# Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2024-29699

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Rule
- **Published:** December 30, 2024
- **Citation:** 89 FR 106768

## Text

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
12 CFR Parts 1005 and 1026
[Docket No. CFPB-2024-0002]
RIN 3170-AA42
Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions

AGENCY:

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

ACTION:

Final rule; official interpretation.

SUMMARY:

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) amends Regulations E and Z to update regulatory exceptions for overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions, thereby ensuring that these extensions of overdraft credit adhere to consumer protections required of similarly situated products, unless the overdraft fee is a small amount that only recovers estimated costs and losses. The rule allows consumers to better comparison shop across credit products and provides substantive protections that apply to other consumer credit.

DATES:

Effective date:
October 1, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

George Karithanom, Regulatory Implementation and Guidance Program Analyst, Office of Regulations, at 202-435-7700 or
https://reginquiries.consumerfinance.gov/.
If you require this document in an alternative electronic format, please contact
CFPB_Accessibility@cfpb.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Overview

A. Summary

B. Market Background

II. The Proposal and Other Procedural Background

A. Outreach and Engagement

B. Summary of the Proposed Rule

III. Legal Authority

A. Truth in Lending Act

B. Electronic Fund Transfer Act

C. Consumer Financial Protection Act

IV. Discussion of the Final Rule

A. Overview of the CFPB's Approach

B. Entity Coverage

C. Transaction and Account Coverage

D. Changes to Definition of “Finance Charge”

E. Changes to Covered Overdraft Credit Offered by Very Large Financial Institutions

V. Effective and Compliance Date

VI. Other Comments

A. Possible Alternative or Additional Requirements

B. Usury Limits

C. Other Comments Regarding Statutory Authority

D. Data Supporting Application of Regulation Z to Overdraft

E. Implications for Other Laws

VII. CFPA Section 1022(b) Analysis

A. Overview

B. Data Limitation and Quantification of Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

C. Baseline for Analysis

D. Comments Received

E. Potential Benefits and Costs to Consumers and Covered Persons

F. Potential Benefits and Costs to Consumers and Covered Persons of Further Provisions of the Proposed Rule

G. Potential Impacts on Depository Institutions and Credit Unions With $10 Billion or Less in Total Assets, as Described in CFPA Section 1026

H. Potential Impacts on Consumer Access to Credit and on Consumers in Rural Areas

VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

IX. Paperwork Reduction Act

X. Congressional Review Act

XI. Severability

I. Overview

A. Summary

The CFPB is updating non-statutory exceptions in Regulations Z and E that have allowed very large financial institutions to avoid statutory consumer credit protection requirements when extending certain overdraft credit.
1

1
When amending commentary, the Office of the Federal Register requires reprinting of certain subsections being amended in their entirety rather than providing more targeted amendatory instructions. The sections of regulatory text and commentary included in this document show the language of those sections. In addition, the CFPB is releasing an unofficial, informal redline to assist industry and other stakeholders in reviewing the changes to the regulatory text and commentary of Regulation E and Regulation Z. This redline may be found on the CFPB's website. If any conflicts exist between the redline and the text of Regulation E or Regulation Z, its commentary, or this rule, the documents published in the
Federal Register
are the controlling documents.

Consumer credit is subject to Regulation Z if the creditor imposes a finance charge, which generally includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.
2

However, when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) first adopted Regulation Z in 1969,
3

it excepted from Regulation Z's definition of finance charge any charges for honoring checks that overdraw a checking account unless the payment of the check and imposition of the fee were previously agreed upon in writing. The Board subsequently made “minor editorial changes” to this exception,
e.g.,
to reflect “items that are similar to checks, such as negotiable orders of withdrawal.”
4

This exception is unique to credit extended to pay account overdrafts; other consumer credit products with similar features, such as short term repayment, are subject to Regulation Z.

2
Consumer credit is also subject to Regulation Z in other circumstances.
See, e.g.,
12 CFR 1026.1(c).

3
34 FR 2002 (Feb. 11, 1969).

4
46 FR 20848, 20855 (Apr. 7, 1981).

This exception was evidently intended to allow banks to continue providing limited overdraft services as a courtesy to consumers who inadvertently overdrew their account, without the banks complying with Regulation Z. In the early years of the regulation, decisions to pay an item that overdraws an account instead of returning it unpaid were made as a relatively infrequent part of administering asset accounts. At the time, consumers typically withdrew funds from their bank accounts through in-person withdrawals or by writing checks. If a consumer mistimed when funds from a check deposit would be available for withdrawal
5

and inadvertently overdrew their account and the overdrawing check were returned unpaid, the bank would typically charge the consumer a nonsufficient funds (NSF) fee and the consumer could be subject to additional fees imposed by the payee and other negative consequences from bounced checks. If, instead of returning the check, the financial institution paid it notwithstanding the unavailable or insufficient funds in the account, such courtesy payment could provide a benefit to the consumer, who would avoid the negative consequences of a bounced check without being charged any additional fees beyond an amount that did not exceed the amount charged for nonsufficient funds.

5
In 1987, Congress enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act (12 U.S.C. 4001
et seq.
) to provide depositors of checks with prompt funds availability and to foster improvements in the check collection and return processes.
See
82 FR 27552, 27552 (June 15, 2017). Section 229.2(d) of Regulation CC (12 CFR 229), which implements that act, defines “available for withdrawal.”

Over the last 30 years, in conjunction with widespread financial institution adoption of information technology systems as well as the expansion of debit card transactions that can overdraw an account, overdraft credit products provided under the exception have morphed from an occasional courtesy provided to consumers into frequently used and promoted products that increase costs to consumers (in certain instances) and generate a substantial portion of the direct fee revenue that financial institutions make from checking accounts (and much of the total revenue that financial

institutions make from low-balance accounts). The volume of overdrawing transactions and related revenue rose drastically over the years, including on transactions where the consumer may have otherwise suffered no negative consequences if the transaction were declined. Since the CFPB focused substantial enforcement and supervision attention on overdraft fees in 2021, overdraft fee revenue has contracted somewhat. However, it is still a source of billions of dollars in profits every year, and most very large financial institutions continue to charge $35 per overdraft transaction today. Financial institutions today generally make pay/no-pay decisions in advance—for example, by setting overdraft limits that the consumer may not be aware of and using information technology systems to make automated pay/no-pay decisions. They sometimes calibrate these systems with the goal of generating fee revenue. Because of these market changes, which increase the risk that a consumer will unwittingly incur high overdraft fees, helping consumers make informed decisions about overdraft credit has become a much more serious concern.

Key Changes

Given these changes over the past 30 years and consistent with TILA's purpose of promoting the informed use of credit, the CFPB is updating several non-statutory exceptions in Regulation Z to extend consumer credit protections that generally apply to other forms of consumer credit to certain overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions. These changes will allow consumers to better compare certain overdraft credit to other types of credit and will provide consumers with several substantive protections that already apply to other consumer credit.

These amendments apply only to very large financial institutions—
i.e.,
insured depository institutions and credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets. The rule does not change the regulatory framework for overdraft services offered by financial institutions with assets of $10 billion or less. The CFPB plans to monitor the market's response to this rule before determining whether to alter the regulatory framework for financial institutions with assets less than or equal to $10 billion.

Under this final rule, Regulation Z will generally apply to overdraft credit provided by very large institutions unless it is provided at or below costs and losses as a true courtesy to consumers. The final rule accomplishes this result by updating two regulatory exceptions from the statutory definition of finance charge. First, the final rule updates an exception that currently provides that a charge for overdraft is not a finance charge if the financial institution has not previously agreed in writing to pay items that overdraw an account.
6

The rule narrows this exception to no longer apply to “above breakeven overdraft credit” offered by a very large financial institution, which generally means that profit-generating overdraft fees charged by very large financial institutions would no longer be excepted from TILA. The final rule gives financial institutions the ability to determine whether an overdraft charge is considered above breakeven overdraft credit by either: (1) calculating its own costs and losses using a standard set forth in the rule; or (2) relying on a benchmark fee of $5. Second, the final rule updates a related exception that provides that a charge imposed on an asset account in connection with an overdraft credit feature is not a finance charge if the charge does not exceed the charge for a similar transaction account without a credit feature.
7

The updates clarify what is and is not a comparable charge in light of changes finalized in this rule.

6
12 CFR 1026.4(c)(3).

7
12 CFR 1026.4(b)(2).

In the proposal, the CFPB presented four alternatives for the benchmark fee described above—$3, $6, $7, and $14—to solicit public comment on what data the CFPB should consider when calculating the fee. In the final rule, the CFPB will apply the same approach used to derive the proposed $3 benchmark fee. However, the final rule increases the $3 benchmark fee to $5 to account for additional costs noted by commenters, such as costs relating to overdraft notices, branch servicing, collection, core providers/vendors, compliance, and technology. As a result of this final rule, above breakeven overdraft credit that is not currently subject to Regulation Z will become subject to Regulation Z, including provisions in subpart B that govern open-end credit (
e.g.,
annual percentage rate disclosures, other account opening disclosures, periodic statements, and advertising rules), on the effective date of this rule. For ease of reference, this final rule generally refers to overdraft credit that is not subject to Regulation Z as non-covered overdraft credit and overdraft credit that is subject to Regulation Z as covered overdraft credit. Above breakeven overdraft credit is currently a type of non-covered overdraft credit, but it will become covered overdraft credit when this final rule becomes effective on October 1, 2025.

The final rule also requires covered overdraft credit offered by very large financial institutions to be put in a credit account separate from the asset account, and it updates exceptions relating to credit cards. Among other changes, it applies the portions of Regulation Z that implement the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act)
8

to covered overdraft credit that can be accessed by a hybrid debit-credit card, such as a debit card or other single credit device (including certain account numbers) that a consumer may use from time to time to obtain covered overdraft credit from a very large financial institution. Provisions of the CARD Act that will apply to such overdraft credit include, but are not limited to, ability to pay underwriting requirements, limitations on penalty fees including certain fees on transactions that are declined due to nonsufficient funds, and various requirements related to rate changes.

8
Public Law 111-24; 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).

The final rule will also prohibit compulsory use of preauthorized electronic fund transfers (EFTs) for repayment of covered overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions. This change will ensure that consumers using those products have a choice of at least one alternative method of repayment. As a result of this change, covered overdraft credit offered by very large financial institutions cannot be conditioned on consumers agreeing to automatic debits from their checking account. Consumers could still opt into automatic payments on a periodic basis if offered by their financial institution, but they will have the right to repay this overdraft credit manually if they prefer.

The final rule will take effect on October 1, 2025. This effective date is more than six months after the date the rule is published in the
Federal Register
, consistent with 15 U.S.C. 1604(d).

B. Market Background

1. Overview of Overdraft Credit

An overdraft occurs when consumers do not have a sufficient balance in their asset account to pay a transaction, but the financial institution pays the transaction anyway. Typically, the financial institution pays an overdraft transaction by either transferring the consumer's own funds from another asset account held by the financial institution, such as a savings account, or

by extending overdraft credit (
i.e.,
using the financial institution's own funds and requiring the consumer to repay).

Currently, not all overdraft credit is subject to Regulation Z. For example, when the Board first adopted Regulation Z in 1969,
9

it excepted from Regulation Z's coverage charges for honoring checks that overdraw a checking account unless the payment of the check and imposition of the fee were previously agreed upon in writing. A Board official interpretation stated that this exception for ad hoc credit decisions applies only to “regular demand deposit accounts which carry no credit features and in which a bank may occasionally, as an accommodation to its customer, honor a check which inadvertently overdraws that account.”
10

The Board subsequently adopted commentary excluding debit cards with no credit agreement from Regulation Z's definition of “credit card.”
11

While the Board did not explain this exception, it appears it was intended to exclude discretionary overdraft services from being subject to Regulation Z when they are accessed by a debit card, consistent with the exclusion for overdraft charges from the definition of finance charge.
12

9
34 FR 2002 (Feb. 11, 1969).

10
42 FR 22360, 22362 (May 3, 1977).

11
46 FR 50288, 50293 (Oct. 9, 1981) (providing that a “credit card” does not include “[a] check-guarantee or debit card with no credit feature or agreement, even if the creditor occasionally honors an inadvertent overdraft”);
see also
Regulation Z comment 2(a)(15)-2.ii.A.

12
Under Regulation Z, an issuer of a credit card can be a creditor regardless of whether the credit is subject to a finance charge. 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(17)(iii);
see also
12 CFR 1026.2(a)(7) (defining “card issuer”). Thus, without the 1981 exception, a financial institution that extends overdrafts could be a “creditor” for purposes of subpart B of TILA even with an exemption of overdraft fees from the finance charge.

Some overdraft credit is previously agreed upon in writing and is currently covered by Regulation Z. Such covered overdraft credit enables consumers to link a checking account to a credit account, like an overdraft line of credit or a credit card, from which funds are transferred automatically to pay transactions when the checking account balance is insufficient to pay them. Some financial institutions charge a fee, often referred to as an overdraft protection transfer fee, for these transfers.
13

Financial institutions may assess such a fee once per day that a transfer is made, once to transfer a round dollar value increment (
e.g.,
a fee for $100 transferred to cover any overdraft(s) less than $100), or, less commonly, once per overdraft transaction;
14

however, since late 2021, in the wake of substantial CFPB enforcement and supervising attention on overdraft fees, a number of financial institutions have voluntarily eliminated such fees.
15

Credit accounts used to cover overdrafts also carry an interest rate applied to the outstanding balance. Repayment of the overdrawn amount and interest is typically made periodically according to a payment schedule. The ability to obtain and use covered overdraft credit is typically limited to consumers whose credit history allows them to qualify for an overdraft line of credit or who have available credit on a credit card.

13
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (CFPB),
CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs: A white paper of initial data findings,
at 55 (June 2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf
(CFPB 2013 White Paper) (noting 28 of a sample of 33 large institutions charged a transfer fee in 2012, ranging from $3 to $20 per transfer, with a median of $10, while smaller institutions charged a median of $5).

14

Id.

15
Between December 2022 and July 2023, CFPB reviewed publicly available information describing the overdraft-related practices of very large financial institutions (CFPB Market Monitoring of Publicly Available Overdraft Practices, Dec. 2022-July 2023).

Financial institutions may also pay overdrafts through currently non-covered overdraft credit, where the financial institution typically pays overdrafts up to certain limits but does not agree in advance to pay the overdrawn transactions, reserving discretion to decline any given overdraft transaction. This type of overdraft credit is currently non-covered overdraft credit because it is currently not subject to Regulation Z. This final rule may also refer to currently non-covered overdraft credit as an overdraft service, overdraft services, or an overdraft program. With certain exceptions provided for by internal policies, the financial institution typically assesses a flat fee for each overdraft transaction the financial institution pays. In addition, some financial institutions charge an additional fee or fees, known as extended or sustained overdraft fees, if the consumer does not bring the account back to a positive balance within a specified period. To collect repayment of the funds advanced to cover overdraft transactions as well as payment of the fees assessed, the financial institution typically deducts those amounts as a lump sum from the consumer's next incoming deposit(s), usually within three days after the account became overdrawn.
16

16
Trevor Bakker et al., CFPB,
Data Point: Checking account overdraft,
at 5, 22 (July 2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_report_data-point_overdrafts.pdf
(CFPB 2014 Data Point).

Financial institutions typically provide non-covered overdraft credit for certain transaction types—primarily checks, automated clearinghouse (ACH) transactions, and recurring debit card transactions—as a default, up to certain coverage limits. For one-time (non-recurring) debit card and ATM transactions, financial institutions cannot assess overdraft fees for paying such transactions without first obtaining the consumer's opt-in following the process required by Regulation E 12 CFR 1005.17(b).

Financial institutions employ a number of different practices and policies when making pay/return decisions in connection with non-covered overdraft.
17

While, as noted above, overdraft credit must technically be discretionary to be excepted from Regulation Z, in practice, financial institutions typically assign each account an overdraft coverage limit representing the maximum amount of overdraft coverage the financial institution will extend on the account. Once an account reaches its overdraft coverage limit, the financial institution will no longer pay transactions into overdraft and will return those transactions unpaid. Overdraft coverage limits may be static (
i.e.,
the financial institution assigns an unchanging limit to each customer) or dynamic (
i.e.,
the financial institution changes the limit for each account periodically based on account usage patterns, market conditions, or account and accountholder characteristics in an attempt to manage more precisely credit risk, overdraft program revenues, and customer retention).
18

Financial institutions that use static limits sometimes communicate those limits to account holders, while financial institutions that use dynamic limits generally do not communicate those limits to account holders.

17
CFPB 2013 White Paper at 48-52.

18
Common account and account holder characteristics include account tenure, average balance, overdraft history, and deposit patterns, as well as other relationships the accountholder may have with the institution.

Historically, financial institutions have charged an NSF fee when they reject, rather than pay, transactions initiated by check or ACH or other electronic payments; in contrast, financial institutions have rarely if ever charged an NSF fee when declining a one-time debit card purchase or an ATM withdrawal.
19

Financial institutions typically have charged the same amount

for an NSF fee as for a non-covered overdraft fee.
20

As noted in part I.B.3, many financial institutions have eliminated NSF fees over the past three years.

19
The CFPB is aware that some prepaid card providers charge NSF fees on one-time purchase transactions, based on fees disclosed in the CFPB's publicly-available prepaid account agreement database.

20

See Consumers Guide to Banking: Staff Report on Commercial Bank Charges in the New York and Washington, DC Metropolitan Area,
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 10-11 tbl.3 (1976) (Senate Staff Report);
see also
70 FR 8428, 8429 (Feb. 18, 2005) (“Regardless of whether the overdraft is paid, institutions typically charge the NSF fee when an overdraft occurs.”); 74 FR 59033, 59035 (Nov. 17, 2009) (“Second, a consumer will generally be charged the same fee by the financial institution whether or not a check is paid; yet, if the institution covers an overdrawn check, the consumer may avoid other adverse consequences, such as the imposition of additional merchant returned item fees.”); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC),
2008 FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs,
at 16 n.18 (Nov. 2008),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/FDIC138_Report_Final_v508.pdf
(FDIC 2008 Study) (“For most of the survey population operating automated programs, the per-item fee charged when items were paid under automated overdraft programs was the same as the fee charged by the bank on NSF items that it did not pay. These two fees were equal to each other for 98.1 percent of 451 institutions reporting the two fee items.”).

2. Evolution and Growth of Non-Covered Overdraft

Non-covered overdraft credit started as a courtesy that individuals within financial institutions provided when they would decide on an ad hoc basis to pay particular check transactions into overdraft rather than returning those checks unpaid.
21

This courtesy would help consumers avoid NSF fees, merchant fees, and other negative consequences from bounced checks. Over time, non-covered overdraft credit began to move away from that historical model, as financial institutions shifted to a system involving heavy reliance on automated programs to process transactions and to make overdraft decisions.
22

Financial institutions also began to extend overdraft credit to debit card transactions, even though a declined debit card transaction did not pose the same risk to consumers of an NSF fee, a merchant fee, or certain other consequences associated with a bounced check.
23

Over time, debit card transactions became more numerous than checks, increasing the number of transactions that could generate overdrafts, with typical debit card transactions involving smaller amounts than typical check transactions.
24

Even as transaction processing and overdraft decisioning became more automated and overdraft transactions increased in frequency and decreased in size, financial institutions increased the size of overdraft fees. In 1976, when the process was typically manual and included only checks, one survey of banks in Washington, DC, and the New York metro area found that the median fee was $5, while some banks charged zero.
25

By 1994, concern had risen about the increase in the average fee to over $15 ($5.77 in 1976 dollars);
26

by 2000, the average had surpassed $20 ($6.61 in 1976 dollars) and continued to increase thereafter.
27

21

See
42 FR 22360, 22362 (May 3, 1977) (describing the exception from Regulation Z as applying when overdraft is provided “as an accommodation . . . honoring a check which inadvertently overdraws that account.”);
see also Federal Reserve Board Staff Opinion Letter No. 948
(Nov. 17, 1975) (explaining that the exception “relates only to regular demand deposit accounts which carry no credit feature and in which a bank may occasionally, as an accommodation to its customer, honor a check which inadvertently overdraws that account”).

22

See
74 FR 59033, 59033 n.1 (Nov. 17, 2009) (citing
FDIC's Study of Bank Overdraft Programs
(Nov. 2008), which found that nearly 70 percent of banks surveyed implemented their automated overdraft program after 2001).

23

See id.
at 59035;
see also id.
at 59034 n.6 (citing
Overdraft Protection: Fair Practices for Consumers: Hearing before the House Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, House Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Cong., at 72 (2007)) (“noting that as recently as 2004, 80 percent of banks still declined ATM and debit card transactions without charging a fee when account holders did not have sufficient funds in their account”).

24
Federal Reserve Payments Studies from 2004 to 2013 (exhibit 1 in each study) show that from 2000 to 2012, annual debit card transactions increased from 8.3 billion to 47 billion, while annual check transactions decreased from 41.9 billion to billion to 18.3 billion. By 2008, debit card transactions exceeded the number of checks.
See
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (FRS),
Federal Reserve Payments Study (FRPS)—Previous Studies, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/frps_previous.htm
(last updated Nov. 13, 2024);
see also
FRS,
The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study,
at 9 ex.2 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.frbservices.org/binaries/content/assets/crsocms/news/research/2013-fed-res-paymt-study-summary-rpt.pdf
(showing the average debit card transaction ranged from $37 to $40 from 2003-2012, while the average check transaction ranged from $1,103 to $1,410). The CFPB has found that the median transaction amount that leads to an overdraft fee in the case of debit card transactions is $24, while the median check and ACH transactions that lead to overdraft fees are $100 and $90, respectively.
See
CFPB 2014 Data Point at 5;
see also
Fin. Health Network (FHN),
Responding to Reform: Overdraft in 2023
(Oct. 8, 2024),
https://finhealthnetwork.org/research/responding-to-reform-overdraft-in-2023/
(FHN Brief 2024) (finding almost half (45 percent) of overdrafters reported that their most recent overdraft occurred on a transaction of $50 or less).

25
Senate Staff Report at 10-11.

26

See Bank Fees Associated with Maintaining Depository, Checking, and Credit Card Accounts,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins., Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 73 tbl.3 (1993) (Testimony by Susan M. Phillips, Member, FRS) (showing average overdraft fee of over $15 in 1993);
see also id.
at 95-96, 101-102 (Statement of Chris Lewis, Dir. of Banking and Hous. Pol'y, Consumer Fed'n of Am.) (noting concerns about the rise in the size of “bounced check fees”, a term the organization used to describe the fee assessed when funds were insufficient, whether the transaction was returned unpaid or paid into overdraft).

27
Gov't Accountability Off.,
Bank Fees: Federal Banking Regulators Could Better Ensure That Consumers Have Required Disclosure Documents Prior to Opening Checking or Savings Accounts,
at 14 (Jan. 2008),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-281.pdf; see also
FDIC 2008 Study (by 2007, among primarily financial institutions with less than $5 billion in assets, the average fee was $27); CFPB 2013 White Paper at 52 (by 2012, among the nation's largest financial institutions, the average fee was $34).

As a result of these market shifts and operational changes, fee revenue from non-covered overdraft credit began to significantly influence the overall business model for many asset accounts. Financial institutions became less likely to charge consumers upfront monthly checking account fees, which consumers could more easily compare across the market, and instead began to rely heavily on overdraft fees.
28

In essence, the provision of non-covered overdraft credit moved away from its original purpose—paying occasional or inadvertent overdrafts as a courtesy—and became the dominant component of a back-end pricing business model. By 2004, marketwide overdraft revenue was estimated at approximately $10 billion and, by 2009, had increased to an estimated $25 billion.
29

28
CFPB 2013 White Paper at 16-17.

29
CFPB's estimates of marketwide overdraft revenue, before banks with over $1 billion in assets began reporting overdraft/NSF revenue on call reports in 2015, are based on the estimated share of aggregated fee revenue that banks and credit unions reported on call reports that was attributable to overdraft fees. For more details on methodology,
see
Jacqueline Duby et al., Ctr. for Responsible Lending (CRL),
High Cost & Hidden From View: The $10 Billion Overdraft Loan Market
(May 26, 2005),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/ip009-High_Cost_Overdraft-0505.pdf; see also
Leslie Parrish, CRL,
Overdraft Explosion: Bank fees for overdrafts increase 35% in two years,
at 4 (Oct. 6, 2009),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/overdraft-explosion-bank-fees-overdrafts-increase-35-two-years.

3. Non-Covered Overdraft Credit Today

Marketwide overdraft revenue declined following the 2010 implementation of the Board's “opt-in” rule under Regulation E to an estimated $12 billion in 2011, before beginning to increase again.
30

In the several years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, marketwide overdraft revenue was persistent, climbing from an estimated $11.8 billion in 2015 to $12.6 billion in 2019.
31

With the onset of the pandemic

in March 2020, overdraft revenue dropped significantly. The drop was likely primarily due to pandemic-related stimulus payments pushing up average checking account balances, as well as temporarily decreased use of debit cards.
32

In addition, Federal regulators encouraged, and some State regulators encouraged or mandated, financial institutions to offer leniency around imposition of overdraft fees in light of the pandemic.
33

Notwithstanding the trend downward during the pandemic, estimated market wide overdraft revenue exceeded $9 billion in 2020 and 2021.
34

30

Id.

31
CFPB's estimates of marketwide overdraft revenue for 2015 to 2022 extrapolate total overdraft/NSF revenue reported on call reports by banks with over $1 billion in assets to banks with less than $1 billion in assets and to credit unions in order to reach a total marketwide estimate of overdraft/NSF revenue, and then estimate the portion of that combined overdraft/NSF revenue that is attributable to overdraft revenue alone. To extrapolate reported overdraft/NSF revenue to banks with less than $1 billion in assets and to credit unions, the CFPB uses

data collected from core processors for the number of accounts by asset size and the overdraft/NSF revenue per account, and from 2014 call report data for distribution of institutions by asset size, and then assumes that overdraft/NSF revenue at small institutions saw the same growth from 2014 to 2019 as at large banks to arrive at the 2019 estimate. These extrapolations result in estimates where banks with over $1 billion in assets comprise 77.4 percent of marketwide overdraft/NSF revenue, banks with less than $1 billion in assets comprise 7.3 percent of such revenue, and credit unions comprise 15.3 percent of such revenue.
See
Éva Nagypál, Ph.D., CFPB,
Data Point: Overdraft/NSF Fee Reliance Since 2015—Evidence from Bank Call Reports,
at 7 (Dec. 2021),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_overdraft-call_report_2021-12.pdf
(CFPB 2021 Data Point). For the 2022 estimate, the CFPB assumes that banks with assets over $1 billion, banks with assets below $1 billion, and all credit unions represent the same relative portions of total marketwide overdraft/NSF revenue in 2022 as they did in 2019.

32
CFPB 2021 Data Point at 22-24.

33

See
Press Release, FRS, FDIC & Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
Joint Statement on CRA Consideration for Activities in Response to COVID-19
(Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2020/bulletin-2020-19a.pdf;
Press Release, CFPB,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Encourages Financial Institutions and Debt Collectors to Allow Stimulus Payments to Reach Consumers
(Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-encourages-financial-institutions-and-debt-collectors-to-allow-stimulus-payments-to-reach-consumers/; see also, e.g.,
State of Cal. Bus., Consumer Servs. & Hous. Agency,
Guidance to Financial Institutions During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(Mar. 22, 2020),
https://www.bcsh.ca.gov/coronavirus19/dbo_banks.pdf;
Press Release, N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs.,
DFS Issues New Emergency Regulation Requiring New York Regulated Financial Institutions To Provide Financial Relief To New Yorkers Demonstrating Financial Hardship From COVID-19 Pandemic
(Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr202003241.

34

See
discussion of methodology at FN 31.

Beginning in late 2021, a number of large banks began announcing and implementing changes to their overdraft policies.
35

Some banks eliminated overdraft fees altogether or reduced them to $10 or $15 per transaction.
36

Some banks made changes to their policies by expanding their fee waiver policies, including establishing a daily limit of one fee per day even if multiple overdrawing transactions are paid;
37

establishing de minimis negative balance thresholds of $50 or more, within which overdrafts do not result in a fee; and implementing grace periods giving consumers time through the next business day to bring their accounts positive before a fee is assessed.
38

Collectively these changes resulted in a sustained reduction in overdraft revenues as compared to pre-pandemic levels.
39

Marketwide overdraft revenue in 2022 was an estimated $9.1 billion ($7.9 billion in 2019 dollars, a 37 percent drop in real terms).
40

Of that, an estimated $6.16 billion, or 68 percent, was earned by financial institutions with above $10 billion in assets.
41

At the same time, most very large financial institutions eliminated NSF fees.
42

35
Rebecca Borné & Amy Zirkle,
Comparing overdraft fees and policies across banks,
CFPB (Feb. 10, 2022),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/comparing-overdraft-fees-and-policies-across-banks/.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39
CFPB,
Data Spotlight: Overdraft/NSF revenue down nearly 50% versus pre-pandemic levels
(May 24, 2023),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/data-spotlight-overdraft-nsf-revenue-in-q4-2022-down-nearly-50-versus-pre-pandemic-levels/full-report/
(CFPB May 2023 Data Spotlight);
see also
CFPB,
Trends in overdraft/non-sufficient fund (NSF) fee revenue and practices
(Apr. 24, 2024),
https://content.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/trends-in-overdraftnon-sufficient-fund-nsf-fee-revenue-and-practices/
(CFPB April 2024 Data Spotlight) (reflecting data and analysis published periodically from Dec. 1, 2021 to present).

40

See
discussion of methodology at FN 31.

41
Estimated using data from 2022 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Call Reports and methodology discussed at FN 31.

42
CFPB,
Data spotlight: Vast majority of NSF fees have been eliminated, saving consumers nearly $2 billion annually
(Oct. 11, 2023),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/vast-majority-of-nsf-fees-have-been-eliminated-saving-consumers-nearly-2-billion-annually/
(CFPB October 2023 Data Spotlight) (finding that nearly two-thirds of banks with over $10 billion in assets have eliminated NSF fees).

Although there was some overall decline in the charging of overdraft fees, a sizeable majority of banks and credit unions with over $10 billion in assets (
i.e.,
68 percent) continue to charge between $30 and $37 per transaction incurring an overdraft fee, and more than half charge $35.
43

Most financial institutions' policies allow consumers to incur multiple overdraft fees per day. Financial institutions continue charging these high fees even though the fees far exceed institutions' costs and losses associated with providing non-covered overdraft credit. CFPB data collections and outreach have found that the single largest cost or loss to financial institutions associated with overdraft programs is charged-off account balances, which most frequently occur when a consumer's subsequent deposits do not cover the negative balance created by the overdraft(s) and associated fee(s).
44

The CFPB's study of 2011 bank data found that charge-offs were small relative to the fee revenue banks earned through their overdraft programs.
45

Among those banks, charged-off principal account balances due to overdraft programs represented 14.4 percent of the net overdraft fees (not including NSF fees) at those banks.
46

During the first half of 2023, the CFPB collected additional data from several banks, which again showed that charge-offs associated with negative account balances were the largest cost or loss associated with providing overdraft. As discussed further in part IV.D.3, charge-offs amounted to an average of $2 per overdraft transaction, whether or not such transaction incurred an overdraft fee, and an average of $5 per overdraft transaction that incurred an overdraft fee—representing 6 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of the average fee of $32.50 charged by those banks during the period studied.

43
CFPB Market Monitoring of Publicly Available Overdraft Practices, Dec. 2022-July 2023.

44
CFPB 2013 White Paper at 17.

45

Id.

46

Id.

4. Consumer Impact of Overdraft Fees

As cumulative overdraft fee revenue for financial institutions increased before recent reductions, so did the cumulative burden of overdraft fees on consumers, particularly more financially vulnerable consumers. CFPB research found that 79 percent of combined overdraft and NSF fees were paid by 9 percent of consumers who paid more than 10 such fees per year, incurring a median of $380 in these fees in a year.
47

Consumers paying more than 20 such fees in a year accounted for about 5 percent of accounts, while paying over 63 percent of the fees.
48

47
David Low et al., CFPB,
Data Point: Frequent Overdrafters,
at 5 (Aug. 2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_data-point_frequent-overdrafters.pdf
(CFPB 2017 Data Point); CFPB 2014 Data Point at 12 (both analyzing 2011-2012 data).

48
CFPB 2017 Data Point at 5.

High overdraft fees can make it more difficult for consumers to return their account to a positive balance, contributing to account charge-offs, involuntary account closures, and consumers blocked out of the banking system. The CFPB found that the banks with the highest share of accounts with frequent overdrafts tended to have the highest rates of involuntary account closure; conversely, those with the

lowest share of accounts with frequent overdrafts tended to have the lowest rates of involuntary closure.
49

Account closures, in turn, are often reported to account screening consumer reporting agencies, and a negative report from an account screening company may limit a consumer's ability to open an account at a bank or credit union in the future. Negative experiences with overdraft fees likely also discourage many consumers from wanting a bank account at all. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that there were approximately 5.6 million unbanked households in the U.S. in 2023,
50

nearly half of which had a bank account in the past.
51

Of those previously banked households, nearly two-thirds have little or no interest in having a bank account again,
52

with high fees, unpredictable fees, and not enough funds to meet minimum balance requirements among the most cited reasons.
53

49
CFPB 2013 White Paper at 25.

50
FDIC,
2023 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households,
at 1 (Nov. 2024),
https://www.fdic.gov/household-survey/2023-fdic-national-survey-unbanked-and-underbanked-households-report
(FDIC 2023 Unbanked Report).

51

Id.
at 27 tbl.1.3 (47.4 percent of unbanked households previously had a bank account).

52

Id.
at 28 fig.1.7 (47.5 percent of previously banked households are not at all interested in having a bank account, and 17.8 percent are not very interested).

53
FDIC,
2023 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households—Appendix Tables
(November 2024), at 13 tbl.A.8,
https://www.fdic.gov/household-survey/2023-fdic-national-survey-unbanked-and-underbanked-households-appendix-tables
(among previously banked households, 32.8 percent cited bank account fees are too high, 30.6 percent cited bank account fees are too unpredictable, and 43.3 percent cited that they do not have enough money to meet minimum balance requirements).

Consumers can face significant uncertainty about whether they will incur overdraft fees. Though financial institutions may provide disclosures related to their transaction processing, deposit availability, and overdraft assessment policies, these policies can be extraordinarily complex.
54

Even consumers who closely monitor their account balances may not know with certainty when transactions will post to their accounts, whether a particular transaction will be paid or returned unpaid, or whether a particular paid transaction will be deemed an overdraft and assessed an overdraft fee.
55

54

See
Press Release, CFPB,
CFPB Orders Regions Bank to Pay $191 Million for Illegal Surprise Overdraft Fees
(Sept. 28, 2022),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-regions-bank-pay-191-million-for-illegal-surprise-overdraft-fees/; see also
Press Release, CFPB,
CFPB Orders Atlantic Union Bank to Pay $6.2 Million for Illegal Overdraft Fee Harvesting
(Dec. 7, 2023),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-atlantic-union-bank-to-pay-6-2-million-for-illegal-overdraft-fee-harvesting/.

55

Id.; see also
87 FR 66935, 66935-40 (Nov. 7, 2022).

In response to the CFPB's 2022 request for information regarding fees that are not subject to competitive processes that ensure fair pricing, which received over 80,000 responses,
56

overdraft-related fees were by far the most common issue raised. Common concerns included that the fees were unclear or confusing, disproportionate compared to the incidents resulting in the fees, and difficult or impossible to avoid. These concerns were generally consistent with those reflected in complaints about overdraft fees consumers have submitted to the CFPB since its inception in 2011.

56
87 FR 5801 (Feb. 2, 2022).

The CFPB has also studied how consumers who are opted-in to overdraft services on one-time debit card and ATM transactions—and thus subject to overdraft fees on those transactions—fare compared to those who are not opted-in. In total, opted-in accounts incurred more than seven times as many overdraft fees as accounts that were not opted-in.
57

At the account level, opted-in accounts were three times as likely to have more than 10 overdrafts per year as accounts that were not opted-in.
58

And among frequent overdrafters, those who were opted-in appeared similar across a number of dimensions to frequent overdrafters who were not opted-in, but incurred significantly more—at the median, 13 more—overdraft/NSF fees per year.
59

In addition, involuntary account closure was about 2.5 times as likely for consumers who were opted-in than for consumers who were not.
60

57
CFPB 2014 Data Point at 21.

58

Id.
at 13.

59
CFPB 2017 Data Point at 6, 32-33. This dynamic was likely driven primarily by the scenario where a debit card or ATM transaction is authorized against a sufficient balance but then settles against an insufficient balance. A consumer who was not opted-in would have had this transaction approved and assessed no fee. A consumer who was opted-in may have been charged a fee. For discussion of regulatory guidance and CFPB enforcement actions addressing overdraft fees assessed on these “authorize positive, settle negative” transactions,
see
part I.B.5.

60
CFPB,
A Closer Look: Overdraft and the Impact of Opting-In
(Jan. 19, 2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Overdraft-and-Impact-of-Opting-In.pdf
(citing a rate of 6.2 percent in a given year for non-opted-in consumers and 2.5 percent for opted-in consumers, based on calculations using the same large bank data used in CFPB 2014 Data Point).

Consumers whose accounts are frequently overdrawn are typically more financially insecure than those who do not overdraw or who do so infrequently.
61

Compared to non- or infrequent overdrafters, frequent overdrafters tend to have lower incomes and lower end-of-day balances.
62

They are also less likely to have access to alternative credit options: they have lower credit scores, are less likely to have a general purpose credit card, and, if they do have such a card, they have less credit available on it.
63

Black households and Latino households are more likely to incur overdraft fees than white households.
64

61
CFPB has previously used “frequent overdrafters” to describe those who incur more than 10 overdraft/NSF fees in one year and “very frequent overdrafters” to describe those who incur more than 20 overdraft/NSF fees in one year.
See
CFPB 2017 Data Point at 4-5.

62

Id.
at 15-16 (finding that as neighborhood income decreases, overdraft frequency increases);
id.
at 6 (finding that nearly 70 percent of frequent overdrafters had end-of-day balances with medians between $237 and $439, while another 20 percent had median end-of-day balances of $140).
See also
FHN,
Overdraft Trends Amid Historic Policy Shifts
(June 1, 2023),
https://finhealthnetwork.org/research/overdraft-trends-amid-historic-policy-shifts/
(FHN Brief 2023) (finding that households with incomes under $30,000 were twice as likely to report at least one overdraft than those with incomes of $100,000 or more).

63
CFPB 2017 Data Point at 15-16.

64

See
FHN Brief 2023 (finding that 26 percent of Black, 23 percent of Latinx, and 14 percent of White households reported having overdrafted, making Black and Latinx households 1.9 and 1.6 times as likely as White households, respectively, to have overdrafted);
see also
FHN Brief 2024 (finding that 31 percent of Black, 24 percent of Latinx, and 14 percent of White households reported having overdrafted in 2023); Meghan Greene et al., FHN,
FinHealth Spend Report 2022: What U.S. Households Spent on Financial Services During COVID-19,
at 14 (Apr. 2022),
https://finhealthnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FinHealth_Spend_Report_2022_Final.pdf
(finding in a 2021 survey that Black and Latinx households with a savings or checking account were 1.8 and 1.4 times as likely as White households to report having overdrafted);
see also
CFPB,
Overdraft and Nonsufficient Fund Fees,
at 25 (Dec. 2023),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_overdraft-nsf-report_2023-12.pdf
(finding that Black and Hispanic consumers are 69 and 60 percent more likely to reside in a household charged at least one overdraft or NSF fee in the past year).

Further, evidence suggests that millions of accounts with outstanding overdrafts are closed every year, and those former accountholders may have less subsequent access to the formal banking system as a result.
65

65
For example, a 2012 study found that 30 million checking accounts were involuntarily closed from 2001-2005 due to excessive overdrafts, with the former accountholders having limited or no subsequent access to the formal banking system.
See
Dennis Campbell et al.,
Bouncing out of the banking system: An empirical analysis of involuntary bank account closures,
36 J. Banking & Fin. 1224 (2012). The CFPB's supervisory experience suggests that overdraft-related involuntary closures remain prevalent in today's market.

5. Growing Regulatory Concerns About Non-Covered Overdraft Credit

As financial institutions began to evolve the provision of non-covered overdraft away from the historical model and toward increased automation, greater frequency, and higher revenues, Federal regulators expressed increasing consumer protection concerns. In 2001, in declining to issue a requested “comfort letter” for a financial institution's overdraft program, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) stated that overdraft services are extensions of credit and that the associated charges may be “just as burdensome as those imposed on borrowers utilizing other types of high interest rate credit.”
66

In 2002, the Board noted that some non-covered overdraft credit may not be all that different from overdraft lines of credit,
67

and in 2004 the Board stated that further consideration of the need for Regulation Z coverage of overdraft services would be appropriate if consumer protection concerns were to persist.
68

In 2005, the Federal banking agencies issued joint guidance on non-covered overdraft credit noting that “the existing regulatory exceptions [
i.e.,
exceptions in Regulation Z such that it does not apply] were created for the occasional payment of overdrafts, and as such could be reevaluated by the Board in the future, if necessary” and “[w]ere the Board to address these issues more specifically, it would do so separately under its clear [TILA] authority.”
69

In 2009, the Board adopted a rule under Regulation E prohibiting institutions from assessing overdraft fees on one-time debit card and ATM transactions unless the institution obtained the consumer's affirmative consent to such fees (“opt-in rule”).
70

Following the adoption of the Board's rule, the FDIC issued additional supervisory guidance,
71

which advises, among other things, that where transactions overdraw an account by a de minimis amount, the overdraft fee should be eliminated or be reasonable and proportional to the amount of the transaction.
72

66
OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 914, at 6 (Sept. 2001),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2001/int914.pdf.

67
67 FR 72618, 72620 (Dec. 6, 2002). In 2003, the Board noted that “[t]he Board's staff is continuing to gather information on these services, which are not addressed in the final rule.” 68 FR 16185 (Apr. 3, 2003).

68
69 FR 31760, 31761 (June 7, 2004).

69

See
70 FR 9127, 9128-29 (Feb. 24, 2005).

70
74 FR 5212 (Jan. 28, 2009).

71
FDIC,
Final Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance,
FIL-81-2010 (Nov. 24, 2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10081.html.

72

Id.

More recently, in October 2022, the CFPB issued a policy statement stating that the assessment of overdraft fees that consumers would not reasonably anticipate, including overdraft fees on debit card or ATM transactions that are authorized when the consumer's available balance is sufficient to cover the transaction but that later settle against a negative balance due to intervening transactions or complex processes (“authorize positive, settle negative” or “APSN” transactions), likely violates the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA)'s statutory prohibition against unfair practices.
73

In April 2023, the OCC and FDIC issued guidance advising that overdraft fees charged on such transactions raise heightened risk of unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
74

The OCC's guidance also describes certain practices that it notes may help to manage risks associated with overdraft programs, including assisting consumers in avoiding “unduly high costs” in relation to the face value of the item being presented, the amount of their regular deposits, and their average account balances, and implementing fees and practices that bear a reasonable relationship to the risks and costs of providing overdraft programs.
75

73

CFPB Circular 2022-06: Unanticipated Overdraft Fee Assessment Practices,
87 FR 66935 (Nov. 7, 2022). The CFPB, the Board, and the FDIC also highlighted risks related to the imposition of overdraft fees from 2015 to 2018.
See
CFPB,
Supervisory Highlights,
at 8-9 (Winter 2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-winter-2015.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2024) (CFPB Winter 2015 Highlight); FRS,
Interagency Overdraft Services Consumer Compliance Discussion,
Outlook Live presentation slides, at 20-21 (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.consumercomplianceoutlook.org/-/media/cco/Outlook-Live/2016/110916.pdf;
FRS,
Consumer Compliance Supervision Bulletin,
at 12 (July 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/201807-consumer-compliance-supervision-bulletin.pdf
(FDIC 2018 Highlight); FDIC,
Consumer Compliance Supervisory Highlights,
at 2-3 (June 2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/consumercomplsupervisoryhighlights.pdf?source=govdelivery&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
(FDIC 2019 Highlight).

74
OCC,
OCC Bulletin 2023-12, Overdraft Protection Programs: Risk Management Practices
(Apr. 26, 2023),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2023/bulletin-2023-12.html
(OCC Bulletin 2023-12); FDIC,
Supervisory Guidance on Charging Overdraft Fees for Authorize Positive, Settle Negative Transactions,
FIL-19-2023 (Apr. 26, 2023),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2023/fil23019a.pdf.

75
OCC Bulletin 2023-12.

The CFPB has previously established rules governing overdraft credit on prepaid accounts. In 2016, the CFPB amended Regulation Z to provide that prepaid accounts that offer credit features are generally covered under Regulation Z's credit card rules.
76

The CFPB also amended the compulsory use provision under Regulation E to prohibit prepaid card issuers from requiring consumers to set up preauthorized EFTs to repay credit extended through an overdraft credit feature accessible by a hybrid prepaid-credit card.
77

76
81 FR 83934, 83934-35 (Nov. 22, 2016). The CFPB amended the 2016 Prepaid Final Rule in 2017 and 2018.
See
82 FR 18975 (Apr. 25, 2017); 83 FR 6364 (Feb. 13, 2018). The 2016 Prepaid Final Rule and subsequent amendments to that rule are referred to collectively herein as the Prepaid Accounts Rule.

77
81 FR 83934, 83935-36 (Nov. 22, 2016).

In applying Regulation Z to overdraft credit features on prepaid accounts, the CFPB noted that the term “credit” in TILA includes “the right to . . . incur debt and defer its payment”
78

and explained that that definition “covers the situation when a consumer makes a transaction that exceeds the funds in the consumer's account and a person elects to cover the transaction by advancing funds to the consumer.”
79

The CFPB further stated that overdraft fees on prepaid accounts “generally constitute finance charges, because they are directly payable by the consumer and imposed directly by the creditor as a condition of the extension of credit.”
80

The CFPB also stated that overdraft services offered in connection with prepaid accounts “can be regulated by Regulation Z as a `plan' when the consumer is contractually obligated to repay the debt, even if the creditor retains, by contract, the discretion not to extend credit.”
81

At that time, the CFPB stated that it was continuing to study overdraft services on checking accounts and would propose any further regulatory consumer protections in that space through a separate rulemaking.
82

78
15 U.S.C. 1602(f).

79
81 FR 83934, 84168 (Nov. 22, 2016).

80

Id.
at 84160.

81

Id.

82

Id.
at 84162.

II. The Proposal and Other Procedural Background

A. Outreach and Engagement

The CFPB has engaged in outreach and research related to overdraft fees since soon after the CFPB's inception. In 2012, the CFPB initiated a broad inquiry into overdraft programs for consumer checking accounts.
83

This inquiry included a request for information on

the impacts of overdraft fees on consumers,
84

and collection and analysis of overdraft-related data from several large banks with over $10 billion in assets that provided a significant portion of all U.S. consumer checking accounts.
85

The CFPB published analyses of these data in a series of reports from 2013-2017, which examined institution-level policies and data, as well as account- and transaction-level data.
86

These studies assessed, among other things, overdraft fee size, prevalence, and related account closure; overdraft policies and practices across institutions; the distribution of overdraft fee incurrence across accounts; how overdraft transactions and fees vary across opt-in status; the size of transactions that lead to overdrafts; how long account balances stay negative after overdrafts; and the characteristics of account holders (including end-of-day balance, deposits, credit score, and available credit on a credit card) across distributions of overdraft frequency. The CFPB also collected anonymized institution-level information from several core processors, which provide operations and accounting systems to financial institutions. This data collection informed the CFPB's 2021 report assessing policies and practices among a large sample of financial institutions using core processors.
87

83
Press Release, CFPB,
CFPB Launches Inquiry into Overdraft Practices
(Feb. 22, 2012),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-inquiry-into-overdraft-practices/.

84
77 FR 12031 (Feb. 28, 2012).

85

See
CFPB 2013 White Paper at 8;
see also
CFPB 2014 Data Point at 6-7.

86

See
CFPB 2013 White Paper; CFPB 2014 Data Point; CFPB 2017 Data Point.

87
Nicole Kelly & Éva Nagypál, Ph.D., CFPB,
Data Point: Checking Account Overdraft at Financial Institutions Served by Core Processors
(Dec. 2021),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_overdraft-core-processors_report_2021-12.pdf.

In 2021, the CFPB examined financial institutions' reliance on overdraft/NSF fees from 2015 to 2019, finding that it was persistent.
88

Since then, the CFPB has continued tracking trends in the marketplace
89

and evaluating some banks' key overdraft-related metrics through the CFPB's supervision work.
90

From December 2022 to July 2023, the CFPB reviewed the publicly available overdraft practices of financial institutions with assets over $10 billion.
91

In addition, the CFPB has recently collected information from several financial institutions under the CFPB's supervision, including data regarding financial institutions' costs associated with offering overdraft credit, which is discussed further in part IV.D as well as in a separate report issued in January 2024 titled “Overdraft and NSF Practices at Very Large Financial Institutions.”
92

88
CFPB 2021 Data Point.

89
CFPB April 2024 Data Spotlight.

90

See
Patrick Gibson & Lisa Rosenthal,
Measuring the impact of financial institution overdraft programs on consumers,
CFPB (June 16, 2022),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/measuring-the-impact-of-financial-institution-overdraft-programs-on-consumers/;
CFPB,
Fall 2023 Supervisory Highlights Junk Fees Update Special Edition,
at 7-9 (Oct. 2023),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervisory_highlights_junk_fees-update-special-ed_2023-09.pdf
(CFPB Fall 2023 Highlight).

91
CFPB Market Monitoring of Publicly Available Overdraft Practices, Dec. 2022-July 2023.

92

See
CFPB,
Overdraft and NSF Practices at Very Large Financial Institutions
(Jan. 2024),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_overdraft-nsf-practices-very-large-financial-institutions_2024-01.pdf
(CFPB Overdraft and NSF Practices Report).

Consistent with section 1022(b)(2)(B) of the CFPA, the CFPB has consulted with the appropriate prudential regulators and other Federal agencies, including regarding consistency with any prudential, market, or systemic objectives administered by these agencies. Consistent with the CARD Act, the CFPB consulted with the following agencies regarding rules that implement TILA section 149: (1) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; (2) the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and (3) the National Credit Union Administration Board. The CFPB also consulted with the Board and several other Federal agencies, as discussed in part II.A.

B. Summary of the Proposed Rule

On January 17, 2024, the CFPB issued a notice of proposed rulemaking containing several proposed amendments to Regulations Z and E to extend consumer credit protections that generally apply to other forms of consumer credit to certain overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions. This notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the
Federal Register
on February 23, 2024.
93

The CFPB proposed that the final rule, if adopted, would take effect on the October 1 which follows by at least six months the date it is published in the
Federal Register
, consistent with 15 U.S.C. 1604(d). The CFPB expected that would likely fall on October 1, 2025.

93
89 FR 13852 (Feb. 23, 2024).

As described more fully below, the CFPB proposed to amend Regulations Z and E, and accompanying commentary as they relate to overdraft credit. The amendments would have applied only to very large financial institutions—
i.e.,
insured depository institutions and credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets. The proposal would not change the regulatory framework for overdraft services offered by financial institutions with assets of $10 billion or less.

The CFPB proposed to update two regulatory exceptions from the definition of finance charge so that Regulation Z would apply to overdraft credit provided by very large institutions unless it is provided at or below costs and losses as a true courtesy to consumers, as follows. First, the proposal would have updated an exception that currently provides that a charge for overdraft is not a finance charge if the financial institution has not previously agreed in writing to pay items that overdraw an account
94

so that the exception would not apply to “above breakeven overdraft credit” offered by a very large financial institution. The proposal would have given financial institutions the ability to determine whether an overdraft charge is considered above breakeven overdraft credit by either: (1) calculating its own costs and losses using a standard set forth in the proposal; or (2) relying on a benchmark fee set by the CFPB in the proposal. The CFPB asked for comment on four potential benchmark fees: $3, $6, $7, or $14. Second, the proposal would have updated a related exception that provides that a charge imposed on an asset account in connection with an overdraft credit feature is not a finance charge if the charge does not exceed the charge for a similar transaction account without a credit feature.
95

94
12 CFR 1026.4(c)(3).

95
12 CFR 1026.4(b)(2).

As a result of these proposed changes, above breakeven overdraft credit that is not currently subject to Regulation Z would have become subject to Regulation Z, including provisions in subpart B that govern open-end credit (
e.g.,
the account opening disclosures, periodic statements, and advertising rules).

The proposal would also have required covered overdraft credit offered by very large financial institutions to be put in a credit account separate from the asset account, and it would have updated exceptions relating to credit cards. Among other changes, it would have applied the portions of Regulation Z that implement the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act)
96

to covered overdraft credit that can be accessed by a hybrid debit-credit card, such as a debit card or other single credit device (including certain account numbers) that a consumer may use from time to time to obtain covered overdraft

credit from a very large financial institution. Provisions of the CARD Act that would have applied to such overdraft credit include, but are not limited to, ability to pay underwriting requirements, limitations on penalty fees including certain fees on transactions that are declined due to nonsufficient funds, and various requirements related to rate changes.

96
Public Law 111-24; 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).

The proposal would also have prohibited compulsory use of preauthorized electronic fund transfers (EFTs) for repayment of covered overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions, which would have ensured that consumers using those products have a choice of at least one alternative method of repayment. As a result of this change, covered overdraft credit offered by very large financial institutions could not be conditioned on consumers agreeing to automatic debits from their checking account. Consumers could still opt into automatic payments on a periodic basis if offered by their financial institution, but they would have the right to repay this overdraft credit manually if they prefer.

Comments

The CFPB received over 48,000 comments on the proposal.
97

Over 47,000 of those comments were from individual consumers and over 1,000 were from or about institutions with fewer than $10 billion in assets. The CFPB also received many comments from consumer advocate commenters, academic commenters, industry commenters, State regulators, State Attorneys General, and members of Congress. This also includes comments received after the comment period closed via ex parte submissions and meetings.
98

All comments, including ex parte submissions and summaries of ex parte meetings, will be available on the public docket for this rulemaking.
99

97

See https://www.regulations.gov/docket/CFPB-2024-0002/comments
.

98

See
CFPB,
Policy on Ex Parte Presentations in Rulemaking Proceedings,
82 FR 18687 (Apr. 21, 2017).

99

See https://www.regulations.gov/docket/CFPB-2024-0002/
.

Relevant information received via comment letters, as well as ex parte submissions, is discussed below in subsequent parts of this document, as applicable. The CFPB considered all the comments it received regarding the proposal, made certain modifications, and is adopting the final rule as described in part IV below.

III. Legal Authority

A. Truth in Lending Act

TILA section 105(a).
TILA section 105(a) directs the CFPB to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA and provides that such regulations may contain additional requirements, classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for all or any class of transactions, that the CFPB judges are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of TILA, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
100

A purpose of TILA is to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various available credit terms and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
101

This stated purpose is tied to Congress's finding that economic stabilization would be enhanced and competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
102

Thus, strengthened competition among financial institutions is a goal of TILA, achieved through the effectuation of TILA's purposes. A purpose of TILA is also to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
103

100
15 U.S.C. 1604(a).

101
15 U.S.C. 1601(a).

102

Id.

103

Id.

CARD Act section 2.
Section 2 of the CARD Act, which amended TILA to establish fair and transparent practices relating to the extension of credit under an open-end consumer plan, and for other purposes, also specifically grants the CFPB authority to issue rules and model forms it considers necessary to carry out the CARD Act and amendments made by the CARD Act.
104

104
Public Law 111-24; sec. 2, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735 (2009).

For the reasons discussed in this notice, the CFPB is amending Regulation Z with respect to overdraft credit to carry out TILA's purposes. The CFPB is retaining additional requirements, adjustments, and exceptions as, in the CFPB's judgment, are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of TILA, prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance. In developing these amendments pursuant to its authority under TILA section 105(a), the CFPB has considered the purposes of TILA, including ensuring meaningful disclosures, facilitating consumers' ability to compare credit terms, helping consumers avoid the uninformed use of credit, and protecting consumers against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices, and the findings of TILA, including strengthening competition among financial institutions and promoting economic stabilization.

B. Electronic Fund Transfer Act

EFTA section 902 establishes that the purpose of the statute is to provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in EFT and remittance transfer systems but that its primary objective is the provision of individual consumer rights.
105

Among other things, EFTA contains provisions regarding compulsory use of EFTs.
106

105
15 U.S.C. 1693.

106
15 U.S.C. 1693k.

EFTA section 904(a) authorizes the CFPB to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of EFTA.
107

EFTA section 904(c) provides that regulations prescribed by the CFPB may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments or exceptions for any class of EFTs or remittance transfers, that the CFPB deems necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of EFTA, to prevent circumvention or evasion, or to facilitate compliance.
108

The Senate Report accompanying EFTA noted that regulations are “essential to the act's effectiveness” and “will add flexibility to the act by permitting the [CFPB] to modify the act's requirements to suit the characteristics of individual EFT services. Moreover, since no one can foresee EFT developments in the future, regulations would keep pace with new services and assure that the act's basic protections continue to apply.”
109

107
15 U.S.C. 1693b(a).

108
15 U.S.C. 1693b(c).

109

See
S. Rept. No. 95-1273, at 26 (1978).

EFTA section 904(c) also provides that the “CFPB shall by regulation modify the requirements imposed by this subchapter on small financial institutions if the CFPB determines that such modifications are necessary to alleviate any undue compliance burden on small financial institutions and such modifications are consistent with the purpose and objective of this subchapter.”

As discussed in part IV below, the CFPB is adopting amendments to Regulation E, including with respect to compulsory use of preauthorized repayment and the definition of overdraft services, pursuant to the

CFPB's authority under, as applicable, EFTA section 904(a) and (c).

C. Consumer Financial Protection Act

CFPA section 1022(b)(1).
Section 1022(b)(1) of the CFPA authorizes the CFPB to prescribe rules “as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the [CFPB] to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.”
110

110
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).

Among other statutes, TILA, EFTA, and the CFPA are Federal consumer financial laws.
111

Accordingly, in issuing this rule, the CFPB is exercising its authority under CFPA section 1022(b) to prescribe rules that carry out the purposes and objectives of TILA, EFTA, and the CFPA and prevent evasion of those laws.

111
CFPA section 1002(14), 12 U.S.C. 5481(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law” to include the provisions of the CFPA and enumerated consumer laws; “enumerated consumer laws” is defined in CFPA section 1002(12), 12 U.S.C. 5481(12)).

IV. Discussion of the Final Rule

A. Overview of the CFPB's Approach

As discussed above, the CFPB proposed to amend Regulations E and Z to update regulatory exceptions for overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions, thereby ensuring that extensions of overdraft credit adhere to consumer protections required of similarly situated products, unless the overdraft fee is a small amount that only recovers estimated costs and losses. These consumer protections allow consumers to better comparison shop across credit products and provide substantive protections that apply to other consumer credit.

As a result of the evolution of the overdraft market over the last few decades, the regulatory exceptions for overdraft credit provided by very large financial institutions no longer serve their original purpose. The CFPB proposed preserving a limited exception to encourage the availability of overdraft coverage, which can benefit consumers, especially given that much overdraft credit is incidental in nature, as consumers often do not know with certainty whether a transaction will be presented against sufficient funds. But the proposal stated that a blanket exception for all of today's non-covered overdraft credit—which poses serious risks to consumers as reflected in the discussion of consumer impacts noted above, and resembles other mass-marketed high-cost consumer credit products—cannot be justified as an exception for a courtesy to consumers, nor as consistent with TILA's purposes of promoting the informed use of credit and comparison shopping across credit products, and protecting consumers against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.

The CFPB is adopting the same general approach in the final rule, with some modifications, as discussed herein.

Comments Received on the CFPB's Proposed Approach Generally

Comments received by the CFPB on the proposal, and responses thereto, are discussed in more detail throughout this part IV. The following is a synopsis of comments received on the CFPB's proposed approach generally.

Many of the commenters supported the CFPB's proposal, stating among other things that the rule would reduce fee burdens and associated consequences and support the informed use of credit. These commenters generally focused on negative consumer experiences with overdraft fees, stating that what began as a narrow exception to provide for occasional accommodation now generates billions of dollars in fees from vulnerable populations. A State agency commenter noted that overdraft fees can discourage many consumers from wanting a bank account at all and noted that overdraft fees can deduct funds from a consumer's public benefits, thereby frustrating the purpose of those benefit programs. A consumer advocate commenter noted that some financial institutions are already lowering fees or offering alternative products to meet consumer needs and posited that the CFPB's proposal would continue this progress by supporting market shifts that benefit consumers. Another commenter noted that the proposal continues to offer flexibility to covered entities such that they may offer overdraft as courtesy non-covered overdraft or as a covered overdraft line of credit.

Other commenters, including banks, credit unions, and industry groups, did not support the proposed rule, arguing, for example, that it is unnecessary because overdraft fees are already effectively disclosed consistent with Regulations DD and E, and that consumers find value in overdraft programs and expressly opt into them. Therefore, some argued that the CFPB should further study why consumers sometimes use higher-cost credit options and, in the case of overdraft programs, expressly opt into them, before proposing new regulations to ensure that any changes will achieve their goals. Commenters also emphasized a number of changes to overdraft programs that have already reduced fees in recent years and noted that if the proposal is finalized, financial institutions might pass along costs to consumers by increasing other fees or limiting credit or other services, including the possibility that transactions would not be paid through overdraft credit but would instead be declined or that consumers might migrate to less regulated credit alternatives. Some commenters objected to the CFPB's focus on whether overdraft fees recover more than applicable costs and losses.

B. Entity Coverage

Proposed Rule

The CFPB proposed to expand protections to consumers of overdraft credit at financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. Under the proposal, the regulatory framework would not change for overdraft credit offered by financial institutions with $10 billion or less in assets.

To limit the proposed rule to overdraft credit offered by financial institutions with assets of more than $10 billion, the proposed rule would have defined in proposed § 1026.62(b)(8) the term “very large financial institution” as an insured depository institution or an insured credit union with total assets of more than $10 billion and any affiliate thereof. The proposed rule then used the term “very large financial institution” to limit the scope of overdraft credit that would be subject to the proposed rule.

The CFPB preliminarily determined in the proposal that overdraft services offered by financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets should be subject to this rule. The proposal noted that, in the supervisory context, Congress adopted in 12 U.S.C. 5515(a) a $10 billion threshold to define the “very large banks, savings associations, and credit unions” that would be subject to the CFPB's primary supervision authority. The CFPB preliminarily determined that a $10 billion threshold similarly should be used to define “very large financial institution” for limiting the scope of overdraft credit that would be covered by the proposed rule.

The CFPB preliminarily determined in the proposal that consumers would benefit from a rule that would apply to very large financial institutions—
i.e.,
those with assets of $10 billion or more. The proposal noted that such a rule would increase protections for the overwhelming majority of consumers of overdraft credit. The CFPB noted that the proposed rule would have covered

financial institutions holding approximately 80 percent of consumer deposits as of December 2022
112

and responsible for approximately 68 percent of overdraft charges as of December 2022.
113

The CFPB preliminarily determined that consumers at very large financial institutions would benefit from the expanded protections that would be provided by the proposed rule.

112
Computed from 2022 FFIEC and National Credit Union Administration call report data.

113
Estimated using data from 2022 FFIEC Call Reports and methodology discussed at FN 29.

The CFPB noted that in light of the different circumstances smaller financial institutions may face in adapting to the proposed regulatory framework, the CFPB did not propose to extend the proposed rule to those institutions with $10 billion or less in assets. The CFPB noted that while it did not propose any changes to the regulatory requirements for smaller financial institutions, the CFPB will continue to monitor the market in coordination with State and Federal supervisors.

The CFPB requested comment on its preliminary determination to apply the proposed rule only to very large financial institutions and on whether $10 billion is an appropriate threshold for defining very large financial institutions.

For the reasons discussed below, the CFPB is adopting the very large financial institution definition as proposed.

Comments Received

Several commenters, including several consumer advocates, supported the proposal's approach to apply the rule to very large financial institutions. They stated that the rule would benefit a majority of consumers, that very large financial institutions have greater resources to adapt to regulatory changes, and that the CFPB may need additional time to gather relevant cost data for smaller financial institutions. These commenters recommended that the CFPB take steps to conduct a rulemaking as soon as possible to consider expanding the scope of the rule to entities that are not very large financial institutions (non-VLFIs).

A number of industry commenters maintained that the CFPB did not provide a sufficient justification for applying the rule only to very large financial institutions. The industry commenters criticized on several different grounds the proposed rule's approach to apply the revised regulatory framework only to very large financial institutions.

Some industry commenters stated that the CFPB lacks authority to apply the rule only to very large financial institutions. Several industry commenters maintained that the differential treatment of very large financial institutions would be inconsistent with TILA, stating that the proposed rule did not explain why subjecting smaller financial institutions to the rule would not provide a meaningful benefit to consumers while subjecting very large financial institutions to the rule would provide a meaningful benefit. Other industry commenters stated that the proposal did not consider the five factors for an exemption under section 105(f)(2) of TILA and that the CFPB did not explain why it would be appropriate to define overdraft as credit and an overdraft fee as a finance charge only for very large financial institutions.

Several industry commenters stated that the proposal failed to provide a sufficient explanation for covering only very large financial institutions. The commenters stated that the proposal noted the $10 billion supervisory threshold but did not sufficiently explain why that threshold was relevant for exempting very large financial institutions from the proposed overdraft rule. While these commenters acknowledged that the proposal noted that smaller financial institutions may face “different circumstances,” they maintained that the proposal did not sufficiently explain what those circumstances are and why they are relevant.

Several industry commenters stated that the proposal provided insufficient data to support applying the rule only to very large financial institutions. The commenters stated that data cited in the proposed rule indicated that smaller financial institutions hold only 20 percent of deposits but receive 32 percent of overdraft fees. Commenters stated the CFPB's own data indicate that smaller financial institutions appear to receive similar or greater overdraft fees per account compared to larger financial institutions.

Several industry commenters also maintained that applying the rule only to very large financial institutions would cause consumer confusion and market disruption. The commenters stated that consumers would receive different disclosures based upon the asset size of their financial institution and may not understand the differences among the overdraft programs at different financial institutions.

Several industry commenters expressed concern that the CFPB's proposal to apply the rule only to very large financial institutions avoided the CFPB's SBREFA obligations. Moreover, some commenters argued that the CFPB did not fulfill its obligations with respect to the SBREFA process.

In addition, many non-VLFI industry commenters stated that, even if the rule would not apply to non-VLFIs, they would nevertheless face competitive pressure to alter their overdraft programs and reduce their overdraft fees. They maintained that, because they lack the resources of larger financial institutions, they would have difficulty altering their overdraft programs and reducing their fees to compete with larger financial institutions and may be forced to decrease availability of or discontinue overdraft programs.

Several commenters, including consumer advocates, academic commenters, and State Attorneys General, recommended that the CFPB apply the rule's framework to all financial institutions. They stated that non-VLFIs engage in the same problematic overdraft practices that harm consumers and that all consumers should receive the protections from the rule's overdraft framework. Some commenters stated that many large institutions already have eliminated or reduced their overdraft and NSF fees, whereas most small institutions have not and that the proposed rule therefore would not apply to many of the institutions that are causing significant harm to their consumers through their overdraft programs.

A couple of commenters recommended adjusting the threshold. One consumer advocate supported reducing the threshold to the SBREFA threshold of $850 million, noting that the rule provides multiple pathways for financial institutions to determine breakeven overdraft fees. A few other commenters recommended raising the threshold to $100 billion or more, arguing that the largest financial institutions have the resources to adapt to regulatory changes.

Some commenters, including a consumer advocate and a bank, raised concerns that nonbanks that partner with banks to offer bank accounts could evade coverage under the rule. They stated that large nonbanks could evade the rule by partnering with multiple smaller banks with assets under $10 billion. The consumer advocate stated that some nonbanks offer accounts that they claim are checking accounts exempt from the prepaid rule and its protections applicable to overdraft fees on prepaid cards. The consumer advocate recommended that the CFPB clarify that any such account, even if tied to a bank account, is a prepaid

account. Alternatively, the consumer advocate recommended that the CFPB expand the rule's definition of “very large financial institution” by using the Regulation E definition of “financial institution,” which is broader than depository institutions, and including within the scope of the rule nonbanks that offer accounts in partnership with depository institutions. Otherwise, the consumer advocate stated, nonbanks will partner with one or more smaller financial institutions with less than $10 billion in assets to ensure that their accounts would not be subject to this rule. The consumer advocate stated that nonbanks already are using these partnerships to avoid having to comply with the Durbin Amendment's interchange fee limits.

Final Rule

For the reasons stated in the proposal and below, the CFPB is adopting the very large financial institution definition as proposed to expand protections for consumers of overdraft credit at financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. The rule does not change the regulatory framework for overdraft credit offered at financial institutions with $10 billion or less in assets. The CFPB plans to monitor market responses to the protections adopted in this rule, analyze additional information, and consider whether to apply expanded protections to overdraft credit offered by financial institutions with $10 billion or less in assets. As in the proposed rule, the final rule defines the term “very large financial institution” in § 1026.62(b)(6) as an insured depository institution or an insured credit union with total assets of more than $10 billion and any affiliate thereof. A financial institution may determine whether it has total assets of more than $10 billion using the same determination that is used to determine whether such institutions are subject to the CFPB's supervisory authority under 12 U.S.C. 5515(a). The CFPB currently publishes a list of such institutions at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/supervision-examinations/institutions/
. The final rule uses the term very large financial institution to limit the scope of overdraft credit that is subject to the final rule.

The CFPB has determined that it is appropriate to move forward with a rule that expands protections for consumers of overdraft credit at very large financial institutions. The majority of consumers will benefit from such a rule. As noted above, approximately 80 percent of consumer deposits are at very large financial institutions, and more than two-thirds of overdraft fees were imposed by very large financial institutions. Using its supervision and market monitoring capabilities, the CFPB has observed recent market changes for overdraft programs, especially at very large financial institutions. Many very large financial institutions have altered their overdraft programs and reduced or eliminated overdraft fees without imposing additional fees, indicating that very large financial institutions have the capacity to adapt their overdraft programs without impairing their provisions of other products and services.

By contrast, smaller financial institutions may have less flexibility in adapting to changes in the regulatory framework for overdraft credit. To the extent that changes to the regulatory framework would result in a reduction in overdraft revenue, smaller financial institutions may have greater difficulty in absorbing a reduction in overdraft revenue without it having some impact on their operations, and this impact could negatively affect consumers at smaller financial institutions. Although the CFPB has less information about smaller financial institutions, information from the bank call reports and comments on the proposal indicate that smaller financial institutions currently are more reliant on overdraft revenue under the existing regulatory framework than very large financial institutions. For example, based on 2023 call report data, combined revenue from overdraft and NSF charges was 44 percent of deposit service charges and 4.7 percent of noninterest income for banks with assets between $1 billion and $10 billion, as compared to 19 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively, for banks with assets greater than $10 billion. These data suggest that smaller financial institutions are more reliant on overdraft revenue and may be less able to adapt to a regulatory framework that results in reductions in overdraft revenue. A number of non-VLFI industry commenters claimed that if they were subject to the rule, they would face significant challenges that would cause them to alter or eliminate their overdraft programs and impair their ability to offer other products and services. Moreover, as a consumer advocate commenter noted, smaller institutions may have less flexibility to adjust their product offerings.

As noted above, many very large financial institutions have recently adjusted their overdraft credit programs by, among other things, reducing or eliminating fees. This suggests that very large financial institutions, with their diverse product offerings and multiple sources of revenue, would have flexibility to respond to changes in the regulatory framework for overdraft credit and would be able to adapt to a reduction in fee revenue from non-covered overdraft credit. This also suggests that, if very large financial institutions want to continue offering non-covered overdraft credit that is not subject to Regulation Z after the rule goes into effect, they should be able to reduce their fees to continue providing non-covered overdraft credit. The CFPB has not observed a significant number of smaller financial institutions modifying their overdraft credit offerings to reduce or eliminate overdraft fees. On the contrary, the CFPB received feedback from smaller financial institutions stating that they were not capable of making such changes. Given the CFPB's limited information about the potential impact that revising the regulatory framework for overdraft credit could have on smaller financial institutions, and the consumers that rely on those smaller financial institutions, the CFPB has determined that it should proceed at this time with a rulemaking that narrows the exceptions only for very large financial institutions,
i.e.,
those with assets of $10 billion or more.

As noted above, several industry commenters stated that the CFPB lacks authority under TILA to revise the regulatory framework only for very large financial institutions, maintaining that the proposed rule did not consider the standards for TILA exemptions under section 1604(f). As discussed in more detail elsewhere, including in the section discussing changes to the definition of finance charge, the CFPB is partially removing the existing regulatory exceptions created by the Board, not creating new exemptions from TILA or Regulation Z, and therefore need not invoke its statutory exception or exemption authority. Section 1604(f)(2) starts with the phrase “[i]n determining which classes of transactions to exempt,” and then provides a list of factors that the CFPB would need to consider to justify creating an exemption under that authority. It is not a list of factors the CFPB must consider to justify partially removing an existing exception, which is what this rule does.
114

And the CFPB

is not obligated to justify the portion of the Board's exception that the CFPB is not reversing (the portion applicable to non-VLFIs) using those factors) just because the CFPB is declining at this time to remove that portion of the existing exception due to the policy and prudential reasons described herein. As noted above, the CFPB plans to monitor market responses to the protections adopted in this rule and consider whether to remove the exception as to smaller financial institutions.

114
Section 1604(a) provides that the CFPB may prescribe regulations that contain such adjustments and exceptions for all or any class of transactions that the CFPB judges are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of TILA, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith. The CFPB likewise does not have to invoke this statutory adjustment or exception authority to narrow the scope of an existing exception.

Nevertheless, these changes are also consistent with TILA § 105(a), which grants the CFPB authority to establish “additional requirements, classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for all or any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the [CFPB] are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.” Consistent with the discussion above, the CFPB has determined that covering overdraft credit only from VLFIs in this rule at this time will facilitate compliance with TILA and its purposes by providing the protections of TILA and Regulation Z to the vast majority of consumers of overdraft credit, while the CFPB monitors the market impact of the rule, but not disturbing the status quo for smaller financial institutions that may be less equipped to adapt to such changes without impacting their operations in a manner that could negatively affect their consumers. The CFPB notes that consumers of overdraft credit at smaller institutions will remain covered by the existing regulatory regime.

For similar reasons, the CFPB has determined that the elimination of the regulatory exception to EFTA's compulsory use prohibition only for overdraft credit provided by a VLFI is consistent with EFTA § 904(c), which empowers the CFPB to “provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of electronic fund transfers or remittance transfers as in the judgment of the [CFPB] are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith,” and also to “modify the requirements imposed by [EFTA] on small financial institutions if the Bureau determines that such modifications are necessary to alleviate any undue compliance burden on small financial institutions and such modifications are consistent with the purpose and objective of [EFTA].” The CFPB has determined that, because smaller financial institutions may face difficulty in adapting to these regulatory changes without negatively impacting their consumer base, applying the amendment to the compulsory use exception only to VLFIs in this rule at this time will prevent undue compliance burden on those institutions, facilitate compliance with EFTA, and be consistent with the purpose and objective of EFTA by continuing, for now, the existing regulatory framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in those electronic fund transfer systems while the CFPB monitors the market impact of the rule.

Several industry commenters maintained that the CFPB lacks data for its approach of limiting the applicability of the rule to very large financial institutions, noting that non-VLFIs hold only 20 percent of deposits but receive 32 percent of overdraft fees. As noted above, the CFPB has concluded that it is appropriate to adopt a rule now that covers very large financial institutions because the CFPB has more information about overdraft programs at very large financial institutions and about the capacity for them to adapt to a revised regulatory framework and because such a rule would provide protections to a significant majority of consumers. The CFPB has limited information about the costs for overdraft programs at smaller financial institutions and the cost data that the CFPB relied upon in developing the benchmark fee in § 1026.62(d)(1)(ii) may not be representative of the costs for non-VLFIs. The CFPB is concerned that non-VLFIs would face more significant challenges in adapting to a revised regulatory framework. The CFPB is not basing its decision to apply this rule to VLFIs on material differences in the overdraft programs at very large financial institutions and non-VLFIs.

Several industry commenters also stated that applying the rule only to very large financial institutions would cause consumer confusion and market disruption. They noted that the rule would result in a marketplace in which consumers would receive different disclosures for otherwise similar services based upon the size of the financial institution. The CFPB appreciates that the rule would create some differences in regulatory treatment of overdraft programs in the marketplace. However, the CFPB concludes that the benefits of providing additional protections to most consumers while proceeding cautiously with respect to smaller financial institutions outweighs those concerns. The CFPB plans to monitor market responses to the protections adopted in this rule.

As noted above, a number of industry commenters maintained that the CFPB did not comply with its obligations under the SBREFA process. Several non-VLFI industry commenters maintained that the rule will have a negative impact on their financial condition and their ability to offer overdraft products and other products and services because market pressures will force non-VLFIs to lower their overdraft fees and adjust their overdraft programs even if the rule itself does not require them to do so. Other commenters maintained that the CFPB's decision to remove the existing exception for larger financial institutions but not for smaller financial institutions was designed to circumvent SBREFA. But leaving in place an existing exception for smaller financial institutions is not inconsistent with SBREFA. The CFPB has complied with its obligations under SBREFA. The rule does not require non-VLFIs to comply with the revised regulatory framework, and any competitive pressures to adjust their overdraft programs are indirect and uncertain. It is far from clear that market forces will force non-VLFIs to adjust their overdraft programs. As noted above, many very large financial institutions already have adjusted their overdraft programs, including by reducing or eliminating overdraft fees, but these changes have not forced other non-VLFIs to alter their overdraft programs similarly.

The CFPB has concluded that $10 billion is an appropriate asset threshold for this rulemaking. The CFPB reached the decision to use $10 billion as the threshold by borrowing from Congress's policy judgment to use that threshold to separate very large financial institutions from smaller entities in other contexts in the CFPA. The CFPB also considered the lower threshold of $850 million used by the SBA to define small financial institutions, but decided to take the more prudent and cautious approach of initially finalizing a higher threshold that applies only to “very large” entities and not just “large” entities. Congress used a relatively high $10 billion threshold to define “very large banks, credit unions, and savings associations” for purposes of limiting the CFPB's primary supervision and enforcement authority to very large depository institutions. The CFPB will be able to use its primary supervisory authority to closely monitor the implementation of the rule with respect to these entities, which will aid its understanding of the effects of the rule as the CFPB studies the market to

determine whether and what regulations are appropriate for the rest of the market.

The CFPB has concluded that updating the regulatory framework is appropriate for very large financial institutions for several reasons, including that the CFPB has more information about overdraft credit offered by financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets and about their ability to adapt to changes in the regulatory framework for their overdraft programs. As noted above, financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets have greater diversity in product offerings and likely would have greater flexibility in adapting quickly to a revised regulatory framework for overdraft credit. Indeed, as also noted above, many financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets already have modified their overdraft credit offerings to reduce or eliminate overdraft fees and available evidence indicates that these financial institutions are less reliant on overdraft revenue, indicating that they have the ability to adapt to any reductions in overdraft revenue that may result from these changes to the regulatory framework for overdraft credit.

As noted above, a bank and a consumer advocate raised concerns about nonbanks evading the rule by partnering with smaller banks to offer accounts with overdraft credit. The consumer advocate recommended clarifying that such accounts offered by nonbanks are prepaid accounts subject to the protections of the prepaid rule or, alternatively, revising the definition of “very large financial institution” in this rule to cover nonbanks with more than $10 billion in assets. The CFPB declines to address in this rule whether such accounts would be considered prepaid accounts. The CFPB also declines to revise the definition of “very large financial institution” to include nonbanks. Nevertheless, the CFPB will continue to monitor the market and will analyze whether any market participants are taking steps to evade coverage under the rule.

C. Transaction and Account Coverage

The CFPB proposed to add § 1026.62(a) and (b) to define the scope of transactions and accounts that would be covered under the proposed rule. As discussed below, to update non-statutory exceptions in Regulation Z, the proposed updates included defined terms (
e.g.,
“above breakeven overdraft credit,” “covered asset account,” and “hybrid debit-credit card”) that specifically reference a “very large financial institution,” as defined in proposed § 1026.62(b)(8). The proposal would not change the regulatory framework for overdraft services offered by financial institutions with assets of $10 billion or less.

The proposal defined overdraft credit in proposed § 1026.62(a)(2), and also provided an example of overdraft credit in proposed comment 2(a)(14)-4. The CFPB's proposed rule would have added commentary to the definition of open-end credit in § 1026.2(a)(20) to confirm that overdraft credit that is subject to a finance charge is generally open-end credit and is therefore subject to the Regulation Z provisions that apply to open-end credit. The CFPB proposed definitions of covered overdraft credit and non-covered overdraft credit by adding § 1026.62(b) to assist with ease of reference. The proposal provided that covered overdraft credit would be overdraft credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than four installments, and would be subject to Regulation Z. The proposal provided that non-covered overdraft credit would be overdraft credit that is neither subject to a finance charge nor payable by written agreement in more than four installments, and would not be subject to Regulation Z. Additionally, the CFPB proposed to add a definition for covered overdraft credit account to facilitate ease of reference to credit accounts through which the financial institutions extend or can extend covered overdraft credit. Each of these proposed amendments is discussed below.

1. Overdraft Credit (§§ 1026.2(a)(14) and 1026.62(a))

TILA defines “credit” to mean the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.
115

Regulation Z similarly defines “credit” in existing § 1026.2(a)(14) to mean the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.

115
15 U.S.C. 1602(f).

The CFPB's Proposal

To facilitate compliance, proposed comment 2(a)(14)-4 provided an example of overdraft credit: funds extended by a financial institution to a consumer to pay transactions that overdraw a checking or other transaction account held at the financial institution whenever the consumer has a contractual obligation to repay the funds. The proposal noted, as stated in the 2016 Prepaid Final Rule, that a “person, in extending overdraft funds, has provided the consumer with `the right . . . to incur debt and defer its payment.' ”
116

116
81 FR 83934, 84168 (Nov. 22, 2016).

As part of defining the scope of credit transactions that would be covered under the proposed rule, proposed § 1026.62(a)(2) provided a definition of “overdraft credit”: any consumer credit extended by a financial institution to pay a transaction from a checking or other transaction account (other than a prepaid account as defined in § 1026.61) held at the financial institution when the consumer has insufficient or unavailable funds in that account. Proposed § 1026.62(a)(2) provided non-exhaustive examples, such as consumer credit extended through a transfer from a credit card account or overdraft line of credit. The definition of “overdraft credit” in proposed § 1026.62(a)(2) did not include credit exempt from Regulation Z pursuant to existing § 1026.3.

For the reasons discussed below, the CFPB is adopting comment 2(a)(14)-4 substantially as proposed and is adopting § 1026.62(a) as proposed. The CFPB is also adopting a proposed cross reference to the definition of “overdraft credit” at § 1026.62(b)(7) as proposed but with technical changes to conform to Code of Federal Regulations style requirements.

Comments Received

Several commenters, including State Attorneys General, consumer advocates, and nonprofits, agreed that when a financial institution extends funds to pay transactions that overdraw a checking account held at the financial institution, the financial institution is providing credit. A consumer advocate commenter stated that it is common sense that overdraft is credit and that regulators, including the Board, have long acknowledged that overdraft is credit. For example, the commenter noted that in 2005 the Board—along with the OCC, FDIC, and National Credit Union Administration—issued Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs, which stated that “[w]hen overdrafts are paid, credit is extended.”
117

Among other examples, the commenter also pointed to a 2001 OCC interpretive letter stating that an “overdraft would be `credit,' as defined by the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.”
118

117
70 FR 9127, 9129 (Feb. 24, 2005).

118
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 914 (Aug. 3, 2001).

A nonprofit commenter stated that the TILA statute defines “credit” broadly and does not exclude overdraft. The commenter further stated that when the Board excepted certain overdraft

charges from Regulation Z's definition of “finance charge,” the Board did not rely on an interpretation of the terms “finance charge” or “credit” in the statute (rather, the Board used its authority to create a regulatory exception). A consumer advocate commenter stated that it is immaterial to the definition of “credit” whether the financial institution has previously committed to pay overdrafts or has an absolute right to use every means to collect repayment; rather, “credit” simply means the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.

Several industry commenters asserted that overdraft is not credit under TILA and that TILA does not confer authority upon the CFPB to regulate overdraft. A commenter stated that the term “overdraft” does not appear in TILA's text and that the legislative history is similarly silent on the issue. Some commenters stated that, if the intent of Congress was for overdraft to be subject to TILA, then Congress would have amended TILA to supersede the Board's regulatory exception for overdraft.

Several commenters asserted that in 1969 when the Board excepted discretionary overdraft charges from Regulation Z's definition of “finance charge,” it did so because the Board determined that discretionary overdraft is not “credit.” A commenter asserted that the history of Regulation Z and various Board statements show that discretionary overdraft was never considered to be “credit.” For example, the commenter pointed to a 1977 interpretive letter where Board staff stated that the regulatory exception for overdraft charges “relates only to regular demand deposit accounts which carry no credit features and in which a bank may occasionally, as an accommodation to its customer, honor a check which inadvertently overdraws that account.”
119

119
42 FR 22360, 22362 (May 3, 1977).

Several commenters stated that overdraft is not credit because the financial institution retains the right to decline transactions that would overdraw the account. Some commenters stated that overdraft is not credit because the consumer is obligated to pay the debt within a very short timeframe; for example, commenters pointed to a State court opinion interpreting the Iowa Consumer Credit Code definition of “credit” as not covering overdraft because the consumer “must pay the bank back immediately upon their next deposit.”
120

Some commenters also asserted that overdraft does not involve a written obligation, an interest rate, an application, or an underwriting process and otherwise lacks the hallmarks of credit.

120

Legg
v.
W. Bank,
873 NW 2d 763, 770 (Iowa 2016).

The CFPB received few comments regarding the specific language of proposed comment 2(a)(14)-4 and proposed § 1026.62(a). A consumer advocate commenter generally supported the language of these proposed provisions and made some suggestions. First, in addition to the proposed language referencing a contractual “obligation,” the commenter suggested referencing a contractual agreement regardless of whether the financial institution has agreed to limit its means of recourse if the consumer does not repay. Second, the commenter suggested revisions to reflect the possibility that overdraft credit could be extended by a different entity than the financial institution that holds the account. Third, the commenter suggested referencing an “asset account” rather than a “checking or other transaction account.” Fourth, among other non-exhaustive examples of overdraft credit, the commenter suggested adding a reference to “overdraft services” as defined in Regulation E § 1005.17(a).

Final Rule

For the reasons discussed below, the CFPB is adopting comment 2(a)(14)-4 substantially as proposed and is adopting § 1026.62(a) as proposed. As proposed, § 1026.62(a)(2) provided the definition of “overdraft credit” and the CFPB is finalizing it without change. The definition of “overdraft credit” does not include credit exempt from Regulation Z pursuant to existing § 1026.3 (
e.g.,
transactions in securities or commodities accounts in which credit is extended by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). Nor does the definition of “overdraft credit” cover prepaid accounts, as the CFPB's Prepaid Accounts Rule already provides comprehensive consumer protections tailored to prepaid accounts.

Arguments that overdraft is not credit under TILA or that TILA does not confer authority upon the CFPB to regulate overdraft are not supported by the statute itself. The final rule is consistent with TILA's definition of “credit”
121

and with the CFPB's statutory authority under TILA section 105(a).
122

121
15 U.S.C. 1602(f).

122
15 U.S.C. 1604(a).

TILA defines “credit” broadly and does not exclude overdraft. As stated in the 2016 Prepaid Final Rule, “[b]y authorizing or paying a transaction where the consumer does not have sufficient or available funds . . . to cover the amount of the transaction when the transaction is authorized or paid, the [institution] is allowing the consumer to incur a debt with the [institution] where payment of that debt is not immediate.”
123

Thus, when a transaction exceeds the funds in the consumer's account and a financial institution elects to cover the transaction by extending overdraft funds, then the financial institution has provided the consumer with the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment, and therefore has extended “credit” under the plain language of TILA's definition.
124

123
81 FR 83934, 84167-68 (Nov. 22, 2016).

124
15 U.S.C. 1602(f).

The fact that Congress did not legislatively supersede the Board's regulatory exception for overdraft does not demonstrate that overdraft is outside the scope of TILA. Rather, Congress provided a broad definition of “credit” under the statute and then delegated to the Board (and, later, the CFPB) the authority to prescribe regulations “to carry out the purposes of” TILA and which “may provide for such adjustments and exceptions . . . as in the judgment of the [agency] are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [TILA], to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.”
125

The Board used its delegated authority to create a regulatory exception from the definition of finance charge for certain overdraft fees and the CFPB is using its authority to narrow that exception.
126

125
15 U.S.C. 1604(a).

126
Commenters disagreed about whether the Board, in issuing the original regulatory exception for certain overdraft fees from TILA's definition of finance charge, was relying on its delegated authority to create adjustments and exceptions or was using its delegated rule-writing authority to implement an interpretation of a statutory provision of TILA. The Board's original 1969 issuance over 50 years ago was not explicit about what authority it used for the overdraft charge exception. 34 FR 2002, 2004 (Feb. 11, 1969). And it neither discussed policy rationales nor interpretation of statutory text. The proposal did, however, invoke the Board's exception authority generally. 33 FR 15506 (Oct. 18, 1968). The inclusion of a specific “exception” for overdraft charges that would have met the general definition of finance charge but for the exception, in a rule that did not state it was an interpretation or engage in textual interpretation, suggests the exception was not created as an interpretive exercise. Regardless, the CFPB has put forward its interpretation of the relevant provisions of TILA in

this rule and explained why the statute covers overdraft fees.

Commenters' assertion that the Board determined that discretionary overdraft is not “credit” conflates the definition of “credit” with the definition of “finance charge.” The history of Regulation Z and the Board's statements show that the Board excepted certain overdraft charges from Regulation Z's definition of “finance charge,” which would have been unnecessary if overdraft was not credit. The Board did not except overdraft from the definition of “credit.” Existing Regulation Z's definition of “finance charge” excepts overdraft charges “unless the payment of such items and the imposition of the charge were previously agreed upon in writing.”
127

But the fact that these charges were not considered “finance charges” under the regulation does not mean that the underlying overdrafts were not considered credit. For example, existing Regulation Z commentary acknowledges the existence of “incidental
credit
that is not extended under an agreement between the consumer and the financial institution.”
128

One example of such incidental “credit” in the overdraft context is “
credit
inadvertently extended incident to an electronic fund transfer using a debit card, . . . if the bank and the consumer do not have an agreement to extend credit when the consumer's account is overdrawn.”
129

Incidental overdraft credit remains “credit,” notwithstanding that the Board excepted the overdraft charges from Regulation Z's definition of “finance charge.”

127
12 CFR 1026.4(c)(3).

128
Regulation Z comment 13(i)-2 (emphasis added).

129

Id.
(emphasis added).

Regarding the 1977 interpretive letter cited by a commenter, the CFPB notes that the letter addresses whether certain overdraft charges are finance charges, not whether overdraft is credit.
130

Board staff did not exclude overdraft from the definition of “credit.” Rather, the

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2024-29699. Public record. Not legal advice.
