# Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-03595 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Proposed Rule - **Published:** February 23, 2026 - **Citation:** 91 FR 8616 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 8 CFR Parts 208 and 274a [CIS No. 2799-25; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0370] RIN 1615-AC97 Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes to modify regulations governing applications for asylum and withholding of removal (asylum applications) and employment authorization based on a pending asylum application. The proposed rule would change filing and eligibility requirements for aliens requesting employment authorization and an employment authorization document (EAD) based on a pending asylum application. The changes include pausing acceptance of EAD applications from asylum applicants during periods when affirmative asylum average processing time exceeds 180 days, extending the waiting period to apply for employment authorization to 365 days, changing EAD application processing time requirements, and adding eligibility requirements. DATES: Comments on this proposed rule, including the proposed information collections, must be received on or before April 24, 2026. The electronic Federal Docket Management System will accept comments prior to midnight Eastern time at the end of that day. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the entirety of this proposed rulemaking package, identified by DHS Docket No. 2025-0370, through the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), the summary of this rule may also be found at https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the website instructions for submitting comments. Comments must be submitted in English, or an English translation must be provided. Comments submitted in a manner other than via http://www.regulations.gov, including emails or letters sent to DHS or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, will not be considered comments on the proposed rule and may not receive a response from DHS. Please note that DHS and USCIS cannot accept any comments that are hand-delivered or couriered. In addition, USCIS cannot accept comments contained on any form of digital media storage devices, such as CDs/DVDs and USB drives. USCIS is also not accepting mailed comments at this time. If you cannot submit your comment by using http://www.regulations.gov, please contact Samantha Deshommes, Chief, Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, by telephone at (240) 721-3000 for alternate instructions. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Division of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, MD 20746; telephone (240) 721-3000 (not a toll-free call). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. Public Participation II. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action 1. Amend 8 CFR 208.3(c)(3), Form of Application 2. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(a), Employment Authorization a. Biometrics b. Extension of 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock to 365 Calendar Day Waiting Period c. Recommended Approvals d. Processing Timeframes e. Criminal Ineligibility Grounds f. Effect of a Denial of Asylum Application g. One-Year Filing Deadline h. Illegal Entry i. Use of Derogatory Information j. Pause and Re-Start of Acceptance of Initial (c)(8) EAD Applications 3. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(b), Renewal 4. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(c), Termination 5. Amend 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8) 6. Amend 8 CFR 274a.13, Application for Employment Authorization 7. Technical and Conforming Updates to the Proposed Amendments C. Impact of Effective Date of the Final Rule 1. Processing Timeframe 2. Waiting Period To Apply for and Receive an Initial (c)(8) EAD 3. Pause and Re-Start of (c)(8) EAD Application Acceptance D. Summary of Benefits and Costs E. Legal Authority F. Severability III. Background and Purpose A. Introduction B. Efforts To Reform the Asylum System C. Continued Need for Reform D. Background 1. Eligibility for Asylum 2. Affirmative vs. Defensive Filings 3. Employment Authorization for Asylum Applicants a. 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock b. 30-Day Processing Timeframe c. Impact of Denial of the Asylum Application on Employment Authorization IV. Related Rulemakings A. Discretionary EAD NPRM B. Biometrics NPRM V. Discussion of Proposed Rule A. Pause and Re-Start of (c)(8) EAD Application Acceptance B. 365 Calendar Day Waiting Period To Apply for (c)(8) EADs C. Changes to Filing Requirements for Asylum Applications D. Processing Timeframe for (c)(8) EADs E. Biometrics Requirements F. Eligibility Requirements 1. One-Year Filing Deadline 2. Criminal Bars 3. Illegal Entry G. Discretionary Decisions H. Recommended Approvals I. Termination of Employment Authorization 1. Asylum Applications No Longer Pending Before DHS and DOJ 2. Maintaining an EAD While Seeking Administrative or Judicial Review 3. Limited Exception for Unaccompanied Alien Children J. Prioritizing the Adjudication of an Asylum Application Due to Derogatory Information in the Form I-765 Adjudication K. Corresponding DOJ Regulations VI. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements A. Executive Orders 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation) 1. Summary of Proposed Provisions and Benefits and Costs Impacts 2. Background and Purpose 3. Baseline and Population 4. Wages and Opportunity Costs of Time 5. Forms, Time Burdens, and Fees 6. Monetized Impacts (Costs, Benefits, and Transfers) a. Variables and Descriptions b. Module 1: EAD Application Acceptance Pause c. Module 2: EAD Issuance Provisions 7. Distributional Effects of the Monetized Impacts 8. Impacts on Labor Market 9. Other Impacts Not Estimated B. Regulatory Flexibility Act C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform) F. Family Assessment G. Executive Order 13175(Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments) H. National Environmental Policy Act I. Paperwork Reduction Act 1. Paperwork Reduction Act—Collection of Information 2. Form I-589 3. Form I-765 J. Executive Order 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation) K. Executive Order 12630 (Governmental Actions and Interference With Constitutionally Protected Property Rights) Table of Abbreviations AO—asylum officer APA—Administrative Procedure Act BIA—Board of Immigration Appeals BLS—U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection CFR—Code of Federal Regulations DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice EAD—employment authorization document E.O.—Executive Order EOIR—Executive Office for Immigration Review Form I-589—Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal Form I-765—Application for Employment Authorization FY—Fiscal Year HSA—Homeland Security Act of 2002 ICE—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement IIRIRA—Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 IJ—Immigration Judge INA—Immigration and Nationality Act INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service LIFO—last in, first out NEPA—National Environmental Policy Act NPRM—notice of proposed rulemaking NTA—Notice to Appear OMB—Office of Management and Budget PRA—Paperwork Reduction Act RFA—regulatory flexibility analysis RIA—regulatory impact analysis SBREFA—Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional Review Act) Secretary—Secretary of Homeland Security TVPRA—William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 UAC—Unaccompanied Alien Child UMRA—Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 U.S.C.—United States Code USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services I. Public Participation DHS invites all interested parties to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, comments and arguments on all aspects of this proposed rule. DHS also invites comments that relate to the economic, environmental, or federalism effects that might result from this proposed rule. Comments must be submitted in English, or an English translation must be provided. Comments that will provide the most assistance to USCIS in implementing these changes will reference a specific portion of the proposed rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Comments submitted in a manner other than via http://www.regulations.gov, including emails or letters sent to DHS or USCIS officials, will not be considered comments on the proposed rule and may not receive a response from DHS. Instructions: If you submit a comment, you must include the agency name (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) and the DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0370 for this rulemaking. Regardless of the method used for submitting comments or material, all submissions will be posted, without change, to the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov, and will include any personal information you provide. Therefore, submitting this information makes it public. You may wish to consider limiting the amount of personal information that you provide in any voluntary public comment submission you make to DHS. DHS may withhold information provided in comments from public viewing that it determines may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. For additional information, please read the Privacy and Security Notice available at http://www.regulations.gov. Docket: For access to the docket and to read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov, referencing DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0370. You may also sign up for email alerts on the online docket to be notified when comments are posted or a final rule is published. II. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action The overarching goals of this proposed rulemaking are to enhance the benefit integrity of requests for asylum and employment authorization based on a pending asylum application, address national security and public safety concerns, and mitigate undue strains on DHS's operational resources by reducing the incentive for aliens to file frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless asylum applications as a means to obtain employment authorization, and thereby facilitating faster and more efficient adjudications of meritorious asylum claims and pending asylum employment authorization applications. USCIS' receipts of initial applications for employment authorization based on a pending asylum application have reached a historic high and USCIS' adjudicative resources are strained. To enhance benefit integrity, protect national security, and reduce resource strains on USCIS, DHS proposes changes to its regulations regarding EAD applications filed by asylum applicants 1 under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8) (“(c)(8) category”). DHS proposes to codify in regulations to pause USCIS' acceptance of initial Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization (“EAD application”), filings in the (c)(8) category when USCIS' average processing time for affirmative asylum applications exceeds 180 days. This proposed rule also increases the waiting period to apply for (c)(8) EADs to 365 calendar days, extends the processing timeframe for USCIS to adjudicate initial (c)(8) EAD applications, and introduces additional eligibility requirements for (c)(8) EADs. Lastly, the proposed rule also impacts affirmative asylum processing by allowing USCIS to prioritize adjudication of asylum applications when derogatory information is found during review of the EAD application. Allowing asylum officers to prioritize an affirmative asylum application based on derogatory information found during the employment authorization application process will improve USCIS' national security and public safety posture while also allowing the agency to more efficiently triage and process potentially frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless cases. 1 For purposes of this rule, the term “asylum applicant” is generally used interchangeably with “aliens who applied for asylum,” and “aliens with a pending asylum application.” As discussed below, there is historical precedent for the provisions proposed in this rule, and DHS believes that the promulgation of this rule will reduce frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless asylum applications that are filed for the sole purpose of obtaining employment authorization. Ultimately, reducing frivolous, fraudulent, or meritless asylum filings will enable USCIS to dedicate an increased share of its finite resources to adjudicating meritorious asylum applications, including backlog cases, and other pending benefit requests. USCIS anticipates that the impact of this proposed rule will align the adjudication of the applications for (c)(8) EADs more closely with the statute by facilitating timely adjudication of asylum applications and eventually limiting work authorization during the pendency of an application for asylum to a reduced number of cases where a decision on an asylum application cannot be made within 365 days. B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action DHS proposes to codify in regulation the following major changes: 1. Amend 8 CFR 208.3(c)(3), Form of Application DHS proposes to align its criteria for determining when an asylum application is received and complete more closely with the general rules governing immigration benefit requests in 8 CFR 103.2. The existing regulations at 8 CFR 103.2(a)(7) state that USCIS will record the receipt date as of the actual date the immigration benefit request is received at the designated filing location, whether electronically or on paper, provided that it is signed with a valid signature, executed, and filed in compliance with the regulations governing that specific benefit request and with the correct fee. DHS proposes to apply these existing regulations to asylum applications filed after the effective date of this rule. Immigration benefit requests not meeting these requirements are rejected and returned and do not retain a filing date. DHS also proposes to remove the language in 8 CFR 208.3(c)(3) providing that an application for asylum will be deemed “complete” if USCIS fails to return the incomplete application to the alien within a 30-day period. 2. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(a), Employment Authorization a. Biometrics DHS proposes to require all applicants for a (c)(8) EAD, including renewal requests, to submit biometrics. If an alien fails to appear for biometrics submission, the alien's application for employment authorization would be denied under 8 CFR 103.2(b)(13)(ii), similar to how USCIS currently handles other benefit requests. b. Extension of 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock to 365 Calendar Day Waiting Period Under the proposed rule, asylum applicants would be eligible to apply for employment authorization 365 calendar days from the date their asylum application is received. The 365 calendar-day waiting period will begin on the date of the receipt of a complete asylum application, as recorded pursuant to 8 CFR 103.2(a)(7). c. Recommended Approvals DHS proposes to remove the language referring to “recommended approvals.” USCIS' Asylum Division no longer issues recommended approvals as a preliminary decision for affirmative asylum adjudications. d. Processing Timeframes DHS proposes to amend the regulatory requirement that USCIS complete adjudication of initial (c)(8) EAD applications within 30 days. For initial (c)(8) EAD applications received on or after the effective date of the final rule, DHS proposes to extend the processing timeframe to 180 days for USCIS to adjudicate the EAD application. DHS does not propose any changes to initial (c)(8) EAD applications submitted prior to the effective date of this rule. e. Ineligibility Grounds DHS proposes to exclude from (c)(8) EAD eligibility any alien where there is reason to believe that the alien may be barred from a grant of asylum due to one of the criminal bars to asylum under sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). f. Effect of a Denial of Asylum Application DHS proposes to exclude from initial (c)(8) EAD eligibility any alien whose asylum application is denied by an asylum officer or an Immigration Judge (IJ) within the 365 calendar-day waiting period, or before the adjudication of the initial (c)(8) EAD application. g. One-Year Filing Deadline DHS proposes to exclude from (c)(8) EAD eligibility any alien whose asylum application is filed on or after the effective date of the final rule and more than 1 year after the alien's arrival in the United States, unless an asylum officer or IJ determines that an exception to the 1-year filing deadline exists, or unless the alien is under USCIS' initial jurisdiction as an unaccompanied alien child (UAC). h. Illegal Entry DHS proposes to exclude from (c)(8) EAD eligibility any alien who entered or attempted to enter the United States without inspection on or after the effective date of the final rule, unless the alien, without delay but no later than 48 hours after entry, expressed to an immigration officer an intention to apply for asylum or expressed to an immigration officer a fear of persecution or torture; or unless the alien establishes good cause for the illegal entry or attempted entry; or unless the alien meets the definition of, or at any time since their most recent entry was determined to be, a UAC as defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). i. Use of Derogatory Information To assist with improving adjudicative efficiency, DHS proposes to prioritize asylum applications for adjudication if USCIS finds derogatory information during the process of the adjudication of (c)(8) EAD applications. j. Pause and Re-Start of Acceptance of Initial (c)(8) EAD Applications DHS proposes to pause the acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications when the average processing time for affirmative asylum applications over a consecutive period of 90 day adjudications exceeds 180 days. After such a pause is implemented, acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications would resume when the average processing time for affirmative asylum application adjudications over a consecutive period of 90 days is less than or equal to 180 days. The USCIS Director's determination to pause and restart (c)(8) EAD acceptances will be based solely on the affirmative asylum application processing times, and not subject to discretion. In evaluating the affirmative asylum application processing times for USCIS asylum cases, the USCIS Director will consider all pending asylum applications before USCIS over the preceding 90-day period. The rule would require the USCIS Director to review affirmative asylum application processing times on the effective date of the final rule. DHS proposes to notify the public of any such processing changes and provide the supporting quarterly processing times through USCIS website announcements. As described in section V.A of this preamble, USCIS' current affirmative asylum processing times are significantly greater than 180 days. 2 Processing times were trending downward, but recently increased again. USCIS expects this rule to support another downward trend in the long term, but USCIS also expects that, upon implementation of this rule, new EAD applications for pending asylum applicants would be paused for an extended period, possibly many years. For example, without factoring in any of the other proposed changes in this rule and how they may impact adjudication times, it may take between 14 and 173 years to reach a 180-day processing time, depending on the extent of the reduction in asylum application receipts following this rule. It bears repeating that neither of those projections take into account any of the other proposed changes in this rule which, if finalized, would also shorten those processing times. USCIS also recognizes that while the asylum adjudication processing time calculation will be based solely on affirmative asylum applications, the pause on acceptances of (c)(8) employment authorization applications will impact both affirmative and defensive asylum applications. While this is a significant change in access to employment authorization based on a pending asylum application, DHS believes it is necessary to achieve its goals of enhancing benefit integrity, protecting national security, and reducing resource strains. 2 USCIS OPQ DATA, “I-589 Processing Time With and Without Admin Closed by Fiscal Year (FY2022-2025) (May 27, 2025). DHS notes these processing times are under LIFO processing, so these are still the “newer” cases being adjudicated. Further, these adjudications are not reducing the overall size of the asylum backlog. 3. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(b), Renewal DHS proposes to clarify and consolidate the requirements for requesting a (c)(8) EAD renewal and specify that aliens applying for renewal (c)(8) EADs must also submit biometrics. 4. Amend 8 CFR 208.7(c), Termination Under the proposed rule, termination of a (c)(8) EAD would occur: (1) immediately following the denial of an asylum application by an asylum officer, unless the case is referred to an Immigration Judge; (2) on the date that is 30 days after the date on which an Immigration Judge denies an asylum application, unless the alien makes a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; or (3) immediately following the denial or dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals of an appeal of a denial of an asylum application. 5. Amend 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8) DHS proposes to remove the reference to recommended approvals because USCIS no longer issues recommended approvals as a preliminary decision for affirmative asylum adjudications. 6. Amend 8 CFR 274a.13, Application for Employment Authorization Under the proposed rule, approval of (c)(8) EAD applications would be at USCIS' discretion, in keeping with its discretionary authority under section 208(d)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2). DHS also proposes to replace the detailed information about filing and adjudicating applications for (c)(8) EADs with a reference to 8 CFR 208.7. 7. Technical and Conforming Updates to the Proposed Amendments DHS proposes technical and conforming amendments to the affected regulations to align with the major changes described previously, including structural updates to 8 CFR 208.7(a) in order to incorporate the new provisions. The proposed rule would also revise outdated language, such as replacing references to “the commissioner” with “USCIS.” C. Impact of Effective Date of the Final Rule Under this proposed rule, DHS will allow aliens with pending asylum applications that have not yet been adjudicated and who already have employment authorization before the final rule's effective date to remain employment authorized until the expiration date on their current EAD, unless the card is terminated or revoked on the grounds specified in regulations in effect when their EAD was issued. In this proposed regulation, there are certain provisions that apply only to initial (c)(8) EAD applications filed on or after the effective date of the final rule. Provisions that apply only to initial (c)(8) EAD applications are noted in the proposed regulatory text. The remaining proposed provisions apply to both initial and renewal (c)(8) EAD applications filed on or after the effective date of the final rule. In general, and unless otherwise specified, aliens who file renewal (c)(8) EAD applications on or after the effective date of the final rule would be subject to the applicable provisions in this proposed rule regardless of the date on which their initial application for a (c)(8) EAD was filed. By applying many of these provisions to renewals, DHS aims to further insulate the employment authorization and asylum processes from fraud and abuse. Aliens requesting employment authorization renewals who may have abandoned their asylum applications or not appeared for their asylum interviews or biometrics appointments will no longer be able to receive employment authorization renewals due to additional scrutiny under the proposed rule. The application of certain provisions to renewals will also allow DHS to vet aliens and reduce the number of employment authorization renewals granted to aliens who were convicted of crimes after receiving their initial EAD, thereby enhancing public safety and strengthening national security. Finally, applying these changes to renewals as well as initials results in efficiencies for USCIS adjudicators, who would only have to apply one set of eligibility requirements for (c)(8) EADs and not one set of eligibility requirements for initial (c)(8)s and a different set of requirements for renewal (c)(8)s. The provisions that apply only to initial (c)(8) EAD applications include the proposed changes to the processing timeframe, the waiting period to apply for and receive a (c)(8) EAD, and the pause and re-start of (c)(8) EAD application acceptance. With regard to the pause and re-start, USCIS anticipates that the rule would result in an initial and potentially lengthy pause. USCIS anticipates that this pause would be instituted after USCIS reviewed average asylum application times for the first 90-day period after the rule took effect. USCIS acknowledges that, while the asylum adjudication processing time calculation will be based solely on affirmative asylum applications, the pause on acceptances of (c)(8) employment authorization applications will impact both affirmative and defensive asylum applicants. This rule will not have any impact on the ability to apply to replace lost, stolen, or damaged (c)(8) EADs. 1. Processing Timeframe DHS proposes to amend 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1) to extend the processing requirement from 30 days to 180 days for all initial (c)(8) EAD applications filed on or after the effective date of the final rule. Any initial (c)(8) EAD applications that are pending as of the effective date of the final rule would continue to be subject to the current 30-day processing requirement. A fuller discussion of this change and litigation relating to processing timeframes in Rosario v. USCIS appears in section V.D of this preamble. There are currently no processing timeframe requirements for renewal (c)(8) EAD applications, and there would be no changes to timeframe requirements for renewal (c)(8) EAD applications within this proposed rule. 2. Waiting Period To Apply for and Receive an Initial (c)(8) EAD DHS proposes to amend the waiting period to apply for and receive an initial (c)(8) EAD to 365 calendar days. This regulation would apply to all initial applications for (c)(8) EADs filed on or after the effective date of the final rule. Any initial (c)(8) EAD applications that are pending as of the effective date of the final rule would still be subject to the current 180-day Asylum EAD Clock. There are currently no regulatory waiting period requirements for renewal (c)(8) EAD applications, 3 and there would be no changes related to waiting periods for renewal (c)(8) EAD applications within this proposed regulatory action. 4 3 USCIS advises aliens that they should file their renewal Form I-765 within 6 months of the expiration date of the current EAD. USCIS, “I-765, Application for Employment Authorization,” https://www.uscis.gov/i-765 (last updated Apr. 29, 2025). 4 A settlement in Garcia Perez v. DHS, 2:22-cv-806 (W.D. Wash. 2022) was approved in September 2024 after class members challenged EOIR and USCIS policies and procedures regarding the 180-day Asylum EAD Clock. Among other provisions, the Garcia Perez settlement provides asylum applicants with an ability to obtain information about their Asylum EAD Clock and challenge the reason for any stops to the clock. The current mechanism to do this will be simplified by conversion to a 365-calendar day calculation. To the extent that there is conflict between the settlement agreement and the 365-calendar day calculation, this rule change would supersede the Garcia Perez settlement agreement, which contains a clause acknowledging the settlement agreement does not preclude future regulatory or statutory changes. See Garcia Perez Settlement Agreement, Section II.C.7— Impact of Statutory, Regulatory, or Precedential Changes, and/or Operational Needs. 3. Pause and Re-Start of (c)(8) EAD Application Acceptance DHS proposes to pause and re-start the acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications based on the average processing time of asylum application adjudications over a 90-day period. For purposes of this NPRM, an affirmative asylum application is considered processed when a grant, referral, or denial is issued or the application is administratively closed. Cases described as administrative closures are those that do not receive a final decision on the merits but are closed for reasons such as lack of jurisdiction or abandonment of the asylum application, USCIS uses different terms to address the lifespan of a case, including both “process time” and “cycle time”. Generally, “processing time” is the time from receipt to completion for each individual form and can be averaged over a specific period of time in the past, but does not take into account currently pending applications and is not used for projections. “Cycle time” is defined as how many months' worth of receipts represents the current pending case volume. This is an internal metric that can be used for projections because it takes into account current pending volume, anticipated receipts, and expected completions. As an internal management metric, cycle times are generally comparable to the agency's publicly posted median processing times. Cycle times are what the operational divisions of USCIS use to gauge how much progress the agency is, or is not, making on reducing our pending affirmative asylum caseload and overall case processing times. DHS would pause the acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications when the average processing time for all affirmative asylum applications over a consecutive period of 90 days adjudication exceeds 180 days. Acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications would resume when the average processing time for affirmative asylum adjudication over a consecutive period of 90 days is less than or equal to 180 days. The proposed provisions to pause and re-start EAD application acceptance only impact initial (c)(8) EAD applications. Thus, even in a period in which USCIS has paused the acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications due to asylum application processing times, USCIS will continue to receive and adjudicate renewal (c)(8) EAD applications, as well as EAD applications in other eligibility categories. The rule would require the USCIS Director to review affirmative asylum application processing times for the purpose of determining whether USCIS' (c)(8) EAD application acceptances would be paused or restarted. This requirement would begin on the effective date of the final rule and the Director would conduct the first required review of asylum application processing times after the first 90-day period thereafter. Based on recent processing times, USCIS anticipates that the Director will institute an initial pause on asylum EAD adjudications following that review. The USCIS Director's determination is not discretionary, and the determination to pause or restart acceptance of initial (c)(8) EAD applications is directly tethered to the processing times of all affirmative asylum applications over the previous 90-day period. DHS proposes to notify the public of any such processing changes and provide the supporting processing times through USCIS website announcements. D. Summary of Benefits and Costs DHS expects that this proposed rule will generate substantial benefits. As discussed later in this preamble, the asylum system is overwhelmed, federal adjudications resources are strained, and the affirmative asylum application backlog serves as a magnet pulling aliens into the U.S. illegally. The surge in both asylum filings and associated EADs over the past few years has created an untenable situation. This proposed rule would benefit USCIS by allowing it to operate under long-term, sustainable case processing times for initial EAD applications for asylum applicants, to allow sufficient time to address national security, public safety, or fraud concerns, and to maintain technological advances in document production and identity verification. Just as the 1994 INS rulemaking referenced below, DHS expects that this action would reduce frivolous and fraudulent asylum claims and perverse economic incentives to obtain an EAD under meritless asylum claims. 59 FR 14779 (Mar. 30, 1994); 59 FR 62284 (Dec. 5, 1994). Frivolous, fraudulent, and meritless asylum applications and related filings for employment authorization can serve as a magnet for illegal immigration and generate costs to localities, states, the national economy, and strain resources. These costs could include public assistance and additional local or state resources used to assist aliens, and this rule would potentially mitigate some of these costs. DHS expects that these changes would reduce confusion regarding EAD requirements for aliens with pending asylum applications and the public, help ensure the regulatory text reflects current DHS policy and more faithfully implements the intent of the statute while simultaneously improving program integrity. DHS cannot currently quantify all of the potential benefits of this proposed rule. In addition, if employers are able to hire American workers to fill the jobs the asylum applicants would otherwise hold, the change in earnings to such aliens would constitute beneficial wage and benefit transfers to American workers and would potentially pose no productivity loss or costs to employers. While it is possible that aliens without work authorization could require assistance from their social and support networks, which could include public entities, there could be a counterbalance; as this rule potentially will reduce immigration, there could be less of an economic strain on states, local government, and non-governmental organizations, in terms of any public assistance and resources that are currently provided to asylum applicants. Furthermore, DHS anticipates this proposed rule would decrease illegal migration and fraudulent claims for asylum applications and EADs. Many of the impacts described above will be indirect, unquantifiable benefits resulting from this proposed rule. DHS cannot estimate these potential indirect impacts (whether costs, benefits, transfers) or second order effects and beyond, as they are beyond the scope of this analysis. This rulemaking seeks to reduce frivolous, fraudulent, and meritless asylum applications and their associated applications for (c)(8) EADs while improving the administrative process for issuance of employment authorization documents for aliens with meritorious asylum applications at USCIS. Requiring aliens to submit biometrics collections for both initial and renewal requests for employment authorization would enable DHS to vet an alien's biometrics against government databases to determine if he or she matched any criminal activity on file, to verify the alien's identity, and to facilitate card production. In addition, biometrics collection enables DHS to confirm that individuals are not utilizing multiple identities or that multiple individuals are not utilizing one identity. Lastly, from biometrics collections DHS would increase program integrity by ensuring that only eligible aliens who continued to pursue asylum were applying for and obtaining work authorization, because those who have abandoned their asylum applications or who do not have a genuine need for asylum may be less likely to appear for biometrics collection. This would also generally provide a benefit for the public because it would increase transparency pertinent to application and filing requirements. As discussed in the preamble, the asylum program has been subject to identity fraud concerns historically. The impacts of this proposed rule include both potential distributional effects (which are transfers) and costs. The potential distributional impacts fall on the asylum applicants who may be delayed in entering the U.S. labor force or who may not obtain an EAD due to being ineligible ( e.g., aggravated felon, serious non-political crime, etc.) or due to a processing pause. The potential distributional impacts (transfers) would be in the form of lost opportunity to earn compensation (wages and benefits). A portion of this lost compensation might be transferred from asylum applicants to others that are currently employed in the U.S. labor force, possibly in the form of additional hours worked or overtime pay. A portion of the impact of this rule may also be borne by companies that would have hired the asylum applicants had they been eligible for an EAD or in the labor market earlier. However, if the affected employer were unable to find available workers, these companies could incur a cost to productivity and potential profit. Companies may also incur opportunity costs by having to choose the next best alternative to immediately filling the job the asylum applicant would have filled. USCIS does not know what this next best alternative may be for those companies. As a result, USCIS does not know the portion of overall impacts of this rule that are transfers or costs. If companies can find replacement labor for the position the asylum applicant would have filled, this rule would have primarily distributional effects in the form of transfers from asylum applicants to others already in the labor market (or workers induced to return to the labor market). USCIS acknowledges that there may be additional opportunity costs to employers such as additional search costs. However, if companies cannot find a reasonable substitute for the labor an asylum applicant would have provided, the effect of this rule would primarily be a cost to these companies through lost productivity and profits. USCIS uses the changes to earnings to asylum applicants as a measure of the overall impact of the rule—either as distributional impacts (transfers) or as a proxy for businesses' cost for lost productivity. It does not include additional costs to businesses for lost profits and opportunity costs or the distributional impacts for those in an applicant's support network. The lost compensation to these asylum applicants could range from $34.6 billion to $126.6 billion annually (undiscounted) depending on the wages the asylum applicant would have earned and other factors. The 5-year total discounted lost compensation to asylum applicants at 3 percent could range from $155.4 billion to $568.6 billion and at 7 percent could range from $135.5 billion to $495.8 billion (FY 2025 through FY 2029). The quantified estimates may be overstated, as they assume that without this rule ( i.e. under the baseline) the EAD validity period would be longer than is currently permitted. 5 Since USCIS has reduced the maximum EAD validity period for aliens with pending asylum applications to 18 months, recipients must renew more often, which could result in fewer pending asylum applicants authorized to work over the 5-year period of analysis. This reduction would result from attrition in renewal applications and more frequent vetting. 5 Effective December 5, 2025, USCIS reduced the maximum EAD validity period for aliens with pending asylum applications to 18 months. See USCIS, Policy Alert, “Updating Certain Employment Authorization Document Validity Periods” (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf. There could be tax impacts pertinent to earnings changes. Asylum applicants who could be delayed or precluded from obtaining an EAD may generate forgone federal and state taxes. However, as was noted above, the strain on resources that could be mitigated due to the effects of this rule could counterbalance some or all of the tax losses, if there are any. Additionally, if the earnings are transferred to American workers, there may be no loss of taxes. This rule could possibly result in reduced opportunity costs to the Federal Government. Since the Rosario court order, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018), compelled USCIS to comply with the 30-day processing timeframe provision in FY 2018, USCIS has redistributed its adjudication resources to work up to compliance. By extending the 30-day processing timeframe to 180 days, it is possible that resources could be reallocated, which could have the effect of reducing delays in processing status-granting benefit requests, and avoiding costs associated with hiring additional employees. However, there are many factors that could influence such processing. Additionally, if asylum filings decline, as this rule generates a disincentive to meritless claims with the goal of obtaining an EAD, then the public and the Federal Government could experience operational and cost efficiencies as it is based on adjudicating fewer asylum claims. DHS does not rule out that there could be resources allocated to other operational areas. Table 1 provides a detailed summary of the regulatory changes and the expected impacts of proposed rule's provisions. USCIS estimates the primary impact of the rule would result from a pause in accepting all new initial (c)(8) EAD applications until USCIS' affirmative asylum applications processing time reach a 180-day average (Module 1). Additionally, USCIS provides impacts for provisions that would affect applicants (for initial and renewal EADs) when the pause is lifted (Module 2). However, USCIS does not include Module 2 in the total rule impact, because the Module 1 impacts (pause EADs) already accounted for impacts to all new EAD applicants. To include Module 2 would be double counting the impacts for the same population. Where a monetized figure is presented, it is based on a 7 percent annualized average, and the annual population is the midpoint of a high-low range. BILLING CODE 9111-97-P EP23FE26.011 EP23FE26.012 EP23FE26.013 EP23FE26.014 EP23FE26.015 EP23FE26.016 BILLING CODE 9111-97-C In addition to the information presented in Table 1, details and an A-4 accounting statement are provided in Section VI (Statutory and Regulatory Requirements) of the proposed rule. 6 See Office of the Inspector General, OIG-16-130 “Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records” (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/2016-09/potentially-ineligible-individuals-have-been-granted-uscitizenship-because, finding “During immigration enforcement encounters with aliens, CBP and ICE take fingerprint records. These components and their predecessor, INS, used to collect aliens' fingerprint on two paper cards. One card was supposed to be sent to the FBI to be stored in its repository. The other fingerprint card was to be placed in the alien's file with all other immigration related documents.” Ultimately finding that “As long as the older fingerprint records have not been digitized and included in repositories, USCIS risks making naturalization decision without complete information and, as a result, naturalizing additional individuals who may be ineligible for citizenship or who may be trying to obtain U.S. citizenship fraudulently.” See also Office of the Inspector General, DHS, “Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits” DHS-OIG 17-111 (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.oig/dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-111-Sep17.pdf, “Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits” finding “from this data set, we determined that, as of April 24, 2017, 9,389 alients USCIS identified as having multiple identities had received an immigration benefit” and that “10 percent of cases, but not discussed in this report, include applications for asylum and travel documents.” 7 DHS caveats that the quantified estimates are currently overstated due to the change in the maximum EAD validity period for aliens with pending asylum applications to 18 months. USCIS will consider the recent change and incorporate updates where appropriate in the final rule to reflect this change. E. Legal Authority The Secretary's authority for the proposed regulatory amendments is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in part at 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. ). General authority for issuing this proposed rule is found in section 103(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), which authorizes the Secretary to administer and enforce the immigration and nationality laws and establish such regulations as the Secretary deems necessary for carrying out such authority, as well as section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, which vests all of the functions of DHS in the Secretary and authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations. 8 8 Although several provisions of the INA discussed in this proposed rule refer exclusively to the “Attorney General,” such provisions now refer to the Secretary by operation of the HSA. See 6 U.S.C. 202(3), 251, 271(b), 542 note, and 557; 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1) and (g) and 1551 note; Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2 (2019). Additional authority for this rule is found in: • Section 274A(h)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)(B), which recognizes the Secretary's discretionary authority to extend employment authorization to aliens in the United States; 9 9 Courts have acknowledged that Congress delegated authority to DHS to grant or extend employment authorization to certain classes of aliens. See, e.g., Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS, 50 F.4th 164, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“What matters is that section 1324a(h)(3) expressly acknowledges that employment authorization need not be specifically conferred by statute; it can also be granted by regulation.”). DHS is exercising this discretionary authority consistent with all applicable authorities, including the referenced authorities in the HSA, and sections 103, 208, and 274A(h)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, and 1324a(h)(3), as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at 5 U.S.C. 553. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024) (“In a case involving an agency, of course, the statute's meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion. Congress has often enacted such statutes. For example, some statutes expressly delegate to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term. Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to fill up the details of a statutory scheme, or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that leaves agencies with flexibility, such as `appropriate' or `reasonable.' ”) (internal citations omitted). • Sections 208(d)(1) and (d)(5)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(1) and (d)(5)(B), which authorize the Secretary to establish regulations concerning the procedures and conditions on asylum applications; • Section 208(d)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2), which provides the Secretary discretion to grant employment authorization to applicants for asylum if 180 days have passed since filing an application for asylum; • Section 101(b)(1)(F) of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(F), which establishes as a primary mission of DHS the duty to “ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland;” and • Section 271(a)(3) of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 271(a)(3), which confers authority on the Director of USCIS to establish “policies for performing [immigration adjudication] functions.” F. Severability The Department intends for the provisions of this proposed rule, if finalized, to be severable from each other and to be given effect to the maximum extent possible, such that if a court were to hold that any provision is invalid or unenforceable as to a particular alien or circumstance, the other provisions will remain in effect as to any other alien or circumstance. For example, if a court of competent jurisdiction were to hold that the proposed amendments to the regulations under 8 CFR 208.7(a)(2) alone should be enjoined or should be vacated for some reason, it is the intent of DHS that such court would narrowly construe its decision and leave the remainder of the rule in place with respect to all other covered aliens and circumstances. While the various provisions of this proposed rule, taken together, would provide maximum benefit with respect to improving the integrity of both the asylum program and employment authorization benefits process, strengthening the Department's national security and public safety posture, and decreasing the strain on operational resources, none of the provisions are fully interdependent and unable to operate separately. DHS recognizes that the proposed provisions at 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(i), 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(iv), and 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(v) are related to each other, but they may still exist independently. The proposed amendments at 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(iv) would expand the list of criminal ineligibilities for employment authorization, including the incorporation of criminal bars to asylum, specifically where there is reason to believe that the applicant may be barred from a grant of asylum due to one of the criminal bars to asylum under sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) and the proposed amendments at 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(v) would allow DHS to prioritize for adjudication asylum applications for which derogatory information is discovered during the EAD adjudications. These proposed provisions would be strengthened by the proposed provision at 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1)(i), which requires biometrics for all aliens applying for EADs based on pending asylum applications. This new categorical biometrics provision would allow DHS to conduct more in-depth screening and vetting, thus providing a more complete, comprehensive, and accurate view of the alien's criminal history. However, even if USCIS could not implement the categorical biometrics provision, the Department could still apply the criminal ineligibility grounds and derogatory information provisions to the EAD adjudication by reviewing other available evidence in the record or available in government systems. III. Background and Purpose A. Introduction On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation declaring that a national emergency exists at the southern border of the United States 10 and a Presidential Proclamation stating that the circumstances of the emergency qualify as an invasion under Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the United States. 11 Stating that the number of aliens encountered along the southern border of the United States over the course of the prior administration had overwhelmed the U.S. immigration system and rendered many of the INA's provisions to control the entry and exit of people and goods across the borders of the United States ineffective, the President invoked emergency tools to suspend the physical entry of aliens involved in an invasion into the United States across the southern border and provide additional authorities and resources to support the Federal Government's response. 12 10 Proclamation 10886 of Jan. 20, 2025, “Declaring a National Emergency at the Border”, 90 FR 8327, 8328 (Jan. 29, 2025). 11 Proclamation 10888 of Jan. 20, 2025, “Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,” 90 FR 8333, 8335 (Jan. 29, 2025). 12 Id. On the same day, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14159, Protecting the American People Against Invasion, to ensure “that the Federal Government protects the American people by faithfully executing the immigration laws of the United States.” 13 The E.O. also directed the Secretary to ensure “that employment authorization is provided in a manner consistent with section 274A of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1324a), and that employment authorization is not provided to any unauthorized alien in the United States.” 14 13 E.O. 14159 of Jan. 20, 2025, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion,” sec. 1, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025). 14 Id. at sec. 16(c), 90 FR 8446. Through this proposed rule, DHS is addressing, in part, the President's national emergency and invasion at the southern border declarations by: (1) reducing incentives for aliens to file frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless asylum applications intended primarily to obtain employment authorization and to remain in the United States for years due to the current backlog of asylum cases; (2) disincentivizing illegal entry into the United States by providing that, on or after the effective date of the final rule, any alien who enters or attempts to enter the United States at a place and time other than lawfully through a U.S. port of entry will be ineligible to receive a (c)(8) EAD, with limited exceptions; (3) reducing opportunities for fraud; and (4) protecting USCIS' ability to have sufficient time and resources to receive, meaningfully screen and vet, and process initial (c)(8) EAD applications, while also protecting the security-related processes undertaken for each employment authorization application. This rule also aims to address the increased public safety and national security concerns exacerbated by large numbers of aliens illegally crossing the border and overwhelming the U.S. immigration system. DHS is also proposing reforms that will ease many of the burdens USCIS faces in accepting and adjudicating applications for asylum and related employment authorization. As explained more fully later in this preamble, these reforms will help mitigate the crisis that our immigration and asylum systems are facing as a consequence of the mass migration of aliens across the southern border, and improve the current asylum backlog by discouraging new frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless asylum applications and freeing DHS resources to focus on applications in the current backlog, helping to clear the way for meritorious asylum applications to be received, processed, and adjudicated more quickly. The existing asylum backlog has engendered a flood of litigation by aliens with pending asylum applications alleging unreasonable delay of their applications that has significantly drained the resources of USCIS and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to resolve. In fact, petitions for writs of mandamus 15 related to affirmative asylum cases have been on the rise in recent years, from 1,545 in FY 2022 to 4,093 in FY 2023 to 5,187 cases in FY 2024. 16 Affirmative asylum cases with mandamus actions further stymie progress on affirmative asylum backlog reduction because USCIS must prioritize responses to and adjudication of certain mandamus affirmative asylum cases. This creates a cyclical issue because mandamus actions force USCIS to reallocate resources to meet the court deadlines by pulling officers off either recent or backlog adjudications, which leads to increased processing times for other pending asylum applications. 17 Adopting the provisions described in this proposed rule would give aliens with meritorious asylum claims the predictability they deserve but are currently denied because of the backlog of asylum claims clogging the system. The extensive resources required to process pending asylum applications generally extends the time to process meritorious asylum claims. 15 A Writ of Mandamus is a district court filing used to compel an agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. USCIS may expedite cases for aliens with long-standing asylum claims who use this style of litigation to seek action. 16 USCIS internal data, Office of the Chief Counsel, Form I-589 Mandamus Statistics, May 22, 2025. 17 Office of Inspector General, DHS, “USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing Its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims” (July 3, 2024), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-07/OIG-24-36-Jul24.pdf. See also Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman, DHS, “Annual Report 2022” (June 30, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/2022%20CIS%20Ombudsman%20Report_verified_medium_0.pdf. Additionally, illicit organizations, including designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), 18 benefit financially by smuggling aliens into the United States, and, upon arrival in this country, many aliens then apply for asylum or other immigration benefits. A 2023 congressional report stated that aliens routinely paid smuggling organizations more than $10,000 to $15,000 to facilitate the journey across the southwest border, with drug cartels playing an increasingly influential role in human smuggling. 19 It is estimated that cartel revenue from human smuggling is in the billions of dollars, with cartels operating in the Del Rio Sector alone making around $1.5 billion a year. 20 Recently designated FTOs, including Cartel Del Golfo (Gulf Cartel), Cartel Del Noreste, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) continue to engage in dangerous and often fatal human smuggling operations, bringing vulnerable men, women, and children to the United States illegally. 21 By nature, these organizations engage in illegal and often extremely violent activities; therefore, this strategic exploitation of the immigration system by FTOs constitutes a massive national security and public safety threat. 18 Bureau of Counterterrorism, DOS, “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ (last visited May 23, 2025); E.O. 14157 of Jan. 20, 2025, “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” 90 FR 8439 (Jan. 29, 2025). 19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security Majority Report, Phase 2 Interim Report, 118th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 7, 2023, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/09.07-Phase-2-Final.pdf. 20 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security Majority Report, Phase 2 Interim Report, 118th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 7, 2023, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/09.07-Phase-2-Final.pdf. 21 ICE, “Cartel Del Noreste Members Sent to Prison for Roles in Cartel-Linked Human Smuggling Scheme” (Nov. 4, 2024), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/cartel-del-noreste-members-sent-prison-roles-cartel-linked-human-smuggling-scheme; DOJ, “Fatal human smuggling case and two alleged MS-13 members among those charged in relation to immigration and border security” (Apr. 4, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/fatal-human-smuggling-case-and-two-alleged-ms-13-members-among-those-charged-relation; DOS, “In Dual Actions, Treasury Sanctions Clan Del Golfo Leadership in Colombia and Businesses” (Sept. 25, 2024), https://pa.usembassy.gov/in-dual-actions-treasury-sanctions-clan-del-golfo-leadership-in-colombia-and-businesses-owned-by-sinaloa-cartel-fentanyl-traffickers-in-mexico/; DOJ, “Law Enforcement Cooperation Between United States and Mexico Results in Mexican Takedown of Cartel-Linked Alien Smugglers,” (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/law-enforcement-cooperation-between-united-states-and-mexico-results-mexican-takedown-cartel. DHS expressly recognizes that there are many populations with reliance interests on the current regulatory framework for (c)(8) EAD applications, including aliens applying for asylum, employers, and state and local communities. These interests include the aliens with meritorious asylum claims desiring to access employment authorization faster and with fewer requirements so that they might become financially independent sooner, the need for employers to more readily access a pool of employment-authorized aliens, and a state or community's economic need for newly arrived aliens to sustain themselves and contribute to the economy. DHS acknowledges that this rule may negatively impact potentially meritorious asylum applicants who may decide not to file for asylum because they cannot afford to wait the extended period before applying for employment authorization. These aliens, who may otherwise have strong asylum claims, may have family responsibilities, medical, or other financial burdens, that make it extremely difficult for them to wait 365 calendar days, or potentially many years due to the pause and restart provisions of this rule, to file for employment authorization while their asylum application is pending. DHS also recognizes that extending the processing time for employment authorization may also factor into a potentially meritorious applicant's decision-making process before applying for asylum. Due to this rule and the increased waiting periods before an alien may receive employment authorization, there may be aliens with potentially meritorious asylum claims who instead return to a country where they may fear harm. DHS has seriously considered the harm to this potential population, and, while these interests are relevant and justified, DHS has determined that they are outweighed by the needs of the Federal Government to protect U.S. national security, public safety, and the overall integrity of the asylum program, as well as sustain an operationally efficient immigration system. 22 The asylum program and the immigration system are heavily burdened and overwhelmed, and this has led to a massive pending affirmative asylum caseload. 23 This pending affirmative asylum caseload weakens the integrity of the system, allowing thousands of non-meritorious cases to languish and obstructing the agency from identifying potential public safety and national security concerns until years later when the cases are finally adjudicated. The security of the United States and the integrity of our immigration processes outweigh the potential harm to a subset of the asylum applicant population. Additionally, there is no justified reliance on the current regulations for the purpose of exploiting the immigration system through filing fraudulent, frivolous, or otherwise meritless asylum cases primarily to access employment authorization. Removing this potential abuse as a pull factor for illegal immigration should decrease the number of illegal border crossers and outweighs reliance on the current regulations. Finally, many asylum seekers may have existing support networks of family, friends, and community members, including other asylees and refugees, who are able to alleviate the financial burdens caused by the longer wait to receive employment authorization. These communities provide a significant and positive national fiscal impact and may support those who are not yet employment authorized. 24 Therefore, reliance interests are limited to the employment of aliens who are already present in the United States at the time the final rule becomes effective and who may apply for asylum, or those who are lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States and subsequently apply for asylum, and the employers, states, and local communities who are impacted by these populations. 22 See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 (2020). (“And, even if DHS ultimately concludes that the reliance interests rank as serious, they are but one factor to consider. DHS may determine, in the particular context before it, that other interests and policy concerns outweigh any reliance interests.”). 23 USCIS, “Number of Service-wide Forms By Quarter, Form Status, and Processing Time” (Apr. 30, 2025), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/quarterly_all_forms_fy2025_q1.xlsx. 24 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The Fiscal Impact of Refugees and Asylees Over 15 Years: Over $123 Billion in Net Benefit from 2005-2019” (Feb. 15. 2024), available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ea6442054785081eb121fa5137cf837d/aspe-brief-refugee-fiscal-impact-study.pdf. Further, many of the goals of this rule actually support the interests of those same asylum applicants, employers, and state and local communities. For example, the changes proposed in the rule would help deter frivolous, fraudulent, and otherwise meritless asylum filings, which would permit DHS to more efficiently adjudicate the applications for aliens with meritorious asylum claims. Employers who rely on employment-authorized aliens for a labor pool are unlikely to prefer aliens with criminal arrests and convictions, aliens who pose national security threats, or aliens who committed fraud during the immigration process. Similarly, while state and local communities have an economic interest in newly arrived aliens sustaining themselves and contributing to the economy, they also have an interest in protecting their communities from national security threats, aggravated felons, and other criminal and fraud risks. It is the policy of the Executive Branch to protect the national sovereignty of the United States by facilitating the admission of aliens whose presence serves the national interest and preventing the admission of those who do not, as well as to protect national security and public safety. 90 FR 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025); 90 FR 8333 (Jan. 29, 2025). Aliens admitted into the United States may choose to file for a variety of immigration benefits or protections, one of which is asylum. This rulemaking is part of a series of reforms DHS is undertaking to improve the integrity of the asylum system, including streamlining efforts, so that those with meritorious asylum claims are adjudicated quickly and aliens who are ineligible are promptly denied. B. Efforts To Reform the Asylum System The Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, was the first comprehensive legislation to establish the modern refugee and asylum system. 25 Signed into law in March 1980, the legislation was intended to “provide a permanent and systematic procedure for admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States” and to provide provisions for effective resettlement of such refugees. 26 The Refugee Act also, for the first time, created a statutory basis for asylum, in order to help ensure that U.S. statutory law conformed to Article 33 of the 1951 U.N Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 27 The law directed the Attorney General to establish a procedure for the granting of asylum status to aliens physically present in the United States, or at a land border or port of entry, if the Attorney General determines the alien meets the definition of a refugee. 28 25 The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the definition of a refugee from the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. United Nations, “Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” (Jan. 31, 1967), 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 26 Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, sec. 101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (Mar. 17, 1980). 27 H.R. Rep. No. 96-608 (1979). 28 Refugee Act of 1980, sec. 201(b), 94 Stat. at 105 (adding section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158); see also id. at sec. 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102 (codifying the following definition of “refugee”: “The term `refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . . .”). In June 1980, legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued an interim regulation implementing provisions of the Refugee Act. 29 Among other things, the regulation permitted district directors, in their discretion, to grant requests for employment authorization made by aliens who had filed non-frivolous asylum applications. 30 DHS notes the significance of even that interim regulation requiring that asylum applications be non-frivolous. The regulation did not, however, build in a waiting period, meaning aliens were eligible to request and receive employment authorization upon filing their asylum applications. 31 Further, the regulation did not specify any other restrictions related to employment authorization, such as the duration of employment authorization or grounds of ineligibility. 32 29 Aliens and Nationality; Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 FR 37392 (June 2, 1980). This interim rule was not finalized until 1983. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum Procedures, 48 FR 5885 (Feb. 9, 1983). 30 45 FR 37394. 31 Id. 32 Id. While the 1980 regulation fulfilled the Refugee Act's rulemaking mandate, it was a temporary regulatory mechanism and merely functioned to bridge the new statute with the system that was already in place while the U.S. government took up a period of deliberate study and analysis to design permanent procedures. 55 FR 30674, 30675 (July 27, 1990). In 1987, the INS published a more fulsome proposed regulation to reform asylum adjudications. 52 FR 32552 (Aug. 28, 1987). In 1988, the INS published a revised proposed rule in response to comments on the 1987 proposed rule, and in 1990, it promulgated the final regulation. 48 FR 5885 (Apr. 8, 1988); 55 FR 30674 (July 27, 1990). The final system included, among other changes, the creation of a new corps of asylum officers who would adjudicate asylum claims, moving away from district directors. 55 FR 30676. The final rule also changed the process for obtaining employment authorization, removing it from district director discretion and instead mandating employment authorization for asylum applicants who were not detained and whose applications an asylum officer determined were not frivolous. Id. at 30676-77. The validity period was set to 1 year, with renewable increments of up to 1 year. Id. The regulation also included automatic termination of employment authorization upon expiration of the EAD or 60 days after denial of asylum, whichever was longer. Id.; see also id. at 30682. The INS's new regulatory scheme for asylum cases proved to be flawed and inadequately resourced, and as a result, asylum processing quickly became overwhelmed. By 1992, the INS received 103,964 asylum applications but adjudicated only 21,996, a mere 21 percent of received asylum applications. 33 Since employment authorization was tethered to the filing of a nonfrivolous asylum application, at this time asylum applicants were typically employment authorized immediately. 34 This created a processing issue that fueled itself: as asylum adjudication times increased, more aliens received employment authorization without having to appear before an INS officer to establish identity or justify their asylum claims, then more aliens began to use asylum applications as a mechanism for prompt employment authorization which further increased filings and asylum application processing times. 35 In addition to breeding asylum abuse and program integrity concerns, this situation adversely impacted aliens with meritorious asylum claims by increasing the backlog and decision wait times and leading to a rise in unscrupulous immigration “consultants” who preyed on aliens with meritorious asylum claims, convincing them to file boilerplate asylum claims even when the aliens had their own valid claims. 36 33 INS, DOJ, “1994 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (Feb. 1996), p. 83. 34 FR 30681-82. Additionally, the direct filing of asylum applications in the asylum office with jurisdiction over the applicant's residence did not change until 1994. See 59 FR 14779, 14782. 35 See, e.g., David A. Martin, “Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms” 70 Wash. L. Rev. 725, 734-37 (July 1995). 36 Id. Faced with these difficulties and mounting pressures from internal and external stakeholders, the INS published a proposed reform in March 1994 and final regulations in December 1994. 59 FR 14779 (Mar. 30, 1994); 59 FR 62284 (Dec. 5, 1994). INS's 1994 proposed rule could easily describe the current state of DHS's asylum backlog, albeit with an even larger backlog and longer wait times for adjudications: The existing system for adjudicating asylum claims cannot keep pace with incoming applications and does not permit the expeditious removal from the United States of those persons who [sic] claims fail. While part of this difficulty is attributable to limited resources, the problem also stems in large part from the effort to meet procedural requirements imposed by current regulations. On October 1, 1990, the INS had a backlog of approximately 90,000 asylum claims. Since that date, approximately 250,000 cases have been added to that backlog. Asylum applications are received at a current rate approaching 150,000 per year. A significant and growing percentage of current receipts are claims that appear on their face to be nonmeritorious or abusive. . . . Indeed, most asylum applicants wait a year or more to receive even initial decision on their cases. 37 37 See 59 FR 14780. As such, INS proposed several changes to the rules governing asylum applications and associated EADs. Most relevant to what DHS endeavors to do today were the provisions designed to decrease frivolous filings, specifically the creation of the rule that asylum applicants could not apply for employment authorization until 150 days had elapsed after their initial filing of a complete asylum application. 38 According to the proposal, the INS then had 30 additional days to adjudicate the employment authorization application. 39 This 180-day period is colloquially known as the “180-day Asylum EAD Clock.” 40 The INS proposed rule explained that the proposed 150-day wait for filing an EAD application was important to encourage INS to adjudicate claims promptly within the 150-day period to avoid having to separately adjudicate the work authorization applications; and that it would authorize INS to deny employment authorization to those whose underlying asylum applications have been denied. The proposed rule noted that this reform should reduce the number of asylum applications filed primarily to obtain employment authorization. It also explained that applicants with pending asylum claims would wait longer, but those whose claims are not adjudicated within the 150-day period would, subject to certain conditions, would be eligible to apply for and receive work authorization; and that INS would adjudicate those applications within 30 days, regardless of the merits of the underlying asylum claim. 41 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 USCIS, “The 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice,” https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/notices/Applicant-Caused-Delays-in-Adjudications-of-Asylum-Applications-and-Impact-on-Employment-Authorization.pdf (last updated Mar. 2025). 41 See 59 FR 14779, 14780. The INS received 345 public comments in response to the proposed rule and, in December 1994, published a final rule. 59 FR 62284, 62285 (Dec. 5, 1994). 42 While the INS changed several parts of the proposed rule in response to public comments, the provisions governing the 150-day waiting period to apply for employment authorization and the 30-day processing timeframe for adjudicating employment authorizations for pending asylum applicants were both retained. 59 FR 62290-62291. The INS discussed several public comments submitted that were not supportive of the proposed 150-day waiting period and 30-day processing timeframe changes, which included concerns that: 42 Not all public comments related to the 150-day waiting period and the 30-day processing timeframe. Many of the public comments related to the other proposed changes, including the proposed filing fee for asylum applications and associated employment authorization applications, the form of the asylum application, how incomplete applications would be processed, renewal of employment authorization, interviews and other procedures, and how failures to appear by the alien would be processed. See generally 59 FR 62284. • Asylum applicants would be forced to work illegally in jobs where they would be underpaid and treated poorly but would have no means of redress because of the fear of reprisals. • Advocated for eliminating the waiting period and maintaining the current rule, which allowed immediate applications for employment authorization and issuance within 90 days. • Advised providing exceptions to the waiting period by granting employment authorization immediately or within 90 days to applicants who demonstrate hardship or economic need (such as those with no relatives in the United States or who have small children). 59 FR 62290. The INS responded to explain the belief that the asylum process should be separated from the employment authorization process and that the rule would discourage applicants from filing meritless asylum applications solely to obtain employment authorization. The INS further explained that it expected all applicants to have work authorization after 180 days unless their claims had been denied. INS stated that it had considered in particular recommendations that it establish alternate means for adjudicating employment authorization based on the merits of the asylum application or on economic need. INS noted that either alternative would invite a large number of applications, thus diverting resources and undermining the goal of asylum reform. The Department noted that it did not believe loosening eligibility standards for employment authorization was the appropriate path in light of the large number of applicants who applied for asylum primarily as a means to gain work authorization, and that it believed the rule would instead provide the best way to discourage applications filed for this reason and enable it to grant asylum, and work authorization, to applicants meriting such relief. 59 FR 62290-91. Clearly, the intent was that this would decouple asylum applications from employment authorization in order to disincentivize frivolous filings and allow the system to function properly. Further, DHS notes that the INS affirmatively decided to delay all aliens with pending asylum applications (both meritorious and meritless filings) the opportunity to apply for employment authorization expressly because the INS believed this measure would help combat frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless asylum applications filed primarily to obtain employment authorization and regain control over the backlog and processing times. In 1996, shortly after the regulatory asylum reform, Congress passed comprehensive immigration enforcement legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which, among other things, included provisions on asylum adjudications. 43 IIRIRA states that any procedures established under section 208(d)(1) of the INA; 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(1), “shall” provide that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative adjudications of asylum applications “shall” be completed within 180 days after the date applications are filed. 44 Mirroring the 1994 regulatory reforms, IIRIRA also restricted the Secretary from granting employment authorization to asylum applicants until 180 days after the filing of the application for asylum. 45 43 Public Law 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546. 44 Id. sec. 604, 110 Stat. at 3009-694 (codified at INA sec. 208(d)(5)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii)). 45 Id. sec. 604, 110 Stat. at 3009-693 (codified at INA sec. 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2)). The regulatory reforms, either alone or in tandem with the statutory change, succeeded in curtailing meritless claims and delivering fair and timely decisions on asylum cases. New asylum filings actually decreased from their peak of 149,566 in FY 1995 to just 30,261 in FY 1999, a decrease of nearly 80 percent in only five FYs. 46 At the same time, the approval rate significantly increased, from 15 percent of cases adjudicated in FY 1993 to 38 percent in FY 1999. 47 In February 2000, the INS issued a News Release celebrating the 1994 Asylum Reforms (which became effective in January 1995), including the following statement by INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, “Five years ago, INS launched badly needed reform of an asylum system that was overwhelmed, unresponsive and vulnerable to misuse.” 48 The news release continued: 46 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service, “Asylum and `Credible Fear' Issues in U.S. Immigration Policy” (June 29, 2011), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41753; INS, DOJ “Asylum Reform: Five Years Later” (Feb. 1, 2000), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/news/Asylum.pdf. 47 INS, DOJ “1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (Mar. 2002), p. 100. Percent approved is `[t]he number of cases granted divided by the sum of: cases granted; denied; and referred to an Immigration Judge following an interview.” 48 INS, DOJ, “Asylum Reform: Five Years Later” (Feb. 1, 2000), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/news/Asylum.pdf. By 1992, almost two-thirds of all claims became part of a burgeoning backlog due to a lack of resources and effective procedures for processing those claims. By 1993, the asylum system was in a crisis, having become a magnet for abuse by persons filing applications in order to obtain employment authorization. 49 49 Id. INS statistics showed a “decrease of 75 percent in the number of new claims being filed with INS, from 127,129 in FY 1993 to 30,261 in FY 1999” while “the approval rate of cases heard by INS asylum officers has increased from 15 percent of cases adjudicated in FY 1993 to an approval rate of 38 percent in FY 1999, another indicator that INS is receiving more valid claims.” 50 These statistics show that the 1994 rulemakings had an unmistakable impact on asylum program integrity. 51 With overall asylum filings decreasing and the approval rate increasing, the clear implication was that ineligible aliens (regardless of the basis for ineligibility or whether the filing was frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless) stopped filing and, as a result, clogged the asylum system. DHS seeks a similar result with this proposed regulatory action. 50 Id.; see also INS, DOJ “1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service”, p. 100 (Mar. 2002) (Percent approved is `[t]he number of cases granted divided by the sum of: cases granted; denied; and referred to an Immigration Judge following an interview.”). 51 Id.; see also INS, DOJ, “Asylum Reform: Five Years Later” (Feb. 1, 2000), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/news/Asylum.pdf. C. Continued Need for Reform Since IIRIRA, there have been no major statutory changes to the asylum provisions to address the immigration realities faced by the United States today. While little has changed with respect to asylum-specific statutory and regulatory authorities for EADs for asylum applicants since the 1994 regulatory reforms, there have been significant operational changes and numerous challenges for these cases, including what steps constitute a part of the adjudication and the length of time to adjudicate the applications. 52 52 See 59 FR 62284, 62289 (Dec. 5, 1994). On July 26, 2018, in Rosario v. USCIS, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment against the government and issued an order requiring USCIS to comply with the 30-day regulatory timeline at 8 CFR 208.7. 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018). Application Support Centers One such operational challenge arose after the 1994 regulatory reforms, related to biometrics. In 1994 the INS was still using FD-258 fingerprint cards for the submission of biometrics for immigration benefit requests. The INS accepted those FD-258 fingerprint cards directly from applicants and petitioners through the mail. In 1997, when funding the agency for 1998, Congress prohibited the INS from accepting any fingerprint cards collected by entities outside the INS for immigration benefits, except in certain instances when collected by law enforcement agencies and in certain overseas situations. 53 Previously, certain “designated fingerprint services” entities could collect fingerprints and submit them to INS. This FD-258 process was fraught with both errors and fraud. 54 To comply with the law, INS established the Application Support Centers (ASCs), which continue to exist nationwide today and which DHS operates for the collection of biometrics for immigration benefits. See 63 FR 12979 (Mar. 17, 1998). 53 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Title I, Public Law 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2447-48 (1997). 54 See Office of the Inspector General, DHS, OIG-16-130 “Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records” (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/2016-09/potentially-ineligible-individuals-have-been-granted-uscitizenship-because. This new process was something of a double-edged sword. There were notable advantages, including improved program integrity, capability for identity verification, and a more automated conduit for criminal history background checks. However, one time-intensive consequence was that the new process required INS (and later USCIS) to affirmatively schedule an alien's ASC appointment for biometrics collection after receipt of a benefit request. 55 At the time, the affirmative scheduling of an ASC appointment after receipt of a benefit request added anywhere from several weeks to over a month to the front-end processing times for immigration benefit requests with an associated biometrics collection. This continues to be true, as most aliens today are scheduled for ASC appointments approximately three to four weeks after receipt of a benefit request. 55 In essence, INS or USCIS would receive a benefit request and an employee would determine whether the filing was subject to a biometrics requirement. The employee would then determine the nearest ASC to the alien, according to the address provided on the request. The employee would have to then determine the next available appointment date and time for a biometrics collection at that particular ASC. Finally, the employee would have to create a paper appointment notice for the alien and mail it to the address provided on the request. In order to give the alien a reasonable amount of notice, and account for postal service delivery of the written appointment notice, appointments were typically scheduled approximately 30 days from the date of the appointment notice. While much of this process was automated in recent years by USCIS, there is still the need to afford the alien adequate notice of the appointment and not overbook appointments at a particular ASC. Consequently, while there is variance in backlogs and throughputs from ASC to ASC, today USCIS still estimates the wait for an ASC appointment to be several weeks. Additionally, if the scheduled appointment is not convenient, the alien can use an online tool to reschedule an existing appointment, but that does not help schedule initial appointments faster. See generally USCIS, “Preparing for Your Biometric Services Appointment” (last updated July 6, 2023), https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/preparing-for-your-biometric-services-appointment. Aggravated Felony Conviction Bar for EADs With respect to employment authorization for pending asylum applicants, the creation of ASCs and the requirement for biometrics collection at certain facilities, operated by INS and later DHS, brought to bear another problem. In the previously mentioned 1994 final rule, INS amended the regulations to bar aliens convicted of an aggravated felony from submitting an application for employment authorization based on the pending asylum application. See 59 FR at 62299. Although there is no discussion on specific comments directly on this point in the final rule, the INS did not amend the final rule to remove the proposed bar for aliens convicted of an aggravated felony. 59 FR at 62291. Prior to the 1994 rulemakings, having an aggravated felony conviction was not grounds for denying an employment authorization application, 56 and prior to the creation of ASCs in 1998, the agency accepted fingerprints on cards that were submitted with the benefit request being filed. Once INS began requiring an alien to appear at an ASC for biometric collection, it made compliance with both the aggravated felony conviction ineligibility ground and the 30-day asylum EAD processing timeframe extremely difficult. The most reliable way for USCIS to identify criminality ( e.g., aggravated felonies) is with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Identity History Summary (IdHS, formerly known as a “RAP sheet”), which locates criminal records based on the alien's fingerprints. 57 In order to obtain an alien's RAP sheet from the FBI, INS needed to send the alien to the ASC—which took several weeks. All the while, the 30-day asylum EAD processing timeframe was running. See current 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1). Due to the expanded logistics and process for obtaining RAP sheets, officers could not comply with both provisions of 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1), which simultaneously prohibited approval of an EAD to an aggravated felon and required that the application be adjudicated within 30 days of filing. See current 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1). This left INS, and, in turn, USCIS, in an extremely difficult dilemma, as waiting on the results of biometrics in order to identify an aggravated felony conviction for potential ineligibility grounds meant that USCIS would violate the 30-day asylum EAD processing timeframe. DHS recognizes that requiring biometrics collection now and analyzing a variety of criminal issues may again increase employment authorization application processing times, but DHS firmly believes the increased benefits to national security and public safety outweigh this potential delay in adjudications. 56 As explained above, the June 1980 INS interim regulation implementing provisions of the Refugee Act had no waiting period or ineligibilities. 45 FR 37392; see also 48 FR 5885 (Feb. 9, 1983) (finalizing this interim rule). 57 See Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Next Generation Identification (NGI),” https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ ngi (last visited May 23, 2025). Policy Memorandum 110 and USCIS-ICE Memorandum of Agreement. Adding another layer of complexity to employment authorization processing for pending asylum applicants, on July 11, 2006, USCIS issued Policy Memorandum 110 (“PM 110”) entitled Disposition of Cases Involving Removable Aliens, which mandated that officers refer egregious public safety cases to USCIS' Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) and suspend adjudication of such cases for 60 days or until Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) provides notification of its action on the cases, which ever date was earlier. 58 Imbedded within PM 110 was a copy of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with ICE, dated June 20, 2006, negotiated and signed by both agencies. 59 The MOA detailed specific processes at both agencies for handling cases referred to ICE by USCIS, including USCIS 60-day adjudicative hold, ICE response time requirements, and specific guidance for cases where ICE failed to provide any response within the 60-day timeline. The purpose of the 60-day hold was to provide ICE with an appropriate amount of time to adequately screen, vet, and investigate aliens and determine what, if any, enforcement action was appropriate. 60 However, the hold also created a significant impediment to compliance with existing regulations governing the timeline for adjudicating employment authorization for pending asylum applicants. Consequently, this meant that even where USCIS could schedule a biometrics collection and obtain a RAP sheet within 30 days, if the RAP sheet (or any other source of derogatory information) indicated the existence of a public safety concern—even one that did not rise to the level of aggravated felony—an additional 60-day hold would be required. Furthermore, in some cases, scheduling such an alien for an ASC appointment could use the entire 30-day (c)(8) EAD processing timeframe and that was prior to referring the case to FDNS or ICE. 58 USCIS Policy Memorandum No. 110, “Disposition of Cases Involving Removable Aliens” (Jul. 11, 2006). 59 Id. 60 USCIS, PM 110 (“USCIS will interrupt adjudication and FDNS will refer the case to ICE so that ICE has an opportunity to decide it, when and how it will issue an NTA and/or detain the alien.”); see also Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement on the Issuance of Notices to Appear to Aliens Encountered During an Adjudication (June 20, 2006). On May 11, 2007, USCIS issued the Interoffice Memorandum Processing of Applications for Ancillary Benefits Involving Aliens Who Pose National Security or Egregious Public Safety Concerns, 61 which clarified PM 110 as it related to primary and ancillary benefit requests. The Interoffice Memorandum expressly stated, “The adjudication of ancillary applications and petitions shall be suspended for 60 days or until ICE provides notification of its intended action(s) on the primary applicant, whichever is earlier.” In fact, the Interoffice Memorandum added another population of cases to the mix as well, by requiring that any application for an ancillary benefit filed by an alien who poses a national security concern would now be processed in a similar manner as an egregious public safety case. 62 As such, for any employment authorization application filed by a pending asylum applicant with potential national security or public safety derogatory information, officers could not comply with both the 30-day EAD processing timeframe and USCIS policy with respect to ICE referrals. This created another extremely difficult situation even in cases where USCIS already had a RAP sheet: screening and vetting in cases with national security or public safety concerns meant that USCIS would violate the asylum 30-day EAD processing timeframe. As USCIS receipts have increased, so has the need to thoroughly screen and vet cases, especially where there may be security concerns, and while the agency continues to meet its national security responsibilities, the 30-day EAD processing timeframe also continues to make this effort challenging. 61 Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Associate Director, District Operations, HQOFO 70/1-P (May 11, 2007) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/AncillaryEPSNS051107.pdf. 62 Id. Rosario v. USCIS. Another ensuing challenge encountered for asylum related employment authorization applications was the Rosario litigation. On May 22, 2015, Rosario v. USCIS was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under case no. 2:15-cv-00813 challenging the delays in processing initial EADs for asylum applicants. 63 On July 26, 2018, in a published order, the District Court found that USCIS data revealed that “from 2010 to 2017, USCIS met its 30-day deadline in only 22% of cases—that is, out of 698,096 total applications, USCIS resolved only 154,629 applications on time. In 2017, USCIS timely resolved only 28% of applications.” 64 63 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018). 64 Rosario, 365 F.Supp.3d at 1158. However, the District Court recognized USCIS made some changes in response to the need to more quickly adjudicate the (c)(8) EAD applications. First, the court recognized that two years earlier, USCIS had increased the validity period of an initial asylum EAD from one year to two years. 65 Second, the court recognized that the previous year USCIS provided checklists on its websites to assist asylum applicants seeking to submit (c)(8) EAD applications. 66 The court found one of the “chief purposes” of the 30-day asylum EAD processing timeframe, as part of the larger INS regulatory amendments, was “to ensure that bona fide asylees are eligible to obtain employment authorization as quickly as possible.” 67 The court noted that the focus on expediency is reinforced by how the agency described the INS's 1994 proposed rule: “The INS will adjudicate these applications for work authorization within 30 days of receipt, regardless of the merits of the underlying asylum claim.” 68 Ultimately, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, denied USCIS' motion for summary judgment, found that USCIS was in violation of 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1), enjoined USCIS from further failing to adhere to the 30-day asylum EAD processing timeframe as set forth in 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1), and ordered USCIS to submit status reports every six months regarding the rate of compliance with the 30-day EAD processing timeframe. 69 USCIS still submits status reports in compliance with the court order as of the publication of this NPRM. 70 65 See USCIS, “USCIS Increases Validity of Work Permits to Two Years for Asylum Applicants, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services” (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-increases-validity-of-work-permits-to-two-years-for-asylum-applicants. 66 See Form M-1162, “Optional Checklist for Form I-765(c)(8) Filings,” Asylum Applications (With a Pending Asylum Application) Who Filed for Asylum on or after January 4, 1995, (July 17, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/optional-checklist-for-form-i-765-c8-filings. 67 See Rosario, 365 F.Supp.3d at 1160 (citing to 62 FR at 10318). 68 See Rosario, 365 F.Supp.3d at 1160 (citing to 50 FR at 14780). 69 See Rosario, 365 F.Supp.3d at 1163. 70 See generally, USCIS, “Rosario Class Action,” https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/class-action-settlement-notices-and-agreements/rosario-class-action (last updated Sept. 19, 2022). Subsequent Regulatory Efforts and Litigation. More recently, there have been multiple efforts to reform the existing system, with the intent of relieving the agency of the burden of adjudicating (c)(8) EADs within 30 days and diminishing the incentive to file frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise meritless affirmative asylum applications. In recent years, DHS published two regulations aimed at reforming the existing system and accomplishing those goals. In 2020, DHS published the Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-Related Form I-765 Employment Authorization Applications (“Timeline Repeal Rule”) Final Rule, which removed the regulatory provision stating that USCIS has 30 days from the date an alien with a pending asylum application files the initial application for employment authorization to grant or deny that application. 85 FR 37502 (June 22, 2020). The rule also removed the provision requiring that an application for renewal of a (c)(8) EAD must be received by USCIS 90 days prior to the expiration of the employment authorization. Id. In 2020, DHS also published the Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants (“Broader Asylum EAD Rule”) Final Rule, which modified regulations governing asylum applications, interviews, and eligibility for employment authorization based on a pending asylum application. FR 38532 (June 26, 2020). Major provisions of that rule included removing the “deemed complete” provision related to asylum application filings, increasing the waiting period before asylum applicants were eligible to file for and receive an EAD, and imposing other eligibility requirements. Id. In January 2018, prior to the promulgation of these rules, the affirmative asylum backlog stood at approximately 311,000 pending cases. 71 By the end of FY 2022, the backlog had nearly doubled to approximately 625,000 affirmative asylum applications, and by the end of FY 2023, had tripled to more than 1 million pending affirmative asylum cases. 72 This drastic increase in the affirmative asylum backlog highlights the dire situation USCIS finds itself in and the urgent need for reform of the existing regulations and process. 71 71 OIG, USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing Its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Cases (July 3, 2024), available at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-07/OIG-24-36-Jul24.pdf. 72 Id. Litigation followed the publication of these two rules (“2020 Asylum EAD Rules”), including CASA 73 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, and Asylumworks 74 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On September 11, 2020, the court in CASA imposed a preliminary injunction requiring that USCIS not apply the 2020 Asylum EAD Rules to members of CASA and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP) organizations. 75 The CASA preliminary injunction applying only to members of the CASA and ASAP created a bifurcated and operationally challenging application of the 2020 asylum rules in that the rules were enjoined from applying to organizational members while continuing to apply to non-member applicants. The CASA court made a finding that was significant to this proposed rulemaking, when the court determined the elimination of the 30-day Asylum EAD clock (“Timeline Repeal Rule”) was arbitrary and capricious for two different reasons. Specifically, the court found, first, that USCIS' rationale for elimination of the 30-day processing timeframe belied the evidence in the record and, second, that USCIS' responses to public comments were conclusory and reflected that the agency did not consider important policy alternatives ( e.g., imposing a longer processing timeframe). 76 Specifically, the court found, “But rather than giving adequate consideration to this important alternative, the agency provided a half-baked and internally contradictory explanation for rejecting it. Its rationale does not pass muster.” 77 Relying on Rosario, the court noted “While the agency's difficulty in complying with the 30-day deadline supports extending the timeline, it hardly explains why there should be no timeline at all.” 78 In this proposed rule, DHS seeks to extend—rather than eliminate—the 30-day EAD processing timeline. 73 See CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 928 (D. Md. 2020). 74 Asylumworks v. Mayorkas, 590 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2022). 75 CASA, 486 F. Supp. 3d at 973-74. 76 See id. at 961-63. 77 Id. at 963. 78 Id. On February 7, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order in Asylumworks vacating the 2020 Asylum EAD Rules in their entirety. 79 On September 22, 2022, DHS published a final rule titled “Asylum Application, and Employment Authorization for Applicants; Implementation of Vacatur” (87 FR 57795 (Sept. 22, 2022)) that implemented the court order in Asylumworks by removing the changes made by the 2020 Asylum EAD Rules and restored the regulatory text that predated the 2020 Asylum EAD Rules. 79 See Asylumworks v. Mayorkas, 590 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2022) (“ Asylumworks vacatur”). The vacatur decision in Asylumworks effectively mooted the CASA case. The CASA court acknowledged the case had become moot on May 18, 2023, when it granted the government's motion to dismiss. See CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 8:20-CV-2118-PX, 2023 WL 3547497 (D. Md. May 18, 2023). As a result of the Asylumworks court order, since February 7, 2022, USCIS has been required to process all initial (c)(8) EAD applications within 30 days of filing. While the court ordered a return to a regulatory requirement that had existed until 2020, the burden created by the order was significant and continues to impact overall EAD processing due to the surge in (c)(8) EAD applications. Following the Asylumworks vacatur, at the end of February 2022, there were 93,639 pending EAD applications to which the 30-day processing timeframe requirement applied, including those aliens who were CASA or ASAP members who already benefited from the 30-day processing timeframe and those who were not previously subject to the CASA injunction and for whom USCIS was not subject to a processing timeframe prior to the vacatur. 80 To address the backlog of cases and comply with the court's order, USCIS surged resources for the entire initial (c)(8) workload, including adding staff (pulling from other EAD workloads as well as new hires) and authorizing overtime. 80 See Asylumworks v. Mayorkas 1:20-cv-03815-BAH (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2022) memorandum opinion explaining CASA and ASAP members previously were granted a preliminary enjoined enforcement of both 2020 EAD rules; see also USCIS Stopped Applying June 2020 Rules Pursuant to Court Order in Asylumworks v. Mayorkas (Sept. 21, 2022) (noting CASA and ASAP members no longer need to provide evidence of membership with their initial C8 EAD applications), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-stopped-applying-june-2020-rules-pursuant-to-court-order-in-asylumworks-v-mayorkas. Changing EAD Validity Periods Additionally, USCIS utilized a different method to help manage the (c)(8) EAD operational workload. In an effort to control the (c)(8) processing times, on several occasions USCIS has extended the validity periods of (c)(8) EADs. First, in 2016, USCIS increased the validity period of an initial and renewal asylum EADs from one year to two years. 81 This fact was recognized by the Rosario Court in its grant of summary judgment. 82 As data referenced in other parts of this proposed rulemaking illustrate, this did not help with receipts or processing times. So, on September 27, 2023, USCIS extended the validity period for (c)(8) EADs (both initials and renewals) again, this time from two years to five years. The stated justification was, “[t]he increase in the EAD validity period will reduce the frequency with which affected noncitizens must file an Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) with USCIS if they wish to renew their EAD.” 83 The purpose of this policy change was to alleviate some operational pressure to adjudicate renewals prior to expiration solely based on USCIS processing times with an overall benefit of supporting all timely adjudications of employment authorization, including initial applications for (c)(8) EADs. 81 See USCIS, “USCIS Increases Validity of Work Permits to Two Years for Asylum Applicants, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services” (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-increases-validity-of-work-permits-to-two-years-for-asylum-applicants. 82 See Rosario, 365 F.Supp.3d at 1158. 83 Id. To date, the agency is still ascertaining the effectiveness of the validity period extension. What is clear is that with some fluctuations, monthly asylum application filings rose from 36,728 in October 2023 to 53,182 in January 2025, before falling to 40,344 in April 2025. 84 Initial applications for (c)(8) EAD filings increased almost every single month from 90,307 in October 2023 before reaching a high of 152,341 in January 2025. 85 Since that time, initial EAD (c)(8) EAD receipts have somewhat decreased over recent months, but rebounded to 153,888 in July 2025. 86 84 USCIS National Production Dataset (NPD), May 27, 2025. 85 Id; USCIS OPQ Data, “ I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, C08 Eligibility Category, Receipts from August 1, 2024-July 31, 2025” (Aug. 26, 2025). 86 Id. On December 4, 2025, USCIS issued policy guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual to update the maximum EAD validity periods for certain EAD categories, including aliens with pending asylum applications. See USCIS, Policy Alert, “Updating Certain Employment Authorization Document Validity Periods” (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf. Effective December 5, 2025, the maximum EAD validity period for aliens with pending asylum applications has been reduced to 18 months. Id. This change is intended to ensure more frequent vetting of aliens applying for work authorization in the United States and will better enable USCIS to deter fraud and detect aliens with potentially harmful intent. Id. Second, in 2024, DHS published the “Increase of the Automatic Extension Period of Employment Authorization and Documentation for Certain Employment Authorization Document Renewal Applicants” Final Rule which increased the automatic extension period for expiring EADs for certain renewal applicants from 180 to 540 days in order to prevent aliens from experiencing lapses in employment authorization due to significant delays in EAD processing times. 89 FR 101208 (Dec. 13, 2024). 87 While this rule extended authorization periods for a range of EAD categories, it applied to (c)(8) applicants, and DHS discussed the surge in (c)(8) applications as part of the support for that rule. See, e.g., id. at 101220. 88 87 See also 87 FR 26614 (May 4, 2022) (temporary final rule on this same topic); 89 FR 24628, 24634 (Apr. 8, 2024) (same). 88 On October 30, 2025, DHS ended the practice of automatically extending the validity period for EADs in certain categories, including aliens with pending asylum applications. 90 FR 48799 (Oct. 30, 2025). DHS explained that this change was designed to ensure complete and thorough vetting of all EAD applicants and that USCIS only issues EADs to aliens who are in fact eligible. 90 FR 48807-08. During the (c)(8) EAD validity extension and the automatic extensions, asylum application receipts increased while initial (c)(8) EADs significantly increased. Reasonable minds can disagree on whether it was prudent or appropriate from a program integrity perspective to more than double the validity period of (c)(8) EADs to alleviate some operational pressure on renewal based on USCIS processing times with an overall benefit of supporting all timely adjudications of employment authorization, including initial (c)(8) EAD applications. Nevertheless, it is clear that DHS has attempted multiple solutions and attempted to regain control over the (c)(8) filings using regulatory, policy, and operational tools—but all efforts have failed, and receipt volumes keep rising. Frivolous, Fraudulent, and Meritless Filings There are numerous and well-documented examples of frivolous, fraudulent, and meritless asylum filings. 89 Some asylum fraud schemes have been perpetrated for the primary purpose of obtaining an asylum EAD. 90 While USCIS uses various methods to identify fraud in specific affirmative asylum applications, a GAO Report concluded that despite its robust methods USCIS actually had limited capability to detect fraud in affirmative asylum applications. 91 The GAO reported that USCIS asylum officers encountered challenges with proving fraud in asylum filings due to the nonadversarial, cooperative approach that asylum officers are trained to take when interviewing asylum applications. 92 According to an Asylum Division Branch Chief cited in the report, while the “cooperative approach aims to protect genuine asylees, it can also create favorable circumstances for ineligible individuals who seek to file fraudulent claims” and the GAO reported that asylum officers “in seven of the eight asylum offices we spoke with told us that they have granted asylum in cases in which they suspected fraud.” 93 89 See generally, DOJ, Press Release, “Brooklyn Attorneys Sentenced For Asylum Fraud Scheme”, Press Release, “SoCal Immigration Consultants Sentenced to Prison in Scheme That Filed Bogus Asylum Applications for Hundreds of Chinese Nationals” (May 6, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/socal-immigration-consultants-sentenced-prison-scheme-filed-bogus-asylum-applications; DOJ, Press Release, “Three Defendants Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court for Roles in Immigration Asylum Fraud Scheme” (Mar. 14, 2014), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2014/three-defendants-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-for-roles-in-immigration-asylum-fraud-scheme; DOJ, Press Release, “Florida Resident Charged in Scheme to Submit Fraudulent Asylum Applications” (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/florida-resident-charged-scheme-submit-fraudulent-asylum-applications; DOJ, Press Release, “Executives of Immigration Services Company Charged in Scheme to Submit Fraudulent Asylum Applications” (Oct. 11, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/executives-immigration-services-company-charged-scheme-submit-fraudulent-asylum; DOJ, Press Release, “Twenty-Six Individuals, Including Six Lawyers, Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Participating in Immigration Fraud Schemes Involving Hundreds of Fraudulent Asylum Applications” (Dec. 18, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/twenty-six-individuals-including-six-lawyers-charged-in-manhattan-federal-court-with-participating-in-immigration-fraud-schemes-involving-hundreds-of-fraudulent-asylum-applications; DOJ, Press Release, “Middlesex County, New Jersey, Man Admits Attempting to Obtain United States Citizenship by Fraud” (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/middlesex-county-new-jersey-man-admits-attempting-obtain-united-states-citizenship-fraud; DOJ, Press Release, “Broward Woman Charged in Scheme to Submit Fraudulent Asylum Applications” (Mar. 12, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/broward-woman-charged-scheme-submit-fraudulent-asylum-applications. 90 See generally, USCIS, Press Release, “Phony Immigration Attorney Who Filed Hundreds of Fraudulent Asylum Applications Sentenced to More Than 20 Years in Federal Prison” (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/phony-immigration-attorney-who-filed-hundreds-of-fraudulent-asylum-applications-sentenced-to-more; DOJ, Press Release, “Thai National Admits to Running Immigration Fraud Scheme” (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/pr/thai-national-admits-running-immigration-fraud-scheme. 91 GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, “Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address Fraud Risks” (Dec. 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-50.pdf. 92 GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, “Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address Fraud Risks” (Dec. 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-50.pdf. 93 GAO Report, “Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address Fraud Risks” (Dec. 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-50.pdf. This is not a new revelation. As the former INS Commissioner noted in 2000 regarding the asylum reforms, “By 1993, the asylum system was in a crisis, having become a magnet for abuse by persons filing applications in order to obtain employment authorization.” 94 Even more telling, during the same period, incentives to abuse the asylum system reemerged as well. The number of EADs approved for aliens with asylum applications pending for more than 180-days increased from 55,000 in FY 2016 to 270,000 in FY 2022. This increase in EAD approvals may suggest that meritless asylum applications, filed for the purpose of obtaining work authorization, have increased alongside asylum application processing times. 95 94 DOJ, News Release “Asylum Reform: Five Years Later” (Feb. 1, 2000), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/news/Asylum.pdf. 95 Doris Meissner, Faye Hipsman, & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward” Migration Policy Institute, (Sept. 2018). All told, a myriad of factors contributed to the size and growth of the backlog, which then feeds abuse of the system. There were certainly external factors. Over the past decade, USCIS, along with other DHS components, have been substantially taxed due to a surge of aliens attempting to enter the United States at and between ports of entry and expressing a fear of returning to their home countries, thereby requiring a credible fear or reasonable fear screening. Starting in 2014, USCIS saw a surge in affirmative asylum filings. In 2012, the Asylum Division received approximately 3,000 applications per month. 96 By FY 2014, that number doubled, reaching 6,000 filings per month and steadily grew until the peak in March 2017. 97 A 2020 Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman's Report found “Total apprehensions of inadmissible aliens at the Southern border, after reaching an all-time high of 1.6 million in FY 2000, rose again from 444,859 in FY 2015 to 977,509 in FY 2019.” 98 96 USCIS, “Affirmative Asylum Statistics: July, August and September 2014” (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_Affirmative_Asylum_July_August_September_2014.pdf. 97 Id. 98 CIS Ombudsman's Report 2020, at 43. Additionally, COVID-19 exacerbated existing problems. On March 18, 2020, USCIS suspended routine in-person services to help slow the spread of COVID-19. 99 “This included USCIS asylum offices and ASCs used for collecting biometrics. On average, USCIS asylum offices conduct between 2,000 to 4,500 interviews a month; these interviews were not taking place during the period the offices remained closed.” 100 99 USCIS, “USCIS Temporarily Closing Offices to the Public March 18-April 1” (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-temporarily-closing-offices-to-the-public-march-18-april-1. 100 CIS Ombudsman's Report 2020, at 47. USCIS policy and processing changes also led to growth in the backlog. INS developed “Last-in, First-out” (LIFO) processing in the mid-1990s. The LIFO system is designed to allow employment authorization for asylum seekers while discouraging aliens from potentially filing meritless asylum applications to take advantage of the backlog to obtain employment authorization during the period in which their cases are pending in the backlog. In other words, by giving priority to the newest cases, the intent was that aliens who may have filed asylum applications solely to obtain work authorization would have their cases heard more quickly and denied during the waiting period, meaning that any efforts to file solely to obtain work authorization would be fruitless. LIFO remained in place for years. Then on December 26, 2014, USCIS began prioritizing working affirmative asylum cases in the order which they were received; this “First-In, First-Out” (FIFO) processing was a deviation from past agency practice. 101 As a result of this change the asylum backlog grew more than 1750 percent between 2013 and 2018. 102 As such, to “stem the growth of the agency's asylum backlog” and “deter those who might try to use the existing backlog as a means to [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2026-03595. Public record. Not legal advice.