LCA and set forth the responsibilities of employers who desire to temporarily employ alien workers in H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant classifications.

For H-1B petitions subject to the annual numerical cap, employers must first register with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) during the designated registration period. This electronic registration process does not require a certified Labor Condition Application (LCA). When USCIS determines that there is more than a sufficient number of unique beneficiaries on whose behalf registrations were properly submitted to meet the H-1B cap, USCIS conducts a lottery to select registrations eligible to file petitions. This lottery process is administered independently of the Department of Labor. Employers must obtain a certified LCA from the Department of Labor before filing the H-1B petition (Form I-129,
Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker
) with USCIS; however, employers can obtain an LCA prior to or after the USCIS registration lottery process. In December 2025, DHS finalized a rule establishing a weighted selection process based on offered wage levels for cap-subject H-1B registrations to favor higher-skilled, higher-paid aliens and strengthen program integrity.
40

40

See
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking to File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions, 90 FR 60864 (Dec. 29, 2025).

A prospective employer must attest on the LCA that (1) it is offering to and will pay the nonimmigrant, during the period of authorized employment, wages that are at least the actual wage level paid by the employer to all other employees with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question, or the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of intended employment, whichever is greater (based on the best information available at the time of filing the attestation); (2) it will provide working conditions for the nonimmigrant worker that will not adversely affect working conditions for similarly employed U.S. workers; (3) there is no strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the occupational classification at the worksite; and (4) it has provided notice of its filing of an LCA to its employees' bargaining representative for the occupational classification affected or, if there is no bargaining representative, it has provided notice to its employees in the affected occupational classification by posting the notice in a conspicuous location at the worksite or through other means such as electronic notification.
41

41
8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(1)(A)-(C), (t)(1)(A)-(C); 20 CFR 655.705(c)(1), 655.730(d).

As relevant here, the prevailing wage must be determined as of the time the LCA is filed.
42

In contrast to the permanent labor certification process, an employer is not required to obtain a PWD from the OFLC.
43

Rather, an employer may base the prevailing wage on one of several sources: an applicable CBA that was negotiated at arm's length between a union and the employer and contains a wage rate applicable to the occupation; a PWD from the OFLC; a wage determination under the Davis-Bacon Act or Service Contract Act; an independent authoritative source—such as a private wage survey—that satisfies the requirements in 20 CFR 655.731(b)(3)(iii)(B); or another legitimate source of wage data—such as an industry compensation study—that satisfies the requirements in 20 CFR 655.731(b)(3)(iii)(C).
44

42
20 CFR 655.731(a)(2).

43

Id.

44
20 CFR 655.731(a)(2)(ii)(A)-(C).

An employer may not file an LCA more than six months prior to their selected start date.
45

Unless the Secretary finds the LCA is incomplete or obviously inaccurate, the Secretary must certify it within seven working days of its filing.
46

Once an employer receives a certified LCA, it must file the Form I-129,
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker,
with USCIS if seeking classification of the alien as an H-1B worker.
47

During the course of adjudicating the nonimmigrant petition, USCIS determines, among other things, whether the petition is supported by a certified LCA that properly corresponds to the petition, whether the employer's position qualifies as a specialty occupation and, if so, whether the alien is qualified for the position.

45
20 CFR 655.730.

46
8 U.S.C. 1182(t)(2)(C); 20 CFR 655.740(a)(1).

47
For aliens seeking H-1B1 or E-3 classification, the alien may apply directly to the State Department for a visa once the LCA has been certified.

D. Brief History on Use of the BLS OEWS and Current Prevailing Wage Methodology

1. The Department's Methodology for Establishing Prevailing Wages From 1997 to 2020

The Department has always sought to use the best available information on occupational wages representing workers in the United States similarly employed. The BLS OEWS survey remains the largest ongoing statistical survey program of the federal government, producing employment and gross wage estimates for more than 830 SOC codes, and is used as the primary wage source for establishing skill-based prevailing wage determinations in the nonimmigrant and immigrant visa programs administered by the Department. The BLS produces survey materials and selects the employer establishments to be surveyed using the list of establishments maintained by State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) for unemployment insurance purposes. Wage information based on geographic areas are available at the national and State levels and for certain territories in which statistical validity can be ascertained, including the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Wage information is also made available at the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area levels within a State.

The OEWS survey primarily covers wage and salary workers in non-farm establishments and does not include the self-employed, owners and partners in unincorporated firms, household workers, or unpaid family workers. The survey is conducted primarily by mail, with telephone follow-ups to nonrespondents, or, if needed, to clarify written responses. Each year, two semiannual panels of approximately 179,000 to 187,000 sampled establishments are contacted, one panel in May and the other in November. Thus, the OEWS employment and gross wage estimates are constructed from a sample of about 1.1 million establishments collected over a 3-year period, which allows the production of data at detailed levels of geography, industry, and occupation and accounts for approximately 57 percent of employers in the United States. OEWS data are published annually with a May reference date. Wages are defined as straight-time, gross pay, including piece rates, but excludes other forms of pay such as overtime, shift differentials, and non-production or any year-end bonuses. Further, because it collects the gross wages paid to each worker in each occupation during the reference period, the OEWS can consistently report more precise wage estimates for any occupation-specific wage distribution to approximate wage differentials paid to U.S. workers similarly employed in a particular occupation and state.

The OEWS survey consists of two components: employment estimates and wage estimates. The employment component provides data on the estimated number of full- and part-time jobs in an occupation and geographic area, offering insight into workforce distribution and occupational demand across industries and regions. This component measures full- and part-time wage and salary employees in nonfarm industries, but excludes self-employed workers, owners and partners in unincorporated firms, employees of private households, and unpaid family workers. The wage component provides estimates of straight-time, gross pay for employees in an occupation, excluding premium pay such as overtime. The Department incorporated the wage component of the OEWS survey into its prevailing wage guidance in 1997.
48

At the time, the Department divided OEWS wage data into two skill levels: a Level I wage for “beginning level employees” and a Level II wage for “fully competent employees.” Because the OEWS survey does not provide data about skill differentials within each Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code, the Department established the entry and experienced skill levels mathematically.
49

48

Prevailing Wage Policy for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs,
General Administration Letter No. 2-98 (GAL 2-98) (Oct. 31, 1997), available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/advisories/general-administration-letter-no-2-98
and
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/advisories/GAL/1997/GAL2-98_attach.pdf
.

49
GAL 2-98 at 5.

Specifically, under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), BLS computed a Level I wage calculated as the mean of the lowest paid one-third of workers in a given occupation (approximately the 17th percentile of the OEWS wage distribution)
50

and a Level II wage calculated as the mean wage of the highest paid upper two-thirds of workers (approximately the 67th percentile).
51

This two-tier wage structure was based on a practical, informal method of using the mean wage of the lowest paid one-third of the workers surveyed in each occupation to approximate the typical compensation for “beginning level employees,” and the mean wage of the upper two-thirds of the workers surveyed in the occupation to approximate the typical compensation for “fully competent employees.”
52

50
To clarify, the Department notes that, because the old wage methodology took the mean of a portion of the OEWS wage distribution, the precise wage it produced will not always fall at 17th percentile. Rather, the 17th percentile is the midpoint or median of the distribution for which a mean was produced, and is therefore only an approximation for what the actual wage rates would be. The same is true of the old wage methodology for calculating the Level IV wage, which used the mean of the upper two thirds of the OEWS distribution, the midpoint of which is the 67th percentile.

51
Intra-Agency Memorandum of Understanding executed by Mr. John R. Beverly, III, Director, U.S. Employment Service, ETA, and Ms. Katharine Newman, Chief, Division of Financial Planning and Management, Office of Administration, BLS (Sept. 30, 1998).

52
GAL 2-98 at 5.
See also Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-agricultural Employment H-2B Program,
76 FR 3452, 3453 (Jan. 19, 2011);
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, Part 2,
78 FR 24047, 24051 (Apr. 24, 2013).

To implement the INA's four-tier prevailing wage provision, the Department published comprehensive Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs (2005 Guidance), which expanded the two-tier OEWS wage level system to include four “skill levels”: Level I “entry,” Level II “qualified,” Level III “experienced,” and Level IV “fully competent.”
53

The Department applied the formula specified in the INA to its two existing wage levels to set Levels I through IV, respectively, at approximately the 17th percentile, the 34th percentile, the 50th percentile, and the 67th percentile.
54

The Department's adoption of the four-tiered wage structure is grounded in the INA's statutory mandate, which requires that government surveys used to determine prevailing wages “provide at least four levels of wages commensurate with experience, education, and the level of supervision,”
55

and is consistent with the statutory requirement that wage levels be commensurate with experience, education, and the level of supervision, ensuring that wage determinations meaningfully differentiate among workers based on these factors. This differentiation is part of the statutory scheme wherein the Department is

charged with certifying a lack of sufficient workers and that employment of alien workers will not adversely affect the wages or working conditions of U.S. workers.

53
ETA Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs 7 (May 9, 2005), available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/policy_nonag_progs.pdf
; s
ee also
85 FR at 63874-76 for a discussion of the development of the prevailing wage determination process.
See
INA § 212(p)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4) (requiring that any government survey used to determine prevailing wages provide at least four levels of wages commensurate with experience, education, and level of supervision).

54

See,
ETA Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs 1 (May 9, 2005).

55
8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4).

In 2010, the Department centralized the prevailing wage determination process for nonagricultural labor certification programs within OFLC's National Prevailing Wage Center (NPWC).
56

In preparation for this transition, the Department issued new Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs (2009 Guidance),
57

which currently informs OFLC's PWD process for the PERM, H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs and will continue to inform OFLC's PWD process for these programs. When assigning a prevailing wage using OEWS data, the NPWC examines the nature of the job offer, the area of intended employment, and job duties for workers that are similarly employed.
58

In particular, the NPWC uses the SOC taxonomy to classify the employer's job opportunity into an occupation by comparing the employer's job description, title, and requirements to occupational information provided in sources like the Department's Occupational Information Network (O*Net).
59

Once the NPWC identifies the applicable SOC code, it determines the appropriate wage level for the job opportunity by comparing the employer's job description, title, and requirements to those normally required for the occupation, as reported in sources like O*Net. This determination involves a step-by-step process in which each job opportunity begins at Level I (entry level) and may progress to Level II (experienced), Level III (qualified), or Level IV (fully competent) based on the NPWC's comparison of the job opportunity to occupational requirements, including the education, training, experience, skills, knowledge, and tasks required in the occupation.
60

After determining the prevailing wage level, the NPWC issues a PWD to the employer using the OEWS wage for that level in the occupation and area of intended employment.

56

See
Labor Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Workers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 FR 78020 (Dec. 19, 2008); Prevailing Wage Determinations for Use in the H-1B, H-1B1 (Chile/Singapore), H-1C, H-2B, E-3 (Australia), and Permanent Labor Certification Programs; Prevailing Wage Determinations for Use in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 74 FR 63796-01 (Dec. 4, 2009).

57
Employment and Training Administration; Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs (Revised Nov. 2009) (2009 Guidance), available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/eta/oflc/pdfs/npwhc_guidance_revised_11_2009.pdf.

58

Id.
at 3-4.

59

Id.
at 1-7;
see also
Occupational Information Network, available at
https://www.onetonline.org/
. O*Net provides information on skills, abilities, knowledge, tasks, work activities, and specific vocational preparation levels associated with occupations and stratifies occupations based on shared skill, education, and training indicators.

60
2009 Guidance at 6.

2. Regulatory Changes to the Prevailing Wage Methodology in 2020 and Litigation

As discussed in Section I.D.1, the Department has long relied on the BLS OEWS survey to determine prevailing wages for the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and PERM programs. The prevailing wage determination process, first implemented through guidance in 2005, was designed to reflect four tiers of wages commensurate with the experience, education, and level of supervision for the job opportunity and to be consistent with the statutory requirements of 8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4). However, as is detailed further in this NPRM, the methodology adopted in 2005 did not adequately protect U.S. workers from adverse wage effects and deleterious job conditions.
61

The Department also did not clearly articulate a rationale for choosing levels as low as the 17th percentile for Level I and did not similarly provide a reasoned justification for selecting the 67th percentile for Level IV. In addition to these substantive and procedural shortcomings, a growing body of evidence, which is presented below under Section II.B.3, indicates that the 2005 methodology was adversely affecting the wages of U.S. workers.

61
While the Department issued updated guidance in 2009 to centralize processing and clarify procedures, that guidance retained the methodology adopted in 2005. Because the NPRM proposes to revise the percentile-based formula introduced in 2005, this section uses the 2005 guidance as the basis of comparison.

Therefore, on October 8, 2020, the Department published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) in the
Federal Register
revising the methodology used to determine prevailing wage levels for the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and PERM programs.
62

As explained in the IFR, the Department concluded that the existing wage levels were not consistent with the relevant statutory requirement that a government survey used to determine the prevailing wage should provide four wage levels commensurate with experience, education, and level of supervision.
63

The Department also determined that the existing wage levels were artificially low and provided an opportunity for employers to hire and retain alien workers at wages well below what their U.S. counterparts earn, creating an adverse incentive to prefer the hiring of alien workers to U.S. workers, an incentive that is at odds with the statutory scheme and which causes downward pressure on the wages of the domestic workforce. Therefore, the Department revised wage provisions at 20 CFR 655.731 and 656.40 to adjust the existing wage levels to ensure the wage levels would reflect the wages paid to U.S. workers with similar experience, education, and responsibility to those possessed by similarly employed alien workers.

62
85 FR 63872.

63

See
8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4).

In particular, the IFR amended paragraphs (a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of 20 CFR 656.40, codifying the four-tier wage practice and revising the wage level computation methodology. A new § 656.40(b)(2)(i) specified the four new levels (Levels I through IV) to be applied. Paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) explained the Level I wage would be calculated as the mean of the fifth decile of the wage distribution for the most specific occupation and geographic area available, rather than calculated as the mean of the bottom third of the OEWS wage distribution, as was the case prior to the IFR. Paragraph (b)(2)(i)(D) provided that the Level IV wage would be calculated as the mean of the upper decile of the wage distribution for the most specific occupation and geographic area available, rather than using the mean of the upper two-thirds of the distribution. As a result of these changes, the wage levels were increased, respectively, from approximately the 17th, 34th, 50th, and 67th percentiles to approximately the 45th, 62nd, 78th, and 95th percentiles. The IFR also made minor technical and clarifying amendments to sections 656.40 and 655.731.

The Department promulgated the IFR pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3)
64 65

due to exigent circumstances created by the coronavirus public health emergency that threatened immediate harm to the

wages and job prospects of U.S. workers, as well as the need to avoid evasion by employers of the new wage rates. The Department requested public input on all aspects of the IFR during a post-promulgation 30-day public comment period.

64
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551
et seq.,
authorizes an agency to issue a rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). The good cause exception for forgoing notice and comment rulemaking “excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, or where delay could result in serious harm.”
Jifry
v.
F.A.A.,
370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

65

See
Strengthening Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Aliens in the United States, 5 FR 63872, 63898-63902 (Oct. 8, 2020).

Four groups of plaintiffs separately challenged the Department's IFR. The plaintiffs claimed the Department lacked good cause to issue the IFR without undergoing notice and comment procedures under the APA and that the IFR was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the INA. These plaintiffs further requested that the IFR be enjoined and the Department prevented from implementing it. In three of the four cases, the district court approved the parties' stipulation to convert plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction into a motion for partial summary judgment on the notice and comment claim. In
Chamber of Commerce,
the district court issued a decision on December 1, 2020, granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on their notice and comment claim and setting aside the Department's IFR.
66

In
Purdue University
and
Stellar IT
(which were consolidated), the district court issued a decision on December 14, 2020, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the basis that the Department lacked good cause to issue the IFR, and ordered the Department to re-issue prevailing wage determinations issued under the IFR on a mutually agreeable schedule.
67

In the fourth case,
ITServe Alliance,
the district court issued a preliminary injunction on December 3, 2020, prohibiting the Department from enforcing the IFR against the plaintiffs in that case.
68

In discussing plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits in that case, the court limited its analysis to plaintiffs' claim that the Department lacked good cause to forgo advance notice and comment.
69

Following the district court's decisions in
Chamber of Commerce
and
ITServe Alliance,
OFLC took immediate action to comply with the courts' directives, including issuing a public announcement on its website on December 3, 2020, outlining the steps it was taking in response to the courts' orders. Notably, none of these rulings addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges to the substance of the IFR.

66

Chamber of Com. of United States
v.
United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
504 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The plaintiffs in this case also challenged an interim final rule issued by DHS, Strengthening the H-1B Nonimmigrant Visa Classification Program, 85 FR 63, 918 (Oct. 8, 2020).

67

Purdue University, et al.
v.
Scalia, et al.,
20-cv-03006, 2020 WL 7340156 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2020).

68

ITServe All., Inc.
v.
Scalia,
No. CV 20-14604 (SRC), 2020 WL 7074391 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2020).

69

Id.
at 3-8.

The Department issued a Final Rule on January 14, 2021, which adopted the IFR's provisions with modifications that were responsive to both public comments and issues raised during litigation.
70

The Final Rule adjusted the wage percentiles and incorporated changes based on public feedback to the 35th and 90th percentiles for Level I and Level IV wages, respectively. The Final Rule's effective date was set for March 15, 2021. On February 1, 2021, the Department proposed to delay the effective date of the final rule for a period of 60 days to May 14, 2021, in response to a Presidential directive.
71

On March 12, 2021, the Department issued a final rule confirming the delay, wherein it cited the need to finish a “comprehensive review of this rulemaking” and the “complexity of this issue” as its rationale for proceeding with the proposed delay.
72

On March 22, 2021, the Department issued a proposal to further delay the effective date of the rule by eighteen months to November 14, 2022.
73

The Department again cited the need to have “sufficient time to engage in its comprehensive review of the [Jan. 14, 2021 Final Rule].”
74

The Department acknowledged that “delaying the implementation of the Final Rule is likely to have an impact on the wages paid to workers.”
75

Nonetheless, on May 13, 2021, the Department promulgated a final rule confirming the 18-month delay of the effective date.
76

While many commenters supported the delay, “[m]any individual commenters opposed the proposed delay and supported implementing policies that favor and attract higher skilled workers.”
77

The Department again “acknowledge[ed] the potential substantial economic impact of this delay not only on employers but also on U.S. and alien workers.”
78

“[M]any commenters expressed general opposition to the proposed delay or opposed the proposed delay and urged the Department to implement the higher wage levels as soon as possible. . . .”
79

70
Strengthening Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Aliens in the United States, 86 FR 3608 (January 14, 2021).

71
Memorandum from Ronald A. Klain, Chief of Staff, White House to Heads of Agencies Regarding Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2021), available at
https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/regulatory-freeze-pending-review/.

72
86 FR 13995 (Mar. 12, 2021).

73
86 FR 15154 (Mar. 22, 2021).

74
86 FR 15155.

75

Id.
at 15156.

76
86 FR 26164 (May 13, 2021).

77

Id.
at 26170-71.

78

Id.
at 26171.

79

Id.

On April 2, 2021, the Department also issued a Request for Information (RFI) “to provide information on the sources of data and methodologies for determining prevailing wage levels covering employment opportunities that United States (U.S.) employers seek to fill with alien workers on a permanent or temporary basis through certain employment-based immigrant visas or through H-1B, H-1B1, E-3 nonimmigrant visas.”
80

While the comments received on the RFI generally support the Department's assessment of the limitations of the prior methodology and reinforced the need for a revised approach that better aligns with statutory requirements and labor market realities, the comments received did not inform the methodology proposed here.

80
86 FR 17343 (Apr. 2, 2021).

On June 23, 2021, the Northern District of California vacated and remanded the January 14, 2021 Final Rule, pursuant to the Department's unopposed voluntary request for vacatur and remand.
81

On December 13, 2021, the Department promulgated a final rule “effectuat[ing] a Federal district court order vacating a January 14, 2021 Final Rule.” 86 FR 70729 (Dec. 13, 2021). Subsequently, the Department engaged in no further rulemaking regarding the employment-based immigrant visa or the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant visas that are the subject of this NPRM.

81

See Chamber of Commerce, et al.
v.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al.,
No. 4:20-cv-07331 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2021), ECF No. 139.

II. Discussion of the Department's Proposed Amendments to the Prevailing Wage Methodology

The Department is issuing this NPRM to solicit public comment on proposed amendments to the prevailing wage computation methodology relied upon in several labor certification programs, specifically the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant visa classifications, as well as the PERM program for employment-based immigrant visas. The Department proposes to increase the prevailing wage floors for Wage Level I from the 17th percentile to the 34th percentile, for Wage Level II from the 34th to the 52nd, for Wage Level III from the 50th to the 70th, and for Wage Level IV from the 67th to the 88th, relying upon wage data provided by the OEWS survey. The Department believes that these increases in the prevailing wage levels are needed because the previous

methodology set the prevailing wages too low by relying on a methodology that did not take into account the experience, education, and level of supervision, as required by the INA. As a result, employers were permitted to hire alien workers at wage levels below those that similarly employed U.S. workers were paid, resulting in adverse effects to the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.

A. Statutory Authority for Amending the Methodology for Computing the Prevailing Wage Levels

The Department's authority to revise the prevailing wage methodology is grounded in its longstanding role of administering the labor certification process and in the discretion afforded to the Department regarding the establishment of prevailing wage levels for the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and PERM programs.

Section 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) of the INA provides that, “[a]ny alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that . . . there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”

Section 1182(n)(1) of the INA provides that “[n]o alien may be admitted or provided status as an H-1B nonimmigrant . . . unless the employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an application stating the following . . . [that] the employer is offering and will offer during the period of authorized employment to aliens admitted or provided status as an H-1B nonimmigrant wages that are at least (I) the actual wage level paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question, or (II) the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of employment, whichever is greater. . . .” 1182(n)(1); 1182(n)(1)(A); 1182(n)(1)(A)(i); 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)(II);
see also
1182(n)(2). Section 1182(t)(1) contains nearly-identical language with respect to H-1B1 and E-3 and nonimmigrants. 8 U.S.C. 1182(t)(1); 1182(t)(1)(A); 1182(t)(1)(A)(i); 1182(t)(1)(A)(i)(II).

In turn, Section 1182(p)(4) of the INA provides that the Secretary of Labor may “use, or make available to employers, a governmental survey to determine the prevailing wage.” This section also provides that the “survey shall provide at least 4 levels of wages commensurate with experience, education, and the level of supervision.” Section 1182(p)(3) requires that the “prevailing wage required to be paid pursuant to subsections (a)(5)(A), (n)(1)(A)(i)(II), and (t)(1)(A)(i)(II) shall be 100 percent of the wage determined pursuant to those sections.” These statutory requirements are discussed in further detail in Section II.B.2 of this NPRM.

Congress “often enact[s]” statutes in which the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion.”
Loper Bright Enter.
v.
Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024). “[S]ome statutes `expressly delegate[ ]' to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term.”
Id.
(citation omitted). “Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to `fill up the details' of a statutory scheme, or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that `leaves agencies with flexibility.' ”
Id.
(citation omitted). The statutory provisions listed above are of the type identified by the Supreme Court in
Loper Bright
that “delegate[ ] discretionary authority” to the Department on how best to determine prevailing wages such that the employment of alien workers will not adversely affect U.S. workers. The Department's authority to set wage levels is also necessary for it to fulfill its statutory functions and duties under Sections 1182(a)(5)(A), 1182(n)(1), 1182(n)(2)(A),
82

1182(t)(1), and 1182(t)(2)(A), as well as its role in the overall statutory scheme.
83

82
Moreover, the Secretary's duty under 8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(2)(A) to establish procedures for receiving, investigating, and resolving LCA-related complaints includes the authority to promulgate regulations to ensure employer compliance with LCAs.
See, e.g., Aleutian Cap. Partners, LLC
v.
Scalia,
975 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2020). The Department's authority to promulgate prevailing wage rates is also part of its express enforcement authority.

83

C.f. e.g., N. Carolina Farm Bureau Fed'n
v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor,
781 F. Supp. 3d. 455; 2025 WL 1296245, *12 (E.D.N.C. 2025) (“NCFBF”) (the Department has broad authority to “`fill up the details' of its statutory directive,”);
Kansas
v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor,
749 F. Supp. 3d 1363, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2024) (reaffirming the Department's authority to “issue regulations to ensure that any certifications it issues for H-2A visas do not `adversely affect' American agricultural workers”).

B. Reasons for Adjusting the Prevailing Wage Levels

1. Summary

On September 19, 2025, the President issued Proclamation 10973 (“Proclamation”), “Restriction on Entry of Certain Nonimmigrant Workers,” which, among other provisions, directed the Secretary of Labor to initiate rulemaking to revise prevailing wage levels under the H-1B program.
84

The Proclamation explained that the H-1B program “has been deliberately exploited to replace, rather than supplement, U.S. workers with lower-paid, lower-skilled labor.” The Proclamation cited longstanding concerns that the H-1B program, as currently administered, may be used in ways that undermine U.S. labor standards, create downward pressure on wages, and displace U.S. workers. The Proclamation further noted that the current wage structure may incentivize the hiring of alien workers at significantly lower wages than their U.S. counterparts, thereby undermining the program's original intent which was to allow employers to obtain temporary specialized labor when equally skilled and qualified U.S. workers could not be found.

84
Proclamation No. 10973, 90 FR 46027 (Sept. 19, 2025).

The Department is proposing this rule because the current methodology for setting prevailing wages often allows employers to pay alien workers significantly less than what similarly qualified U.S. workers earn for the same jobs in the same area of intended employment. This not only results in unfair competition for U.S. workers, particularly in high-skill sectors like the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields, and adverse effects on the wages of U.S. workers, but also undermines the integrity of the immigration system by incentivizing the use of lower-paid and lower-skilled alien workers over available domestic talent. This misuse of the H-1B program undermines its original statutory purpose—which is to allow employers to temporarily hire alien workers in specialty occupations requiring the “theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge”
85

—by transforming it into a mechanism for importing lower-cost labor. The current methodology further undermines the Department's statutory duties under Section 1182(a)(5)(A) of the INA to ensure that the employment of alien workers does not impose adverse effects onto the wages and working conditions of American workers. By updating how wage levels

are calculated, the Department aims to ensure that alien workers are paid fairly and that U.S. workers are not displaced or undercut—helping to restore balance, fairness, and public confidence in the labor certification process.

85
8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(1)(A). Additionally, the term “specialty occupation” is also defined to require “attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”
Id.
at (i)(1)(B).

Similarly, as is described in more detail below in Section II.B.3, the Department has determined that the current prevailing wage methodology does not adequately reflect labor market realities and may suppress wages and displace U.S. workers. As the Department has noted previously, “prevailing wage rates produced by the four-tier wage structure should approximate actual market wages to the greatest extent possible.” 86 FR 3634.

In response to these concerns, the Department of Labor is proposing to revise the methodology used to determine prevailing wage levels under the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and PERM programs. The proposed changes are intended to ensure that the employment of alien workers does not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers, consistent with the Department's statutory obligations in section 1182(a)(5)(A), 1182(n), and 1182(t) of the INA. When prevailing wage rates are set below what comparable U.S. workers would typically earn, it creates an incentive for employers to hire alien workers who cost less, which in turn, reduces job opportunities for equally qualified U.S. workers.
86

86
Ron Hira, Is There Really a STEM Workforce Shortage?, Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, Summer 2022, available at
https://issues.org/stem-workforce-shortage-data-hira/
.

While the Presidential Proclamation only identifies the H-1B program for regulatory overhaul, any adjustment to prevailing wage levels in this program will also implicate prevailing wage levels in the H-1B1, E-3, and PERM programs because the Department of Labor uses a unified four-tiered wage structure across all of these visa programs. The same OEWS data and percentile-based methodology are used to determine wage levels for both temporary (H-1B, H-1B1, E-3) and permanent (PERM) labor certification processes. Given that over 58% of FY 2024 PERM applications were filed on behalf of aliens already employed in H-1B status, maintaining consistency in wage determinations across these programs is essential to ensure that the statutory requirement—that the employment of alien workers not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers—is met uniformly.
87

Divergent wage structures would create perverse incentives for employers to exploit lower wage thresholds in one program to circumvent higher prevailing wages being offered in the other, ultimately undermining the integrity of all visa programs that utilize the current prevailing wage methodology. The Department therefore believes that revising the wage level for these other programs that are intertwined with the H-1B program, therefore, is also necessary and appropriate.

87
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, FY 2024 PERM Performance Data, available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance
.

2. The Relationship Between the Prevailing Wage Levels, OEWS Survey, and the INA

The Department's prevailing wage determinations serve as a critical safeguard in both the H-1B and PERM programs, ensuring that the employment of alien workers does not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. These determinations rely heavily on data from the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) survey, which provides wage estimates across occupations and geographic areas. However, because the OEWS survey was not originally designed to reflect the statutory requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Department must carefully evaluate how to align OEWS-based wage levels with the INA's mandate to protect U.S. workers.

As noted, the INA requires employers to pay H-1B workers the greater of “the actual wage level paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question,” or “the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of employment.” The statute further provides that, when a government survey is used to establish the wage levels, “such survey shall provide at least 4 levels of wages commensurate with experience, education, and the level of supervision.” If an existing government survey produces only two levels, the statute provides a formula to calculate two intermediate levels. Thus, similar to the statute's actual wage clause, the prevailing wage requirement, when calculated based on a government survey, makes the qualifications possessed by workers in the occupation, namely education, experience, and responsibility, an important part of the wage calculation. Put slightly differently, both clauses yield wage requirements that are meant to align with the wages that similarly employed U.S. workers are being compensated with a requirement that employers pay the higher available wage. In this way, the statutory scheme is meant to “protect U.S. workers' wages and eliminate any economic incentive or advantage in hiring temporary alien workers.” If employers are required to pay H-1B workers approximately the same wage paid to U.S. workers who perform the same type of work in the same geographic area and with similar levels of education, experience, and responsibility as the H-1B workers, employers will have significantly diminished incentives to prefer H-1B workers over U.S. workers. By reducing the perverse incentive to favor alien H-1B workers over the domestic workforce, U.S. workers' wages will not be suppressed by the presence of alien workers in the relevant labor market.

To set appropriate prevailing wage levels consistent with the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions and statutory mandate on the Department, as discussed below, the Department has concluded that it is appropriate to focus on the wages of those U.S. workers that are most similarly employed to alien workers in the H-1B program, those receiving an EB-2 visa, and higher skilled EB-3 visa recipients.

Based on the statutory qualifications to be eligible to receive H-1B status, the Department thinks that while the OEWS survey is the best source of wage data available for use in the Department's foreign labor certification programs, the wage data for any particular occupation does not perfectly align with the requirement that workers in the H-1B program possess highly specialized knowledge. This fact necessarily shapes how the Department integrates the OEWS survey into its foreign labor programs and also demonstrates the existing wage levels' inconsistency with the INA.

At the outset, the Department notes that much of its assessment of how best to adjust the prevailing wage levels gives special attention to the H-1B program. The H-1B program accounts, by order of magnitude, for the largest share of alien workers covered by the Department's four-tier wage structure. Upwards of 80 percent of all workers admitted or otherwise authorized to work under the programs covered by the wage structure are H-1B workers.

88

This, in combination with the fact that, as explained below, the risk of adverse effects to U.S. workers posed by the presence of alien workers is most acute where there are high concentrations of such workers, supports the Department's determination to focus on the H-1B program. Because the wage structure governs, and, for reasons explained below, will continue to govern wages for hundreds of thousands of workers across five different foreign labor programs and hundreds of different occupations, no wage methodology will be perfectly tailored to the unique circumstances of every job opportunity.
89

Accordingly, the Department thinks that it is appropriate to focus its analysis on the H-1B program and those occupations in which the vast majority of H-1B workers are employed.

88

See
Department of Homeland Security, 2017 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 7. Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Type and Detailed Class of Admission: Fiscal Year 2017, available at
https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/yearbook/2017/table7
; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation

Workers: Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report to Congress October 1, 2016-September 30, 2017 (Apr. 9, 2018), available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/Characteristics-of-Specialty-Occupation-Workers-H-1B-Fiscal-Year-2017.pdf.

89

Cf.
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 76 FR 3452, 3461 (Jan. 19, 2011) (justifying wage methodology designed for lower-skilled workers that was adopted in the H-2B program on grounds that the program “is overwhelmingly used for work requiring lesser skilled workers,” while also acknowledging that “not all positions requested through the H-2B program are for low-skilled labor.”).

Relatedly, the Department notes that the H-1B program is closely linked to the PERM programs that are also covered by the Department's wage structure. A majority of workers covered by PERM labor certification applications are already working in the U.S. as H-1B nonimmigrants, and there is significant overlap in the types of occupations in which H-1B and PERM workers are employed.
90

It is also clear that H-1B status often serves as a pathway to employment-based lawful permanent resident status for many alien workers.
91

The programs have thus long been regulated in connection with one another.
92

For these reasons, giving particular attention to the H-1B program and the determination of how wages for H-1B workers are calculated is intimately connected with how the wages for alien workers in the PERM program are calculated, given that many H-1B workers find themselves eventually in the PERM program. It is therefore appropriate that the Department's analysis applies with equal force to both programs.

90
In FY2024, 57.6 percent of all PERM labor certification applications filed were for H-1B workers already working in the United States. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration,
Performance Data,
available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance
.

91

See
Sadikshya Nepal,
The Convoluted Pathway from H-1B to Permanent Residency: A Primer,
Bipartisan Policy Center (July 7, 2020), available at
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/the-convoluted-path-from-h-1b-to-permanent-residency-a-primer/
.

92

See
144 Cong. Rec. S12741, S12756 (explaining that 8 U.S.C. 1182(p) “spells out how [the prevailing] wage is to be calculated in the context of both the H-1B program and the permanent employment program in two circumstances.”); Retention of EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 Immigrant Workers and Program Improvements Affecting High-Skilled Nonimmigrant Workers, 81 FR 82398-01 (November 18, 2016).

Under the INA, H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 classification can, in most cases, only be granted to aliens entering the U.S. to perform services “in a specialty occupation.”
93

The statute defines “specialty occupation” as an occupation that requires theoretical and practical application of a body of “highly specialized knowledge” and the “attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”
94

An alien may be classified as an H-1B specialty occupation worker if the alien possesses “full state licensure to practice in the occupation, if such licensure is required to practice in the occupation,” “completion of [a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent)],” or “(i) experience in the specialty equivalent to the completion of such degree, and (ii) recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions relating to the specialty.”
95

DHS regulations further clarify the requirements for establishing that the position is a specialty occupation and that the beneficiary of an H-1B petition must be qualified for a specialty occupation.
96

The Department's regulations restate the statute's definition of specialty occupation essentially verbatim.
97

93
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

94
8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(1)(i)-(ii).

95
8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).

96
8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), (C).

97

Compare
20 CFR 655.715
with
8 U.S.C. 1184(i)(1)(i)-(ii).

A few features of the definition bear emphasizing. First, the INA sets the attainment of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or experience that would give an individual expertise equivalent to that associated with a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty, as the baseline, minimum requirement for an alien to qualify for the classification. Of even greater importance, having “any bachelor's degree” as a job requirement is not sufficient to qualify a job as a specialty occupation position—the bachelor's degree or equivalent required to perform the job must be “in the specific specialty.” In other words, the bachelor's degree required, or equivalent, must be specialized to the particular needs of the job, and impart a particularized level of expertise tailored to a given field.
98

These aspects of the definition play an important role in how the Department will use data from the BLS OEWS survey to set appropriate prevailing wage levels.

98

See Chung Song Ja Corp.
v.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
96 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1197-98 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“Permitting an occupation to qualify simply by requiring a generalized bachelor degree would run contrary to congressional intent to provide a visa program for specialized, as opposed to merely educated, workers.”);
Caremax Inc
v.
Holder,
40 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“A position that requires applicants to have any bachelor's degree, or a bachelor's degree in a large subset of fields, can hardly be considered specialized.”) (citing
Fred 26 Importers, Inc.
v.
Dept. of Homeland Sec.,
445 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1179-80 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).

The Department has long relied on OEWS data to establish prevailing wage levels. That is because it is a comprehensive, statistically valid survey that, in many respects, is the best source of wage data available for satisfying the Department's purposes in setting wages in most immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs. As the Department has previously noted the OEWS wage survey is among the largest continuous statistical survey programs administered by the federal government. BLS produces the survey materials and selects the nonfarm establishments to be surveyed using the list of establishments maintained by State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) for unemployment insurance purposes. The OEWS collects data from over 1 million establishments. Salary levels based on geographic areas are available at the national and State levels and for certain territories in which statistical validity can be ascertained, including the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Salary information is also made available at the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area levels within a State. Wages for the OEWS survey are straight-time, gross pay, exclusive of premium pay. Base rate, cost-of-living allowances, guaranteed pay, hazardous duty pay, incentive pay including commissions and production bonuses, tips, and on-call pay are included. The features described above are unique to the OEWS survey, which is a comprehensive, statistically valid, and useable wage reference.
99

99
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 76 FR 3452, 3463 (Jan. 19, 2011).

Put simply, the OEWS survey's quality and characteristics have made it, and continue to make it, a useful tool for

setting prevailing wage levels in the Department's foreign labor programs. There are no alternative surveys or sources of wage data that would provide DOL with wage information at the same level of granularity needed to properly administer the H-1B and PERM programs. In response to the Department's 2021 Request for Information, no commenter identified a more suitable and comprehensive data source than the OEWS for determining prevailing wages, further reinforcing the Department's continued reliance on this dataset.

That said, the OEWS survey is not specifically designed to serve these programs. For one thing, “the OEWS survey captures no information about differences within the [occupational] groupings based on skills, training, experience or responsibility levels of the workers whose wages are being reported”
100

—the factors the INA requires the Department to rely on in setting prevailing wage levels.
101

Relatedly, “there are factors in addition to skill level that can account for OEWS wage variation for the same occupation and location.”
102

Further, the geographic areas used by BLS to calculate local wages do not always match up exactly with the “area of employment” for which wage rates are set, as that term is defined by the INA for purposes of the H-1B program.
103

So while the OEWS survey is the best available source of wage data for the Department's purposes, and the Department is proposing to continue using it as the data source, the Department's use of the OEWS data must be done in a way that aligns with the requirements in the INA.

100
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 80 FR 24146, 24155 (Apr. 29, 2015).

101
8 U.S.C. 1182(p)(4).

102
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 80 FR at 24159.

103
8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(4)(A).

Because the wage methodology will, by statute, be used to establish the prevailing wage for the H-1B program and highly skilled workers that are the beneficiaries of PERM applications, as discussed above, the INA's definition of “specialty occupation” is relevant to how the wage levels are set using the OEWS wage survey. The survey categorizes workers into occupational groups defined by the SOC system, a federal statistical standard used by federal agencies to classify workers into occupational categories for the purpose of collecting, calculating, or disseminating data.
104

An informative source on the duties and educational requirements of a wide variety of occupations, including those in the SOC system, is the Department's Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH), which, among other things, details for various occupations the baseline qualifications needed to work in each occupation. A review of the OOH shows that only a portion of the workers covered by many of the occupational classifications used in the OEWS survey likely have levels of education and experience similar to those of H-1B workers in the same occupation.
105

Some share of workers in these classifications do not have the education or experience qualifications necessary to be considered similarly employed to specialty occupation workers. Because the INA requires the prevailing wage levels for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3, and PERM programs to be set based on the wages of U.S. workers based on the levels of education, experience, and supervision in the relevant occupation, the Department must take this into account when using OEWS data to determine prevailing wages.

104
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Standard Occupational Classification, available at
https://www.bls.gov/soc/
.

105
The five most common SOC codes represented in LCAs in FY 2024 were Software Developers (15-1252), Computer Systems Engineers/Architects (15-1299.08), Information Technology Project Managers (15-1299.09), Electronics Engineers, Except Computer (17-2072.00) and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers (15-1253.00) FY 2024 LCA Performance data. These occupations accounted for approximately 47 percent of all LCA's filed in FY 2024.

For each of these occupations, for which data was available, at least some of the respondents to the BLS surveys underlying their data reported educational requirements below the baccalaureate threshold: Software Developers (5%—Associate's degree required); Computer Systems Engineers/Architects (68%—either a Post-secondary certificate or Associate's degree required); Information Technology Project Managers (43%—either a Post-secondary certificate or Associate's degree required); Electronics Engineers, Except Computer (14%—Associate's degree required); and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers (35%—either a Post-secondary certificate or Associate's degree required).
See,

https://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/15-1252.00
;
https://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/15-1299.08
;
https://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/15-1299.09
;
https://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/17-2072.00
; and
https://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/15-1253.00
, respectively.

For example, a common occupational classification in which employers seek to employ H-1B nonimmigrants is Software Developer.
106

The OOH's entry for Software Developer notes that Software Developers
typically
have a bachelor's degree.
107

In other words, while typical, a bachelor's degree-level education, or its equivalent, is not always a prerequisite for working in this occupation. Because a person without a specialized bachelor's degree can still be employed as a Software Developer, some portion of Software Developers captured by the OEWS survey are not similarly situated to H-1B workers because the baseline qualifications to enter the occupation based on the OOH do not match the statutory requirements for H-1B workers.

106

See
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, LCA (H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3) Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics, FY 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/LCA_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

107
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Software Developers, Quality Assurance Analysts, and Testers, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/software-developers.htm
.

A similar analysis applies to the occupation of Registered Nurse (RN). According to the OOH, entry into the RN occupation may be achieved through a bachelor's degree in nursing (BSN), an associate's degree in nursing (ADN), or a diploma from an approved nursing program.
108

For prevailing wage purposes, the Department's methodology considers the broader population of RNs—including those with associate's degrees and diplomas—when determining the wages of U.S. workers who are similarly situated in terms of education, experience, and job duties.
109

In cases where an employer seeks a prevailing wage determination for a nursing position that requires higher qualifications, such as advanced practice or management roles, the prevailing wage determination may reflect the higher educational or experiential requirements, provided the employer demonstrates that such requirements are normal for the occupation and the position.
110

This approach ensures that prevailing wage determinations for nursing occupations are aligned with labor market realities and statutory requirements.

108
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Registered Nurses, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/registered-nurses.htm
.

109
See 20 CFR 656.40(b)(2) (prevailing wage determinations are based on the wages of workers “similarly employed” in the occupation and area of intended employment, as reflected in the OEWS survey).

110
See 20 CFR 656.40(b)(2); see also DOL Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs (2009), at 4-5 (explaining that the wage level may be adjusted based on the requirements of the position and the normal requirements for the occupation).

A review of the OOH entries for the occupations in which H-1B nonimmigrants most commonly work demonstrates that most H-1B workers fall within SOC classifications that

include some number of workers who would not qualify for employment in a specialty occupation. For instance, the OOH entries for Software Developers—an occupation accounting for over 32 percent of all certified LCAs
111

—provides that a bachelor's degree is the
typical
level of education that most workers need” to become one. Computer Systems Analysts, which make up approximately 2.8 percent of all certified LCAs,
112

”typically need a bachelor's degree. . .”
113

Moreover, O*Net does not differentiate between jobs that require bachelor's degrees in specific specialties and those that accept a general bachelor's degree. Because prevailing wages must reflect the wages paid to U.S. workers who are similarly employed—that is, those with comparable education, experience, and responsibility—the Department's analysis focuses only on the subset of U.S. workers in each occupation who would meet the statutory qualifications for H-1B employment, rather than the broader population included in OEWS wage data.
114

111
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, H-1B Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics, FY 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/LCA_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

112
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, H-1B Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics, FY 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/LCA_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

113
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Computer Systems Analysts, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm
;
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, LCA (H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3) Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics, FY 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/LCA_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

114
The Occupational Information Network (ONET), developed by the U.S. Department of Labor, provides detailed information on the knowledge, skills, abilities, education, and work activities associated with occupations classified under the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system. In the context of prevailing wage determinations, ONET is used by the Department to help assess the complexity and requirements of job duties, which informs the appropriate wage level assignment based on the education, experience, and supervision required for the position.

Simply put, the universe of workers surveyed by the OEWS for some of the most common occupational classifications in which H-1B workers are employed is larger than the pool of workers who can be said to have levels of education and experience comparable to those of even the least skilled H-1B workers performing work within that occupational classification. Because this methodology will substantially apply to H-1B petitions and PERM applications for H-1B worker beneficiaries, to allow for a more direct comparison and therefore set a more accurate prevailing wage, it would be inappropriate to consider the wages of the least educated and experienced workers in these occupational classifications in setting the prevailing wage levels. To conclude otherwise would place the Department at odds with one of the purposes of the INA's core wage protections—to prevent employers from using alien workers to depress wage levels, which in turn reduces pay and job opportunities for U.S. workers.

This consideration also demonstrates the problems with the existing wage levels. As noted above, the Department's first wage level is currently set by calculating the mean of the bottom third of the OEWS wage distribution. Because the majority of LCAs receive a Level I or II wage, the wages for many H-1B workers are set based on a calculation that takes into account wages paid to workers who almost certainly would not qualify to work in a “specialty occupation,” as defined by the INA.
115

The Department has noted previously that “workers in occupations that require sophisticated skills and training receive higher wages based on those skills.”
116

As a worker's education and skills increase, his wages are expected to as well.
117

For that reason, it is likely that workers at the lowest end of an occupation's wage distribution generally have the lowest levels of education, experience, and responsibility in the occupation. In consequence, if the occupation by definition includes workers who do not have the level of specialized knowledge required of H-1B workers, because of the prevalence of Level I and Level II wages assigned to LCAs the very bottom of the wage distribution should be discounted in determining the appropriate baseline along the OEWS wage distribution to establish the entry-level wage under the four-tiered wage structure. Yet the existing wage structure makes such workers a central component of the prevailing wage calculation.
118

115
Indeed, even in the Department's original 2005 guidance setting the current prevailing wage methodology, the Department observed that “[e]mployer requests for foreign workers are frequently for fully qualified workers who possess special skills. Wage Level I would not be assigned in those situations.”
See
Employment and Training Administration, Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs 6 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at
https://www.aila.org/files/o-files/view-file/84809966-67A1-4645-95CB-CB8F826C1F3C
.

116
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, Part 2, 78 FR 24047, 24051 (Apr. 24, 2013).

117

See
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Learn more, earn more: Education leads to higher wages, lower unemployment, available at
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2020/data-on-display/education-pays.htm
.

118
For example, the occupation of Software Developers, which accounts for a large number of H-1B workers, does not, as explained above, require the same degree of specialized knowledge as a baseline entry requirement as does the INA's definition of “specialty occupation.” Yet approximately 10 percent of all LCAs filed with the Department for software developer positions classify those positions as entry-level, meaning that under the current wage levels the wages paid to such specialty occupation workers are calculated based, at least in part, on the wages paid to some workers who do not have comparable specialized knowledge and expertise. This outcome directly contravenes the INA's requirement that H-1B workers be paid wages commensurate with the wages paid to U.S. workers with similar levels of education, experience, and responsibility.

Similarly, the current Level IV wage is set by calculating the mean of the upper two-thirds of the wage distribution. That means that the wage level provided for the most experienced and highly educated H-1B workers is determined, in part, by taking into account a sizeable number of workers who do not even make more than the median wage of the occupation. The Department is concerned that workers making less than the median wage of the occupation are unlikely to possess commensurate experience, education, and requirements for supervision as are the alien workers who would be regarded as typical of Wage Level IV. The Department's analysis of OEWS wage distributions confirms that the current Level IV methodology includes a substantial share of workers whose wages—and likely qualifications—fall below what would be expected for the most advanced roles, thereby undermining the intended purpose of the highest wage tier.

The same reasons for discounting a portion of the workers at the bottom of the OEWS wage distribution in order to compute appropriate entry-level wages, based on the fact that such workers are not similarly employed to even the least skilled H-1B workers, also applies to the wages for the EB-2 immigrant visa preference classification and the E-3 and H-1B1 nonimmigrant programs, for which the Department also uses the four-tier prevailing wage structure.

The E-3 and H-1B1 classifications, like the H-1B classification, require that the alien work in a specialty occupation.
119

Thus these programs' relation to the OEWS wage data is essentially identical to that of the H-1B program. Although E-3 and H-1B1 workers may not necessarily be concentrated in the same occupational categories as H-1B workers, the statutory requirement that they be employed in specialty occupations

means they must possess comparable levels of skill, specialization, and responsibility. As such, the level of skill, specialization, and responsibility required for E-3 and H-1B1 positions is often comparable to that required for H-1B positions. Applying the same prevailing wage structure across these classifications ensures consistency in how the Department protects U.S. workers and prevents employers from selecting among visa categories based on wage-setting advantages rather than legitimate labor needs.

119

See
8 U.S.C. 1184(i).

As for the EB-2 classification, the reasons for discounting the lower end of the OEWS wage distribution for setting the baseline to establish an entry-level wage for the classification are even more apparent than they are for the specialty occupation programs. Under the INA, the EB-2 classification applies to individuals who are “members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States.”
120

DHS regulations, in turn, define an “advanced degree” as any United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above that of a bachelor`s degree. A United States bachelor's degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree.
121

120
8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(A).

121
8 CFR 204.5(k)(2).

The regulation goes on to define “exceptional ability” to mean “a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business.”
122

122

Id.

As is the case for H-1B nonimmigrants, the baseline, minimum qualifications that an EB-2 immigrant must possess exceed the educational and experiential requirements the OOH describes as generally necessary to enter some of the most common SOC occupational classifications in which EB-2 immigrants work. For example, the most common occupation in which PERM labor certifications—of which applications for EB-2 immigrants represent a substantial share—are sought is Software Developers, which accounts for nearly 21 percent of all approved PERM applications.
123

As already noted, according to the OOH, a bachelor's degree is the “[t]ypical level of education” for Software Developers.
124

A master's degree, generally a requirement for obtaining EB-2 immigrant status, is therefore substantially above the typical, baseline qualifications needed to work as a Software Developer. Similarly, a Software Developer who satisfies the regulatory definition of “exceptional ability” would be, ipso facto, more highly skilled than the typical entry-level-worker in that occupation. This pattern holds for most of the top occupations into which PERM applications fall.
125

123
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Permanent Employment Program—Selected Statistics, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/PERM_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

124
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Software Developers, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/software-developers.htm
.

125
See Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Permanent Labor Certification Program—Selected Statistics, FY 24, available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/PERM_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf
.

By contrast, EB-3 immigrants—who may qualify as “skilled workers” (requiring at least two years of training or experience) or “professionals” (holding a bachelor's degree)—do not necessarily exceed the baseline qualifications for many of these occupations to the same degree as EB-2 workers. For example, in occupations where a bachelor's degree is the typical requirement, EB-3 professionals align more closely with the median qualifications described in the OOH, while EB-3 skilled workers may fall below that threshold in some cases. Accordingly, while the Department's methodology accounts for differences in education and experience across visa categories, prevailing wage levels for EB-3 workers should reflect that these workers are not uniformly as specialized as EB-2 workers, even though they must still meet statutory requirements and should not be paid wages that undercut similarly employed U.S. workers.

Accordingly, because EB-2 workers are required to possess qualifications that exceed those of the average worker in these occupations, it is appropriate to set their prevailing wage levels higher on the wage distribution to reflect their advanced education, experience, and skill.

In sum, the eligibility criteria established by the INA for most of the immigrant and nonimmigrant programs to which the Department's prevailing wage levels apply set a higher baseline for the minimum qualifications an alien must possess than the minimum qualification requirements that exist for U.S. workers generally in most of the occupations in which these aliens most commonly work. The H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and EB-2 classifications are for workers with specialized knowledge and skills and/or advanced degrees.
126

Because the prevailing wage levels should take into account the experience, education, and level of supervision of occupational classifications, to ensure that those prevailing wage rates are an appropriate wage floor for positions that require specialized knowledge and skills and/or advanced degrees, the prevailing wage rates should be formulated based on the wages paid to workers who similarly possess specialized knowledge and skills in their occupations. Given that not every worker in a given OEWS occupation is likely to meet that standard, and that workers at the lower end of the wage distribution are also likely to be the workers with the lowest levels of education and experience, the Department has determined it is appropriate to discount the lower portion of the OEWS distribution in setting the wage levels. The Department should instead identify where within the distribution workers are to be found who possess the same kinds of specialized education and experience possessed by aliens working in the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and EB-2 classifications. The wages paid to those U.S. workers can serve as the basis for appropriately adjusting the prevailing wage levels to ensure the employment of alien workers does not adversely affect the wages and job opportunities of U.S. workers. Although the EB-3 category is not included in this analysis because its minimum qualifications for skilled workers or professionals with a bachelors' degrees do not uniformly exceed the baseline requirements for many occupations, the Department notes that some EB-3 workers may also qualify for H-1B, H-1B1, or E-3 status, and vice versa. For this reason, and because EB-3 accounts for a small share of PERM applications, the Department applies the same prevailing wage structure to EB-3 to avoid creating incentives for employers to select visa categories based on lower wage

thresholds rather than legitimate business needs.

126
The Department notes that its assessment of the appropriateness of adjusting the prevailing wage levels in the manner described by this rule with respect to the EB-3 classification is governed by distinct considerations, which are described more fully below.

The Department recognizes that applying a unified prevailing wage structure may result in higher wage requirements for some EB-3 positions that do not require the same level of education or specialization as H-1B or EB-2 roles; however, particularly given the prevalence of higher skilled workers in H-1B and PERM, maintaining a consistent wage framework across programs is necessary to prevent program shopping and to uphold the statutory requirement that alien workers be paid at least the prevailing wage for similarly employed U.S. workers, particularly in occupations where job duties and responsibilities may overlap despite differing formal entry requirements.

3. Adverse Effects of Current Prevailing Wage Levels

This section evaluates the comprehensive analysis that the Department has undertaken to understand, assess, and evince the deleterious effects that the current prevailing wage methodology has had on U.S. workers' wages and working conditions. This analysis includes an extensive review of the economic and programmatic data, qualitative evidence consisting of reports and investigations into the H-1B program, and litigation. Based on the evidence, the Department believes that the current prevailing wage methodology sets prevailing wages at levels that may not adequately reflect the Department's statutory requirements.

a. Economic Analysis of Adverse Effects on the Wages of U.S. Workers

As one research organization noted in a recent study of the H-1B program, “[t]he evidence strongly suggests that the H-1B program is not working as intended.”
127

The study pointed out that “in certain occupations, H-1B holders earn significantly less than their American counterparts.” The Department's data also indicates that the majority of H-1B positions are concentrated in the lower wage tiers. Sixty-three percent of certified LCAs in FY 2024 were for positions classified at wage levels I and II—levels typically associated with entry-level roles.
128

This wage distribution raises concerns that the program is being used to fill mostly lower-paid positions and not serving its intended purpose of protecting U.S. workers from adverse effects by preventing employers from using alien workers to undercut wages and job opportunities for American workers.
129

127
Frei, Alexander P.,
Rethinking the H-1B Visa Program: A Data-Driven Look at Structural Failures and the High-Skill Illusion,
Heritage Foundation (Aug. 8, 2025), available at
https://www.heritage.org/border-security/report/rethinking-the-h-1b-visa-program-data-driven-look-structural-failures-and#
.

128
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, H-1B Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics in FY 2024, available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance
.

129

See
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 8 U.S.C.1184(i)(1)(A) (describing the term “specialty occupation” as requiring “theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge” among other educational requirements.

The Department conducted a comprehensive analysis comparing certified LCA wages
130

to OEWS data,
131

matched by SOC code, state, and year. This analysis is documented below, in Section II.C.1. This comparison revealed that the average wage offered to H-1B workers was approximately $10,191 lower than the OEWS average wage for workers for similarly classified occupations. This differential may reflect a range of factors, including experience levels, geographic variation, and employer-specific compensation practices. The disparity is even more pronounced in computer-related occupations, where the average wage gap was $10,972. These findings suggest that employers are leveraging the H-1B program to access a lower-cost labor pool, even in occupations that nominally require high levels of skill and education. This underpayment further supports the Department's conclusion that the current prevailing wage structure does not adequately reflect market wages and is in urgent need of reform. These same labor market dynamics are relevant to the PERM program, where underpayment of alien workers can similarly distort hiring incentives and erode labor standards. Using the same wage levels in both programs ensures that employers cannot use the permanent labor certification process to institutionalize wage disparities that originated in the temporary visa context.

130

See generally
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, H-1B Temporary Specialty Occupations Labor Condition Program—Selected Statistics, available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance
.

131

See generally
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational employment and wage statistics
(BLS Occupational Employment Statistics), available at
https://www.bls.gov/oes/
.

Additionally, the Department's current prevailing wage methodology permits employers to classify a substantial share of H-1B positions, particularly in high-demand occupations such as software development, as “entry-level.” Because the current methodology places Level I wages near the bottom of the OEWS distribution, which includes workers who do not possess the specialized education and experience required for H-1B eligibility, Level I wages are often set far below what specialized H-1B workers and comparably qualified workers would earn. Compounding this issue is the existence of a large pool of alien workers willing to accept lower wages because the cost of living in their home countries is substantially lower and other factors that make U.S. wages attractive even at discounted rates. This dynamic exerts downward pressure on wages for U.S. workers, as employers can classify H-1B roles as entry-level and thus pay wages that do not reflect the qualifications of the alien worker. Moreover, if the same employer hires all similarly qualified workers at the entry-level prevailing wage, then the “actual wage paid” by the employer would be the same as the prevailing wage. This structural flaw creates a systemic cost advantage for hiring H-1B workers over domestic talent, effectively enabling employers to substitute lower-paid alien workers for U.S. workers and institutionalizing wage arbitrage under the guise of legal compliance.

The adjustment to Level IV, in turn, was based on statistical modeling of OEWS wage distributions and is intended to correct for the current methodology's mismatch of mid-level and high-level earners with prevailing wage levels that did not properly compare them to U.S. earners of the same experience, education and level of supervision. This caused dilution of the wage standard for top-tier talent and failed to reflect the wages of workers with the greatest levels of education, experience, and responsibility. By revising the Level IV wages to better reflect the actual compensation of U.S. workers with equivalent qualifications, the Department aims to restore labor market fairness and ensure that the employment of alien workers does not suppress wages or displace U.S. workers.

b. Other Relevant Evidence, Reports, Investigations, and Litigation Demonstrating Adverse Effects of Current Prevailing Wages

The Department's analysis is grounded in its own administrative data and statutory responsibilities. However, other evidence, including investigative reporting and academic research, has supported many of the Department's conclusions.

Academic research indicates that the influx of low-cost alien workers into a labor market suppresses wages, and this

effect increases significantly as the number of alien workers increases. In particular, some empirical research, when inputted into a rough simulation, suggests that a substantial increase (more specifically, a 10 percent increase) in the labor supply due to the presence of alien workers could reduce the wages of the average U.S. worker by 3.2 percent, a rate that grew to 4.9 percent for college graduates.
132

The current prevailing wage structure distorts hiring incentives and compensation by setting entry-level wages far below market rates for positions requiring specialized skills, which incentivizes employers to classify jobs at the lowest permissible level. This NPRM proposes to recalibrate wage levels to better reflect the education, experience, and responsibility required for H-1B positions, thereby reducing the opportunity for wage arbitrage.

132
Borjas, George J. (2003). “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1335-1374.

The Department has also reviewed evidence indicating that the intent of the H-1B “actual wage” requirement can be undermined when end-clients obtain labor through outsourcing or staffing firms (sometimes called “job shops”). In such arrangements, the H-1B employer of record is the outsourcing firm, not the end-client; consequently, the “actual wage” analysis compares the H-1B worker's pay only to other workers at the outsourcing firm—who may be predominantly workers with H-1B visas and paid at or near prevailing-wage floors—rather than to the higher-paid, similarly employed U.S. workers at the end-client company. Government reports and public reporting have documented this dynamic and show it can facilitate large pay gaps between outsourced H-1B workers and client-site employees performing substantially similar functions.
133

Although this rulemaking would not directly change how “actual wage” determinations are applied in third-party placement scenarios, by raising prevailing wage levels it would increase the wage floor and, in turn, reduce the magnitude of these gaps in cases where outsourcing companies pay at or near the prevailing wage. Another report revealed that certain outsourcing firms exploited the H-1B registration system by submitting multiple registrations for the same beneficiaries, thereby gaining an unfair advantage in the selection process.
134

This report demonstrated how some companies would manipulate the lottery by flooding the system with duplicate or coordinated entries for individual workers, often through affiliated entities or shell companies. This practice significantly increased their odds of selection while disadvantaging employers who followed the rules and submitted a single registration per candidate. The result was a distorted allocation process that undermined the integrity of the H-1B program and enabled a small group of companies to cannibalize access to scarce visa slots. Although registrations do not represent actual employment and do not capture wages, evidence that the system can be gamed—even outside the Department's direct purview—despite the availability of ample entry-level U.S. workers suggests that some employers view H-1B workers as a lower-cost alternative. This underscores the importance of ensuring that prevailing wage levels are set appropriately to eliminate incentives for wage arbitrage and protect U.S. workers from being undercut.

133

See
U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program
20 (2011),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314501.pdf
, at 52-56 (raising concerns that the H-1B program lacks an explicit mechanism for holding employers accountable when they obtain H-1B workers through a staffing company); Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, Economic Policy Inst., The H-1B Visa Program Remains the “Outsourcing Visa” (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-h-1b-visa-program-remains-the-outsourcing-visa-more-than-half-of-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-were-outsourcing-firms/
(noting that “H-1B outsourcing companies . . . replace incumbent U.S. workers with H-1B workers and typically pay their H-1B workers the lowest wages permitted by law, far below market wage rates”) and that large companies have “[laid] off hundreds of their well-paid employees and contract[ed] with major outsourcing firms . . . to replace those employees with H-1B workers who were paid salaries that were tens of thousands of dollars less”).

134
Bloomberg News, Outsourcing Firms Monopolize H-1B Visa Program, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2024), available at
https://unity-connect.com/our-resources/news/bloomberg-reveals-outsourcing-firms-monopolize-h-1b-visa-program/
.

Between 2019 and 2025, a significant share of LCAs were filed in technology-related occupations, particularly software engineering roles. During this same period, major technology firms and outsourcing companies that are among the largest users of the H-1B program also conducted large-scale layoffs of U.S. workers. A 2023 study by the Economic Policy Institute found that the top 30 H-1B employers laid off at least 85,000 workers in 2022 and early 2023 while simultaneously hiring 34,000 H-1B workers.
135

And recently, in a lawsuit brought by a class of current and former employees of a significant employer of H-1B workers, a federal jury found that the employer's reliance on employees with H-1B status unlawfully discriminated against non-Indian and non-South Indian employees.
136

135
Daniel Costa and Ron Hira (2023),
Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs,
Economic Policy Institute (Apr. 11, 2023), available at
https://www.epi.org/blog/tech-and-outsourcing-companies-continue-to-exploit-the-h-1b-visa-program-at-a-time-of-mass-layoffs-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-hired-34000-new-h-1b-workers-in-2022-and-laid-off-at-least-85000-workers/
.

136

See Palmer
v.
Cognizant Tech. Sols. Company,
No. 17-cv-6848, 2025 WL 3154720 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025). The jury found that the employer had “engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination against” both “non-South Asian employees on the basis of race who were terminated from the bench,” and “non-Indian employees on the basis of national origin who were terminated from the bench.”
Id.
In a subsequent ruling, the court found, based on expert evidence, that “non-South Asians were approximately seven times more likely to be subject to an involuntary termination.”
Palmer
v.
Cognizant Tech. Sols. Company,
No. 17-cv-6848, 2025 WL 3496682, 24 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025). The analysis also showed that “non-South Asian and non-Indian employees were 8.4 more likely to be terminated from the bench than South Asian and Indian employees.”
Id.
at 27. The court also found that Cognizant replaced U.S. employees with visa-holding, South Asian employees “with a lower grade and experience.”
Id.
at 31.

And while the data indicate that H-1B workers are rapidly replacing U.S. workers, especially in STEM-related fields, recent U.S. graduates in computer science and engineering are facing elevated unemployment and underemployment rates. Unemployment rates for recent graduates in these fields were 7.5% and 6.1%, respectively, with underemployment rates exceeding 17%.
137

For example, employment for domestic software developers aged 22-25 declined by nearly 20% compared to its peak in late 2022, suggesting that qualified U.S. workers are struggling to access opportunities in sectors heavily reliant on H-1B labor.
138

137
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Labor Market for Recent College Graduates, available at
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market
. Latest release: February 20, 2025, based on data from 2023.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market#--:explore:unemployment
.

138
Erik Brynjolfsson, Bharat Chandar, and Ruyu Chen,
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence,
Stanford University (Aug. 26, 2025) at 9, available at
https://digitaleconomy.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Canaries_BrynjolfssonChandarChen.pdf
.

This trend is particularly pronounced in the technology sector, where alien workers plays an outsized role in shaping labor market dynamics.
139

A 2025 report found that two-thirds of Silicon Valley tech workers are foreign-born, underscoring the extent to which the region's workforce is shaped by

immigration and the potential for wage-setting distortions in occupations with high concentrations of H-1B workers.

140
The pool of U.S. workers with relevant credentials has grown rapidly. Bachelor's attainment is higher among younger cohorts, and Computer and Information Sciences (CIS) degree completions more than doubled over the past decade—from about 55,000 in 2013-2014 to roughly 108,500 in 2021-2022.
141

Including Master's (24,514 to 51,338 in the same period) and Doctoral (1,982 to 2,790 in the same period) degrees, the number of degrees conferred in the U.S. increased from 81,767 to 162,658, nearly doubling during that time. Another factor, related to some of the layoff activity of larger technology firms in recent years, has been the impact of generative AI, which a number of early studies indicates is decreasing demand for lower-level technology workers.
142

So, while the potential supply of workers in occupations that are central to the programs affected by prevailing wages have increased, almost doubling since 2014, dramatic improvements in technology have and will continue to decrease demand, especially at the entry-level, for workers in these fields. Indeed, ADP, a leading source of payroll data, reported that employment of software developers, the single largest occupational category in the H-1B system, was lower in 2024 than it w

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-06017. Public record. Not legal advice.